A Theory of Social Welfare

L ITTLE ATTENTION has been

directed at the development of a
David Stoesz
theory of social welfare. Most literature A theory ofsocial welfare in the United
analysis is left at the descriptive level.
These deficiencies could be corrected by
a theory that explains how political and
that describes the application of social economic forces shape the institutions of
work theory focuses on social ad-
States is outlined to explain how social welfare over time. Such a theory
ministration and social policy-often political and economic forces shape the should focus on the structure of social
called "macro phenomena." Social ad- stmctural institutions ofsocial welfare. welfare, identify the most influential
ministration theory tends to derive from The theory emphasizes the role of in- groups, and offer some direction on the
sociology and social psychology and terest groups in defining social welfare future of social welfare.
have little relevance for many social and provides an explanation of why
workers (Lipsky, 1980, 1984). Social some groups remain marginal to the
policy on the other hand often is left at welfare enterprise. The interest groups Structural Interests of
the philosophical level. Most attempts to of the social welfare industry are Social Welfare
systematize thinking about social policy classified, and the viability of each Social welfare-a society's provision of
occurred during the 1970s, when group is evaluated according to the social, economic, and health benefits to
elaboration and consolidation of the members who are unable to obtain such
welfare state seemed probable.
dynamics of bureaucratization and pri- benefits by themselves (Barker, 1987)-
As Gil (1976) noted, the basis for vatization. Some predictions about the is manifested by an extraordinarily
understanding social policy consisted of future ofcertain interest groups also are diverse set of institutions in the United
an "underlying humanistic, egalitarian, offered. States. American social welfare includes
democratic philosophy" (p. 166). Using income benefits that are available
a Marxist dialectic, Galper (1975) cri- through insurance and grant programs,
tiqued the liberal basis for the welfare that the significant aspects of social a range of in-kind benefits that include
state but failed to account for the way in welfare can be identified so that the health and mental health care, and
which instruments of capitalism provide system can be enhanced through planned various personal social services. Govern-
beneficial services to the population. change. Although this characteristic has ment departments, voluntary agencies,
Forder (1984) presented an excellent a logical appeal, the extraordinary diver- independent providers, and proprietary
review of social science theories that sity of social welfare in America raises firms coexist and respond to segments
bear on social welfare but fail to present the fundamental question of whether of the social welfare market. American
a synthesis. Progressive expansion of social welfare is systematic. In addition, social welfare is not unlike a large in-
the welfare state led to extensive the political and economic reversals of dustry through which groups exert in-
descriptive explorations of programs the past decade indicate that systemati- fluence to achieve particular objectives.
and services (Kamerman & Kahn, 1976, zation as a general trend is unlikely in When such objectives are self-serving,
1980). Researchers often presented con- the near future. Instead, social welfare groups may be said to have an "in-
cepts as tools for analysis (Dolgoff & seems to be diversifying-if not frag- terest." As interest groups outmaneuver
Feldstein, 1980; Macarov, 1978; Wilen- menting-in a manner that defies the competitors, they develop complex in-
sky & Lebeaux, 1965) and occasionally emphasis on system maintenance that is stitutionallinkages that anchor them in
presented a framework to organize implicit in systems theory. Moreover, the social structure. Eventually,
thinking about social policy (Morris, systems theory does not account for the
1979; Gilbert & Specht, 1986). Yet a for- conservative influences that affect social
mal theory has not followed from these welfare. To the alarm of many profes- the existence of a network of political,
works. Systems theory is the only for- sionals, social welfare is not moving in legal, and economic institutions which
mulation that approaches a theoretical a direction that is compatible with social guarantees that certain dominant interests
level of thought. work values. will be served comes to be taken for
Systems theory became popular dur- Conventional macro theory fails to granted as legitimate, as the only possible
ing the 1970s but was used primarily to provide an adequate account of the con- way in which these ... services can be pro-
vided. People come to accept as inevitable
explain behavior of subsystems that text in which welfare professionals prac- that which exists and even believe that it
comprised individuals, families, and tice or the profound changes that have is a right .... Precisely because of this, the
organizations (Pincus & Minahan, 1973). affected that context. Meyer (1976) has interests involved do not continuously have
Whether systems theory really is a applied a variation of the systems to organize or to defend their interests;
theory in a technical sense, its utility has approach-ecosystems theory-to the other institutions do that for them. (Alford,
diminished. Systems theory assumes context of social work practice. Her 1975, pp. 14, 17)

CCC Code: 0037-8046/89 $1.00 © 1989, National Association of Social Workers, Inc. 101
 Groups that become enmeshed inex-
tricably in the social structure-to the ex-
tent they become manifestations of the
structure-are structural interests. An in-
verse conventional interest group theory,
which assumes that groups have to
scramble for resources, structural in-
terests theory identifies those groups so
implanted in social reality that their
needs are met virtually automatically.
