Pau, 20th November 2013

Exploration & Production

DGEP/GSR/TG/MTS/AS N° 13-XXX
David ALBERT

Operational HSE Control Audit

TEPI – BGP 8611

Borneo Prince, Borneo Princess,

Tayla Page & Mega Abadi 1 Barges

3D NW Tunu – INDONESIA – November 2013

Evacuation of a casualty on bridging during the MEDEVAC drill performed on crew

Archive Ref:
 Identification page
Title : Operational HSE control Audit / TEPI – BGP / Borneo Prince Barge / 3D NW Tunu –
INDONESIA – November 2013

Author(s) : Agus WATYANTO - Zhang / Victory SHENGLI - David ALBERT

Direction : GEOSCIENCES

Date : 20/11/2013

Formal commercial order : 30T13AS016O24

Chronological reference : DGEP/GSR/TG/MTS/AS 13-xxx Verified by : Patrick RAVAUT

Validated by : Paul MATTHEWS

Domain (general topics) : 1 - HSE 2 - Audit 3 – SW-TZ

Keywords (specific topics) : 1 - Indonesia 2 - TUNU 3 – BGP

4 – 3D 5–

Country : INDONESIA Field : TUNU

Region : EAST KALIMANTAN Well : 16 GTS
Basin : Geophysical Survey 3D North West Tunu 2013/2014
Licence/Block : TUNU

Comments :

Distribution list
Distribution of complete report

2 copies DGEP/GSR/ASI/GDM Reports on paper and on pdf format

1 copy DGEP/GSR/TG/MTS/AS D. ALBERT (report on paper and on pdf format)

6 copies TEPI/GSR/EKD/GPH M. ERBETTA / R. DARTIGUALONGUE (reports on paper and on pdf

format)
Exploration & Production

Abstract/Conclusion

Total EP Indonesia has committed with BGP for a 3D seismic survey on North West Tunu
area. The prospect consists in 590 km2 of seismic acquisition. Around 31 % of the data will
be acquired with air gun source, 21% with explosives flushed in Transition Zone and 48%
with explosives on land (the crew will use both electric and electronic detonators). The
schedule includes 117 579 source points.

The prospect includes several TEPI installations such as 16 GTS and NPU complex. The
operations around each of them are covered by several permits to work hot or cold
depending on the type of operation. The data acquisition started on the 17th April on the first
phase (there is four phases on the survey area, the crew is still operating in the first one), and
will last till end of 2014. BGP has mobilized around 165 floating units including some local
boats, flushing catamarans and barges for the project.

During the audit the POB was established to 1327; the crew reached 3 700 000 hours without
LTI. After 7 months of operation the crew has completed one third of the scheduled program.

During the audit, depending on the days, the sky was cloudy or bright. Some tropical showers
in the morning and thunderstorms were observed. The temperatures never exceed 35°C at
day, but the moisture was generally suffocating in the early afternoons (especially in the
Nipah and mangrove areas, more than 38°C with 100% humidity experienced).

The present operation is performed is a very testing environment (well known by TEPI GSR
supervision personnel as the majority of the supervision team is present since Central Tunu
survey in 2009), where even if the crew is managing quite well the field operations the
hazards faced are multiple and not all preventable.

At the time of the audit the crew had serious production rate problems and was stuck on the
swath 131. This swath is located north of NPU on the most difficult part of the survey (mud
and sand banks, floating mud, tide and current). On this swath more than 1400 hydrophones
and 400 shot points have been reflushed involving over exposure of the personnel.

The present audit purpose was to assess the crew progress versus the results of the audit
performed in May 2013, 7 month before. Amongst others the following points are bullets the
crew has to focus on to improve the global operation HSE level:

 The HOD HSE commitment and awareness is still below expectations despite a one
day HSEMS training organised before the audit (the crew HSE stability is still based on
Indonesian staff experience).
 The HSEMS training plan provided after the first HSE audit has not been implemented.

