(Philipp K. Masur) Situational Privacy and Self-Di (B-Ok - Xyz)

Philipp K.
Masur
Situational
Privacy and
Self-Disclosure
Communication Processes in
Online Environments
Situational Privacy and Self-Disclosure
Philipp K. Masur
Situational Privacy and

Self-Disclosure
Communication Processes in
Online Environments
123
Philipp K. Masur
Institut für Kommunikationswissenschaft
Universität Hohenheim
Stuttgart
Germany
Dissertation, Universität Hohenheim, 2017
ISBN 978-3-319-78883-8 ISBN 978-3-319-78884-5 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-78884-5
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Preface
The following book presents my attempt to rationalize one major argument: in

order to understand people’s privacy perceptions and behaviors, we need to adopt
a situational perspective. Both the theoretical argumentation and the empirical
investigation advanced in this book must be understood as attempts to justify this
claim. At the same time, this work is meant as a contribution to the exploration and
investigation of interpersonal communication.
The book is therefore divided into three parts. Part I advances the theory of
situational privacy and self-disclosure. I start by describing the characteristics
of new media environments and by analyzing why they represent new privacy
threats for individuals’ privacy regulation (Chap. 2). This analysis will reveal
why a situational perspective is particularly important when investigating people’s
behaviors in these new environments. I will then return to the roots of privacy and
self-disclosure theories in order to develop a more comprehensive conceptualization
(Chaps. 3 and 4). So far, self-disclosure has only implicitly been connected to
privacy and the actual nature of this connection has remained ambiguous—at
times even paradoxical. I thus aim at synthesizing both streams of research in
Chap. 5. Until this point, however, the theoretical discussion will have focused on
overall theories of privacy and self-disclosure that did not explicitly incorporate the
specificities of mediated communication. In Chap. 6, I will hence discuss impacts
of new information and communication technologies on these traditional theories of
privacy and self-disclosure. At the core of Part I, the theory of situational privacy
and self-disclosure will be presented (Chap. 7). Based on different approaches
to person-environment interactions, I will derive an overall situational framework
that identifies the entire set of factors influencing situational behavior making
them amendable to theoretical and empirical investigation. Based on five basic
suppositions, I will describe three major processes of the theory: pre-situational
privacy regulation processes, situational privacy perception and self-disclosure
processes, and post-situational evaluation processes.
Part II represents the application of the theory to smartphone-based communi-
cation. The objective of Chap. 8 is to provide an in-depth analysis of how people
choose certain communication environments on their smartphones (i.e., applications
v
vi Preface
that allow for different types of social interactions), how they manipulate them (i.e.,
how they use privacy regulation behaviors to control the level of privacy), and how
these external factors, in combination with interpersonal perceptions and internal
personal factors, affect self-disclosure within these environments. Chapter 9 will
introduce the multi-method study conducted to test the derived assumptions. It will
be shown that a combination of survey, experience sampling, and tracking methods
must be regarded as the most valuable research design for testing the proposed
theory. The results obtained will be described in Chap. 10 and discussed in Chap. 11.
In Part III, the overall implications of the theory will be discussed and critically
reflected upon in light of the findings from the empirical study. In Chap. 12, I
will summarize the major findings and offer some overall criticism of the proposed
theory. I will further consider possible extensions and modifications of the theory.
Finally, I will provide some perspectives on future research (Chap. 13). I will argue
for the merits of adopting a situational perspective and suggest possible research
areas which I deem most important within the next years. To conclude, I will discuss
some societal implications of this work.
The interested reader may find it most useful to read all parts consecutively as
each provides the necessary foundation for the next. However, each part may also
be read on its own as each serves additional purposes. For example, privacy scholars
will find a systematic review of classic as well as contemporary theories of privacy
and self-disclosure in Part I. Likewise, communication scholars will discover an
additional methodological discussion of the mobile experience sampling method in
Part II which—in my opinion—provides an invaluable approach toward measuring
situational communication processes in general. Finally, practitioners, teachers, or
interested individuals may draw from the practical implications discussed in Part III.
By investigating a subject as complex and elusive as privacy and self-disclosure,
I have worked and struggled with the inspiring and oftentimes incredibly compre-
hensive work of previous scholars. Although I may have been critical at times, their
work has been an insightful and an inspiring resource on which I humbly hope to
build. I sincerely hope that I succeeded to provide an enjoyable and insightful read,
not just for other scholars but also for the layperson who is interested in the complex,
yet fascinating nature of privacy and self-disclosure.
This book could not have been written without the help of many important
people. They all have contributed in one way or another and I am deeply indebted to
them. First, I want to thank my supervisor Prof. Dr. Sabine Trepte for her guidance,
inspiration, motivation, feedback, and continual support. I am grateful for being a
part of her team, which provides a truly stimulating research environment. I feel
very blessed to work with such wonderful people and such an inspiring group of
researchers. I also thank her for the initial encouragement to use alternative methods
of data collection and for the funding of the empirical study. Second, I want to thank
Prof. Dr. Jens Vogelgesang, who is the second advisor of this thesis and provided
valuable feedback during the writing of this book. He has encouraged me to be more
critical and precise.
I especially would like to thank Tobias Dienlin. Many thoughts expressed in this
book evolved from our long discussions. I am grateful for such a great scientific
Preface vii
sparring partner, and, more important, for such a true friend. His critical comments,
his ability to think differently, and (obviously) his research have all shaped this
book. I hope, Tobias, that you will continue challenging me over and over again.
Many thanks also go to Michael Scharkow. For me, there could not have been a
better time for him to join our team. I received a great colleague and a new friend.
I want to thank Michael for his continual advice, help, and constructive criticism,
even going beyond methodical issues.
I further want to thank all of my current and past colleagues at the University
of Hohenheim: Cornelia, Doris, Josephine, Laura, Max, Susanne, and Thilo. They
have often made me think outside of the box and inspired me with their original
ways of thinking. I am particularly indebted to Max Braun, who was an invaluable
listener and sparring partner in the last phase of my dissertation. I also want to thank
Marko Bachl, who provided valuable last-minute feedbacks. Many thanks go to Keri
Hartman and Niha Jain for their thorough language editing and proofreading. I also
want to thank the German Society for Online Research for supporting this work. I
am also indebted to all participants who were willing to take part in such a time-
consuming study.
I further want to express my gratitude and love to my family. I thank them for
their understanding and help. They provided constant encouragement and support
during the writing of this book. Finally, I want to thank Maria Kaulbarsch—for
everything.
Stuttgart, Germany Philipp K. Masur

March 2018
Contents
1 Introduction .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 A Situational Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2 Overall Research Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Part I The Theory of Situational Privacy and Self-Disclosure

2 New Media Environments and Their Threats .. . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.1 Technical Properties of Online Communication .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.1.1 Digital Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.1.2 Networked Environments . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.2 Characteristics of Online Communication . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.2.1 Hyperpersonal Interaction .. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.2.2 Permanently Online and Permanently Connected.. . . . . . . . 21
2.2.3 Multimodal Communication Practices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.3 Privacy-Related Dynamics in Networked Environments .. . . . . . . . . . 23
2.3.1 Horizontal Dynamics .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.3.2 Vertical Dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.3.3 Preliminary Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3 Theories of Privacy .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.1 Multidisciplinary Discourses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.1.1 Privacy in Liberal Philosophies . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.1.2 Theories of the Public Sphere .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.1.3 The Feminist Critique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.1.4 The Legal Discourse .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.1.5 The Focus on Informational Privacy .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.1.6 The Philosophical Discourse . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.1.7 Conclusion: Commonalities and Reciprocal
Influences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.2 A Socio-Psychological Perspective on Privacy .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.2.1 Concepts of Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.2.2 Functions of Privacy .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
ix
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3.2.3 Privacy Regulation Behavior .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

3.3 On the Status of Socio-Psychological Privacy Theories.. . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.3.1 The Impact of Westin’s Theory . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.3.2 The Impact of Altman’s Theory . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4 Theories of Self-Disclosure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.1 Definitions of Self-Disclosure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.2 Functions of Self-Disclosure.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4.2.1 Trait Self-Disclosure and Mental Health . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4.2.2 Self-Disclosure in Dyadic or Small-Group
Interactions.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4.2.3 Self-Disclosure in One-to-Many Communications . . . . . . . 78
4.3 Risks of Self-Disclosure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.3.1 Potential Negative Consequences .. . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.3.2 Avoiding Self-Disclosure: Information Control .. . . . . . . . . . 81
4.4 On the Status of Self-Disclosure Theories . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.4.1 Modeling Disclosure Decision Processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.4.2 Modeling Long-Term Outcomes of Self-Disclosure .. . . . . 84
5 Connecting Privacy and Self-Disclosure . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
5.1 Communication Privacy Management Theory ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
5.1.1 Basic Principles .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
5.1.2 Implications .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
5.2 The Privacy Process Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
5.2.1 Basic Components .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
5.2.2 Implications .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
5.3 Privacy and Self-Disclosure as Theoretically Linked Concepts . . . 97
5.3.1 Disclosure Management as a Form of Privacy
Regulation.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
5.3.2 Privacy as a Requirement for Self-Disclosure.. . . . . . . . . . . . 100
6 Privacy and Self-Disclosure in the Age of Information .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
6.1 Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
6.1.1 Privacy Concerns as Measurable Proxy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
6.1.2 Consequences of Privacy Concerns .. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
6.1.3 A Cost-Benefit Perspective: The Privacy Calculus . . . . . . . 113
6.1.4 The Role of Online Privacy Literacy . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
6.1.5 Conceptualizing Privacy Regulation Behavior .. . . . . . . . . . . 117
6.2 Potential Extensions for Theories of Privacy
and Self-Disclosure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
6.2.1 Horizontal and Vertical Privacy .. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
6.2.2 The Networked Nature of Online Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
6.2.3 Multimodal Privacy Regulation .. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
Contents xi
6.3 Further Considerations and Implications .. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125

6.3.1 The Failing Privacy Calculus . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
7 The Theory of Situational Privacy and Self-Disclosure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
7.1 Situations as Units of Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
7.1.1 The Person and the Environment . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
7.1.2 Situational Concepts and Realities. . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
7.1.3 Defining the Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
7.2 Overview of the Theory .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
7.2.1 Basic Suppositions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
7.2.2 Scope and Applicability .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
7.3 Pre-situational Preventive Privacy Regulation Processes . . . . . . . . . . . 145
7.3.1 Privacy Regulation 1: Choosing an Environment . . . . . . . . . 146
7.3.2 Privacy Regulation 2: Manipulating the Environment . . . . 149
7.4 Situational Privacy Perception and Self-Disclosure Processes . . . . . 151
7.4.1 Personal Factors 1: Trait and Trait-Like
Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
7.4.2 Personal Factors 2: Internal Factors . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
7.4.3 Environmental Factors 1: Interpersonal Factors.. . . . . . . . . . 161
7.4.4 Environmental Factors 2: External Factors .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
7.5 Post-situational Evaluations Processes . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
7.5.1 Evaluation 1: Effectiveness of Privacy Regulation .. . . . . . . 173
7.5.2 Evaluation 2: Accuracy of Interpersonal Assessments . . . 175
7.5.3 Evaluation 3: Effectiveness of Self-Disclosure.. . . . . . . . . . . 176
7.6 Summary and Application . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
7.6.1 A Brief Summary .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
7.6.2 A Step-by-Step Application Guide . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
Part II Empirical Investigation of Smartphone-Based

Communication
8 Applying the Theory to Smartphone-Based Communication . . . . . . . . . 185
8.1 Describing Smartphone-Based Communication .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
8.2 Identifying Communication Environments . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
8.2.1 Applications as Communication Environments .. . . . . . . . . . 189
8.2.2 Manipulable and Non-manipulable Environmental
Factors.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
8.3 Antecedents of Pre-situational Preventive Privacy Regulation .. . . . 197
8.3.1 Non-situational Personal Factors . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
8.3.2 Implications for Antecedents of Self-Disclosure.. . . . . . . . . 206
8.4 Antecedents of Situational Depth of Self-Disclosure.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
8.4.1 Non-situational and Situational Personal Factors . . . . . . . . . 209
8.4.2 Situational Environmental Factors . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
8.4.3 Potential Interaction Effects .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
xii Contents
9 Methods .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215
9.1 Beyond Traditional Data Collection Methods . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
9.1.1 The Experience Sampling Method.. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
9.1.2 Combining Experience Sampling and Tracking
Methods .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219
9.2 Overall Research Design .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221
9.3 Pre-study .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222
9.3.1 Sample and Procedure .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
9.3.2 Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
9.3.3 Results and Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225
9.4 Main Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228
9.4.1 Sample and Procedure .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230
9.4.2 Event Sampling Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232
9.4.3 Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236
9.4.4 Variable Coding and Data Analyses . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242
10 Results .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251
10.1 Preliminary Analyses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252
10.1.1 Scale and Item Analyses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252
10.1.2 Assessing Potential Bias in the ESM Sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254
10.2 Predicting Pre-situational Preventive Privacy Regulation . . . . . . . . . . 256
10.2.1 Choosing the Environment .. . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256
10.2.2 Manipulating the Environment.. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 264
10.3 Predicting Situational Depth of Self-Disclosure .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 272
10.3.1 Situational Variance in Depth of Self-Disclosure . . . . . . . . . 272
10.3.2 Antecedents of Depth of Self-Disclosure.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 274
11 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285
11.1 Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 286
11.1.1 What Makes People Engage in Privacy Regulation
Behavior? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287
11.1.2 What Determines Whether People Disclose
Themselves? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293
11.2 Limitations and Reflections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299
11.2.1 Subjective Perceptions of External Environmental
Factors.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299
11.2.2 Sample, Variance, and Power Constraints .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301
11.2.3 General Methodological Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 302
11.2.4 Ethical Reflections .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 304
11.3 Preliminary Conclusion .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306
Contents xiii
Part III Implications and Future Perspectives

12 Overall Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 309
12.1 Summary and Theoretical Implications . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 310
12.1.1 Privacy from the Individual’s Point of View . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 311
12.1.2 Self-Disclosure as a Function of Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 313
12.1.3 Privacy Regulation Behaviors .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 314
12.1.4 The Situationality of Privacy and Self-Disclosure . . . . . . . . 315
12.1.5 Possible Modifications and Extensions .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 317
12.2 First Paradigm: Individuals as Rational Agents.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 318
12.2.1 Rational Choice in the Proposed Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 320
12.2.2 Alternative: Integrating Heuristics . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 323
12.3 Second Paradigm: Subjective Reality . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 324
12.3.1 Constructivism in the Proposed Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325
12.3.2 Alternative: Integrating Affordances . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 326
13 Overall Conclusion and Outlook.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 331
13.1 Prospects for Future Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 332
13.1.1 Disclosure of Personal Information .. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 333
13.1.2 Privacy Invasion Beyond Individual Control .. . . . . . . . . . . . . 336
13.1.3 Understanding Online Privacy Literacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 337
13.2 Societal and Practical Implications .. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 339
13.2.1 Providing More Sustainable Education
and Information .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 340
13.2.2 Fostering Political Deliberation .. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 343
13.3 Conclusion .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 344
A Additional Tables and Figures to Chap. 9 . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 347
B Additional Tables and Figures to Chap. 10 . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 351
References .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 365
Chapter 1
Introduction
Processes of revealing and concealing private information are inherently connected

to any act of communication: as human beings, we have to ask ourselves constantly
if we should permit others to know us as we truly are or if we should rather hide
certain aspects of our selves (Jourard, 1971a, p. vii). These decisions, however,
are not trivial as disclosing private information makes us vulnerable (Derlega,
Metts, Petronio, & Margulis, 1993, pp. 65–88). Exposing our true selves can result
in embarrassment or rejection. In the worst case, shared information may even
be used against us or disseminated to unwanted people (Baxter & Montgomery,
1996, p. 138). Nonetheless, self-disclosure decisions emerge naturally in many
situations. For example, if an untrusted person unexpectedly eavesdrops on our
private conversation with a close friend, we adapt easily by shifting to a neutral
topic. We decide not to disclose based on our interpersonal judgment of the intruder.
Through experiences, human beings learn to handle such privacy violations or
interferences swiftly and without much effort (Laufer & Wolfe, 1977, pp. 26–58).
Nowadays, however, a large part of our interpersonal communication takes
place in mediated environments. As information and communication technologies
disseminate into our lives and shape our communication practices through novel
affordances, the decision to reveal or conceal becomes more difficult (for an
overview, see Trepte & Reinecke, 2011a). Popular communication services such
as Facebook, Google+, WhatsApp, Instagram, Snapchat, or Twitter have altered
the architecture of information flow by accentuating confluence, flexibility, and
reflexibility of media content and information (Papacharissi, 2011a, p. 305). People
today have to navigate and communicate in complex media ecologies in which
information flows across connected platforms and is thus accessed by multiple and
diverse audiences. The emerging convergence culture (cf. Jenkins, 2008) sometimes
causes information to scale unexpectedly and quickly (e.g., Boyd, 2011), confronts
people with formerly disconnected audiences and social spheres (e.g., Binder,
Howes, & Sutcliffe, 2009; Marwick & Boyd, 2010; Vitak, 2012), and thereby
© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2019 1

P. K. Masur, Situational Privacy and Self-Disclosure,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-78884-5_1
2 1 Introduction
increasingly blurs the distinction between public and private spheres (e.g., Boyd,
2011; Joinson, Houghton, Vasalou, & Marder, 2011; Papacharissi, 2010).
At the same time, we can observe an increasing commodification of information
as communication services providers collect more and more data from their clients
(e.g., Castells, 2009). The revelations of former National Security Agency (NSA)
contractor Edward Snowden have shown that governmental agencies have access to
emails, chat conversations, voice calls, documents, search histories, file transfers,
and even live chats through servers of companies like Microsoft, Google, Apple,
Yahoo, Facebook, and many more (Greenwald, 2014). The acceleration in data
collection, accompanied by a steady advancement in aggregation and analysis
abilities, has thus facilitated ubiquitous surveillance and large-scale mining of
databases from which sensitive inferences about individuals can be drawn (Acquisti,
Brandimarte, & Loewenstein, 2015, p. 509).
Simply shifting the topic to avoid unwanted access is hence no longer applicable.
Instead, people have to be aware of a multitude of environmental factors that were
nonexistent in offline situations and implement a variety of preventive privacy
regulation strategies in order to achieve circumstances under which they feel able
to self-disclose. The decision between revealing and concealing private information
therefore must include assessment of the respective media environment in which
the communication takes place. However, the speed of technological progress
often exceeds the time individuals need to become aware of the new threats or
risks. Much information necessary to make reasonable decisions with regard to
privacy regulations and self-disclosure is somewhat intangible and therefore is often
not understood or simply unknown. In many cases, individuals feel overburdened
and consequently experience considerable uncertainty about the safety of their
online privacy (Acquisti et al., 2015, pp. 509–511). Not surprisingly, journalists
have recently proclaimed a constant decrease of privacy in western societies and
consistently evaluated this development as negative (e.g., von Pape, Trepte, &
Mothes, 2017, pp. 8–10). Analogically, uncertainty and privacy concerns increased
almost in all populations all over the world (European Commission, 2011, 2015;
Madden & Rainie, 2015; Trepte & Masur, 2017b).
In the last decades, communication scholars have studied why people seemingly
disclose a lot of private information in new media environments such as social
network sites (SNS). Several theoretical advancements have been proposed and
much empirical work has been conducted in order to shed light on this complex topic
(for overviews, see Abramova, Wagner, Krasnova, & Buxmann, 2017; Bélanger
& Crossler, 2011; Li, 2011; Smith, Dinev, & Xu, 2011; Trepte & Reinecke,
2011a). Although these approaches have brought important insights into many
aspects of privacy and self-disclosure processes in online environments, I think
it is important to go back to a rather fundamental question: What exactly makes
people disclose themselves? Based on several studies that have been conducted
recently, we could argue that general privacy concerns affect the decision to self-
disclose (for a recent meta-analysis, see e.g., Baruh, Secinti, & Cemalcilar, 2017).
Someone who generally fears that the content of digitally transferred messages
might be visible to unintended third parties might be more likely to decide against
1.1 A Situational Perspective 3
disclosing private information. In a similar way, we could investigate other person-

related characteristics: for example, we could argue that more literate individuals
who have high knowledge and skills with regard to data protection might be less
prone to share information in privacy-invasive mediated environments (e.g., Masur,
Teutsch, & Trepte, 2017; Trepte et al., 2015).
However, I argue that the willingness to disclose private information primarily
depends on situational factors. For example, whether we disclose will mostly be
determined by our motivation for sharing that particular information. Sometimes,
telling another person about a recent experience is important because we are in need
of advice. Other times, we simply need someone to talk to, someone who listens to
our concerns or thoughts. Even more so, our readiness to disclose will be determined
by factors that influence our situational perception of the prevailing level of privacy.
These include, for example, interpersonal factors such as our relationship to (or in
the terms that I will use throughout the book: our interpersonal assessment of) the
recipient: I am generally more willing to tell private information to a friend or family
member—a psychologically close and trusted person. My willingness to disclose
will also be higher when I communicate with people who I sympathize with, who
I perceive as similar to myself, and who are central and influential in my daily life.
My interpersonal assessments in a situation hence constitute a form of situational
privacy evaluation.
The point that I want to make is that these latter factors can be and are often
very different in other situations. As different goals will drive people’s behavior
at different times, different people might become more appropriate recipients.
Particular goals might even make many people an appropriate audience. At the same
time, different communication environments may provide varying circumstances
that affect the prevailing level of privacy and thus also the decision to disclose
the self (Masur & Scharkow, 2016, p. 3). For example, it certainly makes a
difference whether or not I am identifiable while sharing information (e.g., visually
by my profile picture). Likewise, it makes a huge difference whether a few
close people or all my acquaintances have access to the information that I am
sharing. Altogether, the prevailing circumstances—both the external characteris-
tics of the environment and the characteristics of the persons involved in that
situation—seem to be more important in influencing our level of self-disclosure
than personalities or general concerns (which might nonetheless affect behavior in
general).
1.1 A Situational Perspective
All behavioral theories in communication science and psychology more or less

implicitly acknowledge that the person and the environment are inextricably
interwoven (e.g., Rauthmann, Sherman, & Funder, 2015, p. 363). Theoretical work
on privacy and self-disclosure, however, suggests that the level of privacy, as well as
privacy needs, perceptions, regulation behaviors, and self-disclosure are inherently
4 1 Introduction
context-dependent (Acquisti et al., 2015; Dienlin, 2015; Nissenbaum, 2010; Smith

et al., 2011) and vary across situations (Altman, 1975; Laufer & Wolfe, 1977;
Pedersen, 1999; Petronio, 2002; Westin, 1967).
For instance, Westin (1967)—one of the most cited scholars in the literature
on privacy—denoted that “individuals are constantly engaged in an attempt to find
sufficient privacy to serve [. . . ] their individual needs of the moment” (p. 44). The
environmental psychologist Altman (1975) also argued that privacy is optimized
and regulated according to situational needs and desires: individuals constantly try
to compare the achieved level of privacy to their desired level of privacy as situations
change and evolve (p. 25). More explicitly, Laufer and Wolfe (1977) have argued
that “concepts of privacy and invasions of privacy are strongly tied to or defined
by the experience of given situations” (p. 25). They reasoned that any privacy
experience must depend on how individuals interact and comprehend the world in
which they live in. As these experiences are inevitably bound to “the modes of
consciousness available for conceptualizing concrete situations” (p. 25), aspects of
privacy must reflect the circumstances of given situations. Pedersen (1999) likewise
argued that privacy—defined as a form of boundary control—“is an optimization
process directed toward achieving a desired level of contact by one’s self or group
with others at a particular time and a given circumstance [. . . ] Privacy regulation is
a function of both personal and situational factors” (p. 397).
More recently, Petronio (2002) started developing her Communication Privacy
Management Theory with the premise that “revealing private information is never
a straightforward decision [. . . ] We try to weigh the demands of the situation
with our needs and those of others around us” (p. 1). Dienlin (2015) similarly
argues that “our context determines the degree of privacy we are currently per-
ceiving” (p. 155). Finally, Acquisti et al. (2015) acknowledge the situationality
of privacy in their review on privacy in the information age: “Applied to pri-
vacy, context-dependence means that individuals can, depending on the situation,
exhibit anything ranging from extreme concern to apathy about privacy” (p.
511).
The situationality of privacy is also evident in other academic discourses: in the
legal sciences, for example, privacy was often understood as a sort of condition
implicitly suggesting that privacy is somehow connected to the prevailing situational
circumstances. Legal scholar Solove (2008), for example, argued that “[i]n any
case, we need to resolve privacy issues by looking to the specific context. How
we value privacy and the countervailing interests depends on the circumstances of
each situation” (p. 48). Most recently, Nissenbaum (2010) provided perhaps the
most convincing rationale for regarding privacy as context-dependent and noted
that “there is, indeed, a great complexity and variability in the privacy constraints
people expect to hold over the flow of information, but these expectations are
systematically related to characteristics of the background social situation” (p.
129).
A situational perspective on privacy and self-disclosure is hence not new.
Nonetheless, a comprehensive conceptual framework for studying situation pro-
cesses seems necessary for two reasons. First, although the situationality of privacy
1.1 A Situational Perspective 5
and self-disclosure has been acknowledged in the theoretical literature, a consistent

and logical conceptual framework is missing. Second, for the most part, situational
aspects have not been transferred to actual empirical research that has been
conducted. Although a large body of literature in the field of communication science
used the theories of Westin, Altman, and Petronio as a theoretical basis, many
studies—specifically since the use of social media has become widespread—remain
vague or even ignorant of situational factors. The reason for this negligence may be
the difficulty of conceptualizing and measuring situationally varying independent
and dependent variables. As I will show in the course of this exposition, finding a
framework for this endeavor will be the main challenge of the theoretical work.
Probably due to this difficulty, previous empirical work has often taken a more
general approach and assessed person-specific variables such as personality traits,
attitudes or concerns on the one hand, and people’s estimations of their general
privacy regulation behavior or average self-disclosure on the other (e.g., Acquisti &
Gross, 2006; Bartsch & Dienlin, 2016; Dienlin & Metzger, 2016; Dienlin & Trepte,
2015; Heirman, Walrave, & Ponnet, 2013; Hofstra, Corten, & van Tubergen, 2016;
Hollenbaugh & Ferris, 2014; Joinson, Reips, Buchanan, Schofield, & Paine, 2010;
Krasnova, Veltri, & Günther, 2012; Masur & Scharkow, 2016; Masur, Teutsch,
& Trepte, 2017; Taddei & Contena, 2013; Taddicken, 2014; Trepte, Dienlin, &
Reinecke, 2014; Tsay-Vogel, Shanahan, & Signorielli, 2016; Tufekci, 2008; Winter
et al., 2014; Vitak, 2012).
Findings from these studies have provided many insights into what drives peo-
ple’s general behavior: The results have shown that correlates of the average level
of self-disclosure and the average engagement with privacy regulation behaviors
include socio-demographics such as age, gender, and education; personality facets
such as deliberation, openness, extroversion, neuroticism, and need to belong;
privacy related concepts such as need for privacy, privacy concerns, privacy
attitudes, negative experiences with privacy violations, and online privacy literacy;
different motives such as relationship maintenance; and also other concepts such
as general trust, trust in website providers, and frequency of media use. Yet
an inherent caveat of these survey studies is that our insights into privacy and
self-disclosure processes remain on that aggregate level. As Ross and Nisbett
(2011) point out, correlations between stable personal variables and behavior
mostly reach a maximum effect size of r = 0.30 (p. 3). In many instances, of
course, such an effect size is not trivial and allows for important predictions—
particularly when certain stable person-characteristics profoundly affect the way
people deal with situations. However, this leaves us with a large unexplained
variance that deserves closer inspection. In ignoring this remaining variance,
we may have over-emphasized on person-specific variables and neglected the
power of situationally varying factors in determining people’s behavior. Such a
perception bias has been investigated in several experimental studies and has
come to be known as the fundamental attribution error—the tendency to over-
estimate the effect of dispositional factors and to underestimate the influence
6 1 Introduction
of situational factors (e.g., Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Ross, 1977; Ross & Nisbett,
2011).1
There are also some methodical caveats in the current research practice. By
taking an aggregative perspective, many recent studies have resorted to a somewhat
similar methodical design: based on self-reports in standardized online surveys,
scholars often correlated person-related characteristics and people’s estimations of
their average privacy regulation behavior or average self-disclosure. A limitation
of such a method is that we can only ask people at one point in time. Although
this method is often adequate to assess a variety of stable variables such as
individual’s personality, opinions, attitudes, or even unique experiences, it is less
suitable to capture behaviors that are very frequent, but irregular (e.g., such
as self-disclosure). As scholars, we try to work around this limitation and ask
participants to reflect about their “general” behavior, their “general” perceptions,
or their “general” feelings. Strictly speaking, participants thus aggregate their many
situational experiences and estimate how they behave, think, or feel “in general” or
“on average.” Research on people’s memory and estimation capabilities, however,
has shown that such guesses or estimations are typically biased (for overviews,
see Bradburn, Rips, & Shevell, 1987; Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Sudman, Bradburn,
& Schwarz, 1996; Tourangeau, Rips, & Rasinski, 2000). Moreover, such biased
estimations disguise the oftentimes considerable variability in human perceptions,
feelings, and behavior across different situations, leaving the researcher with a
somewhat artificially constructed measure.
With this work, I aim to both challenge and build upon the existing literature by
proposing a comprehensive situational perspective on privacy and self-disclosure
processes. Of course, non-situational personal characteristics account for general
differences between individuals. However, I argue that it is the combination of
non-situational and situational factors that allows for more accurate predictions
and a more comprehensive understanding of privacy and self-disclosure processes.
As I intend to show, a situational perspective will not only help to solve some
conceptual issues, but will also provide the necessary tools to grasp the peculiarities
of new media environments. Different online environments provide different cir-
cumstances for communication and, consequently, also different levels of privacy.
Depending on the types of platform or applications that are used to communicate,
different combinations of environmental factors affect people’s privacy and self-
disclosure decisions. A situational theory will thus help us to understand why
new media environments represent a challenge for individual users and why their
behaviors in these environments might not always reflect their own concerns or
attitudes.
1 Empirical evidence suggests that people are inclined to offer dispositional explanations for human
behavior even when situational manipulations are easily perceivable (for an overview, see Ross &
Nisbett, 2011, pp. 119–144).
1.2 Overall Research Goals 7
1.2 Overall Research Goals
In line with the rationale presented above, the first and major aim of this work is to
provide the theoretical foundation to study privacy and self-disclosure from a situa-
tional point of view. As the synthesis of privacy and self-disclosure research remains
largely fragmented, I primarily aim to theoretically connect theories of privacy and
self-disclosure and thereby integrate both aggregative and situational approaches.
Building upon theoretical work investigating person–environment interactions, I
will then develop the theory of situational privacy and self-disclosure which allows
the investigation of both pre-situational privacy regulation processes and self-
disclosure as a consequence of situational privacy perceptions. It hence extends prior
theoretical work on privacy regulation and self-disclosure by putting the concepts
into a sequential order which, in turn, allows a more nuanced understanding
of individual privacy management processes. It further enables differentiation
between antecedents of self-disclosure with regard to their stability (situational
vs. non-situational) and whether they represent personal (i.e., characteristics of the
discloser) or environmental factors (i.e., both interpersonal and external character-
istics). As I will show, this theoretical framework allows to investigate privacy and
self-disclosure processes both in offline and online environments. The integration
of external environmental factors as relevant antecedents particularly facilitates the
inclusion of characteristics of new media environments and, correspondingly, an
investigation of their influence on people’s behaviors.
The second objective of this work is to test the assumptions of the theory
empirically. Of course, scholars have long used experimental designs to investigate
situational processes. However, experiments are likewise limited because they only
provide insights into one specific, and often artificial situation. In contrast, while the
theory of situational privacy and self-disclosure still aims to identify general patterns
in behaviors (just like correlational studies before), it simultaneously acknowledges
the situational variance (which was only partly considered in experiments). Since
classical data collection methods do not suffice to prove the assumptions of the
theory, I propose a new multi-method approach combining traditional survey
methods, log data, and experience sampling techniques. This method facilitates
investigation into how both personal and environmental factors affect self-disclosure
in various mediated and non-mediated communication situations, and it thereby
strengthens the external validity of the empirical analysis by sampling from real-
life situations.
In order to address the issues in explaining people’s behavior in online envi-
ronments, this empirical study is one of the first to address privacy and self-
disclosure processes in smartphone-based communication situations. Investigating
communication in this context is relevant for two reasons: First, using smartphone
applications for interpersonal communication has become the norm instead of the
exception. In 2012, only one-third of the US-American and German populations
owned a smartphone. Five years later, however, the number of smartphone users
doubled, and is likely to continue to increase (see Fig. 1.1). Representative surveys
8 1 Introduction
USA Germany
64% 74%
60%
56% 65%
55%
46%
35% 41%
36%
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Fig. 1.1 Percentage of population owning a smartphone in the USA and Germany from 2012 to
2016 (based on data collected by Bitkom, 2016; Smith, 2013, 2015; Trepte & Masur, 2017b)
have shown that people mostly use their smartphones for communicative purposes
(e.g., Duggan, 2015; Trepte & Masur, 2017b). Smartphone-based communication
thus plays a pivotal role in the daily lives of individuals. Despite these findings,
research on privacy and self-disclosure processes in different types of smartphone-
based communication environments remains surprisingly scarce. Instead, previous
research has typically focused specific platforms (mostly Facebook).
Second, hardly any other device has changed our daily communication as much
as the smartphone. As previous research is often limited to a single platform, it
neglects that people today use different applications for different purposes and thus
engage in what may be termed multimodal communication practices. In light of
this, choosing between different communication applications may already constitute
effective privacy regulation. Even more importantly, each application provides a
different environment that differently challenges an individual in his or her decision
to self-disclose. Hasebrink and Schmidt (2013) have argued that with increasing
media convergence, scholars need to take a more global perspective and analyze
so-called media repertoires. In the context of privacy and self-disclosure processes,
this is particularly relevant because individuals are confronted with more and diverse
communication situations that require granular privacy regulations and individually
affect the disclosure decision process. In light of this, the theory of situational
privacy and self-disclosure will thus be used to answer the following two overall
research questions: First, what makes people engage in application-specific privacy
regulation behaviors? Second, under what circumstances do people engage in high
levels of self-disclosure during smartphone-based communication?
The final goal of this work is to discuss the implications of the proposed theory
and the empirical findings for the individual, society, and future research. Among
other things, I particularly advocate for a stronger emphasis on understanding
online privacy literacy—defined as the awareness, knowledge, reflexion capabilities,
technical skill, and motivation necessary to communicate self-determined and in
line with individually reflected privacy needs in an increasingly digital way of life.
1.2 Overall Research Goals 9
I believe a comprehensive investigation of this concept may help to understand

and partly solve many of the issues we are currently facing and discussing both
in academic and societal circles.
Part I
The Theory of Situational Privacy and
Self-Disclosure
Chapter 2
New Media Environments and Their
Threats
The impact of media on social relationships, communication, and other aspects of

public and private life has always been subject of societal debates and academic
discussions. Oftentimes, these debates fluctuate between celebration and paranoia.
For example, the invention of the telephone has collectively captured the fascination
of people (e.g., Marvin, 1999), but at the same time, it was also condemned
“for its disruption of intimate relationships and its unsettling of established social
hierarchies” (Buckingham, 2008, p. 11). The debates around the impact of new
media do not deviate from this historical example. As Buckingham emphatically
notes, “On the one hand, the technology [Internet] is seen to create new forms
of community and civic life and to offer immense resources of personal liberation
and empowerment, while on the other, it is believed to pose dangers to privacy, to
create new forms of inequality and commercial exploitation, as well as leaving the
individual prey to addiction and pornography” (p. 11).
With regard to privacy and self-disclosure, we may all too hastily conclude that
new media have drastically reduced our informational privacy. However, we need to
be careful with such statements, as we may thereby embody a form of technological
determinism (e.g., Webster, 2014) and thus fail to recognize that technology is “both
socially shaped and socially shaping” (Williams, 1974). Papacharissi (2012) argues
that technology and its uses are negotiated among individuals, society, and also
within technology itself (pp. 51–52). It is hence not just the technology that affects
how privacy is perceived, defined, or affected; the ways in which people use these
new media and the social practices that shape the design of these technologies also
influence how privacy is perceived or conceptualized. More often than not, it is
the corresponding socio-technical dynamics that cause new tensions and threats to
individuals’ privacy.
Today, communication occurs through applications and platforms such as instant
messengers, social network sites, blogs or microblogs, mailing services, or video
chats that can be accessed from any devices with a network connection. In
these online environments, the more users disclose of themselves, the more they

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-78884-5_2
14 2 New Media Environments and Their Threats
can enjoy the benefits and gratifications of these new communication systems.
However, in doing so, they simultaneously risk what they themselves consider
privacy breaches under other circumstances (cf. Walther, 2011, p. 3). In general,
three complicating factors challenge users’ privacy when communicating in online
environments (Walther, 2011, p. 3). First, people generally seem to have a misplaced
presumption that online communication is somehow private because it resembles
analogous offline activities from an interpersonal point of view. Second, the
technical infrastructure of the Internet and in particular of new communication
platforms is in many ways incompatible with traditional concepts of privacy. Third,
people’s expectations of privacy do not constitute privileged communication by
definition.
In light of this, I deem it important to reanalyze what actually defines online
communication and what characterizes the new media environments in which online
communication takes place. I will first analyze the underlying technical infras-
tructure and evaluate how it changes traditional information flows. I will further
elaborate on how online communication differs from face-to-face communication.
I will place a specific emphasis on the impact of mobile devices (e.g., tablets,
or smartphones) and how they have altered they way we communicate with each
other. In doing so, I will describe a number of horizontal and vertical dynamics
that particularly challenge traditional privacy and self-disclosure processes. In the
final section, I will discuss the implications of these analyses for the development
of theories of privacy and self-disclosure.
2.1 Technical Properties of Online Communication
What characterizes online communication? And to what extent does it differ

from face-to-face communication? Put simply, the fundamental difference is the
technology that mediates the communication. To delve into this further, it is first
necessary to understand some technical principles of computer technology that
make computer-mediated communication possible. Two technical aspects seem
particularly important. First, online communication is based on the exchange of
digital information. Understanding the properties of digital information will help to
understand how novel privacy dynamics and threats emerged. Second, due to these
properties, new communication environments became networked. The underlying
network technology enabled the connection of information, spaces and people in
various and new ways.
2.1.1 Digital Information
The fundamental difference between offline and online communication lies in the
properties of digital information. Whereas information passed to other people by
2.1 Technical Properties of Online Communication 15
speech is fleeting and in most cases unrecorded, sharing information online means
transforming words, images, or meanings into bits. This transformation can be
understood as a translation of complex combinations into a simple binary code that
contains only 1 and 0 or on and off. A bit thus refers to the smallest element within
the “DNA of information” (Negroponte, 1996, p. 14). From a computer’s point of
view, information represents strings of these two digits (Miller, 1971, p. 11)
This transformation changes the way one can interact with information. Informa-
tion once shared online becomes persistent, searchable, replicable, and editable (cf.
Boyd, 2008a, p. 126). In my opinion, we can further add the notion that information
becomes linkable.1 These five properties are not distinct and must be regarded as
intertwined.
Persistence Once information is transformed into bits, it can be saved on a
computer hard drive. As long as it is not deleted, information becomes long-lasting
and can be reassessed at later points in time. In contrast to the ephemeral nature of
oral communication, mediated communication is generally recorded and stored. In
principle, what we type into the computer is stored on some local hard drive (either
on hard drives in our own computers or in third party-operated computers). For
example, the clusters of bits that constitute a status update on Facebook are stored
on the company’s servers. The information contained in the status update thereby
becomes accessible beyond the original posting and from anywhere in the world.
Searchability Information can be understood as combinations of binary code or
clusters of bits. However, there are new types of bits that tell us more about these
clusters. As Negroponte (1996) denotes: “a new kind of bit is born – a bit that
tells you about the other bits” (p. 18). Through these so-called headers, digital
information can be indexed and searched by web search engines or other discovery
tools. Mentally returning to a previous face-to-face conversation requires a good
memory. On the Internet, in contrast, finding the right information is comparatively
easy. One can easily browse through old messages and even use search functions to
find specific text passages. People’s profiles are easily detectable and web pages
or pictures can be found based on simple keywords or by searching for meta-
information such as the date or time of the posting.
1 Scholars have discussed similar terms as affordances of social media (e.g., Boyd, 2011; Evans,
Pearce, Vitak, & Treem, 2016; Treem & Leonardi, 2012). They thereby emphasize a relational
view on how people use social media. Affordances represents subjective action possibilities related
to particular features of an object or artifact. There is an important difference between defining
something as a property of digital information or as an affordance of social media. For example,
persistence can be regarded as a mere characteristic of an object. If we say that something is
persistent, we mean that it lasts for a long time (e.g., if I am stating that information is persistent, I
am referring to the long-lasting nature of digital bits). Persistence as an affordance of social media,
in contrast, refers to the reviewability of information as an emerging social practice connected
to the long-lasting nature of information transformed into digital bits. For now, I only use the
following terms to describe the characteristics of digital information and not the action possibilities
they suggest to individual users. However, I will come back to affordances in Sect. 12.3.
Replicability Because digital information is simply combinations of binary code,

it can be copied and duplicated. Thus, information shared on one platform may be
copied and posted on another platform. For example, content shared on a SNS can
be downloaded and saved on a hard drive. The content of a status update can be
copied and integrated in a chat conversation. The nature of bits makes it impossible
to distinguish the original from the copy (Boyd, 2008a, p. 126).
Editability Combinations of bits can also be separated and, in turn, combined in
new ways. Consequently, original information can be edited and transformed into
new information. For example, text passages from different sources may be merged
to create a new text. Or, a photograph posted on one platform may be edited and
used in another application. Again, the nature of bits often makes it impossible to
distinguish the original from the edited version.
Linkability Another property of digital information is what Negroponte (1996)
meant when he argued that “bits commingle effortlessly” (p. 18). Clusters of bits
and thus information can be linked through cross references (hypertextual links).
For example, the conversation between two instant messenger users is connected
to their profiles and their profiles, in turn, are connected through their contact lists.
A status update posted on a SNS can include references to other people or to external
websites. The linkability of information is an important driver of the networked
nature of modern communication that I will discuss in the next section.
2.1.2 Networked Environments
These five properties allow information to be transmitted electronically and, in turn,

virtual spaces and audiences to be bound together through technological networks
such as the Internet or mobile networks (Boyd, 2008a, p. 125). Essentially, they
create the network structures that are a defining aspect of new communication
environments. However, it would be shortsighted to view these networks solely
from a technical point of view. In general, network structures can be understood
as combinations of nodes and links. However, what constitutes these nodes and
links depends on the perspective that we choose to take. With regard to online
communication that takes place in such networked environments, four not entirely
distinct perspectives can be differentiated (Bucher, Erlhofer, Kallass, & Liebert,
2008, pp. 44–45).
1. Technical perspective. One way of viewing networked environments refers to
the underlying computer technologies. Services and platforms are connected
through servers and networks between computers. The nodes may be assessed by
entering specific prompts and through meta-technologies such as search engines
or hyperlinks.
2.1 Technical Properties of Online Communication 17
2. Hypertextual perspective. We can also look at the underlying structures of the

Internet and state that the nodes are bits of information and the links are the
references between them. From a user’s perspective these links are perceivable
relations between single documents or information.
3. Interactional or social perspective. We can further state that in networked
environments, the nodes are equivalent to individuals and the links are the
connections between these individuals (Barabási, 2011, p. 1). This view implies
a sort of communicative order. It alludes to concepts such as communities,
gatherings, and contacts. From a psychological point of view, this perspective
is particularly fruitful to study interpersonal relations or the flow of information
between individuals.
4. Morphological perspective. This last view emphasizes the random order of the
Internet in general. If we regard networked environments as actual network
structures, we can also imply typical characteristics of natural networks. For
example, some nodes are more important than others because they have more
connections. They are thus central points that link to more distant peripheries
(e.g., Barabási, 2003).
In discussing the implications of online communication on privacy and self-
disclosure processes, each perspective has its merits. For example, the technical
perspective helps to explain how servers, computers, and thus also users of these
devices are technically connected. Such a perspective offers insight into how
information that users share on different communication platforms is stored on the
servers of respective providers which, in turn, are connected to other computers and
can thus be assessed by other people and third parties. The hypertextual perspective,
on the other hand, describes how information on the Internet is interrelated. It
helps to visualize how bits are linked and how users navigate new communication
environments by using these links. However, as we will see later, the interactional or
social perspective on the networked nature of online communication is particularly
useful because it helps to visualize the flow of information between people, which
is—according to several theories of privacy (e.g., Altman, 1975; Nissenbaum, 2010;
Petronio, 2002)—an important aspect of privacy and self-disclosure processes.
To describe the new environments in which people communicate nowadays, the
term networked publics has been coined in the recent literature (Boyd, 2008a; Boyd
& Ellison, 2007; Ito et al., 2008; Marwick & Boyd, 2014; Papacharissi & Gibson,
2011). By taking both a technical and an interactional perspective, we can think
of networked publics as spheres that are “restructured by networked technologies;
they are simultaneously a space and a collection of people” (Boyd, 2008b, p. 41).
Within these networked publics, people and companies connect with each other,
exchange information and reference each other as well as other bits of information.
They navigate spheres in which everything they share becomes embedded in large
networks of bits, eventually contributing to a quantified representation of their real
world networks.
Although the term networked publics is mostly used in the literature, I favor
the term networked environments because not all new media environments that
are based on digital information necessarily imply a certain level of publicness.
However, they can nonetheless represent a network structure. Livingstone (2005)
defined publics as “a collection of people who share a common understanding of
the world, a shared identity, a claim to inclusiveness, a consensus regarding the
collective interest” (p. 5). The term networked publics is thus meant to represent
such collections of people in online environments and is often used to describe the
nature of platforms such as SNS or microblogging services that offer different forms
of one-to-many communication. It therefore makes sense to speak about networked
publics for many types of online media such as SNS (e.g., Facebook, Google+,
or Instagram.), microblogging services (e.g., Twitter), blogs, and other platforms
that have created a kind of (virtual) public space. Interpersonal communication via
instant messenger, on the other hand, is also based on network technology but does
not necessarily feel public to its users.
Notwithstanding this notion, networked technology provides the stage for a
multitude of social interactions (Papacharissi, 2011b, p. 304). It is important to note,
however, that the networked nature of online communication does not allow us to
think of different platforms as distinct spheres. The properties of digital information
outlined above allow information to flow through these networks. It thereby passes
increasingly blurred boundaries: A conversation started on SNSs, for example, may
continue on an instant messenger service; a picture uploaded on a photo-sharing
website may be shared on a blog; and a tweet posted to a small audience may be
shared with originally unintended recipients and eventually even with unknown
third parties. Content or information created for a small audience in this way
often expands beyond the original target market (Papacharissi, 2011a, p. 305).
Scholars have thus coined the term media convergence (Jenkins, 2008; Jensen, 2010;
Papacharissi, 2010), which can be described as “the flow of content (i.e., informa-
tion) across media platforms, an overlap between media industries, migratory behav-
ior on the part of audiences that follow content, [. . . ] and the ability for audiences
to interact with content as both consumers and producers” (Papacharissi, 2011a,
p. 305). The convergent architectures of online communication platforms give rise
to new dynamics and social practices. Before I discuss those in detail, however, it is
important to consider some non-technical characteristics of online communication.
Furthermore, we should consider the impact of the increasing use of mobile devices
on the ways in which people communicate today. These new forms of communica-
tion contribute significantly to the tensions that I will discuss further below.
2.2 Characteristics of Online Communication
Next to the technical aspects of online communication, we should consider how

online communication has changed the ways in which people communicate with
each other. A growing body of literature has investigated the specific characteris-
2.2 Characteristics of Online Communication 19
tics of online communication (also known as computer-mediated communication

(CMC). For an overview, see Walther, 2011). Initial theories emphasized that
CMC has no nonverbal cues and thus prevents social functions or interactions
that typically involve such cues. However, related assumptions do not hold given
that people happily socialize, disclose and exchange social information in various
forms of CMC. A group of British scholars (e.g., Lea, 1992; Spears & Lea,
1994) argued that the absence of nonverbal cues nonetheless impacts interpersonal
communication because it can be considered “an impersonalizing deterrent to the
expression and detection of individuality and the development of interpersonal
relations online” (Walther, 2011, p. 450). The model is interesting for the study
of privacy, because it focuses on effects of visual anonymity on communication
(which can be regarded as a form of privacy, according to Westin, 1967, p. 34). Most
prominently, however, Walther (1996) aimed at consolidating these approaches
with the Hyperpersonal Model (HPM), which incorporates several fundamental
assumptions about computer-mediated communication. In the following, I will first
discuss the HPM in order to give brief overview of how online communication can
be conceptualized.
The traditional way of “going online”—which can roughly be described as using
a desktop or laptop computer with Internet access at a fixed place—is increasingly
replaced by the ubiquitous use of smartphones or other mobile devices for accessing
a variety of different online services, media resources, and communication technolo-
gies. The mobility and the multi-functional nature of these devices allow different
forms of computer-mediated communication to be more integrated into our lives
than ever before. Two aspects of online communication today seem particularly
important when discussing privacy and self-disclosure processes. On the one hand,
the mobility of new devices and particularly of the smartphone has slowly allowed
people to be permanently online and permanently connected to others (Vorderer,
2015; Vorderer & Kohring, 2013). A form of continuous presence thus seems to
emerge in social relationships. On the other hand, the multi-functional nature of
modern communication devices leads to multimodal communication practices that
are defined by cross-linked conversations on different platforms and services (for a
more detailed discussion of potential changes caused by the use of mobile devices,
see Krotz, 2014; Vorderer, 2015). All of these transformations may cause new
privacy threats and consequently influence individuals’ self-disclosure in profound
ways.
2.2.1 Hyperpersonal Interaction
Walther’s HPM proposed a set of processes that explain why online communication
may “facilitate impressions and relationships online that exceed the desirability
and intimacy that occur in parallel off-line interactions” (Walther, 2011, p. 460).
The development was inspired by a study in which scholars observed both CMC
and face-to-face groups and rated their relational communication (Walther, 1995).
Walther was surprised to find that CMC groups were generally rated more positively
on several dimensions of intimacy and social orientation (Walther, 1996, p. 17). He
therefrom derived that under certain conditions, CMC may become hyperpersonal.
The model proposes that CMC affects all common components of the com-
munication process (sender, receiver, channel, and feedback). First, CMC is gen-
erally text-based and thereby facilitates selective self-presentation. Without the
co-presence of receivers, senders can actively shape their self-presentation by
transmitting only cues that they desire others to have (Walther, 2011, p. 461). The
technological preconditions allow for a high levels of control over the transmitted
cues and thus foster positive or optimized self-presentation (Walther, 1996, p. 19).
Second, the receiver is presented with a selective self-presentation and may thereby
gain an idealized perception of the sender (Walther, 1996, pp. 17–19). This may
be enforced because individuals tend to complete their impressions of the sender
(based on reduced cues) with stereotypical characteristics (cf. Trepte & Reinecke,
2013a, pp. 166–167). Third, the asynchronous nature of CMC allows senders to edit
their messages without disrupting the communication flow. Walther (1996) noted
that “following the removal of temporal limitations, task and interpersonal inter-
action becomes, in a sense, disentrained; both task-oriented and socially oriented
exchanges may take place without one constraining the time available for others”
(p. 24). It is this very characteristic of early CMC that provides the possibility for
enhanced selective message construction (pp. 25–27). Fourth, Walther argued that
the selective and idealized self-presentation is intensified because receivers provide
corresponding feedback. Senders only receive feedback to the cues they transmitted
and not for those they choose to hide.
A problematic aspect of this model is that it does not explain under what
circumstances such hyperpersonal interaction takes place. It is unlikely that people
always exploit CMC for idealized self-presentation. Furthermore, today’s CMC
is not necessarily always asynchronous. Mobile devices and applications such as
instant messenger have given people the possibility of synchronous communication
even when they are not close to each other. Nonetheless, the HPM provides a first
and comprehensive picture of how online communication can differ from face-
to-face interaction. Cues-filtered-out theories have sparked much research with
important implications for privacy and self-disclosure. For example, Joinson (2001)
found experimentally that participants disclose more information in dyads when
communicating with computers compared to face-to-face. Nonetheless, devices and
technological progress have further shaped how people communicate today. In the
next sections, I will thus discuss some recent theoretical reflections that scholars
have engaged in as a consequence to the growing proliferation of smartphones and
other mobile devices.
2.2 Characteristics of Online Communication 21
2.2.2 Permanently Online and Permanently Connected
Campbell (2013) argued that simply the size of the smartphone “is one of the
important mechanisms of mobility because it means that individuals are both able
and willing to carry, use, and even wear the technology virtually anywhere” (p.
11). This mobility, in turn, allows for “flows of information and communication to
be more seamlessly weaved into the rhythms of every day life” (p. 10). Arguably,
we thus have slowly come to think, feel, experience, and act with the expectation
of being permanently online and permanently connected (Vorderer, 2015; Vorderer
& Kohring, 2013). Anecdotal evidence of people frantically searching for places
to charge their smartphones further supports this claim. Several terms such as
“always-on” (Turkle, 2008), “ubiquitous reachability” (Ling & Donner, 2013),
“hyper-connection” (Lee, Leung, Qiu, & Chu, 2012), and “perpetual contact”
(Mascheroni & Vincent, 2016) have been coined to describe this phenomenon.
Obviously, being permanently online and permanently connected has several
consequences for our relationships and the ways in which we interact with each
other. The possibility of communicating independently of time and space allows,
but also presupposes, permanent social exchange and subsequently leads to an on-
going, never-ending stream of interaction between the individual and his or her
significant others. It has been argued that individuals thereby develop a form of
“connected presence” (Cui, 2016; Licoppe, 2003). In light of this phenomenon,
Vorderer (2015) proposed several transformations. For one, for example, he argues
that availability might replace spatial closeness (pp. 263–264). As geographical
distance is no longer a boundary condition for interpersonal exchange, people
also place much more emphasis on constant accessibility. Among teenagers, these
connected interactions “have an expressive and phatic function, serving as a way
to check on the status of friendship ties” (Mascheroni & Vincent, 2016, p. 311).
Recent smartphone applications such as Periscope, Instagram, and also Facebook
even allow to share live videos with friends and followers. This kind of live
broadcasting allows individuals to share experiences as they are created. In this
context, being available might be more important than actually being close to each
other. Vorderer further argues that boundaries between contact and non-contact are
blurred. Or, in other words, the strict separation between mediated and non-mediated
communication becomes almost meaningless.
This development might also have a dramatic impact on privacy and self-
disclosure processes. Vorderer (2015) proposes that self-transparency might replace
secrets (p. 270). Under the condition of being permanently online and permanently
connected, it seems that people are more inclined to disclose themselves or
might even perceive the necessity to disclose themselves and produce a form
of self-transparency. For example, a study based on 488 SNS users has shown
that frequency of SNS use indeed increased the willingness to self-disclose 6
months later (Trepte & Reinecke, 2013b). This effect was found particularly for
those users who perceived to have a high social capital with their SNS contacts
(p. 1108). Moreover, as individuals expect from others to be constantly available
and communicate, people may feel obliged to disclose and participate more than
they otherwise would.
2.2.3 Multimodal Communication Practices
A second important aspect of contemporary online communication is its multimodal

nature. Before the Internet became an important communication tool, people
communicated primarily face-to-face and via the telephone. Although talking
over long distances and without seeing each other has its unique characteristics,
the diversity of interpersonal interaction was nonetheless limited. Today, people
communicate online in various forms using different types of applications. The
computer—and by now particularly the smartphone—must hence be regarded as a
metamedium (Jensen, Rothenbuhler, Pooley, & Craig, 2016, p. 2), a concept that was
initially introduced by Kay and Goldberg (1977), who argued that the computer is a
technological platform on which a variety of different media can be reproduced and
recombined. In contrast to earlier conceptualizations of the computer as a technical
device, this term emphasized the computer’s applications and implications for
human interaction (Jensen et al., 2016, p. 1). Similarly, scholars have also theorized
smartphones as polymedia, which refers to the integrated environments through
which people communicate when using such complex technical devices (Madianou,
2014). With the help of continuously increasing computational power and a
generally flexible infrastructure, it has incomparably expanded our communicative
media repertoires, featuring a large variety of different applications. Banks (2017)
consequently proposes that human experience in contemporary culture is unfolding
across a broad range of digital spaces (p. 422), eventually producing what other
scholars have recently called “the networked self” (Papacharissi, 2011a).
Because interpersonal communication takes place through a variety of different
applications such as Facebook, WhatsApp, Snapchat, Instagram, or Twitter, online
communication provides very heterogeneous environments in which people may
disclose themselves. Examining the differences between these environments hence
becomes pivotal in understanding people’s privacy regulation practices and self-
disclosure behaviors. Some applications are more privacy-intrusive than others.
Even applications that are designed for the same purpose (e.g., instant messenger)
differ considerably with regard to how specifically a user can manipulate the level
of privacy by using the offered privacy settings. At the same time, multimodal
communication also means that people use different applications for different
purposes. Some information is shared on more public platforms such as Facebook
or Twitter, while other information is held more confidentially within dyadic
messenger communication. Yet, often enough, information originally shared in one
of these environments is replicated and disseminated on others. The networked
structure again provides users with the possibility of combining and connecting
various streams of communication across different platforms and applications.
2.3 Privacy-Related Dynamics in Networked Environments 23
2.3 Privacy-Related Dynamics in Networked Environments
As early as 1985, Joshua Meyrowitz proclaimed with regard to the impact of

the television that “electronic media [. . . ] have rearranged many social forums
so that most people now find themselves in contact with others in new ways”
(p. 5). With regard to digital communication media, this claim becomes even
more valid. The specific characteristics of online communication and the new
forms of communications discussed above have given rise to a number of specific
dynamics and tensions that represent significant challenges for individuals’ privacy
management and self-disclosure decisions.
More specifically, they provoke new types of information flows between individ-
uals, but also between individuals and companies, institutions or other third parties.
It is hence fruitful to distinguish between dynamics and corresponding threats that
occur on a horizontal level (i.e., due to the new forms of information flow between
coequal users) and those that occur on a vertical level (i.e., due to new forms of
information flow between individual users and companies or institutions).2
2.3.1 Horizontal Dynamics
Horizontal dynamics refer to interactions between human beings. In traditional

face-to-face interactions, privacy intrusions and violations originate mostly from
improper behavior by the people involved in the conversation. Such privacy
violations can include the unwanted sharing of information with people which
the discloser deliberately excluded, the broad dissemination of information about
an individual without that person’s consent, secret eavesdropping on private con-
versations, and many more. In online environments, similar violations can occur.
However, particular dynamics—driven by the technical and social characteristics of
online communication—heighten the chances of such violations. These dynamics
include the scalability of information, the convergence of formerly distinct social
spheres, and the blurring of public and private boundaries.
2.3.1.1 Scalability of Information
Unlike in offline contexts, information shared within networked environments may

spread unexpectedly and rapidly. Based on the five technical properties of digital
information described above (persistence, searchability, replicability, editability,
and linkability), networked technologies enable a broader and more far-reaching
2 In the context of privacy research, several scholars have proposed a differentiation between those
two levels (e.g., Masur, Teutsch, & Dienlin, 2018; Raynes-Goldie, 2010; Schwartz, 1968). I will
discuss this differentiation more thoroughly in Sect. 6.2.1.
distribution both by increasing the accessibility of the original content and by

enhancing the reproducibility (Boyd, 2008b, p. 47): As many recipients may access
information that has been shared online, the likelihood that this information will be
copied and redistributed increases. The scalability of content (Boyd, 2011, p. 46)
affects individuals’ privacy because it significantly reduces or even eliminates the
ability to control the access to information. For example, even though an individual
deliberately shares an information only with a few other people, this information
could be copied and shared with other unintended people by one of the recipients.
These unintended recipients, in turn, can even post the information more publicly on
some network platforms such as Facebook or Twitter. Furthermore, the information
could be reused for other, unintended purposes. The individual has very limited
means to intervene in this process.
Yet, although the networked structure of many online environments may in
principle enable individuals to broadcast information to wider audiences, not all
information receives mass attention (Boyd, 2008b, p. 48). Although some people
might find that information they intended to share with a large amount of people
does scale, others do not, and sometimes, information that was not intended to reach
broader audiences, unfortunately does scale. A study by Knobel and Lankshear
(2007) suggests that content (in this case memes) containing an element of humor,
rich intertextuality, many reference to other cultural phenomena and unusual
juxtapositions has a greater likelihood of being shared (pp. 209–216). In the case
of personal posts, it is likewise often the “funny, the crude, the embarrassing, the
mean or the bizarre” (Boyd, 2008b, p. 48) that quickly spreads to wider audiences.
In sum, we can conclude that unauthorized or unwanted dissemination of per-
sonal information is often a severe privacy violation. The scalability of information
in networked environments increases the likelihood of such violations.
2.3.1.2 Unprecedented Convergence of Social Contexts
In face-to-face situations, we are rarely confronted with several contexts at the same
time. In communicating with a partner, for example, we are most likely in the
context of “the family” or an intimate relationship. Other times, we communicate
with friends, work colleagues, or neighbors. In his seminal work The Presentation
of Self in Everyday Life, Goffman (1959) stated—in an analogy to an actor
on stage—that every performance by an individual is influenced by the region
and time in which it takes place. People thus engage in many different dramas
that require them to constantly change roles and inhibit conventional behavior.
A variety of nomenclature has been used to explain that privacy behavior does not
happen under universal circumstances. Different scholars have used labels such as
regions (Goffman, 1959), spheres of value (Max Weber as cited in Oakes, 2003),
social fields (Bourdieu, 1984), or contexts (Nissenbaum, 2010). Apart from slight
differences, these concepts refer to the same idea well described within the definition
of contexts by Helen Nissenbaum:
Contexts are structured social settings characterized by canonical activities, roles, rela-
tionships, power structures, norms (or rules), and internal values (goals, ends, purposes)
(Nissenbaum, 2010, p. 132).
In an attempt to theorize the new electronic media landscape at the time,

Meyrowitz (1985) argued that electronic media generally eliminate these contexts
by bringing different people to the same place (p. 6). In his terms, electronic media
have changed the situational geography of social interactions because through their
use, people increasingly have “no sense of place.” In the same sense, new digital
environments blur the boundaries of traditionally distinct contexts. Specifically in
networked publics (note that I am referring deliberately to publics), users may
experience a so-called context collapse. Binder, Howes, and Sutcliffe (2009) were
the first to rationalize that SNS put constraints on a fundamental property of human
social networks: the need to maintain independent social spheres (p. 966). They note
that due to the conflict of social spheres, “content of communication intended to be
consumed within a social sphere becomes available in another social sphere” (p.
966). Facebook in particular does not imply sophisticated audience segmentations
by default, thus making a user’s disclosures visible to all of his or her Facebook
contacts, which often include people from different contexts. Marwick and Boyd
(2010) similarly noted that Twitter flattens multiple audiences into one broad mass
of recipients (p. 122).
As many of these networked environments encourage people to engage in one-
to-many communications, they make it difficult for individuals to tailor their self-
presentations to different audiences (Vitak, 2012, p. 454). In the case of networked
publics (as provided by social media such as Facebook, Twitter, or Instagram), the
individual is confronted with a potentially limitless audience. Schmidt (2009) hence
argues that it is important to consider the intended audience rather than the potential
or empirical audience when attempting to explain people’s self-disclosure or self-
presentation behaviors (p. 118). The intended audience is the group of people to
whom a user thinks he or she is communicating. Litt (2012) similarly proposed
a concept she calls the imagined audience. She argues that in networked publics,
individuals look for any available cues in order to envision their potential audience
and adapt their behavior to this mental conceptualization of the people with whom
they aim to communicate (p. 331). Empirical studies support these assumptions.
Based on a survey of 232 university students Binder et al. (2009) found that higher
audience diversity on Facebook indeed leads to more psychological tension.
The convergence of formerly distinct contexts breaks with people’s normal way
of presenting themselves in their everyday lives. Increasingly diverse and large
audiences in networked environments cause tension because they make it difficult
to decide what information to share and what to conceal. Papacharissi (2011b) notes
that “the individual must then engage in multiple mini performances that combine
a variety of semiological references so as to produce a presentation of the self that
makes sense to multiple audiences, without sacrificing coherence and continuity”
(p. 307). This context collapse naturally causes the dynamic that I will discuss next
and can be understood as the blurring of traditional boundaries between the private
and the public.
2.3.1.3 Blurring of Public and Private Spheres
An unavoidable consequences of the context collapse, and also of the architecture

of online environments, is the increasing disappearance of private and public
boundaries. Public status updates and subsequent comments on SNS oftentimes
include typical characteristics of a private conversation (e.g., a specific person
is addressed, intimacies are exchanged, specific references are made, etc.), yet
are generally accessible by larger audiences. Information and topics traditionally
perceived as private are now often the subjects of broadcasted messages (for a list of
different studies supporting this claim, see Joinson, Houghton, Vasalou, & Marder,
2011, p. 34). The distinction between what is private and what is public is thus
continuously challenged and sometimes hardly identifiable.
The challenging aspect of online communication is the oftentimes intangible
nature of the audience one aims to address or, conversely, those one seeks to not
grant access to information. Whereas the identification of a private and a public
sphere is comparatively easy in offline environments (because potential recipients
constitute a mostly homogeneous and small group of people that is visible to the
discloser), such a distinction is hard to make in online environments. A wall post
on Facebook, for example, is in principle visible to a larger audience, but it is very
unlikely that all of this potential audience actually sees the post. The actual audience
is most likely considerably smaller. Drawing a line between public and private is
hence no longer feasible.
2.3.2 Vertical Dynamics
Vertical dynamics refer to interactions between users and companies (or clients and
providers) or citizen and governmental institutions. Privacy intrusions thus involve
companies or institutions accessing private data of individuals. This interference
with people’s privacy has been fortified by the increasing proliferation of the com-
puter. Over time, and particularly after the invention of the Internet, this has led to
several economic and societal dynamics that threaten people’s privacy. First, there is
a growing economy that treats personal information as a commodity. An increasing
interest in personal data thus fuels a societal system that structurally invades privacy.
Second, companies collect data in order to maximize their profits.They also use
data about their clients to manipulate them to disclose private information. Third,
governmental agencies and institutions are increasingly interested in data about
their citizens. By promoting national security, they increasingly develop practices
of ubiquitous surveillance.
2.3.2.1 Commodification of Information
Webster (2000) argued that “prioritizing technology as the centre-piece of change”

(p. 75) is no longer appropriate to understand the transition we are currently
experiencing. Instead, he suggested that the growing perception of information as
a valuable commodity must be regarded as the origin of the change. With terms
such as “information society,” we emphasize the unprecedented proliferation of
data-processing technologies to accumulate, aggregate, and analyze large databases
of personal information, as well as the growing interest of companies and public
institutions to do so. According to Nissenbaum (2010), three recent achievements in
information science and technology have contributed to this development (pp. 36–
37). First, an exponential growth in processing power and memory capacities has
unprecedentedly improved the ability to store, organize, and retrieve larger quanti-
ties of information. Second, innovations in network technology have improved the
capacity to move databases reliably and efficiently, making them accessible from
anywhere at anytime. Third, constant achievements in fields such as mathematics,
information science, computer science, statistical analysis, and artificial intelligence
make it possible to transform large quantities of data containing infinitely detailed
information into useful knowledge for a variety of entities. Information databases
increasingly yield useful implications, inferences, and predictions (p. 37). In light
of this, users’ online actions are no longer simply actions but rather valuable data
that can be owned, stored, organized, and analyzed or used in any other form by
others, and in particular by companies (Joinson & Paine, 2007, p. 243). With the
information-handling capacities of computers and the scientific achievements in the
fields described above, the economic interest in personal information has increased
dramatically within the last few decades. By now, an economic sector has emerged
that relies entirely on personal information as a commodity.
Both client-related information such as age, gender, address, and income—
information that is often disclosed on online communication platforms—and also
web-surfing behavior, preferences, or opinions expressed through posts and com-
ments have an economic value (Acquisti, Taylor, & Wagman, 2016). Companies
are interested in such information about their clients because it allows them to
personalize their products, produce targeted advertisements, and thus maximize
their profit (Hess & Schreiner, 2012, p. 106). In general, there are three types of
information-based companies. First, there are companies that sell their products
online (e.g., Amazon). Such companies collect data from their clients by assessing
their surfing behavior, their buying history, and their interaction with online
products. They use this information in order to provide personalized advertisements
and suggestions, and also to regulate prices dynamically and in line with individuals’
purchasing power (Hess & Schreiner, 2012, p. 107). Second, there are companies
that solely handle and edit information. They have no direct contact with clients,
but they buy personal data, aggregate and edit it, and finally sell it to the first type
of companies which, in turn, produce personalized advertisements based on this
data (Acquisti, 2014, p. 8). Finally, many companies provide services in exchange
for personal data (e.g., SNS, search engines, blogging services, streaming services,
etc.). These companies often offer their services for free but collect all types of
information from their members which they, in turn, sell to the first or second
type of company. Oftentimes, these service companies provide not only valuable
information about individuals, but also advertising space that is specifically tailored
to the needs of advertisers (Acquisti, 2014, p. 8). This new information capitalism
(Castells, 2009; Sevignani, 2016; Webster, 2000), however, would cease to function
were people to stop sharing (or producing) personal information on online services.
This large-scale data mining and the practice of using data to draw inferences
about individuals represents an unprecedented interference with people’s privacy.
Many scholars have consequently argued that “privacy is structurally invaded in
contemporary information capitalism” (Sevignani, 2016, p. 1). This is possible
because individuals have almost no prior experience with such privacy interferences.
Understanding this new information flow requires sophisticated knowledge about
the infrastructure of networked environments and the interests of the respective
players. Whereas violations of privacy by other users are mostly perceivable and
may thus be more influential in shaping subsequent behavior, privacy interferences
stemming from providers and institutions are mostly opaque and difficult to
identify. Additionally, the consequences of such violations are mostly invisible
and have no perceivable consequences in the individuals’ everyday lives. Whereas
unauthorized sharing of private information by another user may lead to real
negative consequences such as bad reputation or embarrassment, the repercussions
of having unknown third parties become aware of one’s personal life or surfing
behavior are mostly elusive and intangible (Acquisti, Brandimarte, & Loewenstein,
2015, p. 509). Despite the apparent lack of knowledge and the intangibility of these
privacy intrusions, most people are nonetheless concerned. In Europe, for example,
55% of all citizens are concerned about the recording of everyday activities via
mobile phone use or mobile applications, and about 45% are concerned about
the recording of everyday activities on the Internet (European Commission, 2015,
pp. 15–21). Five years earlier, European populations showed less concerns about
similar issues (European Commission, 2011, pp. 66–68).
In summary, the lines between public and private boundaries are increasingly
complicated on the vertical level as many interactions in networked environments
seem private to the user, yet render the exchanged information accessible to
companies and other third parties. Trepte and Reinecke (2011b) have argued that the
social web offers users an illusion of privacy—users might believe their information
is protected from other users via privacy settings, but they fail to realize that all
their conversations and disclosures can be accessed by the company operating the
platform and potentially other third parties or institutions (p. 62). In this way, users
have a certain of privacy on the horizontal level, but less privacy on a vertical
level.
2.3.2.2 Unconscious Manipulation and Malleability
Lately, Chambers (2017) has noted that we may currently be witnessing “a

social media-led crisis of intimacy signified by [. . . ] the exploitation of intimate
connections for marketing purposes” (p. 33). Acquisti et al. (2015) similarly noted
that “some entities have interest in, and have developed expertise in, exploiting
behavioral and psychological processes to promote disclosure” (p. 512). Research
in information science has identified some of these practices. For example, Conti
and Sobiesk (2010) studied the emergence of deliberately constructed “malicious
interfaces” that are put in place to manipulate, exploit, or even attack the user.
They describe interfaces that, for example, unnecessarily demand compliance from
users and thereby force them to enter personal information. Others confuse users
by asking double, triple, or even quadruple negative questions and thus disguise
options to change the default settings (p. 273). The practice of establishing rather
privacy-invasive default settings is indeed quite common. Experimental evidence
suggests that people tend to stay with the default options because they interpret them
as implicit recommendations (McKenzie, Liersch, & Finkelstein, 2006). Companies
hence promote transparency and openness simply by making it the default.
Companies whose prosperity depends on information disclosure by their clients
promote, actively enforce, or even manipulate users into sharing private information
by simultaneously masking their privacy intrusions (Masur, Teutsch, Dienlin, &
Trepte, 2017; Seubert, 2016). Through these practices, the information capitalism
in general and companies in particular slowly erode the value of privacy (see again
Castells, 2009; Sevignani, 2016). However, this devaluation also takes place because
people seem to adapt to certain privacy intrusions over time. An experiment con-
ducted by Oulasvirta et al. (2012) revealed that in households in which surveillance
technology (such as cameras and logging software) was installed for 6 months,
family members changed their behavior in the beginning (e.g., not talking about
sensitive topics or going to unobserved places), but became less concerned over
time. The authors found that 10 out of the 12 observed subjects became accustomed
to the surveillance (p. 49).
Thus, it seems that users might not be aware of the crisis that Chambers (2017)
envisions because they cherish the types of mediated intimacies new communication
technologies offer while unknowingly and slowly accepting new forms of privacy
intrusions.
2.3.2.3 Data Mining and Ubiquitous Surveillance
The unprecedented proliferation of big data-processing technologies and the accu-

mulation, aggregation, and analysis of personal information have not only changed
the ways in which companies conduct business. Miller (1971) noted that the
increasing capacity of computers to store and retrieve data from various individuals
from any place in the world allows for the “continuous accumulation of dossier-type
material on people over a long period of time” (p. 39). Forty years later, today’s
technology provides governments, public agencies, and intelligence services with

the opportunity for large-scale data mining and analysis, and consequently also with
the capability of ubiquitous surveillance.
The Snowden disclosures in 2013 showed that the NSA has been collecting and
analyzing information about US citizens, as well as intercepting and monitoring
communication worldwide, with the help of major Internet companies (Greenwald,
2014). The extent of these practices shows that governments (in this case particularly
the US government, in concert with British and German intelligence agencies) have
unprecedented knowledge about individual citizens. A recent survey of the German
population found that 56% of the participants were concerned or very concerned
about institutions or intelligence services collecting and analyzing data, and 74%
indicated that they were concerned about having no insight into what organizations
or providers do with their data (Trepte & Masur, 2017b, p. 28).
This development evokes some of the most fundamental questions of privacy:
What are the limits of state power? And under what circumstances is the state
allowed to interfere with people’s privacy? As I will show in the following chapters,
such questions have been asked since the beginning of privacy scholarship many
decades ago.
2.3.3 Preliminary Summary
Looking at the impact of new communication and information technologies on

privacy and self-disclosure, current scholars seem to agree that we are currently
witnessing a fundamental transformation in how privacy is defined and perceived
by individuals and society as whole (e.g., acatech, 2013; Marwick & Boyd, 2014;
Nissenbaum, 2010; Solove, 2008; Trepte & Reinecke, 2011a). Nonetheless, it
is debatable whether the impact of these technologies actually changes privacy
concepts and theories from a pre-internet era, or whether they have simply raised
new dynamics and practices. Scholars and journalists are quick to view technologies
or other landmark inventions as turning points or game changer. I favor reexamining
existing theories in light of the new media environments in which communication
nowadays takes place.
In my opinion, the key question is whether acclaimed theories hold up to the
dynamics of a changing environment. In this chapter, I have outlined why online
communication environments cause new tensions and dynamics that challenge
individuals’ privacy. I argue that it is particularly the properties of digital infor-
mation and the networked nature of these environments that lead to new social and
institutional dynamics which, in turn, evoke new privacy threats and interferences.
The following six key insights broadly subsume my analysis:
1. Online communication environments challenge users’ privacy because they
are based on the exchange of digital information that is generally persistent,
searchable, replicable, editable, and linkable.
2. Due to these properties of digital information, online communication envi-

ronments are essentially networked and thus connect individual computers
and servers from a technical perspective, different types of information from
a hypertextual perspective and people and other entities (e.g., companies or
institutions) from an interactional perspective.
3. The properties of digital information and the networked nature of online commu-
nication environments lead to new types of information flows.
4. Individuals’ privacy is thereby challenged both on the horizontal (i.e., with regard
to other users) and vertical levels (i.e., with regard to providers and institutions).
5. On the horizontal level, people are confronted with new social dynamics such as
the possibility of information scaling quickly and unexpectedly, the convergence
of traditionally distinct social contexts that leads to a so-called context collapse
and the blurring of traditional distinctions between the public and the private.
6. On a vertical level, people are confronted with new economic and institutional
dynamics. Because information is increasingly becoming a valuable commodity,
people’s privacy is structurally invaded by data collection and analysis practices
as well as by the manipulation strategies of companies and institutions.
In the following chapters, I will critically review the most prominent approaches
to privacy and self-disclosure. In doing so, I will question whether these approaches
allow us to grasp and conceptualize the dynamics and tensions outlined in this
chapter. More specifically, I will ask whether they provide the necessary tools to
provide insights into and explain individuals’ behavior in new media environments.
Chapter 3
Theories of Privacy
When we talk about privacy, we talk about many things. We call our home a private
sphere, but we think of our thoughts and feelings as private as well. Our deepest
fears and greatest hopes are private, but so are our decisions to vote for a certain
political party. Information about our families, partners, or friends are private, as
is information about our hobbies and jobs. At the same time, what we share with
others can be, but does not have to be private.
From a linguistic point of view, the word private is an elusive predicate that
people ascribe to actions, situations, states or conditions, locations, and objects
(Rössler, 2001, p. 17). We use the word both for its descriptive and its normative
meaning. If we call something private, we want to emphasize that it belongs to us
and that it deserves protection from unwanted access. Calling something private
connotes that it should not be known by the general public (cf. Geuss, 2013, p. 19).
But talking about privacy must be distinguished from actually experiencing privacy.
When we seek privacy, we often wish to be alone or to be left alone. We sometimes
desire to be in a (spatial or mental) sphere in which we feel we are on our own,
free from external influences, social pressures, or surveillance. Privacy can thus also
be understood as a form of voluntary withdrawal from social contact or society in
general (e.g., Westin, 1967, p. 5).
Although scholars have tried to formulate concepts of privacy around relevant
elements of our lives, theories of privacy do not necessarily adhere to this ordinary
meaning (cf., Solove, 2008, p. 13). The discrepancy results primarily from the
impossibility of capturing all aspects of privacy as well as the vague and ambiguous
usage of the word itself. According to Solove (2008, pp. 13–14), the majority of
scholars have tried to conceptualize privacy by defining it per genus et differentiam.
They hence searched for distinct characteristics of privacy that differentiate it
from other concepts. Although numerous theoretical concepts of privacy have been
developed throughout the last century, it nonetheless seems that scholars today are
still confused about how to tackle the problem of defining privacy. Most of the