Structural interest groups can be clas-
sified into four categories according to
their ability to develop the interinstitu-
tionallinkages that result in power and in-
fluence: (1) dominant, (2) challenging, (3)
repressed, and (4) emerging. Alford
(1975) proposed the first three types of in-
terests; the author added the fourth,
"emerging," to conform Alford's work in
health care to social welfare. A dominant
structural interest has consolidated an ex-
tensive organizational network of person-
nel and revenues that overshadows other
structural interests. These manifesta-
tions of dominance are buttressed by an
institutional ideology, "an official inter-
pretation of the past that makes [other
organizational arrangements] appear
defective or just a step on the way to the
present regime" (Bloom, 1987, p. 249).
A challenging structural interest is
cultivating a parallel network of organi-
zations large enough to claim some of the
resources controlled by a dominant
structural interest. This goal can be
achieved by demonstrating a superior
method of service provision, siphoning
more desirable clients, or simply sway-
ing public sentiment in favor of the
challenging structural interest. A re-
pressed structural interest previously en-
joyed a dominant status but has been
demoted by a challenging interest. Once
a dominant structural interest becomes
repressed, it is not likely to regain the
previous position; rather, other groups
will bypass it as they seek to establish
claims in the field. However, because of
the remnants of the institutional network
that repressed structural interests retain,
repression usually means a residual posi-
tion in the industry and not outright ex-
tinction. An emerging structural interest
is organizing a network that may
challenge a dominant interest some time
in the future. To attain emerging status,
a structural interest must be organized
sufficiently that survival is not a concern;
102
Table 1.
Classification of Structural Interests in Social Welfare
Structure Interest Type
Voluntary sector Traditional Repressed
providers
Welfare state Welfare Dominant
bureaucrats
Private practice Clinical Emerging
entrepreneurs
Corporate welfare Human service Challenging
executives
instead, directing future growth is the
primary issue.
As implied by the four classifications,
the evolution of structural interests is a
slow process that can consume decades
and the entire careers of professionals
associated with a particular group. In the
United States, four structural interests
comprise the social welfare industry:
(1) traditional providers (repressed);
(2) welfare bureaucrats (dominant);
(3) clinical entrepreneurs (emerging); and
(4) human service executives (challeng-
ing) (Table 1).
Traditional Providers
Traditional providers seek to maintain
and enhance traditional social relations,
values, and structures in their com-
munities. Traditional providers hold an
organismic conception of social welfare
and see it as tightly interwoven with
other community institutions. According
to traditional providers, voluntary non-
profit agencies offer the advantages of
neighborliness, a reaffirmation of com-
munity values, a concern for community
welfare as opposed to personal gain, and
freedom to alter programming to con-
form to changes in local priorities. The
base of influence consists of private, non-
profit agencies, often referred to as the
voluntary sector.
