121

Psychology and Psychotherapy: Theory, Research and Practice (2004), 77, 121–133
© 2004 The British Psychological Society

www.bps.org.uk

Effect of the destructive disagreement belief

on relationship satisfaction with a romantic
partner or closest friend

Duncan Cramer*
Department of Social Sciences, Loughborough University, UK

This study tested the rational-emotive-behaviour theory hypothesis that, when imagin-
ing having a serious disagreement with one’s romantic partner or closest friend,
imagining believing the rational belief that disagreement is not destructive will lead to
less dissatisfaction with either relationship than imagining endorsing the irrational belief
that disagreement is destructive. The in uence of demand characteristics on such an
effect was assessed with two counter-demand control conditions. Undergraduates (106
women and 44 men) were assigned randomly to one of Ž ve conditions in a pretest/post-
test design. The belief appeared to be effectively manipulated. Post-test relationship
satisfaction was signiŽ cantly higher in the rational condition than in the control or
irrational condition. These results were not affected by the counter-demand instruc-
tions and suggest that this rational belief may reduce relationship dissatisfaction during
disagreements.

The idea that certain beliefs exacerbate feelings is a central tenet of theories such as
rational-emotive-behaviour therapy (e.g. Ellis, 1962) and cognitive therapy (e.g. Beck,
1976). This idea has been used to explain dissatisfaction with romantic and marital
relationships and to help those with such relationship problems (e.g. Baucom & Epstein,
1990; Ellis & Harper, 1961). One way of specifying such beliefs is in terms of particular
beliefs. For example, Ellis and Harper (1961) have suggested that marital dissatisfaction
can be increased by holding one or more of the following ®ve beliefs:
(a) the dire need for love;
(b) perfectionism is achievement;

* Correspondence should be addressed to Duncan Cramer, Department of Social Sciences, Loughborough University,
Loughborough, Leicestershire LE11 3TU, UK (e-mail: d.cramer@lboro.ac.uk).
122 Duncan Cramer
(c) a philosophy of blame and punishment;
(d) catastrophizing frustrations; and
(e) emotions are uncontrollable.
These kinds of beliefs have been referred to variously as being unrealistic, irrational or
dysfunctional as opposed to being realistic, rational or functional.
Subsequently, Eidelson and Epstein (1982) proposed ®ve irrational beliefs that were
speci®c to the relationship itself and could reduce relationship satisfaction. These ®ve
beliefs were:
(a) disagreement is destructive;
(b) mindreading is expected;
(c) partners cannot change;
(d) sexual perfectionism; and
(e) the sexes are different.
The belief that disagreement is destructive has been found to be the most strongly
associated with marital dissatisfaction, as has been shown by others (Kurdek & Schmitt,
1986; MoÈller & Van Zyl, 1991). This belief is referred to here as the `destructive
disagreement belief ’ or, more simply, `destructive disagreement’. This belief was based
on Satir’s (1967) notion that maritally distressed couples may think that disagreement
over preferences, habits, expectations and opinions indicates their partner does not
love them. Consequently, they feel more dissatis®ed with the relationship.
The association between the destructive disagreement belief and relationship
dissatisfaction does not necessarily imply that this belief brings about increased
dissatisfaction. It is possible that greater disagreement in the relationship leads to
greater dissatisfaction with the relationship which, in turn, brings about a stronger
endorsement of the belief that disagreement is destructive. If this is the case, the belief is
the result of disagreement in the relationship. Of course, it is possible that both causal
sequences operate. The destructive disagreement belief may lead to relationship
dissatisfaction when there is disagreement, and disagreement may bring about this
belief.
Cramer (2002) sought to determine whether the irrational belief that disagreement is
destructive leads to more relationship dissatisfaction when having a serious disagree-
ment with one’s closest friend than the rational belief that disagreement is not
destructive. An attempt to manipulate these beliefs was made by asking participants
to imagine saying and believing eight irrational or rational statements while imagining
having a serious disagreement with their closest friend. This method was based on
Velten’s (1968) mood induction procedure, which has been widely used (Westermann,
Spies, Stahl & Hesse, 1996). It has also been employed to manipulate irrational and
rational beliefs (Cramer & Buckland, 1995; Cramer & Fong, 1991; Cramer & Kupshik,
1993; Rosin & Nelson, 1983). The attempt to manipulate the destructive disagreement
belief appeared to be successful in that the endorsement of this belief was signi®cantly
higher in the disagreement is destructive condition than in the control condition, which
 Effect of destructive disagreement belief 123
in turn was signi®cantly higher than in the disagreement is not destructive condition.
This technique may appear to be rather simple and super®cial. However, while shorter
in duration, it is similar to behaviour therapy techniques such as systematic desensitiza-
tion and ¯ooding in imagination, in which patients are requested to imagine being in
certain situations. Behavioural interventions including these techniques have been
shown to be effective in treating various psychological problems (e.g. Mathews et al.,
1976; Shaw, 1979).
The irrational and rational statements were phrased in terms of the ®rst four of the
following ®ve characteristics which Ellis (e.g. 1962) has suggested underlies irrational
thinking:

