4.

G.R. No. L-1211             January 30, 1947

CHING HUAT, petitioner, 
vs.
CO HEONG (alias CO HONG, CO YONG

HILADO, J.:

CHING HUAT, petitioner, prays for the issuance of a writ of

habeas corpus directing any lawful officer to take from respondent
and produce before this Court the person of Maria Ching alias
Avelina Ching, allegedly aged 15 years, and requiring the
respondent to justify his right to the custody of said minor, and,
after hearing, to award said custody to petitioner.

Said minor had been living with and had under the custody of
petitioner; that respondent, taking advantage of his confidential
and spiritual relation with Maria Ching as her godfather,
persuaded and induced her by means of trick, promises and
cajolery, to leave the parental home and to elope with him in the
night of June 21, 1946, to Plaridel, Bulacan, where they were
married on the following day before the Justice of the Peace of
said municipality, said Maria Ching being at the time 15 years old;
and that ever since respondent has had the minor Maria Ching
under his custody in Malolos,

the civil marriage between respondent and Maria Ching having

been solemnized by the Justice of the Peace of Plaridel, Bulacan,
on June 21, 1946, is not disputed. Petitioner himself alleges in his
petition that respondent is of legal age, meaning 21 years or more
old upon the date of the petition, November 28, 1946. June 21,
1946, date of the marriage, was only 5 months and one week
earlier. Both man and woman were, therefore, of marriageable age
under section 2 of Act No.
The alleged marriage of respondent to Gue Min in China has not
been proven3613.Bulacan, and has restrained her at her liberty.

ISSUE: WON petitioner still retains his right to the custody of his
minor daughter Maria Ching alias Avelina Ching

RULING: YES,

The fact of the civil marriage between respondent and Maria

Ching having been solemnized by the Justice of the Peace of
Plaridel, Bulacan, on June 21, 1946, is not disputed. Petitioner
himself alleges in his petition that respondent is of legal age,
meaning 21 years or more old upon the date of the petition,
November 28, 1946. June 21, 1946, date of the marriage, was only
5 months and one week earlier. Both man and woman were,
therefore, of marriageable age under section 2 of Act No. 3613.

The alleged marriage of respondent to Gue Min in China has not

been proven

The cited section of the existing Marriage Law provides:

SEC. 19. Marriages performed abroad. — All marriages

performed outside of the Philippine Islands in accordance
with the laws in force in the country where they were
performed and valid there as such, shall also be valid in these
Islands.

the Philippine marriage between said respondent and Maria

Ching before the Justice of the Peace of Plaridel, Bulacan, is
undisputed. It is also beyond question that marriage was
contracted by a man much over 16 years old with a girl 15 years
old. Maria Ching having been validly married on June 21, 1946,
she became emancipated on that same da

by article 48 of Chapter V of the Spanish Marriage Law of 1870,

whose articles 44 to 78 were, and are now partly, in force in the
Philippines

the wife has the duty, among others, of living in her husband's
company and of following him to wherever he transfer his
domicile or residence.

After hearing, to award said custody to petitioner.

7.

[ GR No. L-18649, Feb 26, 1965 ]

CEBU PORTLAND CEMENT COMPANY v. CIR

121 Phil

BARRERA, J.

For the period of from April 16, 1957 to July 20, 1959, for the
cement it produced and sold, petitioner was assessed and paid  in
the total sum of P502,975.28

Petitioner contends that the collectible ad valorem tax should be

based on the actual market value of the quarried minerals that
were used in the production of cement; whereas, respondent
Commissioner of Internal Revenue maintains that, as the cement
produced by petitioner consists of 80% minerals, the same is a
mineral product.
ISSUE:

WON the petitioner claim the refund from overpayments

of ad valorem taxes

WON, ad valorem taxes be based on the selling price of the

cement and not on the value of the limestone and shale it quarried
and used in the production of the cement.

RULING: NO, cement is composed of 80% minerals, it is not

merely an admixture or blending of raw materials, as lime, silica,
shale and others. It is the result of a definite process-the crushing
of minerals, grinding, mixing, calcinging, cooling, adding
of retarder or raw gypsum. In short, before cement reaches its
saleable form, the minerals had already undergone a chemical
change through Manufacturing process. This could not have been
the state of "mineral products" that the law contemplates for
purposes of imposing the ad valoremtax. It must be remembered
that, as aforestated, this tax is imposed on the privilege of
extracting or severing the minerals from the mines. 