Much of the heritage of social welfare
can be traced to this structural interest-
for example, Mary Richmond with the
Charity Organization Society movement
and Jane Addams with the Settlement
House movement. As predominant ser-
Ideology Example
Organic bonds Secular and sec·
among community tarian nonprofit
institutions agencies
Governmental Federal and state
responses to welfare
public problems departments
Professional treat- Individual and
ment of individual group practices
disorders
Corporate ex- For-profit health
ploitation of and welfare cor-
human service porations
markets
vice-delivery forms, Charity Organiza-
tion Societies and settlement houses
were transformed by two influences: (1)
the need for scientifically based treat-
ment techniques on the part of the
workers and (2) the socialization of chari-
ty. Together, these factors anchored the
social casework agency in American in-
dustrial society. The agency provided
the grist for scientific casework, which
was instrumental in the emergence of the
social work profession. In turn, the new
schools of social work relied on casework
agencies for internship training, a
substantial part of professional educa-
tion. After graduation, many profes-
sionals elected to work in the voluntary
sector, which ensured a steady supply of
personnel for agencies.
Voluntary agencies routinized philan-
thropic contributions by socializing chari-
ty. Beginning with Denver's Associated
Charities in 1887, the concept of a com-
munity appeal spread until more than 200
cities had community chests by the 1920s
(Trattner, 1974). Together, the needs of
workers for effective treatment tech-
niques and the economic imperatives for
organizational survival functioned to
standardize the social agency. The
casework agency was the organization
through which professional caseworkers
delivered services (National Association
of Social Workers [NASW], 1974). By the
1940s, the social casework agency had
become a predominant form of service
delivery. Currently, much social service
provision exists in the form of sectarian
and nonsectarian agencies of the volun-
tary sector. In 1984, approximately
Social Work / March 1989
130,000 organizations spent $21.4 billion
providing individual and family counsel-
ing, job training, child day care, residen-
tial services, and other social services
(Hodgkinson & Weitzman, 1986). These
organizations include the traditional
agencies of the voluntary sector-Family
Service America, the Red Cross, and the
Boy and Girl Scouts of America-as well
as newer, more advocacy-oriented ser-
vices-gay and lesbian agencies, bat-
tered women's shelters, and programs
for refugees and immigrants.
Welfare Bureaucrats
Welfare bureaucrats are public func-
tionaries whose experiments in state-run
welfare programs during the Progressive
Era were consolidated during the New
Deal, when the federal government
assumed a leading role in defining the
welfare state. Welfare bureaucrats are
civil servants of federal, state, and local
jurisdictions who administer the maze of
social insurance, means-tested, and
federal domestic assistance programs
(Evans & Robb, 1985, Appendix C).
Despite the complexity of mandated
welfare programs, welfare bureaucrats
tend to have a similar orientation to the
provision of social welfare that is rein-
forced by the vertical integration of the
welfare bureaucracy: U .S. Department
of Health and Human Services, state
human resources departments, and local
social welfare departments. The
ideology of welfare bureaucrats stresses
"a rational, efficient, cost-conscious,
coordinated ... delivery system" (Alford,
1975, p. 204). Welfare bureaucrats view
government intervention as more effec-
tive than private sector initiatives
because authority is centralized,
guidelines are standardized, and benefits
are allocated according to principles of
equity and equality.
The influence of welfare bureaucrats
in social welfare became substantial as a
result of the Social Security Act of 1935.
To a limited extent, the larger communi-
ty chests "exerted a pressure toward ra-
tionalization of the professional welfare
machinery" (Lubove, 1969, p. 197), but
this pressure did not approximate the ef-
fect of the federal welfare bureaucracy,
which soon eclipsed the authority of
traditional providers. Actually, a uni-
Stoesz / A Theory of Social WeHare
linear evolution connecting these struc-
tural interests could have occurred had
not Harry Hopkins, the head of the
Federal Emergency Relief Administra-
tion, prohibited states from turning
federal welfare funds over to private
agencies (Trattner, 1974, 1985). Denied
the resources to address the massive
social problems caused by the Great
Depression, private agencies lapsed in-
to a secondary role while federal and
state agencies ascended in importance.