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-78884-5_3
34 3 Theories of Privacy
theories thus remain fragmented, largely inconsistent, often not fully developed and
hardly empirically validated (Smith, Dinev, & Xu, 2011, p. 992).
Theories of privacy evolved from different disciplines and scientific cultures.
As a first step, I will summarize the most prominent disciplinary discourses and
evaluate their potential to contribute to a situational concept of privacy. I will
show that particularly many approaches implicitly acknowledge the situationality
of privacy by defining it as something temporary. At the core of this chapter, I will
then review existing behavioral approaches to privacy that stem from psychologists
and communication scholars. Before I delve into the literature review, I want to
emphasize that when I talk about privacy, I am referring to individual privacy.
Although the privacy of institutions, organizations, or other entities has been
discussed before (e.g., Westin, 1967, pp. 46–56), I am concerned with a theory of
individual privacy, and more specifically with the situational experience of privacy
and how it influences people’s behavior, from a psychological point of view.
3.1 Multidisciplinary Discourses
From where does our current understanding of, as well as the value we place on
privacy, stem? This question is almost impossible to answer because the origins of
privacy are so manifold and can be traced back to different societal transformations
and schools of thought. Although the term privacy was only coined in the late
nineteenth century when legal scholars defined the right to privacy as “the right to
be left alone” (Warren & Brandeis, 1890, p. 195), a number of older discourses exist
that have all contributed in one way or another towards our modern understanding of
privacy. Most of these discourses evolved independently from each other, and efforts
to integrate them remain scarce. Although most of these discourses still impact
modern thought, I will nonetheless try to represent them in their chronological order
while pinpointing similarities, differences, and reciprocal impacts.
3.1.1 Privacy in Liberal Philosophies
One of the most prominent discourses on privacy is rooted in political philosophy

(e.g., Hobbes, 1651/2011; Kant, 1785/2015; Locke, 1689/2005; Mill, 1859/2015;
Rawls, 1971/1999). Liberal theorists have provided the basis for our modern society
with regard to ideas about equality, liberty, neutrality of the state and democracy.
Accordingly, liberal theories are not exactly theories of privacy, but they have shaped
many related ideas—particularly by coining the term negative freedom. This concept
can be regarded as one of the first separations of the public and the private spheres
in state-run societies.
3.1 Multidisciplinary Discourses 35
The first formulation of this idea can be found in Thomas Hobbes’ seminal work
Leviathan. Hobbes assumed that all men are equal and free and therefore strive for
self-preservation and pleasure (Hobbes, 1651/2011, pp. 75–78). He described the
natural condition of mankind (when individuals do not yet live in a society under
a common power) as a state of war, in which every man fights every other man.
In order to escape this precarious state of life, men united and agreed to transfer
power to a regulative institution which Hobbes denoted “Leviathan.” He further
reasoned that this sovereign must be strong to ensure that its authority would not be
questioned by the citizens. Yet the limits of the state’s power would be clearly set;
Leviathan’s function would only be to enforce adherence to common rules. Beyond
these rules, however, men would have no duty to obey and could be free. Hobbes
hence granted citizens in a state-run society a space in which they would still have
the liberty to do as they pleased. Negative freedom is thus freedom from interference
by others (in this case from the sovereign). Positive freedom, in contrast, is having
the capacity to act upon one’s free will (Berlin, 1969).
This general idea of negative freedom has remained unaltered in most liberal
theories. John Locke, for example, extended the concept of negative freedom beyond
land and goods to every thought, intellectual output, writing or anything men could
produce (Locke, 1689/2005, pp. 79–87). von Humboldt (1851/1967) formulated the
most radical anti-paternalistic view on this public–private dichotomy. According
to von Humboldt, the self-reliant occupation and self-determined development of
individuals are the highest “human good” and the state has no value per se. The
state is merely a necessary means to obtain the desired end: to allow for individual
self-occupation. Every positive intervention of the state for individual welfare is
inappropriate or even detrimental as it pre-empts individual occupation. The state
should therefore only be responsible for security (von Humboldt, 1851/1967, p. 56).
These limits of state power were most famously formulated by John Stuart Mill:
That principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or
collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection.
That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a
civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others (Mill, 1859/2015, p. 11).
Kant (1793/1992) summarized the main aspects of this school of thoughts in

three principles that constitute the civil state: first, the freedom of each individual
to do what his free will tells him to do as long as it does not violate the freedom
of others; second, the equality of each individual; and third, the autonomy of each
individual belonging to a common institution realized by transferring the powers of
legislation to the citizens. Kant thus similarly emphasized that the state has no right
to interfere in people’s life beyond the boundaries imposed by all citizens. State
interference is only legitimate if derived from reason.
In sum, liberal political theories implicitly separate individuals’ lives into
private and public. This perspective on privacy focuses on the vertical aspect of
privacy—the relationship between individuals and the government. As we will see,
contemporary discussions on privacy on the Internet often refer to similar ideas as
those expressed in liberal theories. It is important to note here that the connotation
of privacy is negative as it is determined by the limits of state power (the public)

and not vice versa. However, it is important to keep in mind that the separation
between private and public has been controversial ever since (e.g., Rössler, 2001,
p. 43). According to Geuss (2013) it is a considerable mistake to believe that there
is one substantial distinction between the public and the private that can provide
the basis for a truly philosophical or political work (pp. 124–125). Yet, as the
claims and ideas of liberal theorists have been preserved in constitutional and social
law and the political system, we should not underestimate the influence of this
conception on people’s views and attitudes towards privacy. It shows us furthermore
how strongly perceptions and understandings of privacy are subjected to political
systems, cultural influences, and historical traditions.
3.1.2 Theories of the Public Sphere
A second discourse can be found in sociology and in particular in theories of the

public sphere (e.g., Arendt, 1958/1998; Elias, 1939/1969; Habermas, 1962/1990;
Sennett, 1976/1992). In this tradition, scholars have investigated characteristics
and transformations of the public sphere. In these treatises, the concept of privacy
sometimes remains rather abstract and imprecise as it is only referred to as a residual
category of the public sphere. The public and private are hence conceptualized on
the basis of their mutual exclusivity.
This view is prominently reflected in the work Structural Transformations of the
Public Sphere by Habermas (1962/1990). In his discussion, the private sphere serves
as the residual starting point in order to set the boundaries of the public sphere: “the
(bourgeois) public sphere is hence conceived as the sphere in which private people
gather as a public” (p. 86). In broader terms, the public sphere serves as the domain
of social life where public opinion is expressed in public discourses and debates
(cf. Papacharissi, 2010, p. 113). The private sphere, on the other hand, is mostly
associated with the household or a sphere of intimacy between family members
(Arendt, 1958/1998, p. 28). Whereas Habermas notably uses a somewhat wider
definition of the private sphere that encompasses the bourgeois community (trade
and work sphere) and the intimate sphere of the family (p. 89), Arendt confines
the private sphere more or less strictly to the boundaries of a single household
and more specifically around the concept of private property. For her, privacy is
nonetheless important because private property offers “the only reliable hiding place
from the common public” (p. 71). Only in privacy, individuals can emerge as unique
individuals who can then leave the private realm to engage the political sphere
as confident, self-thinking, and independent citizens. This rationale later inspired
privacy scholars that coined the idea of privacy as a condition of limited access
(see Sect. 3.1.4 below). However, Arendt’s discourse of public and privacy also
emphasizes the necessity to maintain both privacy and publicity. Most prominently
she argued that the private sphere on its own is nothing but a state of deprivation:
To live an entirely private life means above all to be deprived of things essential to human
life: to be deprived of the reality that comes from being seen and heard by others, to
be deprived of an “objective” relationship with them that comes from being related to
and separated from them through the intermediary of a common world of things, to be
deprived of the possibility of achieving something more permanent than life itself (Arendt,
1958/1998, p. 58).
Theories of the public sphere have often bemoaned the decay of public life in the
modern age in similar ways. In his work The Fall of Public Man, Sennett argued
that this decay is caused by the increased secularism and industrial capitalism that
eventually led to a tyranny of intimacy. He argues that people nowadays assume
that being close to each other is a moral value itself and that people strive to unfold
individuality through closeness with other people (Sennett, 1976/1992, p. 259).
According to the author, this gradual shift is deeply problematic for society as a
whole and in particular for political involvement and action. As private interests and
individual goals become the main occupation for citizens, society generally becomes
much less political and passive. He claims that the erosion of the public sphere leads
people to develop personalities longing solely for intimacy and comfort (p. 230).
This second discourse thus reveals a continual back and forth with regard to
the general evaluation of the private sphere. In the beginning, Greek and Roman
philosophers glorified the public sphere as the domain of governance, democracy,
and deliberation (e.g., Papacharissi, 2010, p. 28). During the age of enlightenment,
in contrast, philosophers discovered the value of freedom and hence the necessity for
a private sphere. After the industrial revolution and the rising capitalism, however,
the decline of the public sphere was again bemoaned. This discourse shows us
that individual privacy claims often have to be defended against the argument that
more transparency and publicity serves a greater, societal good. The exploitation
of privacy in the age of information, for example, is often justified by the need for
security and protection on a national level.
3.1.3 The Feminist Critique
A critical discourse of traditional concepts of privacy (and the public) can be

found in the feminist theory (e.g., DeCew, 1997; Landes, 1998; Pateman, 1989).
From the 1960s onward, the relation between the public and the private spheres
is critically examined and reflected with regard to gender inequalities. Political
theorists and philosophers in this tradition focus on the downsides of the public–
private dichotomy by pointing at potential suppression processes and an unequal
social order.
To understand this critique, we have to differentiate between two contradictory
meanings of the private-public dichotomy that can be found in classical liberal
theories, modern theories on privacy, and theories of the public sphere. On the
one hand, the private sphere denotes an area of life in which an individual is free
from state interference (i.e., negative freedom in terms of liberal theorists). This
sphere is not regulated by public institutions or government supervision. Such a
differentiation is the fundamental basis and a structural characteristic of modern
societies (Rössler, 2001, p. 42). On the other hand, however, the private sphere
is associated with the household and the family—a place that was traditionally
reserved for women. The public sphere, in contrast, is where political and societal
decisions are made and where professional life takes place and is traditionally
reserved for men. The public–private distinction is hence part of “an ideological
apparatus that minimizes the significance of the domestic sphere” (Papacharissi,
2010, p. 34). In this conceptualization, the private sphere remains devalued because
it is only in the public sphere that relevant decisions are made and that independence
from requirements of nature and reproduction can be obtained (cf. Benhabib &
Nicholson, 1988; Rössler, 2001).
The problem is that the two meanings of the private sphere contradict each other.
Although liberalism claims equality and freedom for all human beings, at the same
time, these rights are in practice reserved for men. This is in particular problematic
as women in consequently may not have the same privacy experience as men.
Whereas a male perception of the private sphere accords with a relief of public
pressures and political responsibility, women (whose life is limited to the private
realm) cannot find this freedom and autonomy. In the view of feminist scholars, the
separation of a private and a public sphere plays a key role “in ideologies justifying
both the exclusion of women from full membership in the political community and
the denial of equality of opportunity in economic life” (Cohen, 1997, pp. 134–135).
As such, it has contributed towards stereotypes about gender and reinforced unequal
power constellations between men and women. As Cohen notes, “apparently neutral
discourses of privacy and [emphasis in original] of publicity have all too often been
conducted on the basis of male norms, and have served male interests” (p. 135).
Even more specific, the feminist critique rightfully argued that for men, the private
sphere can be a shielded sphere in which female suppression is not sanctioned
(DeCew, 1997, p. 81).
In consequence, some feminist scholars have demanded the total abolishment
of the public–private distinction altogether (e.g., Brown, 2004; Olson, 1991). For
the most part, however, they have demanded a reconceptualization of the privacy-
public dichotomy in order to secure equal freedom for both men and women to
live their lives according to their own will. In sum, we must acknowledge that
classical concepts of privacy (sometimes despite their overall positive intention) are
not free from gender connotations. The question remains how the general idea of
equal freedom can be preserved without risking a gender-specific codification of the
private-public dichotomy (Rössler, 2001, p. 49).
3.1.4 The Legal Discourse
Starting in the 1890s and resurfacing in the 1960s, a legal discourse about the right
to privacy began to be taken into account. All attempts to secure people’s right
to privacy in common law can be counted hereunto. However, the legal discourse
is multifaceted and also multinational, and consequently not very homogeneous.
Differences between the American and European data protection law created very
different discourses. In this section, I will not summarize how privacy is protected
in different legal systems.1 Instead, I will pinpoint definitions of privacy that have
been developed in these discourses and that do provide a useful basis for a situational
concept of privacy.
The foundation of privacy law in the USA was the seminal article The Right to
Privacy, by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, which was published in 1890. In
this paper, the authors argued in favor of a new right that should serve to guarantee
the full protection of the individual in person and property (Warren & Brandeis,
1890, p. 193). Based on common law, they argued that a right to privacy could
be understood as “the right to be let alone” (p. 195). The article had a profound
influence on privacy law, but even more so on the conception of privacy itself.
Unfortunately, it seems that many scholars have mistaken Warren and Brandeis for
conceptualizing privacy as a right (Tavani, 2007, p. 5). Such a conceptualization,
however, would be problematic because it would not allow differentiation between
the right itself and the content of the right. Warren and Brandeis instead defined
privacy as “being let alone.” Tavani (2007) counts this definition among the non-
intrusion theories of privacy. He argued that definitions in this traditions are
nonetheless problematic as they partly confuse privacy with liberty. He argued for
a differentiation between these concepts because “privacy is essential for liberty
in that it makes possible the exercise of [emphasis in original] liberty” (Tavani,
2007, p. 5). Despite these limitations, it is due to Warren and Brandeis that many
scholars have regarded privacy as a condition or state. This implies that there must
be conditions of no privacy or less privacy. We may therefrom derive that such
approaches regard privacy as varying across situations.
Over the course of several decades, legal scholars and philosophers have further
advanced the theoretical concept of privacy by developing refined, but sometimes
contradictory, definitions of privacy. Fruitful academic disputes arose between anti-
reductionists and reductionists (cf. Powers, 1996, pp. 370–372), on the one hand,
and between those who favored descriptive concepts versus those who argued for
normative concepts, on the other (cf. Nissenbaum, 2010, pp. 68–69).
1 The literature is too vast to be summarized here. In Germany, for example, the Sphärentheorie
(engl. theory of spheres) is additionally used to distinguish between the social sphere, the private
sphere, and the intimate sphere (e.g., Geminn & Roßnagel, 2015). Valuable overviews can be found
in the Law, Government and Technology Series of the publisher Springer (e.g., Gutwirth, Leenes,
& de Hert, 2015, 2016; Leenes, Gutwirth, & de Hert, 2017).
Anti-reductionists (e.g., DeCew, 1997; Prosser, 1960; Solove, 2008; Westin,

1967) have argued that diverse aspects and concepts should be understood under
the heading of privacy. Many legal scientists proposed that privacy is not a simple
matter, but touches different rights and torts. Prosser (1960), for example, asserted
that the law of privacy includes various invasions of differently articulated interests
that can be subsumed under a common name, but have almost nothing in common
(p. 389). Solove (2008) summarized emphatically: “privacy is not one thing, but
a cluster of many distinct yet related things” (p. 40). He elaborated that previous
attempts to conceptualize privacy failed because they were unable to identify the
common denominator that unifies all instances in which privacy is touched. Refer-
ring to Wittgenstein (1953/2008), he proposed a family-resemblances approach that
aims to understand privacy in a pluralistic manner (Solove, 2008, p. 40). This
way, he argued, one “must no longer search for one unifying common trait in all
privacy violations, [one] can identify many specific elements of privacy without
sacrificing inclusiveness” (Solove, 2008, p. 44). He nonetheless acknowledged that
how we value privacy and the countervailing interests primarily depends on the
circumstances of the specific situation in which they unfold (p. 48).
On the other hand, reductionists (e.g., Allen, 1988; Gavison, 1980; Miller, 1971;
Posner, 1978; Powers, 1996; Shils, 1956/1996) criticized these ambiguous concepts
and argued that they do not provide a useful basis for investigating specific problems
of privacy. Whereas some of these scholars have held extreme positions arguing
that one should abandon the term privacy altogether, others have provided reduced
definitions of privacy that seek to lower the risk of vagueness. Legal scholar Gavison
(1980), for example, defined privacy as “the limitation of other’s access to an
individual” (p. 428). According to her, an individual has perfect privacy when
nobody has any information about a person, pays attention to this person or has
physical access to this person (p. 428). Again, privacy is regarded as a condition of
limited access and must hence be regarded as situational. Gavison further supported
the need for a neutral concept of privacy. Her definition is essentially descriptive, as
one can describe different states of privacy without normatively asking whether any
of these states is good or bad for the individual.
Indeed, most scholars who have put forth a reduced concept of privacy have
argued for a neutral concept of privacy. They argued that a descriptive concept of
privacy can be a starting point to precisely establish criteria indicating which levels
of privacy are to be secured and how much privacy is needed or desirable. The
problem with these conceptions of privacy is that they contradict the aforementioned
pluralistic meaning of privacy that is prevalent in the common parlance. This
problem becomes more apparent in the critique by Tavani (2007) who argued that
conceptualizing privacy descriptively (for example as a form of seclusion) would
confuse privacy with other concepts such as solitude or isolation. The general idea
behind this critique can be understood by means of an easy example: does a prisoner
in a single cell have perfect privacy? According to Gavison, he would have perfect
privacy because access to him is, indeed, limited. Tavani (2007), however, would
respond that a prisoner could not enjoy privacy in a meaningful sense because he did
not choose to be in such a condition. As we will see later, one can only experience
privacy if there is also the possibility of abandoning privacy. Or, in other words,
an individual enjoys privacy if he or she voluntarily chooses to have privacy in a
situation where he or she could also have less or no privacy.
The shortcomings of these concepts were addressed in subsequent years by
adding the notions of choice and control. Early non-intrusion or seclusion theories
of privacy had a strong focus on limited accessibility. However, with the widespread
use of computers at the time, this focus shifted. Privacy concerns became primarily
associated with the new flow of information. The “increasing electronic way of
life” (Miller, 1971, p. 2) and the massive data collection practices of institutions led
scholars to analyze privacy in terms of control over personal information (cf. Tavani,
2007, p. 7). Although legal and philosophical scholars continue to be influential in
this discourse, many more disciplines such as computer sciences, communication
and media sciences, psychology, and sociology have contributed to the on-going
goal of conceptualizing informational privacy.
3.1.5 The Focus on Informational Privacy
From the 1960s onward, a specific discourse on informational privacy can thus be
identified (e.g., Miller, 1971; Nissenbaum, 2010; Petronio, 2002; Shils, 1956/1996;
Tavani & Moor, 2001; Westin, 1967). Since the rise of computer technology, and
even more since the advent of the Internet and social media, a broad discourse of
the implications of these developments has captured both the scientific world and
society and politics. This discourse is largely defined by the fear of a loss of privacy
due to the digitization of many aspects of our everyday lives. The central focus of
this discourse is the threat arising from the increased interest of governments and
companies in collecting data of their citizens and clients and relatedly, the legal
protection of informational privacy in the age of ubiquitous computing (Miller,
1971, p. 26).
There are several variations of the control theory of privacy (cf. Tavani, 2007,
pp. 7–9), all of which claim that one has privacy if one has control over information
about oneself. Perhaps the most influential definition of privacy comes from Westin
(1967), who defined privacy as “the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to
determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them
is communicated to others” (p. 5). In this definition, he emphasized the normative
notion of self-determination, that people claim they should be able to control what
information is shared with others. Fried (1990) used a similar definition in which he
noted that privacy “is not simply an absence of information about us in the minds
of others, rather it is the control over information we have about ourselves” (p. 54).
Miller (1971), summarizing several contemporary lawyers’ and social scientists’
conceptions of privacy, noted that “privacy is the individual’s ability to control
the circulation of information relating to him—a power that often is essential to
maintaining social relationships and personal freedom” (p. 25). There are several
other control-based theories of privacy that had a great influence on the subsequent
academic discourses, as well as on the empirical research on privacy (e.g., Altman,

1975; Johnson, 1974; Kelvin, 1973; Margulis, 1977). Although they could be
included in this discourse on informational privacy, I will discuss them in much
greater detail in Sect. 3.2 since they provide the basis for a more psychological or
behavioral understanding of privacy and as such also the foundation for my own
theory of situational privacy and self-disclosure.
There are several problematic aspects regarding such control-based definitions.
The first and foremost concern is that such a concept of privacy is counterintuitive
to our conventional understanding of privacy (cf. Tavani, 2007, p. 8). Verbatim
interpretations of these theories imply that an individual who reveals everything
about himself or herself might nonetheless enjoy privacy if he or she discloses
the information voluntarily. A high level of privacy could mean both the complete
withholding as well as the complete disclosure of information (with consent). The
only precondition is that the individual has control over whether an information
is revealed or not. Tavani and Moor (2001) and Laufer and Wolfe (1977) have
argued for a clear distinction of privacy and control as it is conceivable to have
control without privacy and privacy without control (p. 6). It would be unfair to
presume that all scholars who have developed a control-based definition of privacy
would actually argue that someone has privacy even when he voluntarily discloses
all information about himself in a public situation. Accordingly, most scholars
implicitly assume that privacy refers to a condition of limited access (mentally or
spatially). Westin (1967), for example, further said that “privacy is the voluntary
and temporary withdrawal of a person from society” (p. 5). However, this ambiguity
seems problematic as it remains semantically paradoxical for privacy to mean being
in control over information and being in a condition of limited access.
Rössler (2001) also uses a control-based definition, yet she avoids the aforemen-
tioned ambiguity by suggesting that something is called “private” if one literally
can or should be able to control access to it (p. 23). This definition presents an
interesting alternative to older control-based concepts, as it fits with our daily usage
of the word. A room, for example, is private if we can control access to it and hence
use it to limit access to the self. Nonetheless, by defining the predicate “private”
instead of the term “privacy” itself, it seems that Rössler implicitly assumes (similar
to other scholars in this tradition) that a private sphere is a “condition of limited
access.”
A second concern is that these theories do not explain which kinds of personal
information an individual can expect to have control over, and how much control
he can expect to have over his personal information (e.g., Solove, 2008; Tavani &
Moor, 2001; Trepte, 2016b). According to Tavani and Moor (2001), it is useful to
differentiate between information about sensitive and confidential data (nonpublic
personal information) and information about where a person works, lives, shops,
dines, and so forth (public personal information). The idea is that control over public
personal information is generally limited (pp. 7–8). This led philosophical scholar
Nissenbaum (2010) to assert that “we may already agree that no one (except possibly
the hermit or someone living in total isolation) can have absolute control over all
information about him- or herself” (p. 73). She argued that a plausible theory of
privacy must also include a principled account of its limits. Trepte (2016a) made a
similar point by arguing that control over information in many online situations is
no longer feasible since active control cannot really be exerted once information is
shared. She thus argued that we should question whether control remains a useful
paradigm for understanding privacy, and instead, asserted that control is increasingly
replaced by communication about how information can and should be used (p. 162).
3.1.6 The Philosophical Discourse
According to Rössler (2001), we need to consider an additional, genuinely philo-

sophical discourse in which different articulations of the feminist theory, theories
of the public sphere, and theories of informational privacy come together in order
to precisely define both the concept and functions of privacy for liberal societies
(e.g., Bier, 1980; Nissenbaum, 2010; Reiman, 1976; Rössler, 2001; Schoeman,
1984). This discourse is primarily interested in identifying the conceptual premises
that previous discourses have implicitly assumed, and furthermore in clarifying the
individual and societal value of privacy. A complete summary of all constituent
parts of this discourse would be beyond the scope of this work. Consequently, I
will discuss only those approaches that, in my opinion, have helped tremendously
in integrating both newer perspectives and older aspects of traditional concepts into
more modern conceptions of privacy.
An interesting account of privacy stems from Jeffrey Reiman, who defined
privacy as a “condition under which other people are deprived of access to either
some information about you or some experiences of you” (Reiman, 1976). Although
in the tradition of the limited access perspective on privacy, the formulation “some
experience of you” extends what privacy might include or protect. This view is
further extended by social and political philosopher Rössler (2001), who provided a
concise and comprehensive definition of a three-dimensional privacy concept. She
proposed that “something” counts as private if one can control the access to this
“thing” and that the protection of privacy refers to protection against unwanted
access of others (p. 136). Rössler emphasized further that the term access should
be understood both in its literal meaning (physical intrusion) and in its metaphorical
meaning (access to knowledge about a person and as intervention in decisions or
actions). Based on this rationale, she distinguished between three dimensions of
privacy.
Local privacy refers to the traditional understanding of privacy. It describes the
classic interpretation of the private sphere that has been a fundamental aspect of
modern liberal societies (cf. Sects. 3.1.1 and 3.1.2). This dimension encompasses
the privacy of the home, the accommodation, the room, and the privacy of objects or
items (p. 255). However, Rössler argued that this dimension should not be mistaken
as a simple description of a spatial area.2
Informational privacy refers to the control over what other people are able to
know about oneself (p. 201). In other words, informational privacy is obtained if one
is able to control the access of others to information about oneself. Consequently,
it alludes to topics such as unknown or unwanted surveillance and data collection,
sharing or dissemination of information to third parties without the consent of the
information owner and so on (pp. 201–254).
Rössler identified a third dimension, decisional privacy, which she believed
captures what people mean when saying things like “religion is my private affair”
(p. 144). In contrast to local and informational privacy, decisional privacy protects
people—symbolically and literally—from interference with their decisions, actions,
and ways of living. In other words, this dimension should protect people from
unwanted access to their private affairs. Rössler herself acknowledged that the
predicate “decisional” might be misleading since this dimension encompasses many
more aspects than decisions (p. 145). Protection of decisional privacy is necessary in
order to enable individuals to enact their deliberately chosen actions, decisions, and
ways of living without interference from others. Claims to decisional privacy are
claims to indifference, reserve or non-perception with regard to the private aspects
of a publicly lived life (p. 153).
Some scholars have criticized this dimension as being too elusive and negligible.
For example, Hotter (2011) argued that even issues about local and decisional
privacy encompass personal information (p. 37). Furthermore, he promoted the
argument that people are already protected against physical or psychological
intrusion by simple rights to liberty (p. 37). Although decisional privacy might
indeed be protected by other rights, it could nonetheless be a fundamental aspect
of people’s understanding of privacy. According to Rössler, decisional privacy is
based on the argument that self-determination and autonomy include the right of
individuals to be the authors their own biographies and should therefore guarantee
that individuals’ life must not be commented upon, interpreted or influenced by
others in social contexts (p. 153).
Apart from this tripartite concept of privacy, Rössler emphasized that her
definition was oriented around the basis idea of individual control and as such was
a departure from the traditional distinction between public and private. She argued
that, by focusing on the “ability to control,” her definition accounted for the norma-
tive notion of the overall concept as “being able to control” should be understood as
“being allowed to control” or even as “being supposed to control” (Rössler, 2001,
p. 137). Control, in this sense, can even be understood as democratically legitimized
2 Rössler’s concept of local privacy is far more comprehensive than comparable dimensions
developed by other scholars (e.g., Burgoon, 1982). Apart from physical intrusion into someone’s
property, it describes a sphere that is subject to an individual’s enactment. For a comprehensive
description of this dimension, see again (Rössler, 2001, pp. 255–304).
control (e.g., if data protection is ensured by a democratically elected government,

cf. Rössler, 2001, p. 137).
A second approach to privacy comes from Nissenbaum (2010) who argued
that claims to privacy are in fact claims to an appropriate flow of information
(p. 127). She posited that there is great variability in privacy needs, which are
systematically related to characteristics of social contexts. Based on this assumption,
she argued that the appropriateness of information flow is dependent on context-
relative informational norms which may vary from context to context. A privacy
violation is accordingly not so much a form of unwanted access, but rather
an inappropriate access in relation to the respective context. Accordingly, many
contemporary “socio-technical systems” violate these norms and thereby threaten
individuals’ contextual integrity (examples are described on pp. 152–157 and
pp. 191–198).
The key concept of the framework of contextual integrity are context-relative
informational norms. Based on existing sociological theories (e.g., Bourdieu, 1984;
Goffman, 1959; Miller, 2001; Walzer, 1984), Nissenbaum described contexts as
“structured social settings characterized by canonical activities, roles, relationships,
power structures, norms (or rules), and internal values (goals, ends, purposes)”
(p. 132). Contexts are hence social settings that have evolved over time, such as
family, workplace, education, or religion. The development and organization of
these contexts are obviously influenced by historical, social, and cultural circum-
stances. For Nissenbaum’s framework, four main aspects are of importance (pp.
133–134): (1) roles are defined as typical or paradigmatic capacities in which people
act in contexts (e.g. teachers, lawyers, father, mother, doctors, patients, etc.), (2)
activities refer to the corresponding behavior in which people engage according to
their assigned roles (e.g., a doctor examines a patient, a student completes an exam,
a teacher is lecturing in a classroom, etc.), (3) norms are described as specific rules
that prescribe acceptable actions and practices in line with the roles within specific
contexts (e.g., students are prescribed to attend classes, write notes, ask questions,
complete homework, etc.), and (4) values are defined as the objective around which
a context is oriented and thus present shared goals and purposes within one context
(e.g., in the context of a school, the purpose is to transmit knowledge; in the context
of a medical examination, the goal is to find the cause of an illness).
Within these contexts, particular norms related to the flow of information
are central to the framework of contextual integrity. These informational norms
refer to transmission, communication, transfer, distribution, and dissemination of
personal information between one party and another (p. 140). The norms are in turn
characterized by four parameters: (1) contexts that present the boundary setting for
each informational norm, (2) actors that can be further differentiated into senders of
information, recipients of information and information subjects, (3) attributes that
constitute the nature or type of information, and (4) transmission principles that can
be regarded as the terms and conditions under which a flow of information ought to
take place. Interestingly, Nissenbaum’s (2010) construct of transmission principles
closely resembles to Petronio’s (2002) concept of privacy rules. As Petronio’s
theory represents an important contribution towards the connection of privacy and

self-disclosure, I will discuss it more thoroughly in Sect. 5.1.
The framework of contextual integrity presents a novel way of looking at privacy
which helps in particular to determine privacy violations, specifically with regard
to socio-technical systems that have altered the traditional flow of information. As
Nissenbaum emphasized, the framework is not designed to capture the full meaning
of privacy, but rather to characterize the nature of privacy violations, predict when
practices might arouse protest, and identify the sources of objections against data
handling practices (p. 148). The focus on contextual circumstances and context-
relative informational norms is an interesting starting point for a conceptualization
of a psychological and, in particular, a situational concept of privacy. Connections
between Nissenbaum’s concept and my own rationale will thus be highlighted
throughout the book.
3.1.7 Conclusion: Commonalities and Reciprocal Influences
As we have seen, the identified discourses often strongly reflect the interests and
problems of different disciplines. Almost in all discourses, privacy is viewed as
an important value for individuals and often even for society (see also: Newell,
1995). Yet the differences are clearly identifiable. Privacy may refer to limits
on governmental authority, separation of spheres of activity, secret knowledge or
experiences, control over access, ideas of group memberships or simple conditions
of states of protection (DeCew, 1997, p. 13). However, there is also considerable
overlaps. Taken together, these discourses have provided the subsequent scholarship
on privacy with a vast landscape of theoretical frameworks, a long list of potential
problems and threats associated with privacy, and an important discussion on why
privacy should be considered as an essential value for modern societies. In short,
the following key findings should be kept in mind for the further investigation of
privacy:
1. Initial ideas about privacy and more specifically, about the private sphere, stem
from liberal philosophies that emphasized the importance of individual rights
and limits to the state’s power. For the first time, the private sphere became a
valued domain that allowed for individual self-determination and liberty. Modern
claims of privacy—and particularly of data protection and self-determination—
are consequently derived from this tradition of limiting the powers of the state to
interfere with the private activities of its citizens.
2. Privacy has often only been treated as a residual category in opposition to the
public sphere. Scholars have often bemoaned the decay of the public in favor
of lived individuality in the private. In this context, the private sphere is often
negatively connoted because it symbolizes the slow erosion of an active, political
society.
3. Feminist scholars have criticized the liberal concepts of privacy and their
potential to shield domination, repression, degradation, and physical harm to
women and others without power. Although some have advocated in favor of the
total abolishment of the term privacy, most feminist scholars have nonetheless
identified an inherent value in the concept and subsequently contributed towards
more refined and gender-neutral interpretations of privacy and in particular the
private sphere.
4. In the legal sciences, many scholars have provided refined definitions of privacy
in order to generate a starting point for the subsequent discussions of how
to protect individuals’ rights. In particular, theories that define privacy as a
form of seclusion or nonintrusion and theories that define privacy as a form of
control over the access to the self can be differentiated. Subsequent academic
discourses have introduced the role of choice into previously narrow and neutral
concepts of privacy. The question of whether privacy should be regarded as a
form of control or a form of constraint or limited access is still not solved.
According to Nissenbaum (2010), common usage suggests the intuition behind
both conceptions is sound and that both capture essential aspects of privacy
that seem to matter to people (p. 71). Nonetheless, we will have to return to
this question once we conceptualize privacy from a psychological point of view
(cf. Sect. 3.2).
5. In the 1960s, scholars focused specifically on informational privacy, which led to
several systematic analyses of privacy. Threats arising from computer technology
have motivated scholars to redefine privacy and include several distinct aspects
in the broader concept.
6. Finally, philosophical scholars have tried to develop more comprehensive and
integrative frameworks of privacy that focus on the premises that are implicitly
assumed in most other discourses. These treatises of privacy mainly aim at
identifying the value of privacy by linking it to the concept of autonomy, and by
further providing a robust basis for both policymakers and empirical researchers.
Moreover, the context-dependence of privacy is highlighted and consequently
discussed with regard to prevailing societal norms.
Up until the mid-1960s, there were only a few scholars that had investigated
privacy as a social-psychological phenomenon. The state of social research on pri-
vacy at the time led Westin (1967) to start the first part of his seminal work Privacy
and Freedom with the following words: “Few values so fundamental to society as
privacy have been left so undefined in social theory or have been the subject of such
vague and confused writings by social scientists.” (p. 5). Eight years later, Margulis
(1974) still came to a similar conclusion, stating, “privacy is a concept with a long
past but a short history” (p. 101). Since that time, however, several psychologists
and communication scientists have provided systematic analyses of privacy as a
behavioral phenomenon. In the following sections, I will provide an overview of the
most important contributions within this field. In doing so, I will link back to several
aspects of the aforementioned discourses.
3.2 A Socio-Psychological Perspective on Privacy
Within psychology and communication science, scholars are less concerned about
rights to privacy, the public–private dichotomy or clarifying premises of traditional
privacy concepts. Instead, they focus on individuals’ experiences of privacy or
privacy violations and how these influence behavior. Privacy research from a
social scientific point of view generally aims at analyzing and understanding
individuals’ behaviors and their associated mental processes. To grasp the potential
of disciplines such as communication science or psychology in contributing to a
more comprehensive understanding of privacy, it seems fruitful to identify common
aims and interests of scholars in these fields. These aims are reflected in the typical
research questions of these disciplines. Most of them can broadly be subsumed
under four main research questions. Of course, such a categorization represents a
disproportionate oversimplification of all research interests and aims. Over time,
scholars have investigated many more fine-grained aspects of privacy. At this stage,
I simply want to pinpoint their key interests in abstract terms that can be identified
in the literature on privacy and can help to understand the potential contribution of
a socio-psychological discourse on privacy.
What Is Privacy from the Individual’s Point of View?
The first of the four key questions asks how privacy should be defined, or rather
conceptualized when the focus is the individual person. Interestingly, privacy in
this regard is often not as clearly defined or conceptualized as in other disciplines.
One origin of this vagueness could be the differentiation of objective and subjective
privacy. Studying privacy from an individual’s point of view inherently requires
scholars to acknowledge the variability in how people perceive privacy or how they
define it for themselves. Accordingly, we will find that all privacy theories developed
in psychology or communication science incorporate the notion of subjective
perceptions. It is important to note, however, that other aspects of the discourse
on privacy aspects (e.g., as raised in other disciplines) may not be addressed with
these theories in a meaningful way.
Why Do Individuals Need Privacy?
A second central interest refers to the identification of the psychological functions
of privacy for the individual. Behavioral scientists generally accept the proposition
that human beings are cognizing and goal-directed organisms that attempt to satisfy
their needs by interactions and exchanges with their physical environments (cf.
Proshansky, Ittelson, & Rivlin, 1970, p. 176). In order to understand people’s
behaviors associated with privacy, it is crucial to understand why people need
privacy.
How Do Individuals Achieve Privacy?
The third question inquires about the ways in which people regulate their individual
privacy. It is commonly believed that perceptions of a lack of privacy motivate
people to act and achieve a desired level of privacy. Questions along these lines
include: What mechanisms can individuals use to achieve privacy? Are there
3.2 A Socio-Psychological Perspective on Privacy 49
different ways of achieving privacy? What do people do to secure their privacy,

once they have attained a desired level of it? As we will see in this chapter and
also in the following ones, much research aims at clarifying what types of privacy
regulation behavior can be differentiated.
When Do Individuals Perceive High or Low Levels of Privacy and How Does
This Affect Their Behavior?
Finally, if privacy is dependent on the subjective perceptions of individuals, it is
important to identify the specific conditions and circumstances under which people
perceive a high level of privacy or feel the need for greater privacy (Proshansky
et al., 1970, p. 176). No individual desires privacy all the time because the desire
to be sociable and to interact with others, to open oneself and to take part in social
exchanges is equally important. As Proshansky et al. (1970) noted, “there remains
the no less crucial question of what consequences follow from persistent frustration
of human needs for privacy, or whether there are any conditions under which
privacy ceases to be important” (p. 177). More broadly, psychological and social
science research increasingly asks how people perceive privacy under different
circumstances. This final research question is central to the work presented in this
book as it explicitly addresses the situationality of privacy. In the following section,
I will discuss the most important theoretical contributions within the social sciences,
structured in accordance with the four identified categories of research goals.
3.2.1 Concepts of Privacy
According to Margulis (1977), the literature on privacy in the social sciences can
be differentiated into three overlapping stages of concept development. The first
stage includes the works of Goffman (1963a, 1963b), Bates (1964), and Schwartz
(1968). These early works helped to justify the research on privacy and raised
important questions with regard to the usability of privacy as a concept for the
behavioral sciences. In the second stage, scholars turned to explore the concept of
privacy systematically. The works of Westin (1967), Kelvin (1973), Johnson (1974),
Altman (1975), Laufer, Proshansky, and Wolfe (1973), and Laufer and Wolfe (1977)
deserve mention here. It should be noted that scholars in the second stage developed
their ideas and theories almost simultaneously. In the work of one scholar, we find
references to others and vice versa.
Stage three represents the move towards concrete theory development. At the
time, Margulis still believed that the major analyses by Westin and Altman should
be seen as orientations rather than complete theories (p. 6). But given the various
studies that have adopted their theories since that time, we can now conclude
that they represent the most cited and most useful accounts of privacy today.
Surprisingly, theoretical advancement has almost stopped since the 1970s. It was
only in 1982 that Burgoon presented a newer dimensional account of privacy.
Accounts combining the concepts of privacy and self-disclosure emerged later
(e.g., Dienlin, 2015; Petronio, 2002), but as they represent more comprehensive
approaches that explicitly incorporate the concept of self-disclosure, I will discuss
them in Chap. 5.
3.2.1.1 Early Analyses
Although Goffman (1959, 1963a, 1963b) did not explicitly advance a theory of
privacy, his studies on self-presentation, behavior in public places and stigmatized
identities anticipated many of the ideas that guided later approaches to privacy. He
stated—in an analogy to actors on stage—that every performance of an individual
is influenced by the region and time in which it takes place (Goffman, 1959,
pp. 106–140). People engage in many different “dramas” that require them to
constantly change roles and inhibit conventional behavior. He was one of the first
to prominently acknowledged the situational variance of behavior. In his work
Behavior in Public Places (1963a), he further distinguished between unfocused and
focused interactions between individuals, acknowledging how different situations
affect individuals’ self-presentation and thus implicitly their need for privacy. He
thereby proposed the concept of “communication boundaries” (p. 151), which later
became a powerful metaphor often used in privacy theories (Altman, 1974; Petronio,
2002).
One of the first psychological treatises that explicitly focused on privacy came
from Bates (1964). As a starting point, he observed that by thinking about the
meaning of privacy, scholars and individuals alike were irresistibly tempted to slip
into spatial analogies. His somewhat colloquial definition thus referred to privacy as
a dwelling with “the self” as the only inhabitant (p. 430). He argued that everybody
decides who else is allowed to enter the “rooms” of this house. More precisely, he
proposed a tripartite scheme of privacy. First, privacy can be structured into many
different content areas. Different things (e.g., body image, ideas, emotions, beliefs)
arouse feelings of privacy for different people. Second, privacy can be seen as a sort
of withdrawal. Referring to informational privacy, Bates argued that privacy can
be structured “by the answer a person gives to the question, ‘Who are the persons
you wish to exclude from having this knowledge?”’ (p. 430). He suggested that
there are differences between individuals regarding the extent to which they want to
open themselves to others. Third, he argued that privacy is structured by situational
contexts. Feelings of privacy are affected by the situation in which individuals find
themselves. Based on these three aspects of privacy, Bates further noted that privacy
is inevitably subjective and that the “structure of these psychological regions” must
be regarded as subjective perceptions of individuals. A final observation was that
privacy is generally positively valued, although there is the possibility of having
too much privacy. Like Goffman, he thus acknowledged the situational nature of
privacy. Although this was only a first attempt of conceptualizing privacy, Bates
raised important points and aspects of privacy that led subsequent scholars to
develop systematic and structurally richer concepts of privacy.
3.2.1.2 A Typological Approach by Westin
The first systematic psychological analysis of privacy, which continues to inspire

psychologists and communication scholars today, was not advanced by a psychol-
ogist, but by legal scholar Alan Westin. In his seminal work Privacy and Freedom
(1967), he proposed to view privacy as relationship of the individual to others. In
this multifaceted definition, he focused on several aspects which that echoed the
vaguely expressed ideas of Bates:
Privacy is the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when,
how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to others. Viewed in
terms of the relation of the individual to social participation, privacy is the voluntarily
and temporary withdrawal of a person from the general society through physical or
psychological means, either in a state of solitude or small-group intimacy or, when among
larger groups, in a condition of anonymity or reserve (Westin, 1967, p. 5).
Several aspects of this definition deserve closer examination. First, we could

criticize that his seemingly contradictory approach to defining privacy as both a
claim and a form of withdrawal. However, this ambiguity can be resolved if we
regard the first part as a reference to legal definitions of privacy and the second as
a psychological account of privacy. Whereas the first refers to the idea that people
believe they should rightfully be in control of information about them, the second
is a (objective) description of how individuals achieve this control. Accordingly, the
second part can be regarded as a psychological definition of privacy.
A second aspect that deserves attention is the notion of voluntariness. Respond-
ing to the critics of reduced concepts of privacy (see Sect. 3.1.4), Westin argued that
privacy can only be experienced if the individual chooses to withdraw from social
interaction. A forced isolation thus cannot be regarded as privacy. As we will see
in the next section, this notion of choice is important because only a freely chosen
state of privacy allows for the satisfaction of specific needs. A third aspect refers
to the notion of time. People do not always want privacy. Westin, like Bates before
him, acknowledged that there are people need privacy only under certain conditions.
Individuals thus move between seeking privacy and seeking companionship (cf.,
Margulis, 1974, p. 104). Fourth, privacy is viewed as withdrawal from interaction
with other people. The ultimate aim of privacy is hence to distance oneself from
others. Westin further posited that this withdrawal could be achieved by physical
or psychological means, thereby opening up the question of what types of privacy
regulation mechanisms actually exist. At this point, he paved the way towards a
psychological investigation of privacy regulation behavior.
Finally, and maybe most important, he proposed several states or conditions
of privacy (Margulis, 2003, p. 418). By introducing four states of privacy, he
explained the types of privacy an individual can actually achieve. All four states
make reference to many ideas about privacy that have already been raised in the
multidisciplinary discourses. The first state is solitude, which Westin described as
being “separated from the group and free from the observation by other persons”
(p. 33). This state of privacy closely resembles privacy concepts of reductionists
(cf. Sect. 3.1.4). Likewise, Westin viewed solitude as the most complete state of
privacy that one could achieve (p. 34). The second state is intimacy and refers
to small group seclusion (p. 34). Intimacy exists typically between husband and
wife, or with family or friends. It comprises a small group of individuals who
withdraw from larger groups or society. The third state is anonymity and refers to
being free from identification and surveillance in public places or during public
acts (p. 34). Although an individual may be walking in the streets, he must not fear
being personally identified as he merges with the situational landscape. The last state
of privacy is called reserve and refers to a mental state of privacy that people can
achieve by creating a psychological barrier (p. 35). Even if all other states of privacy
are not achievable, individuals may still find privacy by not disclosing information
to others and limiting communication about themselves.
A problematic aspect of conceptualizing states of privacy is that it suggests
privacy is something one can either have or not have. However, Westin himself
acknowledged the gradual nature of privacy; he later wrote that “individuals are
constantly engaged in an attempt to find sufficient privacy to serve their general
social roles as well as their individual needs of the moment” (p. 44). It thus makes
sense to view Westin’s theory as defining different types of privacy instead of
different states of privacy. Depending on the situational circumstances, people may
experience different levels of these types of privacy. Most importantly, however,
Westin’s approach is clearly acknowledging the situationality of privacy.
3.2.1.3 A Power-Based Approach by Kelvin
Kelvin’s (1973) aim was to establish a concept of privacy that helps to explain
people’s concrete behavior. In broad terms, he defined privacy as a function of
the perceived limitation of power through the active intervention or presence of
others. He demonstrated that privacy can be linked to well-explored phenomena
such as power and norms. According to Margulis (1974), Kelvin’s theory has many
strengths as it is testable and based on prior conceptual and research literature
(p. 113).
He observed that privacy refers to situations of conflict between the individual
and society (Kelvin, 1973, p. 250). In all these situations, one can assume that
the individual is (1) independent and has the right to be independent, but this
independence can be threatened making the individual (2) vulnerable, and this
vulnerability is given because other people have (3) power over him (p. 250). From
these observations, he derived that “it is a necessary condition of privacy (though not
sufficient to define ‘privacy’) that the individual is free from the power or influence
of other people: he enjoys privacy (. . . ) to the extent to which the probabilities of
his behavior are not (emphasis in original) causally affected by others” (p. 251).
It is important to note that Kelvin viewed privacy as a matter of degree and not
as a dichotomy between no-privacy and privacy. Power, here, is understood as an
attribute of a relationship (between two or more persons) that is causal in nature and
refers to the idea that the power of person A modifies the probabilities of a person
B’s behavior (p. 251). According to Kelvin, behavior could also refer to feelings and
beliefs, beyond just concrete actions.
Kelvin elaborated on this power-based view of privacy in four ways. First, he
noted that privacy can be extended to units and groups of all sizes. Like Westin,
who proposed the state of small-group intimacy, he also emphasized that there are
important realms of privacy associated with dyadic relationships such as friendships
or marriages (p. 251). Second, power can be differentiated into active intervention
of a person and the mere presence of this person. Whereas the first can be regarded
as positive, the second represents a constraint (p. 252). Third, Kelvin argued that
absolute absence of external influence is not feasible as even in solitude people’s
thoughts, feelings, and actions have antecedents that may be caused by the influence
of others. Based on this rationale, he proposed giving privacy a location in time
in order to clarify that a condition of privacy exists whenever the behavior of an
individual “is not immediately affected or determined by the influence of ‘others”’
(p. 252). This notion is important as it will be a fundamental of the theory of
situational privacy and self-disclosure that I will develop later. Finally, and in line
with Bates, he regarded privacy as a subjective state that is only present in the
experience of the individual. Again, his account of privacy is clearly situational
as the amount of power that others exert over an individual varies across situations.
Like Westin, Kelvin embraced the notion of choice. In contrast to isolation
(which an individual seeks to avoid), privacy is a pleasurable experience because
it is deliberately chosen. Privacy is hence the perceived—and positively valued—
limitation of others’s power. Privacy in this sense is a kind of counterpower that
individuals can exercise to nullify the perceived power of others over them. The
final definition hence reads as follows:
Privacy may be regarded as a condition of ’separateness’ deliberately chosen and protected
by the individual (or group), as separateness which the individual can, in principle, abandon
or break down if he chooses (Kelvin, 1973, p. 253).
3.2.1.4 A Behavioral Approach by Johnson
Johnson (1974) elaborated on the general idea that privacy involves personal
control. He defined privacy as “those behaviors which enhance and maintain
one’s control over outcomes indirectly by controlling interactions with others”
(Johnson, 1974, p. 90). He thereby contributed an important notion towards a
broader understanding of privacy: privacy is not an end in itself, as it does not satisfy
a fundamental need (p. 91). Because of this, Johnson regarded privacy as a sort of
secondary control (or, more precisely, a secondary need).
In order to corroborate this concept of privacy, he drew upon the extensive
psychological literature on personal control, which posits that people generally
“seek to make their outcomes consistent with their needs by translating their
desires through actions into appropriate outcomes” (p. 85). This process (from need
awareness to need satisfaction) involves several stages of control. First, outcome
choice control refers to the selection of a one of more outcomes. Second, behavior
selection control refers to the evaluation and selection of possible behaviors to

attain the selected outcome. Third, outcome effectance control refers to performing
the goal-directed behaviors adequately enough to attain the expected outcomes.
Finally, outcome realization control refers to the interpretation and evaluation of
the outcomes that one achieves.
Johnson then denoted that person control could be primary or secondary (p. 89).
Whereas primary control refers to behavior that causes outcomes directly, secondary
control refers to behavior that increases the chances of exerting primary control
(i.e., behaviors that cause desired outcomes). Privacy is hence regarded as secondary
control, as it includes behaviors which serve to facilitate behaviors that then cause
need-satisfying outcomes (p. 91). Interestingly, Johnson even referred to privacy as
“condition-setting control” (p. 91). With regard to the four types of personal control
outline above, privacy thus refers primarily to behavior selection control.
Johnson argued further that much of the stress related to privacy decisions
stems from the uncertain relationship between privacy control behavior and need-
satisfying outcomes (p. 93). People need to decide beforehand what type of privacy
control behavior they utilize without knowing if it will actually serve their desired
outcomes. This aspect is very important because it shows that people are constantly
optimizing their privacy—a notion that was further refined by Altman.
3.2.1.5 A Dialectical Approach by Altman
One of the most influential theories of privacy was advanced by Altman (1974,
1975). He aimed to establish the concept of privacy systematically in the field
of environment and behavior by analyzing the distinct properties and multiple
levels of behaviors associated with privacy, and by regarding the environment as
a determinant of as well as an extension of behavior (Margulis, 1977, p. 12).
Central to his analysis is the definition of privacy “as the selective control
of access to the self or to one’s group” (Altman, 1975, p. 18). This definition
again contains several notions worth examining: First of all, Altman’s definition
is consistent with the limited-access perspective (Margulis, 2011, p. 14). Privacy
is fundamentally about access to the self. It is also consistent with control-based
theories of privacy in that it concretely defines privacy as control of access to
the self. However, Altman emphasized that this control is selective since privacy
demands change over time and in different circumstances (Altman, 1975, p. 18).
His approach was thus also inherently situational.
Altman explicated the nature of privacy by postulating six properties (pp. 10–
12). First, privacy can be regarded as an interpersonal boundary-control process.
The term “boundary” is important here as it has been adapted and extended in
the Communication Privacy Management Theory by Petronio (2002). According
to Altman, “privacy regulation [. . . ] is somewhat like the shifting permeability
of a cell membrane” (p. 10). Second, privacy includes the regulation of inputs
and outputs. Third, Altman differentiated between desired and achieved privacy.
He thereby acknowledged the subjectivity of privacy perception as the individual
constantly compares his desired level of privacy (the optimal level of interaction
with others) to the actual degree of contact that results from interaction with others
(p. 10). If desired and achieved privacy are equal, an optimum level of privacy
exists. Too much or too little achieved privacy in comparison to the desired level of
privacy leads to a perceived imbalance. In consequence, fourthly, privacy involves a
continuous optimizing process. An imbalance between desired and achieved privacy
is unsatisfactory and hence drives the individual towards an optimal level of privacy
at any moment in time. Fifth, privacy involves different types of social units (individ-
uals, families, couples, etc.). Finally, Altman regarded privacy as a dialectic process.
In his view, privacy should be understood as an interplay of opposing forces. People
sometimes want to be open and interact with others while at other times, they want
to be alone and out of contact. Like other control-based theories, this implies that
people enjoy privacy even when they voluntarily disclose all information about
themselves. With this last property, Altman also departed from the traditional
understanding of privacy as a form of withdrawal. His theory is consequently
only partly consistent with the conventional usage of the word privacy. Although
Altman’s theory is highly useful, I will come back to this critical aspect later on.
3.2.1.6 A Dimensional Approach by Burgoon
Based on the existing literature at the time, Burgoon (1982) asked whether the
overall concept of privacy must be divided into different kinds of subdimensions.
Like other scholars before, she emphasized that privacy is subjective in nature. She
further argued that the concept of privacy needs to include the concepts of choice
and control because privacy is generally considered a desirable state (p. 209). Her
main contribution, however, was a multidimensional account of privacy based on a
comprehensive literature review. She proposed four interdependent dimensions that
she believed to have concrete implications for individual’s communication:
Physical privacy refers to the “degree to which one is physically inaccessible to
others” (Burgoon, 1982, p. 211). This dimension is closely related to concepts such
as crowding, personal space, and territory. Depending on an individual’s desired
level of physical privacy, physical privacy can be violated because someone literally
comes too close or even touches the individual’s body. According to Burgoon,
however, physical privacy can also relate to a personal space or “buffer zone,” as
well as to one’s claim to a certain territory (e.g., house). In other words, physical
privacy alludes to the ability to control the physical boundaries surrounding oneself
(p. 214).
Social privacy refers to one’s degree of interaction with others. Perceptions of
social privacy refer both to feelings of intimacy (e.g., with a significant other) and
to feelings of inaccessibility from outsiders (p. 217). For Burgoon, this dimension
captures well what Altman termed the dialectic nature of privacy: social privacy in
this sense fosters closeness among some individuals while simultaneously creating
distance from others. In other words, social privacy alludes to “the ability to
withdraw from social intercourse” (p. 216).
Psychological privacy refers to “one’s ability to control affective and cognitive

input and outputs” (p. 224). With regard to inputs, it means to be able to think, to
formulate ideas, beliefs, and attitudes and to feel free from external influences (p.
224). Output control includes the decision to share thoughts and feelings or intimate
information with other people. In other words, psychological privacy represents the
ability to withdraw from over-stimulation and external impediments, as well as the
ability to choose when to disclose something about oneself to another person.
Informational privacy refers to an individual’s ability to control the initial release
of information about himself, as well as its subsequent distribution and use (p. 230).
It includes controllability of the amount, content and recipients of the information.
Importantly, Burgoon denotes that informational privacy goes beyond that which is
under personal control (p. 229) since information about persons can be collected
without their knowledge.
Burgoon noted that all four dimensions are not necessarily distinct. Instead, she
regarded them as interrelated and overlapping. However, they serve to identify and
classify the behaviors and strategies implied by individuals to restore privacy or to
express the desire for a more optimal level of privacy.
3.2.2 Functions of Privacy
By now, we should have a basic understanding of what privacy is. We can thus
turn to an even more fundamental question: Why do people need privacy? Finding
an answer to this question is essential for any discipline that is concerned with
privacy. Legal scholars need to inquire about the function of privacy in order to
justify what a right to privacy actually protects. Philosophers inquire about the
value or moral legitimacy of privacy because it could otherwise be a negligible
concept. Naturally, this question also concerns social scientists because if privacy
has nameable functions, it should be these ends that foster and explain human
behavior related to regulating, achieving, or abandoning privacy.
In order to understand the functions of privacy from a psychological point of
view, it is useful to have a general idea about what constitutes a need. A need can
generally be defined as a motivational force that is activated in an unpleasant state of
deprivation (Doyal & Gough, 1991). Because such a state is unsatisfactory, it drives
the human organism to reduce or eliminate the respective deficiency. Its motivational
aspect is the satisfaction an individual believes he or she is able to achieve through
by eliminating the specific unpleasant condition (Trepte & Masur, 2017a). Being
lonely, for example, is such an undesirable condition. Someone who is lonely longs
for the company because he or she knows that interacting and being in company of
other people will alleviate the unpleasant feeling of loneliness. It is the anticipated
shedding of the feeling of loneliness that drives the person to go about and seek the
company of other people.
With this definition in mind, we can ask whether there is a need for privacy.
A first assumption that is shared by all scholars is that privacy is not a self-
sufficient state or end in itself. Instead, a need for privacy has to be understood
as a secondary need, as it represents the desire for a temporary (spatial or mental)
state in which the satisfaction of more fundamental needs becomes possible (Trepte
& Masur, 2017a). Westin (1967), for example, said that privacy is “basically an
instrument for achieving individual goals of self-realization” (p. 43). As denoted,
Johnson (1974) even went so far as to say that privacy is nothing else but secondary
control, as it facilitates the attainment of other outcomes or ends. More precisely,
he regarded privacy as “condition-setting control” (p. 91), which means people
engage in privacy behavior in order to indirectly set the conditions necessary to
satisfy other primary outcomes (or more fundamental needs). Furthermore, he
argued that even successfully achieved privacy itself is not satisfactory if the
originally desired (primary) outcomes are not attained. Based on this rationale, he
deduced that decisions about privacy behaviors are in particular stressful because the
individual may not know beforehand which state of privacy is necessary to satisfy
specific needs. In sum, to investigate the functions of privacy means to ask about
the fundamental needs that require privacy in order to be satisfied. Based on the
literature, we can differentiate a number of functions, which will be described in the
following paragraphs.
3.2.2.1 Autonomy and Privacy
There seems to be an almost universal agreement among privacy scholars that a

major function of privacy is autonomy. Although the concept of autonomy has been
transferred into the social sciences, its origins can be traced back to philosophers
like Kant (1785/2015). Just like privacy, autonomy has a multitude of meanings
and has been defined in many ways. For the purpose of this work, it is sufficient
to understand autonomy as a kind of self-determination. It can be described as the
individual’s ability to ask what kind of person he or she wants to be and how he
or she wants to live his or her life (e.g., Rössler, 2001, p. 97). Autonomy hence
involves self-governance, sovereignty, self-ownership, and the general idea of being
independent from external influences.
The connection between privacy and autonomy can be investigated from several
perspectives. As Nissenbaum (2010) denoted, privacy is partially constitutive of
autonomy since privacy can be regarded as “self-determination with regard to infor-
mation about oneself” (p. 81). Most psychological concepts of privacy, however,
allude to the idea that privacy provides individuals with the ability to be autonomous.
Bates (1964) previously proposed that privacy serves as escape from external
pressures and influences. Privacy in this sense is a sort of “buffer between social
pressures upon the individual and his response to them” (p. 433). Westin (1967) also
emphasized that privacy serves to satisfy the need for “personal autonomy” (pp. 35–
37), which he described as the “desire to avoid being manipulated or dominated by
others” (p. 36). In a state of privacy, individuals can behave and act as they want, can
do things that they deem not appropriate for public spaces, and accordingly develop
individuality and consciousness of individual choice because they are not under the
scrutiny of other people. Similarly, Kelvin (1973) argued that privacy “consists of a
removal of limitation of constraints—in common parlance, it allows the individual
‘to be truly himself”’ (p. 259). If an individual perceives a (positive) limitation of the
power of others over himself, he can feel truly by himself as his behavior (note that
Kelvin uses the term ‘behavior’ for actions, beliefs, and feelings) is not influenced
by the presence or interference of others. In sum, privacy provides the necessary
conditions for individuals to act, think, and feel autonomously.
With regard to the question of why people need privacy, we can hence argue that
people from time to time desire (spatial or mental) conditions in which they can
exercise self-determination because their daily lives puts them under the constant
scrutiny and influence of other people, social norms, and external pressures.
3.2.2.2 Privacy and the Self
A second function of privacy is its relationship to individual needs such as

well-being (including life satisfaction and mental health), personal development
(including self-realization and development of a self-identity), and self-evaluation.
In other words, privacy provides the necessary conditions for individuals to engage
with themselves. Notions of these functional relationships between privacy and
individual values can be found in many theories of privacy. Bates (1964) emphasized
that privacy has an ameliorative function as it allows for the restoration of self-
esteem and the regaining of energy (p. 433). He also denoted that privacy serves
to cope with the daily amount of information that we receive by evaluating them
and considering alternatives in order to act as appropriately as possible (p. 432).
Westin’s second and third function of privacy can be subsumed under this category.
He asserted that privacy serves for “emotional release” (pp. 37–40). It allows the
individual to stop playing social roles and to withdraw from external stimulation. In
states of privacy (specifically in solitude or intimacy), individuals are able to relax,
show emotions, and display feelings without fearing external judgment. Privacy thus
provides release of tension during acts and events that are emotionally demanding
(e.g., sexual functions, experiences of loss, shock or anger). Westin’s third function,
“self-evaluation” (pp. 40–41) explains that privacy is essential in providing room
(spatially or mentally) for the individual to “integrate his experiences into a
meaningful pattern and to exert his individuality on events” (p. 40). Pedersen (1999)
later added that privacy also allows individuals to contemplate and to be creative
(p. 399).
Altman (1975) also alluded to the idea that privacy regulates the interface of the
self and the non-self (p. 47). Based on Westin’s remarks, he further argued that pri-
vacy allows for self-evaluation, and more important, self-observation in the service
of self-worth and self-identity (p. 49). In this sense, privacy allows individuals to
decide on courses of action, to apply meanings to various interpersonal events, and
to build a set of norms or standards for interpreting the self or other relations with
the world.
In the elaborations of Westin and Altman, the connection between autonomy

and self-evaluation or emotional release becomes visible. The functions are clearly
related to each other, as experiencing autonomy, for example, is necessary for
expressing and understanding emotions and subsequently evaluating the self.
3.2.2.3 Privacy and Social Interaction
Another functional aspect of privacy is its fundamental role for human relations.
Many scholars have argued that privacy is a precondition for the development of
strong relationships based on friendship, love, and trust (e.g., Fried, 1968, p. 477).
The general idea is that conditions or states of privacy allow for closeness and
intimacy between two or more individuals. People generally maintain a number of
different relationships that vary based on the level of closeness, appreciation, love,
or trust. Whereas some things are appropriate in one relationship, the same things
may not be appropriate in another (Schoeman, 1984, p. 408). Again, we can identify
related ideas in the systematic analyses of Westin and Altman.
Westin’s (1967) fourth function of privacy, called “limited and protected commu-
nication” (pp. 41–43), refers to the idea that in small-group intimacy, individuals are
able to share their feelings, thoughts, and other personal things with trusted others
(e.g., partner, friends, family) without fearing being overheard by outsiders. This
raises an interesting point: although Westin seemed to view needs for privacy and
needs for self-disclosure as opposing forces (Westin, 1967, p. 43), he also posited
that conditions of privacy allow for self-disclosure. In other words, limiting one’s
self-disclosure could be means to attaining a certain level of privacy (e.g., a state of
reserve), but a certain level of privacy could also foster self-disclosure (e.g., in a state
of small-group intimacy). Nissenbaum (2010) provided an informative summary
of this general idea: “Privacy makes it possible for people to share information
discriminately, which in turn enables them to determine not only how close they are
to others, but the nature of their relationships” (p. 85). However, I will investigate
the relationship of self-disclosure and privacy further in Chap. 5.
Altman (1975) explained this function of privacy differently. In contrast to other
scholars, he argued that privacy mainly serves to regulate the interaction with the
social environment (p. 46). Conceptualizing privacy as a dialectic process, he argued
that privacy allows for interpersonal-boundary regulation. As he defined privacy as
the selective control of access to the self, he seemed to argue that privacy allows
individuals to achieve a desired amount or degree of interaction with other people.
In this case, however, Altman remained somewhat imprecise, because in his terms,
interpersonal-boundary regulation is both the function and the definition of privacy.
However, his contribution remains important, as it shows that privacy is clearly
linked to the management of social interactions. The nature of this connection,
however, becomes comprehensible once we connect the concepts of privacy and
self-disclosure (Chap. 5).
3.2.3 Privacy Regulation Behavior
So far, we have looked at different psychological concepts of privacy and the

functions of privacy for the individual. Next, it is important to identify the behaviors
and mechanisms that individuals use to achieve their desired level of privacy.
Although Westin (1967) already referred to types of privacy behavior by saying
that “privacy is (. . . ) withdrawal (. . . ) through physical and psychological means”
(p. 5), he did not name concrete privacy regulation behaviors and mechanisms.
First, we should acknowledge that there are many different types of privacy
regulation behaviors. Each situation affords corresponding behavioral strategies and
provides other mechanisms. To achieve a certain level of privacy for interpersonal
communication, simply choosing a certain medium already constitutes one possible
privacy regulation behavior. From a general perspective, one could even argue that
any behavior can be regarded as somehow related to achieving an optimal level
of privacy. Consequently, it is not possible to list all forms of privacy regulations
behaviors implied by individuals.
One possible way of understanding the ways in which individuals achieve and
manage their privacy is provided by means of classifying and categorizing the
relevant behaviors. However, the utility of categorizations depends on the specific
research interest, and the risk of oversimplifying the subject matter is inherent to
this analytical method. Nonetheless, several scholars have tried to categorize privacy
regulations behaviors across different levels.
3.2.3.1 Modes of Privacy Regulation Behaviors
Altman (1975) differentiated (1) verbal, (2) non-verbal, (3) environmental privacy
mechanisms, and (4) culturally defined norms and practices (pp. 32–40). Verbal
privacy mechanisms include the use of verbal content to signal the desired level of
social interaction (e.g., “I’d like to be alone”) and the use of structural aspects of
verbal behavior such as vocabulary selection, pronunciation, voice dynamics, and
so on. For example, individuals may be able to achieve a desired level of protected
communication by lowering their voices so that others cannot hear them. Nonverbal
privacy mechanisms refer to the use of body language. Privacy can be subtly
managed by arm and leg positions, facial expressions, body postures, broad gestures,
or head movements. Among others, Altman proposes to use the classification by
Ekman and Friesen (1969), who differentiate the use of (1) emblems (nonverbal
gestures as substitutes for words or statements, e.g, nodding) and (2) illustrators
(complements of verbal statements, e.g., pointing), (3) displaying affect (e.g.,
conveying emotions through facial expressions), (4) using regulators to manage
and pace interactions, and (5) using adapters (e.g., covering the eyes, mouth, or
face). Privacy, for example, may be obtained through aversion or defensive facial
expressions. Environmental privacy mechanisms include the use of clothing (e.g.,
using a veil to cover the face) and personal space (e.g., regulating the distance from
other people by sitting next or further from them), as well as the use of territories
(e.g., building oneself a house with fences or walls) or objects (e.g., closing doors)
(Altman, 1975, pp. 36–40).
Burgoon (1982) further refined this classification of privacy regulation behaviors,
proposing six categories (pp. 232–243). In line with Altman, she recognized the
(1) use of the environment and artifacts, (2) regulation of personal space and
physical contact (also labeled haptic and spatial privacy regulation), (3) use of time
(chronemics), (4) kinesic and vocalic privacy management, (5) privacy regulation
through physical appearance, and finally (6) verbal privacy regulation. Whereas
most of the categories are straightforward, the use of time and physical appearance
deserve closer attention. Burgoon argued that people could achieve privacy by
“permitting territories to overlap spatially, but to be segregated by time use” (p.
238). This occurs, for example, when someone tries to escape crowded trains or
buses by riding them during non-peak times. Physical appearance in the form of
clothing may also help to establish privacy as clothes can signal approachability
or define a certain role (e.g., wearing a uniform signals a professional distance).
Likewise, wearing sunglasses may provide a certain level of anonymity as people
cannot see where one is looking.
Differentiating the modes of privacy regulation behaviors helps to identify
concrete actions people use to achieve a certain state of privacy. However, this type
of classification is merely descriptive and does not tell anything about the goals
behind each actions.
3.2.3.2 Preventive vs. Corrective Strategies
A more evaluative categorization differentiates behaviors that aim at avoiding

potential unwanted outcomes in the form of privacy violations in the future and
those that aim at regaining a certain level of privacy after a concrete violation. This
differentiation is particularly useful as it meshes with the theoretical frameworks
summarized above. Johnson’s (1974) concept of privacy as secondary control and
Westin’s (1967) concept of privacy as voluntary and temporary withdrawal relate
well to the idea of preventive privacy strategies in which people seek to establish
conditions that reduce their vulnerability and allow for the satisfaction of primary
needs or the attainment of desired outcomes. Corrective strategies, on the other
hand, correspond well to Altman’s (1975) idea of privacy as a continuing optimizing
process: once people perceive a mismatch between their desired and achieved levels
of privacy, they engage in privacy regulation behaviors to regain an optimal level
of privacy. The simple measure of closing a door and consequently excluding
unwanted people presents a typical strategy implied to prevent privacy violations.
The closed door in this case represents a visual and physical barrier that serves to
protect the inner room that then serves as the private sphere. Accordingly, the use
of the environment as described by Altman and Burgoon can mostly be seen as a
preventive strategy to achieve a certain level of privacy.
Corrective measures have not been studied as intensively. According to Burgoon

et al. (1989), these strategies can also be called privacy restoration behaviors.
Based on a survey with 444 adults and adolescents who were asked about privacy
in different role relationships contexts (e.g., doctor–patient, teacher–student, etc.),
six different types of corrective measures were identified: (1) interaction control
(e.g., ignoring another person’s presence, postponing conversation), (2) dyadic
intimacy strategies (e.g., telling secret information, talking in a non-understandable
language. . . ), (3) expression of negative arousal (e.g., raising one’s voice, becoming
angry. . . ), (4) blocking and avoiding (e.g., avoiding eye contact, changing the
topic. . . ) , (5) distancing (e.g., increasing physical distance, moving or leaning
backwards. . . ), and (6) confronting (e.g., telling the person about the privacy
violation). It must be noted, however, that these factors (derived from a factor
analysis) are not distinct, and the typology may not be helpful for categorizing
corrective strategies any further.
However, conceptualizing privacy regulation behaviors remains an important
aspect of privacy research. As we will see later, recent work on privacy in online
environments has contributed significantly to the differentiation of different forms
of privacy regulation strategies (see Sect. 6.1.5).
3.3 On the Status of Socio-Psychological Privacy Theories
A complete review of all studies that have built upon the theories presented above is
beyond the scope of this work (valuable attempts to grasp the influence of the most
prominent approaches can be found in the following reviews: Margulis, 1977, 2003;
Newell, 1995); however, it seems fruitful to pinpoint some of the key empirical
validations of the theories, and to summarize further refinements and potential
alternative suppositions. I will conclude by synthesizing the presented theories into
six broad statements that serve as a first foundation for the theory of situational
privacy and self-disclosure.
3.3.1 The Impact of Westin’s Theory
Reviewing the research conducted in the last few decades highlights that Westin’s
typology of privacy states and functions and Altman’s dialectical approach to
privacy have been the most influential. Many scholars have tried to empirically
identify the privacy states and functions proposed by Westin (1967) using factor
analytical frameworks (e.g., Dawson & Hammitt, 1996; Hammitt, 1982, 2000;
Marshall, 1974; Pedersen, 1979, 1997, 1999). These items have been administered
to individuals in surveys and the responses factor analyzed. In general, these
studies have found evidence for the suggested factor structure. Marshall (1974), for
example, found six privacy states: intimacy, solitude, anonymity, reserve (all posited
3.3 On the Status of Socio-Psychological Privacy Theories 63
by Westin), seclusion (being or living away from other people), and not neighboring
(attitudes towards inclusion of neighbors in daily life). It should be noted that
these results reflect the author’s decision to include items regarding specific privacy
concerns relating to living in a family home and dealing with neighbors. Hammitt
and colleagues have further found evidence for privacy functions such as self-
evaluation and limited communication for individuals or small-groups living in
wilderness areas (Dawson & Hammitt, 1996). Pedersen not only investigated the
stability of Westin’s states of privacy, but also tested the relationship between states
and functions proposed by Westin. In his original factor analysis (Pedersen, 1997,
1999), he found evidence for three of Westin’s privacy states (solitude, anonymity,
and reserve) and two additional states (intimacy with friends and intimacy with
family) which further specify the fourth state proposed by Westin. He also found a
sixth state (isolation) that closely resembles Marshall’s identified state of seclusion.
Pedersen (1999) also extended Westin’s theory by proposing a model for types of
privacy by privacy functions. His results suggested, for example, that intimacy with
friends best fosters autonomy, and intimacy with the family provides conditions
for concealment. He also identified an additional function described as “creativity”
(Pedersen, 1997, p. 153). His findings suggest that isolation and solitude provide the
best conditions for being creative (Pedersen, 1999, p. 401).
However, as early as 1970, Proshansky et al. (1970) criticized the typology
proposed by Westin because his proposed states “are not always conceptually clear
or consistent with each other” (p. 178). They asserted, for example, that solitude
refers to an individual’s relationship to the physical environment, whereas intimacy
refers to his relationship with other people. Accordingly, the relationship between
the proposed states is not considered. They further proposed distinguishing between
individual and group states of privacy. A final criticism of Westin’s theory was that
identifying the states of privacy implies that privacy is a matter of being in one of
these states or not. The idea of privacy as a matter of degree is largely ignored in the
research based on Westin’s typology.
Pastalan and Carson (1970) provided an additional, largely ignored extension of
Westin’s theory. In their analysis, they systematically related situational, organismic
factors and other antecedent factors with specific privacy regulation mechanisms
and the privacy states proposed by Westin in a matrix. Although they acknowledged
that this approach was more suggestive than comprehensive, the developed matrix
(see Table 3.1) may help to understand the general process when people seek
any of the proposed states of privacy. People’s behaviors and needs can easily be
classified within the framework and evaluated according to the four specified social
contingencies. Consider the following example:
A young adolescent recently moved into a new town with his parents. On the first day at
school, he gets introduced to some new classmates. Although they are nice and friendly,
they do not inquire much about the young adolescents. Despite wanting to make friends,
the young adolescent consequently hesitates to reveal too much about himself. This way, he
does not risk making a bad impression.
64
Table 3.1 Privacy states and situational contingencies by Pastalan and Carson (1970)
Organismic factors Behavioral states
Types of privacy Antecedent factors (privacy needs) (privacy regulation behaviors) Environmental factors
Solitude Pressure of multiple role playing; Relief from visual Physical withdrawal from Degree of crowdedness and
role incompatibility; observations; self-evaluation; secondary associates; primary confinement; design and
interpersonal incompatibility; unmasking oneself; and reference groups; arrangement of space;
defeat performance of bodily defensive responses and environmental props to
functions verbal reports control informational flow;
location; single person
Intimacy Role relations and interpersonal Need for close, relaxed, frank Physical seclusion from Degree of crowdedness and
compatibility or incompatibility relationships; egalitarian secondary associates and confinement; design and
sharing of confidences (limited public; anticipatory arrangement of space;
and protected communication) preventive responses; full environmental props to
range of occupancy and control informational flow;
defense responses location; small group
Anonymity Role responsibilities demanding Need to escape personal Psychological and physical Control of informational flow
full adherences to expected identification and responsibility blending with the public; through merging into the
behavior; anonymous relation of full rules of behavior and self-markers and verbal situational landscape; use of
role; anonymous sharing of reports open space, mass numbers of
confidences people and objects;
anonymous interviews,
questionnaires. . .
Reserve Reciprocal reserve and Need to limit communcation Psychological barriers against Control of informational flow
indifference; mental distance to about the self unwanted intrusion; defense through self-restraint and
protect the personality through self-markers and willing discretion of others
verbal reports
3 Theories of Privacy
We can use Pastalan and Carson’s matrix to identify the relevant aspects of
this specific communicative act. The reason for the young adolescent’s hesitation
to disclose personal information is most likely the indifference and reserve of the
other people (antecedent factors). Since he does not learn anything about them and
perceives a social distance between himself and his classmates, the need for privacy
in the form of reserve is aroused (organismic factors). He consequently engages in
privacy regulation behavior by not disclosing personal information (maybe even
lying when asked about personal things), thus creating a psychological barrier
(behavioral states). The adolescent controls the flow of information through restraint
(environmental factors) and thereby reduces his vulnerability.
Pastalan and Carson explicitly incorporated the environment as a central factor
into the process. They further identified environment-related antecedents that raise
needs for different types of privacy which, in turn, lead to certain privacy regulation
behaviors. The type of privacy regulation behavior again depends on the environ-
ment. I want to emphasize the value of Pastalan and Carson’s framework here,
because it allows the systematization of such processes by highlighting individual’s
perception of situations, subsequent privacy needs, and privacy regulation behaviors.
The theory of situational privacy and self-disclosure (described in detail in Chap. 7)
follows a similar approach in order to identify relevant situational factors for privacy
perceptions and corresponding self-disclosure.
3.3.2 The Impact of Altman’s Theory
Altman’s (1975) theory has greatly influenced subsequent research. Since its
publication, two aspects have been featured in almost all psychological accounts
of privacy. First, the idea that privacy is about interpersonal interaction and second,
that privacy is about the interplay between people and the physical environment
(Margulis, 2003, cf.). According to Margulis (1977), Altman’s analysis has distinct
strengths. It integrates earlier concepts into a comprehensive account of privacy
and particular privacy perception and control processes. It integrates social psycho-
logical concepts as well as environmental psychological concepts such as personal
space, territory and crowding, and it proposes their interplay with social interaction
and needs for privacy (Margulis, 2003, p. 422). It also links concepts of the self with
interpersonal interaction (Margulis, 1977, p. 14).
Altman’s influence is not only visible in empirical work (e.g., Harris, Brown,
& Ingebritsen, 1995; Harris, Brown, & Werner, 1996), but also in subsequent
theories that combined several frameworks into a (more) comprehensive model
(e.g., Dienlin, 2015; Kupritz, 2000a, 2000b; Petronio, 2002). Kupritz (2000a),
for example, extended Altman’s privacy regulation mechanisms, Dienlin (2015)
specifically drew upon Altman’s idea of desired and achieved privacy—which play
a central role in his Privacy Process Model, and Petronio (2002) explicitly used the
idea of boundary management as a key concept for her Communication Privacy
Management Theory (CPM-Theory). The latter two provide a useful basis for
studying self-disclosure under conditions of privacy and they will be described in

greater detail in Chap. 5.
Some aspects of Altman’s theory have been further adapted to online environ-
ments. Joinson, Houghton, Vasalou, and Marder (2011), for example, built upon
Altman’s idea of input control and crowding and suggested that much research today
ignores the impact of new technology on interpersonal issues as new media forms
such as SNS foster excessive self-disclosure, socialization, and social contact (p.
38). The corresponding information overflow might be perceived as a sort of “digital
crowding” with negative effects on people’s privacy.
Stephen Margulis—whose continuous effort to review, evaluate, and synthesize

existing psychological theories of privacy is unsurpassed in the literature—recently
suggested that the three most supported theories (Westin, Altman, and Petronio)
“provide a reasonable foundation for understanding the fundamentals of privacy as
a psychological concept” (Margulis, 2011, p. 15) because they share so much in
common. The concepts by Bates, Kelvin, Johnson, and Burgoon also share many
commonalties with Westin and Altman and can thus be regarded as further evidence
for this claim. All the same, due to the variability in definitions of privacy, Margulis
suggested a core definition of privacy that states the essential means and ends of
privacy:
Privacy, as a whole or in part, represents control over transactions between person(s) and
other(s), the ultimate aim of which is to enhance autonomy and/or to minimize vulnerability
(Margulis, 1977, p. 10).
Returning to the issues of control-based definitions presented already earlier