Also, that the taxes collected and paid two years before the filing
of the action in the Court of Tax Appeals are barred by
prescription, the same must be sustained. By specific provision of
Section 308 of the Internal Revenue Code, action for recovery of
tax payments erroneously or illegally collected must be filed
within 2 years from such payments. As the action in this case was
instituted only on October 16 1959, over payments made prior
to October 15, 1957 are no longer refundable.
NO, respondent cannot use the selling price of the product in this
case as gauge of its actual market value. The cement here is
manufactured by petitioner itself out of materials quarried from
its mines. While the selling price of cement may reflect the actual
market value of cement, said selling price cannot be taken as the
market value also of the minerals composing the cement. And it
was not the cement that was mined, only the minerals composing
the finished product.

10.

GR  178541          March 27, 2008

People vs. Zeta
Criminal Case Digest
Digested Cases
Criminal Law 

FACT:
On or about the 28th day of October 1995 in Quezon City, Angelo
Zeta and his wife Petronilla Zeta was found conspiring together,
confederating with and helping one another, with intent to kill,
attacked, assaulted and employed personal violence to Ramon
Garcia by shooting the latter with a .45 caliber pistol hitting him
on the different parts of his body which ultimately caused his
death.
The Regional Trial Court ruled that Ramon’s killing was attended
by the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and
nocturnity.
On December 24, 2002, Petronilla filed a Notice of Appeal with
the Regional Trial Court stating that there are no testimonial
evidence presented before the lower court that could sufficiently
served as justifiable basis to warrant the reversal of the appealed
decision rendered insofar as Petronilla is concerned but then
upon being informed of the health predicament of the
undersigned counsel, Petronilla voluntarily decided to withdraw
the appeal, the appeal is dismissed.

ISSUE:
                Whether or not there is aggravating circumstance of
evident premeditation in the commission of the crime.
HELD:
No, the court held that the aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation cannot be appreciated. Evident premeditation
qualifies the killing of a person to murder if the following evidence
are present: (a) the time when the offender determined to commit
the crime; (b)an act manifestly indicating that the culprit clung to
his resolve; and (c) a sufficient interval of the time between the
determination or conception and the execution of the crime to
allow him to reflect upon the consequence of his act and to allow
his conscience to overcome the resolution of his will if he desired
to hearken to its warning.

In the case at bar, the third element of premeditation is lacking.

The span of 30 minutes or half an hour from the time appellant
shot Ramon could not have afforded them full opportunity for
meditation and reflection on the consequences of the crime they
committed. The court held that the lapse of 30 minutes between
the determination to commit a crime and the execution is
insufficient for a full meditation on the consequences of the act.

11.

[ GR No. L-332, Jun 18, 1947 ]

ALEJANDRO R. SANTOS v. CATALINA DE ALVAREZ 

78 Phil. 503

Alejandro R. Santos filed a suit in ejectment for the premises

designated as No. 22, Altura Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila, occupied
since September 1942 by

Catalina de Alvarez, Carlos Tanseco, and Manuel Alvarez. This

appeal is now from the judgment of the Court of First Instance
wherein defendants Alvarez et al

according to his testimony reiterated in his brief, wishes to secure

the premises for his two sons or near relatives.

ISSUE: WON that the appellants should be ejected from

the property

Rulings: NO,

Under Section 2 of Republic Act No. 66, amending

Commonwealth Act No. 689 , provides that a lessee cannot be
ejected even for non-payment of rents, where such non-payment
is not willful and deliberate and the lessor does not need the
property for himself and the lessee has never subleased it without
authority

Defendant is unable to pay on time the agreed rents because of

poverty or of any other circumstance beyond his control cannot,
under the present law, be ejected from the leased property

It is expressly ordained by said law that "no lessee or occupant

shall be ejected in cases other than for willful and deliberate non-
payment of rents," a negative and all-inclusive expression which is
mandatory and embraces within its protection all lessees and
occupants without distinction at the time the law was passed. The
only exceptions to the rule as above indicated are (1) when the
lessee or occupant subleased the property without the consent of
the lessor; (2) when there has been willful and deliberate non-
payment of rents; or (3) when the lessor has to occupy the
building leased. Under the facts of the instant case, the first and
second exceptions cannot be invoked As regards the third, the
lessor "has to occupy the building leased." It does not apply when
the lessor needs the building for others.the need contemplated by
law is only the lessor's need. His sons or near relatives are not the
lessors

12

GR No. 25386, Oct 20, 1926 ]

ASIATIC PETROLEUM CO. v. A. LLANES

49 Phil. 466

STREET, J.:

Facts:

Government leased to Asiatic Petroleum Co.  (P. L), for the term
of fifty years a piece of land, having an area of one and one-half
hectares, situated adjacent to the Island of Mactan, municipality
of Opon, Province of Cebu, said island being at a distance of about
600 meters from  the  landing place of the port of Cebu.