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Exploration & Production

 The BGP crew HSE Department (as well as HOD/supervision level) is still under staffed
for a 1300 POB crew. The BGP crew management staff has remained stable in number
while the workforce has more than doubled in 7 months
 The BGP crew HSE Department needs enhanced support from HQ (Jakarta). The crew
is still lacking of international qualified (land, TZ, SW and OBC skills and experience)
despite the former audit recommendation on this topic.
 The commitment of middle management to HSE is questionable as various basics are
not in place and nothing shows an on going progress, despite the former audit
recommendation on this topic.
 RWP (remedial Work Plan) system not used as a tool but as data base, despite the
former audit recommendation on this topic.
 BGP crew HSE documentation not reviewed enough and consequently not always
accurate or applicable, this concerns amongst other, procedures and all related check
lists, efforts have been witnessed during the audit but they are not at expected level.
 The crew has still not received the support of a professional technical translator, despite
the former audit recommendation on this topic.
 It has been witnessed a general lack of communication and coordination on crew
between Departments despite various daily and weekly meetings (hazard maps not
despatched in time)
 Weak UA/UC reporting in such demanding environment: average of 15 reports a day for
an average POB of 1 215, this represents one report per person every three months. In
addition, among the 15 UA/UC reported, 3 are reported by TEPI HSE supervisory staff.
 One fourth of the items of the BGP crew RWP is issued by TEPI supervision staff.
 The Dong Fang Kan Tan 2 OBC vessel is not yet integrated to the crew HSE system.
 The communication resources on site are still not sufficient enough and not reliable
(repetitive internet connections failures during the audit).

At the time of the audit, the crew has already been in production for 7 months with all field
operations active.
The crew HSE awareness learning curve is still questionable as after 7 months of production,
basics are still not in place.
No real progress has been witnessed concerning the global HSE awareness of the workforce
from team leader to crew top management, the planning of operations and HSE activities and
the management of non routine operations.

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Exploration & Production

For the above mentioned reasons and the general means in place to identify, assess,
control and recover, the BGP crew 8611, engaged on the NW Tunu 3D 2013, is considered
as barely acceptable for the purpose of the work after 7 months of operation.
BGP management urgent and real commitment on the bullet points listed above is awaited.
The global audit “rating” is POOR, even considering the difficulties to manage a complex
and populated crew in such a testing environment.
As a reminder the quotation rate is as follows:
UNACCEPTABLE HSEMS not implemented, resources and standards not acceptable
POOR HSEMS not implemented but risks are identified, assessed,
controlled, and recovered
FAIR HSEMS not entirely implemented or/and HSEMS not fully
satisfactory
GOOD HSEMS implemented and fully satisfactory

Remarks:

Crew partial stoppage:

During the audit a partial stop of the crew (topo and bridging operations) has been
decided following the MEDEVAC drill results, performed on the bridging operations.
Logic should have dictated a complete stop of the operation, however, reason
prevented it because of the consequences of stopping an operation mobilizing 1,300
people and 160 floating units are difficult to anticipate (loss of part of the workforce
and part of the local logistics: longboats). The restart of such an operation would have
been, by experience, a long and painful process equivalent to a complete re
mobilization and its undesirable consequences.

Dong Fang KanTan II

The DFKT II is mobilised on crew, but lacking of medical on board support. In addition, BGP
does not have anyone on crew with enough marine related HSE knowledge to fully integrate
the DFKT II in the crew system. The DFKT II is a recent vessel but its crew is far to
understand the HSE constraints of the present operations and the operational links with
land/TZ existing crew. Extra qualified personnel are awaited urgently on the vessel.

Future operations:
The crew management, at present, is not really able to manage, with acceptable supervision
capabilities and in good HSE conditions, the TZ part activities in the north the barges and
accommodations in the center and the survey advance party in the south. Considering the
present status of the crew, BGP plans to conduct in parallel OBC operations, TZ operations
in the center, and land operations in the south cannot be seriously considered.