An array of welfare legislation fol-
lowed. The flourishing of bureaucratic
rationality, concomitant with this
legislative activity, represented the in-
stitutionalization of liberal thought that
sought to control the caprices of the
market, to ensure a measure of equality
among widely divergent economic
classes, and to establish the adminis-
trative apparatus to provide continuity of
these principles. Confronted with a
rapidly industrializing society that lacked
the most basic programs for ameliorating
social and economic catastrophe, pro-
gressives perceived the state as a vehi-
cle for social reform. Solutions focused
on "coordinating fragmented services,
instituting planning, and extending
public funding" (Alford, 1975, p. 2). Im-
plicit in the methods advocated by wel-
fare bureaucrats is an expectation, if not
an assumption, that social welfare ad-
ministration should be centralized, that
eligibility for benefits should include all
people regardless of income, and that
social welfare should be part of the in-
stitutional fabric of society. In the United
States, Wilensky and Lebeaux (1965)
labeled this orientation to social welfare
"institutional," meaning that govern-
ment would ensure that citizens would be
entitled to basic needs as a social right.
By the mid-1980s, the influence of wel-
fare bureaucrats had been curtailed. The
Reagan administration all but capped the
growth of welfare programs; in 1982,
federal governmental expenditures for
domestic programs peaked at 15.9 per-
cent of the gross national product, and
that figure has fallen every year since
(Advisory Commission on Intergovern-
mental Relations, 1987; "Up from De-
pendency," 1986). After election defeats
in 1980, 1984, and 1988, many Demo-
crats equivocated about government
social programs and instead preferred
private sector solutions to welfare-
related problems (Reich, 1983). Still, the
volume of resources and number of per-
sonnel that depend on public sector
welfare programs ensure welfare bu-
reaucrats of a dominant role in social
welfare for the near future.
Clinical Entrepreneurs
Clinical entrepreneurs are professional
service providers-chiefly social
workers, psychologists, and physi-
cians-who work for themselves rather
than being salaried employees (Piliavin,
1968). Important to clinical entrepre-
neurs is the establishment of a profes-
sional monopoly. The evolution of that
professional monopoly represents a con-
cern of practitioners that their occupa-
tional activity not be subject to political
interference from the state or to the
ignorance of the lay public. In the most
fundamental sense, private practice
reconciles the desire of professionals for
autonomy with the imperatives of a
market economy. The transition from
entrepreneur to professional monopolist
is a matter of obtaining legislation that
restricts practice to individuals who are
licensed by the state. According to
Alford (1975), "professionalism provides
a way of preserving monopolistic control
over services without the risks of com-
petition" (p. 199). As an extension of the
entrepreneurial model of service de-
livery, professional monopoly offers
privacy in practice, the freedom to
valuate one's worth through setting fees,
and the security of membership in the
professional monopoly.
The social worker as clinical entre-
preneur is a relatively recent pheno-
menon; NASW did not sanction this
form of service delivery officially for its
members until 1964 (Golton, 1973).
Before that, privately practicing social
workers identified themselves as psycho-
therapists and lay analysts. Typically,
social workers in private practice relied
on referrals from physicians and psychi-
atrists (Golton, 1973), and after World
War 11 , began to establish "flourishing
and lucrative" practices (Trattner, 1974,
p. 250). By the 1970s, private practice in
social work was developing as an impor-
tant form of service delivery. In 1975,
NASW estimated that from 10,000 to
103
20,000 social workers were engaged in of the market. However, unlike clinical the very markets they serve, thus influ-
private practice (Gabriel, 1977). By 1983, entrepreneurs, human service execu- encing not only consumer demand, but
Barker (1983) speculated that about tives are salaried employees of proprie- also government policy. The capacity to
30,000 social workers, or 32 percent of tary firms and so have less autonomy. As function independently of government
all social workers, engaged in private corporate officers who are accountable coupled with the scale of operations, as
practice on a full- or part-time basis. By to investors, human service executives determined by the large volume of
1985, a large portion of psychotherapy advance an ideology that emphasizes revenues and number of employees,
was being performed by social workers: market strategies for promoting social places human service executives in a
welfare. This approach differs from the strong position to challenge the welfare
Growing numbers of social workers are ideology of welfare bureaucrats, which bureaucrats.
