Lingua 120 (2010) 2657–2660

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Lingua
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/lingua

Nihilism masquerading as progress

Klaus Abels, Ad Neeleman *
Research Department of Linguistics, Division of Psychology and Language Sciences, UCL, Chandler House, 2 Wakefield Street, London WC1N 1PF, UK

A R T I C L E I N F O

Article history:
Received 29 January 2010
Accepted 5 March 2010
Available online 28 April 2010

1. Progress by fiat

We begin by defining the content of a theory: the content of a theory increases with the number of empirical states of
affairs that it excludes. A theory that does not forbid anything has no content. To forbid certain states of affairs is equivalent
to making a universal claim (¬∃xф⇔ɐx¬ф).
Applied to linguistics this means that the content of a theory of what is a possible human language lies in the number of
logically possible languages that it forbids. For example, the universal claim that if the pronominal object follows the verb,
then the nominal object follows the verb (Greenberg, 1963:91, Universal 25) rules out languages in which nominal objects
precede and pronominal objects follow the verb. Therefore, a theory from which this universal can be derived has more
content than a theory does not make a connection between the positioning of nominal and pronominal objects. A linguistic
theory that does not put any limits at all on the properties that a language might have has no content.
Evans and Levinson (2009; henceforth E&L) claim that there are no interesting language universals: ‘‘decades of cross-
linguistic work by typologists and descriptive linguists [. . .] show [. . .] just how few and unprofound the universal
characteristics of language are’’ (E&L:429).
What this extraordinary claim implies is that the data are such that no contentful theory of the notion of a possible
language can be formulated. If true, this would be a lethal blow to the generative enterprise, which attempts to develop
exactly such a theory and to which such diverse frameworks as Government and Binding Theory, Lexical Functional
Grammar, Head Driven Phrase Structure Grammar, and Tree Adjoining Grammar belong. These theories are very different in
their styles of analysis, but share the common goal of finding a contentful theory of the limits of natural language.
What compels E&L to make their far-reaching claim, as far as we can tell, is the existence of counterexamples to most, if
not all, descriptive universals as currently formulated. Not all linguists are equally impressed by the mere existence of
counterexamples. Indeed, as E&L point out in their reply to peer commentary, there is a ‘‘deep rift in contemporary linguistics
between Chomskyans and the rest, which ultimately rests on different judgments about the interlocking of theory and
evidence’’ (pp. 476–477).
The reason that many linguists are unpersuaded by the mere existence of counterexamples lies in the fact that there is a
fundamental difference between the assumptions on which a theory rests and the empirical generalizations known as
universals. A counterexample to a universal can, in fact, be a confirmation of the theoretical assumptions used to explain it.

* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: a.neeleman@ucl.ac.uk (A. Neeleman).

0024-3841/$ – see front matter ß 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.lingua.2010.03.008
2658 K. Abels, A. Neeleman / Lingua 120 (2010) 2657–2660

(Nevins (2009:462) points out an example of this in biology.) We will illustrate this apparently paradoxical statement using
the universal about the relative order of pronominal and full objects with respect to the verb.
There is work on the distribution of pronouns compared to that of full objects that sheds some light on Greenberg’s
observation. It has been argued for many of the European languages that all objects are generated in the same position, but
that pronominal objects in a number of languages undergo a process of movement that does not apply to full nominal
objects. Movement displaces a category from its original position to a position further to the left.
Taking these theoretical assumptions to be valid beyond the European languages, we can explain the empirical
generalization captured by Greenberg’s universal 25 through variation in the position of the verb. If the verb follows the full
object, it will also follow the pronominal object, whether it has moved or not. On the other hand, if the verb precedes the full
object, there are two possibilities: it may be sandwiched between the surface position of moved pronominal objects and that of
full nominal objects, or it may precede both pronominal and full nominal objects. If we limit ourselves to the operations just
described, the fourth logical possibility is ruled out: a language in which full nominal objects precede the verb while pronominal
objects follow. This possibility is ruled out because it would either require movement of the pronominal object to be rightward
or the full object to move while the pronominal object remains in place. Notice that this captures the content of Greenberg’s
universal 25.
According to the universals archive (http://typo.uni-konstanz.de/archive) there is no known counterexample to universal
25. (We rely on this archive because the World Atlas of Language Structures (Haspelmath et al., 2005) does not contain
information about the position of pronominal objects.) However, suppose a language were discovered in which universal 25
is violated. E&L would consider this discovery a direct refutation of the proposed theory. The perspective from our side of the
rift is somewhat different. The assumptions on which the theory rests dictate a specific analysis of the counterexample. In the
language in question, the unit consisting of the verb and the base-position of all objects (position B in example (1)) must have
undergone movement across the surface position of pronominal objects (position A in example (1)). To derive the order in
question, the movement of the object–verb unit must be subsequent to the movement of the pronominal object.