(Sects. 3.1.4 and 3.1.5), we can counter this core definition with the idea that
“a situation is not necessarily a privacy situation because the individual per-
ceives, experiences, or exercises control/choice” (Laufer & Wolfe, 1977). Also,
Nissenbaum (2010) argued that the degree of access that others have to information
about individuals is an important dimension of privacy, regardless of who is in
control (p. 71). On the one hand, privacy can only be experienced meaningfully
if the individual voluntarily chooses to have privacy in a situation where he could
also have less or no privacy. In other words, individuals experience the ability
to exercise choice in any privacy situation as they can choose how, under what
circumstances and to what degree they interact with others or separate themselves
from others (Laufer & Wolfe, 1977, p. 37). But on the other hand, being private
means also having control over choice, access and stimulation (Laufer et al., 1973,
p. 361). In this sense, having control constitutes a form of autonomy—the central
function of privacy. The question of whether privacy should be understood as
control is not solved. As the literature review in this chapter has shown, conceptual
conflicts necessarily emerge. Despite these conflicts, I view psychological privacy
as involving control, but not as control.
Furthermore, Laufer et al. (1973) noted that it could be hazardous to present

“one all encompassing definition [of privacy]” (p. 353). They therefore proposed
a number of analytical dimensions that should serve to provide a conceptual
framework from which a comprehensive theory of privacy could emerge. Although
merely a dimensional approach, it shows what a vast array of different perspectives
on privacy should be considered (for a description of all dimensions, see pp. 355–
367). Many of the dimensions were addressed in the theories presented above, but
some were intentionally or unintentionally excluded. Particularly under-researched,
but of inherent value, are two dimensions focusing on timely aspects of privacy:
the so-called life-cycle dimension and the history-biography dimension (Laufer
et al., 1973, pp. 357–360). The authors argued that at various stages and ages,
individual needs, abilities, experiences, desires, and feelings change and therefore
also the individual’s concepts of privacy (p. 357). This process is influenced
by the development of the self and the corresponding need for autonomy, the
extent and type of one’s interactions with others, and one’s abilities and emotional
maturity (Laufer & Wolfe, 1977; Laufer et al., 1973; Trepte & Masur, 2017a).
However, developmental theories have hardly considered the role of privacy, and
privacy theories have hardly considered the developmental aspects of privacy (Peter
& Valkenburg, 2011, p. 223), even though many developmental goals during
adolescence require conditions of privacy in order to be attained (e.g., autonomy
in form of the separation from the parents, identity building, intimacy with friends
and first lovers and the corresponding development of the sexual self).
That being said, the following points seem to be shared by most theorists and
serve well to investigate further how privacy is perceived and enacted in different
communication situations.
1. Privacy is inherently subjective. When an individual needs privacy, how he or
she perceives situations as involving privacy, what he or she perceives as privacy
violations, and what he or she does in order to achieve, maintain, or optimize the
level of privacy depends on the individual’s personality, skills and knowledge,
developmental stage, prior experiences, cultural background,3 and the situations
in which the individual finds him- or herself.
2. Privacy involves withdrawal from (in Altman’s terms, selective control of) social
interaction to a certain degree. The desired extent of withdrawal depends on the
individual and the situation. An imbalance between desired and achieved levels
of privacy fosters privacy regulation or optimization (if the necessary options for
the respective behaviors are available)
3 I deliberately chose not to focus on cultural aspects of privacy since the discussed theories all
aim at conceptualizing privacy independently of cultural differences. This approach is acceptable

as anthropological studies suggest that in virtually all cultures, both primitive and modern Western
societies, people have sought privacy from time to time. However, the exact needs associated with
privacy as well as the privacy regulations behaviors may differ (e.g., Kaya & Weber, 2003; Trepte
& Masur, 2016; Trepte, Reinecke, et al., 2017). Descriptions of privacy and associated behaviors in
different cultures can be found in the work of Moore (1984), Westin (1967, pp. 7–23) and Altman
(1975, pp. 12–17).
3. Privacy thus constitutes a form of limited access to the self—either physically or

psychologically—that is deliberately chosen and achieved by privacy regulation.
Privacy can only be experienced if an individual simultaneously has the ability to
abandon this privacy if he or she wishes to do so. Forced seclusion (i.e. isolation)
is hence not a form of privacy.
4. Privacy is not an end itself. People temporarily try to achieve certain levels
of privacy in order to satisfy more fundamental needs (e.g., autonomy, self-
evaluation, protected social interaction). Individuals may also employ long-term
strategies that aim at securing a future level of privacy in anticipated situations.
5. Privacy does not only refer to information about the self. Although the exact
dimensionality deserves further investigation, it is important to acknowledge
that privacy also refers to the physical (body, home, territories. . . ), the social
(interactions with other persons), and psychological (input control, setting
constraints on external influences).
6. Finally, it is important to note that privacy regulation behaviors can meaningfully
be distinguished into preventive and corrective privacy strategies.
These shared insights serve as a starting point for the next chapters. In con-
clusion, I want to refer to a quote by Weiss (1999) who emphatically noted that
“psychological literature has tended to emphasize the aspects of privacy having
to do with seclusion and withdrawal (. . . ) these definitions are limited in their
adherence to a paradigm that emphasizes the objective and behavioral aspects of
a phenomenon, in this case what we understand privacy to be from observing
the behavior of others. These definitions might more accurately be understood as
what we observe others doing in order to safeguard their privacy, rather than the
experience of privacy itself” (p. 203). The framework of situational privacy and
self-disclosure aims at providing insights into this experience of privacy and how it
connects to self-disclosure.
Chapter 4
Theories of Self-Disclosure
Humans are social beings. Although an individual might want to be alone from
time to time and seek privacy in the form or solitude, he or she has a stronger
desire to form meaningful relationships and have significant others in his life. The
need to belong (Baumeister & Leary, 1995) or the need for relatedness (Ryan &
Deci, 2000) has been said to be a fundamental driving force of human behavior.
As a simple starting point, we could advance the following hypothesis: in order to
form a meaningful relationship, an individual has to overcome the initial barrier
of interpersonal mistrust by disclosing personal information to another person.
Although this might render him or her vulnerable to the recipient of the information,
it may also create a form of obligation in the recipient to disclose as well and
subsequently make both individuals known to each other. This might provide the
basis for further interactions and in the long-run, the preconditions for forming and
maintaining a meaningful relationship. But what is self-disclosure exactly and why
is it important for individuals?
Before we define self-disclosure, it is fruitful to state what self-disclosure is
not. People express themselves in many different ways. Although their manifold
utterances may include truthful information about themselves, they oftentimes seek
to present themselves in a favorable manner. While communicating with other
people, they seek to attain certain goals that sometimes require them to present
themselves differently from their actual selves. Or, in other words, “the process of
self-presentation becomes an ever-evolving cycle through which individual identity
is presented, compared, adjusted, or defended against a constellation of social,
cultural, economic, or political realities” (Papacharissi, 2011a, p. 304). Scholars
have proclaimed that people virtually always engage in self-presentation (see the
seminal work by Goffman, 1959). Self-Disclosure, in contrast, refers to “the process
of making the self known to other persons” (Jourard & Lasakow, 1958, p. 91). The
emphasis is on revealing the true self. It thus follows that self-presentation may
include self-disclosure, but does not necessarily have to. In this work, I am only
concerned with truthful disclosures of the self.

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-78884-5_4
70 4 Theories of Self-Disclosure
Whereas controversial theories of privacy have evolved in various disciplines, the

history of theories of self-disclosure is different. Until recently, self-disclosure has
almost only been investigated in social psychology. This is particularly surprising
given its fundamental relationship with privacy. Yet even psychological theories of
privacy (as described in Sect. 3.2) have largely ignored the extensive literature on
self-disclosure. The independence of both research fields may be explained by the
originally positive evaluation of self-disclosure in social psychology, which does
not seem to relate to its seemingly privacy-threatening nature at first glance. To
understand this, we need to look at the early literature on self-disclosure. The
following review is not meant to be comprehensive as the literature is too vast to
be summarized here. Instead, I seek to outline a coherent concept of self-disclosure
and its functions for the individual.
4.1 Definitions of Self-Disclosure
Self-Disclosure has typically been defined as the verbal communication of personal

information about the self to another person or groups of persons (e.g. Chelune,
1975; Cozby, 1973; Derlega, Metts, Petronio, & Margulis, 1993; Jourard, 1971a;
Omarzu, 2000; Taylor, 1979). Much theoretical and empirical work has implied a
similar definition in order to study self-disclosure as a trait or a varying behavior in
close relationships or patient–therapist relationships (cf. Cozby, 1973).
However, the most basic assumption of this definition can be criticized, since
individuals can also reveal much about themselves through non-verbal behaviors
(Omarzu, 2000, p. 175). Including non-verbal behaviors is also present in earlier
attempts to define self-disclosure. Naturally, what people wear, how they behave, or
whether or not they are smiling might tell a lot about them. It can hence be argued
that all forms of verbal and nonverbal behaviors reveal something about the self (cf.
Greene, Derlega, & Mathews, 2006, p. 411).
Jourard (1971a) later argued against this, that self-disclosure refers primarily
to “willful disclosures.” Likewise, Greene et al. (2006) defined self-disclosure as
“an interaction between at least two individuals where one intends to deliberately
divulge something personal to another” (p. 411). These scholars hence focused
on behavior that is intentional and goal-directed. Accordingly, the most simple
behavior through which willful disclosure is achieved is the transmission of verbal
messages. As I aim at explaining self-disclosure both in non-mediated and mediated
communication situations, I will adopt the latter perspective and define self-
disclosure as the intentional communication of information about the self to another
person or group of people. Note that I do not use the word verbal because I want to
emphasize that willful disclosures can also include the sharing of private items that
have information about the discloser attached to them (e.g., photos).
I have made this definition deliberately broad with regard to the content of
self-disclosure. Information about the self can include intimate and very sensitive
information such as personal feelings, thoughts, hopes and fears, but also less
4.1 Definitions of Self-Disclosure 71
sensitive information such as tastes and preferences. Greene et al. (2006) noted
that research on self-disclosure often focuses on the revealing of highly sensitive
information (p. 411). Disclosure of the self, in this sense, refers to the revealing
or granting of access to private information or secrets (e.g., Rosenfeld, 2000).
However, most scholars have acknowledged that even disclosure of less serious
information serves similar goals (cf. Sect. 4.2). Altman and Taylor (1973) suggested
categorizing the content of self-disclosures into three layers: peripheral (e.g.,
biographic data such as name, age, gender, or address), intermediate (e.g., attitudes,
values, or opinions), and core layers (e.g., personal beliefs, needs, or fears). Like
the metaphor of an onion, information becomes increasingly sensitive as one
approaches the core layers of the self. In line with this, Masur and Scharkow (2016)
found that people perceive different types of information as differently private. In
a study with 316 university students, they found that personal feelings, fears, and
concerns were generally perceived as very private, whereas tastes and information
about one’s job or hobbies was rated mostly as not very private (p. 7).
For now, let us assume that self-disclosure is not limited to highly sensitive
information. We can then ask on what dimensions self-disclosure varies. Although
it can be assessed on dimensions such as frequency, duration, honesty, accuracy,
intimacy, intention, or valence (Chelune, 1975; Greene et al., 2006; Wheeless,
1976), the amount or level of self-disclosure has mostly been measured on three
dimensions (Omarzu, 2000, p. 175): The first dimension refers to the breadth of self-
disclosure. This dimension asks how many different types of information or topics
an individual discloses or has disclosed. The more topics an individual is willing
to share with another person, the higher the level of self-disclosure. The second
dimension refers to the duration of self-disclosure or “the time spent describing each
item of information” (Cozby, 1973, p. 75). This dimension has often been measured
by word count of self-disclosure acts. The last dimension refers to the depth of self-
disclosure and thus to the idea put forth by Altman and Taylor (1973). It assesses
the level of intimacy of the information that has been disclosed. Obviously, the
three dimensions are not completely independent. As the breadth of self-disclosure
increases, in most cases the duration and depth will increase as well.
It has been argued that what constitutes an intimate or private disclosure is
highly subjective (Masur & Scharkow, 2016). It is hence pivotal to include the
individual’s intimacy or privacy rating of specific information in the measurement
of self-disclosure. This seems particularly important as many previous studies have
argued that the more information someone discloses, the more privacy he or she
loses. However, the sharing of a non-sensitive information may not be perceived
as a loss of privacy by the individual. In order to anticipate some of the ideas
developed in Chap. 5, I think it is important to understand that the relationship
between self-disclosure and privacy is not straightforward one of opposing forces,
as is often proclaimed in the literature. As already briefly mentioned in Sect. 3.2.3,
self-disclosure can be both a means to attain a certain level of privacy and a behavior
in which one engages in while in a condition of privacy. This becomes clearer when
investigating the functions of self-disclosure, which will be subject of Sect. 4.2.
A second important aspect of the definition refers to the recipient of disclosed

information. First, it is important to note that self-disclosure requires revealing
information to at least one other person. Writing a private diary may be regarded
as a form of self-expression that includes personal information, but should not be
considered a form of self-disclosure as the information is not necessarily transmitted
to someone else (Omarzu, 2000, p. 175). Second, although self-disclosure has
traditionally been studied in dyadic relationships, self-disclosure can also happen
in the form of one-to-many communications. Specifically in computer-mediated
communication, people often reveal information about themselves to a larger
audiences. Jourard (1971a) already noted that this so-called “broadcasting self-
disclosure” might be fundamentally different from disclosure in dyadic contexts.
Disclosures to larger groups of people may serve other purposes than disclosures to
one person (see also: Miller & Read, 1987, p. 43). A discussions of the functions
of self-disclosure hence needs to distinguish between dyadic and multi-group
disclosures.
4.2 Functions of Self-Disclosure
From the definition provided above, it should be evident that self-disclosure is a

varying behavior. People sometimes disclose a lot about themselves and other times
they withhold information. Early studies, however, mostly investigated trait-like
differences in self-disclosure behavior. Scholars in this tradition inquired about the
functions and ends achieved through being a generally open and self-disclosing per-
son (e.g., Jourard, 1971a). Accordingly, this first generation of scholars investigated
general self-disclosure and potential correlates such as personality. Corresponding
to the emerging humanistic psychology at the time, they often tried to find the
connection between self-disclosure and mental health.
After this initial empirical work, a second generation of researchers investigated
what functions self-disclosure fulfills in different situations. The most influential
theory in this regard advanced by Derlega and Grzelak (1979). In their functional
theory of self-disclosure, they posited that revealing the self to others generally
serves to obtain specific goals and is hence always strategic. They proposed
five overall categories of functions (pp. 156–158): self-expression, social vali-
dation, identity clarification, relational development, and social control. Though
this categorization helps to classify the various functions of self-disclosure, we
further need to distinguish between the types of interactions that typically involve
self-disclosure. Obviously, self-disclosure in a romantic relationships serves other
purposes than self-disclosure in friendships. Furthermore, people have different
goals when disclosing the self to a larger group or even to the public compared
to disclosing to smaller number of confidants or just a friend.
In the following, I will first elaborate on the benefits of being an overall open
and self-disclosing person. I will then review the existing research on functions
of self-disclosure in both dyadic or small-group relationships and one-to-many
4.2 Functions of Self-Disclosure 73
conversations. In both categories, I will refer to the framework provided by Derlega

and Grzelak (1979) whenever possible and elaborate on the different qualities of the
functions depending on the receiver of personal information.
4.2.1 Trait Self-Disclosure and Mental Health
Research on self-disclosure is inevitably associated with the work of Sydney M.

Jourard, who started to investigate the benefits of self-disclosure. He argued that
people who disclose themselves are more likely to develop healthy and self-
determined personalities (Jourard, 1971a, pp. 25–33). He believed that people who
actively avoid becoming known to others, provide for themselves “a cancerous kind
of stress which is subtle and unrecognized, but none the less effective in producing
not only the assorted pattern of unhealthy personality which psychiatry talks about,
but also the wide array of physical ills that have come to be recognized as the
province of psychosomatic medicine” (p. 33). Low self-disclosure is hence regarded
as an indicator of self-repression and an inability to grow as a person.
Together with his colleague Lasakow, he developed the first comprehensive ques-
tionnaire to measure retrospectively whether and how much people had disclosed
certain topics in the past (Jourard & Lasakow, 1958). His initial work then focused
on identifying trait-like differences in and predictors of general self-disclosure
(e.g., Jourard, 1961a, 1961b, 1961c). Jourard’s efforts led many other scholars to
investigate potential correlates of self-disclosure (for an overview see: Cozby, 1973,
pp. 75–80).
With regard to the influence of self-disclosure on mental health, the influential
review by Cozby (1973) showed conflicting findings (p. 77). Cozby agreed with
Jourard that the relationship between self-disclosure might be curvilinear, thus
explaining the contradicting results. Based on this argumentation, healthy person-
alities show high self-disclosure to a few significant others and relatively low or
medium self-disclosure to other people. Maladjusted or ill people, on the other hand,
show either too low or too high disclosure to anyone (p. 78).
Looking at subsequent studies that have further investigated relationships
between general self-disclosure and mental health, we can state with reasonable
certainty that a general tendency to conceal aspects of the self comes along with a
higher chance of becoming mentally ill. Specifically after traumatic events or bad
experiences, disclosing to significant others is regarded as an important function
of emotional release (e.g., Cole, Kemeny, Taylor, & Visscher, 1996; Greene et al.,
2006; Pennebaker, 1990; Pennebaker & O’Heeron, 1984). People who are generally
closed and refrain from opening themselves to others are more likely to develop
mental illnesses. Accordingly, nondisclosure is nowadays seen as psychological
inhibition as well as a sort of suppression that causes stress (Derlega et al., 1993,
p. 96). Disclosure, in turn, serves as a way of cognitive processing and disinhibition
(Greene et al., 2006, p. 421).
4.2.2 Self-Disclosure in Dyadic or Small-Group Interactions
Opening the self is an important aspect of relationships. People become friends

because they get to know each other through self-disclosure. Likewise, romantic
couples become lovers because they share intimacies with each other. Derlega et al.
(1993) noted that self-disclosure is a useful behavior to study close relationships (p.
1). Thus, we can argue that self-disclosure in dyadic or small-group conversations
always serves—both indirectly and directly—to develop or maintain relationships.
4.2.2.1 Relationship Formation and Maintenance
There is a vast amount of literature supporting the function of self-disclosure for

relationship initiation, development, and maintenance (for overviews see again:
Derlega, 1987; Derlega & Grzelak, 1979; Derlega et al., 1993; Greene et al., 2006;
Knapp & Vangelisti, 1991; Rosenfeld & Kendrick, 1984). By disclosing ourselves,
we get to know each other, learn the extent to which we are similar to each other and
reciprocally learn about our needs, feelings, hopes, and thoughts, and thus about the
potentials to support and help each other. Through this process, we might become
closer to each other and strengthen emotional ties and bonds both in dyadic and
group relationships.
One of the most influential theories that helps to explain the development of
interpersonal relationships is the social penetration theory by Altman and Taylor
(1973). The theory aims at explaining how social relationships develop from rather
superficial levels of interaction between strangers to those of casual acquaintances,
close friends, or even romantic couples (p. 3). The authors used the term social
penetration in order to refer to “(1) overt interpersonal behaviors which take place in
social interaction and (2) internal subjective processes which precede, accompany,
and follow overt exchange” (p. 5). The overall proposition of the theory is that
the depth of penetration increases over the course of a relationship. Although
social penetration processes include verbal, non-verbal, and environmental-oriented
behaviors, it includes a number of important insights on the role of self-disclosure
for the formation and maintenance of social relationships. As people continue
to interact and maintain relationships, “they gradually move toward deeper areas
of their mutual personalities” (p. 27). With regard to verbal exchanges, we can
derive that interpersonal communication within dyads moves from relatively non-
sensitive and superficial information exchange to deep and intimate self-disclosure
(p. 40). Moreover, the message exchange moves from a narrow to a broad range
of different topics. In other words, as relationships become closer, the breadth and
depth of self-disclosure between the relationship partners increases. Altman and
Taylor (1973) proposed four consecutive social penetration stages: (1) orientation
stage, (2) exploratory affective stage, (3) affective exchange stage, and (4) stable
exchange stage (pp.135–141). Each stage involves characteristic levels of self-
disclosure. Whereas individuals engage in relatively non-sensitive small talk in the
first stage, they start to express personal attitudes in the second, begin to reveal
private things in the third, and finally disclose their deepest feelings, thoughts or
beliefs in the last stage.
Several studies have supported this developmental aspect of self-disclosure and
relationship intimacy. Laurenceau, Barrett, and Pietromonaco (1998), for example,
studied how reciprocal self-disclosure between partners affected their experiences
of intimacy. Sixty-nine participants completed short standardized questionnaires
after every partner interaction that lasted longer than 10 min for 7 days. The within-
subject correlations showed that intimacy strongly correlated with the individual’s
self-disclosure (r = 0.66) and with the partner’s self-disclosure (r = 0.57).
Multilevel regression models showed that the self-disclosure had a direct effect on
the perceived intimacy (β = 0.47) and was further mediated by perceived partner
responsiveness.
Although this process seems intuitive at first, the reality might be more complex.
For example, another view is provided by the so-called clicking model (Berg
& Clark, 1986). This model assumes that an individual makes an immediate
assessment of another person and compares him or her with his or her prototype
of a friend or intimate partner. This assessment further influences the subsequent
behavior, and increase the level of self-disclosure. Derlega et al. (1993) proposed
that self-disclosure and relationships must be regarded as mutually transformative
(p. 9). Assuming that self-disclosure and relationships are mutually transformative,
however, has a number of underlying assumptions. First, self-disclosure and the
ways in which individuals perceive relationships are dynamic, vary over time, and
are deeply subjective. Second, although the amount of self-disclosure influences
(and also defines) a relationship, the relationship, in turn, determines the amount
of self-disclosure (i.e., the appropriateness of certain disclosures). According to
Derlega et al. (1993), these transformations occur because communicative messages
are “always received into a matrix of expectations, perceptions, and understandings
of relational rules that give meaning to messages and that also change in light of
these” (p. 10). The receiver of a self-disclosing message does not only react to the
information itself, but he or she also evaluates the information with regard to the
relationship with the sender and its implication for future interactions (p. 10).
Although researchers have highlighted the beneficial function of self-disclosure
in relationships, negative consequences are possible too (e.g., when certain self-
disclosures are considered inappropriate in a relationship or the disclosed informa-
tion is used against the sender at a later point in time). In light of this, proposing
a linear relation between closeness and self-disclosure in a relationship is rather
imprecise. Derlega et al. (1993) noted that other patterns are imaginable (p. 25).
Empirical work with couples has shown that the level of disclosure indeed increases
in the beginning of a relationship, but oftentimes declines sharply after an initial
period of openness (e.g., Huston & Ashmore, 1986). For the purpose of this work,
however, it is sufficient to acknowledge the importance of self-disclosure for the

initiation and maintenance of relationships.1
4.2.2.2 Disclosure as a Coping Strategy
Besides the always-present goal of maintaining a sound relationship, self-disclosure

in close relationships can also be beneficial for the discloser. Although the relation-
ship between general willingness to self-disclose and overall mental health might
be detectable on the aggregate level, the more important function of self-disclosure
is its ability to reduce stress or tension after certain experiences. The idea is that
concealing or disclosing information about the self (e.g., upsetting experiences,
or traumatic events) to a significant other can influence how this information is
evaluated (Derlega et al., 1993, p. 95). Self-Disclosure through this form of self-
expression has a cathartic function (Derlega & Grzelak, 1979, p. 156). As Knapp and
Vangelisti (1991) noted, “We may have some need to free ourselves of information
which is eating away at us, a desire to get something ‘off the chest”’ (p. 254). In
line with this, Derlega et al. (1993) argued that there are at least three reasons that
nondisclosure after negative events can be damaging for the individual.
First, nondisclosure after negative experiences might lead to stress and tension as
the individual does not receive alternative views and evaluations and consequently
might have the same negative thoughts repeatedly. Individuals sometimes conceal
or lie about certain information about themselves, because they feel embarrassed
or guilty. Continuously concealing this negative information might further reinforce
feelings of guilt or shame (Derlega et al., 1993, pp. 95–96).
Second, nondisclosure might further increase physiological stress and conse-
quentially harm one’s physical and psychological health. Based on the ideas of
Pennebaker (1990), Derlega and colleagues argued that the inhibition of one’s
thoughts, feelings, or behaviors requires energy, as the individual has to exert some
effort to not think or feel. Disclosure, on the other hand, might provide relief from
these thoughts and feelings (Derlega et al., 1993, pp. 96–101). This function of
self-disclosure is also implied in psychotherapy when the patient discloses to the
therapist and thereby learns about his self.
Third, Derlega and colleagues (1993) argued that the main benefit from self-
disclosure stems from the reaction of the recipient. Disclosure to a trusted other
may result in different types of social support such as esteem, informational,
instrumental, emotional, or motivational support (Derlega et al., 1993, pp. 101–
103). The individual needs to self-disclose in order to receive social support. There
are a number of studies that support this finding. For example, the relationship
1 There is a vast amount of theoretical work on relationship formation and self-disclosure. For
more detailed theoretical conceptualizations of relationship stages, see for example: Knapp and
Vangelisti (1991) and Levinger (1983). For theoretical work on self-disclosure in relationships, see
Derlega and Grzelak (1979), Parks and Floyd (1996), or Harvey and Omarzu (1997).
between self-disclosure and social support has recently been studied in non-
mediated and mediated communication contexts (Trepte, Masur, & Scharkow,
2017). In a longitudinal survey study, the authors found that willingness to self-
disclose in instant-messaging communications leads to more social support 6 month
later.
Apart from this general positive effect, Derlega (1987) noted that self-disclosure
is not always successful in reducing stress and anxiety. They argued that “it is
unrealistic to expect that social support provided by talking with a friend inevitably
leads to coping successfully with stress” (p. 28). In summarizing exemplary studies
that found negative effects of self-disclosure, they noted that the effect of received
social support after self-disclosure depends on the nature of the experienced crisis,
the specific needs of both participants, the timing of social support, and the content
of the verbal exchange.
4.2.2.3 Personal Clarification and Social Validation
From a developmental perspective, the development of self-identity is an important

goal in adolescence (e.g., Bukatko, 2008). Identity formation refers to the need of
individuals to clarify who they are and who they want to be by developing complex
and abstract self-conceptions (e.g., Harter, 1999; Peter & Valkenburg, 2011). This
process involves self-evaluation as well as evaluation of others.
Much identity clarification happens after feedback from social surroundings.
In other words, individuals disclose their selves in order to receive social val-
idation. Positive valuations will lead to a positive self-concept and continuous
self-development. Individuals actively seek approval and feedback from others that
in turn influence their own identity formation process. Specifically in trusted dyadic
relationships, this process of identity formation is important as the safe environment
between confidants allows individuals to try themselves out and receive honest yet
benevolent feedback. Self-Disclosure thus serves to convey information about the
self to others and thereby clarifies one’s own position in relation to others (Derlega
& Grzelak, 1979, pp. 156–157).
Again, this process is closely related to the goal of maintaining close rela-
tionships. Social validation in these types of relationships might be mutually
transformative and reciprocal. Specifically in close relationships or small groups,
it is important to disclose at least parts of the self in order to define one’s own
position with regard to the others and thereby also contribute to the overall relational
definition on which the relationship is based. Self-Disclosure and respective social
validation might hence contribute to a feeling of self-worth and, in turn, to more
well-being (Derlega & Grzelak, 1979). However, it is important to differentiate
social validation processes (when people seek feedback from others) and personal
clarification processes (when self-disclosing leads to self-awareness and, in turn, to
self-clarification) (Derlega & Grzelak, 1979, p. 157). Already by talking about the
self, individuals engage in a sort of self-assessment that helps to reduce ambiguity
and inconsistency in their own thinking. The overall purpose is consequently the
avoidance of self-criticism and potential criticism from others (p. 157).
4.2.3 Self-Disclosure in One-to-Many Communications
As described above, self-disclosure in dyadic or small-group conversations is

more or less always connected to the goal of forming or developing relationships.
These relationship goals often require deeper levels of disclosure and are based on
reciprocity. In situations in which the individual has the opportunity to communicate
with many other people, the decision to self-disclose is mostly based on other
motivations. Jourard (1971b) called this behavior “broadcasting self-disclosure”
as the individual broadcasts his or her personal information to a larger audience
or even the greater public (e.g., talking in front of a large audience or posting
something publicly on the Internet). Strategic disclosure in these one-to-many
communications accordingly takes the specific characteristics of these situations
into account. Although the way one self-discloses to larger audiences might in some
form (indirectly) influence the formation of relationships with potential recipients
of this information, the disclosure itself is most likely not motivated by relationship
needs. Individuals rather seize the opportunity to benefit from reaching a large
number of people. This advantage of one-to-many communications is particularly
beneficial for needs of identity development and social validation (e.g. Bazarova &
Choi, 2014; Waters & Ackerman, 2011).
4.2.3.1 Identity Formation and Social Validation
Broadcasting personal information to larger audience increases the opportunity for

social feedback. Letting other people know aspects of the self, they can help the
individual “to define the appropriateness and correctness of his or her attitudes,
beliefs, and values” (Derlega & Grzelak, 1979, p. 157). Furthermore, this might
contribute to identity formation as described already in dyadic and small-group
relationships. Let us nonetheless consider the following example in order to pinpoint
at the specific characteristics of one-to-many communications:
An individual likes to post photos of himself or herself on the photo-sharing platform
Instagram. Since he or she started using Instagram, he or she has posted more and more
revealing pictures because many followers gave positive feedbacks through likes and
comments.
This individual strategically discloses revealing photographs because he or she

wants to receive positive feedback and thereby validates his or her self-concept as
an attractive human being. Specifically by posting to a larger number of people,
the individual increases the chances of gaining social validation from different
people and consequently increasing the possibility to clarify his or her self-concept,
4.3 Risks of Self-Disclosure 79
to gain self-esteem and to strengthen the self-value more than by just disclosing
to a friend. Although the functions of broadcasting self-disclosure have seldom
been investigated, some well-designed studies suggest that people mostly disclose
in one-to-many conversations to satisfy needs for social validation (Bazarova &
Choi, 2014). Although an explicit investigation of the functions of self-disclosure
has rarely been undertaken, research on SNS use generally shows that people
general profit from the social capital they can asses through their friends (e.g.,
Ellison, Lampe, Steinfield, & Vitak, 2011; Ellison, Steinfield, & Lampe, 2007). As
disclosing the self is a pivotal part of using SNS, these findings lend further credence
to these claims.
4.2.3.2 Emotional Release Through Public Expression of the Self
Derlega and Grzelak (1979) defined self-expression disclosure as relieving distress

through disclosure of negative emotions, feelings or problems. As already men-
tioned above, this goal can be achieved particularly in dyadic relationships (e.g.,
when an individual discloses very personal concerns, fears, feelings, or emotions to
a significant other). However, emotional release might also be possible by disclosing
(probably somewhat less sensitive) emotions to a greater audience. Depending on
the concrete nature of the negative emotions, thoughts, or feelings, the discloser
might feel even more relieved from disclosing to a greater audience. For example,
if someone is upset and angry about the unemployment rate in his or her country,
voicing his or her feelings in a rather public environment might have more beneficial
effects. Although he or she might be able to vent his or her anger in a dyadic
conversation, he or she might feel a lot less angry if he or she discloses his or
her dissatisfaction with the labor policy of his or her government publicly. The
cathartic function might even increase if he or she receives a larger amount of
positive feedbacks or consolations.
4.3 Risks of Self-Disclosure
Although self-disclosure has primarily been regarded as rewarding and beneficial

for the individual, revealing our true selves also means exposing ourselves. As
early as 1982, Malcolm Parks emphatically argued that the research at the time
focused too much on the benefits of self-disclosure. In fact, he fought against an
ideology in interpersonal communication research. By referring to the prominent
work of Sennett (1976/1992), he argued that an “ideology of intimacy” has limited
and distorted the search for scientific understanding of interpersonal communication
(Parks, 1982, p. 79). He observed that many definitions and approaches in interper-
sonal communication research display a heightened concern with the personal self.
As a consequence, disclosure of the self had become the dominant research topic.
Although Parks did not deny that self-disclosure is an important research topic, he
noted that the ideology of intimacy led to the exclusion of important phenomena
such as information control or the individual and social functions of weak or non-
intimate relationships (p. 89). In particular, focusing on information control—which
can be regarded as the flipside of self-disclosure—may provide further insights into
the nature of opening and closing the self.
Since the 1980s, several scholars have investigated why people refrain from dis-
closing in certain situations. Initially, research investigated negative consequences
of self-disclosure as a primary reason for non-disclosure. In the following, I will
hence first discuss potential negative outcomes of disclosure of the self. I will
then move on to describe some approaches toward studying the avoidance of self-
disclosure (i.e., information control).
4.3.1 Potential Negative Consequences
Several potentially negative effects of self-disclosure can be considered. An individ-

ual who permits others to know him or her as he or she truly is, makes himself or
herself vulnerable. According to Baxter and Montgomery (1996, p. 138), four risks
can be identified. First, disclosing oneself (especially negative aspects of the self)
can lead to embarrassment and consequently rejection by the listener. By disclosing,
individuals risk being negatively evaluated (Vangelisti, 1994). Second, disclosing
the self may cause the reduction of personal autonomy and integrity. By disclosing
to other people, individuals jeopardize their opportunities for self-reflection and
development independently of external influences. This leads to the third risk, which
can be thought of as a loss of control or self-efficacy. Finally, disclosing the self
includes the possibility of hurting or embarrassing the recipient. These risks hint
at the connection between self-disclosure and privacy. For example, disclosing to
someone else might invade his or her privacy as it imposes input that he or she
cannot control. In this way, his or her psychological privacy is violated (Burgoon,
1982). At the same time, by disclosing and revealing the self, an individual gives up
the control over that particular information as it is now shared knowledge. Receivers
of this information might take advantage of it and misuse the shared information
against him or her or pass it to unintended audiences. A loss of privacy might hence
occur (cf. also Chap. 5).
All of the aforementioned consequences are particularly problematic for the
individual as they might damage the relationship with the recipient of the disclo-
sures. Studies have shown that people avoid disclosure due to fear of damaging
or negatively affecting the relationship with the listener (Baxter & Wilmot, 1985;
Rosenfeld, 1979). However, there are other reason for nondisclosure as well,
including the fear of making a negative impression or projecting an unfavorable
image of the self, or the fear of hurting oneself or others (Baxter & Wilmot, 1985;
Metts, 1989; Rosenfeld, 1979).
Apart from these general risks associated with self-disclosure, there is also
evidence that certain conditions may contribute to a negative effect of self-
4.4 On the Status of Self-Disclosure Theories 81
disclosure. Derlega et al. (1993), for example, argued that self-disclosure under
conditions of heightened self-awareness, disclosure of negative feelings or generally
negative information can lead to worse feelings as the individual pays even more
attention to his or her weaknesses, faults or problems (p. 104).
4.3.2 Avoiding Self-Disclosure: Information Control
As a reaction to Park’s criticism, some scholars have devoted themselves to the study
of information control. As Crowley (2017) recently noted, concepts of information
control vary. It thus rather represents a sort of umbrella term for a variety of different
topics and primarily for different types of behavioral manifestations revolving
around the notion the people consciously hide or withhold information in social
relationships (p. 203). Research areas focusing on information control include
“taboo topics” (e.g., Baxter & Wilmot, 1985; Dunleavy & Dougherty, 2013; Roloff
& Ifert, 1998), “topic avoidance” (Afifi & Afifi, 2009; Dailey & Palomares, 2004),
and “secrecy” (Bok, 1983; Caughlin & Vangelisti, 2009).
What these studies and investigation add to the literature on self-disclosure is that
people might also have reasons to not disclose to other persons that are not related
to the risks or potential negative consequences (for a discussion of the literature,
see Crowley, 2017). Although protecting the self might be a primary driving factor
of information control (which I will discuss more thoroughly in the next chapter),
people might also avoid certain topics in order to avoid stress or disputes, or they
might choose to remain closed in order to increase their attractiveness. Information
control is thus often bound to certain topics or to the type of information that is
withheld (Crowley, 2017, p. 2011)
4.4 On the Status of Self-Disclosure Theories
For now, we can state that self-disclosure serves a variety of functions—which

are often connected to relationship initiation or maintenance—and that certain
antecedents foster self-disclosing behavior. On the one hand, we need to look at
empirical evidence for these theories of self-disclosure. Beyond the studies already
referenced above, an extensive body of empirical work on self-disclosure exists. For
example, several studies have investigated the disclosure of personal information
under therapeutic circumstances (for an overview, see Farber, 2003). On the other
hand, we need to look at further refinements and extensions of these theories
of self-disclosure. Since 2000, several models have been proposed that focus on
the situational decision-making process and potential outcomes. In recent years,
researchers have attempted to explain variation in self-disclosure across different
situations (Afifi & Steuber, 2009; Greene, 2009; Omarzu, 2000). The primary
focus has been to understand individual decision-making processes before specific
disclosure acts. Some of these models have been developed in the context of health
communication and focus on explaining under what conditions individuals disclose
personal secrets or illnesses. Although developed for this particular context, they
can nonetheless be applied to broader situations.
In the following, I will focus on the model advanced by Omarzu (2000) as
it is particularly useful to understanding the situational decision-making process
before the actual disclosure of private information. It adopts a situational perspective
and isolates variables that are constantly present in different situations and are
thus amendable to different situational circumstances. The models by Afifi and
Steuber (2009) and Greene (2009) represent similar approaches, but do not extend
or refine the general process described by Omarzu.2 Another model was proposed
by Chaudoir and Fisher (2010), which aims at outlining long-term processes
and consequences of self-disclosure. This model incorporates mediating variables
that help to explain how the disclosure event influences long-term individual,
interpersonal, and societal outcomes. Both models fit well with my own way of
thinking, as they adapt a situational perspective on self-disclosure that will be the
core of the proposed theory in Chap. 7.
Lastly, I will conclude this chapter by synthesizing insights from the presented
theories and models into six broad statements that again serve as a foundation for
the following chapters.
4.4.1 Modeling Disclosure Decision Processes
The disclosure decision model (DDM) developed by Omarzu (2000) describes a

chronological sequence of conscious choices that eventually lead to the decision to
disclose personal information (Fig. 4.1). The DDM applies the functional theory of
self-disclosure (Derlega & Grzelak, 1979) by acknowledging that people generally
have goals they want to achieve through self-disclosure. It describes a decision-
making process because it is based on the assumption that “individuals decide
what, how, and to whom they are going to disclose” (p. 177). These decisions
further include the weighing of potential benefits against the risks of disclosing.
The process can be separated into three stages: (1) entering into the situation, (2)
selecting strategy, and (3) searching for an appropriate target, and weighing the
subjective utility against the subjective risk. It is important to note that Omarzu also
incorporated individual differences into the model, but she denotes that they “will
not necessarily lead to disclosing more or less across situations, but they make it
more or less likely that disclosure patterns will change depending on the situations”
2 Both models represent valuable approaches on their own. For example, both Afifi and Steuber
(2009) and Greene (2009) incorporated the concept of communication or disclosure efficacy. That
being said, they did not extend Omarzu’s model in substantial ways. Consequently, I will refrain
from discussing them in detail here. The interested reader may nonetheless consult the cited papers
as they may further enhance the comprehension of disclosure decision processes.
No disclosure
occurs
No No
Disclosure
duraon
Is there an What is the
Situaonal
Possible goals appropriate subjecve
cues ulity?
target ?
Approval Disclosure
Is a parcular breadth
Relief
goal salient? Yes Yes
Inmacy
Identy Is disclosure an What is the
Individual Control Disclosure
appropriate subjecve
differences depth
strategy? risk?
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3
Fig. 4.1 The disclosure decision model by Omarzu (2000)
(p. 17). To understand the implications of the model, I will look at each stage more
closely.
Stage 1: Entering the Situation A basic assumption of the DDM is that people
enter situations in which a particular goal is made salient. The accessibility of
these goals depends both on situational cues and individual differences. Although
Omarzu remained vague with regard to what these situational cues and individual
differences actually are, it seems that she mostly referred to interpersonal cues and
general personality traits or needs associated with interpersonal interaction. The
logic outlined here is that certain situations foster certain needs that make certain
goals more salient than others. For example, a party or a romantic dinner may make
the goal of establishing an intimate relationship more salient than an office meeting
(see also p. 178). On the other hand, individual differences (e.g., feeling lonely,
being less sociable) may motivate people to pursue a certain goal (e.g., relationship
initiation) in almost any situation. In conclusion, which goal is salient depends both
on situational cues and individual motivations. Omarzu further argued that because
situations are often complex, it may be difficult to identify one specific goal. Goals
as described by Derlega and Grzelak (1979) may be combined, overlap or even
conflict each other.
Stage 2: Selecting a Strategy and Searching for Targets In this stage, individuals
first evaluate whether self-disclosure is an appropriate strategy to obtain the goal
that is salient. Some goals (e.g., relationship initiation or maintenance) may be
achieved through other means such as physical contact or showing non-verbal
affection. However, in many situations (e.g., computer-mediated conversations),
verbal exchanges of information are the most effective way of achieving particular
goals. Second, individuals have to assess potential recipients of their disclosures.
The assessment of potential targets is critical because if an appropriate target is not
available, disclosure will most likely not occur. Selecting the strategy and the target
hence “sets up the conditions under which individuals will be making the ultimate
decision about what and how to disclose” (p. 179).
Stage 3: Weighing Subjective Utility Against Subjective Risk In the last stage
of the disclosure decision process, individuals precisely evaluate how much, how
intimately, and how broadly they will disclose themselves (cf. three dimensions
of self-disclosure: duration, depth, and breadth). Assessments of the subjective
utility of self-disclosure refers to the individually perceived importance of achieving
the particular goal that was made salient. The importance of goal achievements
depends on individual characteristics of the discloser, situational cues, and the
characteristics of the recipients. In sum, the higher the perceived benefits and the
higher the importance of receiving these benefits, the more likely and the longer
self-disclosure will be. With regard to subjective risk perceptions, Omarzu argued
that the probability of making oneself vulnerable may lower the level, particularly
the depth, of self-disclosure. Risks include social rejection, betrayal or causing
discomfort for the listener (p. 180).
The DDM provides a valuable model that allows us to study situational disclosure
decision processes empirically. Its strength is the focus on variables that are con-
stantly present across different situations. It thus allows us to explain variations of
self-disclosure as a function of these variables. This approach is particularly useful
in conquering the challenge of conceptualizing an infinite number of situations.
Nonetheless, Omarzu did not explicitly define what a situation is. I will elaborate
on this in more detail in Chap. 7 and propose my own definition of the situation
(p. 136). This definition will then provide the basic framework for the theory of
situational privacy and self-disclosure that I aim to develop.
4.4.2 Modeling Long-Term Outcomes of Self-Disclosure
The disclosure processes model (DPM) by Chaudoir and Fisher (2010) rather asked
under what conditions self-disclosure may be beneficial.3 In line with the DDM, the
disclosure processes model (DPM) argues that self-disclosure is essentially goal-
directed. However, next to goals associated with high levels of self-disclosure, it also
incorporates goals associated with low levels or even avoidance of self-disclosure.
That being said, at its core, it focuses on different long-term outcomes and the
processes that mediate between the situational disclosure event and these outcomes
(Fig. 4.2). Finally, it also acknowledges potential feedback loops. Chaudoir and
Fisher (2010) argue that the long-term outcomes of self-disclosure events may, in
turn, influence the antecedent goals of future disclosure events, eventually leading
to an upward spiral toward visibility or a downward spiral toward concealment.
The model hence distinguishes between (1) salient or antecedent goals, (2) the
3 Please note that the DPM was developed for the context of revealing or concealing stigmatized
identities. All the same, I do believe that it provides a broader insight on how self-disclosure may
led to benefical outcomes in general, and how these outcomes, in turn, influence self-disclosure in
future interactions.
Antecedent goals
Mediang processes
Approach -Focused Goals All eviaon of inhibion
Social support
Pursue posive outcomes Changes in social informaon
(e.g., understanding, stronger
relaonships, educang others)
Aenon to posive cues
Long-term outcomes
(e.g., greater inmacy, acceptance) Disclosure event
Posive affect
Individual
(e.g., hopefulness) Content Psychological
Approach coping Depth / Breadth / Duraon Behavioral
Emoonal content Health
Avoidance -Focused Goals Dyadic

Reacon of confidant
Supporve vs. unsupporve Liking
Prevent negave outcomes Inmacy
(e.g., social rejecon, conflict) Trust
Aenon to negave cues
(e.g., social distancing) Social Contextual
Negave affect Cultural sgma
(e.g., anxiety) Norms for disclosure
Avoidance coping
Upward spiral toward visibility vs.Downward spiral toward concealment
Fig. 4.2 The disclosure processes model by Chaudoir and Fisher (2010)
disclosure event, (3) mediating processes between the disclosure event and the
outcomes, (4) long-term outcomes, and (5) feedback processes. To understand the
core implications of the model, I will discuss each component in more detail.
Salient or Antecedent Goals Chaudoir and Fisher differentiated between
approach-focused goals and avoidance-focused goals. With regard to the first,
they relied on the works of Derlega and Grzelak (1979) and Omarzu (2000),
arguing that several goals foster higher levels of self-disclosure. Approach-focused
goals include the pursuit of positive outcomes, attention to positive cues and
positive affect. The latter, on the other hand, can be compared to what Omarzu
called subjective risk evaluation. Reformulating subjective risks as goals means
that under certain conditions, individuals seek to prevent negative outcomes, give
attention to negative cues, and sustain negative effect. Although Chaudoir and
Fisher emphasized the importance of incorporating goals associated with concealing
behavior, they nonetheless noted that “approach- (or compassionate) focused goals
may be better able to garner positive social responses” (p. 10). From an overall
perspective, the antecedent goals represent a simplification of Omarzu’s disclosure
decision model.
Disclosure Event Chaudoir and Fisher operationalized the disclosure event itself
as a combination of the disclosure content and the reaction of the confidant. In
line with prior research, they differentiated between depth, breadth, and duration
of disclosure. The level of self-disclosure is a direct function of the antecedent
goals. Approach-focused goals positively influence the level of self-disclosure and
avoidance-focused goals negatively affect the level of self-disclosure. Extending
prior research, they further argued that the disclosure content has an emotional
dimension. Thus, disclosure events also vary with regard to the amount of emotions
a discloser expresses.
It is important to note that Chaudoir and Fisher (2010) subsumed both one-time
situations and longer periods of time under the concept of the disclosure event. They
argued that it is important to incorporate the reaction of the confidant in this event.
As this reaction can be either supportive or unsupportive, the level of disclosure may
be adapted to this reaction despite salient goals. The authors argued here that some
people choose “to test the waters” with their confidant before they discuss a topic in
its entirety (p. 6).
Long-term Outcomes Based on an in-depth review of the literature, Chaudoir
and Fisher (2010) proposed that self-disclosure generally leads to three types of
long-term outcomes: (1) individual, (2) dyadic, and (3) social contextual outcomes.
In line with the theories and findings presented in Sect. 4.2, they proposed that
self-disclosure may have a range of psychological, behavioral and positive health
outcomes for the individual, that it positively influences relationships through
processes of liking, intimacy, and trust, and that it may also positively affect the
social and cultural context in which the individual lives in.
Mediating Processes Chaudoir and Fisher (2010) proposed three processes that
mediate between the disclosure event and the various outcomes. These include
alleviation of inhibition, social support, and changes in social information. All three
processes may impact different types of outcomes.
Feedback Loops The general idea is that if self-disclosure has created positive
outcomes, it may increase the likelihood of future disclosure. Likewise, negative
outcomes may decrease the likelihood of disclosure (Chaudoir & Fisher, 2010,
p. 23). The experience of positive outcomes is thus critical: if a person receives
negative feedback after disclosing to a confidant and negative long-term outcomes
increase, he or she may find himself or herself in a downward spiral toward conceal-
ment. Given the benefits of disclosing the self such a process can be problematic. In
the case of stigmatized identities, this may be even more problematic.
In sum, the DPM conceptualizes potential long-term effects of self-disclosure
and models how these outcomes may, in turn, influence future disclosure. As such,
it provides a broad and comprehensive picture of the overall process in which self-
disclosure events are embedded. We can critically argue that it simplifies certain
components within this process. Yet, by combining the work of Derlega and Grzelak
(1979), Omarzu (2000), and Chaudoir and Fisher (2010), it paints a fuller picture
that provides a comprehensive basis for further theoretical development.
From the preceding chapter, it should become apparent that self-disclosure is a

critical aspect of any type of communication. As Chelune (1979) noted, “people
cannot enter into social transactions with others without revealing something of
themselves or being affected by what the other reveals to them” (p. 243). In order
to understand communication between a person and the social environment, we

need to focus on disclosure processes and ask what influences people’s willingness
to disclose personal information. I have attempted to summarize and synthesize
the major approaches in defining, theorizing, and studying self-disclosure from a
psychological point of view. However, given the large body of research, this chapter
is not meant to be comprehensive and it should be noted that there are other areas in
which self-disclosure has been studied. That said, for the purpose of this book, we
may recap the following shared insights that help to operationalize self-disclosure
as part of a larger theory of situational privacy and self-disclosure.
1. Self-Disclosure can be defined as the intentional communication of information
about the self, orally or in written form, to another person or group of people.
2. Self-Disclosure can be studied from a trait or state perspective. Whereas the
former seeks to analyze predictors or consequences of being a generally open
or self-disclosing person, the latter investigates self-disclosure as a varying and
situational behavior. In the course of this work, I will adopt the latter perspective.
3. The level of self-disclosure can be assessed with regard to the breadth, depth,
and duration of self-disclosure. That being said, what constitutes a high level
of self-disclosure depends on the individual and his or her assessment of several
factors pertaining to the specific disclosure act. For example, sharing information
about one’s income may be regarded as very sensitive (i.e., corresponding to a
high level of self-disclosure) by some people who fear that such a disclosure
may make them vulnerable or that the information can be misused. Other people,
who see less value in money, may see such a disclosure as less problematic (i.e.,
corresponding to a low level of self-disclosure).
4. Self-Disclosure is a goal-directed behavior and thus serves several functions. As
self-disclosure should be regarded as a social phenomenon, it serves to initiate,
develop, or maintain relationships in most cases. That said, certain circumstances
make other goals salient, such as self-expression, social validation, identity
clarification, or social control.
5. There are several risks associated with self-disclosure, such as a heightened
chance of embarrassment and consequent rejection by the listener, reduction of
personal autonomy and integrity, and loss of control or self-efficacy. People may
hence refrain from disclosing when they believe that it may harm themselves or
others.
6. In consequence, individuals traverse several stages in a decision process before
engaging in self-disclosure. Essentially, people assess potential recipients and
subsequently weigh the risks and benefits of disclosing personal information.
Put differently, they self-disclose when the circumstances are appropriate.
These points serve as starting point on which I will build in the next chapters. In
particular, I will try to connect research on both privacy and self-disclosure in order
to provide a comprehensive framework for the theory of situational privacy and self-
disclosure. In doing so, it becomes particularly important to investigate the relation
between privacy and self-disclosure in more detail. In 1973, Cozby asked, “What
is the function of privacy in interpersonal relationships? What are the consequences
of unrestrained self-disclosure?” (p. 88). We could argue that the need for privacy
may be regarded as an inhibiting factor for self-disclosure. However, as we will see
in the next chapter, this view is too narrow and does not explain the occurrence of
self-disclosure and privacy regulation behavior under specific circumstances.
Chapter 5
Connecting Privacy and Self-Disclosure
From the two previous chapters, it should be evident that people face needs for
both privacy and self-disclosure in their daily lives. They constantly seek a balance
between concealing and revealing when initiating friendships, communicating with
strangers, buying products on online shopping platforms, or talking with friends via
instant messengers. We could hence hastily conclude that privacy and self-disclosure
are two sides of the same coin: by disclosing information about ourselves, we lose
a little bit of privacy, conversely, by concealing information about ourselves, we
can retain privacy. Similar arguments have been made by many scholars. Westin
(1967), for example, already emphasized that privacy “is only part of the individual’s
complex and shifting system of social needs (. . . ) Individuals have needs for
disclosure and companionship every bit as important as their needs for privacy”
(p. 43). This dialectical view is also present in Altman’s (1975) theory in which he
posits that privacy itself is nothing but an “interplay of opposing forces – that is,
different balances of opening and closing the self to others” (p. 11).
Although implicit assumptions such as these have always guided research on
privacy and self-disclosure, an in-depth theoretical discussion has rarely been
undertaken. In the following chapter, I will discuss two theoretical approaches
that focus on both privacy and self-disclosure: first, the communication privacy
management theory (CPM) by Petronio (2002), which uses the metaphor of closed
and open boundaries and a rule-based management system in order to exemplify and
explain processes of revealing or concealing, and second, the privacy process model
(PPM) by Dienlin (2015), which provides a procedural framework for explaining
why people disclose in situations of perceived privacy.