(1) The belief that our desires and wishes should and ought to be met as opposed to
the rational belief that it is desirable and preferable that they be met.
(2) The inclination to exaggerate the way we feel when our desires are not ful®lled.
(3) The tendency to overgeneralize about events in the sense that what has happened
has always occurred in the past or will always occur in the future.
(4) The inclination globally to evaluate objects and events in the world as opposed to
evaluating speci®c aspects of them.
(5) The predisposition not to check the inferences that we make about the world.

The last characteristic was not included because it appears to be more dif®cult to
manipulate.
Relationship dissatisfaction was found to be signi®cantly higher in the destructive
disagreement condition than in the control condition and the non-destructive disagree-
ment condition, implying that this belief may bring about greater dissatisfaction.
However, relationship dissatisfaction was not signi®cantly lower in the non-destructive
disagreement condition than in the control condition. This ®nding suggests that
believing that disagreement is not destructive may not reduce relationship dissatisfac-
tion. This interpretation is based on the assumption that some of the participants in the
control condition will believe that disagreement is destructive and so participants in the
control condition as a whole should be more dissatis®ed than those asked to believe that
disagreement is not destructive.
If this ®nding holds more generally, it suggests that people who are dissatis®ed with a
close relationship may not be helped to be less dissatis®ed as a result of being
encouraged to believe that disagreement is not destructive. In other words, empirical
support for cognitive approaches to helping relationships, such as rational-emotive-
behaviour therapy, needs to show that relationship dissatisfaction can be reduced by
holding rational beliefs about disagreement. The relationship between participants’
own beliefs and the manipulation of their beliefs was not investigated.
One explanation for the failure to ®nd that believing that disagreement is not
destructive reduces relationship dissatisfaction is that participants were generally very
satis®ed with their relationship. Although their satisfaction was signi®cantly lower
when asked to imagine having a serious disagreement with their closest friend than
124 Duncan Cramer
when simply asked to describe their satisfaction with that relationship, it was possible
that there was a potential ceiling effect for the satisfaction scale when applied to
describing such a relationship when having a serious disagreement, in that there may
have been no further scope for satisfaction to increase. Relationship satisfaction scores
tend to be skewed negatively with most people expressing strong satisfaction with their
relationship. Consequently, the main aim of the present study was to determine whether
relationship satisfaction would be signi®cantly higher in the rational non-destructive
disagreement condition than in the control condition if participants were initially
requested to describe their satisfaction when having a serious disagreement. If believing
that disagreement is not destructive reduces relationship dissatisfaction, dissatisfaction
should be lower after being asked to believe this than before doing so.
In the previous study (Cramer, 2002), an attempt was also made to determine
whether any effect of this belief induction procedure was due to the demand
characteristics of the procedure (e.g. Orne, 1962). Orne suggested that cues in
experimental procedures may bring about the effects rather than the variable or
variables that have been ostensibly manipulated. Polivy and Doyle (1980) have proposed
that one way of testing whether effects are due to demand characteristics is to run
counter-demand control conditions in which participants are told that the effects
expected will be the opposite of those predicted by the researchers. Of course,
participants are not told what the predicted effects of the researchers are; they are
told only that the opposite effects are expected. If the effects obtained are those
suggested in the counter-demand conditions, this suggests that these effects may be
explained by demand characteristics.
In the earlier study, demand characteristics were tested by running two counter-
demand conditions in which participants were informed that the effects expected
would be opposite to those predicted by rational-emotive-behaviour theory. So in
the non-destructive disagreement condition, participants were told that believing the
rational statements may make them feel less satis®ed with the relationship. In the
destructive disagreement condition, they were told that the irrational statements may
make them feel more satis®ed with the relationship. Relationship satisfaction did not
differ signi®cantly between the irrational and the irrational counter-demand conditions
and between the rational and the rational counter-demand conditions, suggesting that
the observed effects were not due to the demand characteristics of the experimental
procedure. The failure to ®nd such differences may have been due to the permissive or
conditional nature of expressing the likelihood of the demand characteristic effect
occurring, which used the word `may’. A secondary aim of the present study was to
determine whether the effect of demand characteristics would be more evident by using
an obligatory or expectancy term for expressing the likelihood of this effect happening,
which was the word `should’.
The previous study was restricted to investigating the effect of the destructive
disagreement belief on relationship satisfaction with one’s closest friend. Part of the
reason for doing this was to make the sample as inclusive as possible. However, it is
 Effect of destructive disagreement belief 125
important to establish that the manipulation of this belief also affects satisfaction with
one’s romantic relationship, as people may be more likely to perceive this relationship
as being more central to their lives and to seek help for it when dif®culties arise. As not
everyone has a current romantic relationship, the present study sought to determine
whether the effect of the destructive disagreement belief was equally applicable to a
romantic relationship as to a closest friendship as the theory would imply. According to
rational-emotive theory, there should be no difference between romantic relationships
and closest friendships in the effect that rational and irrational statements have on
changing relationship satisfaction. In a previous study in which the correlation between
relationship satisfaction and the destructive disagreement belief was reported only for
romantic relationships (Cramer, 2001), the correlation for closest friendships ( .37) did
ê
not differ signi®cantly from that for romantic relationships ( .42), suggesting that
ê
rational and irrational beliefs may operate in similar ways in both romantic relationships
and closest friendships. The terms `romantic partner’ and `closest friend’ were used to
de®ne these two types of relationship. Participants describing a romantic partner were
asked whether they were married to, cohabiting with or going out with this person.