(1) a. A. . .[B. . .V]

b. [B. . .V]. . .A. . .

In the literature movement of a category that has been vacated by movement of another constituent is known as remnant
movement. The proposed theory would therefore predict that languages that violate universal 25 have a very specific profile.
First, pronominal objects must move in such languages. Second, the language must have movement of VP, the unit containing
position B and the verb. This profile makes specific empirical predictions, some of which are quite intricate. These involve the
ordering of adverbials in the postverbal domain as well as the relative order of pronominal objects and elements such as verbal
particles and resultatives, all of which bear a great affinity to the verb and are generated in close proximity to it.
If languages that counterexemplify universal 25 indeed have these properties, that would in fact be a triumph for the
proposed theory. It is only when counterexemplifying languages do not fit the predicted profile that the theory is refuted. So
from our perspective, refutation of a universal is not in itself interesting. The question is how the properties of the language
that refutes it bear on the theory that is intended to explain the universal.1
These comments are not just abstract ruminations. Another universal (Greenberg’s number 20) has been subject to close
scrutiny since the publication of Greenberg’s paper more than 40 years ago. This universal describes cross-linguistic
variation in the order of demonstratives, numerals, descriptive adjectives, and nouns within the noun phrase. Over the years
several counterexamples to the original formulation of universal 20 have accumulated. The research strategy recommended
by E&L would seem to be that one give up on the universal and assume that any word order is permitted in the noun phrase.
Neither typological nor theoretical work on the subject has ever followed this strategy. Early attempts to explain the
universal were as much subject to counterexemplification as the universal itself. However, analysis of some of the
counterexamples led to a revised theory that correctly predicted that exceptions to the original formulation of the universal
would fall in a specific class: out of the 24 logically possible relative orders of demonstrative, numeral, adjective, and noun
only 14 are admitted (for details see Cinque, 2005). Interestingly, some of the components of Cinque’s proposal are identical
to the suggestions we made in connection to universal 25 (such as the claim that movement is leftward). Thus, a pairing of
typological and theoretical research gave rise to a correction of Greenberg’s universal that is unchallenged to date.
We do not wish to suggest that this new universal is the ultimate statement of the facts, but it is certainly closer to the
truth than Greenberg’s original suggestion, which in turn is much closer to the truth than saying that anything goes. We can
quantify this claim. If a description scores a point for every pattern it correctly predicts to exist, and gets a point taken off for
every prohibition it fails to capture, Cinque’s theory scores 14 out of 14, Greenberg’s universal 20 in its original form scores
10 out of 14 (on its interpretation in Hawkins, 1983), and the suggestion that there are no restrictions on word order in the
noun phrase scores 4 out of 14.) Giving up on universals thus leads to regression rather than progress.
To sum up, E&L’s claim that there cannot be a contentful theory of the notion possible language seems defeatist to us and
unjustified in view of developments in the field. Of course, E&L would not describe their own work as defeatist and they do
advocate an alternative approach to the study of language.