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-78884-5_5
90 5 Connecting Privacy and Self-Disclosure
5.1 Communication Privacy Management Theory
One of the most elaborate theories and according to Margulis (2011) “the most
valuable privacy theory for understanding interpersonal computer-mediated com-
munication” (p. 12) was advanced by Petronio (2002). Her communication privacy
management theory (CPM) provides a systematic framework for understanding the
ways in which people manage the relationships between revealing (self-disclosure)
and concealing (privacy) and how they control access to and distribution of shared
information. In short, the theory posits that individuals sustain and control private
boundaries with other people. Each boundary is characterized by specific rules
that coordinate the level of accessibility of the information that flows between the
members of the boundary. The theory further rests on the assumption that people
view information as private if they believe they own this information. Based on this
feeling of ownership, they claim to have the right to decide who may become a
co-owner and what these co-owners are allowed to do with that information. If this
rule-based privacy management fails (e.g., a co-owner shares private informations
with non-owners), boundary turbulences occur.
5.1.1 Basic Principles
Essentially, Petronio (2002) argues that privacy and self-disclosure can be regarded
as polar opposites, as disclosing information means giving up privacy (p. 14).
However, to understand how CPM theory connects privacy and self-disclosure in
more detail, it is useful to take a closer look at the underlying principles (see also
Margulis, 2011; Petronio & Durham, 2008):
Ownership and Control Privacy is defined as “the feeling that one has the right
to own private information” (Petronio, 2002, p. 6). Personal information is thus
perceived as private because people believe it belongs to them. By defining privacy
in terms of ownership, CPM theory alludes to legal conceptions of privacy that also
emphasize the role of control over information. In light of this, CPM further argues,
“because the information belongs to us, we want to determine who is privy to it and
who is not ” (p. 9). People hence want to control the access to and distribution of
their private information.
Boundaries and Co-ownership CPM refers to boundaries in order to illustrate
the border between public and private (Petronio, 2002, p. 6). If information is not
shared with anyone, it remains in the smallest and completely closed boundary,
which Petronio also refers to as the “personal boundary” (p. 7). Once an information
is shared with other people, all receivers become co-owners of that information and
form a collective privacy boundary. Boundaries thus differ with regard to the people
they include. They can be small (e.g., dyadic boundaries) or large (e.g., groups of
people).
5.1 Communication Privacy Management Theory 91
Rule-Based Management As people believe they own their private information,

they want to control the flow of this information both in their personal and collective
boundaries. In order to do so, they develop privacy rules and use them to coordinate
the established boundaries. This coordination primarily means that the original
owner of the information transfers the responsibilities to new co-owners to jointly
control the flow of that information according to the previously established rules
(Margulis, 2011). Petronio differentiated three types of processes pertaining to
these rules: (1) privacy rule foundations, (2) boundary coordination operations, and
(3) boundary turbulences.
Privacy rule foundations refer to the development of privacy rules and their
specific attributes. People generally acquire rules through socialization or negoti-
ation (Petronio, 2002, pp. 72–79). By referring to the work of Wolfe and Laufer
(1974), Petronio argued that commonly shared rules of boundary coordination are
developed in the family and corresponding separation processes (see also Sect. 3.3).
However, many rules are also established through interaction with others. Members
of a privacy boundary will mutually determine the rules maintaining and regulating
the collective boundary (p. 76). Whereas some rules are explicitly stated, others are
only implicitly articulated (pp. 77–78). These rules may become routinized in form
of privacy orientations, may change over time, and may be associated sanctions if
not obeyed (pp. 79–81).
The nature of the rules depends on cultural, gendered, motivational, and contex-
tual criteria (Petronio, 2002, pp. 24–25) and thus differs immensely for different
people and situations. Specifically, motivations play an important role in the
development of these rules. It is here that Petronio drew connections to the existing
literature on self-disclosure and in particular to its functions (pp. 49–56). CPM
further posits that individuals and co-owners weigh the risks and benefits of
disclosing or concealing. Petronio (2002) adopted this theoretical rationale as she
notet that “each of us has a mental calculus that we use to decide whether to tell or
keep private information” (p. 3). Estimating the risks and benefits of revealing or
concealing private information hence becomes an important aspect of privacy rules.
I will discuss the privacy calculus in more detail in Sect. 6.3.1 because the theory
has primarily been used to understand how users of different online platforms deal
with uncertainty and perceived privacy risks.
Boundary coordination operations are determined with the help of three types
of rules. First, linkage rules define how owners of a shared information are
connected and who is allowed to be part for the boundary (i.e., become a co-
owner). Permeability rules define the openness or closeness of the established
boundary. Through these rules, co-owners coordinate the level of accessibility to
others outside of the boundary. Third, ownership rules determine the responsibilites
and rights of each boundary member with regard to control over and the distribution
of information they own.
Boundary Turbulences Finally, turbulences may occur due to the complexity of
the boundary coordination processes (Petronio, 2002, p. 177). CPM differentiates a
number of different types of turbulences that can be classified into (1) intentional
rule violations (e.g., betrayal, spying, dilemmas of confidentiality), (2) wrong

interpretation of rules (e.g., making erroneous assumptions about possible co-
owners), (3) the emergence of fuzzy boundaries or divergent boundary definitions
(e.g., when members of a collective boundary are ambiguous about the limits of a
boundary), (4) dissimilar rule orientations (e.g., when members of a boundary were
differently socialized with regard to privacy values), and (5) privacy dilemmas (e.g.,
accidentally becoming a member of a privacy boundary) (pp. 177–203). In sum,
boundary turbulences arise due to the difficulty of implying an efficient boundary
rules and subsequent boundary coordination.
5.1.2 Implications
CPM theory as described by Petronio (2002) has been very influential since its
publication. By now, Google Scholar records 1018 citations, not counting those
researchers that cited earlier publications on the theory. Despite this huge impact,
empirical evidence for its underlying assumptions are still scarce. Many investiga-
tions remain fragmented and insufficient in providing solid credence to all claims
made in the theory. This may come as a surprise as many of the suppositions seem
intuitively valuable. The problem seems to be that central aspects of the theory such
as private boundaries or the rule-based management are difficult to operationalize
in empirical studies. Child, Pearson, and Petronio (2009), for example, are the
only researchers who have tried to develop a measure that applies the boundary
coordination processes proposed in CPM theory to privacy management of bloggers.
The final scale (p. 2085) includes items on three dimensions reflecting boundary
permeability (e.g., “I would be upset if friends shared what’s written on my blog”),
boundary ownership (e.g., “I am certain that all the information I reveal on my blog
remains under my control”), and boundary linkage (e.g., “No one can read my blog
without my permission”). However, I would critically note that this measure rather
reflects individual’s perception of whether his or her individual rules are working.
Taken together, these dimensions thus show how open or closed someone wants the
privacy boundary around a personal blog to be. Nonetheless, the measure can help
to identify people who are more reluctant to disclose private information on their
blog and who are more likely to restrict their blog to specific audiences.
Based on an extensive literature review, and to the best of my knowledge, many
important assumptions of the theory such as how private boundaries are created,
what characterizes them, and how rules are established have not been the explicit
subject of empirical investigation. Notable exceptions are the studies by Hosek
and Thompson (2009), who explored motivations to form privacy rules in the
context of college education, or Child and Westermann (2013), who investigated
adjustment of privacy rules when privacy boundaries (in this case their Facebook
community) grow. Most notably, the notion of information ownership and boundary
coordination was investigated by Kennedy-Lightsey, Martin, Thompson, Himes, and
Clingerman (2012). Based on 100 pairs of friends’ survey answers, they found that
5.1 Communication Privacy Management Theory 93
when disclosed information was riskier, disclosers and receivers both perceived
that the receiver had fewer ownerships rights. Receivers, furthermore, were more
likely to share the disclosed information when they perceived they had more
ownership. More recently, Steuber and McLaren (2015) conducted a survey with
273 participants and found that recalibration of rules after privacy turbulences was
related to less relational damage.
On a theoretical level, CPM theory has several implications with regard to the
connection of privacy and self-disclosure. First of all, the link between privacy and
self-disclosure lies in the assumption that CPM theory is dialectical (Petronio, 2002,
pp. 12–23). A dialectical perspective generally describes the connection of two
concepts through a set of conceptual assumptions that revolve around the notions
of contradiction, dialectical change, praxis, and totality (Baxter & Montgomery,
1996, p. 6). Specifically, contradiction refers to the “dynamic interplay of unified
oppositions” (p. 8) and dialectical change to the interplay of stability and flux that
people experience in their daily lives (p. 10).
According to Petronio (2002), CPM theory acknowledges these characteristics of
dialectics in the interconnectedness of privacy and self-disclosure. It suggests that
privacy and self-disclosure are functional opposites as they have “distinct features
from one another that function in incompatible ways” (p. 13). In this sense, privacy
is not disclosure, however, they are unified as each presupposes the existence of the
other for its meaning (p. 14). Self-Disclosure is thus only meaningful in relation to
privacy as disclosing private information means giving up some degree of privacy.
In short, Petronio (2002) argued that through disclosure, people become a little
less private and more public (p. 12). Furthermore, the theory adheres to the notion
of dialectical change as people are constantly experiencing opposing forces of
revealing and concealing. As disclosure leads to the formation of privacy boundaries
and boundaries themselves are constantly changing, change is an inherent concept
of CPM theory.
However, CPM theory contradicts itself in aspects. In contrast to the dialectical
point of view, Petronio also introduced the concept of privacy boundaries, which can
be seen as safe environments in which self-disclosure becomes possible. Compared
to viewing privacy and self-disclosure as conceptual opposites, this view emphasizes
that privacy is sometimes needed to facilitate self-disclose. In the following, I will
discuss another theoretical model that stresses this view on privacy and self-
disclosure.
As I will show later, these perspectives do not contradict each other. In fact,
I argue that CPM theory presents a well-designed rationale for seeing self-disclosure
both as a dialectical opposite to privacy and as a function of privacy. In conclusion,
the merit of CPM theory is its focus on the mutual relationships between sender and
recipient. Using the metaphor of privacy boundaries and a rule-based management
system, the theory provides the necessary tools to understand how people manage
their disclosures both individually and collectively.
5.2 The Privacy Process Model
In an attempt to combine the theoretical work of Westin (1967), Altman (1975),

and Burgoon (1982), Dienlin (2015) proposed the PPM, which aims at arranging
“existing definitions, mechanisms, and effects in a single model” (p. 102). The
basic assumption of the model is that an objective privacy context is perceived
subjectively which, in turn, leads to a corresponding level of self-disclosure. Dienlin
(2015) thereby regarded privacy as the degree of separation from others (p. 104).
5.2.1 Basic Components
The model comprises four major elements that serve as the procedural framework.
To understand the implications of the model for the connection of privacy and self-
disclosure, I discuss each component in more detail.
Privacy Context The first component of the PPM refers to the context in which
the individual finds himself or herself in Dienlin (2015, pp. 104–105). This context
should be objectively measurable in all four dimensions proposed by Burgoon
(1982). The idea of a privacy context refers to the idea that privacy may be
regarded as the degree of separation from others. In other words, it is the condition
of informational, social, psychological, and physical privacy that an individual is
currently experiencing (Dienlin, 2015, p. 105). However, it is important to note
here that Dienlin most likely referred to the situational circumstances instead of
contextual characteristics.1
Privacy Perception The second component refers to the idea that privacy is always
subjectively perceived. Dienlin argued that the objectively measurable privacy
context does not necessarily adhere to the subjective perception of the individual.
Using a number of different examples, he showed that oftentimes discrepancies exist
between actual and perceived privacy.
Privacy Behavior Depending on the respective privacy perception, individuals
engage in corresponding behaviors. The third component of the PPM is hence the
privacy-related behavior, which, according to Dienlin, is nothing but self-disclosure.
The general idea is that individuals will disclose themselves when they perceive high
levels of privacy (p. 107).
Privacy Regulation and Controllability The PPM further adheres to Altman’s
(1975) concept of balancing desired and achieved privacy. Dienlin argued that
the perceived privacy and the privacy behavior are constantly compared to a
corresponding desired level of privacy and a desired privacy behavior. An imbalance
1 I will discuss the problems of the synonymous use of context and situation in more detail in
Sect. 7.2.2.
5.2 The Privacy Process Model 95
CONTROLLABILITY PRIVACY REGULATION CONTROLLABILITY

(Takes place if current status differs from desired status)
Current Status Desired Status
PRIVACY CONTEXT PRIVACY PERCEPTION PRIVACY BEHAVIOR

(Informaonal, Social, Psychological, Physical) (Informaonal, Social, Psychological, Physical) (Self-Disclosure)
Influence Evaluaon Regulaon
Fig. 5.1 The privacy process model by Dienlin (2015)
between the current and the desired status is perceived as dissatisfying and fosters
privacy regulation. Privacy regulation can mean adjusting the context or the behavior
(p. 108). Which mechanism people choose depends further on their controllability.
Figure 5.1 represents a visualization of the entire model.
5.2.2 Implications
So far, the PPM has not explicitly been tested empirically. Nonetheless, the model
has several valuable implications and some studies implicitly support some of its
underlying claims. First of all, it separates the objective privacy context from the
subjective privacy perception. Dienlin emphasized the importance of drawing such
a clear distinction because people may sometimes perceive privacy although they
are not in a private situation from an objective perspective. Trepte and Reinecke
(2011b), for example, argued that “people create online spaces of social and
psychological privacy that may be an illusion; however, these spaces seem to be
experienced as private” (p. 62). SNS users thus often perceive a high level of
privacy because they have the illusion of controlling with whom they interact or
share information. Particularly on social media platforms, people may feel private
because a lot of fine-grained privacy settings are provided.
The PPM furthermore allows the integration of both privacy regulation behaviors
and self-disclosure. In contrast to CPM theory, self-disclosure is not seen as a
dialectical opposite to privacy. Instead, Dienlin (2015) argued that people disclose
specifically when they feel they are in a private situation: the higher the perceived
privacy, the higher the corresponding level of disclosure. This rationale is closely
related to Westin’s (1967) supposition that privacy in the state of small-group

intimacy is important for limited and protection communication. Only under pri-
vate circumstances, communication is truly protected and self-disclosure becomes
possible. Trepte (2012) also argued that a major function of privacy is the ability
to disclose private information (p. 63). Although this view might at first contradict
the notion of CPM theory that people lose their privacy through self-disclosure, this
seeming paradox can easily be solved. Conditions of perceived privacy (as noted
by Dienlin) can be seen as well-functioning privacy boundaries (as described by
Petronio) in which individuals are able to disclose themselves.
The PPM furthermore does not contradict the notion that self-disclosure, or more
specifically the adjustment of self-disclosure, can be a means to adapt to conditions
of lower privacy thus achieving an optimal balance of desired and achieved privacy.
Dienlin (2015) noted that people adapt their levels of self-disclosure to the current
context in which they find themselves. If their desired level of privacy is not
achieved, they either change the context (which is basically what Altman and others
termed privacy regulation) or they adapt the level of self-disclosure.
A problematic aspect here is that it remains unclear whether the comparison of
the current and the desired status is a conscious or unconscious process. Originally
stemming from Altman (1975), it remains unclear how theses processes actually
play out in human minds. Some qualitative research suggests that people oftentimes
do not even associated the term privacy with such elaborate decision-making (e.g.,
Nippert-Eng, 2010; Teutsch, Masur, & Trepte, 2018). Perceptions of privacy may
hence not be measurable, as the academic understanding of what constitutes a
privacy perception is not necessarily echoed in the answers of participants in several
studies. However, as perceptions depend on concrete and measurable situational
factors we can nonetheless infer implicit cognitive processes that eventually lead to
privacy-related behaviors.
In sum, although more empirical investigation is needed, the PPM model
provides a valuable framework for studying how people perceive privacy in different
contexts, or, more specifically, in different situations. It further allows us to study
how people react to this perception. In particular, it provides a useful depiction of
self-disclosure as a function of privacy. However, one has to bear in mind that the
model remains underspecified with regard to some aspects that have been brought up
recently. First, it does not incorporate interpersonal perceptions (what Dienlin might
have considered in the social privacy context) into privacy regulation processes.
Second, motivational aspects of the individual are not considered (although are
somewhat included in the desired level of privacy), and collective privacy manage-
ment processes (as described by Petronio) are neglected. These aspects, however,
may be particularly important for successful privacy management on the Internet.
Furthermore, the PPM remains largely ambiguous about the specific characteristics
of contexts. In my opinion, it would be more precise to talk about situational instead
of contextual factors as the term context may be too broad. It is this point that I seek
to further develop in the theory of situational privacy and self-disclosure.
5.3 Privacy and Self-Disclosure as Theoretically Linked Concepts 97
5.3 Privacy and Self-Disclosure as Theoretically Linked

Concepts
In my opinion, the works of Petronio (2002) and Dienlin (2015) provide promising
starting points for the theoretical linking of the two concepts. Notwithstanding their
contributions, I still believe it is necessary to look into the connection of privacy
and self-disclosure more deeply and to develop a comprehensive framework that
incorporates both perspectives addressed in these theories. In order to exemplify
the connection of privacy and self-disclosure, let us imagine the following typical
situation:
Parents are worried about their child’s unsatisfactory school achievements. They are not sure
whether they are supporting their child enough. They start to debate the right and wrongs
of parenting and education. They both get very agitated and emotional, thereby revealing
a lot about their fears and hopes. In the meantime, their child comes home from school.
Both parents stop their conversation and shift to a neutral topic. Once the child has left, they
resume the conversation about his or her education.
From this example, we can derive two observations that give us an idea of
how privacy and self-disclosure are inherently intertwined. First, it should be quite
obvious that both parents need a rather high level of privacy to be able to discuss
their child’s education. They only feel able to talk about their true feelings and
hopes when they are alone and no one—especially not their child—can overhear
them. They do not want to appear vulnerable or doubtful in front of their child, and
most likely anyone else. In their home, withdrawn from the public, both parents feel
able to securely discuss these sensitive matters with each other. A first supposition
is hence that privacy can be regarded as a necessary condition for self-disclosure.
At other times, however, limiting or actively managing one’s disclosure can be a
means to attain privacy in the form of reserve. In the example, the parents shift to a
neutral topic as soon as the child enters the situation. By refraining from disclosing
their vulnerability in front of their child, they are able to achieve an optimal balance
between their conflicting needs. In this sense, actively deciding not to disclose
something can be regarded as an effective privacy regulation strategy. A second
supposition is hence that disclosure management presents a valuable means to arrive
at an appropriate level of concealing and revealing, specifically in situations when
the appropriate level for disclosing oneself is not given.
A similar idea was proposed by Derlega and Chaikin (1977) who argued that
when self-disclosure is regarded as a form of boundary regulation, it makes sense to
imagine two boundaries: They distinguish between the self (or personal) boundary
and the dyadic boundary. The self boundary “separates the discloser and his or her
information from the recipient” (Derlega, Metts, Petronio, & Margulis, 1993, p. 68).
It is the smallest boundary possible as a closed self boundary means that nobody
has access to the discloser or his or her information. Nondisclosure or disclosure
management is thus a form of privacy regulation. The dyadic boundary “is perceived
by the individual as the boundary within which it is safe to disclose to the invited
participant and across which the self-disclosure will not pass” (p. 67). In this regard,
the boundary is the safe condition in which self-disclosure can be performed. This
boundary is hence the private sphere which is needed for self-disclosure. It has to
be noted, however, that this boundary does not necessarily have to be dyadic. As
proposed by Petronio (2002), privacy boundaries can included more than one or
two people.
In my opinion, both perspectives are important to understand the theoretical
connection between privacy and self-disclosure. In the following, I will elaborate
further on this theoretical link between privacy and self-disclosure by referring to
existing theories from both areas of research. While scholars have often written
about similar ideas, they have used different terminologies. I will show that the
two perspectives do not contradict each other but rather provide the necessary
foundations for a comprehensive theory of privacy and self-disclosure. In fact,
resolving the seeming paradox that self-disclosure can be both an opposite to privacy
and the reason why we seek privacy is fundamental to the theory of situational
privacy and self-disclosure that I will develop.
5.3.1 Disclosure Management as a Form of Privacy Regulation
The first perspective can be summarized in the following postulate: avoiding

self-disclosure can be understood as a form of privacy regulation behavior. The
rationale here is that people are able to achieve a certain level of reserve by
actively avoiding or at least proactively managing their self-disclosure. Concealing
information thus represents a valuable means to safeguarding one’s integrity and
reducing vulnerability under conditions of low privacy.
In order to understand this idea, it is necessary to recap what privacy regulation
behaviors stand for (cf. Sect. 3.2.3). As stated before, achieving a certain level of pri-
vacy is associated with the specific goals that an individual wants toattain. Although
the environment may sometimes naturally provide the optimal circumstances for a
high level of privacy, in most cases individuals have to act in order to achieve their
desired levels of privacy. For example, a Facebook user might have to use friend
lists (a way of segmenting the potentially large audience on Facebook into smaller
groups) to establish smaller and ultimately more secure communication boundaries,
in which he might be able to fulfill more fundamental needs. He actively produces a
higher level of privacy for his communication, his disclosures can be more targeted
and the risk that the disclosed information reaches unwanted recipients may thereby
be lowered.
Although this process seems intuitive, we should bear in mind that other scenar-
ios are possible. In many cases, individuals are not able to employ preventive privacy
regulation strategies in order to achieve a certain level of privacy. Instead, they are
thrown into situations in which they have to deal with the prevailing circumstances.
As Dienlin (2015) argued, if the context cannot be changed, individuals may
have to adapt their self-disclosure. In such circumstances, avoiding self-disclosure
becomes a means to reducing risks and vulnerability. Even if the need to self-
disclose is particularly salient, withholding personal information may be the best

way for protecting one’s privacy and reach the optimal balance between achieved
and desired levels of privacy (Altman, 1975). Particularly in public situations,
individuals may feel the need to stay reserved in order to enjoy the specific state
of privacy that Westin (1967) called reserve.
There is another situation that affords this proactive disclosure management.
As Johnson (1974) noted, individuals often need to decide what types of privacy
regulation behaviors they should implement without knowing if these behaviors will
actually contribute to reaching their goals. In many cases, individuals have to deal
with situations that are not perfectly suited to satisfy particular needs because their
chosen privacy regulation was not successful. If a situation cannot be optimized after
unsuccessful attempts to change the prevailing circumstances, an adequate privacy
regulation strategy may be to oppress the salient need to self-disclose for the time
being.
In fact, this idea is not as new. Altman (1975) already argued that “if a person
cannot achieve a desired level of boundary regulation, additional mechanisms may
be mobilized” (p. 32). He further denotes that “[t]he volume and quality of verbal
output may reflect privacy mechanisms” (p. 34). This notion can be regarded as
an early formulation of the idea that actively managing self-disclosure can be
regarded as a form of privacy regulation. Likewise, Burgoon (1982) said that “a
second class of verbal [privacy] behaviors revolves around self-disclosure (emphasis
in the original) – controlling the depth, breadth, and intimacy level of sensitive
information revealed about the self” (p. 242). Furthermore, as Crowley (2017)
noted, information control research (less than self-disclosure research) has often
focused on nondisclosure as a way of controlling one’s privacy (p. 205).
Hogan (2010) similarly introduced the theory of the lowest common denomina-
tor, which posits that in online environments such as SNS in which many different
people may witness our communication, people actively manage their disclosures
by asking themselves what information is appropriate for all potential recipients.
The theory hence supports the claim that disclosure management can be regarded as
a coping strategy in situations of low privacy.
In short, we can conclude that avoiding or restricting self-disclosure may be seen
as a way of achieving an optimal balance between concealing and revealing under
conditions of low privacy. Although this state of reserve may not be related to the
most essential goals associated with privacy (such as autonomy, self-realization, or
relationship development), it is nonetheless a condition of reduced vulnerability in
which the individual is in control over the output (Altman, 1975). It thus represents
a sort of psychological barrier in line with an individual’s need to stay safe (Westin,
1967). It is a self-determined barrier against unwanted intrusion, thus allowing the
individual to adapt to the prevailing circumstances.
5.3.2 Privacy as a Requirement for Self-Disclosure
The second perspective can be summarized in the following postulate: self-

disclosure can be regarded as a function of privacy. The rationale here is that people
need a high level of privacy in order to be able to self-disclose. In this sense, privacy
reduces the risks associated with self-disclosure (see again Sect. 4.3).
From the self-disclosure literature, we know that people disclose private infor-
mation when they evaluate and subsequently discount the potential risks associated
with it. Put differently, we can argue that people need a sort of safe environment or
at least particular circumstances under which they feel able to disclose. Research on
self-disclosure has acknowledged this rationale by incorporating individuals’ risk
assessments in the disclosure decision process (Chaudoir & Fisher, 2010; Omarzu,
2000). I argue that situations with high levels of privacy are these safe environments,
the particular conditions in which people feel they can disclose themselves. From
the theoretical work discussed in Chap. 3, we can conclude that privacy constitutes
a form of limited access (however this might manifest itself) and thus lowers the
vulnerability of the person disclosing. This is why Dienlin (2015) reasoned that
situations with a high level of privacy provide the necessary conditions for revealing
private information.
If we regard self-disclosure as a function of privacy, we may ask how this notion
is addressed in the seminal theories of privacy. First of all, Westin (1967) alluded
to this idea by proposing the functions “limited and protected communication”
as well as “emotional release”. Specifically, privacy in the state of small-group
intimacy provides dyads or small groups with the opportunity to share confidences
and intimacies with trusted others (p. 41). An important aspect to bear in mind is
that when we talk about self-disclosure as a function of privacy, we need to look
at privacy as a state of dyadic or small-group intimacy. In these states of privacy,
self-disclosure becomes possible in order to fulfill individual needs of relationship
maintenance or initiation and emotional release. When Westin argued that privacy
is necessary for emotional release, he was most likely also referring to situations
of small-group intimacy, in which the disclosure of feelings or sorrows becomes
possible. This relates well to Johnson’s (1974) point of view that people exert
secondary control in order to satisfy primary needs: people accordingly seek small-
group seclusion in order to be able to share private information without fearing
the interference of other people or institutions. In this sense, the amount of self-
disclosure between two individuals may even be indicative of interpersonal intimacy
(Burgoon, 1982, p. 242).
In short, if self-disclosure is regarded as a goal-directed behavior that comes
along with certain risks, we can argue that conditions of privacy lower these
risks and achieving privacy can be regarded as a precondition for self-disclosure.
As self-disclosure serves to satisfy many important needs and is in particular a
requirement for social interaction, achieving privacy in the state of dyadic or small-
group intimacy is fundamental to people’s everyday lives. This view is also shared in
many non-psychological accounts of privacy (e.g., Fried, 1968; Nissenbaum, 2010;
Rachels, 1975; Schoeman, 1984). Rachels (1975) provided a great example that
illustrates quite well why privacy is essential for self-disclosure which, in turn, is
important for maintaining relationships with other people:
First, consider what happens when two close friends are joined by a casual acquaintance.
The character of the group changes; and one of the changes is that conversation about
intimate matters is now out of order. Then suppose these friends could never be alone;
suppose there were always third parties (. . . ) intruding. Then they could do either of two
things. They could carry on as close friends do, sharing confidences, freely expressing their
feelings about things, and so on. But this would mean violating their sense of how it is
appropriate to behave around casual acquaintances or strangers. Or they could avoid doing
or saying anything which they think inappropriate to do or say around a third party. But this
would mean that they could no longer behave with one another in the way that friends do
and further that, eventually, they would no longer be close friends (p. 3).
Schoeman (1984) in a similar manner argued that privacy rather is a need for
facilitating intimacy with other people, instead of independence from them. Privacy
thus plays a key role for differentiating and maintaining on the one hand the variety,
and on the other hand the distinctiveness of, relationships with different people
(Nissenbaum, 2010, p. 85).
Despite the supposition that privacy and self-disclosure should be regarded
as dialectical opposites, this view is quite well adopted in CPM theory: private
boundaries in fact may be more accurate descriptions of what Westin called small-
group intimacy. People thus establish boundaries with other people in which private
information can circulate (p. 6). To put differently, people are able to disclose private
information within groups of people they trust or have allowed to be co-owners of
this information: in such boundaries, “the discloser believes that the disclosure is
safe with the recipient” (Derlega et al., 1993, p. 67).
Of course, we could still argue that by disclosing to a significant other, an
individual loses privacy. In fact, he or she does lose some privacy with regard to
the other person(s) within the defined privacy boundary. However, as the privacy
boundary was initiated in order to allow the disclosure and circulation of private
information and rules pertaining these boundaries are carefully established, this
loss of privacy is not particularly large and not necessarily perceived as a loss
of privacy by the individual. In line with this rationale, Ben-Ze’ev (2003) noted
that the need for privacy might be less pronounced in the case of close, intimate
relationships (romantic couples or friends) or in the extreme case of an relationship
with a complete stranger who simply does not present a risks to the discloser (p.
453).
In sum, theories on privacy and self-disclosure can be linked through these two
interdependent perspectives. On the one hand, managing self-disclosure or even
non-disclosure is a means to adapt to situations of low privacy, and on the other
hand, privacy provides the necessary circumstances to disclose personal information

and thus satisfy more fundamental needs. Put differently, we can derive that
people engage in privacy regulation behaviors in order to attain a certain level of
privacy that then allows them to disclose themselves to achieve more fundamental
goals. However, if the level of privacy is low and preventive privacy regulation
strategies are ineffective or impossible, individuals may cope by refraining from
self-disclosure. That said, we have to critically note that such a perspective on
privacy and self-disclosure emphasizes the rationality of individuals. It posits that
people are able to rationally assess the prevailing cirumstances with regard to
their impact on the level of privacy and thus act accordingly. The rational choice
paradigm has long guided research in the social sciences and has proven to be a
valuable way of understanding human behavior. However, its premise that people
are rational agents can be criticized. The concept of bounded rationality is important
to incorporate because it can help to explain situations in which human behavior
deviates from such a rational decision process. That said, the theoretical framework
proposed in this chapter forms the basis for the theory of situational privacy and
self-disclosure that I am going to develop in Chap. 7. However, I will return to the
critique of the rational choice paradigm in the overall discussion of the proposed
theory in Sect. 12.2. The following six points may again be understood as the
common insights resulting from the analyses provided above.
1. On the most basic level, privacy and self-disclosure can be understood as
dialectics. If an individual shares information with another person or group of
persons, he or she looses part of his or her privacy as the information is now
known by someone else. Petronio (2002) called this co-ownership.
2. However, as acknowledged already by older theories, privacy must not only be
equated with absolute seclusion of the individual. Consequently, self-disclosure
might play a different role in specific forms of privacy (e.g., in the different states
of privacy described by Westin, 1967).
3. Actively avoiding self-disclosure can be regarded as a form of privacy regulation
behavior as it represents a means to stay reserved in situations in which self-
disclosure would be too risky.
4. This type of active disclosure management occurs particularly under conditions
of low privacy (e.g., when the conversation can be overheard by other people, or
is recorded)
5. Privacy in the form of dyadic or small-group intimacy (as described by Westin,
1967) or private boundaries (as described by Petronio, 2002) can be regarded as
a precondition for self-disclosure. In this sense, self-disclosure is a function of
privacy.
6. Because people want to self-disclose but simultaneously avoid the risks asso-
ciated with such behavior, they seek conditions of privacy or establish privacy
boundaries in which they negotiate the rules for an appropriate information flow.
Although I believe that these fundamental principles of privacy and self-

disclosure processes are valid in offline and online environments, we can now ask
whether these traditional theories of privacy and self-disclosure require modifica-
tions or extensions in order to capture the dynamics of new networked environments
as described in Chap. 2. In the next chapter, I will review more recent research that
aimed at understanding privacy and self-disclosure processes in the context of e-
commerce and social media.
Chapter 6
Privacy and Self-Disclosure in the Age
of Information
In the last three chapters, I discussed the predominant theories of privacy and self-
disclosure and how they should be linked. However, these theoretical approaches
mostly date back to the 1960s and 1970s. They thus emerged before the proliferation
of contemporary information and communication technologies.1 As mentioned
previously in Chap. 2, we should now inquire whether they hold up to the dynamics
of a changing media environment. In particular, we have to ask whether certain
modifications or extensions are needed to account for the specific horizontal and
vertical information flows that cause new privacy threats and breaches.
Nonetheless, I believe that the traditional theories of privacy and self-disclosure
provide a comprehensive framework through which human behaviors related to
privacy in new media environments can be understood and analyzed (a similar
point is also made by Trepte & Dienlin, 2014, p. 53). It is hence not surprising
that most scholars in the last two decades have adopted one of these theories for
empirically investigating privacy and self-disclosure in various online environments
in the larger contexts of e-commerce and social media. The results of these empirical
studies, however, have sometimes puzzled scholars and raised questions, the distinct
characteristics of online privacy processes.
In the following, I will first present a critical review of the literature that has
been published on online privacy and self-disclosure within the last 20 years.
I will highlight which theories scholars used to investigate privacy and self-
disclosure processes and to what extent these theories were able to predict the
empirical findings. Based on this review, I will discuss potential extensions for
traditional privacy and self-disclosure theories. More recent work has pinpointed
several new aspects that seem promising for grasping the characteristics of online
privacy and self-disclosure processes. These include particularly the differentiation
between horizontal and vertical privacy, the collaborative or networked nature of
1 Exceptionsare of course Petronio’s CPM theory (2002) and Dienlin’s PPM (2015), but these
approaches are still not necessarily media-specific.

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-78884-5_6
106 6 Privacy and Self-Disclosure in the Age of Information
privacy management in networked publics, and the multimodal nature of privacy

regulation. In a last step, I will offer some further considerations that should be
taken into account when developing a comprehensive framework. These concerns
refer primarily to the intangibility of vertical online privacy intrusions and the
corresponding impossibility of individuals making informed self-disclosure and
privacy regulation decisions. I will close this chapter with a short summary and
some perspectives on the development of the theory of situational privacy and self-
disclosure in the next chapter.
6.1 Literature Review
If we look at the historical evolution of privacy research, it becomes apparent that

certain events and particularly technological developments, such as the dispersion
of new information and communication technologies, have massively influenced the
subsequent scholarship (for a discussion of the socio-political context of privacy
research development, see Westin, 2003). The privacy theories presented in the
previous chapters, for example, can be regarded as reactions to the increasing
proliferation of electronic surveillance practices brought about by the growing use
of computers between the 1960s and 1980s. Within the last 20 years, however, it was
particularly the rise of the Internet, the growing e-commerce sector, and the social
web that sparked scholarly interest and subsequently shaped the research.
Although the literature on online privacy and self-disclosure research has been
systematized before (for overviews see Abramova, Wagner, Krasnova, & Buxmann,
2017; Bélanger & Crossler, 2011; Li, 2011, 2012; Smith, Dinev, & Xu, 2011; Trepte
& Reinecke, 2011a), I believe there are five (more or less consecutive) streams
of research that stand out and have important implications for this work. First, it
seems peculiar that in most studies, the concept of privacy concerns plays a central
role. An astonishing amount of empirical research so far has investigated either
antecedents or consequences of individual privacy concerns. This is somewhat
surprising as traditional approaches to privacy do not put a particular emphasis on
concerns. Notwithstanding this notion, scholars have mostly aimed at analyzing the
relationship between privacy concerns and several types of behaviors. Initial studies
of this second stream of research, however, often revealed a discrepancy between
people’s concerns and their willingness to self-disclose. In consequence, a fruitful
line of research set out to explain this seeming privacy paradox. Third, inspired
by the emerging scholarship on SNS use, scholars have started to investigate
both costs (mostly still individual privacy concerns) and benefits of privacy-
related behavior such as self-disclosure (e.g., social support, social capital needs,
or other gratifications). Many studies in this tradition hence investigated the so-
called privacy calculus. Fourth, recent research has slowly moved away from
privacy concerns as the central construct and has investigated other concepts such
as online privacy literacy, trust, or perceived control as similarly pivotal variables
in privacy and self-disclosure processes. Finally, scholars have made great progress
6.1 Literature Review 107
in understanding and conceptualizing how people regulate their privacy in various

online platforms. Findings from such studies have meaningfully extended prior
classifications of privacy regulation behaviors.
In the following, I will structure the literature review according to these five
themes. The review is not meant to be comprehensive. Instead, my aim is to provide
a general perspective on the research that has been conducted in the last two
decades. I will thereby draw primarily from the work of communication scholars
that have helped tremendously in understanding people’s online behavior in general
and online privacy processes in particular.
6.1.1 Privacy Concerns as Measurable Proxy
The growing discomfort with data collection practices had already begun before
the rise of the Internet, when companies and organizations started to use computers
to handle client information more efficiently. Smith, Milberg, and Burke (1996),
for example, developed a four-dimensional information privacy concern scale
which comprised (1) concerns about data collection, (2) concerns about errors or
inaccuracies in databases, (3) concerns about unauthorized use of data, and (4)
concerns about improper access to data (p. 172 and p. 183). Interestingly, the first
engagement with information privacy thus focused on vertical dynamics and the
question of to what extent companies or organizations are allowed to interfere
with their clients’ privacy. The 15-item concern for information privacy (CFIP)
scale was later validated by Stewart and Segars (2002), who found that each of
its dimensions serves as a second-order factor that makes up the broader concept
of information privacy concerns. Although not explicitly formulated for the Internet
context, this scale was used in several empirical studies, including those that focused
more particularly on online privacy (Bélanger & Crossler, 2011, p. 1020). Further
online privacy concern scales were later proposed by Malhotra, Kim, and Agarwal
(2004) and Buchanan, Joinson, Paine, and Reips (2007). Bansal (2017) recently also
developed the more comprehensive Internet user information transmission security
concern (IUITSC) scale, which further distinguishes privacy and security concerns.
Since the 1990s, growing privacy concerns have been documented in numerous
surveys. A large survey conducted by the Federal Trade Commission (2000), for
example, found that more than half of US American consumers were very concerned
about the privacy of personal information they shared online (cited after Acquisti
& Grossklags, 2004, pp. 2–3). Ten years later, 40% of the European population
was very concerned about their behavior being recorded through the Internet when
browsing, downloading files, and accessing content online (European Commission,
2011, p. 67). In 2014, the percentage of those concerned rose to 45% (European
Commission, 2015, p. 15). In Germany, 57% indicated concern about data collection
practices of website providers (Trepte & Masur, 2017b, p. 28).
Given the theoretical approaches to privacy that I have presented in the previous
chapters, it is surprising that initial research put so much emphasis on privacy
concerns. As elaborated before, privacy was mostly regarded as a voluntary and

temporary withdrawal into conditions in which a varying degree of limited access
is given (see Chap. 3, p. 66). A measure of privacy hence would have to grasp
the subjectively perceived degree of limited access at any given moment. Privacy
concerns, in contrast, refer to general attitudes towards practices or behaviors
that may—depending on the subjective evaluation—constitute privacy violations or
improper intrusions. In this regard, we could criticize that a lot of the initial work on
privacy concerns is rather disconnected from the predominant theories of privacy.
So why did scholars start to analyze general privacy concerns? On the one hand,
it seems likely that much privacy research was simply ignited by the negative
public reaction to particular events or technologies which has manifested itself in
growing concerns in the population. Privacy scholars hence became interested in
understanding and measuring people’s concerns about organizational data collection
practices (as indicated by the surveys summarized above). They were furthermore
interested in identifying the reasons for these concerns. Smith et al. (1996), for
example, found that negative experiences of privacy breaches lead to stronger
concerns. Dinev and Hart (2004) further showed that privacy concerns primarily are
related to the perceived vulnerability that results from awareness of organizational
practices. In line with these findings, manipulating the perceived control over infor-
mation in experimental designs indeed affects privacy concerns: the more control
people perceive they have, the less concerned they are (Xu, 2007). Differences in
personality also explain privacy concerns (Bansal, Zahedi, & Gefen, 2010; Lu, Tan,
& Hui, 2004). For example, people scoring high on measures of extroversion are
less likely to be concerned (Lu et al., 2004).
On the other hand, it seems that privacy scholars turned to investigating privacy
concerns because they represent a measurable proxy for privacy that can be
translated into actual items in surveys or experimental studies (cf. the argument
put forth by Smith et al., 2011, p. 997). As already argued earlier, however, what
is measured is not really a proxy for privacy; it is rather a trait-like measure of
what people perceive as privacy breaches or violations. Privacy concerns thus may
guide future behavior in relevant situations, but they do not represent the level of
privacy that an individual perceives in a specific situation. This is why the theory of
situational privacy and self-disclosure aims at providing concepts that empirically
acknowledge the actual situational level of privacy and simultaneously acknowledge
the influence of more trait-like measures such as privacy concerns on situational
behavior.
Nevertheless, these initial survey studies on information privacy concerns with
regard to organizational practices eventually became a separate research field that
still today analyzes privacy and self-disclosure processes in the context of “e-
commerce.” Both communication and information scholars in this field investigate
mainly to what extent characteristics of providers or companies, different pri-
vacy policies, individual differences, and varying contextual factors influence the
decision to use certain providers and to disclose personal information in online
transactions (e.g., Dinev & Hart, 2006; Metzger, 2004; Spiekermann, Grossklags,
& Berendt, 2001). In particular, the emergence of social network sites such
as Friendster, Myspace, and finally Facebook formed an entire communication

research field that continues to explore how privacy concerns relate to privacy
regulation behavior and how they affect self-disclosure (e.g., Debatin, Lovejoy,
Horn, & Hughes, 2009; Dienlin & Trepte, 2015; Taddicken, 2014).
6.1.2 Consequences of Privacy Concerns
With survey studies consistently reporting high privacy concerns in different popu-
lations, scholars began to ask how these concerns affect individuals’ behavior. Over
time, different studies investigated relationships between privacy concerns (some-
times also broadly conceptualized as privacy attitudes) and behavioral outcomes
such as self-disclosure, privacy regulation, and willingness to use privacy-invasive
online services.
In evaluating the respective literature, four aspects have to be taken into account.
First, it is important to note that, except in few experimental studies, scholars mostly
relied on measurements of people’s aggregated estimations of their general behavior
or simply their intentions to behave in certain ways (e.g., the willingness to self-
disclose or the intention to use certain privacy regulation strategies), instead of
capturing actual behavior. Second, similar study designs were used in the context
of both e-commerce and social media. Although contextual factors are certainly
of relevance, the literature in both contexts is nonetheless often treated as a
continuous exploration of the same relationship. Third, it is vitally important to
distinguish between experiments (which allow us to investigate situational effects
of concerns on behavior) and surveys (which allow us to draw conclusions about
general relationships). In the following, I will pinpoint the implications of these
aspects whenever necessary. Lastly, most studies refer to the theories of Westin
(1967), Altman (1975), and more recently also to CPM theory (Petronio, 2002).
In these studies, however, the theories mostly served to conceptualize privacy
and in particular privacy regulation behavior. Additionally, scholars mostly drew
from socio-psychological theories such as utility maximization theory or behavioral
theories such as the theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1985) in order to derive
testable assumptions (cf. Li, 2012).
6.1.2.1 The Privacy Paradox
One of the first studies investigating the relationship between privacy concerns and
actual behaviors was by Spiekermann et al. (2001). In their laboratory experiments,
participants reported their privacy preferences in a pre-survey and then engaged
in an online-shopping transaction during which an anthropomorphic shopping
bot asked them different questions designed to elicit sensitive disclosures. The
results revealed that even those who were clustered as privacy fundamentalists
(i.e., very concerned about their privacy) revealed their addresses during the online
transaction. Because of the experimental nature and the observation of actual

behavior, this first study (in contrast to subsequent survey studies) might indeed
lend credence to a discrepancy between attitudes and behaviors.
Inspired by these and similar results from other experiments, Acquisti and
Grossklags (2004) asked whether there is generally a discrepancy between privacy
attitudes (or concerns) revealed in surveys and privacy-related behavior measured
in experiments (p. 3) and offered psychological explanations such as limited
information or bounded rationality (p. 7). In a subsequent empirical study in
which the authors scraped Facebook profiles, the results revealed that Facebook
users indeed reveal a lot of information about themselves such as identifiable
photos, birth date, or phone numbers (Gross & Acquisti, 2005). A survey study
among 506 US American students revealed that concerned users were still likely
to reveal private information on their profiles (Acquisti & Gross, 2006). Of those
who were concerned about people getting access to information about their sexual
orientation, 48% nonetheless disclosed that information on Facebook (p. 11). We
should, however, bear in mind that this study focused on analyzing aggregative
relationships.
Around the same time, Barnes (2006) more or less accidentally coined the term
that would henceforth be used to describe the discrepancy between privacy concerns
and privacy-related behavior. Describing the status quo in the United States in 2006,
she wrote:
Herein lies the privacy paradox. Adults are concerned about invasion of privacy, while teens
freely give up personal information. This occurs because often teens are not aware of the
public nature of the Internet (Barnes, 2006, p. 3).
Although she referred to a discrepancy between adults’ concerns and teenagers’

behavior, the term “privacy paradox” was subsequently adopted to describe the gap
between an individual’s stated privacy concerns and privacy-related behavior (for an
overview of the research related to the privacy paradox, see Trepte & Teutsch, 2016).
The underlying reasoning is closely related to the first perspective on the connection
between privacy and self-disclosure outlined in Chap. 5: scholars expected people to
manage (i.e., reduce or avoid) disclosure of private information in order to adapt to
low levels of perceived privacy. They thought people with high concerns about their
online privacy would refrain from disclosing a lot of information about themselves
in privacy-invasive online realms.
Several empirical studies (in the context of both e-commerce and social network
site use) subsequently investigated the privacy paradox. However, initial findings
were not very consistent. Tufekci (2008), for example, found in a survey study with
704 US American college students that concerned people regulated the visibility
of their Facebook and Myspace profiles (a form of privacy regulation), but did not
reduce the amount of self-disclosure. A survey study with 718 Italian participants
by Taddei and Contena (2013) likewise showed that higher concerns did not relate
to self-disclosure on SNSs. Similar results were also obtained in the context of e-
commerce. In an experimental study, Norberg, Horne, and Horne (2007) found that
people’s risk perceptions (a concept that is generally regarded as closely related to
privacy concerns) were negatively related to the intention to self-disclose, but not
to the actual amount of self-disclosure. In a survey study with 889 participants,
Sheehan (1999) similarly found that stated privacy concerns correlate negatively
with the reported frequency of registering with websites in the past.
Recent attempts to investigate the privacy paradox on SNSs, in contrast, have
revealed that higher privacy concerns do, after all, relate to lower levels of self-
disclosure and higher levels of privacy protection (e.g., Dienlin & Metzger, 2016;
Dienlin & Trepte, 2015; Krasnova, Spiekermann, Koroleva, & Hildebrand, 2010;
Krasnova, Veltri, & Günther, 2012; Zlatolas, Welzer, Heričko, & Hölbl, 2015).
Among other explanations, scholars have particularly argued that the privacy
paradox is illusory because broadly measured attitudes or concerns should not be
expected to correlate to specific behaviors (e.g., Dienlin and Trepte, 2015; Trepte,
Dienlin, & Reinecke, 2014). Correspondingly, Dienlin and Trepte (2015) conducted
an online survey with 595 German participants and showed that the privacy paradox
can be supported if measured similarly to the older studies described above, but is
not supported when items are designed according to the principle of compatibility
(Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010). In consequence, their more specific research design
revealed that privacy concerns moderately related to all different types of privacy
behaviors.
A recent meta-analysis based on 166 studies from 34 countries by Baruh, Secinti,
and Cemalcilar (2017) also confirmed that concerned SNS users were less likely
to disclose themselves (r = −0.13) and also more likely to engage in privacy
regulation (r = 0.13; however, this overall relationships is only based on three
studies). These findings suggest that people indeed adapt their levels of self-
disclosure in order to attain an optimal balance between desired and actual levels
of privacy. Or in other words, if they perceive the prevailing privacy on SNSs to be
too low to self-disclose, they refrain from doing so. In the e-commerce context,
studies likewise found significant effects of privacy concerns on privacy-related
behavioral outcomes. Based on 243 respondents, Chellappa and Sin (2005) found
that consumers with higher information privacy concerns were less likely to use
services that require personal data collection to offer personalized features.
Although the privacy paradox seems to be a methodical relic (Dienlin & Trepte,
2015), it has to be noted that the relationship between concerns and behavior is
mostly moderate or even small. Acquisti, Brandimarte, and Loewenstein (2015) also
argued that considering the privacy paradox to be illusory is not satisfactory because
attitude-behavior gaps may nonetheless arise in particular situations (p. 510). A
problematic aspect of the existing research on the privacy paradox is that most of
it is conducted from an aggregate perspective. Studies have primarily investigated
general attitudes and general behaviors. Results from such studies are different
from those that investigate situational processes. Acquisti and colleagues hence
implicitly argued for a more specific context-dependent or situational approach
to studying the privacy paradox. Even today, the notion of the privacy paradox
sparks a fruitful stream of research, which, by attempting to explain the attitude-
behavior gap, investigates a variety of covariates that were expected to mitigate the
paradoxical behavior. In the following, I will highlight some of the most promising
studies on this topic.
6.1.2.2 Trust, Perceived Control, and Other Factors
Many studies have investigated the relationship of trust with privacy concerns and
self-disclosure. Metzger (2004, 2006), for example, studied the role of trust in
websites during e-commerce transactions using a fake commercial website. In the
first study, based on a sample of 189 university students, trust was negatively related
to privacy concerns, but positively related to self-disclosure. Metzger further found
that trust in the website provider correlated with the perceived privacy protection
offered by the website. An experimental study with 180 participants by Joinson,
Reips, Buchanan, Schofield, and Paine (2010) similarly revealed that privacy and
trust at a situational level interact such that high trust compensates for low privacy,
and vice versa. This is an important finding as it indicates that trust may be a pivotal
factor in determining people’s subjective privacy perception in a situation. I will
return to this notion in the next section and also in Sect. 7.4.2.
Theoretically, Trepte and Reinecke (2011b) also argued that “people create
online spaces of social and psychological privacy [emphasis in the original] that
may be an illusion; however, these spaces seem to be experienced as private” (p.
62). SNS users thus often perceive high levels of privacy because they have the
illusion of controlling with whom they interact or share information, but fail to
recognize that they abandon privacy on a vertical dimension. Particularly on social
media platforms, people may perceive high levels of privacy because numerous of
fine-grained privacy settings are provided. In three innovative experiments, Brandi-
marte, Acquisti, and Loewenstein (2013) also found that manipulating participants’
perceived control over information influenced their willingness to self-disclose.
Participants who were “given explicit control over the release and accessibility
of their personal information revealed more, even exposing themselves to higher
risks of identifiability” (p. 345), thus supporting the assumptions by Trepte and
colleagues. Brandimarte and colleagues termed this effect the control paradox—
the tendency of people to respond to safety measures intended to protect them in
ways that counteract the protection (p. 340).
The underestimation of personal risks is also evident in the literature on
optimistic biases. Survey studies by Baek (2014) (conducted in South Korea with
2028 participants) and Metzger and Suh (2017) (conducted with in the United States
with 1156 Facebook users) showed that people are generally quite optimistic that
other people are more likely to experience privacy violations. Interestingly, the
results of both studies suggested that comparative optimism decreases if individuals
experience privacy violations. These empirical results hence also support the
assumption expressed in the PPM (Dienlin, 2015) that an objective privacy context
and a subjective privacy perception should be differentiated.
With the exception of research in the e-commerce context, communication
scholars have increasingly focused on horizontal privacy perceptions and practices
of individuals. This is most likely due to the simultaneously emerging scholarship on

general social network site use, its antecedents and psychological effects (e.g., Boyd,
2008a; Ellison, Lampe, Steinfield, & Vitak, 2011; Ellison, Steinfield, & Lampe,
2007; Reinecke and Trepte, 2014). As researchers began to theorize new forms
of sociality that developed within networked publics, communication scholars in
particular focused on interactional privacy processes in contrast to privacy intrusions
on a vertical level. Corresponding studies hence primarily investigated how users
safeguard their privacy against unwanted access or unwanted dissemination by other
users (e.g., Brandtzæg, 2010; Masur & Scharkow, 2016; Millham & Atkin, 2016;
Vitak, 2012). Vitak (2012), for example, analyzed how people deal with the context
collapse on SNSs. Based on the responses of 392 US American Facebook users, she
found that higher audience diversity and size led to higher engagement with privacy
settings such as friend lists. Masur and Scharkow (2016) found that SNS users
engage in higher disclosure management in public channels such as status updates
and comments. Based on 316 German SNS users, the authors found that people
disclosed less information they deemed as private in one-to-many communications.
This form of disclosure management was significantly more pronounced in public
communications than in private communications.
The growing research on benefits of Facebook use has led to a more compre-
hensive investigation of the antecedents of self-disclosure. In particular, scholars
have theorized that people disclose themselves on SNSs due to their social capital
needs (e.g., Ellison et al., 2011) or to obtain other gratifications (e.g., Krämer &
Haferkamp, 2011; Taddicken & Jers, 2011; Trepte et al., 2015). The engagement
with the positive effects of SNS use eventually made scholars aware of the cost-
benefit weighing process that likely guides people’s decisions to self-disclose.
6.1.3 A Cost-Benefit Perspective: The Privacy Calculus
In 1977, Laufer and Wolfe proposed the “calculus of behavior,” which posits that
individuals rationally evaluate potentially negative outcomes of their behavior while
simultaneously identifying positive outcomes (pp. 35–36). Accordingly, people
will self-disclose when the perceived benefits outweigh the negative consequences.
This mental calculus is a central tenet of many psychological theories. Protection
motivation theory, for example, suggests that individuals engage in protection
behavior after evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of a reaction to a
perceived threat (Rogers, 1975). The general idea—which is also advanced in other
theories such as the theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1985) or the subjective
expected utility theory (for an comprehensive analysis of theories used in the privacy
literature, see again Li, 2012)—is that “motivation toward protection results from a
perceived threat and the desire to avoid the potential negative outcome” (Floyd,
Prentice-Dunn, & Rogers, 2000, p. 408).
Interestingly, this notion has been adopted in several privacy theories already
presented in the previous chapter. The balancing of desired and achieved privacy
levels as suggested by Altman (1975) might implicitly allude to the notion that
a mental calculus drives people’s privacy behaviors. Likewise, Petronio (2002)
argued that risk-benefit analyses are important in establishing the rules for particular
privacy boundaries. The second perspective on the link between privacy and self-
disclosure, described in Sect. 5.3.2, similarly alludes to the idea that people evaluate
the circumstances of a situation with regard to potential risks before they deem it
appropriate to engage in self-disclosure.
In the context of e-commerce, a fruitful line of privacy research adapted this
theoretical rationale quite early on and investigated the so-called “privacy calculus”
(Culnan & Armstrong, 1999; Dinev & Hart, 2006). Later, scholars also investigated
the privacy calculus in the context of SNS use (Dienlin & Metzger, 2016; Krasnova
et al., 2010, 2012). In general, the findings of these studies lend credence to
the assumption that oftentimes perceived benefits outweigh the perceived threats.
Culnan and Armstrong (1999), for example, conducted a secondary analysis of 1000
US American survey participants. The findings suggest that for people who were
told that their data would be handled with care, privacy concerns did not influence
their willingness to disclose the data. Likewise, Dinev and Hart (2006) conducted
a survey with 369 participants and found that personal interest in the transaction
and perceived trust towards the e-commerce provider could outweigh privacy risk
perceptions in the decision to disclose necessary data for the transaction.
With regard to communication on SNSs and based on a sample of 259 partici-
pants, Krasnova et al. (2010) found that the perceived benefits of disclosing on SNSs
(convenience, relationship building functions, and general enjoyment) positively
predicted the actual amount of self-disclosure, while perceived risks were negatively
related to the same behaviors. The cumulative effect size of the benefits was higher
than the effect of the perceived risks. Dienlin and Metzger (2016) conducted a
representative survey of the US population (N = 1156 participants) and again found
that the privacy calculus helps to predict self-disclosure behavior. Again, benefits
had more predictive power than the privacy concerns. Additionally, they found that
privacy concerns predicted the level of self-withdrawal (i.e., the implementation of
privacy settings), thus exemplifying that people try to manage their contrary needs—
revealing and concealing—in different ways. Recently, Trepte, Reinecke, et al.
(2017) investigated to what extent cultural differences affect the privacy calculus
that determines whether one is willing to have an SNS profile that is visible to
anybody (even non-SNS users) and whether one is willing to upload pictures on SNS
profile. The results showed that individualism (which is, for example, high in the
USA, rather high in European countries, but low in China) was negatively correlated
to the subjective importance participants ascribed to privacy risks, but positively
to the subjective importance of social gratification that could be obtained through
having an open profile or uploading pictures. In contrast, uncertainty avoidance
(which is rather high in Germany, moderate in the USA and other European
countries, and rather low in China) was positively related to avoiding privacy risks
and negatively related to ascribing importance to social gratifications. The calculus
itself confirmed prior findings that costs and benefits exerted contrary effects on the
willingness to have an open SNS profile and to upload pictures.
Again, a major limitation of these studies is that they did not analyze the privacy
calculus from a situational perspective. In its original sense, the privacy calculus
is meant to represent a decision-making process (similar to the weighing process
described in the disclosure decision process model by Omarzu, 2000). People
assess the risks and benefits of a particular behavior in a specific situation. The
calculus of behavior may thus be different for each disclosure act. It seems likely
that in some cases, the benefits may indeed outweigh the risks, but in others, the
opposite is equally likely. By using cross-sectional and aggregative data, most prior
studies often asked participants about their general risk evaluations and their general
expectations of benefits. Consequently, these findings can only be regarded as an
aggregated representation of several situationally varying decision processes that
involved a privacy calculus. Although the overall theory is quite intuitive, further
research is needed that experimentally prompts participants to reflect on the risks
and benefits of information disclosure. The theory of situational privacy and self-
disclosure acknowledges the variability in these decision processes by including
both self-disclosure enforcing and inhibiting factors on the situational level. The
findings of the aggregative studies, however, will nonetheless be considered by
incorporating attitudinal and trait-like factors on a personal level.
6.1.4 The Role of Online Privacy Literacy
After the Snowden revelations in 2013, scholars slowly returned to studying

people’s privacy concerns and behaviors on a vertical level, with regard to data
collection practices by companies and institutions. Particularly, users’ awareness
and knowledge was measured and investigated as an important requirement for
privacy regulation (e.g., Masur, Teutsch, & Trepte, 2017; Trepte et al., 2015). The
theories on which the privacy calculus theory builds implicitly assume that the indi-
vidual has the ability to estimate the probability of certain events or consequences
to occur. However, this might not always be the case. As Acquisti and Grossklags
(2004) noted, individuals’ privacy-related decisions might be impaired by bounded
rationality, the non-availability of necessary information, general psychological
distortions, specific ideologies or personal attitudes, and the market behavior.
Recently, the “knowledge gap hypothesis” has been investigated. It states that
people are generally concerned about their online privacy, yet a lack of online
privacy literacy prevents them from engaging in sophisticated privacy regulations
behaviors (Trepte et al., 2015, p. 339). The problem is the incomplete and oftentimes
hidden information about how data is being used and how informational privacy
might be diminished by using certain online services. Providers generally develop
interfaces with high usability and a strong focus on direct gratifications. They
make the benefits of participating salient and thereby disguise their own data-
gathering practices. Individuals rarely have comprehensive knowledge about how
online companies make profits, what information they collect about users, and how
this information is further used (Masur, Teutsch, & Trepte, 2017; Park, 2013).
In consequence, individuals might be uncertain whether to use such services

and whether to share personal information. More specific, they might lack the
knowledge and skills to protect their data efficiently.
Online privacy literacy may be defined as the combination of factual and
procedural knowledge about online privacy. In terms of declarative knowledge,
online privacy literacy refers to the users’ knowledge about technical aspects of
online data protection and about laws and directives as well as institutional practices.
In terms of procedural knowledge, online privacy literacy refers to the users’ ability
to apply strategies for individual privacy regulation and data protection (Trepte
et al., 2015, p. 339). In current debates about self-data-protection, online privacy
literacy is thus regarded as an important requirement for individual informational
self-determination (e.g., Hoofnagle, King, Li, & Turow, 2010; Masur, Teutsch, &
Trepte, 2017; Park, 2013; Trepte et al., 2015).
Several studies consequently have investigated whether knowledge about differ-
ent aspects of online privacy functions as an enabler of effective information control
and thus allows individuals to behave in accordance with their attitudes and needs
(e.g., Masur, Teutsch, & Trepte, 2017; Milne & Rohm, 2000; Park, 2013; Turow,
2003; Turow, Feldman, & Meltzer, 2005). Based on n sample of 419 US American
participants, Park (2013) found that knowledge about surveillance practices, policy
understanding, and technical aspects of data protection did predict how often people
used certain privacy regulation strategies such as pseudonymization, withdrawal
from certain services, and use of privacy-enhancing technologies. Likewise, Masur,
Teutsch, and Trepte (2017) investigated the relationship between online privacy
literacy and self-data protection behavior in a representative sample of German
Internet users (1945 participants). Using a multidimensional and objective scale
to measure online privacy literacy in four areas of knowledge (knowledge about
institutional practices, technical aspects of data protection, data protection law,
and data protection strategies), they found that higher knowledge correlated with
active data protection strategies such as using pseudonymization, privacy enhancing
technologies, or encryption. However, higher literacy was not related to passive
strategies such as avoiding certain services. Findings by Tsai, Egelman, Cranor,
and Acquisti (2011) further lend credence to ideas about the role of individuals’
knowledge about data collection practices, as making those salient in an experiment
indeed caused participants to choose products from merchants with higher privacy
protection.
Again, we have to keep in mind that these studies are conducted from an
aggregate perspective: we now know that general online privacy literacy relates
to general privacy regulation behavior. We do not know whether higher literacy
actually makes people engage in privacy regulation in every situations, or whether
a specific type of knowledge or skill set is needed for each application that people
might use in order for them to engage in privacy regulation. Thus, a situational
perspective would extend this initial work on online privacy literacy and its effect
on privacy regulation behavior tremendously.
6.1.5 Conceptualizing Privacy Regulation Behavior
Another important contribution of the recent literature refers to the ongoing

conceptualization of privacy regulation behavior. Based on the original work of
Altman (1975) and Burgoon et al. (1989), scholars have further identified strategies
people use to safeguard their privacy in online environments. Whereas the early
analyses focused on differentiating verbal and non-verbal behaviors, as well as the
use of the environment for regulating privacy needs (e.g., Altman, 1975; Burgoon,
1982; Burgoon et al., 1989), more recent studies in the context of social media
use have assigned typical online privacy behaviors to Burgoon’s multidimensional
privacy concept (e.g., Dienlin & Trepte, 2015; Trepte et al., 2014), and have further
distinguished between more specific preventive and corrective behaviors as well as
individual and collaborative strategies (e.g., Lampinen, Lehtinen, Lehmuskallio, &
Tamminen, 2011; Masur & Scharkow, 2016).
6.1.5.1 New Preventive and Corrective Strategies
Recent qualitative research on privacy strategies on SNSs have identified new

preventive and corrective privacy strategies (Lampinen et al., 2011; Vitak, Blasiola,
Patil, & Litt, 2015). Such strategies have been studied in several empirical studies
and include people using different profiles for different purposes (e.g., Kramer-
Duffield, 2010), using pseudonyms (Debatin et al., 2009; Dienlin & Trepte, 2015;
Tufekci, 2008; Vitak & Kim, 2014), creating friend lists (Lampinen et al., 2011;
Litt, 2013; Trepte, Dienlin, & Reinecke, 2013; Trepte & Masur, 2016; Vitak, 2012;
Vitak & Kim, 2014), allowing only trusted persons to be friends (Christofides,
Muise, & Desmarais, 2009; Vitak & Kim, 2014), generally restricting the visibility
of profile information (Debatin et al., 2009; Dienlin & Trepte, 2015; Litt, 2013;
Trepte & Masur, 2016), limiting the opportunity of other users to share information
or tag photos including them (Trepte & Masur, 2016; Trepte et al., 2013) and
using advanced privacy settings to ensure that their profiles cannot be found via
search engines (Trepte & Masur, 2016). In the context of general Internet use
and to safeguard against vertical privacy intrusions, strategies such as opting out
from certain online activities, and using anti-tracking-software, pseudonyms, or
anonymization tools have been investigated (Masur, Teutsch, & Trepte, 2017;
Matzner, Masur, Ochs, & von Pape, 2016; Park, 2013).
With regard to corrective strategies (again in the context of SNS use), scholars
found similar behaviors such as users deleting content they deemed inappropriate
(Lampinen et al., 2011; Litt, 2013), removing tags from photos uploaded by others
(Litt, 2013), and deleting certain people from their contact lists (Litt, 2013). Boyd
(2010b) found that people sometimes also used a strategy called “whitewalling” or
“whitewashing,” which means that users delete all wall messages and status updates
shortly after they have been read. Lampinen et al. (2011) found another interesting
corrective strategy. In a qualitative study, two interviewees reported that they would
react to an inappropriate comment (e.g., by an ex-partner) by diminishing the

seriousness of that comment. This is often done collaboratively as other friends
might add another ironic comment or smiley. The next paragraph will hence
introduce another possible differentiation between individual and collaborative
strategies.
6.1.5.2 Individual and Collaborative Strategies
Most of the strategies presented above can be regarded as individually implied

strategies. However, dyadic or small-group privacy (c.f. Westin, 1967) is often
associated with intimate relationships, and privacy management becomes a co-
coordinated endeavor. Particularly in networked publics (see again Sect. 2.3),
collaborative strategies become necessary (Marwick & Boyd, 2014). Based on
their qualitative data, Lampinen et al. (2011) thus proposed further differentiating
between individual and collaborative strategies.
Typical collaborative privacy regulation behaviors include the negotiation of
certain rules and norms (Nissenbaum, 2010; Petronio, 2002), as well as the creation
of more inclusive in-group identities or an emphasis on the importance of being
responsible (Lampinen et al., 2011). Qualitative researchers also found that people
use a kind of social steganography (Boyd, 2010a), which means that users limit
access to the meaning of a publicly posted message as the interpretation of the
message requires the recognition of specific references and cues (Boyd, 2011;
Burgoon et al., 1989; Oolo & Siibak, 2013; Vitak & Kim, 2014).
6.1.5.3 Synthesis of Prior Classifications
From the traditional approaches, we have learned that a differentiation between

preventive and corrective strategies is useful as it separates privacy regulations
behaviors according to different purposes. However, distinguishing only two pur-
poses seems too narrow. People further employ strategies that aim at maintaining
a certain level of privacy. If we go back to Johnson’s or Altman’s theory, we can
argue that once a desired level of privacy is achieved, individuals seek to maintain
this level for as long as they need (e.g., to satisfy a specific need). A comprehensive
categorization should hence also include preservative strategies. These privacy
regulation behaviors are less active and encompass a form of monitoring and
controlling previously established privacy conditions.
Furthermore, it seems useful to differentiate between short- and long-term
strategies. As needs for privacy change from situation to situation, people employ
different preventive strategies depending on the situational needs. Whereas some
strategies are employed to secure a general level of privacy for similar situations
in the future (long-term privacy management), individuals sometimes engage in
concrete preventive actions to temporarily achieved a certain level of privacy
for temporary need satisfaction (short-term privacy management). For example,
6.2 Potential Extensions for Theories of Privacy and Self-Disclosure 119
someone might use encryption for all of his or her email communications in order
to achieve a certain privacy level every time he or she was to write an email (long-
term preventive privacy strategy), but he or she could also decide to use a totally
different communication channel (e.g., intimate face-to-face communication) for an
especially sensitive conversation (short-term preventive privacy strategy).
Corrective strategies can also be further differentiated as they encompass both
actions after concrete privacy violations as well as subtle corrective measures. As
the theoretical concepts presented earlier suggest, people often engage in privacy
regulation behaviors when a current situation or state becomes unbearable or
does not fit a desired level of privacy. This does not necessarily mean that a
privacy violation has occurred; according to Johnson’s (1974), people can only
evaluate whether the achieved privacy actually serves to generate the intended need-
satisfying outcomes after they have engaged in previously decided behaviors. If the
desired needs are not satisfied, people should employ (sometimes subtle) corrective
measures that have an optimizing nature. Obviously, actual privacy violations also
trigger privacy regulation behaviors as people seek to restore the desired level of
privacy.
In line with Lampinen et al. (2011), we should finally differentiate individual
and collaborative strategies. Table 6.1 presents a systematic overview of privacy
regulation behaviors that synthesize both traditional classifications of privacy
regulation behaviors and the extensions proposed by recent research on online
privacy. It assigns both individual and collaborative strategies to long- and short-
term preventive strategies, preservative strategies, and corrective strategies of an
optimizing or restorative nature. Apart from explaining the general purpose of
these strategies, the table provides typical examples of such privacy regulation
behaviors. The collection of examples is not meant to be comprehensive. Rather,
the present matrix provides a framework for organizing all forms of privacy
regulations behaviors. As we will see later, this organizational framework is useful
for determining situational environmental factors influencing the willingness to self-
disclose (see Chap. 7).
6.2 Potential Extensions for Theories of Privacy

and Self-Disclosure
Based on this literature review, we can state that much progress has been made
to understand and explain people’s privacy-related behaviors in the contexts of
e-commerce and social media. However, some important novelties seem underrepre-
sented. I am thus going to discuss three (new) aspects of privacy and self-disclosure
in networked environments that I believe can be regarded as major challenges to
traditional concepts of privacy and self-disclosure. Although initial work on these
aspects has already been conducted (as shown by the literature review above), we
Table 6.1 Classification of privacy regulation behaviors
120
Preventive strategies Corrective strategies

Long-term Short-term Preservative strategies Optimizing Restorating
Purpose To avoid unwanted future To temporarily achieve a To maintain a previously To (further) optimize the To regain a optimal level
outcomes (e.g., undesirable certain level of privacy (to achieved level of privacy
perceived level of privacy if of privacy after a privacy
environmental satisfy salient needs) the preventively achieved violation or an unexpected
circumstances or privacy level of privacy is not privacy loss
violations) sufficient
Individual In general, creating physical In general, temporary In general, examining In general, taking further In general, taking reactive
strategies or psychological barriers by withdrawal into states of previously established steps on top of the steps such as sending an
opting-out (e.g., not using a solitude or reserve by physical barriers for preventive measures such as unwanted intruder away;
SNS or IM); deciding to use walking away; closing a potential weaknesses by e.g., additionally closing confronting the violator;
certain services (e.g., door; asking other persons monitoring actual inputs windows after walking into avoiding eye contact;
Threema); using to go away; postponing and outputs; continuously a closed room; lowering the erasing cookies or browser
pseudonyms; using available conversation; changing the assessing environmental voice; changing the history after using the
tools and settings (e.g., communication channel; changes; being alert; etc. communication channel; Internet; deleting
separating audiences with not disclosing sensitive changing topic of a inappropriate content
friend lists on Facebook); information; temporary conversation; stopping to (e.g., whitewalling);
using encryption; using use of pseudonyms or disclose sensitive taking legal data
anonymization tools (e.g., anonymization tools; etc. information; etc. protection strategies (e.g.,
TOR); etc. asking company to delete
data); etc.
Collaborative Negotiating general rules for Using social Supervising each other Implying stricter rules of Sanctioning inappropriate
strategies information sharing; steganography; with regard to the information flow; behavior; asking someone
strengthening in-group collectively deciding on established rules; etc. emphasizing existing rules; to delete inappropriate
identity; stressing certain communication changing the content; reporting
importance of responsibility channels for information communication channel; inappropriate behavior to
over information; creating exchange; etc. etc. an administrator; etc.
habits; inventing secret
language (social
steganography); etc.
6 Privacy and Self-Disclosure in the Age of Information
are still at the beginning of investigating these phenomena both theoretically and
empirically.
The first aspect refers to the differentiation between the horizontal and vertical
levels of privacy. To understand users’ perceptions and behaviors related to privacy,
it is indispensable to distinguish between threats arising from other people and
threats arising from institutions, companies, and governments. Although empirical
research has investigated people perceptions, concerns, and behaviors on both
levels, the previous theories have not explicitly differentiated between the two per-
spectives. The second aspect refers to the impossibility of controlling information
on the Internet. As many scholars noted, absolute control over personal information
may no longer be feasible. As a consequence, we have to ask whether traditional
concepts of privacy and self-disclosure, which are often based on control over
personal information (e.g., Altman, 1974), suffice to explain the new dynamics of
online communication. In particular, people seem to circumvent the impossibility
of information control by engaging in collective privacy management processes and
thus create a sort of “networked privacy.” It is hence necessary to revisit traditional
approaches to privacy and ask whether they account or allow for incorporating
such collaborative processes. Finally, and as noted in Chap. 2, the multimodality
of online communication itself poses new risks to the privacy regulation and self-
disclosure processes of individuals. As the literature review has shown, many
empirical studies focus only on one platform and oftentimes on the broad context
of SNSs or e-commerce. However, the increasing differentiation of application and
media platforms requires multimodal privacy regulation behaviors.
6.2.1 Horizontal and Vertical Privacy
As described already earlier, the increasing digital way of life presents challenges
to individuals’ privacy from two perspectives. On the one hand, privacy may be
endangered on a horizontal level (i.e., by other users). On the other hand, it may be
threatened on a vertical level (i.e., by providers and institutions). It is important
to note that such a differentiation of two levels of privacy was first mentioned
by Schwartz (1968, p. 744) who argued that privacy serves to stabilize both the
horizontal and vertical societal order. However, the use of the terminology by Masur,
Teutsch, and Dienlin (2018)—which I have adopted here—instead refers to the
entities against which individual’s seek to protect there privacy. This differentiation
is similar to the one proposed by Raynes-Goldie (2010), who distinguished between
social (referring to other users) and institutional privacy (referring to providers
such as Facebook). With regard to horizontal privacy, Internet users thus need to
prevent their personal information from misuse by other users, from spreading to
unwanted audiences, and generally from flowing uncontrollably through networked
environments in which it may be replicated, altered, and redefined. With regard
to vertical privacy, users are confronted with a new economy that centers on their
personal information as a commodity, gathers as much information about them
as possible, and aggregates and analyzes it to infer personal tastes, beliefs, and
willingness to buy products or engage in certain activities. Violations thus occur
primarily through unwanted access to personal information.
The current research implies that people engage in several measures to safeguard
their horizontal privacy, but are largely uncertain about whether and how to protect
their vertical privacy. In a 2.5-year ethnographic study, Boyd (2008a) found that
teens mostly care about horizontal privacy and use various privacy settings to
mitigate threats arising from other users. The studied users were well aware of the
privacy challenges arising from other users they encountered while using Myspace
or Facebook. However, Boyd also found that her participants oftentimes did not
know how to use privacy settings that would help to mitigate those threats. Raynes-
Goldie (2010) conducted a similar year-long ethnographic study of young Facebook
users. She found that the participants generally cared a lot about their privacy
while using Facebook. However, they were primarily concerned about how to
manage inappropriate friend requests and about information being shared with their
bosses, or students they were teaching. In many in-depth interviews and through
observation, Raynes-Goldie found that these young adolescents were often quite
concerned about their “social privacy,” but considerably less concerned about how
Facebook and its partners might use their personal information.
Recently, Padyab, Päivärinta, Ståhlbröst, and Bergvall-Kåreborn (2016) con-
ducted an innovative study in which they confronted participants with inferences
based on their own Facebook data. In two consecutive studies, they presented
participants with a tool that allowed them to draw specific inferences from disclo-
sures. In focus-group interviews with 12 participants in total, the authors found that
participants were generally aware of what they disclosed on Facebook. However,
they became more aware and concerned about their privacy when they were
confronted with the tool. Some even expressed feelings of being shocked and
frightened because what the tool could do was completely new to them (p. 10).
In sum, being confronted with the possibilities of secondary data analysis made
participants more concerned and even scared. Many participants consequently stated
that they will be more cautious when disclosing personal information in the future.
From these findings, we can conclude that vertical privacy (or institutional
privacy) is something new for most people. It seems that awareness and knowledge
are often not yet developed and that individual privacy needs are not reflected with
regard to vertical privacy violations. Threats are most likely not even identified.
Accordingly, many questions remain to be answered. Do people actually perceive
privacy intrusions by website providers, institutions or governments as threats? How
do they perceive the new type of information flow? Furthermore, how do people
manage their vertical privacy? Are there new needs associated with vertical privacy?
I will consider some of these questions in more detail in Sect. 6.3.
Distinguishing between horizontal and vertical privacy in the context of media
use represents a major task for future research. With regard to the psychological
experience of privacy, we have to bear in mind that mediated communication takes
place in environments that are provided by large companies. Previous research has
often either investigated people’s perceptions and concerns about data collection
processes on their behavior (e.g., mostly in the context of e-commerce) or the

influence of horizontal concerns on corresponding behavior. In some cases, it simply
neglected to distinguish between the two.
6.2.2 The Networked Nature of Online Privacy
The second aspect refers to the increasing uncontrollability of information flow.