Method
Design
A 5 ´ 2 ´ 2 pretest/post-test design was used. The three factors were treatment
(irrational, irrational with counter-demand, control, rational with counter-demand,
or rational), sex of participant, and type of relationship (romantic partner or closest
friend). The dependent variable was post-test relationship satisfaction. The variable
checking the manipulation of the treatments was post-test destructive disagreement.
Participants were assigned randomly to the ®ve treatments. The power of the design
was set at .80 with an alpha of .05. Based on the previous study (Cramer, 2002), in
which the maximum difference between any two conditions was 1.11 for relation-
ship satisfaction and the estimated population standard deviation for the whole
sample was 0.83, the minimum number of participants for each of the ®ve conditions
was set at 15.

Participants
Participants were a convenience sample of 106 female and 44 male British students with
an age range of 16±25 years and a mean age of 19.67 (SD = 1.36) and 20.52 (SD = 1.81),
respectively. Of these, 92 described a romantic relationship, all of which were hetero-
sexual. None of these participants was married to the partner, ®ve were cohabiting, 85
were `going out’ and two did not answer this question. Of the participants, 58 described
a closest friendship, of which 38 were of the same sex. The mean duration was 2.03
years (SD = 1.74) for the romantic relationships and 4.45 (SD = 4.05) for the closest
friendships.
126 Duncan Cramer
Measures
Relationship satisfaction was measured with the Hendrick (1988) Relationship Assess-
ment Scale. It consists of seven items (e.g. `In general, how satis®ed are you with your
relationship?’) answered on a 5-point Likert scale. In this study the last item (`How many
problems are there in your relationship?’) was excluded from analysis because it
overlapped conceptually with having a serious disagreement. Higher scores indicate
greater relationship satisfaction.
A previous modi®cation of the 8-item `disagreement is destructive’ subscale of the
Eidelson and Epstein (1981) Relationship Belief Inventory was used to assess this
irrational belief (Cramer, 2001). Items 4±7 of the original subscale remained unchanged.
To reduce the ambiguity concerning their irrationality, items 1 and 8 were reworded
respectively as `If my partner expresses disagreement with my ideas, I think less highly
of her/him’ and `I do not feel less positive towards my partner when we argue’. To have
equal numbers of rationally and irrationally phrased items, items 2 and 3 were phrased
rationally. Each item was rated on a 6-point scale ranging from `de®nitely true’ to
`de®nitely false’. Higher scores denoted stronger endorsement of this belief. This
modi®ed subscale in romantic relationships was found to have higher alpha reliability
(.76 vs. .67) and to be more strongly related to relationship satisfaction ( .42 vs. .26)
ê ê
than the original scale (Cramer, 2001).
The score for each scale was averaged across items so that the scores corresponded
to the Likert scale used.