treating more affluent, private clients, thus emphasizes the planning and regulatory
moving into the traditional preserve of the functions of the state. Human service ex-
elite psychiatrists and clinical psycholo- ecutives favor the rationality of the ~argjnalInterests
gists, as well. (Coleman, 1985, p. Cl) marketplace in allocating resources and Social welfare is populated by
evaluating programs and advocate mar- numerous interest groups that have not
Clinical entrepreneurs are an emerg- ket refonn of the welfare state, the do- become as symbiotically attached as
ing structural interest in social welfare. main of welfare bureaucrats, thus structural interests to the social struc-
Continued growth of this group is likely challenging this structural interest. ture. These marginal interest groups
for several reasons. Through local and The entrance of for-profit finns in usually represent special populations
state chapters, NASW has been effective social welfare can be traced to the 1960s, that have been neglected, excluded, or
in expanding the scope of its professional when Medicaid, Medicare, and Civilian oppressed by mainstream society. The
monopoly. In 1983, 31 states had passed Health and Medical Program of the number of these groups reflects the ca-
legislation regulating the practice of U nifonned Services funds were paid to pacity of the American political economy
social work ("Thirty-one Jurisdictions," proprietary nursing homes, hospitals, to maintain equilibrium while excluding
1983); by 1987, the number had in- and mental health facilities (Light, 1986). many groups from full participation in
creased to 45 ("Licensure Act Passed," Since then, human service executives society. A partial list of marginal interest
1987). At the same time, professional rapidly have been creating independent, groups includes black Americans,
groups have lobbied for vendorship for-profit human service corporations women, native Americans, homosexuals,
privileges that allow them more regular that provide an extensive range of ser- residents of rural areas, and Hispanic
income through insurance held by vices nationwide. Human service corpor- Americans. These groups are of great in-
clients. Finally, many students who enter ations have established prominent-if terest to welfare professionals because of
graduate schools do so with the ex- not dominant-positions in several concern for social justice as well as an im-
pressed intent of setting up a private human service markets, including nurs- plicit assumption that welfare would be
practice ("Licensure Act Passed," 1987). ing home care, hospital management, enhanced if marginal interests were well-
Thus, clinical entrepreneurs will become health maintenance, child care, child represented within the social welfare in-
a more influential interest in the future. welfare, home care, life care, and correc- dustry. Unfortunately, the American
tions. In 1981, 34 human service corpora- political economy has contributed to
tions reported annual revenues of more much disparity among groups in social
Human Service Executives than $10 million; by 1985, the number of welfare. Within the context of democratic
Human service executives include the firms had increased to 66 (Stoesz, capitalism, transfonning marginal in-
chief executive officers and management 1988b). In 1985, two human service cor- terests into structural interests remains
personnel of the for-profit human service porations reported annual revenues that extraordinarily difficult.
corporations and franchises that have exceeded the total contributions to the The marginal status of many groups re-
proliferated since the mid-1960s. Promi- United Way of America, $2.6 billion. lates to the nature of the social welfare in-
nent human service executives include Moreover, each of these corporations dustry in the United States (Taylor &
Jack Massey, founder of the largest employed more than 80,000 workers, by Roberts, 1985). In American culture,
human service firm, the Hospital Corpor- far more than the number of state and groups excluded from the mainstream are
ation of America; Tom Beasely, founder local public welfare employees in any expected to gather resources and identirry
(with Massey' s assistance) of the Correc- state in the United States ("Statistical leadership to mount programs to serve the
tions Corporation of America; and Philip Abstract," 1988b). particular group. Although this expecta-
Bredesen, whose health maintenance As the proprietary sector expands to tion is conconant with traditional values,
company, HealthAmerica, was acquired dominate human service markets, oli- such as self-sufficiency and community
by Maxicare, a health maintenancecom- gopolies emerge and a fundamental solidarity, that approach does not ensure
pany founded by Fred Wassennan. change occurs. No longer passively success. The voluntary sector may be able
Human service executives share an dependent on government appropriations, to accommodate only a limited number of
important characteristic with clinical proprietary £inns obtain revenues from in- marginal interests because of financial
entrepreneurs-both are ways of or- dividual consumers and businesses and restraints or may be unresponsive to
ganizing service delivery in the context create a strong base from which to shape groups that violate traditional community
104 Social Work I March 1989
norms. As a result, marginal interest
groups may have to take care of their
needs themselves.