Many scholars have argued that complete control over personal information and
the ways in which it is shared or disseminated is simply no longer feasible, and
it is thus questionable whether control is a useful paradigm for privacy theories
(e.g., Marwick & Boyd, 2014; Matzner et al., 2016; Trepte, 2016b). In particular,
the privacy maintained and managed in networked environments is no longer
solely dependent on individual decisions. Establishing a certain level of privacy
rather depends on collective measures, technical mechanisms, and established social
norms. Due to the properties and dynamics of networked environments, some
scholars have thus argued that we need a model of privacy that is networked (e.g.,
Marwick & Boyd, 2014, p. 12). The general idea is that people do need to be
able to “fully understand the context in which they are operating, influence others’
behaviors, shape who can interpret what information, and possess the knowledge
and skills necessary to directly affect how information flows and is interpreted
within that context. In other words, they must have agency” (e.g., Marwick & Boyd,
2014, p. 13). Privacy strategies, particularly among adolescents, are hence more
collaborative than individual.
This view closely resembles Nissenbaum’s concept of contextual integrity. In
this framework, an optimal privacy level is attained if informational norms are not
violated (Nissenbaum, 2010, p. 140). Naturally, these norms need to be negotiated
and established. Petronio’s CPM theory likewise alludes to this idea: people
establish privacy boundaries in which certain rules determine the appropriate flow of
information. These rules, again, have to be negotiated and established collectively.
As Marwick & Boyd (2014) noted, “networked privacy is the ongoing negotiation
of contexts in a networked ecosystem in which the information flows” (p. 13).
Next to traditional privacy regulation mechanisms, people need to co-construct the
architecture of these systems and embed meaning and context in the content itself, in
order to successfully manage their privacy (Marwick & Boyd, 2014, p. 13). Trepte
(2016b) likewise stresses that communication about how information is allowed to
flow is important for individual self-determination (p. 163).
The general theoretical framework for conceptualizing the networked nature of
privacy in online environments is hence already provided. However, a consequence
of the increasingly collective negotiation of privacy is the emphasized role of trust.
Although the role of trust has been studied extensively in the context of e-commerce
and shown to be a pivotal requirement for self-disclosure (e.g., Joinson et al., 2010;
Metzger, 2004, 2006), the role of interpersonal trust as a natural requirement for
collaborative privacy management has almost never been investigated. Qualitative
findings by Marwick & Boyd (2014), for example, show that individuals indeed
try to achieve privacy through relationship management: when absolute control
is not possible, risks may be lowered by sharing only with trusted others. This
view also fits well with the literature on self-disclosure, which suggests that trust
is indeed an important antecedent of disclosing (see Sect. 7.4.2). Teutsch, Masur,
and Trepte (2018) conducted qualitative interviews and found that the perceived
level of privacy in a communication is mainly dependent on the people that are
present in that situation. A high level of privacy is therefore perceived when these
people can be trusted. Based on these findings, trust seems to be a central aspect of
people’s privacy perceptions and has a pivotal role for achieving an appropriate flow
of information in networked environments.
6.2.3 Multimodal Privacy Regulation
The third aspect refers to the multimodality of online communication. As outlined

in Chap. 2, people communicate online in various forms using different types of
applications. Particularly since the use of smartphones has become widespread,
people engage with different media applications on a daily basis. As the literature
review has shown, differences between privacy and self-disclosure processes across
environments are scarcely investigated. In contrast, most studies have focused on
studying privacy and self-disclosure on SNSs and particularly on Facebook.
Not surprisingly, scholars have recently argued for the need to investigate
multiple social network sites in order to understand the complexity of privacy
management strategies (Lampinen, 2016). I extend this claim and argue that it can be
hazardous to limit our research interest on a single application: people manage their
relationships through a form of “multimodal connectedness” (Schroeder, 2010). In
other words, they scale their sociality through the use of different communication
technologies. Hence, we must assume that different services provide structurally
diverging opportunities for social interaction, thus rendering certain applications
more useful for certain communicative exchanges than others. In order to gain a
broad picture of how people regulate their privacy and under what circumstances
they disclose themselves, we must investigate people’s multimodal communication
and, consequently, their multimodal privacy regulation practices.
Specifically choosing the right application is an important form of polymediated
user agency (Chambers, 2017, p. 32). The choices individuals make between
numerous forms of communication hence support a form of “scalable sociality”
(Miller et al., 2016, p. 3), a way of managing both the size and the degree of
privacy in social interactions. Focusing on one application at a time does not allow
us to fully understand these fundamental privacy regulation behaviors. Second,
each application has different environmental characteristics and thus confronts users
with specific privacy threats. Multimodal communication thus requires individuals
to engage with different, app-specific options for regulating their privacy and in
consequence also requires them to adapt their levels of self-disclosure to constantly
changing environments.
6.3 Further Considerations and Implications 125
6.3 Further Considerations and Implications
In the previous two sections, I presented a literature review on privacy and self-
disclosure in the age of information and discussed three aspects that I deem
particularly important to consider for further theoretical development. In this third
section, I want to offer some further considerations on why theorizing and analyzing
privacy in networked environments is particularly challenging. These considerations
concern one aspect that can be subsumed under the following thesis: the speed of
recent technological progress often exceeds the time individuals need to become
aware of new threats or risks and, furthermore, to become knowledgeable about the
dynamics that affect their communication. In some cases—when privacy violations
occur on a horizontal level and are thus tangible and may cause severe negative
consequences—privacy management or seeking privacy emerges naturally (Acquisti
et al., 2015, p. 509). For example, if a friend posts an undesired picture of me
on Instagram, I can quickly tell him to remove it. Or if I do not want all of my
Facebook contacts to see one of my posts, I might change its visibility and restrict
access to selected friends. Thus, depending on the situation, my engagement in both
preventive and corrective privacy regulation behavior emerges naturally.
However, today, many privacy breaches that stem from the discussed information
capitalism and the growing interest of governments in monitoring citizens (see
Sect. 2.3.2) requires individuals to be quite knowledgeable and skilled at evaluating
their own privacy needs and consciously deciding how to handle their data in
networked environments. From an objective point of view, it even seems that privacy
protection is not feasible anymore. To ensure limited access to personal information,
one has to engage in sophisticated and difficult privacy management strategies
(Masur, Teutsch, & Trepte, 2017; Matzner et al., 2016).
From the user’s point of view, however, it is more complicated: Because society
and research fails to clearly formulate the threats stemming from vertical privacy
intrusions, potentially negative consequences of self-disclosure are too vague and
consequently not taken seriously, pushed aside and downplayed because people are
not able to relate to them, or simply require too much knowledge about data handling
practices and the information society in order to be conceivable. For the average
user, there remains only an elusive feeling that he or she should be concerned
without visible impact on his or her everyday life (Acquisti et al., 2015, p. 509).
6.3.1 The Failing Privacy Calculus
As discussed above, many theories and empirical studies are based on the idea that
people weight the benefits and risks of disclosing information. But what if the risks
are simply to elusive and intangible? What if they are too abstract to be understood,
rendering a rationalized calculus improbable? In such a scenario, benefits of use
or disclosure may be the only antecedent factor guiding peoples’ behavior. The
problem is well documented in a study conducted by Tsai et al. (2011). In their

online experiment, the authors prompted participants to use a specifically designed
search engine to find online shopping sites and purchase goods from them. When the
search engine displayed only links to the respective sites, people mostly compared
prices and bought the cheapest goods. In the other experimental condition, the
search engine additionally showed concise privacy policy information. Participants
were willing to pay more for the same goods if the online merchant was more
privacy-protective. However, this was only the case when they knew about how
their information was used and the merchant provided more privacy protection.
These findings suggest that people are generally unaware of privacy risks or
violations and only act against them when they become aware of them. But once
those are made salient, participants indeed use a sort of calculus to determine their
subsequent behavior. In conclusion, as elaborate and rational decisions require a lot
of mental resources and knowledge about risks and potential dangers, it seems that
the privacy calculus—albeit being a meaningful approach to understanding people’s
decision with regard to privacy regulation and self-disclosure—might simply fail
in the contexts in which intangible privacy breaches (mostly on a vertical level)
occur. However, other factors might also explain why people do not always decide
rationally and thus unwittingly risk their privacy.2
6.3.1.1 The Lack of Online Privacy Literacy
The first considerations allude to the recent stream of research that began investi-
gating the role of online privacy literacy in predicting people’s privacy regulation
behaviors. The argument can be formulated as follows: people are not able to act
rationally in the context of networked environments because they lack awareness of
and knowledge about potential threats, as well as the ability to connect these privacy
breaches with their own behaviors.
Although scholars have made great efforts in improving the conceptualization of
online privacy literacies, it has been argued recently that online privacy literacy has
to be understood as a combination of knowledge, skills, and behaviors in order to
function as a true enabler of individual self-determination (Masur, Teutsch, Dienlin,
& Trepte, 2017; Masur, Trepte, & Wolfers, 2018, May). People not only need
to be knowledgeable about different aspects of online privacy (such as vertical
information flows and economic interests); they also need to be able to identify the
subsequent risks, relate them to their personal use of specific online-services, reflect
on their current behavior, and reevaluate their own needs and finally learn new skills
2 The present work nonetheless assumes that people mostly act rationally and thus employ such a
privacy calculus. As noted already in the previous chapter, this general paradigm can be criticized.
I discuss this notion in more detail in Sect. 12.2.
to be able to use the Internet and handle their data in accordance with their reflected
attitudes and needs (Masur, Teutsch, Dienlin, et al., 2017).3
In light of this, fostering privacy literacy becomes an important driver of users’
self-determination. Only by becoming more literate will users be able “to see
through the technological veil and make educated choices” (Debatin, 2011, p. 57).
However, an important requirement for increasing privacy literacy is making privacy
relevant for individual users. This is not as easy as it seems because people seem to
have few negative experiences when communicating in networked environments.
6.3.1.2 The Lack of Negative Experiences
People experience uncertainty with regard to their online privacy because they gen-
erally lack negative experiences. A representative survey of the German population
revealed that Internet users barely experience any privacy violations (Trepte &
Masur, 2017b, p. 42). Based on 3278 participants, the authors found that the large
majority of people never had negative experiences such as identify theft, unwanted
information dissemination, or someone unintentionally gaining information about
them. The only negative experience that at least 56% of the participant had was
that they felt website providers asked for too much personal information, a privacy
breach that most people seem to accept nonetheless.
In light of these findings, we could argue that the lack of negative experiences
leaves people uncertain about whether their current online behaviors are actually
privacy-endangering. Some smaller studies, however, found significant effects of
negative experiences with privacy invasions on subsequent use of privacy settings
on SNSs. Debatin et al. (2009), for example, conducted an online-survey with
119 university students and found that people who did experience unwanted
advances, stalking, or harassment, damaging gossip or rumors, or personal data
being stolen/abused by others were more likely to change their Facebook privacy
settings. Trepte et al. (2014) similarly conducted a longitudinal online survey with
327 participants. They found that participants who had negative experiences with
hostile or aggressive messages were also those who disclosed less personal infor-
mation on their Facebook profiles 6 months later. However, negative experiences
were not related to social (i.e., use of privacy settings that regulate the content or
profile visibility) or psychological privacy behaviors (i.e., the willingness to discuss
sensitive topics on the SNS).
Although more research needs to investigate whether negative experiences
actually increase the likelihood that people engage in privacy regulation behaviors, it
3 Although research on online privacy literacy is still nascent, I strongly believe that increasing
knowledge, skills, reflection abilities, and motivation are pivotal for individuals to live self-
determined lives in line with their needs and hopes as well as for society in order to prevent unequal
power distribution between individual users and large companies aimed at exploiting them. I will
come back to this discussion in Sect. 13.2 when considering the societal and practical implications
of this work.
seems nonetheless likely that many privacy invasions (and particularly those perpe-
trated by providers and institutions) do not lead to tangible negative consequences.
Users hence do not know whether they should be concerned or how to react. It
even seems that media coverage on the NSA scandal did not necessarily affect user
behavior. Preibusch (2015) found that users’ interest in privacy protection rose after
the Snowden revelations but returned to or even fell below original levels despite
continuing media coverage. He further found that there was no significant growth
in use of privacy-enhancing technologies. Yet, these findings contrast with results
from a study by Marthews and Tucker (2015) that suggests a different pattern. In
their paper, the authors used data from 12 countries on the search volume of select
keywords from before and after the Snowden revelations to analyze whether Google
users’ search behaviors changed as a result. They found that users generally used
less sensitive search terms, which the author saw as evidence for a chilling effect of
government surveillance. That said, it nonetheless seems that people do not want to
stop using privacy-invasive media and the lack of negative experiences might simply
make people accustomed to threats that are communicated by the media, but not felt
in their daily lives.
This chapter provided an overview of recent research on privacy and self-disclosure

in the information age. Based on the literature review, I offered potential extensions
of traditional theories of privacy and self-disclosure. I also considered potential
pitfalls of using privacy calculus theory in explaining people’s privacy and self-
disclosure decisions in online environments. The results from these analyses can be
summarized in the following statements.
1. Research on privacy in networked environments has put a strong emphasis on
information privacy concerns. Accordingly, scholars have analyzed antecedents
and effects of privacy concerns. Most prominently, research has focused on
studying the privacy paradox—the finding that high privacy concerns do not
necessarily lead to corresponding behavior such as low self-disclosure or high
engagement with privacy regulation. However, recent studies have shown that
concerns do relate to behavior when it is measured more specifically. The found
effects are nonetheless small. Further research has shown that other covariates
such as gratifications, perceived control, or privacy literacy may be able to
explain the low power of privacy concerns to affect privacy-related behavior. At
the same time, the growing literature on online privacy shows that people are not
oblivious to privacy threats. In contrast, they engage in various types of privacy
regulation (e.g., using platform-specific privacy settings). However, these privacy
strategies are mostly directed at horizontal privacy threats. Elaborated protections
strategies against vertical privacy intrusions are seldom implemented.
2. The predominant approach to studying privacy behavior is based on a cost-benefit

paradigm. The privacy calculus was consequently studied extensively both in
e-commerce and social media settings. The results suggest that benefits have
more power in influencing self-disclosure than do privacy concerns. From this
it follows that individuals seem to trade privacy against social or other types of
gratification.
3. Although privacy research on both horizontal and vertical privacy has been
conducted, it has seldom been acknowledged that both levels affect privacy
behavior in communication situations. Future research should thus consider
characteristics of both levels and investigate the interaction of both levels in
shaping people’s behavior.
4. Due to the impossibility of absolute control over personal data and information
on the Internet (even on a horizontal level), scholars have argued that traditional
concepts that rest on a control-based paradigm are no longer useful in explaining
contemporary privacy regulation processes. Instead, privacy concepts have to
become networked. Collective privacy management processes that rely on trust
and negotiated rules must be integrated into concepts of privacy and self-
disclosure.
5. The growing diversity of communication applications and platforms has led
to multimodal communication practices. Depending on the purposes and the
people involved, people choose different types of applications with different
functionalities, but also with different levels of privacy for communicating with
other people. In consequence, they also have to engage in multimodal privacy
regulation behaviors that can be understood as granular privacy regulation in
each application. They thereby have to adapt to the prevailing circumstances and
work out how the available privacy options can be tailored to their needs.
6. The intangible nature of vertical privacy intrusions leaves individuals uncertain
with regard to their online privacy and in particular about their vertical privacy.
It can be argued that cost-benefit assessments that generally guide people’s
behavior fail in such environments because people do not have the skills and
knowledge to reflect on the risks and privacy breaches stemming from providers
or institutions. At the same time, a lack of negative experiences after privacy
intrusions seems to make people rather ignorant about privacy risks on the
Internet.
Together with the theoretical reviews of the previous chapters, I have now
completed the discussion of previous work on privacy and self-disclosure both in
offline and in online environments. The next step will thus be the development of
the theory of situational privacy and self-disclosure. I will aim at synthesizing the
insights and findings from the literature while also addressing the issues discussed
in the previous chapters. Thereby, it becomes particularly important to develop
an approach that first allows to capture the multimodality of privacy regulation
and situationally varying circumstances in media environments and second to
conceptualize privacy perceptions both on horizontal and vertical levels.
Chapter 7
The Theory of Situational Privacy
and Self-Disclosure
The central thesis of this book is that privacy and self-disclosure should be
investigated from a situational perspective. I argue that the changing characteristics
and circumstances of situations allow for better predictions of when people perceive
high levels of privacy and, in turn, feel able to self-disclose. In simple terms, I
argue that an individual’s perceived level of privacy directly relates to the specific
circumstances of the situation he or she is experiencing. However, this central claim
has several important implications and connected assumptions. In what follows, I
will advance the theory of situational privacy and self-disclosure. It is meant to
provide a framework for understanding privacy regulation processes, identifying
relevant factors and variables of privacy experiences in a given situation, predicting
privacy related behavior such as self-disclosure, and ultimately guiding research
designs.
Before I begin to develop the theory, it is important to understand what I mean
when I talk about situations. Section 7.1 thus serves as a justification for why I
believe that a situational perspective is warranted when investigating and predicting
fluctuating mental perceptions and continuously shifting behavior. Starting with
the basic ideas of the field theory and moving on to contemporary concepts of
person and environment interactions, I will conclude by providing a comprehensive
definition of the situation. Section 7.2 describes five basic suppositions on which the
theory rests. Afterwards, I will explain the three central components of the theory.
Section 7.3 focuses on what I refer to as pre-situational privacy regulation processes
which explain how situations are initiated or manipulated in order to fulfill certain
needs. Next, I will elaborate on situational privacy perceptions and self-disclosure
in Sect. 7.4. The major assumptions and tenets of the theory are outlined in this sec-
tion. In Sect. 7.5, I will describe post-situational evaluations processes and thereby
discuss how individuals’ evaluations of their privacy regulation behavior and self-
disclosure may influence future behaviors. Finally, I will provide a summary of the
theory and a step-by-step guide on how to apply the theory in Sect. 7.6.

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-78884-5_7
132 7 The Theory of Situational Privacy and Self-Disclosure
7.1 Situations as Units of Analysis
We first need to find a usable definition of what constitutes a situation. Where

does it start? And where does it end? How can we define its exact boundaries?
We further need to ask how people generally perceive situations. Is there even
such a thing as an objective situation? Finally, we need to inquire about the exact
relationship between the person and the environment and how their entanglement
might influence behavior. In what follows, I will discuss these questions in more
detail. I will start by laying out the fundamentals of Kurt Lewin’s field theory, which
represents the earliest framework for predicting behavior based on the interaction
of the person and the environment. I will further summarize more contemporary
approaches that aim at explaining situational processes. I will thereby discuss
the subjectiveness of situations or what Ross and Nisbett (2011) have called the
“construal of the social world.” Finally, I will propose a usable working definition
of the situation with the aim of making the plurality of possible situations amenable
for theoretical and empirical analyses.
7.1.1 The Person and the Environment
The origins of a situational perspective on human behavior are inevitably connected

to the work of Kurt Lewin.1 His contributions to field theory have refined the field
of social psychology. It is important to note, however, that Lewin himself did not
regard the field theory as an actual theory. Instead, he viewed it as a method to
analyze causal relations and to synthesize several scientific concepts and ideas.
Lewin’s central assumption is that human behavior is dependent on the psycho-
logical field at a given time (Lewin, 2012, p. 88). A psychological field encompasses
the combination of all possible factors that (can) affect an individual’s behavior.
Human behavior can thus be perceived as a function of the prevailing forces within
the psychological field that an individual perceives at a given time. A psychological
field, however, includes more than just external factors of the environment. It rather
originates from the interaction of the individual and the individual’s psychological
representation of the environment (Ross & Nisbett, 2011, p. 9). In other words, the
person and the environment must be understood as a constellation of interdependent
factors. Lewin calls the entirety of these factors the “life space” (Lewin, 2012,
p. 272). It is this life space that an individual experiences at any given moment and
that determines the individual’s behavior in that moment. This famous theoretical
1 Please note that I am citing primarily from the book Field theory in social science (Lewin, 1951).
However, the page indications refer to a German translation of the book (Lewin, 2012) that was
published by Huber.
7.1 Situations as Units of Analysis 133
assumption is well represented in the following formula (Lewin, 2012, p. 271):
B = F (P , E) (7.1)
Accordingly, behavior (B) is a function (F ) of the person (P ) and the envi-

ronment (E). Lewin assumed that this formula is valid for affects, goal-directed
behavior, dreams, wishes, and also thinking. Both the person and the environment
have to be understood as intertwined factors. The potentially complex interaction
between the two—represented by the function (F ) in the formula—is what deter-
mines people’s behavior. Human behavior is thus even-handedly dependent on what
type of person an individual is, how his or her personality plays out in a given
situation, and on the subjectively perceived environment in a given situation. For
example, whether an individual discloses himself on a SNS depends both on his
or her individual characteristics (e.g., personality) and the characteristics of the
environment (both the physical and virtual environment) he or she is finds himself
or herself in.
This view is echoed in many theoretical works on the interaction of the person
and the environment. Saucier, Bel-Bahar, and Fernandez (2007), for example,
noted that “psychology has a longstanding custom of dividing the bases for
human behavior into two kinds. Dispositional factors (traits or other constitutional
tendencies including genetic ones) are commonly differentiated from environmental
factors (external and situational conditions)” (p. 479). Altogether, there seems to be
a certain agreement between scholars that both stable and situationally activated
personal factors2 and environmental cues (physical cues of the environment)
determine a person’s psychological representation of a situation (e.g., Forgas, 1976;
Lewin, 1951; Magnusson, 1981a; Rauthmann, Sherman, & Funder, 2015; Reis,
2008; Saucier et al., 2007; Walsh, Craig, & Price, 2000).
It is important to identify the relevant forces of a psychological field that affect
human behavior. From a general perspective, we can argue that there are positive,
or driving, forces and negative, or inhibiting, forces that coexist in a dynamic
field (Lewin, 2012, p. 292). Accordingly, Ross and Nisbett (2011) argued that
in investigating such a tension system, one needs to analyze restraining factors
as much as stimulating factors (p. 14). Potential conflicts between such factors
force individuals to decide for or against certain behaviors (Lewin, 2012, p. 293).
One might wrongly conclude that field theory somehow neglects that previous
experiences or events may also influence our behavior. However, as Lewin (2012)
argued, the psychological past and future are likewise factors that affect behavior at
a given time t (pp. 95–98). This means that a person’s ideas about his or her past
and future are just one of the forces that guide their behavior in a given situation
(pp. 116–117).
2 Quite inconsistently, scholars have used both the term person factor and personal factor to refer
to person-related characteristics. With regard to environment-related characteristics, however, they
mostly used the term environmental factors. For reasons of consistency, I will use the terms
personal and environmental factors in the course of this work.
Field theory provides a classificatory framework for the investigation of person–

environment interactions. However, it remains unclear how the situation itself fits
into this theoretical framework. Is the psychological field a synonym for the term
situation? Or is a situation something different? These questions are only implicitly
and often times ambiguously addressed in field theory. In the next section, I will
hence summarize different approaches that aimed at conceptualizing situations more
precisely.
7.1.2 Situational Concepts and Realities
Elaborating on the exact characteristics of a situation is quite challenging. On the

one hand, we want to find a definition that is parsimonious and tangible, but on the
other hand, it should be broad enough to include the manifold situations in which
people find themselves. It should allow us to characterize situations objectively,
yet also acknowledge that situations are bound to some degree by the barriers of
perception of individuals. In fact, there is a long scientific debate circling around the
question of whether situations should be conceptualized as objective or subjective
phenomena.
In short, the problem is how to conceptualize the environment. In the literature,
there is generally a “conceptual distinction between (1) the environment “as it is”
and (2) the environment “as it is perceived,” construed, and represented in the
mind of an individual who is appearing and acting in it on a certain occasion”
(Magnusson, 1981b, p. 3). But which of these conceptual perspectives is more useful
for analyzing people’s behavior? In practice, we often want both. On the one hand,
we want to understand to what extent the materiality of the environment affects
individuals’ behavior (e.g., whether a closed door makes people perceive higher
levels of privacy). On the other hand, we want to understand how people process
these physical cues and whether different individuals draw different conclusions
from the same physical cues (e.g., whether different environmental characteristics
lead to different behavioral outcomes in different individuals).
Depending on the conceptual perspective, definitions include various elements
such as physical stimuli (e.g., environmental artifacts), available behavioral options,
intrapersonal factors such perceived tasks or goals, cultural factors such as rules and
traditions, temporal factors such as month, time, and season, interpersonal factors
such as characteristics of the people present and so on. As a consequence, however,
the term situation has been used ambiguously and inconsistently throughout the
literature. In an attempt to classify different definitions of the situation and
simultaneously identify related conceptual problems, Rauthmann, Sherman, and
Funder (2015) proposed three core principles on which definitions are mostly based
(pp. 366–372).
First, and in line with the subjective notion in Lewin’s framework, they identified
the processing principle as a core characteristic of many situational concepts. It
refers to the idea that only the subjective representation of a situation has an
effect on human behavior. By taking a constructivist view, scholars argue that the
psychological experience of situations matters. An important premise is hence that
physical artifacts themselves have no agency in influencing the individual. Instead
physical cues are processed by the individual, rationally evaluated, and thereby
become driving or inhibiting factors of behavior. It is important to realize that our
own understanding of a situation (even as researchers) is the result of a constructive
and subjective process rather than an objective perception of some external reality.
Situations only affect thinking or behavior when they are perceived, processed, and
thus psychologically experienced by at least one individual (Rauthmann, Sherman,
& Funder, 2015, p. 367). This view was first expressed by Thomas and Thomas
(1928), who formulated famously:
If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences. The total situation
will always contain more and less subjective factors, and the behavior reaction can be
studied only in connection with the whole context, i.e., the situation as it exists in verifiable,
objective terms, and as it has seemed to exist in terms of the interested persons (p. 572).
Yet such a perspective does not necessarily dismiss the physical reality because
it still assumes that people’s psychological experience of a situation is based on
consistent and somehow tangible external cues from the environment. Accordingly,
the Rauthmann, Sherman, and Funder (2015) also noted that situational concepts
differ with regard to the reality to which they refer. Situational concepts generally
can be classified according to three different realities (see also Block & Block,
1981, pp. 86–87). For example, some scholars define situations in terms of their
measurable physical cues. Such a conceptualization acknowledges a physico-
biological reality that is objective and independent of any individual perceptions.
According to Block and Block (1981), it can be described as the “infinitely
detailable, perceptually unfiltered and uninterpreted, sensorily available intakes by
the individual” (p. 86). Other scholars define situations by referring to a kind
of consensual reality that is socially construed and consensually accepted. Using
such a perspective, a situation is what people agree upon. The shared experience
hence creates the situation. Third, many definitions of situations refer to a solely
idiosyncratic (Rauthmann, Sherman, & Funder, 2015, p. 367) or functional reality
(Block & Block, 1981, p. 87). Such a perspective argues that only an individual’s
unique perception defines a situation. It is thus the most strict adoption of the
processing principle.
Finally, Rauthmann, Sherman, and Funder (2015) point toward an inherent
problem of most definitions. The authors argued that many research designs
need to use participants’ situational perceptions in order to measure information
about the environment. Such a variable, however, is nothing but another person
variable leaving attempts to examine person–environment transactions circular. The
circularity principle thus refers to the idea that persons and environments are in
principle conceptually and methodologically conflated. A clean separation between
person and situation (in the sense of the external environment) is hence not possible.
The authors argued that people’s perceptions and environmental characteristics are
confounded “when situations are defined or measured in terms of (i) people’s mental
states or behaviour (State Corollary); (ii) observed or assumed consequences on

people’s mental states or behaviour (Consequences Corollary); and/or (iii) only one
person’s perception (Approximation Corollary)” (p. 372). In consequence, Rauth-
mann, Sherman, and Funder (2015) noted that “because preceding, concomitant
and outcome state variables (i.e., affect, cognition, motivation and behavior) reside
with(in) persons, they should not constitute situations but be used to describe
persons” (p. 376).
What does this mean for the present work? Rauthmann, Sherman, and Funder
(2015) emphasized that the three principles alert us that we should attend to
people’s experiences, impressions, or perceptions of situations particularly if we
are interested in behavioral outcomes in varying situations (p. 373), but also that
we need to take into account what type of reality we are referring to (p. 375).
With the theory of situational privacy and self-disclosure, I adopt the processing
principle and argue that the psychological perception of the environment guides
people’s behavior. I thereby acknowledge, however, that the subjective perception
(or experience) of a given situation is to some degree shared with others, but to
some degree also distinctive (Rauthmann, Sherman, Nave, & Funder, 2015, p. 105).
Furthermore, I acknowledge that due to this subjective perception, there may be
great variability in how individuals perceive a certain situation which, in turn, may
foster different behavior. For example, an individual might feel a certain pressure
to share personal information during a family dinner, whereas his or her sibling
feels more comfortable just listening to others’ talking. When modeling privacy
and self-disclosure from a situational perspective, I deem it important to account
for interindividual differences—not just with regard to individual differences in
behavior itself, but also with regard to the differences in effects of the environment
on behavior.
7.1.3 Defining the Situation
Based on this theoretical background, I define a situation as the entirety of

circumstances that affect the behavior of a person at a given time. The situation
itself is construed by the perception of the individual, yet dependent on physical
cues. The entirety of circumstances can be differentiated into personal factors and
environmental factors. Personal factors include, on the one hand, characteristics
of the person itself, such as personality traits (e.g., neuroticism, risk avoidance,
deliberation) and trait-like qualities (e.g., opinions, attitudes, skills, long-term goals,
etc.) that are generally stable (i.e., non-varying across situations). On the other
hand, personal factors also include internal factors such as perceived duties, norms,
motives, goals, or feelings that are subject to change (i.e., varying across situations).
Environmental factors, on the other hand, are non-stable constructs (i.e., varying
across situations) and can further be differentiated into interpersonal factors and
external factors. Interpersonal factors refer to the perceived characteristics of the
people present at a given time (e.g., number of people, interpersonal assessment of
Table 7.1 Systematic overview of factors of situational behavior

Situational Non-situational
Person Internal factors Traits and trait-like
characteristics
Environment Interpersonal factors
External factors
these people, etc.). External factors refer to what Rauthmann, Sherman, and Funder
(2015) described as perceptions of physical cues of the environment (e.g., objects,
barriers, artifacts, available behavioral options).
Table 7.1 presents a systematic overview of all factors and organizes them on the
two proposed levels. Based on this categorization, one might wonder if there are
any non-situational environmental factors. However, this is not the case based on
the implied differentiation. For example, my gender will influence my behavior in
every situation. It is hence truly a non-situational factor. The fact that I do not have a
surveillance camera at my home might be considered a stable environmental factor,
but because I can go somewhere else where surveillance cameras are installed (e.g.,
a public place), external factors (under which the presence of surveillance cameras
would fall) must be considered situational. Likewise, the audience size on Facebook
(determined by the number of contacts I have) might be fairly stable for all my
status updates, but I can have a totally different audience as soon as I use another
application or even when I choose to restrict the visibility of my status update.
In sum, non-situational factors refer to those that affect behavior in all situations.
Situational factors, however, are all others and even those that remain stable within
a certain context, but change once the individual changes the context.
Differentiating these broad clusters of situational circumstances allows us to
grasp the entire diversity of situations through a limited number of dimensions.
Although more specific subdimensions are possible, I believe the proposed factor
categories present a reasonable framework for characterizing situations with enough
specificity. Hence, predicting variation in a certain behavior (in this case self-
disclosure) across situations becomes possible by identifying the combinations
of enforcing and inhibiting factors that theoretically should affect the respective
behavior in a given situation. This resembles to the approach by Omarzu (2000),
who denoted that “attempting to explain variation in self-disclosure across social
situations requires identifying variables that are constantly present in those differing
situations. To facilitate research, these variables preferably should be amenable to
experimental manipulations” (p. 177).
For the proposed theory, it is further important to understand when a situation
begins and when it ends. From a phenomenological point of view, we can state
that people experience an endless sequence of consecutive situations. However, we
cannot say that one situation has a certain duration. Instead, the temporal stability of
a situation depends on the stability of the situational circumstances. Sometimes the
situational factors influencing an individual’s behavior stay the same for several
minutes or even hours. Other times, they change within seconds. From this it
follows that a person experiences a new situation as soon as any of the situational
factors changes. For example, when a third person enters a room in which two
persons are already communicating, the interpersonal factors have changed. The
two persons thus experience a new situation. Or, put differently, a new combination
of personal and environmental factors now influences their behavior. In sum, as soon
as any personal or environmental factor changes, new situational circumstances are
created, and thus a new situation evolves.
On a final note and to simplify usage, I hereafter use the predicate situational in
order to describe something as potentially varying across situations. This does not
mean that such factors have to change from one situation to the next. I rather want
to emphasize that these factors can be different. In contrast, non-situational is used
to describe something that is stable and independent of situations.
7.2 Overview of the Theory
Before I provide an in-depth description of the relevant components of the theory,

I will advance some basic suppositions that serve as the fundamental framework of
the theory. Furthermore, I will shortly describe the scope and applicability of the
theory. In doing so, I will particularly discuss the primary focus of the theory (i.e.,
predicting self-disclosure in a communication situations) and why other focuses are
in principle possible (e.g., predicting pre-situational privacy regulation behavior).
7.2.1 Basic Suppositions
The following five consecutive suppositions are derived from the literature presented
in the previous chapters and thus represent the core insights of the distinct attempts
to understand privacy and self-disclosure from a psychological perspective.
Supposition 1:
The level of privacy is determined by
the perception of the environment and is thus situational.
This is the central tenet of the proposed theory. It must therefore be regarded
as the fundamental basis for all following suppositions. As should be apparent
through the discussion of the theoretical work presented in Chaps. 3 and 5, the
assumption that the level of privacy is inherently situational is not new. Perhaps
most explicitly, Laufer and Wolfe (1977) argued that “concepts of privacy and
invasions of privacy are strongly tied to or defined by the experience of given
situations” (p. 25). According to them, any privacy experience must depend on
how individuals interact and comprehend the world in which they live. As these
experiences are inevitably bound to “the modes of consciousness available for
conceptualizing concrete situations” (p. 25), aspects of privacy must reflect the
7.2 Overview of the Theory 139
circumstances of given situations. Pedersen (1999) likewise argued that privacy as

a form of boundary control “is an optimization process directed toward achieving a
desired level of contact by one’s self or group with others at a particular time and
a given circumstance [Emphasis added]” (p. 397). Most prominently, Nissenbaum
(2010) proposed the framework of contextual integrity, which posits that there is
great variability in the privacy constraints individuals expect to hold over the flow
of information, which are systematically linked to characteristics of the background
social situation (p. 129). As summarized in Sect. 3.3.3, most scholars seem to agree
that privacy can be regarded as a form of limited access to the self—either physically
or psychologically (p. 67).
According to the proposed definition of the situation, we can now posit that
the perceived level of privacy is determined by those circumstances of a given
situation that constitute such a form of limited access. These can be differentiated
into external and interpersonal factors. External factors include all objects or
artifacts that either prevent identification (e.g., a mask in offline environments or a
pseudonym in online environments) or prevent access to the communication content
(e.g., closed doors/physical barriers in offline environments or encryption/limited
visibility in online environments). Interpersonal factors, on the other hand, include
assessments of the people that do have access to the self in that situation. Individuals
evaluate whether the presence of a given person and his or her access to the self
raise any privacy risks. It is hence mostly an evaluation of trustworthiness and
psychological closeness.
As I discussed in Chap. 6, people should in principle perceive privacy on a
horizontal and a vertical level. The levels of horizontal and vertical privacy are both
perceived based on the environmental factors of a situation. But whereas circum-
stances affecting the level of horizontal privacy are mostly tangible, circumstances
affecting the level of vertical privacy may remain hidden behind the overt interfaces
of the media in use. This difference makes accurate evaluations of a situation
difficult. Horizontal privacy is primarily determined by the people involved in the
communication process and the external factors that protect the messages exchanged
against accessibility by other people. Yet sometimes the audience is vast, diverse,
and hard to grasp. Particularly in one-to-many communication situations, people
may have difficulties estimating the entire audience of their disclosures. The level
of vertical privacy is even more elusive as being able to identify environmental
factors that protect the self against access from providers or institutions requires
awareness about data collection practices of communication technology providers,
knowledge about the vertical information flow in general and knowledge about the
technical infrastructure of communication environments. Literate users may know
that encryption protects against unwanted access of providers. Non-literate users,
on the other hand, may not be able to perceive these factors.
In sum, we can posit that the level of privacy depends on the perception of
the specific combination of environmental factors (interpersonal and external) of
a given situation. The theory thus regards privacy as a form of limited access,
yet acknowledges its gradual nature, and also the option of individuals to actively
withdraw into these gradual levels of privacy through privacy regulation behaviors
(see supposition 4). It is important to emphasize here, however, that the perception
of environmental factors may not necessarily be understood or seen as a certain
level of privacy by individuals. As suggested by qualitative research (e.g., Nippert-
Eng, 2010; Teutsch, Masur, & Trepte, 2018; Vasalou, Joinson, & Houghton, 2015),
people may associate various things with the term privacy and may not evaluate
a certain combination of environmental factors as a specific level of privacy.
Nippert-Eng (2010), for example, found three reoccurring themes in people’s
definitions of privacy: (1) the ability or power to control access to a thing, place,
or piece of information, (2) the condition of being alone, without others’ demands,
interruptions, intrusions, and (3) the freedom to do, live, or make decisions, without
regulation or restriction (p. 7). Teutsch et al. (2018) also found that people often
think of private things (e.g., feelings, family affairs, relationships, etc.) or territories
(e.g., the home, rooms, etc.). It seems that there exists great variability in how people
define privacy for themselves. Although some aspects can be linked to the proposed
concept of privacy, it is nonetheless important to take into account that different
people may not articulate the combination of external factors as the same level of
privacy. However, from a scientific point of view, I believe it to be fruitful to look
at it in this way: certain combinations of environmental factors imply a certain level
of privacy.
Supposition 2:
A certain level of privacy is needed to satisfy more fundamental
needs or to perform behaviors (e.g., self-disclosure) necessary
to satisfy fundamental needs.
This assumption has been thoroughly discussed in Chaps. 3 and 5. However, I
would like to highlight some specific implications that are important for the present
theory. First of all, it is important to acknowledge that people have fundamental
needs (e.g., the need for autonomy, competence, relatedness, or social interaction).
Some of these needs require a certain level of privacy to be satisfied. In some cases,
these needs even require individuals to perform a certain behavior, which, in turn,
requires a certain level of privacy. The latter is particularly the case when people
want to disclose themselves (see Sect. 5.3.2).
As assumed by many theories of self-disclosure and supported by empirical
research, people disclose themselves in order to initiate or maintain relationships,
to cope with certain events or experiences, or to clarify and validate their identity.
Broadly speaking, they often seek relatedness with other people in order to ensure
their personal well-being. However, disclosing oneself means sharing private infor-
mation and accepting inherent risks such as misuse or rejection by the recipient(s).
Whether the level of privacy is appropriate or not thus depends on our assessment
of the potential recipients and the protection against unwanted access by other
people and entities in that situation. For example, I would rather disclose personal
information to a friend than to a complete stranger. Likewise, I am more willing to
share a personally traumatic episode with my family than with my work colleagues.
We can thus assume that the person(s) in a given situation should have some sort
of relationship to the discloser. At the very least, the recipients of our disclosures
should be rated as trustworthy.3
This is reflected in most privacy and self-disclosure theories. Westin (1967), for
example, expressed a similar view by suggesting that privacy in the form of small-
group intimacy allows for limited and protected communication (Westin, 1967).
Jourard (1971a) similarly argued that self-disclosure depends on an attitude of trust
and love. Further, Omarzu (2000) emphasized that individuals need to evaluate the
appropriateness of the target person. Petronio (2002) likewise argued that people
build privacy boundaries with other people in which information may circulate
based on certain rules. Finally, the concept of “networked privacy” (Marwick
& Boyd, 2014) also acknowledges that people negotiate rules for information
dissemination. In sum, we can posit that people need to be private in order to be
able to perform self-disclosure. The need for privacy is hence evoked by different,
more fundamental needs.
Supposition 3:
The level of self-disclosure is determined by personal factors
and the perceived level of privacy.
This supposition consolidates the previous two suppositions according to the
definition of the situation described in Sect. 7.1.3. Accordingly, behavior depends on
non-situational and situational personal factors as well as situational environmental
factors. In more abstract terms, behavior (B) is a function of the person (P ) and the
environment (E).
With supposition 2, I posit that people need a certain level of privacy in order to
be able to self-disclose. Supposition 1 further posits that the perception of certain
interpersonal and external factors determines the level of privacy. We can thus
derive that perceptions of the interpersonal and external factors of the environment
affect self-disclosure. More specifically, we can say that a specific combination of
environmental factors represents a certain level of privacy which, in turn, either
allows for or inhibits self-disclosure. Thus, when both external and interpersonal
factors provide protection against identification and unwanted access by other
people or third parties, people feel able to self-disclose. In contrast, when people
are identifiable and many people or companies have access to their communication,
people feel less able to self-disclose. That said, the level of self-disclosure must be
regarded as a linear function of the level of privacy: with higher perceived privacy,
individuals also feel able to engage in higher levels of self-disclosure and vice versa.
This aligns well with the theories of Petronio (2002) and Dienlin (2015) as explained
in Chap. 5: the individual feels particularly able to self-disclose under conditions of
3 “The stranger on the train-phenomenon” described by Ben-Ze’ev (2003) is a notable exception
in this regard. A complete stranger might generally be perceived as nonthreatening because the
discloser assumes that this stranger may simply not affect his or her life after their meeting. At the
same time, when the discloser has chosen not to reveal his or her name or any other identifying
information, he or she has actively controlled the level of privacy (in the form of anonymity), thus
allowing him or her to disclose himself without risks.
high privacy (or in Petronio’s terms: in functioning privacy boundaries), yet ceases
to disclose under conditions of low privacy.
The level of self-disclosure—in line with the level of privacy—is hence situa-
tional. Again, this idea is not new (see Chap. 4). In 1973, Pearce and Sharp argued
that treating self-disclosure as a trait may fail to account for the dynamic nature of
such a behavior. Based on a transactional view of communication, they noted that
“people are not the same in different communication contexts” (Pearce & Sharp,
1973, p. 412). They further argued that such a view on self-disclosure deprecates
many studies conducted at the time that sought to identify high and low disclosers
and associate those with other personality variables (p. 413).
However, people do not simply disclose because the environmental circum-
stances provide them with the opportunity to do so. Of course, they further have
to be motivated to disclose themselves. We know that self-disclosure is driven by
the need to achieve certain goals (see again Sect. 4.2). Omarzu (2000) argued that
“cues within a situation may make a certain goal salient” (p. 178). Yet these needs
can also be stable across several situations (Omarzu, 2000, p. 178). Hence, next to
environmental factors, a number of personal factors are important drivers of self-
disclosure. These can be differentiated into non-situational (e.g., personality and
other trait-like characteristics) and situational factors (e.g., situationally cued goals
or feelings). Empirical research has shown that there are several personality traits
that make people disclose more. As previously discussed in Chap. 6, certain skills
and knowledge may also influence individuals’ willingness to self-disclose.
That said, personal factors not only directly influence the willingness to engage
in self-disclosure, they may also influence the way in which people perceive
environmental factors. As already noted in supposition 1, online privacy literacy
may be an important personal characteristic that determines whether people are able
to identify environmental factors that affect the level of vertical privacy. Similarly,
certain personality facets (e.g., risk avoidance) can make people attuned to such
evaluations. Accordingly, we can summarize that the level of self-disclosure is
determined by non-situational (traits and trait-like characteristics) and situational
personal factors (internal factors), situational environmental factors (external and
interpersonal), and their interaction in any given situation.
Supposition 4:
People seek certain levels of privacy (to be able to self-disclose)
by choosing and manipulating certain environments.
In supposition 1, I said that environmental factors determine the level of
privacy. Supposition 2 further posits that certain levels of privacy are needed to
satisfy fundamental needs or to perform behaviors that lead to the satisfaction
of fundamental needs (e.g., self-disclosure). We can hence assume that people
actively seek certain levels of privacy (see also the theoretical argument by Johnson,
1974). As described earlier, Westin (1967) noted that “individuals are constantly
engaged in an attempt to find sufficient privacy to serve [. . . ] their individual needs
of the moment” (p. 44). As shown by the literature on online privacy regulation
(Sect. 6.1.5), individuals indeed actively seek specific environments and aim at
manipulating these environments in correspondence to their desired level of privacy.
These pre-situational privacy regulation processes thus actively shape the envi-
ronmental factors of a given situation. External factors can further be differentiated
into those that can be manipulated by the individual (e.g., an individual can
sometimes decide whether to use encryption for a specific online communication)
and those that are non-manipulable (e.g., encryption by default or inevitable
surveillance by CCTV cameras). Interpersonal factors can similarly be distinguished
into those that are manipulable (e.g., excluding certain audiences by using friend
lists) and those that are not manipulable (e.g., when the audience is simply given).
In sum, the results of previous privacy regulation behaviors become environ-
mental factors in the subsequent situation. The theory hence proposes, similarly
to Laufer, Proshansky, and Wolfe (1973), that privacy is a condition that can be
achieved through controlling the environment (but simultaneously also provides the
circumstances for being in control).
Supposition 5:
People evaluate the effectiveness of their privacy regulation,
the accuracy of their environmental assessment,
and the outcome of their self-disclosures.
This last supposition refers to potential pitfalls in the described process. As
Johnson (1974) argued, much of the stress related to privacy decisions stems from
the uncertain relationship between privacy control behavior and need-satisfying
outcomes (p. 93). People often do not know whether their preventive privacy regu-
lation was appropriate to avoid risks of self-disclosure. Similar, their interpersonal
assessments of the potential recipients can be inaccurate. Finally, self-disclosure
itself can be ineffective in providing the desired need satisfaction.
I hence propose that individuals engage in three types of evaluation processes.
First, they evaluate the effectiveness of their privacy regulation behaviors, that is, to
what extent the pre-situational manipulation of a situation enabled them to engage
in self-disclosure. If the privacy regulation was not successful, several boundary
turbulences or even privacy violations may occur (Sect. 5.1). Such an experience
influences individuals’ future pre-situational privacy regulation processes. Second,
they evaluate the accuracy of their interpersonal assessments, that is, to what extent
recipients acted as expected. If a trusted person nonetheless disseminates private
information to unwanted audiences, an individual might not disclose to this person
in the future. The interpersonal assessment thus changes. Third, individuals evaluate
whether disclosing in such a situation allowed them to achieved their initial goal
(e.g., relationship initiation, social validation, and so on). This evaluation then
influences future situations and in particular what situations individuals perceive
as suitable for need satisfaction through self-disclosure.
Using a similar rationale to Chaudoir and Fisher (2010), I thus argue that self-
disclosure events have certain long-term consequences, which in turn, influence
antecedent goals of future situations or affect the ways people use certain privacy
regulation strategies and adapt their levels of self-disclosure to similar situa-
tions. This supposition thus also implies that privacy and self-disclosure decision
processes have a developmental character (see also Wolfe & Laufer, 1974). By
experiencing situations and particularly unexpected privacy intrusions, people learn
how to manage their privacy more effectively in future situations.
7.2.2 Scope and Applicability
The following theory presents a situational perspective on interpersonal interaction

that ranges from one-to-one to one-to-many communication situations both in
mediated and non-mediated contexts. It can be regarded as a micro-theoretical
framework for studying privacy and self-disclosure in varying communication
situations. I generally focus on contributing to the ongoing exploration of computer-
mediated communication. Most examples and also the empirical investigation in
Part II of this book refer to mediated communication with a specific emphasis
on information disclosure in networked environments. I nonetheless want to stress
that the theory should be applicable to offline contexts as well. The difference lies
naturally in the type of interactions that are possible in these different contexts
and the external factors of potential situations within these contexts. Obviously,
external barriers in networked environments such as SNSs or instant messengers are
fundamentally different from those in face-to-face encounters. Yet the underlying
principles remain the same. For example, whereas the visibility of disclosures on
Instagram or Facebook can be limited with certain privacy settings, the accessibility
of disclosures in offline contexts can be limited by closing a door or telling people
to leave the room. In both cases, individuals regulate their privacy in order to control
the circumstances of a situation in which they want to disclose themselves.
Before I start to describe the theory, I would like to highlight a problematic
aspect in the existing literature on privacy—the often synonymous use of the terms
situation and context. Strictly speaking, these words refer to something different.
Whereas the situation is a psychological construct and may be defined as suggested
earlier in this chapter, the context is traditionally a sociological concept that refers
to structured social settings that have evolved over time and are characterized by
purpose, place, culture, and history (Nissenbaum, 2010, p. 130). Contexts typically
refer to places or groups of people such as the family, work, educational settings
(e.g., school or university), friends, religion, or a club. As described in Sect. 3.1.6,
we behave in these contexts according to certain rules and consequently adopt
certain roles. Contexts as such have a stable set of characteristics which in their
own way shape our perceptions of privacy. Situations, on the other hand, refer to the
individual’s point of view on the self and the environment at a given time. From this
it follows that contextual characteristics also become the circumstances of a given
situation. But situations are fluctuate more than contexts. In other words, contexts
are specific constellations in which—to a certain degree—similar situations may
occur again and again. This is because several situational factors reoccur each time
an individual enters a certain context. For example, in the context of my family,
7.3 Pre-situational Preventive Privacy Regulation Processes 145
I most often encounter my partner, siblings or parents. As such, the interpersonal

factors of all possible situations in that context remain the same (at least to a certain
degree).
In my opinion, differentiating between situations and contexts is important
because it allows us to look at privacy from two perspectives. From a contextual
point of view, we can analyze how privacy and corresponding behaviors unfold
in certain structured settings (and can thereby even overcome the specificities of
changing situations). This allows us to develop privacy policies or specific privacy
protection mechanisms for these particular contexts and thus present a reasonable
aggregation of specific situations (e.g., Nissenbaum, 2010). But from a situational
point of view, we are able to analyze why and under what conditions people show
certain behaviors. Thereby, we are also able to understand and explain why people’s
behaviors often vary, even within one context.
Lastly, I want to highlight an important distinction that has to be made when
investigating both privacy regulation behavior and self-disclosure. The theoretical
fundamentals for analyzing behavior in situations derived above enable a look at
both types of behaviors from a situational perspective. In other words, we can try to
identify the entirety of factors that influence people’s privacy regulation behaviors or
self-disclosure at a given time. In the particular case of these two types of behaviors,
some factors even remain the same or at least have similar effects. For example,
the goal of maintaining a close relationship first makes people seek or manipulate
situations in order to provide the necessary environment for self-disclosure. A goal
is hence an enforcing factor both for the privacy regulation behavior as well as for
the self-disclosure itself. However, some factors are also different. For example,
the results from privacy regulation behaviors become the situational factors of self-
disclosure. Likewise, evaluations of self-disclosure may become influential factors
(in the form of experiences) for future privacy regulation behaviors.
Because self-disclosure is the behavioral focus of this work, I am primarily taking
a situational perspective on self-disclosure. As such, I discuss privacy regulation as
pre-situational processes that shape the situational factors which, in turn, influence
self-disclosure. Likewise, I am regarding evaluative behaviors that happen after
the act of self-disclosure as post-situational processes. However, as understanding
why people engage in privacy regulation behaviors before they engage in self-
disclosure is also important to understanding the act of self-disclosure itself, I will
discuss potential antecedents of privacy regulation behavior. I will pick up on these
considerations in the empirical study presented in Part II.
7.3 Pre-situational Preventive Privacy Regulation Processes
Before we enter a situation in which an individual may self-disclose, we have to

understand how pre-situational processes shape the environment in this situation.
People are generally driven by fundamental needs. These needs can be regarded as
stable forces that generally drive human behaviors in all situations or situational
forces that are activated by situational cues. For example, if I generally feel alone,
it is very likely that my thoughts almost always circle around this problem and I
consequently constantly experience the need to be in an intimate relationship with
another person. However, sometimes such a goal is not of such a chronic nature and
is only activated in certain situations. For example, it is only made salient when an
attractive person is present.
In this manner, different needs constantly influence our behavior. Sometimes, we
are thrown into certain situations and can only evaluate whether the circumstances
actually allow for the pressing satisfaction of the salient need. However, in many
cases, we are able to seek out or actively initiate and control those situations that
enable us to satisfy the more fundamental needs. As the focus of this work is on
the relationship between privacy and self-disclosure, I focus on needs that can be
obtained by disclosing to other people and therefore require conditions of privacy.
When control over situational circumstance can be exerted, people often engage
in what I have previously called preventive privacy regulation (Sect. 6.1.5). It is
important to understand that pre-situational privacy regulation only allows us to
influence the environmental factors of a situation and even those in most cases only
to a certain degree. Person factors (that pertain to the individual himself or herself),
on the other hand, are less susceptible to individual manipulation. In the following, I
focus on two types of preventive privacy regulation strategies that can be understood
as a two-step process toward controlling future situations in which the individual
wants to disclose. The first step is to simply to choose a certain environment. The
second refers to adapting this environment to the specific purpose of disclosing
private information.
In Sect. 6.1.5, I noted that we need to distinguish between long-term or short-term
preventive privacy regulation behaviors. Such a temporal perspective is specifically
important when investigating mediated communication as people mostly choose to
adopt a certain communication technology at one point in time and consequently
use it for a certain type of interaction again and again. However, people oftentimes
also decide what communication technology (of those they chose to adopt earlier)
they want to use situationally. When the salient goal is to engage in self-disclosure
in order to fulfill more fundamental needs such as relationship development or
maintenance, coping and release of tension, or identity clarification and validation
(Sect. 4.2), people may decide situationally what environments are best to satisfy
their salient needs.
7.3.1 Privacy Regulation 1: Choosing an Environment
The simplest way to achieve a certain level of privacy is to choose an environment

with a certain level of privacy. Deciding in favor of a particular environment requires
a certain experience with this environment (see Sect. 7.5) and, in the case of
mediated environments, knowledge about certain features and characteristics of
these networked technologies (i.e., a certain online privacy literacy). In some cases,
and especially when knowledge and experience are limited, trust in the provider
itself may be the only option left for choosing between different environments.
This selection process involves two important aspects: As the goal is to control
the environmental factors of a situation, it includes the control of interpersonal and
external factors (controlling both the people and physical characteristics). However,
these groups of factors can seldom be manipulated independently of each other.
In fact, they are often inseparable, as choosing a certain environment necessarily
affects both types of factors. In general, people seem to prefer offline environments
for self-disclosure compared to online environments (Teutsch et al., 2018). In the
next section, I will consequently discuss the selection of certain non-mediated
environments as a form of preventive privacy regulation. However, the variety
of online communication platforms also allows individuals to choose between
communication channels with different levels of privacy and is thus an invaluable
form of privacy regulation in the age of information.
7.3.1.1 Choosing Certain Non-mediated Environments
A first step refers to the active controlling of the potential audience of one’s
disclosures. In face-to-face settings, this is often achieved by withdrawing from a
greater public into small-group seclusion (Westin, 1967). Individuals may simply
walk away from crowds to a place where nobody can overhear their conversations
(or, more broadly speaking, where nobody has access to them). It can also mean to
tell unwanted audiences to go away. Asking people to leave us alone indeed is an
acceptable behavior in many situations.
Teutsch et al. (2018) found that in qualitative interviews, participants often
reported actively seeking “private offline spaces” for communicating intimacies.
The authors note: “Our participants stated that they manage physical and social
boundaries in face-to-face communication by excluding unintended audiences. This
is achieved by meeting in protected spaces such as in one’s bedroom. However,
privacy can also be found in the anonymity of a crowded city center, in a quiet
corner of a café, or during a walk in the park.”
Various offline environments not only exclude unwanted audiences, but also
provide certain barriers against surveillance or other forms of intrusion. Sometimes
they literally supply physical protection (e.g., in the form of walls or fences), and
other times also protection against non-physical intrusion (e.g., a certain safety
against digital interception or surveillance). Choosing a non-mediated environment
is naturally the best way to safeguard one’s vertical privacy. As described in Chap. 2,
such privacy intrusions originate from the transformation of information into bits.
The easiest way of preventing such intrusion is hence to avoid this transformation
and consequently the recording and storing of information.
7.3.1.2 Choosing Certain Mediated Environments
In many cases, choosing a certain offline environments is simply not feasible or

is deemed unnecessary by the individual. However, some mediated environments
provide more privacy protection than others. For example, some services offer
privacy-by-default or even privacy-by-design. The first refers to the idea that the
privacy settings of a certain services are set to the highest possible protection by
default and users can then decide if they want to lower these settings in order to
be able to benefit from certain services. Privacy-by-design means that such services
have a certain privacy protection (e.g., end-to-end encryption) implemented that
cannot be turned off. Privacy is hence an in-built feature of these services. Again,
choosing to generally use a more privacy-friendly communication technology can be
regarded as form of long-term preventive privacy regulation. However, it can also be
a form of short-term preventive privacy regulation when people situationally decide
to use a more privacy-friendly communication technology instead of a privacy-
invasive one.
From a user’s point of view, this often means choosing between a popular service
that does offer neither privacy-by-default nor privacy-by-design, but is nonetheless
used by the vast majority of people, and a privacy sensitive alternative that only a few
people use. The market for instant messengers, for example, offers a great diversity
in this regard. The most popular service, WhatsApp, for example, did not offer end-
to-end encryption until April 2016 (Barrett, 2016, December 23). At the time, a
number of other services such as Threema or Signal have already implemented this
type of privacy protection by design. Although WhatsApp now also encrypts the
messages exchanged via its service, Signal or Threema still provides more options
for securing privacy.
In general, choosing a certain service also means having different options for
further fine-tuning one’s privacy. Although Facebook does not offer privacy-by-
default, it nonetheless provides users the option to decide how to protect their
privacy with regard to many aspects. For example, users can limit the general
visibility of their profile information or their status updates. It is important to bear in
mind, however, that choosing a certain service might indeed provide more options
to protect horizontal privacy, but in most cases it does not protect against vertical
privacy intrusions. End-to-end encryption provides a notable exception as it allows
users to protect their messages even against access by providers. In consequence,
people may choose certain services because the providers have also taken steps to
protect their clients’ privacy against their own intrusion.
Choosing a certain environment thus also means having more or less options for
safeguarding privacy. Using these options in order to fine-tune the environmental
factors of future situations is the second form of preventive privacy regulation
behavior, which I will discuss in the next section.
7.3.2 Privacy Regulation 2: Manipulating the Environment
After choosing a certain environment, people may further fine-tune their privacy.
This second step in the pre-situational privacy regulation process thus refers to using
the available options in a chosen environment to further enhance protection against
certain privacy intrusions. In general, people try to prevent two different types of
intrusions: first, they try to avoid being identified by other people and providers,
and second, they try to limit the visibility or accessibility of the content of their
communications.
As noted above, the number of available options depends on the setting or
communication technology that has been chosen. In the case of mediated com-
munication, these options depend on the communication technology that is used.4
Facebook, for example, offers different privacy settings than Twitter or Instagram.
Threema has other privacy regulation features than WhatsApp. Yet, even in certain
offline environments, a more fine-grained privacy tuning is possible. It is important
to note that these options for privacy regulation become particularly important in
environments that imply a certain publicness. Specifically in networked publics,
individuals need to find ways to protect their information from reaching unwanted
audiences (as described in Sect. 2.3.1).
That said, most privacy settings within a certain communication technology only
allow us to safeguard horizontal privacy. Apart from some sophisticated strategies,
they mostly do not protect individuals’ data from being collected, aggregated,
analyzed, and sold by providers and third parties. It is hence important to distinguish
between privacy regulation features that enable control over horizontal privacy,
vertical privacy or both.
7.3.2.1 Preventing Identification
The first set of privacy regulation mechanisms aims at preventing identification.

Before I discuss different strategies for achieving this aim, it is fruitful to ask why
people want to stay anonymous in the first place. An answer to this question can be
found in the work of Westin (1967), who said that under conditions of anonymity
“the individual can express himself freely because he knows the stranger will not
continue in his life and that, he is able to exert no authority or restraint over the
individual” (p. 34). When they are not personally identifiable, people may find the
4 In the following, I am describing several privacy options of services such as Facebook, Twitter,
Instagram, WhatsApp, and many more. Throughout the history of these services, the respective
privacy settings have constantly changed. My description represents the status quo of these settings
in January 2017. Due to the short lifespan of these features, this description may soon become
outdated; however, I believe the overall aims associated with these privacy settings will likely
remain the same.
freedom to express certain ideas or share intimate disclosures without becoming

vulnerable, fearing negative reactions, or being found.
Preventing identification can be achieved in different ways. In offline encounters,
for example, it may sometimes be possible to interact with other people without
revealing one’s name or other identifying information. Furthermore, in crowded
spaces, individuals may be able to merge with their surroundings. In such cases,
the individual is in principle observable, but he or she does not have to fear
being personally identified and is consequently able to merge with the “situational
landscape” (Westin, 1967, p. 34)
In mediated environments, preventing identification requires more active regu-
lation. Strategies include using a fake name or pseudonym (e.g., Debatin, Lovejoy,
Horn, & Hughes, 2009; Dienlin & Trepte, 2015; Trepte and Masur, 2016; Tufekci,
2008), entering a non-identifying e-mail address when registering for certain com-
munication services (e.g., Masur, Teutsch, and Trepte, 2017; Matzner, Masur, Ochs,
& von Pape, 2016) or staying visually anonymous by uploading non-identifiable
profile pictures.
7.3.2.2 Preventing Unwanted Access to the Content
A second form of privacy regulation within a certain environment refers to limiting

the visibility or of access to communication content. In many cases, people
refrain from being anonymous and do not mind being identifiable within a certain
environment. For example, most people use their real names on Facebook because it
facilitates interactions with friends and acquaintances (Trepte, Dienlin, & Reinecke,
2013). But in many instances, they want to target specific people with their
disclosures and hence need to limit the visibility of the public disclosures. Yet
while people might feel free to express themselves under conditions of perceived
anonymity, their disclosures might nonetheless be visible to many recipients and
enable other users, providers, or third parties to draw certain conclusions and
inferences about them.
The focus is hence to prevent unwanted access to the communication content.
Depending on the chosen environment, the content may be encrypted, obfuscated,
or its visibility limited to specific audiences. Encryption refers to the process of
encoding messages or information so that it becomes accessible only to authorized
parties. This can even be done in offline environments (e.g., by encoding a letter).
While some communication technologies offer end-to-end encryption by default,
others allow users to decide whether or not to use encryption. For example, most
email services do not provide encryption by default. However, users are able to use
additional software such as Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) to encrypt their emails.
Obfuscation means to deliberately adding ambiguous, confusing, or misleading
information to interfere with data surveillance and data collection (Brunton &
Nissenbaum, 2015, p. 1). Whereas a number of sophisticated obfuscation methods
to prevent vertical privacy intrusions have been discussed (see Chapter 1 and 2 by
Brunton & Nissenbaum, 2015), people also use similar tactics to safeguard their
7.4 Situational Privacy Perception and Self-Disclosure Processes 151
horizontal privacy. Social steganography as described by Boyd (2010a), Oolo and

Siibak (2013), Marwick & Boyd (2014) (see also Sect. 6.1.5), for example, can be
regarded as a form of obfuscation.
Most prominently, people use the available options of communication technolo-
gies to limit the visibility of their content and disclosures. Facebook users, for
example, can decide who in their contact lists can see their status updates or profile
information by default. They can further adapt the visibility for every type of profile
information and every single status update independently. They can also create
“friend lists” that can be understood as groups of people with different visibility
rights. WhatsApp allows users to set the visibility of their profile image and status.
On Twitter and Instagram, users are able to limit their posts (tweets or images) to
their followers instead of to the overall public.
In conclusion, we can state that there is great variability in the ways that people
manipulate environments to suit their individual privacy needs. Based on knowl-
edge, experience, and trust in the provider, people decide on certain environments
and manipulate them according to their needs. This variability has to be taken into
account when investigating the influence of these environments on human behavior.
Disclosing in face-to-face situations is not the same as disclosing on Facebook or
WhatsApp, even when the recipients are present and the same needs are salient.
The characteristics of these environments thus change from situation to situation—
sometimes because individuals just happen to be in a certain environment, other
times because they actively chose the environment and in some cases because their
further manipulated the chosen environment. In all three cases (and as outlined in
supposition 4), the characteristics of these environments become the environmental
factors of the situational behavior.
7.4 Situational Privacy Perception and Self-Disclosure

Processes
The theory of situational privacy and self-disclosure is primarily about how the
prevailing circumstances of a situation affect self-disclosure. For the purpose of
this theory, it is important to understand self-disclosure as the deliberate sharing of
information about the self with one or more persons. Two notions are important
here. First, self-disclosure is defined as a deliberate and conscious behavior. In
doing so, I refer to the existing literature of self-disclosure, which posits that self-
disclosure is primarily a goal-directed behavior. Second, such a definition allows
to operationalize the level of self-disclosure with regard to the three proposed
dimensions breadth, depth, and duration (Cozby, 1973, p. 75). Depth of self-
disclosure, for example, may be assessed by asking the discloser how private the
shared information is for him or her. I use the term private as defined by Rössler
(2001, p. 136): information about the self is regarded as private when one wants to
control the access to it. It is important to note that I do not restrict self-disclosure to
the verbal revealing of private information. Self-Disclosure may also happen when
an individual shares pictures or other things that might reveal something about him-
or herself.
The level of privateness of different information about the self varies consider-
ably. A substantive amount of empirical work shows that the willingness to disclose
differs greatly depending on the type of information (e.g., Jourard, 1971b; Miller,
Berg, & Archer, 1983). To name one example, fears and concerns are rated as much
more private than, for example, political, ethical, and religious opinions. Personal
interests or hobbies, on the other end, are mostly not rated as very private (Masur
& Scharkow, 2016, p. 7). Accordingly, the definition of self-disclosure I use here
differs from the one proposed by Petronio (2002) because it incorporates all types
of information that reveal something about the discloser being limited to information
that is particularly sensitive.
Based on the definition of the situation provided above, we have to acknowledge
that potentially innumerable factors in all proposed factors categories may influence
self-disclosure. Naming and discussing all of them would be beyond the scope
of this work and, more important, also unnecessary. We only need to know a
limited number of important factors in all suggested factor categories in order to
successfully explain and predict situational self-disclosure.
As noted before, these factors can be differentiated among several dimensions.
First, we have to distinguish between those factors that vary across situations
and those that remain stable. Second, we can differentiate between those factors
that relate to the person (i.e., the discloser), and those factors that relate to the
environment. Personal factors, in turn, can be categorized into personality facets
and trait-like characteristics on the one hand, and situational needs and feelings on
the other. Environmental factors can further be distinguished in interpersonal and
external factors.
In the following, I will discuss each group of factors and their effects on self-
disclosure separately. However, in doing so, two aspects have to be taken into
account. First, we have to acknowledge that these clusters include both inhibiting
and enforcing factors. A situation thus confronts the individual with a dynamic
set of forces that on the one hand enable individuals to self-disclose and on the
other restrict the opportunity to fulfill the need to self-disclose. These positive and
negative tensions may pose a conflict to the individual, for he or she has to decide
rationally whether to dismiss the risks of satisfying the prevailing need. At other
times, these contradicting forces may simply cancel each other out.
Next, I want to stress again that I theoretically understand the specific combi-
nation of the environmental factors at a given time as the level of privacy that an
individual perceives. Put simply, the presence, specific form, and value of these
factors determine the level of privacy in a situation. From this it follows that the mere
perception of these environmental factors—no matter if associated with a somehow
abstract and individual concept of privacy or not—together with the personal factors
at a given time directly influence the likelihood of an individual’s self-disclosure.
7.4.1 Personal Factors 1: Trait and Trait-Like Characteristics
Based on my rationale for taking a situational perspective on privacy and self-

disclosure, it might seem inapt to start a discussion of the factors that influence
situational behavior with those that do not vary across situations. However, this is
not a contradiction. Instead, it is important to combine both perspectives. Both stable
and non-stable characteristics of the person and the environment influence behavior
and thus should be examined simultaneously.
Non-situational personal factors thereby have a twofold role. First, they explain
the overall tendency towards a certain behavior (e.g., an extroverted person will be
more likely to self-disclose than an introverted person across several situations).
Second, we have to bear in mind that people form psychological impressions of
situations based on cues in the environment. The resulting reality is partly shared and
partly distinctive (cf. reality principle described by Rauthmann, Sherman, and Fun-
der, 2015). The distinctiveness of individual “situational construals” (Rauthmann,
Sherman, Nave, et al., 2015, p. 99) may be explained by different stable personal
factors. We thus can indeed start with the individual him- or herself. What type of
person is he or she? Is he or she a shy or an extroverted person? Does he or she
like to take risks or always stays stick to familiar paths? What experiences did this
person have in his or her life? And what skills or knowledge does he or she have?
Although our power to predict situational behavior with traits or trait-like
characteristics may be limited, what the person brings into a situation is not trivial.
That being said, the interaction between these factors and behavior is quite complex
and can be understood from two interdependent perspectives that deserve closer
inspection.
First, personality facets and trait-like characteristics simply determine how an
individual behaves in a certain condition. The idea is that certain individuals
are simply more inclined to display certain behaviors. This point of view thus
emphasizes a direct and linear relationship between personality and behavior. Of
course, personality facets and other trait-like characteristics may also interact in
predicting situational behavior. Possible moderation effects hence need to be taken
into account.
Second, personality facets and trait-like characteristics determine how indi-
viduals perceive certain circumstances of a situation. Thus, the subjectivity of
perceptions (i.e., the situational construal) may be explained by individual differ-
ences. We can therefrom derive that certain environmental factors may exert a lot of
influence on the behavior of some individuals but not others. This implies that these
more stable factors moderate the influential power of certain environmental factors.
This first set of personal factors hence refers to all traits and trait-like char-
acteristics that do not vary across situations, but between persons. Naturally,
these characteristics are manifold and include the personality, attitudes, opinions,
concerns, knowledge and skills, as well as stable needs. In general, many studies
have investigated such antecedents in order to explain privacy needs, privacy
perceptions, and privacy behavior. The literature on self-disclosure is likewise full of
investigations of personality correlates of the willingness to self-disclose. That being
said, we have to bear in mind that those studies often tried to explain aggregated self-
disclosure and seldom investigated the influence of non-situational personal factors
on self-disclosure in specific situations (e.g., in an experimental design). As such,
we may only find hints about how these characteristics impact situational behavior.
Although I am focusing primarily on personal factors that affect self-disclosure,
it is important to bear in mind that the same personal factors also explain why people
engage in privacy regulation behaviors beforehand. The following personal factors
may thus both directly and indirectly influences the likelihood of self-disclosure. I
will highlight indirect processes when applicable.
7.4.1.1 Personality
In broad terms, personality refers to the idea that individuals can be characterized by
a number of unique psychological facets that in theory influence their characteristic
behaviors in many situations and over a longer period of time. Generally, many
different personality characteristics can be differentiated. Today, most scholars
nonetheless seem to agree that the structure of personality can be described by
five basic factors: neuroticism, extroversion, openness, agreeableness, and consci-
entiousness (e.g., Costa & McCrae, 1976, 1992a; Goldberg, 1981, 1990; Tupes
& Christal, 1992). However, this five-factor model is not meant to replace more
specific facets. Rather, it provides a sort of taxonomy that classifies the various
characteristics and subfacets into broad clusters (e.g., Costa & McCrae, 1992b).
It is important to note, however, that investigating particularly the ‘Big Five’
and their effects on self-disclosure is somewhat arbitrary as other personality
models or individual differences can similarly be incorporated into the theory.
For example, a person with a low self-esteem may feel less comfortable with
disclosing his or her true self. Similarly, a person with alexithymia—the inability
to express emotions—may experience difficulty in disclosing feelings or concerns
(e.g., Loiselle & Dawson, 1988; Páez, Velasco, & González, 1999). That said, I
believe it is fruitful to investigate the potential of certain personality facets of the big
five inventory to influence privacy regulation behaviors and self-disclosure because
there are already some theoretical approaches and also empirical studies that have
analyzed relationships between such facets and general privacy-related measures
such as the need for privacy or privacy concerns.
For example, people scoring high on neuroticism tend to be more worried,
experience more anger, feel discouraged more often, are generally more self-
conscious, and often feel vulnerable (Costa & McCrae, 1992b). Junglas, Johnson,
and Spitzmüller (2008) therefrom reasoned that emotionally unstable individuals
are more worried and concerned about their privacy because they are more likely
to appraise the risks than the potential benefits in a situation (p. 392). In their
survey study with 550 student participants, they nonetheless did not find a significant
relationship between neuroticism and privacy concerns. Based on a survey study
with 296 university students, Dienlin and Metzger (2017) found that anxiety (a sub-
dimension of neuroticism) did not relate to the desire for anonymity or interpersonal
privacy. With regard to the effect on self-disclosure, Pedersen and Breglio (1968)
found—based on a survey of 52 students—that males with higher neuroticism
counterintuitively were more likely to disclose aspects of their personality and
describe their physical appearance. Thus there is hence only preliminary and only
survey-based evidence that neuroticism actually influences self-disclosure.
Extroversion refers to the tendency to be outgoing, energetic, and dominant
(Junglas et al., 2008). People with high extroversion are more gregarious, generally
more positive and seek a certain level of excitement (Costa & McCrae, 1992b).
Scholars have thus reasoned that extroverted individuals desire less privacy (e.g.,
Dienlin & Metzger, 2017; Junglas et al., 2008). In their study, Junglas et al. (2008)
again did not find such an effect. However, based on an experiment with 95 adults,
Lu, Tan, and Hui (2004) did find that people with higher extroversion were less
concerned about their privacy and more likely to disclose personal information.
Similarly, Dienlin and Metzger (2017) found that shy people (a subfacet of reversed
extroversion) desired more interpersonal privacy and anonymity. They might hence
employ more privacy regulation strategies and also disclose less private information.
Open people are less bound to habits, try out new things, and are generally
excited by things they do not know yet. Two hypotheses have been proposed
about open people’s approaches to privacy regulation and self-disclosure. First,
people scoring high on openness may tend to discard the risks associated with
new behaviors. They should thus be more inclined to desire less privacy and to
disclose themselves more. On the other hand, it may be argued that open people
generally have richer life experiences due to their curiosity and have thus learned
and become more aware of privacy issues. Results are mixed. If measured as a
tendency to discard risks, openness is indeed a significant negative predictor of the
desire for interpersonal privacy (Dienlin & Metzger, 2017). Measured more broadly,
however, openness has positively predicted privacy concerns (Junglas et al., 2008)
thus contradicting the results obtained by Dienlin and Metzger.
Individuals scoring high on conscientiousness tend to have a high self-discipline
and are deliberate in what they are doing (Costa & McCrae, 1992b). It has thus
been argued that such people should show higher privacy concern because they are
more methodical in assessing situations and risks (Junglas et al., 2008, p. 392).
The empirical findings in study of Junglas et al. support this finding, suggesting the
conscientious people are more inclined to use privacy regulation behaviors to initiate
or seek safe environments and also generally disclose less private information.
From a general point of view, it thus seems that personality factors do dif-
ferentiate people with regard to their desire for certain conditions of privacy and
their general willingness to self-disclose. In this sense, the studies presented above
built upon the classical research on the need for privacy and self-disclosure as
traits. However, research on the influence of personality on specifically situational
behavior is scarce. Based on the rationales described above, we may nonetheless
assume that particularly people who score high on extroversion and openness to new
experiences, and those who score lower on conscientiousness are generally more
likely to engage in self-disclosure. However, as the conflicting findings of Junglas
et al. (2008) and Dienlin and Metzger (2017) show, it remains unclear how specific
personality facets have to be operationalized. The subdimensions of each factor of

the ‘Big Five’ described by Costa and McCrae (1992b) may influence privacy and
self-disclosure in different ways. Evaluating the impact of personality on privacy
and self-disclosure thus requires a careful assessment of these facets.
With regard to the second perspective described above (i.e., the moderating role
of personal factors), the literature on personality effects is almost non-existent. Yet,
from my point of view, this perspective provides a differentially more important
view on the interaction of personality and situational behavior. For example, as
people scoring high on neuroticism have a tendency to view almost all aspects of
life as less positive and even stressful, we could argue that they generally perceive
situations as threatening which, in turn, should make them more anxious. We can
thus reason that the influence of generally enforcing factors of the environment may
be lower and the impact of inhibiting factors stronger. Likewise, it seems plausible
that for people who score high on openness, extroversion, and agreeableness and
thus generally tend to be more sociable and gregarious, interpersonal assessments
(e.g., trustworthiness or psychological closeness of recipients) are less important—
they self-disclose regardless. For people scoring high on deliberation, on the
other hand, external factors of the environment might even be more important in
determining their level of self-disclosure since they take care to avoid any risks
associated with such behavior.
7.4.1.2 Privacy Attitudes or Concerns
Next to personality, people’s attitudes and concerns play an important role in

determining their engagement in privacy regulation behaviors and their willingness
to self-disclose. People who are more concerned about both their horizontal and
vertical privacy, who generally value privacy and who know a lot about how
information they share with others (specifically in online environments) is handled
and used, should implement more privacy regulation strategies to safeguard their
communication and should also be less inclined to self-disclose.
As noted in Sect. 6.1, previous research has often investigated the relationship
between privacy concerns (or attitudes) and privacy-related behavior. The overall
finding, which was recently supported by the meta-analysis of privacy concerns
and overall privacy management by Baruh, Secinti, and Cemalcilar (2017), is that
concerned users of SNSs were less likely to self-disclose and were also more likely
to engage in more privacy regulation behavior.
Nonetheless, and as described in Chap. 6, more research is needed to investigate
differences between horizontal and vertical privacy concerns. Many of the studies
cited above focus on horizontal privacy concerns and subsequently also on hori-
zontal privacy protection strategies. It seems plausible to differentiate between (1)
risks arising from the recipients of the disclosures (horizontal privacy concerns), (2)
risks arising from website and communication technology providers, and (3) risks
arising from institutions such as governments or intelligence services (both vertical
privacy). As denoted before, research suggests people are generally less concerned
about vertical privacy intrusions (e.g., Raynes-Goldie, 2010).
Consequently, it seems plausible to assume that if horizontal privacy concerns
arise, they may negatively affect the likelihood of self-disclosure. However, even
here we have to keep in mind that based on the interpersonal assessment of the
recipients as described in the next sections, people might not be concerned that
potential recipients will actually put their privacy at risk. Vertical privacy concerns,
on the other hand, may have a lower effect on self-disclosure as there seems
to be great uncertainty about whether data collection practices of providers and
institutions actually pose a threat to the individual (see again Chap. 6). That said,
it remains unclear how horizontal and vertical privacy concerns relate to each other
and whether they interact in predicting situational self-disclosure. From a general
perspective, however, it seems plausible that both concerns are highly correlated.
Higher vertical privacy concerns may further positively affect the influence of
external factors on self-disclosure.
7.4.1.3 Privacy Literacy
Based on the literature review in the previous chapter, another individual charac-
teristic might be pivotal in determining how an individual behaves in a certain
situation and whether concerns have an impact on this behavior. Perceiving threats
in a situation and thus rightly assessing environmental factors that should inhibit
certain behavior requires knowledge about these threats and, in the case of privacy
and self-disclosure, knowledge about the environment in which one self-discloses.
Particularly in networked environments, people need to know how information is
handled by providers, by whom it can be accessed, and how it may flow across
platforms and invisible boundaries. This knowledge is pivotal for a comprehensive
assessment of the situation. Consequently, online privacy literacy should in principle
make people less willing to disclose personal information.
Research, however, has shown that people who know more about institutional
practices of data collection, technical aspects of data protection, data protection law
and data protections strategies are also more likely to use certain privacy protection
strategies (e.g., using pseudonyms or encryption), but do not necessarily disclose
less (Masur, Teutsch, & Trepte, 2017; Park, 2013). Recently, Bartsch and Dienlin
(2016) conducted a survey study with 630 participants and found that subjectively
perceived higher privacy literacy was positively related to the implementation of
privacy regulation behavior on Facebook. Hence, although higher online privacy
literacy can be regarded as an inhibiting factor for self-disclosure, it is even more
likely that it is a requirement for effective privacy regulation. Privacy literacy
provides the necessary knowledge and skills to choose or manipulate situations
instead of fostering more deliberate self-disclosure. The results from the meta-
analysis by Baruh et al. (2017) again support this rationale, as privacy literacy
generally relates positively to the use of privacy settings on SNSs. Nonetheless, it
may make people more aware of potential threats arising from institutional data
collection practices and thus render vertical privacy concerns more effective in
determining the level of self-disclosure.
An additional moderating effect may be detectable for higher online privacy
literacy. The more a person knows about how his or her data is used, the more likely
it will be that the level of protection against identification and content accessibility
affects his or her self-disclosure.
7.4.1.4 Chronic Needs
As argued before, certain cues within a situation may make certain needs more
salient and the corresponding need satisfaction more urgent (Omarzu, 2000, p. 178).
Yet people also have stable needs that they bring into any new situation. These needs
can be closely related to the personality of an individual. For example, introverted
people may have a higher need to belong because they are too shy to socialize.
With regard to situational privacy and self-disclosure, we can differentiate two
groups of needs. First, there are a number of goals that positively influence the
willingness to self-disclose in different situations, and second, there are likewise a
number of goals that inhibit such a behavior. Chaudoir and Fisher (2010) similarly
distinguished between approach-focused goals and avoidance-focused goals of
self-disclosure. Some people are more focused on establishing relationships or
experiencing intimacy, while others are more likely to prevent negative outcomes
such as social rejection, conflicts, and anxiety. Omarzu (2000) provides a great
example that exemplifies well that some needs are so chronic that they drive human
behavior in any situation: “A person who desperately wants to achieve intimacy with
another [person] may bring this motivation to every situation encountered, whether
or not the appropriate cues are present” (p. 178). Such a person might try to engage
in a conversation with other people regardless of the situational circumstances.
Such a chronic need to belong has been studied intensively in the psychological
literature. It refers to human being’s “pervasive drive to form and maintain at least
a minimum quantity of lasting, positive, and significant interpersonal relationships”
(Baumeister & Leary, 1995, p. 497). In order to satisfy this need, people need to
interact with other people. As described in Sect. 4.2.2, they particularly have to
engage in self-disclosure in order to initiate and, in turn, maintain relationships with
other people. Although regarded as a fundamental need, the need to belong is not
necessarily equally strong in each individual. In several survey studies, a higher need
to belong was related to grooming behavior on SNSs (Utz, Tanis, & Vermeulen,
2012, p. 39), and to depth of self-disclosure in status updates (Winter et al., 2014,
p. 199).
We thus have to acknowledge that several needs can be stable and strong drivers
of human behaviors in every situation. With regard to the general willingness to self-
disclose, we hence have to bear in mind that people differ with regard to their need to
belong, their need to experience intimacy with other people, their need to be socially
accepted, their feelings of loneliness and so on. These chronically accessible needs
are likely to explain both why people behave similarly in different environments
and also why certain environmental factors are less influential for some people than
for others. Again, we have to bear in mind that such stable needs (like all other
non-situational personal factors) can only explain how people differ with regard to
their average self-disclosure and not why a given individual’s behavior varies across
situations.
7.4.2 Personal Factors 2: Internal Factors
The remaining factors—whether personal or environmental factors—are all situ-

ational. It is important to understand that situational in this sense means that the
factors indeed vary considerably across situations. But that does not mean that
several situations cannot be characterized by similar combinations of these factors.
If we regard these factors as parameters, we can thus state that it is perfectly
possible for the value of these parameters to be the same in two seemingly different
situations (e.g., the same person is the recipient of disclosures in a face-to-face
and a subsequent instant messenger conversation). By characterizing one of these
parameters as situational, I thus refer to the possibility that this parameter may be
different in a new situation.
This second set of personal factors hence refers to those characteristics of a
person that do vary across situations. I understand them as “internal factors” because
they describe cognitive and affective processes within a person. Broadly speaking,
these factors include situational goals or needs and the situational feelings (i.e.,
emotional experience). These internal factors should generally have a direct and
linear affect on subsequent behavior. However, they may also interact with each
other.
7.4.2.1 Situationally Activated Needs
The general assumption is that different types of needs evoke different levels of self-
disclosure. The higher the need to self-disclose (that is, to share private information),
the more an individual will consequently disclose. Again, it is important to bear
in mind that these needs may be the same needs that drive people to engage in
privacy regulation behavior just before the actual communication takes place. But
oftentimes they are also activated by situational cues (Omarzu, 2000, p. 178). It is
thus also possible for several needs to affect a person’s behavior at the same time.
In Sect. 4.2, I outlined what particular needs and goals drive self-disclosure.
I further explained that these goals are different in dyadic and one-to-many
interactions. Based on the functional theory of self-disclosure (Derlega & Grzelak,
1979), we can nonetheless posit that people generally try to achieve five broad
goals: relationship initiation or maintenance (that is, intimacy with others), social
approval, emotional relief, social control, and identity clarification or development.
As Omarzu (2000) noted (by citing Baumeister, 1982), if no other goal is present,
people generally strive to be accepted and liked by others (p. 178). Social approval
is hence a default need that is salient in any situations. But as situations are complex,
different needs may be salient and hence affect the level of self-disclosure.
Existing theories of self-disclosure remain quite vague with regard to how
exactly different needs affect the level of self-disclosure. It seems plausible that
the achievement of different goals also requires the individual to disclose different
types of personal information, thus influencing the level of self-disclosure on all
three dimensions. For example, someone who seeks social approval on Facebook
may increase the breadth of his or her disclosures by showing different aspects of
his or her life through photographs, yet at the same time not exceeding a certain
depth of self-disclosure by taking care that no sensitive information is included in
the pictures.
A recent study conducted by Bazarova and Choi (2014) showed how self-
disclosure goals affect the depth of self-disclosure on SNSs. The authors conducted
a content analysis of 1295 messages including status updates, wall posts, and private
messages that were contributed by 81 participants. They coded these messages
for goals that were closely related to those proposed by Derlega and Grzelak
(1979) and found that participants tried to achieve different goals in different
channels. Different goals were further associated with different depths of self-
disclosure. Whereas goals pursued in status updates were mostly related to social
validation, wall posts and in particular private messages were used more frequently
for relationship development as well as social validation (p. 12). As expected,
messages that were coded as including relationship-related goals were also coded
as containing more intimate information and thus deeper self-disclosure.
Although more research is needed to clarify which goals affect self-disclosure
and in what ways, we can nonetheless conclude that the higher a need associated
with self-disclosure is perceived, the more likely it is that individuals also engage
in deeper self-disclosure. More important, it seems apt to investigate more closely
whether there are needs that require higher levels of privacy in order to be fulfilled
through self-disclosure. Based on the existing literature, for example, goals such as
relationships maintenance, for example, require deep levels of self-disclosure that
can only be performed in situations that are perceived as particularly safe, including
face-to-face situations, dyadic interactions in situations where no other audience is
present (e.g., in a instant messenger chat), and so on. Other goals such as identity
clarification or social approval require less depth of self-disclosure and may thus
be pursued also in public or semi-publics environments (e.g., in status updates on
Facebook or tweets on Twitter).
7.4.2.2 Situational Feelings
Next to goals, other affective processes may affect the level of self-disclosure in a
situation. I am referring here to the concept of feelings, which must further be seen
in the context of emotions. An emotion can generally be defined as “an episode of
interrelated, synchronized changes in the states of all or most of the five organismic
subsystems in response to the evaluation of an external or internal stimulus event

as relevant to major concerns of the organism” (Scherer, 2016, p. 697). Feelings,
however, reflect the total pattern of cognitive appraisal as well as motivational and
somatic response patterning that underlies the subjective experience of an emotional
episode (p. 698). As such, they must be regarded as a component within the broader
concept of emotions. In simple terms, we may understand feelings as conscious, yet
subjective, emotional experiences of a situation (VandenBos, 2007).
Research on the influence of situational feelings on privacy perception and
privacy-related behavior is virtually non-existent. It is thus highly speculative to
reason how feelings might influence situational self-disclosure. Rationalizing such
effects is particularly difficult because the same feeling might have different and
sometimes even opposite effects. For example, if an individual does not feel “good”
in a moment, he or she might not be willing to self-disclose. But in other situations,
the reason for the feeling might drive him to talk about it. Not feeling good
might even intensify the need to disclose the self. At this point, I simply want
to acknowledge the emotional experience of a situation may affect the level of
self-disclosure. Even more likely, it will affect how other factors influence the
level of self-disclosure. This might be particularly true for a type of feeling that
many privacy researcher implicitly seem to acknowledge when considering the
intangibility of vertical privacy intrusions: the feeling of uncertainty. As previously
noted in Sect. 6.3, people might experience considerable uncertainty in networked
environments due to a lack of information and experience (Acquisti, Brandimarte, &
Loewenstein, 2015). Such a feeling might hinder people from disclosing themselves
even when no other rational assessment of the situation is made. The stronger such
a feeling, the less likely an individual will engage in self-disclosure.
In sum, I postulate that feelings—defined as subjective emotional experiences of
situations—may affect how individuals perceive situations, and how they behave in
those situation. Given the lack of research on feelings in the context of privacy,
however, future research will have to investigate which specific feelings may
increase or decrease the willingness to self-disclosure. It seems likely that the effects
of feelings will dependent on other situational factors and vice versa.
7.4.3 Environmental Factors 1: Interpersonal Factors
This first set of environmental factors refers to the people present in a situation. The
level of privacy perceived by the individual depends to a large extent on the people
with whom he or she is at a given time. This is well expressed in the theory by
Altman, who argued that the level of achieved privacy corresponds to the level of
interaction with other people (Altman, 1975, p. 10). With this set of factors I hence
allude to the overall social psychological view on privacy which posits that privacy
is about boundaries around the self that may or may not include certain persons
(particularly Altman, 1975; Dienlin, 2015; Petronio, 2002).
Similar to the personal factors described above, characteristics of other people