DGEP/GSR/TG/MTS/AS N 13-XXX
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 Table of contents

1 Main findings......................................................................................................................7
1.1 Positive findings.................................................................................................................... 7
1.2 Areas of concerns................................................................................................................. 8
1.3 Remarks............................................................................................................................... 8
1.4 Risk matrix and assessment.................................................................................................9
2 Audit/visit..........................................................................................................................10
2.1 Audit programme................................................................................................................10
2.2 Audit team........................................................................................................................... 10
2.3 Reference documents.........................................................................................................11
2.4 Operations Location............................................................................................................ 12
2.5 Fleet / Barge and other floating units..................................................................................13
3 Action Plan.......................................................................................................................18
4 Acronyms.........................................................................................................................22

Krait snake hanging in branches 5 meter aside the bridging

DGEP/GSR/TG/MTS/AS N 13-XXX
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1 Main findings

1.1 Positive findings

 All boats and barges certificates are valid.

 Fair standards of the Borneo Prince barge, but AC remains a problem

 Fair standards of the Borneo Princess fuel barge, after refurbishment of the SOPEP kit due
to present audit

 Catering fulfilling the contractual requirements

 Global respect of the IAGC standards in the field of operations

 Excellent quality of the bridging

 Equipment (logistic, transportation, barge, VHF communication, VTS) globally fits for
shallow water and transition operations purpose (VTS under reliability upgrade during audit)

 The journey management is very efficient and the radio operators skilled in their duty

 Borneo Prince Barge clinic efficient and fit for purpose/ambulance boat well equipped

 Regular rotation of the ISOS medics on crew

 Sewage treatment plant fully operational on barge Borneo Prince

 Recovery equipment sufficient on crew (2 ambulance boats, two clinic, medical team,
emergency equipment present). A doubling of field support (doctor and ambulance) has
been implemented as soon as the crew reached 1000 POB. DFKT II to be improved.

 Tool box meetings done in Bahasa and translated to expatriate staff if needed

 PPES are of good quality and worn by personnel (efforts to be done on earing protection of
RIB drivers and on specific gloves)

 The PTW system in place and implemented on crew (controlled by TEPI HSE Dpt on crew)

 Meetings held as per schedule

 Rubber boats perfectly adapted to the operation (safe and efficient)

 Huge effort of personnel training (around 100 persons trained everyday)

 Excellent reactivity of the crew concerning corrective actions

 Excellent and transparent communication between BGP crew management and TEPI
supervision team

 Good management of the 45 long boats gathered in 11 floating fly camps

 Decomissioning operations are well managed (specific supervisor and team assign to this
task)

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1.2 Areas of concerns
 See main bullet points of the abstract of the present audit

 Emergency drills not performed as per plan, some of them are below expectation in terms
of management (MOB on DFKT 2 and MEDEVAC on bridging crew)or results

 The Borneo Princess fuel barge bunkering operation has been performed below
acceptable standard with a supporting documentation not adapted.

 The RWP (remedial work plan) still not used as a tool by crew management.

 BGP documentation is not always relevant or do not fit for purpose, a lot of work is to be
done in this domain to reach an acceptable level in documentation quality

 Heads of Departments not fully involved in HSE

 A lot of records (inspections, visits) and meetings are done but without consistency

 Internet system far to be reliable (despite the set up of two V-Sat systems)

 Involvement of the HSE department on field visits but poor results

 Too much complacency in reporting (80 inspections a day producing only 15 action
points)

 Weaknesses in the inspections follow-up and RWP implementation

 Excellency of crew reactivity is often obtained under constraints (points raised as

ultimatums are always sovled within 24 to 36 hours)

 The incident report quality made by BGP still needs real improvement (analysis and
investigations are made by TEPI HSE supervision team, then passed to BGP). The HOD
are not involved in investigations or even on CTA, the process is performed by HSE
Department.