Procedure
Participants were assigned randomly to one of the ®ve conditions and were asked to
answer the questions in terms of their current main romantic relationship or their
current closest friend if they did not currently have a romantic partner. The gender
and age of the participant and the gender of the other person were obtained,
together with the duration of the relationship in years and months. Participants
describing a romantic relationship were asked whether they were married to,
cohabiting with or going out with this person. They were requested to complete
the two pretest measures while imagining having a serious disagreement in that
relationship. They were then presented with a series of statements which they were
asked to imagine believing during this disagreement. The statements corresponded to
one of the ®ve treatments. They were then asked to complete the two post-test
measures in terms of how they would feel about the person in this relationship if
they believed these statements.
The statements for the ®ve treatments were:
(1) Irrational: `It is awful disagreeing. I can’t stand disagreeing. We should not be
disagreeing. We ought to agree. Disagreeing means that our relationship is not
good. Disagreeing shows that our relationship is not working. We’ll never agree.
We’ll always disagree.’
 Effect of destructive disagreement belief 127
(2) Irrational with counter-demand: The statements in (1) above followed by
`Saying and believing these statements should make you feel better about your
relationship’.
(3) Control: `We are having a serious disagreement. I don’t agree with some of the
things this person is saying and s/he doesn’t agree with some of the things I’m
saying. It looks like we don’t agree on this issue. We do not hold the same views on
the matter.’
(4) Rational with counter-demand: `It may be inconvenient disagreeing but it is not
awful. I may not like disagreeing but there is no reason why we should not
disagree. Disagreeing does not mean that our relationship is not good but shows
we can say what we think. Disagreeing now does not mean that we’ll always
disagree. Saying and believing these statements should make you feel worse about
your relationship.’
(5) Rational: The statements in (4) above but without the ®nal one (i.e. `Saying and
believing these statements . . .’).
The irrational condition consists of four pairs of statements which re¯ect the four
characteristics of irrational thinking sometimes referred to as catastrophizing, demand-
ingness, global evaluation and overgeneralizing, respectively (e.g. Ellis, 1962). The
rational condition comprises their rational counterparts. The counter-demand condi-
tions include a further statement that suggests participants should feel the opposite to
what is predicted to occur. The control condition is made up of ®ve statements that
simply reiterate that there is a serious disagreement. Insofar as this was possible, there
was an attempt to make the overall length of the passage similar for the ®ve conditions.
The possible association between the participant’s pretest disagreement belief and the
®ve conditions on their post-test belief was not central to the main hypothesis of this
study, which was primarily concerned with the manipulation of these beliefs. However,
it was possible that those with a lower destructive disagreement belief would show less
of a decrease in this belief in the rational condition and more of an increase in the
irrational condition than those with a higher destructive disagreement belief.