At the time of the making of the lease, the land referred to was 
accustomed to be covered by water at high tide; but  it was needed
by  the lessee as a site for  tanks to be used in the storage of
petroleum.  In order to reclaim the site  and protect the
improvements thereon from the sea, it was necessary for the
company to build a concrete and cement foundation, protected by
retaining walls of the same material.

ISSUE: WON the leased land be exempted from tax

Ruling:

YES, Improvements are taxable  separately in  this jurisdiction

and there  is neither difficulty nor injustice in allowing the tax
laws  to operate against the owner of the improvements, while
relieving it from liability for the tax on the land.

It is quite clear that the lessee is not liable for the tax assessed
against  it with respect to the land which  is the subject 

Whether the plaintiff was liable for the tax assessed against it
upon the value of the  improvements which it placed upon Shell
Island is a question which is governed by different
considerations.lease.  That  land  is  the  property  of the
Government; and section 344 of the  Administrative Code
especially exempts from local taxation

improvements consist of oil tanks, wharf, warehouse, pump

house, and sheds, together with an office and residence building
and coolie quarters

are not public improvements, but are of  a  private nature,

constructed for the use of the  lessee  in conducting its business as
a purveyor of coal oil.  Said improvements belong to the lessee
and will remain its property until the termination of the lease

20

GR. NO. 161921, July 17, 2013

Joyce Ardiente v. Spouses Javier and Ma. Theresa
Pastorfide, Cagayan De Oro Water District and Gaspar
Gonzales, Jr.

FACTS:

Ma. Theresa Pastorfide entered a MOA with Joyce Ardiente where

the latter sold, conveyed, and transferred all their rights and
interests in the Emily Homes Housing unit to the former. It has
been agreed by the parties that the water bill will remain in the
account of Ardiente. On March 12, 1999, Ma. Theresa's water
supply was disconnected without notice. She complained to the
Cagayan De Oro Water District (COWD) and she found out that
the account has become delinquent. She paid the three months
due and wrote a letter through her counsel to the COWD to
explain why her water supply was cut without notice.

The general manager of the COWD, Gaspar Gonzalez, replied that

it was Joyce Ardiente who requested the disconnection of the
water supply. A complaint for damages was filed against Ardiente,
COWD and Gonzalez by Ma. Theresa. The RTC ruled in favor of
Ma. Theresa on the ground that the defendants committed abuse
of their rights. The ruling was upheld by the CA on appeal with
modification on the award of the amount for damages.Hence this
petition before the SC.

ISSUE:

Are the defendants liable for damages?

RULING:

Yes. The court ruled that the principle of abuse of rights under
Section 19 of the Civil Code was violated. It provides that "every
person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone
his due, and observe honesty and good faith."  

A right, although it is legal for being recognized by law as such,

may nevertheless become the source of illegality (Globe Mackay
and Radio Corporation v CA), when it is exercised in a manner
that does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and
the same causes damage to another. The person exercising an
abuse of right is thus liable for damages caused to another. The
herein petitioner is liable for damages by ordering the cutting of
the water supply of the respondent without giving notice about
such intention. The COWD and Gonzalez are likewise liable for
damages by disconnecting the water supply without prior notice
and for their subsequent neglect of reconnecting the water supply
even when the respondent already paid the delinquent account. 
23.

G.R. No. 188767               July 24, 2013

SPOUSES ARGOVAN AND FLORIDA

GADITANO, Petitioners, 
vs.
SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION

PEREZ, J.

Petitioner Spouses Argovan Gaditano (Argovan) and Florida

Gadiano (Florida), who were engaged in the business of buying
and selling beer and softdrinks products, purchased beer products
from San Miguel Corporation (SMC) in the amount of ₱285,
504.00 on 7 April 2000. Petitioners paid through a check signed
by Florida and drawn against Argovan’s Asia Trust Bank Current
Account. When said check was presented for payment on 13 April
2000, the check was dishonored for having been drawn against
insufficient funds. Despite three (3) written demands,1petitioner
failed to make good of the check. This prompted SMC to file a
criminal case for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and estafa
against petitioners, docketed as I.S. No. 01-4205 with the Office of
the Prosecutor in Quezon City on 14 March 2001.