 BGP crew has difficulties to plan operations and forecast issues

 Even if trainings are performed in quantity, the quality remains a concern

 PT BUMA workers food ration is below standards (proteins quantities still questionable)

 The presence of a professional translator is requested on crew to up date documentation

and translate all applicable documents into Bahasa

 Leakages in the Borneo Prince kitchen piping

1.3 Remarks
As stated in May, the majority of the HSE progresses on crew are led or helped by the TEPI
HSE Supervision team.

A strong commitment of the crew is awaited to actually implement the BGP HSE MS
throughout all Departments activities.

DGEP/GSR/TG/MTS/AS N 13-XXX
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 1.4 Risk matrix and assessment
The rating of the operation is based upon the evaluation of the risk associated to it:

 If any of the hazards faced by the crew, after its mitigation through the system of control and
recovery established by the crew, is still associated to a SERIOUS RISK according to the
Hazard Risk Matrix, the operation has to be stopped without delay and resumed only after the
full involvement of the concerned affiliate.

 If any of the hazards faced by the crew, after its mitigation through the system of control and
recovery established by the crew, is still associated to a HIGH RISK according to the Hazard
Risk Matrix, the URGENT attention of the management is required to solve at the earliest the
priority points and to bring the crew back to acceptable standards.

 In all other cases (MEDIUM or LOW), the normal attention given by the management to HSE
matters and a focus on the recommended action points will maintain the crew within
acceptable standards. Nevertheless a combination of MEDIUM and LOW risk may lead to
consider the crew as facing a global HIGH RISK.

The evaluation does not only concern the crew, but applies to the whole line management and
also appreciates the assistance of the Contractor HSE Department during the preparation and
progress of the crew.
Seriousness

CONSEQUENCES INCREASING LIKELIHOOD

People

Reputation
Environment
Assets

A B C D E

Never Heard of Incident Happens Happens

heard of in in industry has several several
industry occurred times per times per
in our year in our year in a
Company Company location

0 No health No damage No effect No impact

effect/injury
1 Slight health Slight Slight effect Slight
LOW
damage impact

2 Minor health Minor Minor effect Limited

MEDIUM
effect/injury damage impact

3 Major health Localised Localised Consider-

HIGH
effect/injury damage effect able impact

4 PTD or 1 Major Major effect National

SERIOUS
fatalitiy damage impact

5 Multiple Extensive Massive International

fatalities damage effect

DGEP/GSR/TG/MTS/AS N 13-XXX
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2 Audit/visit

2.1 Audit programme

Date Activities
S 3 Travel home-Paris-Singapore
M 4 Arival Singapore – night in Singapore
T 5 Travel Singapore – Balikpapan
W 6 Briefing with affiliate GSR Department - Travel Balikpapan– crew
T 7 HSE induction - bunkering operation – documentation review
F 8 HOD interviews
S 9 Floating fly camps audit – HOD interviews
S 10 Bridging operations – MEDEVAC drill – topo and bridging crews stopped
M 11 Dong Fang Kan Tan 2 OBC vessel – MOB drill - documentation review
T 12 SW flushing - AP review and report drafting
W 13 Debriefing on crew - Travel crew Balikpapan
T 14 visa done in immigration office - Debriefing in Balikpapan
F 15 Report writing - Travel Balikpapan – Singapore – Paris
S 16 Travel Paris - home

2.2 Audit team

David ALBERT / Total HSE Advisor for seismic operations worldwide
Alain CARNEMOLLA / TEPI HSE Superintendant on crew
Agus WATYANTO / TEPI HSE/SAF Head of Department
Adi PAULUS / TEPI HSE Superintendant on crew
Irfan FADLAN / TEPI HSE Supervisor
Muhammad SYARIEF / TEPI HSE Supervisor