Results
The alpha reliability of relationship satisfaction and destructive disagreement was .80
and .79, respectively, for the pretest and .87 and .87, respectively, for the post-test,
indicating that they were reliable. At pretest relationship satisfaction was signi®cantly
negatively correlated with destructive disagreement in the romantic relationship
(r = .60, two-tailed p < .001), and approached signi®cance in the closest friendship
ê
(r = .25, two-tailed p < .06). This correlation was signi®cantly larger in the romantic
ê
relationship than in the closest friendship (z = 2.55, two-tailed p < .05).
A 5 ´ 2 ´ 2 ANOVA was carried out on pretest relationship satisfaction and destruc-
tive disagreement to determine whether the mean scores of these two scales differed
signi®cantly between the ®ve conditions and their interactions with sex of participant
128 Duncan Cramer
and type of relationship. None of these effects was signi®cant, indicating that pretest
scores were similar across these conditions.
Consequently, a 5 ´ 2 ´ 2 ´ 2 mixed ANOVA was conducted on relationship satisfac-
tion and destructive disagreement. The repeated factor was the pretest and post-test
scores. The only interaction involving the ®ve conditions that was signi®cant was for the
repeated factor for both relationship satisfaction, F(4, 131) = 3.01, p < .05, and destruc-
tive disagreement, F(4, 131) = 6.30, p < .001. The means and standard deviations for
pretest and post-test relationship satisfaction and destructive disagreement for the
®ve conditions are shown in Table 1, together with the number of cases in the ®ve
conditions.

Table 1. Means (SDs) for pretest and post-test relationship satisfaction and destructive disagreement
for the Ž ve conditions

Satisfaction Disagreement

Conditions n Pre Post Pre Post

Irrational 29 4.20 (0.67) 3.70 (0.80) 2.70 (0.71) 3.45 (1.11)

Irrational counter-demand 29 4.01 (0.66) 3.53 (0.90) 2.83 (0.71) 3.33 (0.91)
Control 30 4.12 (0.71) 3.87 (0.64) 2.69 (0.85) 2.94 (0.84)
Rational counter-demand 32 4.22 (0.56) 4.08 (0.73) 2.79 (0.54) 2.85 (0.65)
Rational 30 4.01 (0.71) 4.22 (0.67) 2.90 (0.91) 2.38 (0.79)

One-tailed unrelated t tests were used to determine which means differed signi®-
cantly at post-test. For relationship satisfaction, there were no signi®cant differences
between the irrational and the irrational counter-demand conditions (t = 0.77, p = n.s.),
the irrational and the control conditions (t = 0.88, p = n.s.), the control and the rational
counter-demand conditions (t = 1.24, p = n.s.) and the rational counter-demand and the
rational conditions (t = 0.76, p = n.s.). The irrational condition was signi®cantly lower
than the rational counter-demand (t = 1.94, p < .05) and the rational (t = 2.68, p < .01)
conditions. The irrational counter-demand condition was signi®cantly lower than the
control (t = 1.68, p < .05), the rational counter-demand (t = 2.66, p < .01) and the
rational (t = 3.35, p < .001) conditions. The control condition was signi®cantly lower
than the rational condition (t = 2.07, p < .05).
For destructive disagreement, there were no signi®cant differences between the
irrational and the irrational counter-demand conditions (t = 0.43, p = n.s.), and the
control and the rational counter-demand conditions (t = 0.48, p = n.s.). The irrational
condition was signi®cantly higher than the control (t = 1.99, p < .05), the rational
counter-demand (t = 2.60, p < .01) and the rational (t = 4.26, p < .001) conditions.
The irrational counter-demand condition was signi®cantly higher than the control
(t = 1.73, p < .05), the rational counter-demand (t = 2.41, p < .01), and the rational
 Effect of destructive disagreement belief 129
(t = 4.29, p < .001) conditions. The control condition was signi®cantly higher than the
rational condition (t = 2.64, p < .01). The rational counter-demand condition was
signi®cantly higher than the rational condition (t = 2.55, p < .01).
Two-tailed related t tests were applied to see whether any change between pretest
and post-test scores was signi®cant. Relationship satisfaction decreased signi®cantly for
the irrational (t = 3.60, p < .001) and the irrational counter-demand (t = 3.20, p < .01)
conditions. The decrease was almost signi®cant for the control condition (t = 1.90,
p < .07). Satisfaction signi®cantly increased for the rational condition (t = 2.45, p < .05).
Destructive disagreement increased signi®cantly for the irrational (t = 3.10, p < .01), the
irrational counter-demand (t = 2.82, p < .01) and the control (t = 2.32, p < .05) condi-
tions only. Destructive disagreement decreased signi®cantly for the rational condition
(t = 4.06, p < .001).
To determine whether asking participants to imagine having a serious disagreement
at pretest signi®cantly decreased relationship satisfaction and increased destructive
disagreement, these means were compared using a one-tailed unrelated t test with those
in two studies in which participants were simply asked to report their current opinions.
The ®rst study was similar to the present one in that participants were asked to describe
a current romantic relationship or their closest friend if they did not currently have a
romantic relationship (Cramer, 2001). The second study asked participants to describe
their current closest friendship (Cramer, 2002). In the ®rst and the present study there
was no signi®cant difference in relationship satisfaction and destructive disagreement
between the romantic and the friend relationship. Consequently, these two relation-
ships were grouped together. Relationship satisfaction was signi®cantly lower in the
present study than in the ®rst and second studies: t(279) = 1.77, p < .05; t(314) = 2.98,
p < .01, respectively. Destructive disagreement was signi®cantly higher in the present
study than in the ®rst and second studies: t(279) = 1.70, p < .05; t(314) = 2.00, p < .05,
respectively.
To determine if a ceiling effect may have operated for the rational condition in the
previous study, relationship satisfaction at post-test in this condition for the two studies
was compared and found not to differ signi®cantly: t(67) = 1.85, two-tailed p < .07.
The association between the participants’ pretest destructive disagreement belief
and the ®ve conditions was examined by subtracting the post-test from the pretest
and correlating this difference with the pretest in each of the ®ve conditions. These
correlations were only signi®cant for the control (r = .76, p < .001), the rational counter-
demand (r = .56, p < .001) and the rational (r = .67, p < .001) conditions. These positive
correlations indicate that those with a stronger destructive disagreement belief show
less of a decrease in this belief than those with a weaker destructive disagreement belief.