Petitioners assert that the issues they have raised in the civil
action constitute a bar to the

SMC filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ) a petition for

review challenging the Resolutions of the Office of the Prosecutor.
In a Resolution dated 3 June 2004, the DOJ dismissed the
petition. SMC filed a motion for reconsideration, which the DOJ
Secretary denied in a Resolution dated 15 December 2004.

Undaunted, SMC went up to the Court of Appeals by filling a

petition for certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 88431. On 11
March 2008, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision granting
the petition prosecution of the criminal case for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 and estafa.

As RULE 65, Rules of Court, states

Section 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any tribunal, board or

officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted
without or in excess its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is
no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or
modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and
granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

The SC agrees that the Court of Appeals that the DOJ abused its
discretion when it affirmed the prosecutor’s suspension of the
criminal investigation due to the existence of an alleged
prejudicial question.
A prejudicial question generally comes into play in a situation
where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending and
there exists in the former an issue which must be preemptively
resolved before the latter may proceed, because howsoever the
issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative
juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the
criminal case. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial
question is to avoid two conflicting decisions

ISSUE : whether of not the petitioner is guilty of estafa and

violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, while in the civil case, it is
whether AsiaTrust Bank had lawfully garnished the ₱378,000.00
from petitioners’ savings account.

The the most serious part of the offense punished by Batas

Pambansa Blg. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless
check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for
payment.13 Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 punishes the mere act of
issuing a worthless check. The law did not look either at the actual
ownership of the check or of the account against which it was
made, drawn, or issued, or at the intention of the drawee, maker
or issuer.14 The thrust of the law is to prohibit the making of
worthless checks and putting them into circulation
Even if the trial court in the civil case declares Asia Trust Bank
liable for the unlawful garnishment of petitioners’ savings
account, petitioners cannot be automatically adjudged free from
criminal liability for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, because
the mere issuance of worthless checks with knowledge of the
insufficiency of funds to support the checks is in itself the offense
Furthermore, three notices of dishonor were sent to petitioners,
who then, should have immediately funded the check. When they
did not, their liabilities under the bouncing checks law attached.
Such liability cannot be affected by the alleged prejudicial
question because their failure to fund the check upon notice of
dishonour is itself the offense. There is no necessity that the civil
case be determined firrst before taking up the criminal
complaints. The issue raised in the civil action is not
determinative or the guilt or innocence of the accused in the
criminal investigation against them.

Petition was, DENIED

25.

G.R. No. L-5921            July 25, 1911

THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY OF NEW

YORK, plaintiff-appellee, 
vs.
JUAN CODINA ARENAS AND OTHERS, defendants;
VICENTE SIXTO VILLANUEVA, appellant.

EN BANC
ARELLANO, C.J.:

On December 15, 1908, Juan Codina Arenas and Francisco Lara

del Pino, as principals, and Alipio Locso, Vicente Sixto Villanueva
and the Chinaman, Siy Ho, as sureties, assumed the obligation to
pay, jointly and severally, to the corporation, The Standard Oil
Company of New York, the sum of P3,305. 76, at three months
from date, with interest at P1 per month.

On April 5, 1909, The Standard Oil Company of New York sued

the said five debtors for payment of the P3,305.76, together with
the interest thereon at the rate of 1 per cent per month from the
15th of December, 1908, and the costs.