Zhang SHENGLI (Victory) / BGP Corporate HSE Advisor

Qin Lin / BGP HSE Indonesia Manager
Li WEIGUO / BGP crew Party Chief
Zhu CHAO / BGP crew Party Manager
Donna BERNARDUS / BGP crew HSE advisor

DGEP/GSR/TG/MTS/AS N 13-XXX
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2.3 Reference documents
 The contract includes a list of HSE standards
 A Crew HSSE Plan has been developed for the crew
 Various HSE and operational plans have been developed for each crew activity (recording,
drilling, rintis, survey, etc)
 BGP HSEMS documentation is available on crew
 A set of HSE Manuals is kept on crew
 IAGC and OGP Manuals are available
 ESBS and ESIA are available on crew
 HIRA document drawn by TEPI seismic HSE
 A SIMOPS dossier is available on crew
 A bridging document has been written and reviewed for the seismic operation

Part of the audit team on the Borneo Prince Barge

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Operations Location

The prospect is divided in 4 phases,

in red the swath 131 on which the crew was stuck during the audit

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 2.4 Fleet / Barge and other floating units

Borneo Prince
barge

Workshop
barge

Fuel barge

DGEP/GSR/TG/MTS/AS N 13-XXX
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Explosive
barge

GUN BOAT
Haibo 2

Fang Lan
small model

DGEP/GSR/TG/MTS/AS N 13-XXX
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Fang Lan large
model

CATAMARANS

TUG BOAT
(FiFi)

DGEP/GSR/TG/MTS/AS N 13-XXX
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LCT Recording

SEA TRUCK
(example)

Rubber boat

DGEP/GSR/TG/MTS/AS N 13-XXX
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FFC (Floating
Fly Camp)
example

Dong Fang
Kan Tan II
(OBC vessel)

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3 Action Plan
Priority: 1 Urgent

2 Essential

3 Advised

The action points number are correlated to the BGP 8611 crew remedial Work Plan excel file

The prioritisation will have to be done on crew depending on delivery time, resources and
operational possibilities.

N° P ACTION POINT

Borneo Princess barge, bunkering operation : review PTW form

Borneo Princess barge, bunkering operation : put “flammable” sticker on the store
room (paint, thinner, waste oil drums found in the store

Borneo Princess barge, bunkering operation : get rid of the dripersant drum (use
forbidden in the delta, no proper lid, no label on the drum, no related MSDS)

Borneo Princess barge, bunkering operation : replace the dispersant by soap as

instructed since the beginning of the operation

Borneo Princess barge, bunkering operation : train the SPOB (Self propelled oil
barge) Star 3 personnel about the use of dispersant

Borneo Princess barge, bunkering operation : to set scuppers on the holes of the
containment wall on the fuel barge

Borneo Princess barge, bunkering operation : to replace the wet sand drum by a box
full of absorbent pads

Borneo Princess barge, bunkering operation : to get rid of wet saw dust and replace it
by absorbent pads

Borneo Princess barge, bunkering operation : to provide hydrocarbon resistant

gloves to spillage control team

Borneo Princess barge, bunkering operation : to replace the mask (with cartridges for
organic solvents) and provide hydrocarbon protection cartridges

Borneo Princess barge, bunkering operation : to provide a full body harness

Borneo Princess barge, bunkering operation : to instruct about the use of full body
harness use

Borneo Princess barge, bunkering operation : to follow the procedure concerning the
test of all water pumps before the bunkering operations

Borneo Princess barge, bunkering operation : to provide masks to all personnel

involved in spillage contriol

Borneo Princess barge, bunkering operation : to organize a spillage drill with TEPI
HSE supervisor on site to assess SPOB and barge personnel response

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 Borneo Princess barge, bunkering operation : to review the check list used to control
bunkering operations (at present a copy paste of MPM one without proper
adaptation)

Borneo Princess barge, bunkering operation : to review the procedure and get rid of
all obsolete versions