1
For related discussion on the placement of pronouns in Irish and Gaelic, see Adger, 2007 and references mentioned there.
 K. Abels, A. Neeleman / Lingua 120 (2010) 2657–2660 2659

2. Promises, promises. . .

Although there is much that we do not fully understand about the alternative proposed by E&L, one of its main selling
points appears to be the connection with adjacent fields such as biology and psychology. This, however, cannot be the core of
the ‘‘New Synthesis,’’ as from its inception it has been a stated aim of Chomskyan linguistics to connect to the very same
fields. As Jenkins (2000) points out, Chomsky said during an interview in 1968 that linguistics ‘‘is really a theoretical biology,
if you like, a theoretical psychology’’ (Sklar, 1968:217). More recent work still adopts this stance (see, for example, Chomsky,
2005; Hauser et al., 2002.). It is also hardly a new idea to consider language in the light of Darwinian evolution (see Larson
et al., 2010 and references given there).
Perhaps the main difference between the generative approach and the alternative advocated by E&L is stated in their
thesis 6 (p. 446): ‘‘Language [. . .] exploit[s] pre-existing brain machinery, which continues to do other things to this day.’’
Instead, E&L adopt Philip Lieberman’s hypothesis that the crucial factor in language evolution was the lowering of the vocal
tract (see, for example, Lieberman, 1975, 2006). They write that ‘‘[t]he null hypothesis is that all needed brain mechanisms,
outside the vocal-tract adaptation for speech, were co-opted from pre-existing adaptations not specific to language’’ (p. 447).
Most if not all of E&L’s other theses flow relatively naturally from this claim.
Inherent in thesis 6 is a research program that aims to unify linguistics with general cognitive science. The properties of
language are to be explained in terms of the properties of other brain mechanisms. The aim of unification is of course
laudable and if successful, it would certainly persuade generativists to give up the thesis of the existence of a dedicated
language module. Indeed, there is some work within generative grammar that aims to unify certain aspects of language with
other mental capacities. An example is the research on the relation between language and music reported on in Lerdahl and
Jackendoff (1983), Jackendoff and Lerdahl (2006), Jackendoff (2009), Pesetsky (No year), and Katz and Pesetsky (2009). These
authors develop explicit theories of grammar and of music and consider to what extent these are the same or fundamentally
different. Their conclusions vary in that Katz and Pesetsky go much further in unifying syntax and music than do Lerdahl and
Jackendoff, but all provide well-worked out analyses pointing to at least a certain degree of similarity.
There is a logic to unification. In order to show that two fields of study can be reduced to one, the researcher must begin by
adopting a stance of what one might call ‘‘methodological modularity.’’ The starting point must be a detailed analysis of each
of the two fields in its own terms. Unification can then be defined as an analysis of the analyses, an evaluation of the degree to
which the theories of the two fields can be derived from a single set of principles. (One variant of this is reduction of one field
to the other, where one theory is entailed fully by the other.) Perhaps the best-known example of unification involves
chemistry and physics.
The example of chemistry and physics demonstrates that the road to unification is long and hard, and that it is a great
triumph when it is achieved. As Popper (1979:290–295) points out, we rob ourselves of this triumph if we do not adopt the
stance of methodological modularity, but simply declare that two fields are one and the same. Doing so constitutes what
Lakatos (1978) calls a ‘‘degenerative problem shift.’’ A simple declaration of identity is degenerative because it is achieved by
giving up on a contentful theory of at least one of the fields that are declared to be the same. In our view E&L’s program of
research comes dangerously close to a unification by declaration of linguistics with other branches of cognitive science.
Of course if one tries to say anything about language, methodological modularity is unavoidable. In those passages where
E&L sketch their own perspective on linguistic phenomena, they adopt a universalist and modular approach comparable to
that of generative grammar. For example, E&L suggest that the notion of subject is too coarse-grained to capture the attested
variety in the languages of the world and therefore propose a decomposition of this notion into ‘‘pivot,’’ ‘‘topic,’’ and ‘‘agent.’’
(A pivot is defined on page 440 as ‘‘the syntactic broker around which many grammatical properties coalesce.’’) These three
notions may coincide in certain constructions and/or languages, giving rise to the archetypal subject, and diverge in others.
Although ‘‘agent’’ might be a notion relevant to other areas of cognitive science, ‘‘pivot’’ and ‘‘topic’’ seem to be specific to
language and, as far as we can tell from E&L’s discussion, universal.2
So, if E&L are serious about the unification of linguistics with other areas of cognitive science, what they owe us is a
detailed argument that the notions of ‘‘pivot,’’ ‘‘topic,’’ and ‘‘agent’’ can be reduced to notions relevant to other mental
faculties. But such an argument is lacking. Instead, all that is offered elsewhere, in thesis 4, is a research initiative that
pervasive properties of human languages should be investigated with the aim of explaining – in terms of language use and
other properties of the mind – why they are ‘‘attractors.’’ On our reading, then, E&L’s new synthesis is no more than a
collection of promises unlikely to be fulfilled. No progress has been made.