(that is, the potential recipients of the disclosures in a situation) are manifold too.
We may assess these other people by those aspects of their personality that they
show us in a given situation, we might judge their behavior and therefrom infer a
certain character, or we might simply show affection to them because they seem
similar to us.
In order to predict the self-disclosure of an individual at a given time based
on his or her interpersonal assessments of the people present, some factors seem
more relevant than others. My selection is based on three rationales: first, these
factors need to capture the manifold possible combinations of unequal recipients
with enough specificity; second, they must include the option to address the
specific audience constellations in mediated environments (in particular networked
environments); and third, they must have been found to significantly affect self-
disclosure in prior research. At the same time, they need to be factors that are
subjectively perceivable. In line with the rationale provided earlier, environmental
factors are only effective when they are perceived by the potential discloser. As
such, they are also highly subjective accounts of these factors.
7.4.3.1 Number and Diversity of People Present
The first factor is simply the number of people that can be regarded as potential
recipients of my disclosures. Broadly speaking, it makes a difference whether I
am writing an e-mail to one person or whether I am posting a status update to
large audience on Facebook. The more people that can potentially access the shared
information, the less likely I am to disclose that information at all. Furthermore,
the diversity of these people plays an important role. For example, even in small-
group conversations via instant messenger, it makes a difference whether the group
(consisting of the same number of people) consists of my family, friends, or work
colleagues.
This view is connected to several theoretical works presented earlier. For
example, the context collapse that users experience in networked publics such
as SNSs makes them less likely to engage in deep self-disclosure. Instead they
might use the common lowest denominator approach (Hogan, 2010) and share only
information they deem appropriate for all audience members. Most likely, such
information is not very private. Vitak (2012) also found that users of SNSs are more
deliberate in their disclosures when the audience is more diverse.
So far, audience diversity has mostly been studied by differentiating the contexts
within an audience (Binder, Howes, & Sutcliffe, 2009; Trepte & Masur, 2016; Vitak,
2012). Although this seems reasonable sociologically, it is not very suitable to
explain privacy behavior psychologically. The problem is that the concept always
leads to specific typologies that are only schemata addressing assumptions about
roles, norms, and appropriate behaviors that are supposed to be shared by groups
of people who act accordingly. If we want to find out what factors predict self-
disclosure, it is not sufficient to know to which context the communication partners
belong to. We need to know more precisely what communication partners in a

situation actually mean to each other regardless of which contexts they inhabit. For
example, although a father and a mother belong to the same context, the question of
whether an individual discloses to them depends on how he or she evaluates both the
father and the mother. Or, likewise, individuals do not disclose private information
to all of their friends although all may be subsumed under the context “friendship.”
In other words, no two persons are the same to me as individuals even though they
can both be called “friends.”
From this it follows that the likelihood of self-disclosure depends on the unique
assessment of the recipient(s). Whenever the audience is larger than one, it depends
on the assessment of each recipient within the audience. In the cases of mediated
communication in networked publics, the audience is often so large that it can no
longer be perceived as a group of uniquely assessable individuals. In such cases,
individuals rely on available cues and ‘imagine’ a potential audience (Litt, 2012)
which, in turn, is assessed similarly to a small group of people.
In the following, I deconstruct this interpersonal assessment by proposing three
aspects that primarily influence subsequent self-disclosure. These aspects include
interpersonal assessments of trust, relational closeness, and priori established
intimacy through self-disclosure. Interdependent as these factors may be, they help
to characterize the audience of one’s disclosures more precisely.
7.4.3.2 Interpersonal Trust
Trust seems to be a pivotal—if not the most important—aspect of interpersonal

relationships and has consequently received extensive attention in the literature.
Despite its undisputed role, defining its exact nature still remains challenging.
Theoretical work on interpersonal trust goes back to the work of Rotter (1967, 1971,
1980). He defined interpersonal trust as “an expectancy held by an individual or a
group that the word, promise, verbal or written statement of another individual or
group can be relied upon” (Rotter, 1967, p. 651). This definition, however, implies
a certain agreement between two parties that is expected to be held and thus may
not account for a kind of unconditional trust towards another person. Oftentimes,
interpersonal trust is also referred to a form of expectancy that the other person
or group will behave in a positive or beneficial way toward the individual. Cook
and Wall (1980), for example, defined interpersonal trust as “the extent to which
one is willing to ascribe good intentions to and have confidence in the words and
actions of other people. This willingness will in turn affect the way in which one
behaves towards others” (p. 39). This more broad definition is well suited to describe
interpersonal trust as a general belief that the other is a person of goodwill and will
do no harm to me. Several authors share a similar view (e.g., Doney & Cannon,
1997; Larzelere & Huston, 1980; Laucken, 2000; Mayer & Davis, 1999).
Over the time, several other definitions emphasized even more that trusting
another person also means being able to engage in risky behavior. Interpersonal
trust thus also means feeling able to make oneself vulnerable while interacting
with the trusted person (e.g., sharing intimacies) and thereby relinquishing control
over behavioral outcomes (e.g., Currall & Judge, 1995; Deutsch, 1958). Currall
and Judge (1995), for example, defined trust as “an individual’s behavioral reliance
on another person under a condition of risks” (p. 153). They emphasized that a
person would experience certain negative outcomes from the ‘untrustworthiness’
of the other person. In an attempt to synthesize the variety of existing definitions,
Kassebaum proposed the following overall definition:
Interpersonal trust is the expectation that another person or group of persons will behave as
agreed, unagreed but loyal, or at least according to subjective expectations in the future, even
though this person or group of persons has the freedom and choice to act differently. This is
because it is impossible or voluntarily unwanted to control the behavior of the person or the
group of persons. This expectation is accompanied by a feeling of calmness, confidence,
and security depending on the degree of trust and the extent of the associated risk (free
translation of Kassebaum, 2004, p. 21).
Based on this definition, we can derive that trust is a central precondition of self-
disclosure because it cognitively reduces the perceived risks involved in sharing
private information (Knapp & Vangelisti, 1991, p. 260). Derlega, Metts, Petronio,
and Margulis (1993) likewise noted that risks of self-disclosure can be lowered if
individuals choose an appropriate recipient who accepts the discloser, has skills
in understanding the discloser’s message, has a motivation to help or support, and
values discretion (pp. 85–86).
However, it is important to consider that trust does not objectively reduce the
risks associated with information disclosure. Instead, it only lowers the subjectively
perceived importance of these risks because we deem them unlikely to occur based
on an interpersonal assessment of the recipient. We thus expect that the other person
will not use the shared information against us. Nonetheless, we lose control over
that information.
CPM theory implicitly alludes to this idea because as the rules within a private
boundary are also based on a risk-benefit ratio (Petronio, 2002, pp. 65–66), it seems
plausible that people also assess the trustworthiness of potential co-owners of private
information. We can hence posit that people will engage in more self-disclosure
when they trust the recipient(s). In other words, collective privacy boundaries can
be regarded as boundaries of trust.
In the case of few recipients, assessing each person’s trustworthiness is manage-
able. In the case of large audiences, however, it seems plausible that the discloser
uses a heuristic similar to the ‘lowest common denominator approach’: he or she
will think of the person within the audience that is the least trustworthy and adapt
the self-disclosure accordingly. Marwick & Boyd (2014) similarly emphasized the
role of trust in teenagers’ privacy management in networked publics. They argued
that when the single-handed controlling of information distribution is impossible, it
must be negotiated socially (p. 11).
Several scholars have investigated interpersonal trust in relation to self-
disclosure. Wheeless, for example, conducted several studies aimed at identifying
interpersonal correlates of self-disclosure. He and his colleagues analyzed whether
higher trust is associated with higher levels of self-disclosure (Wheeless, 1976;
Wheeless & Grotz, 1977). Based on a survey study with 261 participants, they found
a correlation of r = 0.28 between interpersonal trust and the overall measure of self-
disclosure, comprised of five dimensions. In particular, the dimension interpersonal
trust was related to the depth of self-disclosure (r = 0.71), indicating that trust
is indeed a rather strong predictor of self-disclosure. Wheeless also conducted a
follow-up study in which he again found strong correlations between interpersonal
trust and self-disclosure (Wheeless, 1978). Larzelere and Huston (1980) also found
that dyadic trust was positively correlated to depth of self-disclosure in married (r
= 0.40) and dating couples (r = 0.19).
In the qualitative study by Marwick & Boyd (2014), young adolescents indicated
that they placed a lot of emphasis on what could be done with information they
have shared. They based their decision to disclose information mostly on trust and
respect (pp. 10–11). Teutsch et al. (2018) likewise found in qualitative interviews
with people from different age groups that participants emphasized the pivotal
role of trust for feeling secure to self-disclose. In sum, it seems that interpersonal
assessments of trust may be the one of the most important factors in determining
whether an individual shares private information with other people.
7.4.3.3 Psychological Closeness, Similarity, and Everyday Centrality
Although interpersonal trust might be the most important factor in determining

the amount of self-disclosure at a given time, other characteristics of the potential
recipients are nonetheless important. As denoted above, it matters who these persons
actually are and how they relate to the discloser. As self-disclosure plays a pivotal
role in initiating and maintaining relationships, it is logical to assume that the type of
relationships needs to be assessed in order to understand when individual’s decide to
disclose themselves. Obviously, I behave differently in the presence of my parents
than in the presence of my work colleagues or my friends. This is well expressed in
relationship models such as the social penetration theory (Altman & Taylor, 1973)
and the staircase-model of relationships (Knapp & Vangelisti, 1991), described in
Sect. 4.2.
But in order to avoid the pitfalls of defining relationships as typical contexts,
I suggest using a set of overall relationship characteristics to rate any relationship
with regard to its overall importance for the individual. A useful approach in this
regard was proposed by Vangelisti and Caughlin (1997). They started by developing
items to measure a concept they called relational closeness. Using factor analytical
procedures, they found that these items can be distinguished into three dimensions
(p. 691). The first factor, psychological closeness, refers to the perceived closeness
between the people within a relationships. It includes aspects such as how much
relationship partners like each other, how satisfied they are with the relationship,
how important they are to each other, and how much enjoyment they derive from
their relationship. Relationships such as romantic partners, best friends, and close
family members generally score high on this factor. Second, similarity refers to a
kind of mutual understanding of the world. It includes aspects such to what extent
the relationship partners share the same attitudes, opinions, and values, as well as
a similar views on most things. The last factor is called everyday centrality and is
simply a measure of how often these people talk, see or interact with each other.
The relationships between these aspects of relational closeness and self-
disclosure have been tested in several studies. Vangelisti and Caughlin (1997)
themselves conducted two consecutive survey studies with undergraduates (Study
1: N = 340; Study 2: N = 386) and found that perceived psychological closeness and
similarity to potential recipients (e.g., boyfriend or girlfriend, best friend, friend,
or coworker) was related to the likelihood of disclosing certain family secrets
to these targets. Everyday centrality, however, was not related to self-disclosure.
More broadly, Caughlin and Sharabi (2013) also found that overall communication
frequency—both non-mediated and mediated—between individuals correlated with
relational closeness.
A considerable amount of research has investigated the relationship between
liking and self-disclosure. These findings may also provide support for the rationale
provided above because liking can be regarded a subdimension of psychological
closeness. Although I am primarily concerned with antecedents of self-disclosure,
three types of relationships between self-disclosure and interpersonal liking can
be identified. First, self-disclosure can lead to the recipient liking the individual;
second, liking can lead to self-disclosure to this person; and third, an individual
may like a person as a result of having disclosed to him or her (see also Dindia,
2000, p. 29). Most prominently, Collins and Miller (1994) conducted meta-analyses
for all three relationships.
Specifically the first effect (self-disclosure causes liking) is important as it is
also closely linked to the social penetration theory of Altman and Taylor (1973)
presented above. The theory suggests that a relationship develops through continual
increases in self-disclosure. In line with this rationale, individuals should be more
attracted to those who disclose to them. Collins and Miller (1994) found that
self-disclosure was moderately related to liking (d = 0.28). However, there were
some differences in the effect sizes depending on the type of study conducted.
Whereas correlational studies (mostly based on survey data) typically investigated
the relationship between self-disclosure and liking in close relationships, experi-
mental studies investigated the same relationship in stranger interactions. As one
might expect, the effect proved to be weaker for interactions between strangers.
Nonetheless, and despite rather small effect sizes (d = 0.27 for well-controlled and
d = 0.19 for less-controlled experiments), the studies support a causal relationship
(p. 466).
The second effect (liking causes disclosure) is also supported by several of
the theories mentioned above. As individuals engage in self-disclosure in order to
achieve certain goals and satisfy specific needs, their perceptions of other persons
may play a fundamental role in determining their willingness to disclose to these
persons. As self-disclosure increases the level of intimacy and closeness between
two people, the probability of an individual opening himself or herself to someone
else should primarily depend on his or her positive assessment of that other person.
If the individual judges another person as attractive, attentive, and likable, he or she
will be more inclined to get to know this other person and may hence start to reveal
himself or herself to this other person. The meta-analysis by Collins and Miller
(1994) also found evidence for this effect (Collins & Miller, 1994, pp. 467–469).
The average effect size was d = 0.72. Again, correlational studies had higher effect
sizes than experiments. Although smaller in effect size, the experimental findings
suggested that liking actually causes more self-disclosure both in close relationships
and in stranger interactions and initial meetings between persons.
The third effect (self-disclosure makes the disclosure like the recipient more)
was less strong (d = 0.32). The studies were even quite heterogeneous and there
were two studies with no effect (pp. 469–470).
More recently, Sprecher, Treger, and Wondra (2012) conducted a well-designed
experiment aimed at investigating the relationship between self-disclosure and
liking in initial interactions of dyads more closely. Based on 59 pairs, they found that
initial recipients of disclosure liked the discloser more than the initial discloser liked
the recipient. They further found that the difference between both was nonsignificant
when they switched roles afterwards. The results thus suggest that liking increases
even further when the dyads reciprocate self-disclosure during conversation.
In a second experiment, Sprecher, Treger, and Wondra (2013) specifically
manipulated reciprocity of self-disclosure by comparing dyads who both disclosed
and listened in two interactions with people who only disclosed or only listened in
two interactions. The results revealed that dyads that reciprocated self-disclosure
in each interaction showed greater liking towards each other, even when the other
dyads switched roles.
In sum, these analyses imply that self-disclosure causes the recipient to like
the discloser and that individuals disclose to people they like. There is also some
evidence that we like people after disclosing to them; however, this effect may
be influenced by other moderators. More broadly speaking, we can assume that
if individuals rate potential recipients of their disclosures as psychologically close,
and similar in attitudes, opinions, and values, and interact with them on a regular
basis, the likelihood that they will disclose to these potential recipients increases.
7.4.3.4 The Level of Reciprocity
One of the earliest assumptions in research on self-disclosure was that individuals

who are disclosed to are more likely to disclose in return. Jourard (1971a) suggested
that “participants in dialogue disclose their thoughts, feelings, actions, etc., to the
other and are disclosed to in return. I called this reciprocity the ‘dyadic effect”’
(p. 66). This effect was later termed as the “norm of reciprocity,” referring to the
“tendency for recipients to match the level of intimacy in the disclosure they return
with the level of intimacy in the disclosure they receive” (Derlega et al., 1993,
p. 33). Being disclosed to can thus be regarded as a situational antecedent of self-
disclosure. There are two explanations for the reciprocity of self-disclosure that
are generally proposed in the literature (Derlega et al., 1993, p. 33). First, it has
been argued that people generally prefer to maintain a form of equity of exchange.
Accordingly, people feel obliged to return something after someone has shared
private information with them. Second, reciprocating self-disclosure has become
a conversational norm. It is hence assumed that reciprocity of self-disclosure is
accepted based on the prevailing values of our modern society.
The assumption that initial self-disclosure fosters self-disclosure in return has
been tested from several perspectives. Dindia and Allen (1995, June) conducted a
meta-analysis of 67 studies that investigated the norm of reciprocity. The authors
noted that the evidence in support of this hypothesis would depend on how
reciprocity was tested (Dindia, 2000, p. 25). For example, many studies have
correlated the self-disclosure of two individuals in a relationship. However, a high
correlation in this case might just account for similar base rates of self-disclosure.
Another problem is that a person could theoretically reciprocate certain disclosures
at a later point in time. Apart from these limitations in testing reciprocity of self-
disclosure, the meta-analysis revealed that the average effect was d = 0.69. This
rather large effect size suggests that self-disclosure is indeed reciprocal. These
results again support assumptions propounded in social penetration theory (Altman
& Taylor, 1973) and the functional theory of self-disclosure (Derlega & Grzelak,
1979). It also shows that societal norms and rules have a strong influence on how
people behave, even if they are not consciously considered in concrete situations.
In sum, to determine the likelihood of self-disclosure, one needs to know how
much information has been exchanged beforehand. Or, more simply, I suggest that
it makes a difference whether an individual has started a conversation or simply
responded to someone else’s initiation of conversation. I hence posit that the level
of self-disclosure is higher when information has been exchanged between the
interaction partners before the situation or when the interaction partner(s) have
initiated the conversation.
7.4.4 Environmental Factors 2: External Factors
The second set of environmental factors refers to all characteristics of the physical
or virtual space in which the behavior of interest takes place. However, it is not
necessarily the specific nature of these characteristics that immediately determines
the level of perceived privacy. Rather, it is its potentiality in safeguarding one’s
privacy that influences the level of self-disclosure at a given time. As Altman
(1975) noted, “the role of the physical environment as a privacy mechanism is quite
complex” (p. 36). For example, a door itself as a physical object has no inherent
effect on the level of perceived privacy, but its potential to create a form of seclusion
and thus a barrier against external interferences significantly influences the level of
self-disclosure. People hence use the door, and by closing it, they create a form of
privacy that would not be possible without it.
Online environments are even more complex. From a physical point of view,
it is the technical architecture that provides the virtual spaces in which social
interaction becomes possible. However, what we perceive as the environment is
not physical in the sense that we can touch it. Instead, software creates virtual
barriers and environmental characteristics that may resemble offline environments,
yet have unique potentialities for providing spheres of privacy. On the one hand, for
example, hiding one’s face in offline situations may be similar to uploading a non-
recognizable profile picture on a SNS. In both situations, the individual becomes
visually anonymous. Likewise, closing a door is a similar mechanism to moving
a conversation into a private chat. In both cases, people can be secluded from
others. Notwithstanding this similarity, the potentialities of online environments are
often more permanent, thus providing a certain level of privacy for similar future
interactions. For example, choosing to imply certain privacy settings sets the level
of privacy for all types of social interactions to which these privacy settings pertain.
It would be impossible to discuss all potentialities of offline environments
(e.g., by using objects, clothes, artifacts or other characteristics of the physical
environment) and online environments (e.g., by using specific privacy settings
of all communication technologies available). There is great specificity in every
environment at a given time and consequently also in its potential to determine the
level of privacy. To circumvent this limitation, I again distinguish between two types
of privacy that are generally susceptible to external characteristics: (1) the level of
protection against identification (e.g., anonymity or pseudonymity) and (2) the level
of accessibility of the content exchanged (e.g., a form of seclusion achieved by
privacy settings or encryption). In Sect. 7.3.2 on p. 149, I have already discussed
how individuals actively choose certain environments that provide high levels of
privacy or even manipulate some aspects of these environments in order to gain
more privacy. Section 6.1.5, furthermore provides examples of these types of privacy
regulation behaviors. Consequently, I will now confine my discussion of external
factors to how these two types of privacy determine the level of self-disclosure.
7.4.4.1 Level of Protection Against Identification
As argued before, some environments allow us to stay anonymous or at least allow

us to use pseudonyms that reduce the chances of personal identification. According
to Westin (1967), anonymity can be regarded as a form of privacy that allows us
to perform public acts but still remain free from surveillance and identification (p.
34). Anonymity may thus enable expressing oneself freely because one cannot be
held accountable for unfavorable behavior and in this way reduces one’s overall
vulnerability.
The role of anonymity in online communication has been investigated from
several perspectives. For example, anonymity has often been regarded as the source
of anti-social behavior such as flaming and expressing hostility (Lea, 1992; Spears
& Lea, 1994; Walther, 1996). Kiesler, Siegel, & McGuire (1984) previously argued
that online communication would be “more free because the rapid exchange of
text, the lack of social feedback, and the absence of norms governing the social
interaction” (p. 1126). They therefrom derived that anonymity in online interactions
leads to a form of de-individuation that eventually results in less self-regulation.
Anonymity of the self to others enables individuals to express themselves without

having to be concerned about self-presentation (Spears & Lea, 1994, p. 430).
Anonymity thus allows for more depth of self-disclosure. McKenna and Bargh
(2000) likewise explained that anonymity could be viewed as a sort of protective
cloak that enables users to open themselves and express their authentic selves (p.
62).
So, generally, we need to differentiate between visual anonymity and pseu-
donymity. Visual anonymity refers to being visually unidentifiable. In offline
environments, this can be achieved by masking oneself, hiding one’s face in one’s
palms, or trying to stay out of sight of certain people. Tuareg tribes, for example,
use veils to cover their faces and thus remain unrecognizable by certain people
(Altman, 1975, p. 14). In mediated environments, visual anonymity is achieved
by using unrecognizable profile pictures. Pseudonymity, on the other hand, refers
to providing false names or addresses, typically when registering to use different
communication technologies.
The influence of both types of anonymity on subsequent behavior has been
investigated in several studies. For example, Joinson (2001) conducted a study
with 42 undergraduate students who were prompted to discuss a certain topic in
a computer-mediated setting. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two
groups. The first group was able to communicate only via text messages. The second
group likewise communicated via text message, but participants could also see
each other through a live video feed. The results showed that visually anonymous
participants disclosed significantly more private information that those who saw
each other in the video conference. These findings suggest that being visually
anonymous increases the depth of self-disclosure.
Applying this rationale to different web platforms, scholars found mixed effects.
Based on a survey with 242 bloggers, Qian and Scott (2007) found that visual
and discursive anonymity does not necessarily increase the level of self-disclosure.
Based on a content analysis of 154 personal blogs, Hollenbaugh and Everett (2013)
likewise found that visual anonymity and depth of disclosure were not correlated.
Visually identifiable bloggers even disclosed more personal information. On the
other hand, research on health communication in online forums suggests that
anonymity allows individuals to freely share medical information and details about
their personal lives (Baumann & Link, 2016). A similar effect can be found on
Twitter: Peddinti, Ross, and Cappos (2014) analyzed 41.7 million twitter accounts
and found that the followers of highly sensitive accounts (accounts that tweet about
sexuality, pornography, anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, etc.) were more likely to be
anonymous than followers of non-sensitive accounts (accounts that tweet about
movies, companies, news, etc.).
On SNSs and IM services, users seldom use fake names. Recent studies with
German participants found that about a third of the users did not provide their last
names and only between 14–15% also did not provide their first name on SNSs
(Trepte et al., 2013). It should be noted that these platforms require a certain level
of identification as other users will otherwise not be able to find and connect with
individuals. As such, visual anonymity and pseudonymity might be less important

in these types of social media.
We can derive that visual anonymity and pseudonymity should provide a certain
level of privacy (in Westin’s terms, a certain level of anonymity), which, in turn,
should positively affect the level of self-disclosure. However, this effect might only
be detectable in one-to-many communication situations, since dyadic interactions
are mostly purposely initiated and do not require anonymity. From this it follows
that the effect might only be identifiable when audiences are large. We can thus
assume that the effects of visual anonymity and pseudonymity become larger when
audience size increases.
7.4.4.2 Level of Protection Against Unwanted Accessibility
Although anonymity might provide the possibility of expressing oneself freely in

public spaces, most online communication’s content is targeted to specific persons.
In many cases, the visibility of the content exchanged in online communication
is naturally limited. For example, content exchanged in dyadic interactions via
IM services are generally restricted to the people involved in a particular conver-
sation. As argued before, people hence consciously choose certain mediated or
non-mediated environments, in which the accessibility of their conversation (or
information exchanged) is naturally limited. However, in many cases, people also
want to communicate to more than one person or to small groups of people. At
the same time, they do not want to reach just anyone. Specifically, interacting
in networked publics often allows posting to larger audiences, yet requires the
balancing of privacy concerns at the same time. But people do not always want
to reach everyone. Instead, they seek to address specifically targeted persons. For
example, SNS users often want to share pictures from their holidays only with their
friends and families, but not with their work colleagues or bosses. Hence, they need
to limit the overall accessibility of their disclosures.
As argued before, protection against unwanted accessibility of uploaded content
can be achieved by two means. First, people can use the available privacy options
of different communication technologies, and second, they might use services that
enable encrypted message exchange. It is important to note that the first only
safeguards one’s privacy against interference by other users. Privacy settings such as
status update visibility on Facebook may hence help to mitigate horizontal privacy
concerns, but not those arising from vertical interference of Facebook itself. Strictly
speaking, these privacy settings may thus only provide a high level of horizontal
privacy.
The type of protection that encryption provides depends on the encryption
method that is implemented. Many providers use so-called transport encryptions,
which encrypt data transfer from clients to the server with encryption protocols
such as Secure Sockets Layer/Transport Layer Security (SSL/TLS) or Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES). Data is hence still accessible by providers (and,
depending on the protocol also comparably easy to hack, see, e.g., Karaboga et al.,
2014, p. 21). Effective protection against vertical privacy intrusions is only provided
by end-to-end encryption, which means that a message is encrypted on the sender’s
device and only decrypted on the recipient’s device (Karaboga et al., 2014, p. 22). It
hence implies transmitting a message over the Internet in such a way that it can
only be read by the intended recipient, and cannot be intercepted by accessing
the server or networks of servers through which the message is transmitted.5 This
implies that only encrypted data is stored on transmitting servers, guaranteeing
protection against collection and analysis of communication content by institutions
and providers.
Studies investigating to what extent users of different communication technolo-
gies actually use these settings remain scarce. A representative study for the USA
found that about 53% of all Facebook users limit the visibility of their status
updates (Litt, 2013). A multicultural study by Trepte and Masur (2016) found that
the majority of Facebook users in five different countries limited the visibility of
their status updates to their friends, but not more granularly. Moreover, studies
investigating people’s overall literacy found that only a few users actively decide
to use services that provide encryption or to implement additional encryption
themselves (Masur, Teutsch, & Trepte, 2017; Matzner et al., 2016).
In sum, we can derive that reducing the accessibility of information exchanged in
online interactions should increase the level of horizontal privacy, and in the case of
encryption also the level of vertical privacy. This, in turn, should allow for more self-
disclosure. Yet, the existing findings from empirical studies suggest that few people
actually engage in using these more sophisticated privacy regulations. It is hence
uncertain, whether such external factors have a large impact on self-disclosure.
Furthermore, it seems reasonable to assume that limited visibility achieved through
privacy settings may affect the influence of the audience size on self-disclosure.
When content accessibility is actively limited to certain viewers, it seems likely that
the audience might have a smaller effect on the depth of self-disclosure.
7.5 Post-situational Evaluations Processes
As we applied a procedural perspective on self-disclosure, it is important to

discuss potentially post-situational processes that refer to evaluations and long-
term consequences occurring after the individual has or has not disclosed. More
specifically, I argue that people engage in three types of evaluation processes: (1)
evaluating the effectiveness of pre-situational privacy regulation, (2) evaluating the
accuracy of interpersonal assessments, and (3) evaluating the successfulness of
self-disclosure in satisfying the initial fundamental need. These three evaluation
processes are deeply intertwined and altogether influence future situations. They
5 So called man-in-the-middle attacks may still be successful. For example, a hacker could try to
install an application on a user’s smartphone that fetches messages before they are encrypted.
7.5 Post-situational Evaluations Processes 173
are also similar to the evaluation processes described int the model of user generated
privacy proposed by Einspänner-Pflock (2016). According to this model, individuals
generally evaluate whether (1) the goal was achieved and (2) the level of privacy was
acceptable or optimal, thus resulting in four categories (pp. 128–130). Depending
on whether the goal was reached and the privacy level was acceptable, a positive
outcome evaluation takes place. If both are not met, a negative evaluation takes
place and corrective measures will be implemented. If one or the other is reached,
the evaluation can be either positive or negative. I argue that the three types of
evaluations that I am going to describe in the following are related in a similar
way.
Although some evaluations might be conducted directly after the disclosure
event, it is important to bear in mind that evaluations processes can take much
longer. Positive as well as negative consequences take time to manifest themselves.
For example, implemented privacy regulation strategies may only prove to be
ineffective after a certain privacy violation (or privacy turbulence) occurs. However,
this privacy breach might not happen directly after the disclosure event, but rather
several days, months, or even years later. Likewise, evaluating the accuracy of
interpersonal assessments of trust is based on future experiences with the recipients
of the disclosures. Do they share the confidential information with other people? If
yes, the discloser might reassess his or her interpersonal perception of the recipients.
Reevaluations hence particularly take place when new experiences are made
that are somehow related to the initial disclosure event. If these new experiences
are positive, the disclosure event might serve as a sort of role model for similar
future interactions. If the experience is negative, however, the discloser might
assess similar future interactions differently and/or employ other privacy regulation
mechanisms. Burgoon et al. (1989) aimed at identifying possible privacy violations.
Using factor analyses, they found that there are typically five types of violations:
(1) psychological and informational violations (e.g., someone tells others what
you discussed or reveals personal information to unintended audiences), (2) non-
verbal interactional violations (e.g., someone stands too close or touches you
unexpectedly), (3) physical violations (e.g., someone watches what you are doing
or enters the room without knocking), (4) impersonal or stranger violations (e.g.,
someone whistles at you in public or tries to start a conversation with you),
and (5) verbal interactional violations (e.g., someone comments on your mood or
appearance). From my point of view, these types of violations can be evaluated in
any of the three forms discussed below.
7.5.1 Evaluation 1: Effectiveness of Privacy Regulation
Johnson (1974) noted that the rather uncertain relationship between different forms
of privacy and need-satisfying outcomes makes it difficult to foresee whether regula-
tive steps taken beforehand actually provided the ideal environmental circumstances
for need satisfaction (p. 92). Consequently, people evaluate the effectiveness of
their preventive privacy regulations after they have disclosed. If they feel that their
preventive privacy regulation was successful in providing a safe environment for
their self-disclosure, this positive experience will guide their assessment of future
situations and thus also their future privacy regulation.
For example, if an individual experienced an instant messenger application such
as Threema as an environment with a high level of horizontal privacy because he
or she was able to target his or her disclosures to particular people and also with
a high level of vertical privacy because the disclosures were encrypted, he or she
might choose this application again for similar future interactions. Correspondingly,
negative experiences and in particular privacy violations or unwanted intrusions,
may prevent people from choosing a certain environment or manipulating an
environment in a particular way for similar future interactions. Take the example
of a Facebook user who implemented different types of friend lists in order to
be able to target some disclosures to specific people. He or she arranged a friend
list that contained only family members and shared some of his or her holiday
pictures within that collective boundary. However, one of the members shared one
of the pictures with his or her own Facebook network, thus violating the boundary
established by the original discloser. As a consequence, the discloser might avoid
such an unpredicted dissemination of his or her photographs and not disclose within
that predefined boundary or even exclude the family member that shared the picture.
In general, we can state that overall evaluations of privacy regulation behaviors
lead to a behavioral change when individuals perceive an imbalance between the
desired and the achieved levels of privacy. As an abstract framework, Altman (1975)
proposed four typical cases in which such an imbalance is perceived (pp. 28–31).
Whereas the first two cases involve the control of inputs from others, the latter two
involve the control of output to others.6
In the first case, an individual is intruded upon by another person. The individual
has established a boundary around himself, but someone else has crossed it
nonetheless. An example would be if a person closed a door to be alone and
shielded against visitors. However, someone might nonetheless open the door and
enter without permission. Although this “intrusion” would not necessarily have to
be perceived as severe privacy violation, the individual would still try to reestablish
the boundary that he or she desired at the moment (e.g., by telling the unwanted
visitor to leave). Case one thus represents a situation in which the desired level of
privacy is higher than the achieved level of privacy (Altman, 1975, p. 28)
The second case refers to the opposite situation: an individual wanted to have
a certain level of interaction with someone else, but this level of contact could not
be achieved. Maybe the other person himself wanted to have more privacy, was
inattentive, or was otherwise prevented from interacting with the individual. In this
case, the individual might take certain steps to reach the desired level of interaction
6 Please note that I am referring to cases 3, 4, 7, and 8 in the work of Altman (1975). All other cases
in the work of Altman refer to situations in which a balance between desired and achieved level of
privacy is perceived.
7.5 Post-situational Evaluations Processes 175
with the other person. Case two is thus a situation in which the desired level of
privacy is lower than the achieved level of privacy (Altman, 1975, p. 28).
In the third case, an individual hoped to avoid access of other to the self, but
the boundary he or she established failed. For example, someone posted some
personal information on Facebook. Without his or her knowledge, this information
was shared with unintended audiences. Privacy was hence lost because an undesired
level of interaction with other people occurred. Case three thus represents another
situation in which the desired level of privacy was higher than the achieved level of
privacy (Altman, 1975, p. 30).
The last case refers to situations in which an individual may want to share
information but does not succeed in establishing the necessary level of interpersonal
contact. For example, another person did not get the information from the individual
due to the presence of other people or just because he or she was not available. This
last case presents another situation in which the desired level of privacy is lower
than the achieved level of privacy (Altman, 1975, p. 30).
What Altman described here closely resembles Petronio’s concept of boundary
turbulences (Petronio, 2002, p. 177). Managing information flow is a complex
undertaking and often fails. The instances in which it fails may consequently
affect the handling of future situations and in particular influence the ways in
which an individual engages in pre-situational privacy regulation behaviors. As the
issues that may occur as well as privacy regulation mechanisms are manifold and
impact different interpersonal and external factors of the environment, these first
evaluations processes can be very fine-grained and specific.
In line with the rationale provided in Sect. 6.3, vertical privacy violations are less
tangible and might simply not occur after a disclosure event. However, interventions
such as reading a newspaper article about data leaks or data collection practices of
providers might be evaluated in the context of recent disclosure events and thus
also affect future privacy regulation decisions. Such types of evaluations have to be
considered here too.
7.5.2 Evaluation 2: Accuracy of Interpersonal Assessments
I argued that interpersonal assessments are pivotal in determining the likelihood of

self-disclosure. Through evaluating potential recipients with regard to their trust-
worthiness and their overall psychological closeness, individuals seek to reduce the
risks associated with disclosing to them. However, these interpersonal perceptions
may be biased or simply false. Although research suggests that such negative privacy
experiences rarely happen (Trepte & Masur, 2017b, p. 41), it is possible that an
entrusted recipient unintentionally or even intentionally shares the information with
unwanted audiences or misuses the information against the discloser. Remember
that interpersonal trust can be defined as the expectation that another person or
group of persons will behave as agreed, unagreed but loyal, or at least according
to subjective expectations in the future, even though this person or group of persons
has the freedom and choice to act differently (Kassebaum, 2004, p. 21). When the
person does act differently than expected, boundary turbulence occurs (Petronio,
2002).
As self-disclosure is deeply connected to relational development (Derlega et al.,
1993, as well as Chap. 4), we can expect that such privacy violations negatively
impact the relationship between the discloser and the recipients, resulting in less
self-disclosure in future interactions. Based on N = 273 adult participants, Steuber
and McLaren (2015) found that people indeed did not share similar information with
a person who unexpectedly violated their privacy (p. 357). Evaluating the accuracy
of interpersonal assessments is hence an important factor in determining future
interactions with the person(s) involved. In short, if someone we initially trusted,
misuses that trust, our next assessment might lean more towards distrust. That said,
Steuber and McLaren (2015) also found that those who engaged in communication
about the privacy turbulence with the violator and offered explicit rules (a sort of
renegotiation of privacy rules as proposed by Petronio, 2002) were also more likely
to show forgiveness and to report relational improvement (p. 358). Thus, this second
type of evaluation might also positively influence relationship maintenance—even
after a privacy violation has occurred.
7.5.3 Evaluation 3: Effectiveness of Self-Disclosure
Finally, individuals evaluate the efficiency of disclosing private information to

the recipients. This evaluation refers to asking whether self-disclosure was the
appropriate behavior to attain the salient goal. Communicative success in general
is seen as the correspondence between what an individual set out to accomplish and
the extent to which he or she accomplished it (see also Knapp & Vangelisti, 1991,
p. 408). For example, a person who sought to initiate an intimate relationship with
someone through disclosing to him or her and succeeded would likely act similarly
in future encounters when such a particular goal is salient. Likewise, a person in
need of social support probably would not engage in self-disclosure in the future if
he or she found from experience that disclosing private information did not provide
social support in return.
Chaudoir (2009) found in a longitudinal study focusing on HIV/AIDS disclosure
that the degree to which a recent disclosure was a positive and supportive experience
predicted a greater likelihood of disclosure 6 month later (as cited in Chaudoir &
Fisher, 2010, p. 23). A positive experience of self-disclosure (the achievement of
need satisfaction through self-disclosure) may thus positively influence future the
level of self-disclosure in similar future interactions.
7.6 Summary and Application 177
7.6 Summary and Application
In the following, I will briefly summarized the main tenets of the proposed theory. I
also offer a visual representation of the main components of the theory that I believe
will facilitate comprehension of the overall rationale. In the second section, I will
offer an abstract application guide that should help to use the theory in various
research contexts.
7.6.1 A Brief Summary
The theory of situational privacy and self-disclosure was advanced in order to

organize and expand upon existing research and to rearrange shared insights
into a procedural framework that offers a comprehensive means to study privacy
regulation and self-disclosure in various offline, and particularly in diverse online,
environments. To account for the procedural nature of privacy and self-disclosure
processes, the theory differentiates (1) pre-situational privacy regulation processes,
(2) situational privacy and self-disclosure processes, and (3) post-situational evalua-
tion processes. Figure 7.1 represents an simplified overview of its basic components.
At its core (situational privacy and self-disclosure processes), the theory proposes
that individuals’ level of self-disclosure is determined by the combination of several
personal and environmental factors and their interactions. Personal factors, on the
one hand, are traits and trait-like characteristics (personal factors 1). These may
include various distinct factors, even beyond those that I discussed in this chapter.
However, based on the existing research, it seems that particularly privacy attitudes
and concerns, privacy literacy, and chronic needs should be taken into account.
Furthermore, empirical studies have shown that a number of personality facets and
socio-demographics affect the level of self-disclosure. It is important to note that
these factors are treated as non-situational factors in the theory. Although they can
change over the course of an individual’s lifetime, this change is generally rather
slow. Their effects on behavior in different situations (at least within a shorter
period of time) should thus remain stable. On the other hand, there are a number
of personal factors that can also vary across situations (personal factors 2). These
include internal processes such as situational needs, and also a person’s feelings at
that particular time. These factors are situational and thus not very stable.
Environmental factors include interpersonal factors (environmental factors 1)
and external factors (environmental factors 2). Interpersonal factors refer to the
assessment of the people present in a situation (e.g., with respect to their trustwor-
thiness and relational closeness). As pointed out, the interpersonal assessment of the
people involved in a situation may be the most important force that drives people’s
self-disclosure. External factors refer to the characteristics of objects, artifacts,
or architecture of the environment. They can be distinguished in those that offer
178
Pre-situational Situational Post-situational
Interpersonal
(Audience size, trust, relational
closeness, level of reciprocity)
External
(Protection against identification
and unwanted accesibility)
Evaluation 1 to 3
Privacy Regulation 1 & 2 Environmental factors 1 & 2 (Efficiency of privacy
(Choosing and manipulating Self-Disclosure regulation, accuracy of
the environment) interpersonal assessment,
efficiency of self-disclosure)
Internal
(Situational needs,
feeling, mood)
Personal factors 2
Personality Privacy Attitudes Privacy Chronic Socio-

facets and Concerns Literacy Needs Demographics
Personal factors 1
Fig. 7.1 Overview of the basic components of the theory of situational privacy and self-disclosure
7 The Theory of Situational Privacy and Self-Disclosure
a certain level of protection against identification and those that offer protection
against access by unwanted third parties.
The combination of environmental factors (i.e., both the people who have access
to the self of the discloser and the level of protection offered through [virtual]
objects or barriers) is perceived by the individual as the prevailing level of privacy.
If a person wants to disclose himself or herself (due to situationally salient needs),
he or she will only engage in self-disclosure if he or she deems the prevailing
level of privacy as appropriate. Both personal and environmental factors and their
interactions determine the level of self-disclosure in a situation. The first type of
personal factors (stable traits and trait-like characteristics) can influence this process
on all levels. They particularly may influence self-disclosure directly, but also the
effect of both environmental and situational personal factors on self-disclosure. The
situational privacy and self-disclosure processes must be regarded as the central
framework. These processes occur regardless of whether people actively chose or
manipulated such a situation or were simply thrown into it.
That said, the theory further accounts for the fact that people may actively shape
the situations in which they find themselves. The theory therefore includes pre-
situational privacy regulation processes. As denoted in supposition 2, people need
privacy in order to be able to perform behaviors such self-disclosure without risks.
In line with supposition 4, we can hence assume that people actively seek situations
in which they feel private. They do so by either choosing a certain environment
and by manipulating this environment to make it more private. Privacy regulation
processes thus shape the environmental factors that then affect the level of self-
disclosure in communication situations that occur in these environments. Again, the
willingness to engage in these preventive privacy regulation behaviors is influenced
by stable personal factors. It is important to note that the theory focuses particularly
on preventive privacy regulations. Of course, preservative and corrective privacy
regulation could be integrated. However, they would have to be treated similarly to
self-disclosure as a dependent variable with similar antecedents. However, as I am
focusing on self-disclosure, I have refrained from discussing the role of preservative
and corrective regulations.
The theory further includes post-situational evaluation processes, which may
influence future privacy regulation as well as situational self-disclosure processes.
In particular, people evaluate the effectiveness of their privacy regulation (an
ineffective privacy regulation will in many, but not all, cases lead to perceivable
privacy turbulence), the accuracy of their interpersonal assessments (an inaccurate
assessment may lead to concrete privacy violations by one of the recipients), and
the effectiveness of self-disclosing in satisfying the salient need.
As shown in Fig. 7.1, all components are arranged in a procedural framework.
But how can we use the theory for answering specific research questions? In the
following, I will offer an abstract application guide that should help researchers to
make the theory of situational privacy and self-disclosure amendable for empirical
investigations.
7.6.2 A Step-by-Step Application Guide
The following brief step-by-step guide should facilitate the application of the theory
in a wide array of research contexts and fields. It is meant as a starting point for
researchers who aim at investigating situational self-disclosure as a consequence
of privacy processes. Following the proposed steps should provide researchers
with a deeper understanding of the fundamental principles of the theory while
simultaneously adapting them to the context of interest. Part II of this book
represents an example of an in-depth application of the theory to smartphone-based
communication situations based on this guide.
Naturally, the application of the theory, and therefore the steps described in the
following may differ depending on the type of research one seeks to conduct. For
example, the theory may first help to deductively understand situational processes of
privacy and self-disclosure and thus describe how these processes unfold in different
scenarios. Second, one could also use the theory to study privacy perceptions and
self-disclosure across several situations. In this case, the application of the theory
helps to identify the relevant variables that need to be assessed on a situational
level. Lastly, one could use the theory to create laboratory situations in which one or
several of the proposed factors are manipulated. Such a research design would allow
researchers to isolate the effects of each factor (e.g., environmental factors such as
the number of recipients or the amount of privacy resulting from external factors)
or study possible interaction effects. In what follows, I thus describe an abstract
way of applying the theory, which may have to be adapted slightly depending on
the research goal. In this guide, the first two steps must be regarded as suggested
theoretical steps that I deem important to conduct before the actual application can
be made. They will help to make the application of the theory more consistent.
The actual application of theory, however, only starts with step 3. To facilitate
the theoretical investigation, the guide is structured by fundamental questions that
should be considered when investigating privacy or self-disclosure.
What type of communication is studied?
1. Describe the type of communication in which you are interested on a familiar
level of generality (e.g., dyadic communication in friendships, one-to-few
communication at the workplace, one-to-many communication in networked
publics, etc.). Although the theory of situational privacy and self-disclosure
can be applied to any type of communication, it is nonetheless unlikely that
one would want to study all types of communications at the same time.
Notwithstanding this notion, the level of specificity of this initial description
primarily depends on the researcher’s interest. For example, in the second part
of this book, I investigate smartphone-based communication, which includes
several and different types of communication that are all still carried out via
smartphone applications (e.g., WhatsApp, Facebook, Instagram and so on).
2. Identify the kinds of information that are generally shared in this form of
communication. Are certain information types shared more frequently than
others? Do people communicate verbally and/or visually? Do they share

pictures alongside written messages? Do they share links or videos? Is this
type of communication mostly superficial or more sensitive?
In which environments does this type of communication take place?
3. List and precisely describe all environments in which this type of communi-
cation may take place. This is particularly important in order to identify and
classify the varying situations that may occur. Friendship communication, for
example, may take place at various offline locations such as in a café, at home,
or on a bus. At the same time, friends also communicate via instant messenger
services or on other mediated platforms. If we look more broadly on online
communication, we can distinguish between different platforms such as SNSs,
instant messengers, microblogs, blogs, and much more. At this step, it is
important to list all possible environments in which this particular type of
communication may take place.
4. Identify the characteristics of these environments and distinguish interper-
sonal and external factors. Evaluate to what extent these characteristics
determine the level of protection against identification and accessibility of
information. This step presents an in-depth analysis of the environments listed
and described in step 3. Questions such as the following ones should be asked:
Does the environment allow encryption of the content of the communication?
Is it possible to remain anonymous? What other physical or virtual barriers
are given or can be implemented by the individual?
5. Analyze to what extent these environmental factors are manipulable by
individuals and describe how such manipulations may change the level of
privacy in that environment. This refers to all types of privacy regulation
behaviors that aim at manipulating the environment to further increase the
level of privacy.
What factors influence such preventive privacy regulation behaviors?
6. Identify personal factors that contribute to choosing appropriate environments
for self-disclosure (privacy regulation behavior 1). Next to overall personality
factors, it is particularly important to identify the necessary knowledge
and skills required to evaluate these environments and make a meaningful
selection. What types of knowledge and skill are required depends on the
specificities of the studied environments. Derive hypotheses on how these
factors affect this first type of privacy regulations behaviors.
7. Identify personal factors that influence the likelihood of further manipulating
the external factors within these environments (privacy regulation behaviors
2). What personality facets make it more likely to use certain privacy settings?
What type of literacy is required to implement such privacy strategies? Derive
hypotheses on how these factors affect this second type of privacy regulations
behaviors.
What factors influence situational self-disclosure at a given time within these

environments?
8. Identify all personal factors that should influence situational self-disclosure,
particularly in the studied environments (in so far as they differ from
the general assumptions explicated in the theory itself). Differentiate non-
situational and situational personal factors. Non-situational personal factors
can be further distinguished into socio-demographics, personality traits, and
trait-like characteristics such as privacy concerns, privacy literacy, or chronic
needs. Situational personal factors include primarily salient goals and moods
or feelings. Derive hypotheses on how they affect the level of self-disclosure.
9. Based on the previous assessment of the environment in steps 3 to 5, identify
all environmental factors that affect the perceived level of privacy. Derive
hypotheses on how these factors affect the level of self-disclosure. Environ-
mental factors that provide significant protection against identification and
unwanted access to content should increase the likelihood of self-disclosure.
Similarly, low to no protection should inhibit self-disclosure.
10. Identify potential interactions among all identified factors (in so far they
deviate from the general assumptions of the theory) and formulate modera-
tion hypotheses.
What evaluation processes occur after the act of self-disclosure?
11. Describe potential positive and negative consequences of those privacy
regulation behaviors identified in step 5 and derive hypotheses on how the
evaluation of these consequences might impact future privacy regulation
behaviors.
12. Describe potential turbulences arising from false interpersonal assessments
and derive hypotheses on how these might impact future privacy regulation
behaviors.
13. Describe potential positive and negative effects of self-disclosure acts in
those environments and derive hypotheses on how the evaluation of these
consequences impacts future self-disclosure acts in similar environments.
Part II
Empirical Investigation of
Smartphone-Based Communication
Chapter 8
Applying the Theory to
Smartphone-Based Communication
The following study has two major goals: The first is to apply the theory of
situational privacy and self-disclosure to smartphone-based communication situ-
ations in order to understand what makes people engage in preventive privacy
regulation behaviors (in this case, choosing and manipulating the environments
provided by different smartphone applications) and in situational self-disclosure
(in this case, the depth of self-disclosure in smartphone-based conversations).
For this purpose, it is important to analyze possible environments (in this case,
smartphone applications) in detail and understand which environments allow for
more secure and private interactions compared to others, and to what extent far
these environments can be manipulated in order to prevent unwanted identification
and content accessibility. On the basis of this initial theoretical analysis, I aim (1)
to explain why individuals differ with regard to their engagement with preventive
privacy regulation behaviors, and (2) to analyze how external factors, together
with interpersonal perceptions and internal personal factors, influence people’s
self-disclosure within these environments. It is important to note here that I am
not investigating potential post-situational evaluation processes as outlined in the
theory. To investigate such long-term processes empirically, one would have to
monitor participants over a longer period of time in order to capture all potential
privacy turbulences or violations that occur after particular self-disclosure acts. It
is furthermore important to note that I am not going to investigate all potential
antecedents of privacy regulation behavior and self-disclosure I have discussed in
the theory of situational privacy and self-disclosure. For example, due to the lack of
research in this area, I will discuss the influence of situational feelings on subsequent
self-disclosure. I am furthermore limiting the number of factors to those I deem
particularly worthwhile of investigation. The following overall research questions
can be formulated for the purpose of this study:
1. What makes people engage in application-specific privacy regulation behaviors?
More specifically, what personal factors influence people’s decision to choose

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-78884-5_8
186 8 Applying the Theory to Smartphone-Based Communication
certain applications over others and to what extent these factors also explain the
use of privacy strategies and settings within these environments?
2. Under what circumstances do people engage in a high level of self-disclosure
during smartphone-based communication? In particular, which personal and
environmental factors influence the situational depth of self-disclosure?
Using the theory of situational privacy and self-disclosure to answer these overall
questions allows several more specific research questions and assumptions to be
derived. The second aim is therefore to develop a methodical approach to test
these assumptions empirically. To this end, it is necessary to measure participants’
situational assessments and behaviors across several different smartphone-based
communication situations. The present study therefore implemented a combination
of online survey methods, log data, and experience sampling techniques. More
precisely, the first research question was investigated using an initial online survey,
which was answered by N = 1572 German participants. Afterwards, smartphone
users within the sample were invited to participate in a subsequent experience
sampling study which required them to install a specifically programmed application
on their own smartphone that tracked their smartphone use for 14 days. During
this time, the application automatically triggered questionnaires after relevant
usage episodes in order to assess situational factors that influence subsequent self-
disclosure. Based on n = 164 participants, the combined data of the online survey
and the experience sampling method (ESM) study were used to investigate the
second research question.
In this chapter, I apply the theory of situational privacy and self-disclosure to
smartphone-based communication, the step-by-step guide proposed in Sect. 7.6.
Thereby, I put particular emphasis on describing smartphone-based communication
environments and their privacy-influencing characteristics because such an anal-
ysis will help us understand how environmental factors shape self-disclosure in
smartphone-based communication situations. In a subsequent step and in line with
research questions 1 and 2, I identify potential antecedents of privacy regulation
behaviors and situational self-disclosure. In Chap. 9, I first discuss challenges
related to testing the theory of situational privacy and self-disclosure empirically.
Thereby, I focus on combining of experience sampling and log data methods,
which provide a useful approach for investigating situationally varying concepts.
I then proceed to describe the methods used in this study in detail. In Chap. 10,
I present the results of the study. I first describe findings pertaining to the first
question of why people differ in their engagement with privacy regulation behaviors.
Findings from the experience sampling study investigating antecedents of the depth
of self-disclosure form the core of that chapter. Finally in Chap. 11, I discuss the
implications of my findings, placing primary focus on the concrete results and how
they can be interpreted. In Part III, I discuss the implications of this study’s findings
for the proposed theory more broadly.
8.1 Describing Smartphone-Based Communication 187
8.1 Describing Smartphone-Based Communication
The first stage in applying the theory of situational privacy and self-disclosure
should always be a comprehensive characterization of the type of communication
being studied (steps 1 and 2 of the proposed application guide). This section focuses
on smartphone-based communication. From a cultural-historical point of view, the
smartphone has been conceived as an incomparable intervention into the styles
and genre of contemporary culture (Goggin, 2009, p. 231). By revolutionizing
mobile Internet access, it has brought forth what can be regarded as a new
media and communication environment that “hybridises not only technologies and
platforms but also users’ own practices, habits, and modes of accessing media with
implications for personal communication” (Madianou, 2014, p. 667).
In general, smartphones can be defined as portable personal computers that
combine the functionality of the original mobile phone with network connectivity
enabling the installation and running of diverse and multi-functional software
applications (Madianou, 2014, p. 669). Historically, the smartphone can be seen as
the result of the continuous extension and enhancement of the conventional mobile
phone. This development ranged from originally large and impractical devices to
increasingly smaller phones with some Internet capabilities and finally to advanced
technical devices (e.g., smartphones, tablets, smartwatches or smartglasses) with
increasingly faster processors, larger screens, improved usability, and memory
capabilities (Goggin, 2009; Madianou, 2014). As a result, Krotz (2014) noted that
the smartphone is primarily a multi-functional device which only by historical
chance is still called a “phone” (p. 24). Although feature phones and smartphones
had already existed for quite some time, it was nonetheless Apple’s iPhone in 2007
that initiated their mass penetration (Goggin, 2009 as cited by Madianou, 2014,
p. 669). Specifically the design of the smartphone, which eliminated the keyboard in
favor of a touch screen, led to a “haptic turn” in the mobile industry (Goggin, 2009,
p. 242), eventually supporting the massive transformation of how people navigate,
arrange, and orchestrate their everyday lives (p. 243). Currently, devices based on
iOS (iPhone’s operating system) and Android (Google’s operating system) have the
largest market shares (Goggin, 2012).
The smartphone must be understood as a kind of “metamedium” (Jensen,
Rothenbuhler, Pooley, & Craig, 2016) or as “polymedia” (Madianou, 2014). Such
terms refer to the smartphone’s capacity to install and launch countless applications
with different purposes and uses (Madianou, 2014, p. 667). Thus, the smartphone
rather provides the access to different kinds of media uses rather than representing
a form of media use itself. It allows users to consume news and other content
from different providers, access information from countless resources, navigate
to places, listen to music, play games, organize their everyday life, and to most
notably communicate with other people in various and different ways. Jenkins
(2008) consequently referred to the smartphone as the “swiss army knife of the
21st century” (p. 5) which eventually enables users to unify almost all of their
digital activities on a single device and thereby contributes to and drives the growing
process of media convergence. In June 2016, the Apple App Store listed more than
two million applications (Golson, 2016). In December 2016, the number of available
applications in the Google Play Store was 2.6 million (Statista, 2017).
In light of the technical infrastructure that the smartphone provides, what is
the characteristic nature of smartphone-based communication? From a general
perspective, the smartphone has fortified the characteristics of online communi-
cation already discussed in Sect. 2.2: it increases the likelihood of hyperpersonal
interaction, arouses an expectation in users that they should be permanently online
and permanently connected, and facilitates multimodal communication.
The most important aspect is that the smartphone provides access to already
familiar communication platforms through applications that are installed on a single
device. At the same time, the capacities of this technical device also drive innovation
and thus new forms of communication. As Miller (2014) noted: “the smartphone is
an amalgamation of familiar media along with a few new ones that are constantly
being improved: innovative affordances are regular and expected additions [. . . ] its
distinctiveness lies in its capacity to engage, in a variety of ways, with the larger
multimedia networked world” (p. 211). By using their smartphone, individuals are
able to access any platform or media they use to communicate with other people
from anywhere at anytime.
The range of communication modes is thus large and diverse. People use the
smartphone for one-to-one communication (e.g., phone calls, instant messaging, e-
mailing), one-to-few (e.g., instant messaging in groups), one-to-many (e.g., posting
status updates on social network sites). All of these forms of communication may
include the sharing of voice or written messages, pictures, videos, links or other
digital content. Depending on the application through which these types of com-
munications are performed, the content can be extremely private and sensitive (e.g.,
in dyadic instant messenger conversations) or non-sensitive and public (e.g., when
posting a non-sensitive picture on a photo-sharing platform such as Instagram).
Conversations with the same person are often spread over different applications.
For example, a written conversation started in WhatsApp may be continued on
Facebook.
These multi-modal communication practices comprise the setting for this study
of privacy regulation and self-disclosure. It is important to note, however, that I am
focusing specifically on content sharing within interpersonal communication, which
can range from one-to-one to one-to-many communication. I am thus excluding
traditional phone calls and video telephony from this study. I am also excluding
non-interpersonal one-to-many communication such as posting a comment under a
news article. In the next step, I identify and describe all potential environments in
which the remaining forms of smartphone-based communication can take place.
8.2 Identifying Communication Environments 189
8.2 Identifying Communication Environments
The central argument of the theory of situational privacy and self-disclosure is

that both perceptions of privacy and subsequent self-disclosure are primarily deter-
mined by people’s assessment of the entirety of factors that characterize different
situations. These factors can be differentiated into personal and environmental
factors. In the next stage of applying the theory, it is important to identify the
possible environments in which smartphone-based communication can take place
(i.e., communication applications) in order to describe the environmental factors
that influence situational self-disclosure and evaluate the extent to which they can
be manipulated by individual users (steps 3 to 5 in the proposed application guide).
Overall, a large number of applications enabling different forms of communication
can be downloaded both from the Google Play Store and the Apple App Store. In
the following section, I will discuss the most commonly used applications that are
available for both operating systems.
8.2.1 Applications as Communication Environments
In general, smartphone-based communication services can be classified into (1)

email services, (2) instant messaging services (including short message services
and instant messenger applications), (3) social network sites (4) microblogging (and
blogging) services, and (5) other services whose primary focus is not communica-
tion but nonetheless allow users to communicate with other people (e.g., multiplayer
games or dating applications). Most of these services are also accessible with a
computer because they are based on a client–server system. This type of network
structure mediates between a central server, which hosts the data and resources
needed to run the application, and several clients, which can be thought of as
the interface through which users access the stored information. Most applications
require users to register with their email address and sometimes also with additional
information such as name and address. For example, Facebook’s platform policy
requires users to provide their real identity, which most users seem to accept
(Zhao, Grasmuck, & Martin, 2008). Most communication services are not restricted
to a single form of communication. In many cases, they also allow other types
of media uses and thus represent miniature media ecologies in their own right.
With the rise of smartphones, most providers of these services have developed
smartphone-specific applications that represent highly usable client interfaces of
the original web-based services and often include additional functions that make
use of the smartphone’s technical features (e.g., using the location awareness
provided by the GPS sensors or providing an interface for using the in-built camera).
Only a few communication applications can only be used with a smartphone.
Some instant-messenger applications, for example, have implemented a peer-to-peer
instead of a client–server system. However, initially smartphone-only applications
such as WhatsApp now also provide desktop interfaces. Below, I describe the
phenomenology of each group of services in more detail.
Email Services Electronic mail is the oldest form of computer-mediated commu-
nication and encompasses the exchange of digital messages (originally text only)
between people over the Internet (Beck, 2010, p. 22). Email communication is
based on the Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP). Messages are generally stored
on a mail server and can be retrieved by users using standard protocols such as
the Post Office Protocol (POP) or the Internet Message Access Protocol (IMAP).
Although email communication is mostly dyadic, it nonetheless allows users to
send messages to several other people. Today, it is also possible to send all kinds of
digital attachments, including documents, pictures, videos, or software. Although
email communication was initially conceptualized as an asynchronous form of
communication, technical progress in computational power (and in particular ever
faster data transfer over the Internet) has made email transfer considerably faster
and almost synchronous (Beck, 2010, p. 23). Today, 2.59 billion people worldwide
actively use email communication (Radicati, 2015, p. 2). About one billion of those
use Gmail, which is the email service provided by Google (Statista, 2016). In
Germany, however, people favor other services for email communication. The most
popular email services are GMX (27.34%), Web.de (26.44%), T-Online (11.36%),
Outlook.com (8.15%), AOL (5.17), Freenet (4.37%), Gmail (4.08%), and 1&1
(2.68%) (Statista, 2015). All of these major email services provide proprietary
applications for mobile devices. However, people often also use more generic email
applications that allow them to connect with several providers (e.g., the native
Android email application or Aqua Mail).
Instant Messenger (IM) This form of online communication offers real-time
message transfer in the form of texts, images, emoticons, audio, videos, and location
information over the Internet (Cui, 2016, p. 19). IM services are provided by
different companies, each of which uses proprietary software. In contrast to email
communication, message transfer between different software is not possible. IM
services are primarily designed for synchronous one-to-one communication, but can
also be asynchronous and take the form of one-to-few communication when users
converse in small groups (Beck, 2010, p. 26). Depending on the provider, IM can be
based on peer-to-peer or client–server transmission. In most IM applications, people
can generate a profile with a photo and sometimes also a status that may contain
some individually created content. Users connect through their phone numbers.
Phenomenologically, IM is thus very similar to the older short message service
(SMS) allowing text message transfer through the mobile phone network. Due
to this similarity, I consider both to be instant messaging. In 2014, 51.7% of all
smartphone users worldwide regularly used IM applications (eMarketer, 2015). In
the same year, about 72% of all German smartphone users used IM applications
(Trepte & Masur, 2017b, pp. 13–14). In turn, 72.1% of those IM users used
WhatsApp, 14.2% used Skype, and 5.4% used the Facebook-Messenger. Only a
few people used other applications, such as Threema (1.7%), iMessage (1.7%) or
Snapchat (0.1%).
Social Network Sites (SNS) The most common definition of these applications
was advanced by Ellison and Boyd (2013), who define a social network site (SNS)
as “a networked communication platform in which participants (1) have uniquely
identifiable profiles that consist of user-supplied content, content provided by other
users, and/or system-level data; (2) can publicly articulate connections that can
be viewed and traversed by others; and (3) can consume, produce, and/or interact
with streams of user-generated content provided by their connections on the site”
(p. 158). SNS generally provide different modes of communication such as (1)
one-to-one communication using the private message function (e.g., the integrated
Facebook Messenger); (2) one-to-few communication in the form of group chats
using the private message function, status updates in closed groups, and status
updates for which accessibility is limited to only a few recipients; and (3) one-
to-many communication in the form of unrestricted status updates. Overall, a third
of the world population (2.34 billion people) uses social network sites regularly.
In 2014, 30% of the German population used Facebook (Trepte & Masur, 2017b,
p. 12). Only a few people used other SNS such as Google+ (9%), Xing (a German
version of LinkedIn; 3%), or StudiVZ/MeinVZ (German SNSs). Due to the client–
server infrastructures of most SNS, they can be accessed from different devices
(both on desktop computers or laptops and mobile phones or tablets). Major
SNS such as Facebook and Google+ provide adapted mobile versions, again also
using the features of the smartphone (particularly the in-built camera). Professional
networks such as XING and LinkedIn currently do not provide a mobile version of
their service. Instagram, in contrast, was originally developed as a smartphone-only
service. Although a web-based version and a desktop application are now available,
most users still access Instagram with their mobile phones. Of all smartphone users
in Germany, 42% indicated using SNS applications (Trepte & Masur, 2017b, p. 13).
Instagram (which was not explicitly considered in the survey by Trepte and Masur)
recently has grown to more than 600 million users worldwide (Instagram, 2016).
Microblogging Services A weblog or blog refers to a kind of online journal that is
generally publicly accessible. As smartphones are generally not used for traditional
blogging, I have elected to specifically focus on microblogging services, which
have profited massively from the mobility of smartphones. Although microblogs
can be perceived as a new form of online communication, the platform Twitter
has become synonymous with microblogging in most countries (Weller, Bruns,
Burgess, Mahrt, & Puschmann, 2014). Similar to a SNS, it allows users to create
uniquely identifiable profiles, publicly articulate connections that can be viewed
and traversed by others, post short messages (tweets) of up to 140 characters, and
follow the updates posted by other users. A unique characteristic of Twitter is that
communication is heavily based on hyperlinks (in particular so-called hashtags).
Through keywords advanced by a hashtag, users explicitly establish connections
not only with other users but also among tweets and topics (see also Schmidt,
2011). Twitter is hence primarily built for one-to-many communication. However,
it also allows users to share privacy messages with other individual users. Twitter is
a client-server system and can be assessed from different devices. At the beginning
of 2017, Twitter had 313 million users worldwide, of which 82% use Twitter on
their mobile phones (Twitter, 2017). In Germany, about 12 million people regularly
utilize Twitter (Beer, 2016, March 21).
Other Services A number of other applications that were developed for other pri-
mary purposes nonetheless allow for interpersonal communication. These include
social games, multiplayer games, and dating applications. With regard to studying
self-disclosure in interpersonal communication, the popular dating application
Tinder is particularly interesting. It represents a “location-based real-time dating
application” (Ranzini & Lutz, 2017, p. 81) that requires users to log in with their
Facebook profiles. Tinder then uses this information to compile a list of potentially
compatible candidates based on geographical location, number of mutual friends,
and common interests. Users are presented this list and are able to like another
user by swiping right or pass by swiping left. When two users swipe right on each
other, they are able to chat within the application. Tinder thus allows for one-to-one
communication in the context of dating. In 2015, Tinder had about two million users
in Germany (Spiegel Online, 2015, January 30). Similar applications—however
with considerably less users—are, for example, OK Cupid, Lovoo, Zoosk, Grindr
or Happn.
8.2.2 Manipulable and Non-manipulable Environmental

Factors
The next step consists of an in-depth analysis of those characteristics that affect the
level of privacy perceived in these environments. Environmental characteristics can
be either interpersonal or external factors. Interpersonal factors refer to the potential
recipients of an individual’s disclosures and external factors to characteristics
of the chosen environments that influence the perceived level of privacy. Both
types of factors are frequently pre-determined by the specific environment, but in
some cases, they can be manipulated. As discussed in the theory of situational
privacy and self-disclosure, the first step to controlling these factors is choosing
the appropriate channel to self-disclose and targeting the appropriate recipient(s).
In smartphone-based communication, this is done by choosing the appropriate
application. The proposed theory allows us to classify all external factors into
those that prevent identification by other users and providers (visual anonymity
and pseudonymity), and those that lower the accessibility of the shared content
(audience segmentation and end-to-end encryption). In some applications, these
factors can be further adapted and controlled using available privacy settings or
by implementing certain strategies. Thus, in this section, I discuss both manipulable
and pre-determined factors within each communication application. Table 8.1 shows
the specific combination of external factors in each application and further presents
an overview of the extent to which these factors are alterable by individual users.
Table 8.1 External factors in communication applications
Preventing identification Preventing content accessibility
Visual anonymity Pseudonymity Audience segmentation (End-to-end) Encryption
Email services By design Possible n/a Possiblea
Instant messenger
WhatsApp Possible Possible n/a Not possibleb
Facebook-Messenger Possible Possible n/a Not possiblec
Google Talk/Hangout Possible Possible n/a Not possible
Skype Possible Possible n/a By designd
Snapchat Possible Possible Possible/by design Not possible
Threema By design By design n/a By design
Signal/TextSecure By design Partly availablee n/a By design
Telegram Possible Possible n/a Possiblec
Surespot By design Possible n/a By design
SMS By design Partly availablee n/a Possiblea
8.2 Identifying Communication Environments
Social network sites

Facebook Possible Possible Possible Not possible
Google+ Possible Possible Possible Not possible
Xing Possible Possible Possible Not possible
StudiVZ/MeinVZ Possible Possible Possible Not possible
Stayfriends Possible Possible Possible Not possible
Ello Possible Possible Possible Not possible
Microblogging services
Twitter Possible Possible Possible Not possible
Other services
Tinder Same as Facebook Same as Facebook n/a Not possible
a End-to-end encryption is not implemented in the software or technology, but in principle possible with additional software
b Not possible at the time of the study. However, since 2016, WhatsApp has implemented end-to-end encryption
c Not possible at the time of the study. However, since 2016, Facebook Messenger provides users with the option to use “secret conversations” which are end-to-end encrypted. Telegram likewise gives users
the option to use “secret chats” which are end-to-end encrypted

d Skype offers a form of peer-to-peer encryption using the AES-256, which resembles end-to-end encryption, but has been criticized for being nontransparent with regard to Skype’s access to the content
e The user’s phone number is used
193
Email communication is generally used to send content to specifically targeted

people. By choosing who to address with each email, potential recipients can
be selected individually. Interpersonal factors are hence highly controllable. With
regard to external factors, some privacy regulation is possible. First, email services
generally provide visual anonymity, as no profile picture or other photos have to be
sent with the message (some newer services offer the possibility to connect profile
pictures, but that does not mean that they are visible to the receiver). Pseudonymity
is also achievable if the user decides to not use his or her real name in the local
part1 of the email address. Most common providers of email services have not
implemented end-to-end encryption. In order to protect email communication from
provider and third party access, users must use additional end-to-end encryption
tools such as Pretty Good Privacy (PGP/GnuPG)2 or Secure/Multipurpose Internet
Extensions (S/MIME). However, a study using a quota sample of N = 1932 German
Internet users found that only about 30% have ever used such tools to encrypt their
email communication (Matzner, Masur, Ochs, & von Pape, 2016, p. 285).
Instant messenger services come in different forms and shapes and thus provide
different privacy conditions and settings for the individual user. Overall, instant
messaging gives individuals high control over interpersonal factors, as they are also
used to send content to targeted people. Recipients must be actively selected which
obviously reduces the risk of unwanted access. However, applications differ greatly
when it comes to preventing identification both from other users and providers,
as well as protecting content from unwanted provider or third party access. In
the most popular IMs (WhatsApp, Facebook Messenger, Google Hangout, Skype,
and SnapChat), for example, users are able to stay visually anonymous if they
do not upload an identifiable profile picture. They can also use a pseudonym to
prevent initial identification. With regard to vertical privacy options, however, IM
applications vary considerably. At the time of the study (2015), WhatsApp had no
end-to-end encryption. Exchanged messages were hence visible to the provider.
In 2016, however, WhatsApp implemented end-to-end encryption, guaranteeing
that messages cannot be read by anyone except the targeted recipient (WhatsApp,
2016). Messages transmitted via Facebook Messenger were likewise not end-to-
end encrypted. However, Facebook recently implemented a beta version of an
option allowing users to send so-called “secret conversations” that are end-to-
end encrypted (Facebook, 2017). Google Hangout and Snapchat do not provide
end-to-end encryption. Skype, however, uses the AES-256 encryption standard
for their peer-to-peer network. This system is generally similar to end-to-end
encryption. However, Skype has been frequently criticized for leaving “back doors”
open allowing them to access users’ conversations and other personal information
(Rütten, 2007, February 07; Sokolov, 2008, July 24). Telegram provides more
options by giving users the option to conduct so-called “secret chats” which are
end-to-end encrypted. Although most IMs provide similar functionalities, some
1 The part before the @ -sign in the email address.