Borneo Princess barge, bunkering operation : to contact other BGP crew (to have
accurate example) to set proper SOPEP boxes on Borneo Princess Barge and Star3

HSE Dpt : to have the BUMA HSE personnel involved in the sectional meetings

HSE Dpt : to review the job description of the HSE advisor on crew

HSE Dpt : to create a job description for the HSE advisor assistant

HSE Dpt : to create the job description of the HSE support (Qin Lin based in Jakarta)

HSE Dpt : to translate the job description in Bahasa for the HSE officer

HSE Dpt : to ensure the bridging is verified before the various Dpt are using it

HSE Dpt : to train HSE personnel involved with loading and shooting in basic shooter
licence

To train the HOD in procedure writing

To train HOD on CTA cause tree analysis

To train HOD about HSEMSimplementation “on the spot” = on day to day crew
business : RWP use and purpose, HAZID method, etc

To review the HOD jod descriptions for English language and accuracy versus the
real activities

To have all job description written on the same format (including KPI and minimum
training)

To have the Production manager of the crew attending the various sectional
meetings

To review the production manager job description with accurate KPI

To up date the crew organisation chart and highlight the line management

To provide ear muffs to all rubber boats drivers

To provide ear protection (plugs ?) to all rubber boats assistant pilots

To establish a plan of rubber boats inspection and implement it on crew

DGEP/GSR/TG/MTS/AS N 13-XXX
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DGEP/GSR/TG/MTS/AS N 13-XXX
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 Part of the audit team on the Dong Fang Kan Tan II

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4 Acronyms

AB Able Bodied seaman = seafarer

BA Breathing Apparatus
BOSIET Basic Offshore Safety Induction Emergency Training
EBS Environmental Baseline Study
ECG Electrocardiogram
EIA Environment Impact Assessment
ESIA Environment and Societal Impact Assessment
FAC First Aid Case
FAK First Aid Kit
FRB-FRC Fast Rescue Craft – Fast Rescue Boat
GPA General Platform Alarm
GPS Global Positioning System
HEMP Hazard Effect and Management Process
HLO Helicopter Landing Officer
HLA Helicopter Landing Assistant
HOD Head Of Department
HQ Head Quarters
HRA Health Risk Assessment
HSEA HSE Adviser
HSE MS HSE Management System
HUET Helicopter Underwater Escape Training
IAGC International Association of Geophysical Contractors
ISM International Safety Management
ISPS International Ship and Port Security
IVMS In Vehicle Monitoring System
JMS Journey Management System
JRA Job Risk Analysis
JSA Job Safety Analysis
KOM See ROC
KPI Key Performance Indicators
LOTO Lock out – Tag Out
LPT Loss Prevention Team (WesternGeco particular)
LTI Lost Time Injury
MARPOL MARitime POLlution

DGEP/GSR/TG/MTS/AS N 13-XXX
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MMO Marine Mammal Observer
MOPO Manual Of Permitted Operations
MSDS Material Safety Data Sheet
N/A Not Applicable
OGP Oil & Gas Producers
OIM Offshore Installation Manager
PC Party Chief
PM Party Manager
POB Personnel On Board
PPE Personal Protective Equipment
PRISM Personal Responsibility Integrated Sustainable Management (CGGV)
PTW Permit To Work
QC Quality Control
RCCB Residual Current Circuit Breaker
RSES « Responsable Safety Environment on Site”
RIR Reportable Incident Report (WesternGeco particular)
RLO Réunion de Lancement d’Opération = presurvey meeting
ROC Réunion d’Ouverture de Chantier = Kick Off Meeting (KOM)
RWC Restricted Work Case
RWP Remedial Work Plan
SAR Search And Rescue
SOLAS Safety Of Life At Sea
SOPEP Ship Oil Pollution Emergency Plan
SSB Single Side Band
SSO Ship Security Officer
UV Ultra Violet
VHF Very High Frequency
VSAT Satellite System (Communication)
VTS Vehicle Tracking System

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