In a democratic polity, marginal groups
can make claims on the social order by
seeking benefits through governmental
programs, but to do so presents other
problems. Government programs are
likely to be managed by welfare
bureaucrats, who have a different
understanding of what is best for the
marginal interest. For a marginal interest
group to get benefits from government
programs, its claim must be interpreted,
programmed, and monitored by agents of
the welfare state, who have a welfare
ideology that differs from that of op-
pressed groups. The result is likely to be
a program that is more consonant with the
ideology of welfare bureaucrats than that
of the marginal interest group. An attrac-
tive solution to this problem is the deploy-
ment of a special agency to respond to the
needs of marginal interests. Unfortunate-
ly, agencies that are not integrated in the
welfare state proper can be dismantled
easily, as illustrated by the fate of the Of-
£ice of Economic Opportunity.
Because of these obstacles, members
of marginal interest groups have power-
ful incentives to work within existing
structural interests. The success of
marginal interests in this regard has been
mixed. As a result of affirmative action,
black males have been able to secure
positions in the welfare bureaucracy in
relatively significant numbers and now
are well established among welfare
bureaucrats. White women, however,
have found independent practice more
desirable and are represented more
among clinical entrepreneurs (NASW,
1985). Despite such changes, the installa-
tion of representatives of marginal in-
terests within structural interest has not
resulted in a corresponding increase in
the status of their respective group of
origin, which reflects the power of the
political and economic structure to ap-
portion opportunity arbitrarily regard-
less of who operates the machinery. The
structural interest of human service ex-
ecutives remains a bastion of white
patriarchy.
A subtle, but nonetheless significant,
reason for the subordinate status of
marginal interest groups is related to pro-
fessional career requirements and incen-
Stoesz / A Theory of Social Weliare
tives. Few students will become exposed
to agencies that serve marginal popula-
tions, because those agencies cannot af-
ford the credentialed staff to supervise
interns. New professionals quickly learn
that better-paying jobs are found within
the structural interests, particularly in
private practice, programs of the welfare
state, or firms within the corporate
welfare sector. In other words, the career
path of the typical welfare professional
leads away from service to marginal in-
terests. Consequently, marginal interests
are less likely to enjoy the representation
of those professionals who could ad-
vocate effectively on their behalf. Work
with marginal interest groups typically
is avocational for welfare professionals
who find their primary professional ac-
tivity within the structural interests of
social welfare.
Dynamics of Structural
Interests
Two dynamics are central to the
viability of structural interests: (1)
bureaucratization and (2) privatization.
The expansion of civil authority to con-
trol the caprices of industrialization in a
capitalist economy provided the base for
the welfare bureaucracy that has come
to dominate social welfare. The scale of
operations implicit in bureaucracy has
continued into the postindustrial era,
despite the attempts by liberals to
dismantle the corporate bureaucracy
through antitrust litigation or the at-
tempts by conservatives to dismantle the
government bureaucracy through devo-
lution legislation. Currently, the state
bureaucratic apparatus coexists parallel
to private sector oligopolies; both types
of groups require enormous revenues to
apply technically sophisticted processes
to mass populations (Harris, 1981). Ac-
cordingly, welfare bureaucrats and
human service executives execute stra-
tegies of bureaucratic reform to further
their interests (Alford, 1973). Although
human service executives may use other
terminology for their plans, the plans are
no less bureaucratic in nature. Human
service executives prefer a rationalized
system of service provision, and
bureaucratic reform is a way to realize
this arrangement, consistent with the
second dynamic in social welfare.