2 For more information: https://gnupg.org/.
focus more on written communication, but also allow pictures or videos to be

sent (most IMs), while others focus more on sharing photos and videos (e.g.,
Snapchat). One feature of Snapchat also deserves closer attention: In contrast to
messages on most IMs, regular “snaps” on Snapchat are not persistent, and are
automatically deleted after a user-specified length of time (1–10 s). This feature
might render Snapchat more favorable in terms of privacy protection as a certain
inaccessibility of the shared content is provided by design. However, a recent study
did not find a relationship between privacy concerns and Snapchat use (Lemay,
Doleck, & Bazelais, 2017). Threema, Signal, and Surespot likewise represent more
privacy-friendly alternatives, as they implement more privacy-by-design. Users
cannot upload a profile picture and end-to-end encryption is implemented by design.
Telegram does not implement privacy-by-design; however, allows users to send
encrypted messages. In contrast to all other IMs, Threema and Surespot do not
depend on a phone number. Instead, they create a random eight digit ID (Threema,
2017) or a username (Surespot, 2017) that is used to connect users. Finally, short
message services—which are not transmitted via the Internet—have high visual
anonymity but require to the disclosure of users’ phone numbers. SMS are generally
not encrypted; additional software is required for effective end-to-end encryption.
Social network sites generally provide many possibilities to manage both inter-
personal and external factors. As discussed earlier, they provide different channels
with different affordances for interpersonal communication. Each of these channels
may be further adapted to individual needs. Facebook, Google+, and Instagram
all provide users with the possibility to stay visually anonymous. However, this
requires users to not upload identifiable profile and cover pictures and restrict the
visibility of other photographs on which they might be identifiable. People can use
pseudonyms instead of their real names, further preventing identification by other
users, providers, or institutions. The visibility of content posted on SNS can often
be precisely specified. On Facebook and Google+, for example, users are able to
create friend lists or circles respectively (means for audience segmentation) and
adjust the default visibility of profile information, status updates, and other content
according to their individual needs. XING and LinkedIn also allow users to specify
the visibility of diverse profile elements separately. In contrast, Instagram and Ello
give users the option of having an open profile (visible to anyone, even people who
do not Instagram) or a closed profile (visible only to accepted followers). That
being said, Ello claims to provide higher vertical privacy than all other SNSs, as
they state that they do not sell user data to advertisers or third parties, never show
advertisements, and do not enforce a real-name policy. They further claim to collect
only anonymized meta-data, which users can also opt out of Ello (2016). No SNS
provides end-to-end encryption for its message services or postings. Anonymity
strategies can also be implemented on professional networks such as XING or
LinkedIn. However, strategies aimed at preventing identification are very unlikely
on these platforms, as the functionality of such professional websites depends on
visual appearance and identification. I excluded these types of networks sites from
the analysis as they are not purely communication applications, but rather networks
of online profiles for individuals in professional contexts.
Microblogging services such as Twitter allow users to stay visually anonymous

by not uploading identifiable profile or cover photos. Users can further use
pseudonyms and restrict their tweets to followers only. All tweets and data posted in
Twitter are accessible by the provider. End-to-end encryption is not provided (even
for private message exchange).
Other applications allow primarily for dyadic interpersonal communication.
Tinder, for example, creates profiles from people’s Facebook information. Conse-
quently, the level of visual anonymity and pseudonymity depends on the strategies
people implement on Facebook. However, as Tinder’s functionality relies on
people’s visual appearance, it is not very likely that people are visually anonymous
during Tinder conversations. End-to-end encryption is not implemented for these
one-to-one conversations, although encryption schemes have been proposed (Ho,
Nistala, & Tu, 2016).
Based on this analysis, we can categorize some applications as more privacy-
friendly than others. With regard to instant messengers, for example, applications
such as Threema, Signal, or Surespot all provide privacy-by-design. The level
of horizontal and vertical privacy is thus high in such environments. Others
such as WhatsApp, Facebook Messenger, and GoogleTalk/Hangout allow users to
implement certain settings, but do not have a high level of privacy by default. As
they did not offer end-to-end encryption in 2015, the level of vertical privacy was
particularly low in these environments. Telegram represents a rather specific case,
as its default settings are similar to WhatsApp (at the time of the study), but allows
to exchange encrypted messages. It thus allows users to adapt the environment
according to their needs and experience a high or low level of privacy.
With regard to SNS, the differences are more subtle. In general, all SNSs allow
users to implement a variety of privacy strategies. At the same time, they do
not provide options to protect uploaded or shared information from the providers
themselves. Hence, from a vertical perspective, the level of privacy is consistently
low in these environments. As noted above, a notable exception is Ello, which
provides much higher vertical privacy. SNS platforms differ greatly with regard
to the horizontal privacy settings they offer. Although all of them allow users to
be visually non-identifiable and use fake names, they provide different types of
settings to control content visibility. Facebook and Google+, for example, provide
fine-grained options allowing users’ to specify the visibility of almost all types of
posts and profile information. Instagram, in contrast, only gives users the option
to make their profiles private or open. Users’ profiles are hence either visible to
anybody or only to followers.
Twitter, as the prototypical microblogging service, has only a few options to reg-
ulate vertical and horizontal privacy. Whereas visual anonymity and pseudonymity
are possible, tweets are visible to everyone by default and can only be restricted to
followers only.
Based on these categorizations, we may ask why some people choose more
privacy-friendly applications whereas others choose more open ones. Furthermore,
we could ask why some people make use of privacy strategies and settings within
these applications, while others do not.
8.3 Antecedents of Pre-situational Preventive Privacy Regulation 197
8.3 Antecedents of Pre-situational Preventive Privacy

Regulation
In the next stage of applying the theory, I identify and discuss potential antecedents
of both types of preventive privacy regulation behaviors: (1) choosing certain envi-
ronments and (2) manipulating those environments (steps 6 and 7 in the proposed
application guide). The initial selection and subsequent appropriation of certain
communication technologies is a pivotal step for effective privacy regulation. In line
with the theory of situational privacy and self-disclosure, we have to bear in mind
that such privacy regulation processes can be long-term and short-term focused. In
the context of smartphone-based communication, we have to differentiate between
the process of deciding to install and use a certain application in general (long-term
privacy regulation), and the situational process of deciding which application among
those one has installed and generally uses to use for a certain type of communication
at a given time (short-term privacy regulation). In this study, I focus on antecedents
of long-term preventive privacy regulation behavior, that is, choosing to install and
use certain applications as well as manipulating them. As noted before, Chap. 7
focused mostly on personal factors as antecedents of self-disclosure, as the primary
aim was to understand what makes people disclose themselves. In this section, in
contrast, I take a step back and focus on potential antecedents of pre-situational
privacy regulation processes and discuss them more specifically in the context of
smartphone-based communication. Figure 8.1 highlights these relationship in the
broader framework of the theory (cf. also Fig. 7.1 on p. 178).
Such long-term privacy regulation processes in the context of smartphone-
based communication must be considered within the wider framework of media
appropriation or technology adoption theories. The work of Rogers who developed
diffusion theory (Rogers, 1962) and continuously adapted and refined it (Rogers,,
2003) might serve as a starting point. He originally tried to synthesize a variety
of approaches and findings from different disciplines and backgrounds. Among
other aspects of diffusion processes, he proposed a five-stage innovation decision
process (Rogers,, 2003, pp. 168–218). He argued that individuals have to pass
through five consecutive stages (p. 169): (1) knowledge, (2) persuasion, (3) decision,
(4) implementation, and (5) confirmation. In the knowledge stage, individuals are
exposed to an innovation’s existence and gains an understanding of its functions.
In the following stage, the individual forms positive or negative attitudes toward
the innovation by obtaining information from other people and other resources.
Persuasion, in this sense, does not refer to the intention to induce attitude change.
Rather, it represents the psychological involvement with the innovation (p. 175).
In the decision stage, the individual engages “in activities that lead to a choice
to adopt or reject an innovation” (p. 177). Until this point, the innovation process
can be seen as the individual’s mental occupation with the innovation. However,
in the implementation stage, the individual puts the innovation into practice and
implements it into his or her social or organizational settings. It is only then that he
or she determines the innovation’s usefulness, as uncertainty about consequences of
198
Interpersonal
External
Evaluation 1 to 3
Internal
(Situational needs,
feeling, mood)
Personal factors 2

Personal factors 1
Fig. 8.1 Investigating antecedents of preventive privacy regulation behaviors in the context of the theory of situational privacy and self-disclosure
8 Applying the Theory to Smartphone-Based Communication
adopting the innovation still exists (p. 179). Finally, the confirmation stage involves
seeking reinforcement for the decision that has been made or reversing the decision
if cognitive dissonance occurs (p. 189). Rogers thus views innovation diffusion
practices as a form of communicative and social practice.
According to von Pape (2008), the merit of the diffusion theory lies primarily in
its integrative nature. However, he criticizes that the theory suffers from theoretical
and methodological stagnation (pp. 46–51). Consequently, a number of alternative
approaches and theories have been proposed or adopted to explain the diffusion
of innovations and the adoption of technology (for an overview, see von Pape,
2008, pp. 53–96). Two widely used approaches to explaining the adoption of
communication information technologies based on social-psychological theories,
such as the theory of reasoned action (Fishbein, 1980; Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010)
and the theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1985), are the technology acceptance
model (TAM; Davis, 1989) and its extension the unified theory of acceptance
and use of technology (UTAUT; Venkatesh & Davis, 2000; Venkatesh, Morris,
Davis, & Davis, 2003). Both are based on a cost-benefit paradigm and thus focus
on perceived usefulness and perceived ease of use as antecedent factors of the
intention to adopt a new technology, which, in turn, influences its subsequent
adoption (or non-adoption). The TAM model has been criticized for oversimplifying
the adoption process and putting too much emphasis on people’s rationality in
the adoption process (e.g., LaRose, 2010). Davis and colleagues thus refined the
TAM and proposed the UTAUT (Venkatesh & Davis, 2000). The new model still
includes the two factors identified before (renamed performance expectancy and
effort expectancy), but additionally focuses on social influence factors (the degree to
which an individual perceives that important others believe he or she should use the
new technology) and contextual factors (the degree to which an individual believes
that infrastructure supporting the new technology exists) (Venkatesh et al., 2003,
pp. 447–454). Gender, age, experience, and voluntariness of use are regarded as
moderating factors.
However, another integrative approach also deserves attention in the context
of smartphone adoption. Based on a comprehensive literature review, Wirth, von
Pape, and Karnowski (2008) developed the mobile phone appropriation model
(MPA model). Taking the theory of planned behavior as an initial starting point,
the authors identify several evaluative processes that precede the final appropriation
of the mobile phone: (1) functional evaluations refer to individuals’ expectancies
with regard to the uses of the mobile phone and include a pragmatic and a symbolic
aspect, (2) normative evaluations refer to the influence of norms, and (3) restrictive
evaluations refer to financial, temporal, technological, or cognitive restrictions that
may inhibit mobile phone adoption. von Pape (2008) subsequently studied the
appropriation of mobile phones among young adolescents. Based on the MPA model
and using network analysis in school classes, he found that certain dynamics in
social networks of friends also play an important role in determining whether people
adopt the mobile phone or not.
An important aspect of each of these theoretical approaches to explaining appro-
priation processes is the cost-benefit paradigm, which posits that people’s attitude
and behavior reflect cost-benefit analyses. Evaluating the privacy risks involved
in communication technology adoption must thus be regarded as an important
part of these evaluations. For example, with regard to Roger’s (2003) five-step
innovation decision process, it can be argued that people are also initially confronted
with the innovation’s privacy risks (e.g., media reports that smartphones generally
collect location data) and start to evaluate these risks in the persuasion stage, which
eventually influences their decision to adopt or not adopt the innovation. Evaluating
privacy risks can alternatively be regarded as a form of restrictive evaluation in the
context of the MPA model. A loss of privacy can be regarded as a cost of adopting
a new technology and may hence inhibit overall adoption.
It is important to note that most approaches have focused on the adoption of
technologies (i.e., devices such as the mobile phone). The focus of this work,
however, is not on the adoption of the smartphone as a device, but rather the adoption
of specific applications for communicative purposes. Nonetheless, I believe that
the theories discussed above provide a valuable framework for understanding
application selection processes. In a similar way, the mental calculus preceding the
adoption of each application in the context of smartphone-based communication
includes risk evaluations, particularly those that pertain to privacy threats. In
this sense, the rationale presented here is closely related to the privacy calculus
argumentation (see Sect. 6.3.1). Although privacy calculus theory explicitly focuses
on self-disclosure as the behavioral outcome of this mental cost-benefit analysis, I
argue that such a rational choice process can also be adapted to other behavioral
outcomes, such as the adoption of specific technology or applications.
8.3.1 Non-situational Personal Factors
As highlighted in Fig. 8.1, non-situational personal factors, including differences in

personality facets, privacy-related measures such as privacy attitudes or concerns,
privacy literacy, chronic needs, and also socio-demographics, may account for
people’s decisions to engage in different types of privacy regulation behaviors. As
noted before, however, many studies have shown that benefits are more influential
than concerns (e.g., Dienlin & Metzger, 2016; Dinev & Hart, 2006; Krasnova,
Spiekermann, Koroleva, & Hildebrand, 2010).
With this study, I explicitly focus on the cost side of this calculus and investigate
the extent to which a number of non-situational personal factors inhibit the adoption
of more privacy-friendly applications (privacy regulation behavior 1). The same
personal factors will then be investigated with regard to their power to predict the
use of privacy settings and strategies within these applications (privacy regulation
behavior 2). Although a comprehensive analysis of privacy regulation behaviors
would also investigate goals and motives (both chronic and situational) behind the
use of different applications and contrast them with potential risk evaluations, I am
nonetheless purposely limiting my analysis to factors related to privacy evaluations
in order to obtain greater insights into what constitute inhibiting factors to the
adoption of different communication applications.
8.3.1.1 Traits: Personality Facets
In Sect. 7.4.1, I discussed how personality in general affects privacy regulation

and self-disclosure. Based on prior research and theoretical considerations, all
facets of the five-factor model (Costa & McCrae, 1992a) may to some degree
influence users’ likelihood of evaluating privacy-related aspects of application use.
The overall hypothesis is that certain personality characteristics should predict
first whether people choose certain communication applications over others, and
second whether they use certain privacy settings within these applications to further
manipulate the level of privacy in these environments. However, previous studies
have suggested that some personality effects might be stronger than others. For
example, although neuroticism can be thought of as a personality facet that might
contribute to the use of more restrictive, privacy-friendly applications, prior research
has not found considerable neuroticism effects on privacy concerns or desires
(except for Pedersen & Breglio, 1968). Likewise, Ross et al. (2009) found that the
five-factors of the Big Five model were not as influential in explaining different
aspects of Facebook use as prior theoretical work had suggested. However, more
recent work by Junglas, Johnson, and Spitzmüller (2008) and Dienlin and Metzger
(2017) indicates that two personality factors seem particularly prone to influencing
privacy regulation behaviors in smartphone-based communication: introversion (the
opposite of extroversion) and conscientiousness.
As discussed earlier, people scoring high on introversion are more cautious, less
socially active and generally less open to new experiences. As already noted in
Chap. 7, the survey study by Dienlin and Metzger (2017) confirmed these theoretical
arguments. More specifically they found that the introversion subfacet shyness
(measured using the inverted gregariousness scale by Costa and McCrae, 1992b)
was positively correlated with the desire for anonymity (β = 0.13, p = 0.035).
It follows that people scoring high on shyness are more likely to use privacy-
friendly communication applications and implement privacy strategies or settings
that prevent identification and unwanted content accessibility.
That being said, research on personality effects on social media use suggests that
the reverse argumentation can also provide insights into how personality affects
communication application adoption. Extroversion has been shown to be linked
to more social media use because such platforms allow people scoring high on
extroversion to befriend new people and satisfy their need to belong or need for
self-presentation (e.g., Amichai-Hamburger & Vinitzky, 2010; Correa, Hinsley, &
de Zúñiga, 2010; Hodas, Butner, & Corley, 2016; Seidman, 2013; Winter et al.,
2014). Based on these findings, it can thus also be argued that people scoring
higher on extraversion (and maybe in particular those who score high on gregarious-
ness) are more likely to choose less privacy-friendly communication applications
that allow for public communication (e.g., Facebook, Instagram or Twitter) or
un-encrypted dyadic communication (e.g., WhatsApp or Facebook Messenger).

Conversely, introverted people may not only be more likely to use privacy-friendly
applications, but also less likely to use privacy-intrusive applications.
Although communication applications can be broadly categorized as either
privacy-friendly or privacy-invasive on the basis of environmental factors (see
Sect. 8.2.2), these general hypotheses may be too broad and fail to account for subtle
differences between communication applications. Based on the recent finding that
inverted gregariousness is positively related to the desire for anonymity, it seems
reasonable to assume that a less gregarious person may indeed use an application
that offers vertical privacy-by-design (e.g., Threema). However, it is also possible
that he or she will simply not use vertically privacy-invasive applications (e.g.,
Facebook or WhatsApp). As prior research does not allow hypotheses to be specified
for each communication application, the present investigation remains exploratory
in nature. Consequently when formulating the following research question, I bore
in mind that a general pattern in line with the theory of situational privacy and self-
disclosure should be identifiable:
Research Question 1: To what extent does a non-situational personal factor such as gre-
gariousness influence the likelihood of engaging in preventive privacy regulation behaviors
such as using a) different communication applications and b) privacy strategies or privacy
settings within these applications?
The second personality facet that seems likely to influence privacy regulation
behaviors is conscientiousness. As discussed in Chap. 7, conscientious people
should be more risk aware and might also desire more privacy due to their logical
assessment of the negative consequences arising from application use. Again,
Junglas et al. (2008) found that participants scoring high on conscientiousness
were indeed more concerned about their online privacy (β = 0.12, p < 0.05).
One subfacet of conscientiousness seems particularly likely to influence privacy-
related measures. Again, in the study by Dienlin and Metzger (2017), risk avoidance
(measured by the deliberation subfacet scale by Costa & McCrae, 1992b) was
positively correlated with the desire to have privacy from the government (β = 0.21,
p = 0.031). Based on these findings, we could argue that more deliberate people are
more likely to use applications that provide high levels of vertical privacy (e.g., IM
applications that have end-to-end encryption). The findings by Dienlin and Metzger
(2017) further revealed that more deliberate people also desire more interpersonal
privacy (β = 0.34, p = 0.003), suggesting that people scoring high on deliberation
should also be more likely to take more steps against horizontal privacy threats.
Again, due to the subtle differences between communication applications and the
lack of prior research, it does not seem adequate to formulate specific hypotheses
for every individual application. For example, a deliberate individual may be less
prone to use Facebook, but still not use Threema. Instead, he or she might use
Telegram which allows him or her to decide whether to protect a particular com-
munication against vertical privacy intrusions. As deliberate people are generally
self-disciplined and thoughtful in their assessments (Costa & McCrae, 1992a), it
seems possible that they are not very open to adopting new technologies in general
(whether privacy-invasive or privacy-friendly). Based on this rationale, we could

also argue that deliberate people are less likely to use communication applications
and privacy-invasive applications in particular. Drawing upon this argumentation, I
again formulate a broader research question:
Research Question 2: To what extent does a non-situational personal factor such as
deliberation influence the likelihood of engaging in preventive privacy regulation behaviors
such as using a) different communication applications and b) privacy strategies or privacy
settings within these applications?
8.3.1.2 Trait-Like Characteristics: Online Privacy Literacy and Concerns
Based on the rationales and findings presented in Sects. 6.3.1.1 and 7.4.1, both
online privacy literacy and online privacy concerns may be critical factors determin-
ing engagement with privacy regulation behaviors and to a lesser degree the level of
self-disclosure as well. Scholars have argued that being aware of the risks associated
with online media use, understanding the data collection practices of the providers
behind these media, and having the skills to implement specific privacy regulation
strategies are important requirements for effective self-data protection (Hoofnagle,
King, Li, & Turow, 2010; Masur, Teutsch, & Trepte, 2017; Park, 2013; Park & Mo
Jang, 2014; Trepte et al., 2015). Several studies support this claim. In the previously
discussed study by Park (2013), higher privacy knowledge was positively correlated
with social and technical protection behavior. In particular, he found that technical
knowledge (β = 0.26), surveillance awareness (β = 0.32), and privacy policy
understanding (β = 0.29) were positively related to preventive privacy regulation
behaviors, which included items referring to both choosing to (not) use certain
services (privacy regulation behavior 1) and manipulating the environment or using
specific strategy within the environment (e.g., using pseudonyms; privacy regulation
behavior 2). Similarly, Masur, Teutsch, and Trepte (2017) found that knowledge
about providers’ and institutions’ data collection practices, technical aspects of
data protection, data protection law, and data protection knowledge were positively
related to implementing privacy protection strategies (e.g., using pseudonyms or
fake email addresses). In the same study, however, higher knowledge did not predict
whether people stopped using certain sites.
Nonetheless, some studies specifically investigated the extent to which skills and
knowledge characterize non-users of services such as Facebook. For example, Vitak
(2015, May) conducted a survey with 2000 US American participants, of which 286
did not use Facebook at the time of the study. Measuring people’s online skills (i.e.,
familiarity with technical terms such as PDF, Cache, etc.), she found that higher
technical knowledge positively predicted Facebook non-use (odds ratio = 1.50, p
< 0.001). Based on this finding, it seems plausible that people who understand the
infrastructure, functions, and information flows of communication applications are
more likely to avoid privacy-intrusive communication applications, and conversely
more likely to use privacy-friendly applications. In other words, we can assume
that higher privacy literacy decreases the likelihood of using privacy-invasive
communication applications (e.g., Facebook, WhatsApp, Facebook Messenger) and

increase the likelihood of using privacy-friendly communication applications (e.g.,
Threema, Telegram, or Signal).
Several studies on horizontal privacy regulation behaviors in certain platforms
also point in a similar direction. The study by Bartsch and Dienlin (2016), which
was already discussed in the previous chapter, specifically investigated the influence
of privacy literacy on privacy regulation behavior on Facebook. They found that
higher online privacy literacy positively correlated with restricting content visibility
(β = 0.14, p = 0.05). The meta-analysis by Baruh, Secinti, and Cemalcilar (2017)
supports this finding and shows that privacy literacy positively predicts the use of
protection measures (r = 0.29, p < 0.001). Based on these findings and the findings
by Park (2013), Masur, Teutsch, and Trepte (2017), and Bartsch and Dienlin (2016),
I generally also assume that privacy-literate people will be more likely to implement
privacy regulation strategies in their chosen applications because they have the skills
to perform such sophisticated tasks.
In contrast to these assumptions, other literature suggests that online privacy
literacy—particularly when measured as knowledge—has little effect on the imple-
mentation of privacy regulation behaviors. The effective long-term adoption of
certain strategies requires not just knowledge about negative consequences, but also
self-reflection, specific skills, and the motivation to maintain a particular behavior
over a longer period of time (Masur, Teutsch, Dienlin, & Trepte, 2017). Assuming
that people learn about risks through the media, the population’s current knowledge
may be quite biased. Teutsch (2013) conducted a quantitative content analysis of
German newspaper articles from October 2005 (launch of StudiVZ, the first SNS
with a large user base in Germany) until December 2012. On the basis of 283
articles taken from two national (Süddeutsche, and FAZ) and the two largest regional
newspapers (Rheinische Post and Südwest Presse), she found that 68% referred
to Facebook in particular when talking about online privacy (p. 68). Only a few
articles mentioned StudiVZ or MeinVZ (14%), Google+ (3%), or Twitter (3%).
Of those who focused on Facebook, 70% described Facebook as violating users’
privacy. Almost a quarter of the articles discussing StudiVZ or Google+, in contrast,
labeled these SNS as a privacy guarantor. From this, it follows that people might
perceive Facebook as more privacy-intrusive compared to other SNS, because they
have learned more about Facebook’s privacy violations through the media. Although
no such content analyses exist for other types of communication applications, a
similar distribution seems plausible, with a large proportion of news coverage on
instant messengers, for example, most likely focusing on WhatsApp. Based on these
findings, we could ask whether online privacy literacy has a stronger (negative)
effect on the adoption of popular, often discussed applications. Assuming that
more literate participants are more likely to adopt privacy-friendly applications and
less likely to adopt privacy-invasive applications, yet acknowledging the difference

between specific communication services, I formulated the following research
question:
Research Question 3: To what extent does the non-situational personal factor online
privacy literacy influence the likelihood of engaging in preventive privacy regulation
behaviors such as using a) different communication applications and b) privacy strategies
or privacy settings within these applications?
Although a direct effect of online privacy literacy on privacy regulation behaviors

seems plausible (i.e., skills are needed for difficult tasks), it is also possible that this
effect is partly mediated by privacy concerns. I argued before that many users may
be unconcerned about privacy simply because they have no knowledge and actual
experiences of negative consequences resulting from application use. This is based
on the notion that people need to have a certain awareness or knowledge about
information flows in order to be concerned. Vertical privacy concerns, in particular,
may only become salient when people understand the ways in which providers
access their personal information and data. Recent empirical work supports this
claim. For example, Vitak (2015, May) found that higher online skills significantly
predicted concerns about vertical privacy intrusions by Facebook (β = 0.17, p <
0.001). In the same study, the effect on horizontal concerns was not significant (β
= 0.14). However, higher online privacy literacy should make people aware of both
vertical and horizontal risks associated with the use of communication applications.
On the basis of this, I formulate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Online privacy literacy is positively related to a) vertical privacy concerns
and b) horizontal privacy concerns.
Privacy concerns should then predict people’s privacy regulation behavior. Only
a few studies have been conducted on the effect of privacy concerns on the first
type of privacy regulation behavior. Based on a representative survey for the USA,
Rainie, Smith, & Duggan (2013) found that some people cited privacy concerns as
reasons for taking a break from Facebook. Baumer et al. (2013) collected open-
ended responses from N = 410 participants on their reasons for not using Facebook.
Again, one recurring theme was privacy concerns. Participants cited both vertical
and horizontal privacy concerns as reasons for leaving, restricting, or limiting
their Facebook use. The results obtained by Vitak (2015, May) also confirm these
qualitative findings: Higher privacy concerns increased the likelihood of not using
Facebook (odds ratio = 0.68, p < 0.001). Based on 13 studies, the meta-analysis by
Baruh et al. (2017) found that privacy concerns negatively predicted online service
use (r = −0.16, p < 0.01).
Almost a decade of research exists on the second type of privacy regulation
behavior (manipulating the environment; i.e. using privacy settings). As discussed in
Chap. 6, studies investigating the so-called “privacy paradox” have long examined
relationships between privacy concerns and privacy regulation behaviors (cf. also
Baruh et al., 2017). Recent work suggests that privacy concerns positively predict
engagement with different privacy regulation behaviors and the effect was mediated
by privacy attitudes and intentions (Dienlin & Trepte 2015). Dienlin and Metzger
(2016) replicated this finding, showing that privacy concerns had a positive effect
on engagement with privacy regulation behaviors involving withdrawal from social
interaction on Facebook (β = 0.45, p < 0.001). Again, the meta-analysis (Baruh
et al., 2017) further supports these findings, as privacy concerns were positively
related to the use of protection measures (r = 0.17, p < 0.001).
A problematic aspect of these findings is the lack of distinction between vertical
and horizontal privacy concerns, which might be important for several reasons: First,
as discussed in the descriptions of communication applications in the preceding
sections, some applications provide a lot of options for safeguarding against hori-
zontal, but not against vertical, privacy intrusions. For example, Facebook provides
many options to gradually adjust the level of horizontal privacy, but has access to
all of its clients’ data. Hence, people with high horizontal privacy concerns may
choose applications that offer a lot of privacy settings (such as Facebook). Those
people might also be more inclined to implement pseudonymization strategies and
use applications that offer many options for restricting content visibility. People
with high vertical privacy concerns, on the other hand, will be more inclined to use
applications that also offer some protection against vertical data collection. This
might take the form of end-to-end encryption or the ability to use anonymization
strategies (e.g., as provided by Threema). Such people might even be less likely
to use privacy-invasive applications such as Facebook, WhatsApp, or Instagram.
Turning to the results of the content analysis of Teutsch (2013), we can again assume
that concerns about privacy violations are more pronounced with regard to popular
SNS or instant messenger (e.g., Facebook or WhatsApp) and less pronounced with
regard to other communication applications. A recent and rather unique study by
Lutz and Ranzini (2017), for example, found on the basis of an online survey with
497 US based participants that Tinder users were more concerned about vertical
privacy concerns than horizontal concerns. However, due to the lack of further
research distinguishing between horizontal and vertical privacy concerns and the
different perceptions of communication applications, I asked the following question:
Research Question 4: To what extent do non-situational personal factors such as higher
vertical privacy concerns influence the likelihood of engaging in preventive privacy
regulation behaviors such as using a) different communication applications and b) privacy
strategies or privacy settings within these applications?
Research Question 5: To what extent to non-situational personal factors such as higher
horizontal privacy concerns influence the likelihood of engaging in preventive privacy
regulation behaviors such as using a) different communication applications and b) privacy
strategies or privacy settings within these applications?
8.3.2 Implications for Antecedents of Self-Disclosure
At this point, it is important to reconsider why we need to investigate people’s

privacy regulation behaviors: Although people are sometimes thrown into certain
environments and have to deal with the prevailing circumstances, they oftentimes
instead actively seek out certain environments and further manipulate them. Thus,
8.4 Antecedents of Situational Depth of Self-Disclosure 207
in the previous section, I provided some rationale for why people differ in their
decisions to use certain applications and why they differently engage with the
privacy settings or strategies these environments offer. What type of environment
an individual chooses and how he or she manipulates it is central to discussing the
antecedents of depth of self-disclosure: People determine some of the environmental
circumstances that subsequently allow them to disclose themselves. Or in other
words, the results of their privacy regulation behavior affect the environmental
factors that influence their self-disclosure. When discussing the antecedents of self-
disclosure, it is thus important to bear in mind that the environmental factors (both
interpersonal and external), in particular, are often determined by individuals’ long-
term preventive privacy regulation behaviors.
8.4 Antecedents of Situational Depth of Self-Disclosure
At this central stage of the theory application, I am going to identify all personal
factors (step 8 of the proposed application guide), all environmental factors (step
9), and possible interactions between those factors (step 10) that influence the
situational level of self-disclosure. The investigated relationships are depicted in
Fig. 8.2.
In the introduction, I asked whether the amount of self-disclosure an individual
engages in depends on his or her personality or general concerns that the content
of digitally transferred messages might be visible to unintended third parties, or
whether it instead depends on the situational circumstances the individual currently
finds himself or herself in. Throughout the book, I have argued that an individual’s
level of self-disclosure primarily depends on how strongly he or she is motivated
to talk to a certain person or group of persons. I have further argued that the
relationship to these (potential) recipients determines the level of self-disclosure in
the conversation. Based on this rationale and in line with Ross and Nisbett (2011),
we must hence bear in mind that the amount of situational variance may exceed the
amount of variance that can be explained by stable personal characteristics. With this
in mind, we have to be careful in evaluating the possible effects of non-situational
personal factors on self-disclosure, as they may only account for a small portion
of the variance. During the following discussion of both stable and situational
factors related to self-disclosure, we need to consider that non-situational personal
characteristics may indeed have some effect on self-disclosure, but this effect may
be small or even fully absorbed by stronger situational effects.
In contrast to pre-situational privacy regulation processes—which are always
specific to the context in which the theory of situational privacy and self-disclosure
is studied—antecedents of the depth of self-disclosure are more universal and can be
derived from the theory of situational privacy and self-disclosure. However, before I
formulate corresponding hypotheses, I would like to go back and challenge the basic
supposition of the theory, which posits that self-disclosure (and perceived level of
privacy as well, for that matter) is inherently situational (cf. p. 138). Although I
208
Interpersonal
External
Evaluation 1 to 3
Internal
(Situational needs,
feeling, mood)
Personal factors 2

Personal factors 1
Fig. 8.2 Investigating antecedents of self-disclosure in the context of the theory of situational privacy and self-disclosure
8 Applying the Theory to Smartphone-Based Communication
have presented theoretical evidence for this claim, it has not yet been confirmed
and quantified empirically. As a first step, it thus makes sense to ask whether
this supposition is actually true. Consequently, the first research questions was
formulated as follows:
Research Question 6: How much variance in depth of self-disclosure is attributable to
interpersonal differences and how much to situational circumstances?
I assume that the situational variance will be greater than the variance that is
attributable to interpersonal differences. From this, it follows that particular internal,
interpersonal, and external factors of the situation will explain the depth of self-
disclosure. Consequently, I place particular focus on the situational effects within
the broader framework of the theory of situational privacy and self-disclosure.
8.4.1 Non-situational and Situational Personal Factors
In discussing the connection between privacy and self-disclosure (Chap. 5), I argued
that two perspectives have to be taken: First, we can argue that managing self-
disclosure is also a means of attaining a certain level of privacy in situations where
potential disclosures are not protected by the environment. Second, we can regard
privacy as a necessary precondition for self-disclosure. The former perspective
implies that refraining from engaging in self-disclosure ought to be regarded as a
form of privacy regulation that people employ to attain a specific level of privacy
that Westin (1967) called “reserve.”
8.4.1.1 Personal Factors 1: Traits and Trait-Like Characteristics
Consequently, we can use the same rationale as in the previous section to formulate
hypotheses on how non-situational personal factors may effect the depth of self-
disclosure. With regard to personality facets, we could assume that gregarious
people will engage in higher self-disclosure (independent of situational constraint)
than people who score low on this subfacet. Similarly, deliberate people ought to
more frequently refrain from engaging in self-disclosure. Moreover, people with
high online privacy literacy should generally be less inclined to disclose themselves,
as they are more knowledgeable about associated risks. Finally, higher concerns
about both horizontal and vertical privacy may further inhibit a person’s overall
level of self-disclosure.
Although previous research on aggregated measures of these variables has shown
that such relationships indeed exist (Baruh et al., 2017), it remains unclear whether
these effects actually hold when self-disclosure is measured situationally. The
aggregated effects are generally very small—a finding that could be the results
of hidden variance across situations. As these personal factors may have an even
greater impact on people’s likelihood of engaging in privacy regulation behavior
(see previous section), it seems possible that they do not directly influence people’s
level of self-disclosure any given situation. Let us consider a simple example:
Peter is concerned about his privacy while using his smartphone for communication. He
does not feel good about the provider’s data collection practices, and fears that the content
of his conversations might end up being more public than he intended them to be. As a result,
he decides to use Threema, which he believes provides an appropriate level of privacy.
So far, the example is well suited to illustrating the hypotheses derived in

the previous section on antecedents of privacy regulation behaviors. We can now
ask what influences Peter’s level of self-disclosure each time he uses Threema to
communicate with other people:
Peter is happy about his application choice. Since he uses Threema, he no longer thinks
about privacy anymore. He feels able to disclose himself to his friends.
Based on this example, we could argue that Peter’s concerns and his privacy
literacy initially made him choose a privacy-friendly application, but since then,
the only factors determining his level of self-disclosure a given situation are purely
situational ones. Whenever he wants to share something (enforcing factor: need),
he chooses the right recipient (his friends) and thus discloses himself. This example
would contradict or at least complicate the finding from traditional survey studies.
Due to the lack of prior research on the influence of non-situational personal factors
on situational self-disclosure, the following research question was formulated:
Research Question 7: How do non-situational personal factors such as a) personality
facets, b) online privacy literacy, and c) horizontal and d) vertical privacy concerns relate to
the depth of self-disclosure in smartphone-based communication situations?
8.4.1.2 Personal Factors 2: Internal Factors
A basic principle of the proposed theory is that self-disclosure must be regarded

as a goal-directed behavior. In Sect. 4.2 I discussed a number of functions of
self-disclosure. People need to self-disclose in order to fulfill some fundamental
needs. I have argued that these needs may drive short-term preventive privacy
regulation behaviors and, in turn, determine an individual’s level of self-disclosure.
As Omarzu (2000) noted, different types of goals and needs afford different
levels of self-disclosure (p. 178). For example, a person who wants to initiate a
romantic relationship might not engage in deep self-disclosure right a way, but rather
increasingly open up as he or she develops greater trust in the potential partner.
The release of emotions, on the other hand, simply requires the sharing of private
thoughts, feelings, or sorrows. We thus have to bear in mind that different motives
will lead to different levels of self-disclosure.
From the discussion of previous research and functional theories of self-
disclosure in Sect. 4.2, it should be clear that the goals associated with self-
disclosure are manifold and sometimes differ only slightly, yet nevertheless produce
differences in the need to self-disclose. As it would be impossible to identify specific
needs in every situation, I chose to look at the overall need for disclosure in this
study. This measure can be regarded as an appropriate proxy for the goals associated
with self-disclosure, as it captures the differences between goals in terms of the
willingness to self-disclose they induce. Although quite obvious, I believe that it is
an important factor to be included in the model as it lies at the root of all other factors
and thus allows a more precise assessment of the following environmental factors.
Consequently, I simply hypothesize that a higher need to self-disclose results in
deeper disclosure:
Hypothesis 2: With regard to internal factors, the need to disclose will be positively related
to depth of self-disclosure in smartphone-based communication situations.
8.4.2 Situational Environmental Factors
The theory of situational privacy and self-disclosure posits that the characteristics
of a specific environment determine the level of privacy in that situation. Taking the
latter of the two perspectives on privacy and self-disclosure, we can now focus on
environmental factors of situations that determine a high level of privacy and should
therefore foster self-disclosure. In this regard, environments are characterized by
two types of factors: (1) the people present in the situation and (2) the level of
protection against identification and content accessibility. Both will be discussed in
the following sections.
8.4.2.1 Environmental Factors 1: Interpersonal Factors
The theory of situational privacy and self-disclosure proposes that interpersonal fac-
tors fundamentally affect self-disclosure in any type of communication (Sect. 7.4.4).
Such assessments are pivotal in any kind of social interaction.We constantly try to
assess someone’s character and base our expectations on how he or she will behave.
Human beings learn and internalize such interpersonal assessments throughout their
lives. On the basis of their experiences, they naturally acquire the capacity to judge
their fellow human beings (Laufer & Wolfe, 1977; Peter & Valkenburg, 2011). Just
as self-disclosure plays an important role in our relationships, the nature of these
is equally important for self-disclosure. Based on the rationale provided by the
theory of situational privacy and self-disclosure, the following two hypotheses can
be formulated:
Hypothesis 3a: Interpersonal trust will be positively related to depth of self-disclosure in
smartphone-based communication situations.
Hypothesis 3b: Relational closeness will be positively related to depth of self-disclosure in
Interpersonal assessments become more difficult when the number of potential

recipients increases. Communicating to larger audiences may thus decrease the
likelihood of high levels of self-disclosure. Consequently, I formulated the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3c: Larger and more diverse audiences will be negatively related to depth of
self-disclosure in smartphone-based communication situations.
Finally, we have to bear in mind that there is consistent support in the literature
for the reciprocity of self-disclosure. In the context of smartphone-based com-
munication, it seems reasonable to assume that people engage in higher levels of
self-disclosure when they have to answer to a message by another person. Hence,
my final hypotheses is formulated as follows:
Hypothesis 3d: Depth of self-disclosure will be higher when the discloser answers a
message compared to when the discloser him- or herself has initiated the conversation.
8.4.2.2 Environmental Factors 2: External Factors
External factors comprise all characteristics of environments that affect the level
of protection against either identification or content accessibility. Based on the
in-depth analysis of smartphone-based communication applications in Sect. 8.2.2,
specifically in terms of their level of visual anonymity and pseudonymity, the
implementation of end-to-end encryption as well as privacy strategies to limit
content visibility can be analyzed in this study. Based on prior literature, these
factors should all positively influence the level of self-disclosure. However, some
further considerations should be noted: First, many of the applications investigated
rely on identification. It is thus very likely that only a few people actually
implement strategies such as visual anonymity or pseudonymity. For example, on
WhatsApp, people almost always communicate with people they know. Within such
environments, it is possible that visual anonymity and pseudonymity may not really
affect self-disclosure. As noted before, protecting oneself against identification is
particularly important in networked publics and when the goal associated with self-
disclosure does not require being identified (e.g., communicating something in a
health forum). Secondly, content visibility is limited by design in many communi-
cation applications. As such, the effect of privacy settings may only be identifiable
in communication applications that allow for one-to-many communication. Based
on these theoretical considerations, I formulated the following research question:
Research Question 8: To what extent do situational external factors such as a) visual
anonymity, b) pseudonymity, c) limited content accessibility, and d) end-to-end encryption
influence the depth of self-disclosure in smartphone-based communication situations?
8.4.3 Potential Interaction Effects
Several interaction (or moderation) effects can be assumed on the basis of the
proposed theory. Broadly, we can differentiate between (1) situational interac-
tions (e.g., internal factors interact with interpersonal factors), (2) non-situational
interactions (e.g., online privacy literacy interacts with privacy concerns), and (3)
cross-situational interactions (e.g., non-situational trait like qualities interact with
situational internal, interpersonal, or external factors).
Among the first type of interactions, the relation between external environ-
mental factors and audience size needs further inspection. In Sect. 7.4.4, I briefly
argued that external environmental factors (visual anonymity, pseudonymity, and
content accessibility) might not necessarily directly affect self-disclosure, but rather
decrease the negative effect of audience size. In other words, when people have
taken steps to prevent identification and content accessibility, who accesses their
disclosed information might become less important.
Non-situational personal factors may also interact. This second type of interac-
tions is very likely with regard to trait-like characteristics such as concerns or skills.
As argued earlier, it is likely that people with higher online privacy literacy may
also be more aware of potential vertical or horizontal privacy risks. As such, we
could argue that higher literacy also increases the effect of those concerns on self-
disclosure. Furthermore, it seems likely that vertical and horizontal privacy concerns
will be correlated and thus also influence the effect of each other on self-disclosure.
Finally, I argued that personality and trait-like characteristics may not just affect
the situational level of self-disclosure in a linear and direct way, but may also
affect how other situational factors influence the level of self-disclosure (see p.
153). Differences in individuals’ characteristics may thus explain why situational
effects vary across individuals. For example, horizontal privacy concerns may render
interpersonal factors more effective in influencing situational self-disclosure. Higher
gregariousness, on the other hand, may weaken the effect of these factors. At the
same time, personality and trait-like characteristics may also affect the way people
perceive external factors. For example, external factors might be more important for
deliberate people than for non-deliberate people. Likewise, higher privacy literacy
may increase the effect of external factors on self-disclosure.
Although all three types of interactions may seem plausible at first glance, they
remain purely speculative, as no prior study has investigated these type of effects,
and there is no empirical evidence available. For this reason, the present study
remains exploratory. I thus formulated the following research question:
Research Question 9: To what extent do interactions between a) several situational, b)
non-situational), as well as c) between situational and non-situational factors contribute to
explaining the depth of self-disclosure?
Chapter 9
Methods
From Part I of this book, as well as my application the proposed theory to

smartphone-based communication in the previous chapter, it should have become
apparent that this empirical investigation cannot be conducted using traditional
methods of data collection. Taking a situational perspective on privacy and self-
disclosure requires us to assess people’s unique perceptions and behaviors in a
variety of situations in addition to more stable person characteristics. Consequently,
it is not enough to simply ask people to remember past experiences and aggregate
them into coherent answers in one-time self-report questionnaires. Instead, we have
to assess people’s individual characteristics, monitor them over a longer period of
time and measure a variety of variables in each relevant communication situation
(Rauthmann, Sherman, & Funder, 2015, p. 376). Only in this way does it become
possible to assess both inter- and intrapersonal variation in perception and behavior.
But how can this be done?
Much of what we know about privacy and self-disclosure processes (both in
online and offline environments) is based on people’s self-reports. Regardless of
whether we use qualitative or quantitative methods, we mostly rely on what people
tell us. Looking at previous studies that have investigated privacy and/or self-
disclosure, we can differentiate between two types of data collection methods: First
and foremost, scholars have used standardized surveys (both paper-and-pencil and
online questionnaires) to investigate relationships between people’s general feel-
ings, experiences, attitudes, intentions, or behaviors. This data collection technique
has several benefits but also serious drawbacks (for an overview, see Hoyle, Harris,
& Judd, 2008). In general, surveys should only be used when the variables of interest
are reasonably stable over a longer period of time (Brosius, Haas, & Koschel, 2016,
p. 133) or when people are asked to report some form of historical information
(Schwartz & Stone, 2007, p. 12). Accurate reporting is only possible when the
assessed variables fulfill these criteria. If this is not the case, participants have to
perform an abstract aggregation on the basis of several—potentially diverging—
experiences in order to give coherent responses to a standardized set of items.

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-78884-5_9
216 9 Methods
These answers, however, are likely to be falsely constructed representations of

the variable of interest. Self-reports of frequent and irregular behavior as well as
situational accounts of intensity measures are particularly problematic because they
tend to be theory-driven and thus biased (Schwartz & Stone, 2007, pp. 14–20). In
general, recalling information is a complex mental process that is influenced by a
multitude of factors (for overviews, see Barrett & Barrett, 2001; Bradburn, Rips,
& Shevell, 1987; Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Sudman, Bradburn, & Schwarz, 1996;
Tourangeau, Rips, & Rasinski, 2000). Among those factors, the most problematic
for this inquiry is that these aggregated measures flatten situational variance into
one broad self-reported measure that is overly affected by salient experiences
(e.g., recent events compared to older events). They thus only represent random
moments within a larger universe of events. Generally speaking, using surveys to
assess perceptions, behaviors, or other variables that vary across situations poses
considerable problems.
Second, scholars have used experiments to study the effect of certain conditions
or manipulations on people’s behavior. Obviously, experiments are designed to
assess people’s feelings, perceptions, or behavior within a situation. As such, they
represent valuable approaches to measuring situational behavior and may be the
only way to provide proofs of causality. However, experiments also have several
weaknesses (for overviews, see Brosius et al., 2016; Czienskowski, 1996; Hoyle
et al., 2008). One major problem is with regard to external validity: Experimental
designs generally maximize internal validity (i.e., as they isolate single effects
and rule out most alternative explanations), but reduce external validity (i.e., the
generalizability of the findings). This is consequential for two reasons: First, experi-
ments are often conducted in a laboratory setting and thus represent highly artificial
situations. Second, the investigated setting (even when ignoring its artificiality) is
just one situation among a multitude of similar or diverging situations encountered
in daily life. In conclusions, we can say that experiments are not suitable to test the
assumptions of the proposed theory either.
I thus propose a multi-method approach that combines traditional survey methods
with novel data collection procedures such as data logging and experience sampling.
In the main study, these methods for data collection are conducted on participant’s
smartphones. As mobile communication is conducted on the smartphone, the device
simultaneously becomes the instrument for and the object of investigation. In this
way, it becomes possible to capture the entirety of factors that influence people’s
self-disclosure across several smartphone-based communication situations. In the
next section, I will discuss experience sampling methods (ESM) and logging
procedures separately. I will then highlight their unique potential to measure factors
and behaviors from a situational perspective when combined, before proceeding to
discuss the specific research design of the present study.
9.1 Beyond Traditional Data Collection Methods 217
9.1 Beyond Traditional Data Collection Methods
In studying smartphone-based communication, the technical features of the smart-

phone itself allow individual’s communication and media use to be assessed in a
much more detail than ever before. In this section, I am going to discuss two types of
data collection techniques that are particularly useful in assessing smartphone-based
communication: the mobile experience sampling method (M-ESM) and the tracking
of user behavior through logging. These two methods were applied in combination
in the present study.
9.1.1 The Experience Sampling Method
The experience sampling method (ESM) can be regarded as a specific form of

ecological momentary assessment (EMA).1 These methods are generally considered
to avoid recall and its attendant bias by collecting data on momentary states,
ensure ecological validity by collecting data in the real world, and achieve temporal
resolution, enabling the analysis of dynamic processes over time (Stone & Shiffman,
2007, p. 6). The ESM is a particularly valuable form of EMA when the variables of
interest are accessible to introspection, yet vary largely across situations.
The ESM was developed in the 1970s by psychologists at the University of
Chicago (Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1987; Hektner, Schmidt, & Csikszentmihalyi,
2007; Kubey, Larson, & Csikszentmihalyi, 1996; Larson & Csikszentmihalyi, 2014)
in order to measure behavior, feelings, and attitudes as they occur in natural
environments. These scholars recognized that one-time measures rarely capture
the richness and variability of behaviors such as communication and searched for
alternative data collection methods (Kubey et al., 1996, p. 99). The basic idea
of this technique is to prompt study participants to answer a number of short
questionnaires at random times throughout the day. This method thus consists
of several self-reports made by respondents as they engage in ordinary activities
(Kubey et al., 1996, p. 100) The goal is to measure “internal (how people think
and feel) as well as external (time, location, and social context) dimensions of
experience” (Vandewater & Lee, 2009, p. 8). As Karnowski and Doedens (2010)
noted, the ESM is theoretically related to the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl
and the pragmatism of William James, as it concentrates on individuals’ subjective
experience and conceptualizes life as the sum of many such experiences (p. 212).
Initially, researchers handed out electronic pagers (also called ‘beepers’) and
a small booklet of self-report forms to the respondents. The pager reminded
participants to answer the short questionnaires at random times throughout the day
1 Other forms of EMA include diaries, behavioral observation, self-monitoring, time budget studies,
or ambulatory monitoring. For more information on these data collection techniques, see Stone,
Shiffman, Atienza, and Nebeling (2007).
218 9 Methods
over a number of consecutive days (usually about a week) (e.g., Larson, 1977).
Conceptually, the ESM can be compared to the self-reflective data collection in dairy
studies (Görland, 2017; Karnowski, 2013). However, it moves the self-assessment
time point closer to the actual activity, combining the high ecological validity of
diary studies with more reliable measurements. In technical terms, the researcher
receives self-reported measures by randomly sampling events that should in prin-
ciple be representative of individuals’ daily lives. By prompting respondents to
immediately reflect on their behaviors while performing them, the ESM overcomes
the problem of biased recalling mentioned earlier. As Barrett and Barrett (2001)
emphasize, the ESM “does not require retrieval or reconstruction of data from
memory but rather involves access to and accurate reporting of information available
to conscious awareness” (p. 176). Thus, measures from ESM studies are typically be
regarded as reliable and valid self-assessments (Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1987;
Karnowski, 2013; Larson & Csikszentmihalyi, 2014). Nevertheless, the quality of
such measures rests on the assumption that the respondents are actually aware of and
have access to the required information, and moreover, are willing to report it. As
such, we have to bear in mind that ESM is perhaps “best thought of as a procedure
that allows participants to report the contents of awareness along with the situation
in which that awareness takes place” (Barrett & Barrett, 2001, p. 176).
Although ESM studies have mostly used the random sampling procedure
described above, several types of ESM differing with regard to their sampling
method can be distinguished (e.g., Scollon, Kim-Prieto, & Diener, 2003; Shiffman,
2007): Interval-contingent sampling refers to collecting data at designated time
intervals (e.g., every hour or every day) for a longer period of time. Oftentimes,
this type of sampling is also referred to as time-sampling because respondents
are prompted to answer the self-report questionnaires at specific times (e.g., 6.00
pm every day). Event-contingent sampling or event-based sampling refers to data
collection after a predesignated event occurs (e.g., after the respondent has eaten,
has watched TV, has used the Internet, etc.). A specific form of this is known
as self-sampling, as it requires the individual to start the questionnaires him-
or herself. However, compliance is hard to document in such studies. Studying
mediated activities, on the other hand, sometimes allows such event-contingent
sampling procedures to be automatized. As this requires the combination of ESM
and logging techniques, I will discuss these types of automatic event-contingent
sampling procedures more thoroughly below. Lastly, random sampling or signal-
contingent sampling refers to the original procedure proposed by the Chicago
School.
Some scholars have recently introduced the term mobile experience sampling
method (M-ESM) to describe research designs in which mobile devices are used
to collect data (Karnowski, 2013; Karnowski & Doedens, 2010; Randall & Rickard,
2013). Several types of M-ESM approaches can be differentiated (for a discussion of
the costs and benefits of each, see Hofmann & Patel, 2015): (1) giving participants
a prepared device (PDA approach), (2) installing an application on participant’s
smartphones (local APP approach), or (3) sending web-based surveys to participants
via SMS (survey distribution approach). The last two approaches seem particularly
9.1 Beyond Traditional Data Collection Methods 219
valuable for studying smartphone-based communication and smartphone use as

they dissolve the boundary between research and participants (Kato, 2014, as cited
in Görland, 2017, p. 23). This has several beneficial implications for conducting
mobile communication research (see Karnowski & Doedens, 2010, pp. 214–215):
1. Participants do not have to carry an extra device (e.g., electronic pager) around
with them; sampling thus becomes possible without interruptions throughout the
day.
2. Participants do not have to carry printed questionnaires around with them; web-
or application-based surveys can be specifically programmed (e.g., including
filters)
3. Time stamps can be recorded and provide researchers with data on whether and
when a questionnaire was answered.
4. The technical features of smartphones allow for the integration of other methods
of data and content collection (e.g., multimedia content, smartphone sensor data
such as GPS, etc.).
5. The local app approach specifically may also allow to enable the integration
of automatic event-contingent sampling (see further below) and assessments
participants’ smartphone use through log files.
6. Data can be collected and saved during the study.
Despite its advantages and inherent potential, both the M-ESM and the general
ESM have only rarely been implemented in communication science. Some scholars,
for example, have applied these methods to investigate TV use (Csikszentmihalyi &
Kubey, 1981; Karnowski & von Pape, 2009; Kubey & Larson, 1990; Vandewater
& Lee, 2009), video games (Kubey & Larson, 1990), music listening (Greasley
& Lamont, 2011; Randall & Rickard, 2013; Sloboda, O’Neill, and Ivaldi, 2001),
gratifications of media use (Scherer & Schlütz, 2002; Schlütz, 2002), and media
use for procrastination (Reinecke & Hofmann, 2016). These studies all obtained
fine-grained—and often surprising—insights in the studied phenomena.
9.1.2 Combining Experience Sampling and Tracking Methods
As communication scholars, we often want to know when, how often, and how
long people use certain media. Until recently, there was no alternative to simply
asking people to estimate the frequency and duration of their media use. Naturally,
it is quite difficult for respondents to remember, characterize, and aggregate their
media use (Boase & Ling, 2013). Now, however, alternative methods exist that allow
people’s media use to be tracked by assessing log data. A log file can be regarded as
a datum in which a certain event that occurred within a given software is recorded.
With the rise of software-based devices (e.g., the computer, mobile phones, etc.),
the collection of large quantities of log data has become possible (Boase, 2013).
Tracking behavior in this way represents a methodological opportunity for studying
mobile phone use because of two inherent advantages:
220 9 Methods
First, it allows exact measures of media use frequency and duration to be

obtained. As log files generally include information about when and for how long
a certain event occurred, it enables reliable estimates of media use to be computed.
Consequently, the first studies using this method investigated how measures from
log data relate to self-reported measures. In the context of TV use, for example,
Wonneberger and Irazoqui (2013, June) found that people generally overreport the
number of viewing days per week, but underreport their viewing duration. In the
context of mobile phone use, Boase (2013) and Abeele, Beullens, and Roe (2013)
both found that people generally overreported the number of calls and text messages
sent or received during a specific period. Similar results can be found in the context
of Internet use (Goulet & Hampton, 2012, May; Junco, 2013; Scharkow, 2016). That
being said, it should be noted that despite these known problems, “a vast majority
of studies in communication research rely on self-report data, mainly because other,
more direct measures such as [. . . ] observation data are very costly and/or require
much effort from researchers and respondents” (Scharkow, 2016, p. 13).
Second, as log files are created directly after a certain event occurs, such
tracking methods in principle allow media use to be monitored in real time.
When these log files are directly sent to a server the researcher can access, real
time information about participants’ engagement with specific media becomes
accessible, and predesignated interventions tied to previously defined events become
possible. Obviously, this represents a valuable extension to the traditional ESM, as
it allows to event-contingent sampling procedures to be automatized. When log data
can be assessed as soon as they are created, they can also be used to trigger short
questionnaires. In the context of smartphone use, for example, this might allow to
trigger specific questionnaires immediately after certain applications are used or
certain activities within an application are performed. Consequently, the researcher
is able to get even closer to activities of interest, further reducing the recollection
time between actual media use and self-report in the ESM questionnaire. Such
procedures have been called “context-triggered in situ procedures” (Chang, Paruthi,
& Newman, 2015).
So far, however, only a few studies have implemented ESM and log data
methods in combination. Schenk, Niemann, Reinmann, and Roßnagel (2012), for
example, used a specifically programmed browser extension that triggered short
questionnaires every time a person used a specific function on Facebook (e.g.,
posting a status update, changing profile information, accepting a friend request,
or writing a private message). The authors descriptively investigated whether
participants thought about their privacy when performing these activities (via a
single item ranging from 1 = does not apply at all to 5 = applies fully). Interestingly,
respondents indicated on average that they do not think about their privacy when
engaging in any of these activities. (Means were consistently below the scale’s
midpoint; for more information, see Schenk et al., 2012, pp. 190–234.)
Bayer, Ellison, Schoenebeck, Brady, and Falk (2016) applied a similar approach
using a specifically programmed Facebook app. By assessing the open Facebook
API, their triggering system would send out an ESM survey every time a participant
posted content to Facebook. The goal of the study was to investigate the effect of
9.2 Overall Research Design 221
Facebook use on subsequent mood. The authors were thus able to measure mood-
related variables just minutes after people had used Facebook. The results suggested
that Facebook positively effects mood right after usage, but has no longitudinal
effect on overall mood.
These studies clearly support the assumption that many effects we as communi-
cation scholars are interested in analyzing are tied to fleeting experiences and vary
across situations. They also show that behavior fluctuates. Consequently, the present
study adopted a similar data collection approach. The following section describes
the specific research design in detail.
9.2 Overall Research Design
In testing the theory of situational privacy and self-disclosure, the main method-
ological challenge is to measure the entirety of factors that theoretically influence
self-disclosure in a given situation. First, we need to assess respondent’s trait-
like characteristics. Second, we need to assess a variety of situationally-varying
personal and environmental factors. Assessing external environmental factors is
further complicated by the variety of possible situations that potential respondents
may encounter during the study.
The present study combines traditional online survey methods, the tracking of
smartphone and specifically of application use, and mobile experience sampling
methods. This combined research design represents the ideal form for empirically
investigating the theory of situational privacy and self-disclosure. All three methods
are necessary to capture the entirety of factors that influence self-disclosure
during smartphone-based communication. First, the online survey is necessary
to assess non-situational personal factors such as socio-demographic variables,
overall privacy concerns, literacy and skills, and personality facets. Moreover,
preventive privacy regulation behaviors within specific smartphone applications
can be assessed through surveys as they represent rather infrequent behaviors
that can be accurately recollected (Schwartz & Stone, 2007, p. 14). Second,
participants’ smartphone use needs to be recorded both to assess overall usage and
to automatically trigger situational questionnaires. Third, all situationally-varying
factors (both personal and environmental) need to be assessed through an automatic
event-contingent sampling ESM approach as they represent frequent, yet irregular
and situationally-varying variables (Schwartz & Stone, 2007, p. 14). Lastly, a post-
survey allows potential interferences resulting from the overall research design to
be identified. Figure 9.1 shows the research design that was developed on the basis
of this rationale.
Such a complex research design has several specific technical and method-
ological requirements. First, it is important to carefully design the situational
questionnaires. Previous research has shown that answering each questionnaire
should not take longer than 2–3 min (Hektner et al., 2007; Karnowski & Doedens,
2010). As participants have to answer these questionnaires several times throughout
222 9 Methods
Pre-Study Pretests Pre-Survey Field-Study Post-Survey
December February April

2014 2015 2015
Fig. 9.1 Overall research design
the study and potentially at different times during the day, they can only include
a limited number of items. Nevertheless, the instruments assessing the constructs
of interest should be reliable (even when operationalized as a single item). For this
reason, a pre-study was conducted in order to identify suitable short instruments
for the main study. Second, several technical difficulties have to be considered.
Specifically, in the main study, the different types of data obtained during each
of the consecutive data collection steps must be assignable to the respondent
who generated it. It is thus important to attach a unique identifier code to each
collected datum. It is further necessary to test the planned sampling strategy
beforehand. As I will discuss further below, sampling real-life situations involves
several methodological and technical considerations (e.g., including time-based
filters or adapting the event-based sampling to individual media usage patterns).
Thus, several pretests were conducted to ensure a smooth procedure.
In the following section, I briefly describe the design and the results of the pre-
study and discuss their implications for the main study. Afterwards, in the critical
portion of this chapter, I describe the design of the main study in detail.
9.3 Pre-study
The aim of the pre-study was to find reliable instruments both for the pre-survey (in
which long scales could be implemented) and the ESM study (in which only short
instruments could be used). However, not all factors that were eventually measured
in the main study were also included in this pre-study. In order to not overburden
participants, I only included those measures which needed to be measured with a
single-item in the ESM study and the newly developed measures whose reliability
and validity needed to be assessed.
9.3 Pre-study 223
9.3.1 Sample and Procedure
The data for the pre-study stem from an online survey that was conducted from
the 26th of November 2014 until the 8th of December 2014. The link to the study
was disseminated using a snowball sampling technique: The author posted the link
on his Facebook profile, encouraging his Facebook network to participate in the
study and share the link among their networks. Overall, N = 185 Facebook users
took part in the pre-study, the majority of whom lived in Germany (92%). Due to
missing data, 25 participants had to be excluded. The following analyses are thus
based on the remaining n = 160 participants. Their average age was M = 26 years
(SD = 7.39, range = 18–55) and 71% of them were female. Half of the participants
had a university degree (54%) and about a third had a higher eduction entrance
certificate (Abitur).
The goal of the pre-study was to retrospectively assess a number of factors that
influenced the level of self-disclosure in two different mediated communication
situations. Thus, the approach was similar to the one applied by Bazarova (2012).
Participants were randomly assigned to two groups. The first group (79 participants:
Mage = 27 years, SD = 7.1; 76% female) was asked to copy and paste their latest
status update on Facebook into a designated field in the survey.2 All subsequent
questions referred to this specific post, which can regarded as a type of one-to-many
communication in a networked public. Participants in the first group reported to
spend on average 1.5 h per day on Facebook.
The second group (81 participants: Mage = 26 years, SD = 7.7; 66% female)
was asked to insert their last message they had written in an instant messenger
conversation into the designated field in the survey. The same subsequent questions
now referred to this specific message, which can be regarded as a form of one-to-
one communication within a networked dyadic interaction. On average, this group
reported using their favorite instant messenger 2 h and 8 min per day.
9.3.2 Measures
The following instruments were developed on the basis of prior research whenever
possible. All items were designed and presented in German. Item formulations and
their psychometric properties can be found translated into English in a table in the
Appendix A (p. 347).
Depth of Self-Disclosure Using a similar approach as Bazarova (2012), partici-
pants were asked to rate their latest post or message, respectively, with regard to four
bi-polar items. Respondents indicated on a 7-point scale whether the information in
2 Eight participants did not own a smartphone. These participants were directly assigned to this first
group.
224 9 Methods
the message or post was very intimate vs. not at all intimate, very private vs. not at
all private, very personal vs. not at all personal, and very confidential vs. not at all
confidential.
Online Privacy Concerns As discussed earlier, online privacy concerns can be
regarded as a trait-like characteristic of Internet users. Previous literature has
developed several measures to assess Internet users’ concern about their online
privacy. Buchanan, Joinson, Paine, and Reips (2007), for example, developed a
16-item scale that was subsequently used and refined in many empirical studies
(e.g., Dienlin & Trepte, 2015; Stieger, Burger, Bohn, & Voracek, 2013; Taddicken,
2014). However, this scale does not differ between horizontal and vertical privacy
concerns and lacks items regarding concern about website or mobile application
providers’ and institutions’ data collection practices. To overcome this shortcom-
ing, a new 12-item scale was developed on the basis of previous literature on
privacy concerns that included items referring to concerns about vertical intrusions
stemming from website and mobile application providers (e.g., “How concerned
are you about website provider (e.g., Facebook, Google, Amazon,. . . ) giving your
data to unknown third parties?”), and institutions (e.g., “How concerned are you
about institutions, government authorities, or intelligence services monitoring your
online communication?”), as well as concerns about privacy violations from other
users (e.g., “How concerned are you about other people (e.g., your employer,
acquaintances, neighbors, friends,. . . ) getting information about you without your
consent?”). Respondents answered each item on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 = not
at all concerned to 5 = very concerned.
Need to Self-disclose Participants reassessed how strongly they felt the need to
disclose themselves in that particular situation. Four items were developed (e.g., “In
this situation, my desire was to communicate with other people”) and answered
on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree. An
additional, more generic single item was also tested (“How strong was your need
to share something?”) which was answered on a slider ranging from 1 = very low to
101 = very strong.
Interpersonal Trust Several scales to measure trust have been proposed in the
literature (e.g., Rotter, 1967). However, it is important to differentiate between
generalized trust and targeted trust. Whereas the first refers to overall trust in the
benevolence of people, the latter refers to the trustworthiness of a specific person.
Larzelere and Huston (1980) developed a short scale consisting of eight items that
specifically measure dyadic trust. In the original study, this scale had a high internal
consistency (Cronbach’s α = 0.93), was unaffected by social desirability, and was
distinct from other types of trust (Larzelere & Huston, 1980, p. 599). For the purpose
of this study, the scale was adapted to the two study conditions: The first group of
participants were asked to think about the people in their Facebook contact list, and
the second group about the person with whom they had shared their last message.
All eight items (e.g., “I feel that I can trust [my Facebook friends/this person]
completely”) were answered on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 = strongly disagree
9.3 Pre-study 225
to 5 = strongly agree. An additional, generic single item was also included (“How
much do you trust [your Facebook friends/this person]?”) and was again answered
on a slider ranging from 1 to 101.
Relational Closeness The Relational Closeness Scale by Vangelisti and Caughlin
(1997) was adapted to assess how people perceived the person(s) with whom
they shared the post or message. This scale comprises three dimensions that
measure subjective assessments of psychological closeness (4 items: e.g., “The
opinion of [my Facebook friends/this person] is important to me”), similarity (5
items: e.g., “[My Facebook friends/this person] and I share a lot of the same
attitudes about things”), and everyday centrality (3 items: e.g., “I see [my Facebook
friends/this person] very often.”). The internal consistencies of these dimensions
were acceptable in the original study (Cronbach’s α between 0.74 and 0.93). All
15 items were answered on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to
5 = strongly agree. For each dimension, generic items were developed that were
again assessed on a slider ranging from 1 to 101.
9.3.3 Results and Implications
All variables were examined with regard to their univariate distributions. In

medium-sized samples (50 < n < 300), normal distribution should be assessed
based on the absolute z-scores of skewness and kurtosis (computed by dividing the
absolute value by the respective standard error) (Kim, 2013, p. 53). Values above
3.29 indicate non-normality. Only a few items could not be considered normally
distributed using these cutoffs. However, the assumption of multivariate normality
for each set of items that was subjected to confirmatory factor analysis (CFA)
had to be dismissed (Mardia, 2016). To account for this, all CFAs were computed
with robust maximum likelihood estimation (MLR).3 I treated missing data with
casewise deletion and assessed model fit according to the criteria proposed by
Hair, Black, Babin, and Andersen (2010, p. 584). In some cases, changes were
made a posteriori to improve the model. These modifications of the models were
based on empirical (e.g., modification indices or factor loadings) and theoretical
considerations. The internal consistency and composite reliability of the factors
were assessed using Cronbach’s α and McDonald’s ω, respectively. To assess the
factorial validity, I calculated the average variance extracted (AVE). Values above
0.50 imply good convergent validity, indicating that more than 50% of the variance
is explained by the indicators and not attributable to measurement error (Hair et al.,
2010, p. 619).
The best fitting models with factors that also exhibited high reliability and
validity were considered for use in the pre-survey of the main study. For the
3 See p. 243 for more information on the robust estimation.