References

Adger, D., 2007. Pronouns postpose at PF. Linguistic Inquiry 38, 343–349.
Chomsky, N., 2005. Three factors in language design. Linguistic Inquiry 36, 1–22.
Cinque, G., 2005. Deriving Greenberg’s universal 20 and its exceptions. Linguistic Inquiry 36, 315–332.
Evans, N., Levinson, S., 2009. The myth of language universals: language diversity and its importance for cognitive science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32,
429–492.

2
The observation that a monolithic cross-linguistically invariant notion of subject won’t do is not foreign to generativist work, nor is the concomitant
strategy of decomposing the notion (see McCloskey, 1997). The primitives proposed by McCloskey are different from those proposed by E&L, but the
research strategy is the same.
2660 K. Abels, A. Neeleman / Lingua 120 (2010) 2657–2660

Greenberg, J., 1963. Some universals of grammar with particular reference to the order of meaningful elements. In: Greenberg, J. (Ed.), Universals of
Language. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, pp. 73–113.
Haspelmath, M., Dryer, M.S., Gil, D., Comrie, B. (Eds.), 2005. The World Atlas of Language Structures. OUP, Oxford.
Hauser, M., Chomsky, N., Fitch, T., 2002. The faculty of language: What is it, who has it, and how did it evolve? Science 298, 1569–1579.
Hawkins, J.A., 1983. Word Order Universals. Quantitative Analyses of Linguistic Structure. Academic Press, New York/London.
Jackendoff, R., 2009. Parallels and nonparallels between language and music. Music Perception 26, 195–204.
Jackendoff, R., Lerdahl, F., 2006. The human music capacity: What is it and what’s special about it? Cognition 100, 33–72.
Jenkins, L., 2000. Biolinguistics: Exploring the Biology of Language. CUP, Cambridge.
Katz, J., Pesetsky, D., 2009. The identity thesis for language and music. Ms. MIT (Downloadable from http://ling.auf.net/lingBuzz/000959).
Lakatos, I., 1978. The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes: Philosophical Papers, vol. 1. CUP, Cambridge.
Larson, R., Deprez, V., Giannakidou, A. (Eds.), 2010. The Evolution of Human Language: Biolinguistic Perspectives. CUP, Cambridge.
Lerdahl, F., Jackendoff, R., 1983. A Generative Theory of Tonal Music. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Lieberman, P., 1975. On the Origins of Language: An Introduction to the Evolution of Speech. MacMillan, New York.
Lieberman, P., 2006. Toward an Evolutionary Biology of Language. Harvard University Press, Cambridge and London.
McCloskey, J., 1997. Subjecthood and subject positions. In: Haegeman, L. (Ed.), Elements of Grammar: Handbook in Generative Syntax. Kluwer Academic
Publishers, Dordrecht, pp. 197–235.
Nevins, A., 2009. On formal universals in phonology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32, 461–462.
Pesetsky, D., No year. Same recipe, different ingredients: music syntax is language syntax. Unpublished manuscript. MIT.
Popper, K., 1979. Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach. Clarendon Press, Oxford (Revised edition; first published in 1972).
Sklar, R., 1968. Chomsky’s revolution in linguistics. The Nation September, 213–217.