Privatization, the use of nongovern-
mental organizations to provide services,
has a long history in social welfare in the
United States (Abramovitz, 1986; Ben-
dick, 1985; Starr, 1985; Stoesz, 1987). As
Bendick (1985) has observed, this trend
is consistent with the American empha-
sis "on the local, the pluralistic, the
voluntary, and the business-like over the
national, the universal, the legally en-
titled, and the governmental" (p. 1).
Before the New Deal, much social wel-
fare was private and provided by agen-
cies of the voluntary sector. The
emergency of for-profit health and
welfare corporations is, of course, a more
recent example (Stoesz, 1986). With the
growth of health and welfare corpora-
tions, however, privatization has taken
on a new meaning: Privatization has
become equated with the market econ-
omy. Consequently, market reform stra-
tegies of change have emphasized the
role of private practitioners and human
service executives, which operate on a
for-profit basis and have ignored the
traditional providers, which do not.
Bureaucratization and privatization in-
fluence each structural interest different-
ly (Figure 1). In general, human service
executives obtain the most benefit from
bureaucratization and privatization, and
traditional providers have the most to
lose. However, the effect of these forces
is more complex than this.
The problem for traditional providers
is to maintain local institutions that sup-
port community values. In a society in
which individuals increasingly are de-
pendent on megastructures of the public
and private sectors, this atmosphere is
difficult to maintain. At best, national
consortia, such as the United Way or sec-
tarian associations, offer a symbolic
identification but not the vehicle for ac-
cumulating revenues and recruiting per-
sonnel that they had provided in the past.
Traditional providers have suffered par-
ticularly from budget rescissions exacted
by the Reagan administration. Federal
funds to programs in which nonprofit
agencies have been active (excluding
Medicare and Medicaid) were reduced
about $26 billion each year, or 25 percent
between 1982 and 1984; yet increased
fundraising efforts compensated for only
7 percent of this loss (Abramson &
Salamon, 1986). The interaction of
105
 Figure l. choose private practitioners), the client
Dynamics of Structural Interests base for private practitioners will be
eroded seriously. Human services in in-
Scale dustry is a new development, largely
Small Large Privatization limited to Employee Assistance Pro-
Nonprofit Traditional Welfare grams (EAPs). Preliminary studies sug-
providers bureaucrats gest that employers may find industrial
Economy
Clinical Human service human services provided on an in-house
For-profit entrepreneurs executives basis an attractive method for address-
Bureaucratization ing the question of escalating employee
benefit costs (Decker, Starrett, &
Redhouse, 1986; Straussner, 1988). For
privatization and bureaucratization a full-scale "social-industrial complex" this reason, industrial social welfare, the
makes traditional providers particularly under the auspices of the state and monop- provision of welfare directly by an
vulnerable to their competitors in the oly industries. (O'Connor, 1973, p. 54) employer to employees, is particularly
welfare industry, especially the corpora- likely to become a structural interest.
tions managed by human service ex- In the United States, the accumulation of Employees of firms with on-site social
ecutives. To remain viable in a more such accords and the sharing of person- services will find such an arrangement
competitive welfare industry, the volun- nel could evolve into a human service- more convenient than negotiating for
tary sector may have to merge indepen- industrial complex, in which decisions in service with a human service corpora-
dent agencies into oligopolies or establish American welfare are worked out by tion. As major employers seek to reduce
nationwide, centrally controlled fran- welfare bureaucrats and human service the cost of expensive benefit packages by
chises of human service agencies. executives, to the exclusion of other hiring human service workers, employ-
Less vulnerable than traditional pro- groups (Gruber, 1971). ment opportunities will attract profes-
viders by virtue of the bureaucratic For private practitioners, the problem sionals from other structural interests.