Discussion
Relationship satisfaction was signi®cantly more negatively correlated with destructive
disagreement in the romantic relationship than in the closest friendship at pretest. The
130 Duncan Cramer
correlation for the romantic relationship was not signi®cantly more negative than that
found in a previous study where participants were simply asked to complete the same
two scales and not when imagining having a serious disagreement (Cramer, 2001). In
the present study there were no signi®cant differences in the means or variances of
these two measures between these two relationships. Furthermore, there was no
signi®cant interaction between the type of relationship and the ®ve conditions.
Consequently, the results of the experimental manipulations did not differ for the
romantic relationship and the closest friendship, indicating that any effects applied
equally to both relationships as implied by rational-emotive-behaviour theory. It is
unclear why the correlation between relationship satisfaction and destructive disagree-
ment was lower in the closest friend than in the romantic relationship. It is possible that
disagreements have a stronger effect in romantic relationships than closest friendships.
This could not be examined in the present study as there was no condition in which
there was no disagreement.
The manipulation of the destructive disagreement belief appeared to be successful
insofar that this belief was signi®cantly stronger in the irrational destructive disagree-
ment condition than in the control condition, which in turn was signi®cantly stronger
than in the rational non-destructive disagreement condition. Relationship satisfaction
was signi®cantly higher in the rational non-destructive disagreement condition than in
the control and the irrational destructive disagreement condition. However, relationship
satisfaction was not signi®cantly higher in the control condition than in the irrational
destructive disagreement condition. Relationship satisfaction signi®cantly increased
from pre- to post-test in the rational non-destructive disagreement condition and
signi®cantly decreased in the irrational destructive disagreement condition.
These results suggest that imagining saying and believing rational statements that
disagreement is not destructive reduces relationship dissatisfaction when imagining
having a serious disagreement in a close relationship. The fact that this effect was found
when participants were asked to initially imagine having a serious disagreement but not
when they were requested to describe their relationship as it currently is suggests that
the previous failure (Cramer, 2002) to ®nd an effect for the rational non-destructive
disagreement condition may have been due to a ceiling effect for relationship satisfac-
tion. Relationship satisfaction was signi®cantly lower in this study when participants
were asked to imagine having a serious disagreement than in a previous study
(Cramer, 2001), when they were requested to simply describe their relationship as it
currently is.
However, in the rational non-destructive disagreement condition, post-test relation-
ship satisfaction was lower in the previous than the present study, although this
difference was not signi®cant. This ®nding suggests that the failure to ®nd a signi®cant
effect for the rational non-destructive condition in the previous study may not have been
due to a ceiling effect for relationship satisfaction, as relationship satisfaction was higher
in the present study. A possible explanation for the different results in the two studies
may be due to a sensitizing effect in the present study in which being told to imagine
 Effect of destructive disagreement belief 131
having a serious disagreement evokes the irrational destructive disagreement belief, at
least in some of the participants.
There was evidence for this in that the destructive disagreement belief was
signi®cantly stronger at pretest in the present study when participants were asked to
imagine having a serious disagreement than in the previous study where they were
asked to describe their feelings about their current relationship. Being instructed
subsequently to imagine saying and believing that disagreement is not destructive
may have increased their expected satisfaction with that relationship. In the earlier
study there may not have been suf®cient time for the destructive disagreement belief to
have been brought about and consequently for the rational non-destructive disagree-
ment statements to have an effect. If this is the case, then this differential effect should