On August 28, 1909, the Court of First Instance of the city of

Manila sentenced all the defendants to pay jointly and severally to
the plaintiff company the sum of P3,305.76, together with the
interest thereon at 1 per cent per month from December 15, 1908,
until complete payment should have been made of the principal,
and to pay the costs.
While the judgment was in the course of execution, Elisa Torres
de Villanueva, the wife of Vicente Sixto Villanueva, appeared and
alleged:
(1) That on July 24, 1909, the latter was declared to be insane by
the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila;
(2) that she was appointed his guardian by the same court;
(3) that, on October 11, following, she was authorized by the court,
as guardian, to institute the proper legal proceedings for the
annulment of several bonds given by her husband while in a state
of insanity, among them that concerned in the present cause,
issued in behalf of The Standard Oil Company of New York;
(4) that she, the guardian, was not aware of the proceedings had
against her husband and was only by chance informed thereof;
(5) that when Vicente S. Villanueva gave the bond, the subject of
this suit, he was already permanently insane, was in that state
when summoned and still continued so, for which reason he
neither appeared nor defended himself in the said litigation; and,
in conclusion, she petitioned the court to relieve the said
defendant Villanueva from compliance with the aforestated
judgment rendered against him in the suit before mentioned, and
to reopen the trial for the introduction of evidence in behalf of the
said defendant with respect to his capacity at the time of the
execution of the bond in question, which evidence could not be
presented in due season on account of the then existing incapacity
of the defendant.
ISSUE : WON the appellant is insane and should exempted from
the obligations that was charged to him

RULING: NO, The lower court founded its judgment on the basis
of the medico-legal doctrine which supports the conclusion that
such monomania of wealth does not necessarily imply the result
that the defendant Villanueva was not a person capable of
executing a contract of bond like the one here in question.

The trial court, although it conceded as a fact that the defendant

had for several years suffered from such monomania, decided,
however, guided by the medico-legal doctrine above cited, that a
person's believing himself to be what he is not or his taking a mere
illusion for a reality is not necessarily a positive proof of insanity
or incapacity to bind himself in a contract.
Capacity to act must be supposed to attach to a person who has
not previously been declared incapable, and such capacity is
presumed to continue so long as the contrary be not proved, that
is, that at the moment of his acting he was incapable, crazy,
insane, or out his mind: which, in the opinion of this court, has
not been proved in this case.
There is no proof that the said bond was merely the product of an
insensate ostentation of wealth, nor that, if Villanueva boasted of
wealth in giving several bonds, among them that herein
concerned, he was influenced only by the monomania of boasting
of being wealthy, when he was not.
30.

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-11973 June 30, 1959

FELIPE M. ROLDAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. PHILIPPINE

VETERANS BOARD, ET AL.,Defendants-Appellees.

MONTEMAYOR, J.: 
Facts:
Plaintiff Roldan is appealing the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, dismissing his complaint on the ground that
the action brought against the members of the Philippine
Veterans Board, which was a mere agency of the government, was
in effect a suit against the state and that it was done without its
consent
Roldan was a first grade Civil Service eligible, Defendant Antonio
F. Garcia, acting Administrative Officer of the Philippine Veterans
Board of which he was a member and signing for the Chairman
ordered him to vacate his present position for the reason of Sec. 6
of Republic Act 728, which states that "no person shall be
appointed or reinstated in the service when he is already fifty
seven years of age.
Roldan was then 57 so has was ordered that his services in the
Board will terminate effective, March 25, 1954.
So, Roldan was separated from the service on March 25, 1954 and
his place Juan Domingo was appointed. Roldan initiated Quo
Warranto proceedings against Domingo in Civil Case No. 25603
The trial court in said case decided in favor of Roldan, declaring
his ouster to have been illegal.
For the period of about 18 months that he was out of the service
due to his separation therefrom on March 25, 1954, Roldan filed
the present action against the Philippine Veterans Board and its
five members to recover his back wages during said period plus
moral damages in the amount of P5,000.00 including P600.00
for attorney's fees. 
ISSUE: WON the appelant can file action against the Philippine
Veterans Board and its five members to recover his back wages.

RULING:NO, the Philippine Veterans Board was created and

functioned under the Department of National Defense. It is also a
mere agency of the government. It is not a body corporate and
politic in deed and in law, incapable of suing or being
sued.chanrobl
the Philippine Veterans Board is a juridical entity.

ART. 44. The following are juridical persons:chanrobles virtual

law library

(1) The state and its political subdivisions;chanrobles virtual law

library

(2) Other corporation, institutions and entities for public interest

or purpose, created by law; their personality begins as soon as
they have been constituted according to law;chanrobles virtual
law library

(3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for private

interest or purpose to which the law grants a juridical personality,
separate and distinct from that of each shareholder, partner or
member.

No charge can be made against the Philippine Veterans Board or

against its members for the reason that the board member acting
as chairman in affecting the separation of Roldan from the
service, assuming the same to be illegal, acted officially and in the
name of the government. Naturally, any judgment in favor of
Roldan would mean a charge to or a liability against the
Philippine Government.chanroblesvirtua