leviathan that supports them, bureau- will be to expand their influence without Professional schools will establish
cratic providers are more able to endure flooding the labor market with profes- special curricula and offer certificates in
the trend toward privatization. In re- sionals. In 1975, 2.4 percent of social new specializations-such as, human re-
sponse to cuts in public funds, welfare workers identified private practice as sources management and occupational
bureaucrats may jettison programs, but their primary activity, with 22.6 percent social work-as several schools already
they would prefer to subcontract with the indicating it was secondary employment have done; also, professional associa-
private sector and retain an adminis- (Kelley & Alexander, 1985). In 10 years, tions will publish special journal issues on
trative superstructure that can redeploy this group roughly doubled-7.6 percent industrial social welfare (Hopps, 1988).
frontline workers in the event the public listed private practice as their primary Industrial social welfare already has at-
becomes disenchanted with privatiza- activity, and 40.9 percent as secondary tracted the attention of social policy
tion. For welfare bureaucrats, any other employment (NASW, 1985). Aside from analysts. Under the rationale of "human
structural interest would be a plausible increasing competition among private capital investments," Reich (1983) has
contractee, but human service execu- practitioners for clients, clinical en- suggested using the employer as a source
tives offer a special advantage. Although trepreneurs also must fend off the efforts of a range of social welfare benefits.
traditional providers and private practi- of human service executives to capture Many employers now provide child care
tioners may be reliable contractees, they their clientele through superior as a benefit to employees. Such em-
do not have the scale of organization or marketing. The ability of private practi- ployer-provided benefits make social
the degree of centralization that ensures tioners to do the same is hampered welfare more closely related to produc-
welfare bureaucrats that a large volume because most of their power resides at tivity and may be a preferred method of
of service can be provided in a manner the state level (because states regulate provision for those concerned about the
that is sufficiently accountable. In con- professional practice) and the local level competitiveness of American industry
trast, human service executives can (because of the locality-specific nature of (Stoesz, 1988a).
make this assurance, and this group is private practice). At the national level, Industrial social welfare has indirect
most likely to influence welfare bureau- few professional associations are implications for traditional providers.
crats. As might be expected from the equipped well enough to match the Some employees may question whether
trend toward privatization, the growing power of human service corporations. continuing to support traditional pro-
influence of human service executives, Perhaps the most serious threat to viders in the community is necessary,
compared with welfare bureaucrats, private practitioners, however, is the because many services are provided by
makes likely the negotiation of issues development of industrial human ser- employers. As more and larger em-
that are important to both parties. Such vices. If this group convinces public and ployers develop employee assistance
a development would be consistent with private employers to provide welfare ser- programs, employers will have less
British observers (Gough, 1979; O'Con- vices in-house rather than through in- justification to make corporate contribu-
nor, 1973) who envision surance (which allows employees to tions to traditional providers out of some
106 Social Work / March 1989
sense that the employer will benefit in-
directly when employees obtain services
from them. Eventually, corporate con-
tributions to philanthropic organizations
may decline (Kristol, 1982). As a conse-
quence of dynamics of structural inter-
ests, industrial social welfare promises to
expand, probably at the expense of tradi-
tional providers and private practitioners.
The theory of social welfare provides
a preliminary orientation to the context
of social welfare in the United States. As
a structural theory, it emphasizes the role
of interest groups in defining social
welfare and provides an explanation of
why some groups remain marginal to the
welfare enterprise. Finally, the theory of-
fers predictions about the future of
groups that have been instrumental in
American social welfare. The theory in-
vites empirical investigation and en-
courages welfare professionals to pursue
a depth of analysis that identifies causes
for the "complexity and difficulty" in-
herent in social welfare (Craib, 1984).
Such exploration is as useful for those
concerned about macro phenomena as for
clinicians who must conform practice
theory to the contexts in which they work.
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David Stoesz, DSW, is Assistant Professor,
School of Social Work, San Diego State
University, San Diego, CA 92182, and
Director, policyAmerica.
Accepted October 26, 1988
107