be replicated when participants are assigned randomly to a pretest condition where
they are asked to imagine either having or not having a serious disagreement.
There was no evidence to suggest that the effects of the rational non-destructive
disagreement and the irrational destructive disagreement conditions were due to the
demand characteristics of the experimental procedure in that there was no signi®cant
difference in relationship satisfaction between the rational and the rational counter-
demand conditions and between the irrational and irrational counter-demand condi-
tions. This was despite the fact that an attempt was made to induce a stronger demand in
the present than in the previous study by using the obligatory or expectancy term
`should’ rather than the permissive or conditional term `may’. Cramer and Buckland
(1995) also found no support for demand characteristics where these characteristics
were assessed using counter-demand conditions.
Both these studies were carried out on a convenience sample of students to
determine whether this simple intervention had any effect. If there had been no
effect, a stronger manipulation would have been tried. Now that it has been shown
that this simple manipulation can reduce imagined relationship dissatisfaction, it is
necessary to ascertain whether a similar effect can be obtained in a sample of people
seeking help for relationship dif®culties. As such individuals are experiencing relation-
ship problems, their relationship dissatisfaction is likely to be higher and so it would not
seem to be necessary to ask them to imagine having a serious disagreement as was done
in the present study.
The procedure used in these two studies to test whether the destructive disagree-
ment belief affects relationship satisfaction is very brief and involves participants having
to imagine how they would respond in a particular situation. The justi®cation for this
procedure is to try to exercise tighter control of what occurs in this situation so that
clearer inferences can be drawn about likely causal effects. While ultimately it may be
preferable to try to change beliefs, it seems important initially to establish whether
simply asking people to imagine having certain beliefs produces the expected effect.
The disadvantage of trying to change beliefs is that such interventions are more dif®cult
to standardize and control, and raise the unresolved issue of what is the most effective
way of changing beliefs. They also give rise to ethical issues in that it seems undesirable
132 Duncan Cramer
to induce irrational beliefs, as these may produce greater distress. Consequently, it
seems necessary that any attempt to change beliefs should be restricted to countering
irrational beliefs.
Such a limitation makes it more dif®cult to know what the most appropriate control
or comparison group should be for this intervention. The control condition should not
reduce the irrational belief as it is this belief that is thought to result in greater
dissatisfaction. One such control may be to have participants simply discuss their
dissatisfaction without any attempt to make them aware of or to change any irrational
beliefs. There is evidence to indicate that disagreement and negative con¯ict may be
more strongly related to dissatisfaction with a romantic relationship than the destructive
disagreement belief (Cramer, 2001). This ®nding suggests that in trying to enhance
relationship satisfaction it may be more effective to endeavour to decrease negative
con¯ict and disagreement than to increase the rational belief that disagreement is not
destructive. Thus, it also seems worthwhile to include in such a study the effect of
reducing negative con¯ict. Reducing such con¯ict seems to be a major component of
many of the relationship interventions which have been evaluated (Cramer, 1998).
Studies comparing marital behaviour therapy with and without a cognitive component
have generally found few differences in outcome between the two approaches
(Baucom & Lester, 1986; Baucom, Sayers, & Sher, 1990; Halford, Sanders, & Behrens,
1993), suggesting that the cognitive element may not enhance effectiveness. However,
as the cognitive element alone has not been compared with the problem-solving
component on its own, it is not known how effective the cognitive component is
relative to problem-solving training. The components responsible for the effectiveness
of relationship interventions remain to be empirically demonstrated.

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Received 3 December 2002; revised version received 8 September 2003

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