226 9 Methods
situational measures, the following procedure was applied to find the best items
to function as single item measures in the ESM study: In general, I identified the
item with the highest true score (= highest factor loading) and asked whether this
item adequately represented the overall latent construct. If the face validity was
high, I chose this item as the single item measure. Sometimes, however, the item
with the highest true score referred to a somewhat specific aspect of the overall
construct. If the scale also included a more generic item with a high factor loading,
I considered that alternative for the single item measure. That being said, in some
cases I computed the correlation between the overall latent variable and the generic
item I had also included in the survey because the resulting coefficient can be
regarded as a measure of the reliability of that particular item (similar to the item-
to-total correlation, see Hair et al., 2010, p. 123). When the correlation coefficient
was above 0.70, I chose the generic item over a too-specific item from the latent
construct as the single item measure. All analyses were conducted with the statistical
software environment R (Version 3.1.2), using the packages lavaan (Rosseel, 2012)
and semTools (semTools Contributors, 2016). All descriptive statistics and factor
loadings of the variables can be found in the Appendix A. The fit indices for the
final models (i.e., after modification) can be found in Table 9.1.
Depth of self-disclosure was modeled as a uni-dimensional latent construct. The
model fit well and the single factor had good internal consistency (Cronbach’s
α = 0.83) as well as good composite reliability (McDonald’s ω = 0.84). The AVE
was 0.57, indicating an acceptable convergent validity. Factor loadings were all
satisfactory (λ > 0.65), however, the item private vs. not at all private had the highest
true-score reliability (λ = 0.87), and was hence chosen as the single item for the main
study.
As proposed, I modeled online privacy concerns as a four-dimensional construct
(see Table A.2 in the Appendix). This model also fit the data well, with the factor
loadings in all four dimensions above 0.70. The first three dimensions had good
internal consistencies, composite reliabilities, and a high AVE (concerns about
provider: α = 0.86, ω = 0.86, AVE = 0.67; concerns about institutions: α = 0.90,
ω = 0.90, AVE = 0.76; concerns about users: α = 0.83, ω = 0.83, AVE = 0.64). The
last dimension, namely concerns about identity theft, had lower reliability (α = 0.66,
ω = 0.66) and the AVE was slightly below 0.50. Although the initial model fit
the data well, the modification indices revealed that the item “How concerned
Table 9.1 Fit indices for the pre-study scales

Variables χ2 df p CFI TLI RMSEA
Depth of self-disclosure 3.43 2 0.180 0.99 0.97 0.07 [0.00, 0.18]
Online privacy concerns 58.78 38 0.017 0.97 0.95 0.06 [0.03, 0.09]
Interpersonal trust 17.21 9 0.046 0.99 0.98 0.08 [0.02, 0.13]
Relational closeness 94.66 51 < 0.001 0.97 0.96 0.07 [0.05, 0.09]
Note: df = Degrees of freedom, CFI = Comparative fit index, TLI = Tucker-Lewis index, RMSEA
= Root mean square error of approximation
9.3 Pre-study 227
are you about other people sharing information about you (e.g., photos, your
address, experiences etc.) without your consent?” had cross-loadings on the third
factor (concern about other users) and the fourth factor (concern about identity
theft). Furthermore, the other two items assigned to the third factor, which referred
to the concerns that other people might get information about oneself without
one’s consent, shared more common variance with each other than with the third
item. To address these shortcomings of the third dimension, three new items
were developed in order to measure two subdimensions of user-related concerns:
concerns about other people getting information without one’s consent and concerns
about other people sharing information without one’s consent. Lastly, another item
was developed for the last dimension in order to improve its reliability.
Need to self-disclose was modeled as a uni-dimensional latent construct; how-
ever, the CFA did not result in an acceptable model fit. As a result, the generic item
was chosen as the single item measure.
Interpersonal trust was modeled as a unidimensional latent construct. The fit of
this first model was not very good, χ 2 (20) = 108.00, p < 0.001; CFI = 0.94;
RMSEA = 0.17. Modification indices revealed that all reverse coded items loaded
onto one additional factor. However, including a method factor yielded a non-
identified model. Thus, all three reverse coded items were excluded. The restricted
model then had an acceptable fit to the data (Table 9.1). The single factor then had
good reliability (α and ω = 0.96) and good convergent validity (AVE = 0.82). As
all of the remaining items represented somewhat specific aspects of the overall
construct, the correlation between the generic item and the latent variable was
computed. With r = 0.73 (p < 0.001), the generic item had a good reliability
and was hence chosen as single-item measure for the ESM study.
In line with Vangelisti and Caughlin (1997), relational closeness was modeled
as a three-dimensional construct including the factors psychological closeness,
similarity, and everyday centrality. The model fit was acceptable, and all three
dimensions had a high internal consistency (α > 0.93), a high composite reliability
(ω > 0.93) and a high AVE (> 0.75). With regard to the first dimension, the
item “My Facebook friends/this person are/is important to me” was chosen as
the best single item because it is the most generic item and had the second-
highest factor loading (λ = 0.89). With regard to similarity, the second item “My
Facebook friends/this person and I share a lot of the same attitudes about things”
was chosen because it had the highest factor loading (λ = 0.93) and represents a
particularly interesting aspect of relationships that might be important in influencing
a respondent’s willingness to self-disclose to that person. With regard to everyday
centrality, the last item “I communicate very often with my Facebook friends/that
person” was chosen even though it had slightly lower factor loading than the other
two items (λ = 0.87). From a theoretical point of view, it seems more important
to measure the general communication frequency of two people when investigating
people’s smartphone-based communication as people do not necessarily have to see
each other to establish some form of relational closeness. The final item selection
for the ESM- study can be found in Table 9.2.
228 9 Methods
Table 9.2 Item selection for the ESM-study

Concept Selected item
Depth of self-disclosure Q: How private was the content that you shared?
A: Not at all private–very private
Need to self-disclose Q: How strong was your need to disclose?
A: Very low–very strong
Interpersonal trust Q: How much do you trust your [target person(s)]?
A: Not at all–very much
Relational closeness
Psychological closeness My [target person(s)] is/are important to me.
Similarity My [target person(s)] and I share a lot of the same attitudes about
things.
Everyday centrality I communicate very often with my [target person(s)].
Pre-Survey ESM Study Post-Survey

(N = 1,572) (n = 164) (n = 149)
10 April 2015 10 April 2015 24 April 2015

- - -
09 May 2015 11 May 2015 31 May 2015
Fig. 9.2 Research design of the main study
9.4 Main Study
The main study consisted of three different data collection steps, which took
place from the 10th of April 2015 until the 31st of May 2015 (Fig. 9.2). First,
people were recruited to answer an online questionnaire which was designed to
measure general socio-demographic information and personality facets, media use
(with a focus on smartphone use), general trait-like measures (e.g, smartphone
affinity and organizational trust), privacy-related measures (e.g., privacy literacy,
horizontal and vertical privacy concerns, general privacy protection strategies), and
application specific settings and privacy manipulations. At the end of the survey,
smartphone users with an Android operating system were invited to participate
in a 2-week experience sampling study which would be conducted on their own
smartphone. To increase participation in this subsequent study, interested people
were incentivized with a e 20 payment, which they received after completion of the
study. Additionally, people were offered the chance to win one of several prizes (1x
iPad Mini 2, 2x Samsung Galaxy S3 Mini, 3x vouchers for short trips, and 4x e 10
Amazon vouchers).
9.4 Main Study 229
Fig. 9.3 Screenshots of movisensXS questionnaires
After obtaining participants’ consent (see also further below), they were
prompted to install the application movisensXS (movisens GmbH, 2017), which
can be downloaded from the Google Play Store. In short, movisensXS is an
Android-based application that allows researchers to conduct ESM studies with
different sampling designs (particularly time- and self-sampling). For this study, the
application was specifically modified in order to capture participants’ application
use in log files and use this data to trigger self-report questionnaires. Several types
of questions can be included in these situational questionnaires, which have high
usability and an unobtrusive design (see Fig. 9.3).
In the month preceding the study, Android released a new version called
“Lollipop 5.0”. With this update, the application programming interface (API)
that provided access to people’s log files was unfortunately no longer available.
Consequently, people who had updated their smartphone prior to the study were not
able to participate. However, most people were still using older Android version
such as “Jelly Bean” (4.1 to 4.3) or “KitKat” (4.4) at the time of the study.
After installation, participants were asked to photograph a QR code presented
on the last page of the online survey. This procedure automatically linked their
smartphone to both their online survey data and with the programmed ESM
study. After the installation process was completed, the application automatically
started tracking participants’ application use and triggered questionnaires using the
selected sampling strategy (see below). These questionnaires always included a first
question about the activities performed within the relevant applications. Whenever
participants indicated that they had posted or shared some content (text, photo,
audio, video, link) they were asked about the depth of self-disclosure as well as
all personal and environmental factors present in that situation.
230 9 Methods
After 2 weeks, participants received a short message through movisensXS that

included a short description of how to terminate the ESM study and a link to a
mobile version of the post-survey. This questionnaire was designed to assess how
participants perceived the study and collect information necessary for the incentive
payment. Items measured the influence of the study on participants’ answers, the
perceived disruptiveness of the research design, and whether participants used some
form of avoidance strategy in order to answer fewer questionnaires.
9.4.1 Sample and Procedure
Based on the existing literature, I assumed that the assumed effects would nonethe-
less be small (about r = 0.10). I thus aimed at recruiting as many participants to
detect such small effects with an α-error probability of 5% and a power of 80%.
Power analyses revealed a minimal sample size of N = 779. Due to the study design,
the hypotheses and research questions are tested based on different levels (pre-
survey sample, ESM study sample, and number of events per participants in the
ESM study). I hence tried to recruit as many participants as possible for the pre-
survey so that enough participants and disclosure events would remain for testing
both the non-situational and situational effects in the ESM study.
Participants were initially recruited from the Socio-Scientific Panel, which is
a noncommercial online access panel with voluntary participation (Leiner, 2012,
2016). Members receive a maximum of four invitations for online surveys per year.
The panel currently comprises about 100,000 email addresses (fluctuating due to
the addition of new members and the removal of inactive panelists). Questionnaires
have to go through a peer-review process in order to be selected for the panel.
Several formulations in the pre-survey were improved at the reviewer’s request.
An overview of the final sample in terms of socio-demographics can be found in
Table 9.3.
The link to the pre-survey questionnaire was distributed to a random selection
of the panel on the 10th of April 2015. Recipients were informed that all data
collected via the online survey would be anonymous and handled confidentially.
They were further informed that, depending on their eligibility (specifically, whether
they have an appropriate smartphone operating system), they would also be invited
to participate in a subsequent study. Overall, N = 2014 people clicked on the
link, n = 1692 started filling out the questionnaire, and n = 1572 also completed
it (completion rate: 77.6%). On average, it took M = 15.45 min (SD = 6.13 min) to
finish the survey. Sensitivity analyses revealed that effects of non-situational factors
on preventive privacy regulation behavior with an effect size of r > .071 could be
tested when assuming an α-error probability of 5% and a power of 80%.
The resulting convenience sample had an average age of M = 36.39 years
(SD = 14.80 years; range = 15–87 years) and about two thirds were female (60.19%).
Participants mostly lived in Germany (86.19%), although a few participants lived
in Austria (9.59%), Switzerland (1.92%), or other countries (2.30%). The sample
9.4 Main Study 231
generally was highly educated: 58.88% had a university degree and another 30.14%
had a university entrance certificate. Most participants were either employed or
freelancing (43.57%) or currently registered as students (34.55%).
In order to identify participants who would be able to run movisensXS on their
smartphones, participants were asked in the online survey whether they generally
use a smartphone and if yes, what type of smartphone they own. Overall, 80.09%
of the sample were smartphone users and the most frequently used operating
systems were Android (67.04%), iOS (24.43%), Windows (5.22%), and Blackberry
(0.87%). Although the majority of respondents were thus eligible to be invited to
participate in the subsequent ESM study, the distribution of the smartphone types
only somewhat compared to the actual market shares. According to the International
Data Corporation (IDC, 2016), Android had a market share of 79.6% in 2015,
whereas iOS (the iPhone’s operating system) had only 18.7%.
All N = 848 Android users were provided with detailed information about
the procedure of the subsequent ESM study and that they could discontinue
participation at any time. Specifically, they were informed that they would need
to install the application movisensXS and what type of data it would collect.4 It
was further explained that all collected data would be anonymous and used only
for scientific purposes. Potential participants were also informed of how often they
could expect short questionnaires during the 2-week period. After this explanation,
n = 314 indicated interest in the ESM-study (37.02%). Only respondents who agreed
to the consent form were instructed to download the application and start the study.
A few participants had Android operating systems newer than version 4.4 and
thus had to be excluded from the study. Furthermore, several initially interested
users (who had agreed to take part in the study) decided not to participate during
the installation process. Another several participants contacted the author because
they were not able to install the application on their smartphones. In the end, n = 185
people took part in the ESM study. Twenty-one participants, however, either did not
use their smartphone in a way that triggered situational questionnaires (e.g., they
only used their smartphone for calls or non communicative activities) or answered
several questionnaires but never shared or posted a message. These participants
were thus also excluded. The following analyses are hence based on the remaining
n = 164 people who used their smartphone in ways that produced valuable data
(share of the pre-survey sample: 10.43%). Sensitivity analyses revealed that such
a sample size allows to test effect sizes of r > 0.215. I will thus refrain from drawing
inferences from smaller effects sizes in the multilevel analyses. Participants were
M = 29.5 years old on average (SD = 10.00 years, range = 16–63 years), and 66.46%
were female. Overall, the ESM subsample and the base sample of the pre-survey
from which it was drawn had similar socio-demographic characteristics. However,
4 The application recorded people’s smartphone and application use in log files. More specifically,
it recorded when people accessed their smartphone and when they accessed applications. For each
application use episode, it recorded the date, time, and type of application that was used.
232 9 Methods
Table 9.3 Sample description

Pre-survey ESM study
Sample size (N) 1572 164
Share (%) 10.4
Age (M)∗ 36.4 29.5
Gender (%)
Female 60.2 66.5
Male 39.8 33.5
Education (%)
No school leaving certificate 0.8 1.8
Basic school leaving certificate 2.4 1.8
Secondary school leaving certificate 7.9 6.1
University entrance certificate 30.1 34.1
University degree 58.9 56.1
Nationality (%)
German 86.2 90.9
Swiss 1.9 0.6
Austrian 9.6 6.1
Other 2.3 2.4
∗ Significant difference between the samples, t(256.53) = 8.72, p < 0.001
participants of the ESM study were significantly younger (see Table 9.3). Finally,
n = 149 participants also completed the post-survey.
9.4.2 Event Sampling Strategy
An important aspect of any ESM study is the selection of an appropriate event

sampling strategy. In the present study, two major goals were pursued: The first was
to sample a heterogeneous number of smartphone-based communication situations
(hereafter called events) in order to have enough variance in the personal and
environmental factors that characterize these events. Second, the sampled events
for each participant should be somewhat representative of the actual universe of
events the participants engaged in during the study. For example, the sampled events
of a person who primarily used WhatsApp to communicate with other people, yet
sometimes also shared a photo on Instagram or a status update on Facebook, should
include all three types of events, but proportionally more WhatsApp conversations.
On the other hand, the sampled events of a person who never uses WhatsApp, but
uses several other messengers to communicate with other people equally frequently
should comprise similar proportions of each type of messenger conversation.
As mentioned before, an automatic event-contingent sampling strategy was
implemented. The basic concept was that movisensXS immediately started tracking
9.4 Main Study 233
1. Monitoring 2. Automac sampling 3. Event idenficaon 4. Data collecon
Tracking parcipants‘ Triggering app-specific Assessing whether Measuring person and

complete smartphone quesonnaires aer communicave act environmental factors
and applicaon use applicaon use was performed of the situaon
provides a universe of
provides log files for if yes, data collecon
event-congent sampling
events that may include can be performed
communicave acts
Fig. 9.4 Sampling strategy
when people used their smartphone, as well as when and what type of application
they opened or closed.5 Based on these log data, movisensXS was programmed
to automatically trigger application-specific questionnaires right after participants
closed communication applications. However, it is important to note that the log
data did not enable me to identify whether participants engaged in a communicative
act (i.e., a self-disclosure event). As such, the triggered event itself does not
necessarily represent an event of interest for testing the proposed theory. Using a
communication application obviously makes it more probable that the user actually
disclosed something. Nonetheless, the sampling strategy involved several “selection
steps” before actual data collection was conducted (Fig. 9.4):
In a first step, people’s application use was tracked. The resulting log data
provided the basis for the automatic event-contingent sampling which was con-
ducted as a second step. Whenever people used one of a number of predefined
communication applications, movisensXS automatically prompted them to answer
a situational questionnaire. The first question was critical as it asked about the
activities performed within the application. In this third step, communicative acts
involving self-disclosure by the participants were identified. If a person indicated
having shared a post, message, or any other content, the situational personal and
environmental factors identified on the basis of the theory of situational privacy and
self-disclosure were measured. If no communicative act was performed, participants
received a number of questions related to their performed activity (e.g., why they
have changed the privacy settings). These alternative questions were posed in order
to keep all situational questionnaires at a similar length. Otherwise, participants
could have realized that they had to answer fewer questions when indicating that
they did not share or post content and implement avoidance strategies.
As the log files formed the basis of this sampling strategy, it was important to
identify the relevant communication applications discussed in Sect. 8.2.1 within
5 In some cases, movisensXS also allowed me to track what type of activity was performed within
a given application. For very rare, yet interesting events such as posting a tweet on Twitter, these
specific activity logs were also used.
234 9 Methods
these files in advance. I differentiated among the same five types of communication
applications:
1. Email Services. Based on their current market share in Germany and findings
from the pretests, the following email applications were programmed as trig-
gers:
– Gmail
– GMX
– WEB.de
– Aqua Mail
– Native Android Email
2. Instant Messengers. The following IM services were programmed as triggers
on the basis of their user share in Germany:
– Whatsapp
– Facebook Messenger
– Threema
– Skype
– Snapchat
– Signal
– Telegram
– Short Message Services (SMS)
3. Social Network Sites: As not all discussed SNS also provide mobile versions of
their service, only the following applications were programmed as triggers:
– Facebook
– Google+
– Instagram
4. Microblogging Services: As Twitter is the only microblogging service, no other
application was programmed as a trigger:
– Twitter
5. Other applications: The pretests showed that some participants indeed used
Tinder, so this was also included as a trigger:
– Tinder
In the first pretest, closing any of these applications was programmed to trigger
application-specific questionnaires. In order to not overburden people with constant
questionnaires, a filter was implemented that stopped any triggers from firing for
4 h after a questionnaire had been completed. The results of this first pretest showed
that this filter strategy resulted in an overly consistent pattern: People would answer
their first questionnaire in the morning (mostly after having used WhatsApp) and
then answer one questionnaire almost exactly every 4 h. Because WhatsApp was
used so often, most sampled events were WhatsApp usage situations at set intervals.
9.4 Main Study 235
Subsequently, several pretests were conducted in order to find the optimal filter
strategy. In the end, a rather complex sampling scheme was adopted that was best
suited to achieving the two specified goals: First, the applications were divided into
the groups described above. Due to the large number of instant messaging services,
these applications were additionally divided into two separate groups (Group 1:
Facebook-Messenger, Threema, Skype; Group 2: SMS, WhatsApp, Snapchat).
Furthermore, Instagram (in which a form of visual disclosure through photos is
performed), and Tinder (in which disclosure to strangers is mostly performed),
which both represent rather unusual communicative acts, were grouped together
so that they would generally be triggered more frequently. Second, whenever
participants closed an application within any of these groups and the subsequent
questionnaire was triggered and completed, triggers for this particular group were
disabled for different time frames (e.g., 30 h, 29.5 h, 29 h, 28.5 h, etc.). These
different time frames were used to trigger questionnaires less systematically and
thereby spread the events more evenly across the whole day. Third, rather infrequent
events such as one-to-many communications that could be more specifically tracked
by movisensXS (posting a status update on Facebook and posting a tweet on Twitter)
were specified as additional triggers that fired independent of all other filters. If
participants completed a questionnaire after one of those two events, the respective
trigger was disabled for only 12 h. Fourth, a number of other irregular one-to-one or
one-to-few communication events (e.g., writing an SMS or writing an e-mail) were
subsumed to an additional group. If participants completed a questionnaire after one
of those events, triggers were disabled for 24 h.
This rather complex sampling strategy provided the best results in the pretests
and was hence used in the ESM study. According to the log data, participants
engaged in N = 28,525 usage events regarding the designated applications. Of
those, n = 3802 application usage events triggered a questionnaire (13%). Thus,
participants had to answer M = 20.56 questionnaires on average over the course
of the 2-week study (SD = 15.04; range = 1–87). As indicated by the high standard
deviation and the large range, the number of questionnaires per participant varied
considerably, which can be explained by different smartphone usage patterns. A
person who used almost all applications on a daily basis answered up to 4 or 6
questionnaires per day. A person who used only one of the triggered applications
every other day answered only a few questionnaires over the course of the whole
study. The overall response rate was very good, as only 8.31% of all triggered
questionnaires were not completed. More importantly, participant indicated having
performed a communicative act in 31.90% of the completed questionnaires. This
implies that people actively communicated in a third of the sampled events. In the
other cases, they only read messages (e.g., in the case of WhatsApp or Facebook-
Messenger), browsed news feeds (e.g., in the case of Facebook or Google+), or
performed other passive actions within the triggered applications. In the end, 1104
self-disclosure events could be used in the following analyses. In sum, participants
provided situational measures for events in which they disclosed themselves an
average of M = 6.78 times (SD = 5.34; range = 1–32). Sensitivity analyses thus
236 9 Methods
Fig. 9.5 Results of the sampling strategy
revealed that situational effects of r > .085 could be tested when assuming an α-
error probability of 5% and a power of 80%.
To evaluate the effectiveness of this sampling strategy, it is useful to compare the
distribution of sampled events and the distribution of communicative acts within
these events to the universe of events from which they were drawn (i.e., actual
usage events captured in the log data). Figure 9.5 shows the sampled events and the
proportion of sampled events that included a communicative act (the participants
actually shared a message) plotted against the actual number of such events that
occurred during the study according the log data.
As can be seen, the sampled events represent the universe of actual events quite
well. That being said, the data suggests that communicate acts primarily occur
within WhatsApp, as almost half of all filtered events were WhatsApp use events.
Nonetheless, there is a heterogeneity of communication situations, and we can thus
conclude that the sampling strategy was successful in achieving the predefined
goals.
9.4.3 Measures
In this section, I will describe the scales and measures used in the main study.
Table 9.4 provides an overview of all variables and when they were measured.
As mentioned before, non-situational personal factors (traits and trait-like charac-
teristics) were assessed in the pre-survey. People’s long-term preventive privacy
9.4 Main Study 237
Table 9.4 Overview of the measured variables

Variable Measurement
Dependent variable
Depth of self-disclosure ESM study
Preventive privacy regulation behavior
Use of applications Pre-survey
Use of application-specific privacy settings Pre-survey
Personal factors 1: Trait and trait-like characteristics
Gregariousness Pre-survey
Deliberation Pre-survey
Horizontal privacy concerns Pre-survey
Vertical privacy concerns Pre-survey
Subjective online privacy literacy Pre-survey
Personal factors 2: Internal factors
Need to self-disclose ESM study
Environmental factors 1: Interpersonal factors
Audience size ESM study & pre-survey
Interpersonal trust ESM study
Relational closeness ESM study
Level of reciprocity ESM study
Environmental factors 2: External factors∗
Visual anonymity Pre-survey & assigned
Pseudonymity Pre-survey & assigned
Limited accessibility Pre-survey & assigned
End-to-end encryption Pre-survey & assigned
∗ External factors were drawn from people’s reports about preventive privacy regulation behavior.
The exact assignment procedure will be explained on p. 247
regulation behavior (i.e., their use of application-specific settings) was also mea-
sured in the pre-survey. Participants’ answers were used to assign values to
the environmental factors on the situational level (in line with the theoretical
consideration that privacy regulation determines situational environmental factors).
Situationally varying factors (both internal personal factors and interpersonal envi-
ronmental factors) as well as the depth of self-disclosure of each communication act
were assessed in each situational questionnaire during the ESM study. Finally, the
post-survey consisted of items designed to measure people’s opinion and assessment
of the study.
9.4.3.1 Pre-survey Measures
The following instruments were either based on prior research or represented the
final versions of the instruments tested in the prestudy (Sect. 9.3.3). The order of the
items in each scale was randomized to avoid context effects (the effect of preceding
238 9 Methods
questions on responses to later questions). All items were designed and presented in
German. Their exact formulations and psychometrics can be found translated into
English in the Appendix B (p. 351). In addition to the measures described below,
the questionnaire also included items measuring general data protection strategies
(adopted from Masur, Teutsch, & Trepte, 2017) and average self-disclosure within
the relevant application. These measures were not used in the following analyses.
Gregariousness This subfacet of extraversion captures whether people enjoy the
company of others, are sociable, and are open to meeting new people. People who
score high on gregariousness tend to be comfortable in crowds of people and prefer
company over being alone. Four items taken from the gregariousness subscale of
the Revised NEO Personality Inventory (NEO-PI-R; Costa & McCrae, 1992b) were
used (e.g., “I like to have a lot of people around me”). Participants answered on a
scale ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree.
Deliberation This subfacet of conscientiousness captures how deliberate people
are with regard to their actions and decisions. People who score high on deliberation
tend to be less spontaneous and more aware of the consequences of their behavior.
Participants had to answer four items (e.g., “I always consider the consequences
before I take action”) from the deliberation subscale of the NEO-PI-R (Costa &
McCrae, 1992b) on a scale ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree.
Online Privacy Concerns Based on the insights from the pre-study, I measured
five dimensions of online privacy concerns. The first two refer to vertical privacy
concerns and include (1) concerns about website or app providers (e.g., “How
concerned are you about website or app providers sharing your data with unknown
third parties?”) and (2) concerns about institutions (e.g., “How concerned are you
about institutions, public agencies or intelligence services monitoring your online
or mobile communication?”). The last three dimensions refer to horizontal privacy
concerns and include (3) concerns about other users obtaining one’s personal
information (e.g., “How concerned are you about other users finding information
about you on the Internet?”), (4) concerns about other users sharing one’s personal
information (e.g., “How concerned are you about other users sharing information
about you with other people without your consent?”), and (5) concerns about
identify theft (e.g., “How concerned are you that people on the Internet might not be
who they claim to be?”). All items were measured on a scale ranging from 1 = not
very concerned to 7 = very concerned.
Subjective Online Privacy Literacy Trepte et al. (2015) define online privacy
literacy as a “combination of factual or declarative (“knowing that”) and procedural
(“knowing how”) knowledge about online privacy” (p. 339). Factual knowledge
includes knowledge about technical aspects of online data protection and laws and
directives as well as institutional data collection practices. Procedural knowledge,
on the other hand, refers to knowledge about strategies for individual privacy
regulation and data protection. Although the authors emphasize the need to objec-
tively measure online privacy literacy because people are generally not good at
estimating their own knowledge (see also Jensen, Potts, & Jensen, 2005; Morrison,
9.4 Main Study 239
2012), I choose to measure participants’ perceived skills and knowledge about

online privacy and data protection. First, assessing online privacy literacy with
an objective test would have unnecessarily prolonged the survey. Second, existing
scales mostly measure knowledge about vertical privacy (e.g., OPLIS by Masur,
Teutsch, & Trepte, 2017). Subjective online privacy literacy was hence measured
with four newly developed items (e.g., “I know a lot about data protection and
online privacy”). Participants indicated their knowledge on a scale ranging from
1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree.
Application-Specific Privacy Regulation After indicating what type of web
services and applications they used, participants were asked about their individual
privacy settings and privacy protection strategies within these applications. As
shown in Chap. 8, specifically in Table 8.1 on p. 193, opportunities for selecting
various privacy settings differ from application to application. I hence adapted the
questions to each respective platform. Generally speaking, I asked whether partici-
pants were visually anonymous on these platforms (e.g., “Can you be identified from
your profile picture on [name of application]?”) whenever it was possible to upload
a profile or cover photo and whether they used pseudonymization strategies (e.g.,
“Are you using your real name on [name of application]?”) when the application
required users to provide a name. Whenever applicable, I asked whether people had
employed certain audience segmentation strategies (e.g., “Do you use Friend lists
to divide your Facebook friends in different groups?”). Finally, I asked whether
participants used end-to-end encryption. However, in most applications, people
cannot decide for themselves whether or not to use end-to-end encryption. Instead,
communication is either end-to-end encrypted by default or not. Nevertheless, I
asked whether participants used end-to-end encryption regarding e-mail services.
For an overview of all items for each application, see Table 10.5.
Application-Specific Audience Size In general, I asked about the number of
potential recipients directly for each specific situation (see next section). However,
in order to gain a sense of users’ potential audience on applications which allow for
one-to-many communication in networked publics (particular, Facebook, Google+,
Twitter, and Instagram), I asked participants to estimate the number of contacts
they have on these platforms (e.g., “How many contacts do you have on [name
of application]?”). This estimated number of contacts can be regarded as a rough
perception of audience size that individuals have in mind when posting on these
platforms.
Symbolic Smartphone Importance To measure how important people consider
their smartphone and the extent to which it represents a part of who they are, a
subfacet of the mobile phone appropriation scale by Lee, Karnowski, von Pape, and
Cionea (2016) was used. This subfacet refers to the psychological dimension of
symbolic usage aspects and includes items such as “My cellphone is an extension
of me” or “If I forget my cellphone at home, I feel incomplete.” As participants had
smartphones in this study, the word cellphone was replaced with smartphone. All
240 9 Methods
items were answered on a scale ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly

agree.
9.4.3.2 ESM Study Measures
Two types of data were collected in the ESM study. First, movisensXS recorded
people’s overall smartphone use (when the screen was on and off), as well as their
application use (when and what type of application). Within some applications,
specific activities could be recorded as well (e.g., posting a status update on
Facebook or a tweet on Twitter). In principle, movisensXS logged every time the
screen of the smartphone changed. The resulting log data included a time stamp
relative to the start of the study and a unique code that could be used to identify
which application had been used. These log data were used to trigger the situational
questionnaires.
The second type of data were collected through self-reports in these situational
questionnaires. The items for these self-report measures were mostly taken from
the pre-study described earlier. However, the answer options were changed as
the pretests showed that sliders were more convenient for participants to answer
than Likert-type scales (see right screenshot in Fig. 9.3 on p. 229). The sliders
were mostly used for items that required participants to agree or disagree with
certain statements. Figure 9.6 provides an overview of all items used. Due to
technical restrictions, the items were always presented in the same order. The
specific formulation of each item was adapted to the application and interpersonal
constellation of each situation. Figure 9.6 thus only shows the item formulations for
the scenario in which a participant has written a message to one or several persons.
The first question always inquired about the activities that were performed within
the application that triggered the questionnaire (Question 1). For example, if a
participant used Twitter and a subsequent questionnaire was triggered, this first
question read as follows:
What did you do on Twitter?
– I read the newest tweets.
– I read only one particular tweet.
– I wrote one or several private messages (Filter).
– I changed my privacy settings.
– I have not done any of the above things.
The answer options obviously only included activities that are possible to
perform on the triggering application. Whenever a participant indicated having
engaged in a communicative act (e.g., writing a message, posting a status update,
uploading a picture, etc.), all other situational questions were presented (Questions
2.1 to 2.5). The formulations of Questions 2.4 and 2.5 were adapted to the indicated
audience size (e.g., “The recipients of this message are important to me”). In the case
of status updates or tweets, these questions always referred to the relevant audience
(e.g., “My Facebook friends are important to me” or “The readers of my tweets are
important to me”).
9.4 Main Study 241
1 Application -specific activities

Q: What did you do on [name of application]?
This question was designed as a filter. Different activities
were listed as answer options for each application.
Participants simply marked what they did (multiple answers
were possible).
If they indicated having written a message, posted a status

update or engaged in any other type of communicative act,
they were directed to the following questions.
2.1 Reciprocity and audience size 2.2. Content and depth of self-disclosure
Q: You have indicated that you wrote one or several Q: What was the content of the message?
messages. Thinking about these most recent messages, did
a. Text
you start a conversation or respond to a message?
b. Picture
a. Started a conversation. c. Video
b. Responded to a message. d. Link
e. Voice message
Q: How many people received that message?
Q: How private was the content of your message?
a. Only one person.
b. Two persons. Slider ranging from
c. Three persons. 0 = not at all private to
d. Four or more persons. 100 = very private
2.3 Need to self-disclose 2.5 Relational closeness

Q: How strong was your need to disclose? Q: Thinking about the person(s) to whom you have just
Slider ranging from written this message, would agree with the following
0 = very low to statements?
100 = very strong a. My [target person(s)] are important to me.
b. My [target person(s)] and I share a lot of the same
2.4 Interpersonal trust attitudes about things.
c. I communicate very often with my [target person(s)].
Q: How much do you trust your [target person(s)]
Slider ranging from
Slider ranging from 0 = strongly disagree to
0 = not at all to 100 = strongly agree
100 = very much
3 Other measures not included in the analysis
- Post-disclosure concerns about recipients

- Post-disclosure concerns about providers
- Post-disclosure concerns about institutions
- Overall perceived privacy
- Context of smartphone use (location and people)
Fig. 9.6 Situational questionnaires with item formulations
In addition to these items, participants were also asked about their post-disclosure
concerns, perceived level of privacy, and the context of their smartphone use
(location and people present). However, these items were not used in the following
analyses.
242 9 Methods
9.4.3.3 Post-survey Measures
The post-survey was designed to assess people’s evaluation of the overall ESM
study. Participants only had to answer a few items and were eventually led to a
form in which they were able to provide their bank information anonymously (for
the payment) and take part in the competition.
Intervention of the Study Design Two items were used to assess whether
participants felt that the situational questionnaires somehow affected how they
behaved during the study (“Because of the study, I think a lot more about data
protection and privacy than before,” “Because of the study, I am more deliberate
in posting information or data.”). Both items were measured on a scale ranging
from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree.
Interest in the Study One item was used to assess the extent to which participants
were interested in the study (“Overall, the study was interesting”). It was answered
on scale ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree.
Perceived Effort To measure the extent to which people perceived the study
to be time-consuming and requiring a lot of effort, a single items (“The study
required much effort.”) was answered on scale ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to
7 = strongly agree.
Avoidance Strategy Finally, participants were requested to indicate whether they
purposely changed their smartphone use to avoid having to answer questions (“Did
you limit your app use during the study to receive less questionnaires?”). Answer
options ranged from 1 = never to 7 = always.
9.4.4 Variable Coding and Data Analyses
The research questions and hypotheses required several analytical steps in order to
be tested and answered. In a preliminary first step, I assessed potential bias in the
ESM sample resulting from the recruiting strategy. I also analyzed the post-survey
data to evaluate participants’ perceptions of the ESM study. In addition, all scales
were furthermore tested for convergent validity and reliability on the basis of the
pre-survey data.
The second step aimed at investigating antecedents of pre-situational privacy
regulation processes as proposed by the theory of situational privacy and self-
disclosure. Research Questions 1 to 5 and Hypothesis 1 were thus analyzed using
the pre-survey data set of N = 1572 participants.
Finally, the last step consisted of the central investigation of situational privacy
and self-disclosure in line with the proposed theory. Accordingly, Research Ques-
tions 6 to 9 and the Hypotheses 2 and 3 were analyzed using the data from n = 164
participants who took part in the ESM study. This analysis was based on the answers
these participants provided in both the pre-survey and the ESM study.
9.4 Main Study 243
Specifically with regard to the last analysis, several preparative steps had to be
taken before the data could by analyzed meaningfully. In this section, I will describe
the analytical strategies applied to appropriately test the proposed hypotheses and
answer the proposed research questions. I will further justify the type of data
preparation I deemed necessary for the analysis conducted in the third step. I
conducted all analyses with R (Version 3.3.3). Data management procedures were
conducting using dplyr (Wickham & Francois, 2016). Graphics were plotted with
ggplot2 (Wickham & Chang, 2016). I will indicate which additional packages were
used for each analysis in the respective portions of the text.
9.4.4.1 Step 1: Preliminary Analyses
In a first step, all scales used in the pre-survey were subjected to confirmatory factor
analyses (CFA). As all items were measured on a 7-point Likert-type scale and
can thus safely be treated as continuous variables (Babakus, Ferguson, & Joreskog,
1987), standard estimations such as maximum likelihood can be used. However,
several assumptions have to be met (e.g., Finney & DiStefano, 2006, p. 271): (1)
independent observations, (2) large sample size, (3) correctly specified model, and
(4) multivariate normal data. Whereas the first three assumptions were determined to
be met a priori, the assumption of multivariate normality has to be tested explicitly.
First, all variables were examined with regard to their univariate distributions. In
larger samples (> 300), normal distribution should be assessed on the basis of
histograms and the absolute values of the skewness and the kurtosis rather than
by looking at z-scores (Kim, 2013, p. 53). In line with West, Finch, and Curran
(1995), Kim proposes that skewness higher than 2 and kurtosis higher than 7 are
a cause for concern in such samples. In this case, all items were deemed to be
normally distributed on the basis of the psychometric properties of the items (see
Table B.1, B.2, and B.3 the Appendix) and a visual inspection of the histograms.
Second, multivariate normality was tested for each set of items. Mardia’s test for
multivariate normality (Mardia, 2016) revealed that this assumption was not met
in all cases. Consequently, all CFAs were again run with maximum likelihood
estimation with robust (Huber-White) standard errors and a scaled test statistic
that is asymptotically equal to the Yuan-Bentler correction (Yuan & Bentler, 1997,
p. 770). Model fit was then assessed on the basis of the criteria described by
Hair et al. (2010, p. 584): The authors generally argued for using multiple indices
of different types for assessing adequate evidence of model fit, but also suggest
adjusting the index cutoff values based on model characteristics. Drawing on
simulation research (Hu & Bentler, 1999; Marsh, Hau, & Wen, 2004; Sharma,
Mukherjee, Kumar, & Dillon, 2005), they recommend taking into account both
model complexity and sample size.
To assess the factorial validity of the latent variables, I calculated the average
variance extracted (AVE). Values above 0.50 imply good convergent validity,
indicating that more than 50% of the variance is explained by the indicators
rather than by measurement error (Hair et al., 2010, p. 619). Reliability can also
244 9 Methods
be understood as an indicator of convergent validity (Hair et al., 2010, p. 619).

However, there is a considerable debate on what estimators should be used in order
to assess reliability (Revelle & Zinbarg, 2009; Schmitt, 1996; Sijtsma, 2009). In
line with the recommendations brought forward by Revelle and Zinbarg (2009), I
report McDonald’s ωh (McDonald, 1999) in addition to the more conventional alpha
coefficient by Cronbach (1951). These analyses were conducted using the packages
lavaan (Rosseel, 2012) and semTools (semTools Contributors, 2016).
In a second step, I assessed potential biases and intervention effects in the ESM
sample. As mentioned before, in order to be able to conduct the ESM study on
the participants’ smartphones, respondents had to permit movisensXS to log their
smartphone and application use. Although all potential participants were informed
about what type of information movisensXS collected, anonymity was ensured,
and all actual participants consented to the data collection process, people with
high privacy concerns might have been less likely to participate in the study. As
installing movisensXS required some experience with downloading applications
from the Google Play Store, it is also possible that people with higher smartphone
affinity and privacy literacy were more likely to participate in the study. Thus, in
a first step, I investigated whether respondents who took part in the ESM study
differed from those who chose not to participate with regard to privacy concerns,
online privacy literacy, and smartphone affinity. Statistically, I assessed differences
in the mean scores of participants and non-participants using t-tests for independent
samples (using a two-tailed p < 0.050 significance level). A second concern was
that the study’s design somehow affected people’s smartphone and communication
behavior. By answering several questionnaires per day, people are unnaturally
forced to think about their application use and self-disclosure. Thus, they might
have changed their behavior over the course of the study. To identify such effects,
I descriptively analyzed participants’ perceptions of the study as measured in the
post-survey and investigated whether participants tried to avoid questionnaires by
changing their smartphone use during the study. That being said, it is also possible
that participants unwittingly adapted a certain response pattern over the course
of the study. Thus, two additional analyses were conducted: on the one hand,
I hypothesized that participants’ responses would become more consistent over
the course of the study. I hence computed the average variance in participants’
responses to each situational questionnaire and predicted it by the position of that
questionnaire within the context of the study.6 A multilevel analysis was used
to account for the nested structure of the data (see also further below). As self-
disclosure is the key concept of this study, I further investigated whether people
tended to answer closer to the extremes or closer to the mid-point of the self-
disclosure scale (measured with a slider ranging from 1 = not at all private to
100 = very private) over the course of the study. I hence computed the deviation
from the scale’s midpoint (= 50) and predicted it using the same temporal variable.
6 The first questionnaire received the number 1, the second 2, and so on. This variable thus reflected
the temporal position of the questionnaire within the study.

9.4 Main Study 245
9.4.4.2 Step 2: Predicting Privacy Regulation Behavior
The first five Research Questions and Hypothesis 1 were tested using structural
equation modeling (SEM) with latent variables. Missing values were treated with
casewise deletion. As the dependent variables in these models were dichotomous,
I used a weighted least squares (WLS) approach (Muthén, 1993). In particular, a
weighted least squares estimation with mean and variance adjustment (WLSMV)
was used as it represents a robust alternative to the original WLS approach that also
includes an adjustment of the χ 2 and scaled standard errors. This robust approach
also provides a specific fit index that is particularly well-suited for evaluating model
fit for categorical data: the weighted root mean square residual (WRMR). It has
been suggested that values close to or below 1.0 represent good fit (Yu & Muthén,
2002, April, as cited by Finney and DiStefano, 2006, p. 194). Model fits were hence
evaluated by assessing the WRMR in combination with the traditional fit indices.
While initial CFAs were also conducted to assess the factor validity of each scale,
Hair et al. (2010) argue that such separate analyses represent poor practice as it
is easier for single construct to fit the data than the entire model and discriminant
validity and potential item cross-loadings cannot be tested for (p. 583). Hence, these
overall model fits were regarded as the decisive goodness-of-fit measures for this
analysis. As the estimated models included more than 30 manifest variables and
were all based on more than 250 participants, the following criteria were used to
evaluate model fit: CFI > 0.92 in combination with a RMSEA < 0.07 (p. 584).
The procedure described above produced probit coefficients for all paths on
binary dependent variables. Such coefficients estimate in standard deviation units
the amount of change in the dependent variable given a one-unit increase in the
independent variable (Kline, 2016, p. 46). However, the rate of change is not
constant for all values of the independent variable, as the overall relationship is
non-linear (as in logistic regression models). Logistic and probit regression tend to
give similar results in large samples. Although there is no constant scaling factor
for transforming probits into logits, the literature suggest multiplying logits by 1.6
(Gelman & Hill, 2009, p. 119) or 1.7 (Kline, 2016, p. 47). For easier interpretation,
I thus additionally computed odds ratios (OR: EXP(B*1.6)) from the transformed
probit coefficients.7 I tested all hypotheses with a two-tailed p < 0.050 significance
level. The lavaan and semTools packages were once again used to conduct the SEM
analyses.
9.4.4.3 Step 3: Predicting Situational Self-Disclosure
Finally, I analyzed antecedents of self-disclosure in smartphone-based communi-

cation situations. The theory of situational privacy and self-disclosure differentiates
7 Using a scaling factor of 1.7 as suggested by Kline (2016) did not yield considerably different
results.
246 9 Methods
between non-situational and situational factors (see again Table 7.1 on p. 137). Non-
situational factors refer to personality facets (here: gregariousness and deliberation)
and trait-like characteristics (here: privacy concerns and online privacy literacy),
while situational factors include the dependent variable (depth of self-disclosure) as
well as both personal (need to disclose) and environmental factors (interpersonal:
audience size, trust, psychological closeness, similarity and everyday centrality;
external: visual anonymity, pseudonymity, limited access, and encryption). These
measures are conceptualized in a hierarchical system: communication situations
(Level 1) are nested within persons (Level 2). Whereas scores obtained from
variables on the first level (measured in the ESM study) vary across situations,
scores obtained from variables on the second level (measured in the pre-survey) vary
between individuals. As a result of this nested structure, it must be acknowledged
that both intercepts and effects may vary across participants.
From a statistical point of view, the independence of observations (which is
required for most statistical procedures such as standard regression analysis) was
violated because a particular number of observations can be assigned to one specific
participant. Thus, I used multilevel modeling to account for the nested structure
(Hox, 2010). Using multilevel procedures, however, poses several challenges which
require further preparative steps, which I will discuss in the following sections.
Missing Value Analysis and Data Imputation
The first challenge concerns missing values. In ESM designs such as the one
implemented in this study, participants typically do not provide the same number
of observations due to the sampling strategy. In this study, participants provided
on average M = 6.78 (SD = 5.34; range = 1–32) situational measures for events in
which they disclosed themselves. However, as the range indicates, some participants
only provided one or a few events, whereas others provided more than twenty.
Nevertheless, even one or two observations per person is enough to fit a multilevel
model (Hox, 2010, p. 106): When persons have only one or a few observations,
their intercepts may not be estimated precisely, but they can still provide partial
information for the estimation of the regression coefficients and variance parameters
on both levels (Gelman & Hill, 2009, p. 276). In sum, varying numbers of
observations per person do not represent a problem for my subsequent analysis.
A second type of missing values, however, may significantly impair the power to
draw valuable inferences from the data: participants’ item nonresponse. This type
of missing values can occur on both levels. Most statistical analyses (including most
multilevel procedures implemented in statistical software) treat such missing values
with case-wise deletion. Nonresponse to one item at one measurement point in the
ESM study (i.e., on Level 1) causes the deletion of that communication situation and
leaves that particular participant with fewer observations. Missing values in the pre-
survey (i.e., on Level 2) are even more problematic as they eliminate the respective
participant from the analysis entirely. This is particularly worrying as it also causes
the elimination of valuable data obtained on Level 1. Consequently, treating missing
values with case-wise deletion may severely decrease the power to detect effects on
both levels.
9.4 Main Study 247
As a result of these considerations, all item nonresponses were imputed. With

regard to the pre-survey data, several imputation steps had to be conducted because
a number of filters differentiated participants into users of different communication
applications. Basically, several subsets were created, with the first including all
variables that all participants should have answered, the second all Facebook users,
the third all Google+ users and so on. Missing value analyses of each subset revealed
that item response was generally very low (< 5%) and could be considered “missing
at random.” All missing values were thus imputed on the basis of each subset.
Finally, the newly generated subsets, which now included only complete cases,
were merged into one data set. Statistically, imputations in the pre-survey were
performed with the R package Amelia II (for more information, see: Honaker,
King, & Blackwell, 2011) which is based on the expectation maximization with
bootstrapping algorithm developed by Honaker and King (2010). Very few missing
values were found in the ESM data, on the other hand (< 1% for all variables).
Nonetheless, item nonresponses were imputed using the multivariate imputation
with chained equations method as implemented in the MICE package (van Buuren &
Groothuis-Oudshoorn, 2011), which performs better on imputing hierarchical data
sets.
Variable Coding
In a next step, several coding procedures were carried out in order to prepare
the data for the multilevel analyses. First, I computed factor scores for all non-
situational personal factors measured in the pre-survey. Simulation studies have
shown that this type of latent scoring approach performs well with large samples
(Yang, Nay, & Hoyle, 2010). Factor scores were hence created using the initial
CFAs (based on N = 1572 participants) in order to reduce the model’s complexity as
well as the idiosyncratic influences of each variable. Factor scores were estimated
following the procedure described by Muthén (1998–2004, Appendix 11). The
variables were treated as Level 2 measures along with some conventional socio-
demographic variables. All variables discussed in the following, thus represent
Level 1 measures.
Second, situational personal factors (i.e., the need to self-disclose) were mea-
sured using the single item implemented in the ESM study. However, in order to
avoid small coefficients in the output, the original scale ranging from 1 to 100 was
rescaled by 10, and thus ranged from 1 to 10 in the final analysis.
Third, interpersonal environmental factors (i.e., trust and three dimensions of
relational closeness) were likewise measured as single items in the ESM study.
As the original scales also ranged from 1 to 100, they were rescaled similarly.
Preliminary analyses, however, showed that all four measures were highly correlated
(r > 0.66). An additional CFA revealed that they formed one unidimensional factor
(Model fit: χ 2 (2) = 7.07, p = 0.029; CFI = 1.00; TLI = 0.99; RMSEA = 0.05, 90%
CI[0.02, 0.08]; SRMR = 0.01). This factor was internally consistent and reliable
(α = 0.89, ω = 0.90) and was able to explain 69% of the variance in the items on
average (AVE = 0.69). Based on these analyses, factor scores were computed using a
248 9 Methods
similar procedure as described above.8 These factor scores thus represent an overall
interpersonal assessment including trust, psychological closeness, similarity, and
everyday centrality perceptions.
Fourth, audience size was primarily measured at each disclosure event. However,
in one-to-many communication situations (e.g., status updates on Facebook, posts
on Instagram, or tweets on Twitter), audience size is hard to discern (again Litt,
2012). In those situations, the estimated number of contacts or followers measured
in the pre-survey was assigned to the respective disclosure events. These measures
can be regarded as rough estimates of the potential audience a discloser might
have in mind when posting on such platforms. However, due to the large amount
of dyadic or one-to-few communications in the sample, the resulting measure for
audience size was heavily skewed (M = 27.71, SD = 94.54, Median = 1, range = 1–
622, skew. = 4.06, kurt. = 16.62). From a theoretical point of view, such a measure is
also inappropriate for the purpose of this study because audience perceptions change
heavily with increasing size. For example, it might make a huge difference whether
a person communicates with one, two, or three persons. According to the theory
of situational privacy and self-disclosure, adding just one person to the audience
dramatically increases audience diversity and thus should negatively affect the depth
of self-disclosure. However, whether an audience is comprised of 100 or 101 people
does not make much of a difference, although whether the audience includes 100
or 1000 people might still make a difference. In other words, when audiences are
larger, changes must be bigger in order to affect disclosure behavior. Statistically, we
can thus argue that the effect of one additional audience member on self-disclosure
decreases exponentially with increasing audience size. Based on this rationale, I
decided to log-transform the audience size. Consequently, the resulting score was
less skewed (M = 1.25, SD = 1.41, Median = 0.69, range = 0.69–6.43, skew. = 2.63,
kurt. = 5.42) and the resulting coefficient representing the effect of audience size on
depth of self-disclosure should be closer to the effect of participants’ actual audience
perceptions.
Lastly, external environmental factors (i.e., visual anonymity, pseudonymity,
limited access, and end-to-end encryption) were coded as dichotomous items.
Coding was based on the in-depth analyses of each communication application in
Sect. 8.2.2. Values were taken from respondents’ answers in the pre-survey (see
Table 10.5) or assigned when a given factor was either present by design. For
example, with regard to visual anonymity, people were asked in the pre-survey
whether they had uploaded an identifiable profile or cover photo in each application
they used. For example, if a participant indicated having uploaded an unidentifiable
photo in their WhatsApp profile, the situational variable visual anonymity was coded
as 1 for all WhatsApp disclosure events. If the same participant indicated using a
8 Due to the hierarchical data structure, the factor structure may differ between participants, which
is not accounted for in the simple CFA. To control for such between-person variance, a multilevel
CFA was computed in MPlus. However, the results revealed that the factor structure did not vary
between participants.
9.4 Main Study 249
recognizable profile or cover photo on Facebook, the same variable was coded 0 for
all Facebook disclosure events. That being said and as described in Sect. 8.2.2, some
applications do not offer the possibility to upload a profile picture (e.g., Threema or
email services). For disclosure events in those environments, visual anonymity was
coded as 0. The same procedure was used for the variable pseudonymity. Whenever
applications allowed the use of real or fake names, the variable was coded according
to people’s responses in the pre-survey (1 = uses a pseudonym, 0 = uses the real
name). In the case of Threema, again, pseudonymity was coded as 1. With regard to
end-to-end encryption, participants only had to answer whether they used additional
encryption for their email service. With regard to all other environments, coding was
based on the applications’ default settings. Thus, this variable was coded as 1 for
disclosure events in Threema and Skype, which incorporate end-to-end encryption
by design. All remaining disclosure events were coded as 0. Lastly, the factor
limited audience refers to whether people confined their profiles to their friends
or followers. For example, with regard to Twitter, users are able to decide whether
their tweets are visible to anybody (coded as 0 for all respective disclosure events)
or only their followers (coded as 1). Similarly, limited audience was coded as 1 for
disclosure events on Facebook when participants had indicated not having an open
profile. Disclosure events in instant messenger services, on the other hand, always
have a limited audience (selected by the discloser) and were thus consistently coded
as 1.
Analytical Strategy
As mentioned before, the hierarchical structure of the data warrants multilevel
modeling. In particular, I used multilevel linear models9 which can be thought of as
generalizations of classical linear regression models, where intercepts, and possibly
slopes, are allowed to vary per group (Gelman & Hill, 2009, p. 251). Alternatives
would be to either ignore the group-level variable (simple regression, also referred
to as complete pooling) or to estimate separate models for each group (no pooling).
Whereas complete pooling ignores the variation between Level 1 units, the no
pooling approach overstates it (Gelman & Hill, 2009, p. 253).
In this study, participants are the grouping variable as a varying number of
observations can be assigned to each participant. I hence assumed that observations
within one participant were dependent (also expressed as intraclass correlation).
Accordingly, I estimated several multilevel linear models with self-disclosure as
the dependent variable in which predictors were included stepwise. First, the
unconditional model without any predictors was estimated (M0) and used to
estimate the intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC), which indicates the proportion
of the variance explained by differences between persons (Hox, 2010, p. 15). Next,
predictor groups were included stepwise: non-situational personal factors (M1),
followed by situational personal and environmental factors (M2). In the third model,
9 Sometimes also called multilevel regression models, random coefficient models, hierarchical
linear models, or simply mixed-effect or mixed models (Hox, 2010, p. 11).

250 9 Methods
I tested whether some of the situational effects varied across persons (M3). Next, I
included several same-level interactions on Level 1 and Level 2 (M4). Finally, I
included possible cross-level interactions for those situational effects that varied
between persons (M5).
As the models were nested, they can be compared using the likelihood ratio test
(Snijders & Bosker, 2011, p. 97) which is based on a comparison of the models’
deviances. In general, models with a lower deviance fit better than models with a
higher deviance (Hox, 2010, p. 47). As the difference has a chi-squared distribution,
a conventional chi-squared test can be used to assess whether inclusion of predictors
significantly improved model fit. However, while these parameters can be used to
compare models, they do not provide information about each model’s absolute.
In multilevel analysis, computing the amount of explained variance is complex
and not as straightforward as in non-hierarchical linear regression analysis. Several
parameters have been proposed (e.g., Hox, 2010; Johnson, 2014; LaHuis, Hartman,
Hakoyama, & Clark, 2014; Nakagawa, Schielzeth, & O’Hara, 2013; Raudenbush
and Bryk, 2002). In random-intercept models (i.e., only intercepts are allowed to
vary across participants), most measures are based on the reduction of variance
components. Such an approach allows explained variance to be reported on both
levels (Hox, 2010, pp. 69–78), but is difficult to adapt to random-slope models.
Nakagawa et al. (2013) therefore proposed a marginal and a conditional R2 , which
provide simple measures of the variance explained by fixed effects only and by
both fixed and random factors (i.e. the entire model). Johnson (2014) extended
this approach also to random-slope models. Although these procedures have several
caveats that need to be borne in mind, I reported nevertheless the explained variance
on both levels for random-intercept models (M1 to M2) as well as the measures
proposed by Nakagawa et al. (2013) for all models. The package MuMIn (Bartón,
2016) was used for computation.
Finally, all variables were mean-centered to provide regression coefficients that
can be meaningfully interpreted. Centering is generally used to establish a zero
point on scales that otherwise lack such a value (Enders & Tofighi, 2007, p. 121).
In the context of multilevel modeling, variables on the first level can be centered
around the grand mean or the group mean. I used the guidelines by Enders and
Tofighi (2007, p. 136) and centered non-situational variables (Level 2) around the
grand mean, and situational variables that had no natural zero point (interpersonal
assessment and need to self-disclose) around the group mean (i.e., the individual
person’s mean) as such an approach allows for more meaningful interpretation
of Level 1 relationships. The log-transformed audience measure was additionally
centered around the minimum, which means that the zero point can be interpreted
as the smallest possible audience (= 1 recipient).
I tested all hypotheses with a two-tailed p < 0.050 significance level. The
lme4 package (Bates, Mächler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015) and its extension lmerTest
(Kuznetsova, Brockhoff, & Christensen, 2016) were used to conduct the multilevel
analyses.
Chapter 10
Results
Before I present the results, let us briefly recap the main research questions that I
formulated in the introduction to Part II of this book (Chap. 8). Applying the theory
of situational privacy and self-disclosure to smartphone-based communication, the
following two questions express the main goals of this study:
1. What makes people engage in application-specific privacy regulation behaviors?
More specifically, what personal factors influence people’s decision to choose
certain applications over others and to what extent do these factors also explain
the factors also the use of privacy strategies and settings within these environ-
ments?
2. Under what circumstances do people engage in a high level of self-disclosure
during smartphone-based communication? In particular, which personal and
environmental factors influence the situational depth of self-disclosure?
I take an empirical look at two of the three components of the theory of
situational privacy and self-disclosure: (a) pre-situational privacy regulation pro-
cesses (Sect. 10.2), and (b) situational privacy perceptions and self-disclosure
(Sect. 10.3). It is important to note here that the empirical investigations of these two
components are somewhat disconnected in that they are based on different samples.
Furthermore, the analysis of pre-situational privacy regulation processes is limited
to investigating the relationship between personal factors and long-term preventive
privacy regulation behaviors and thus cannot tell us anything about short-term
preventive, preservative, or corrective privacy regulations behaviors as discussed
in Sect. 6.1.5. Nonetheless, the analyses give us insights into how people regulate
their privacy by selecting and manipulating environments in order to prevent future
intrusions or violations and, furthermore, how this affects subsequent behavior in
these environments.
In the course of this chapter, I will present the results of the empirical analyses
in line with the hypotheses and research questions outlined in Chap. 8. The
presentation of the results will also follow the stepwise analytical strategy described

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-78884-5_10
252 10 Results
at the end of the previous chapter. A more comprehensive analysis and interpretation
of the results beyond the individual hypotheses will be conducted in Chap. 11.
10.1 Preliminary Analyses
Any data analysis depends on the quality of the data. A sophisticated data analysis
cannot make up for biased, incomplete, or badly measured data. Thus, I first assessed
whether the obtained data were adequate for the proposed data analysis strategy.
First, I assessed the quality of the scales used in the pre-survey, conducting several
preliminary scale analyses with the aim of testing the reliability and validity of the
variables of interest. Second, I assessed whether the recruitment strategy somehow
had biased the sample of the ESM study. As participants had to agree to let
movisensXS collect their application use over a period of 14 days, particular types
of people were more likely to participate than others. I further assessed whether
participants themselves felt that the study had somehow affected their behavior.
Additionally, several methods were applied to assess potential unconscious effects
of the study on people’s response behavior were conducted.
10.1.1 Scale and Item Analyses
Model fit indices, descriptive statistics, and psychometric properties for all scales are
presented in Tables 10.1 and 10.2 (Exact item formulations as well as psychometric
properties can be found in Tables B.1, B.2, and B.3 in the Appendix B, p. 351).
Looking at the skewness and kurtosis, all items and mean indices could be
considered normally distributed. Both personality facets—which were measured
using the subscales developed by Costa and McCrae (1992b)—fit the data satis-
factorily. Convergent validity was likewise satisfactory, although the latent factors
only accounted for less than 50% of the average variance in the items. According
Table 10.1 Fit indices for the pre-survey scales

Variables χ2 df p CFI TLI RMSEA
Gregariousness 4.31 2 0.116 1.00 0.99 0.03 [0.05, 0.08]
Deliberation 22.87 2 < 0.001 0.97 0.92 0.08 [0.05, 0.08]
Online privacy literacy 34.54 2 < 0.001 0.99 0.96 0.10 [0.08, 0.13]
Smartphone affinity 28.91 2 < 0.001 0.98 0.95 0.10 [0.08, 0.14]
Online privacy concerns 497.08 84 < 0.001 0.97 0.96 0.06 [0.05, 0.06]
Notes: Confirmatory factor analyses using robust maximum likelihood estimation. df = Degrees
of freedom, CFI = Comparitive fit index, TLI = Tucker-Lewis index, RMSEA = Root mean square
error of approximation. χ 2 was corrected according to Yuan and Bentler (1997, p. 770). Analyses
are based on the pre-survey sample (n = 1572 participants)
10.1 Preliminary Analyses 253
Table 10.2 Psychometric properties of the pre-survey variables

Variables M SD Range Skew. Kurt. α ω AVE
Smartphone affinity 4.19 1.41 1–7 0.03 −0.66 0.85 0.86 0.62
Gregariousness 3.70 1.14 1–7 0.01 −0.42 0.71 0.72 0.40
Deliberation 4.49 0.95 1–7 −0.18 −0.03 0.65 0.66 0.34
Online privacy literacy 4.43 1.30 1–7 −0.27 −0.28 0.92 0.92 0.75
Vertical privacy concerns 5.80 1.31 1–7 −0.59 −0.23
. . . about providers 5.25 1.32 1–7 −0.73 0.04 0.87 0.87 0.70
. . . about institutions 4.97 1.53 1–7 −0.52 −0.61 0.90 0.90 0.76
Horizontal privacy concerns 4.46 1.31 1–7 −0.08 −0.57
. . . about information access 4.26 1.39 1–7 −0.01 −0.60 0.86 0.85 0.66
. . . about information sharing 4.62 1.51 1–7 −0.21 −0.78 0.91 0.91 0.78
. . . about identify theft 4.49 1.51 1–7 −0.12 −0.85 0.83 0.87 0.69
Notes: All scales were modeled as latent variables or computed as factors scores in the following
analyses. For easier interpretation, however, mean indices were computed for the descriptive
analyses. M = mean, SD = standard deviation, Skew. = skewness, Kurt. = Kurtosis, α =
Cronbach’s alpha, ω = McDonald’s omega. Analyses are based on the pre-survey sample (n = 1572
participants). Exact item formulations and item-specific psychometric properties can be found in
Tables B.1, B.2, and B.3 in the Appendix B (p. 351)
to the mean values, participants considered themselves as relatively non-gregarious

but relatively deliberate. The newly developed scale measuring subjective online
privacy literacy as well as the subscale measuring smartphone affinity (Lee &
Renzetti, 2016) fits the data satisfactorily and had high internal consistencies, high
composite reliabilities and AVEs above 0.50. Participants indicated that they were
fairly literate with regard to online data protection and privacy on average. About
two thirds (63%) rated themselves above the scale’s midpoint.
Following the modifications discussed in the pre-study, the online privacy con-
cern scale was now modeled as a five-dimensional construct comprising concerns
about data collection practices by (1) providers and (2) institutions, as well as
concerns about (3) information access by other users, (4) information sharing
by other users, and (5) identify theft by unknown people. The initial model fit
the data well, and each factor had a high internal consistency, a high composite
reliability, and high AVEs. However, covariances between all dimensions that could
be subsumed under vertical privacy concerns (1 and 2), and those that could be
subsumed under horizontal privacy concerns (3–5) were highly correlated (r = 0.70–
0.81). Consequently, I estimated a second-order CFA, which allows two overall
factors capturing vertical and horizontal privacy concerns to be computed (see also
Fig. B.1 in the Appendix B). This final model again exhibited a good fit with the
data. Overall, participants were rather concerned about all five dimensions. Looking
at the second-order factors, it becomes apparent that people were particularly
concerned about data collection practices by providers and institutions. About 26%
of participants had a value above 6, indicating that they were very concerned about
the ways in which providers and institutions collected, analyzed, and used their
254 10 Results
personal data. In contrast, about 14% were very concerned that other users might
get access to or share information about them without their consent.
10.1.2 Assessing Potential Bias in the ESM Sample
Table 10.3 compares participants and non-participants in the ESM study with
regard to their smartphone affinity, subjective online privacy literacy, vertical
and horizontal privacy concerns, and personality. Looking at the means of the
two samples, we see that differences turned out to be non-significant. Initially, I
wondered whether people with high smartphone affinity would be more inclined
to participate in the study as they might be more interested in the design and
in evaluating their own smartphone behavior. However, the comparison between
participants and non-participants revealed no significant difference in reported
symbolic smartphone importance. Moreover, people who decided to take part in
the ESM study and thus allowed potentially sensitive usage data to be collected
were not more or less literate about privacy and data protection, nor were they more
concerned about their privacy on either the horizontal or vertical level. Both samples
also had similar scores on the personality measures. In sum, I conclude that the
design of the study did not severely bias the sample.
However, the results of the post-survey measures assessing whether people
perceived the study as an intervention or disturbance reveal that the study might
have slightly influenced people’s behavior and perceptions. On average, participants
were indecisive about whether the study had made them think more about privacy
and data protection (M = 3.97, SD = 1.61). However, as Fig. 10.1 reveals,
about a quarter of the sample (25%) chose a value one point above the scale’s
midpoint (= 5), suggesting that a considerable number of participants indeed felt
that they thought more about data protection and privacy after the study. Likewise,
people were at first glance indecisive about whether the study has made them more
deliberate in disclosing private information (M = 3.84, SD = 1.57). However,
Table 10.3 Comparison between participants and non-participants in the ESM study
Non-participants Participants
M SD M SD t df p
Symbolic smartphone importance 4.17 1.42 4.31 1.30 −1.29 224.15 0.199
Gregariousness 3.80 1.13 3.73 1.03 0.81 226.13 0.419
Deliberation 4.45 0.96 4.38 0.88 1.01 225.28 0.313
Online privacy literacy 4.40 1.32 4.53 1.13 −1.32 234.03 0.189
Vertical privacy concerns 5.08 1.31 4.90 1.29 −1.61 215.91 0.108
Horizontal privacy concerns 4.44 1.31 4.35 1.28 0.83 216.66 0.409
Note: Welch’s two-sample t-tests were computed
10.1 Preliminary Analyses 255
Thinking about privacy and data protection More deliberate disclosure

40
40
30
30
20
20
10 10
Frequency
0 0
Perceived effort Avoidance strategy

125
40 100
30 75
20 50
10 25
0 0
2 4 6 2 4 6
Fig. 10.1 Frequency distributions of the post-survey measures. Note: All items were measured on
a 7-point scale ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree, with the exception of the
last item, which was measured on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 = never to 7 = always. Analyses
are based on the post-survey sample (n = 149)
Fig. 10.1 again suggests that a considerable number of participants now reflect more
before disclosing private information.
That being said, participants also indicated that they did not change their behavior
during the study. Aside from a small share of participants who thought that the study
required a great deal of effort, most participants did not consider the study to be
overly time-consuming or laborious (M = 2.84, SD = 1.46). More importantly, 79%
of all participants indicated that they did not use any avoidance strategy or changed
their usual smartphone use in order to receive fewer situational questionnaires (M
= 1.35, SD = 0.78). Figure 10.1 shows that even participants who scored higher on
that last item were below the scale’s midpoint suggesting that they may have tried
to avoid some questionnaires at times, but mostly did not change their behavior.1
These post-survey findings notwithstanding, it could be that participants were
unconsciously affected by the study design. Stone, Kessler, and Haythomthwatte
(1991) noted that diary studies (and ESM studies as well due to their similar
assessment techniques) require respondents to maintain interest over a considerable
period of time. Otherwise, responses to the situational questionnaires might be
of poor quality because people would tend to answer more quickly and with
less reflection over the course of the study. In this study, participants generally
rated the ESM study as rather interesting (M = 5.13, SD = 1.45). This might
1 What is more, even if participants did use their smartphone less and thus received fewer situational
questionnaires, they should still behave as predicted by the theory in the situations which were
captured.
256 10 Results
suggest that people were generally willing to provide truthful answers to the
situational questionnaires. The additional analyses conducted to test whether people
unwittingly changed their response behavior gave no reason for concern either: The
variance in people’s responses, for example, did not decrease over the course of
the study (random-intercept model (RI-M): b = −1.27, SE = 0.94, p = 0.180).
Participants did answer closer to the scale’s midpoint on the self-disclosure scale
(RI-M: b = −0.08, SE = 0.03, p = 0.009). However, the effect was very small,
as the deviation from the scale’s midpoint decreased by 0.08 points with each
additional questionnaire (potential deviation range = 0–50). Nonetheless, I further
tested whether the increasing number of situational questionnaires had an influence
on people’s self-disclosure reports. The results suggested that this was not the case
(RI-M: b = 0.10, SE = 0.03, p = 0.079). As such, the study design should not have
noticeably biased the subsequent analyses of the ESM data. Based on these results,
I considered the effect of the study on people’s response patterns as negligible.
10.2 Predicting Pre-situational Preventive Privacy

Regulation
The first set of analyses sought to understand what makes people engage in
preventive privacy regulation behaviors. As proposed by the theory of situational
privacy and self-disclosure, we can differentiate between the initial selection of
an appropriate environment (privacy regulation behavior 1) and the subsequent
manipulation of this chosen environment (privacy regulation behavior 2). Choosing
a certain environment in the context of smartphone-based communication refers to
deciding on, installing, and using a certain communication application. In the first
section, I hence investigate whether non-situational personal factors predict the use
of different communication applications in line with the proposed hypotheses. In
the second section, I investigate whether these same personal factors also predict
the use of privacy strategies and privacy settings within the most frequently used
communication applications.
10.2.1 Choosing the Environment
Before I report the analytical results, it is helpful to look at the data descriptively.
Table 10.4 shows the proportion of users and non-users of the various communica-
tion services. The first two columns represent the distribution of users and non-users
in the pre-survey sample, while the last two columns represent the distribution of
the ESM sample. In the latter, the share of participants who actually used the mobile
version of this service during the ESM study is additionally indicated in parentheses.
10.2 Predicting Pre-situational Preventive Privacy Regulation 257
Table 10.4 Users and non-users of different communication services

Pre-survey (N = 1572) ESM study (n = 164)
Users Non-users Users Non-users
Email services 100 0 100 (87) 0 (13)
Instant Messenger
WhatsApp 94 6 96 (93) 4 (7)
SMS 81 19 100 (91) 0 (9)
Skype 64 36 68 (9) 32 (91)
Facebook Messenger 46 54 48 (40) 52 (60)
Threema 11 89 14 (10) 86 (90)
Telegram 4 96 7 (6) 93 (94)
Snapchat 3 97 3 (4) 97 (96)
Google Talk/Hangout 1 99 4 (6) 96 (94)
Signal/TextSecure 1 99 2 (0) 98 (100)
Surespot 0.2 99.8 0 (0) 100 (100)
Social network sites
Facebook 71 29 87 (47) 13 (53)
Google+ 37 63 33 (18) 66 (82)
Instagram 14 85 15 (8) 85 (92)
Stayfriends 12 88 10 (0) 89 (100)
StudiVZ 7 92 7 (0) 93 (100)
MeinVZ 3 97 2 (0) 98 (100)
Ello 0.2 99.8 0 (0) 100 (100)
Microblogging services
Twitter 21 78 23 (9) 77 (91)
Other applications
Tinder 3 96 6 (6) 93 (94)
Notes: Proportion (%) of users and non-users of different communication applications in the pre-
survey sample and ESM sample. Sums do not necessarily equal 100% due to item non-responses.
Numbers in parentheses refer to the percentage of people who actually used the respective
application during the ESM study (based on the log files)
As the study was disseminated via email, all participants had an email account.
Moreover, 83% of those who participated in the ESM study also assessed their email
via a mobile application. With regard to IMs, the results show a mixed picture.
Whereas almost everybody used WhatsApp (94%) and the majority of participants
also utilized SMS (81%), Skype (64%), and the Facebook Messenger (46%), only
few participants used more privacy-friendly alternatives such as Threema (11%),
Telegram (4%), Signal (1%), or Surespot (0.2%). Similar distributions were found
in the ESM sample. However, looking at the actual usage within the ESM study, we
see that using a certain application does not necessarily mean that this application is
used very often. Whereas WhatsApp, which was installed by 96% of the participants
in the ESM study, was also used by 93% during the 2-week study, only 9% actually
used Skype during that time, although 68% indicated using that application in
258 10 Results
general. With regard to SNSs, it can be seen that most people used Facebook
(71%). Less than half of participants used Google+ (37%). Other SNS that used
to be popular in Germany (Stayfriends, StudiVZ, MeinVZ) were only used by a
few participants. Instagram as a SNS that is primarily used to share photographs
was used by 14%. Only four participants indicated using Ello. Again, similar
distributions were found in the ESM sample. However, considerably fewer people
actually used SNS during the ESM study. For example, although 87% indicated
having installed Facebook on their smartphone, only about 47% actually used
it in the course of the study. The other German SNS were not used during the
study because they do not provide mobile applications that allow the service to be
assessed from a smartphone. Next, 21% of participants used Twitter, with a similar
distribution found in the ESM sample. Finally, only a few people used the dating
application Tinder.
Keeping these results in mind, I will now turn to investigating antecedents
of privacy regulation behavior 1 (choosing certain communication applications).
Figure 10.2 shows the basic SEM that was estimated to investigate the relevant
research questions and hypotheses. All independent variables were modeled as
latent variables. The dependent variables (symbolized by the only rectangle in
the figure) were dichotomous usage items (e.g., 1 = uses Facebook and 0 = does
not use Facebook). In order to retain as much power in the model as possible,
I tested two similar models with different dependent variables. The first model
included all IMs that were used via a smartphone.2 The model was thus based on
all participants who indicated owning a smartphone (n = 970, 5.3% were excluded
due to missing data). The estimated model fit the data well, χ 2 (489) = 730.19,
p < 0.001; CFI = 0.95; TLI = 0.94; RMSEA = 0.02, 90% CI [0.02, 0.03];
WRMR = 0.96. All estimated paths and inferential statistics can be found in
Table B.4 in the Appendix B. Figure 10.3 additionally shows coefficient plots of the
odds ratios (with their 95% confidence intervals) and thus provides a more concise
overview of the results. Relationships are hence significant whenever the confidence
intervals do not include 1 (i.e., no effect).
The second model included all SNSs3 as well as the microblogging service
Twitter as services that can, but do not have to be used without a smartphone.
Thus, this model was based on all participants from the pre-survey (n = 1460,
7.1% were excluded due to missing data). The model likewise fit the data well,
χ 2 (467) = 805.99, p < 0.001; CFI = 0.95; TLI = 0.94; RMSEA = 0.02, 90% CI
[0.02, 0.03]; WRMR = 1.09. Table B.5 in the Appendix B provides an overview
of all path coefficients estimated in the model as well as their inferential statistics.
Figures 10.4 and 10.5 show coefficients plots of the odds ratios (with their 95%
confidence intervals).
2 I excluded all services with less than ten users in the sample. Thus, I excluded Surespot from the
first model.
3 As only four participants indicated using Ello, I excluded Ello from the analysis.
Gregarious- RQ1a
ness
…about …about
Provider Instuonal
Pracces Pracces
Vercal
Privacy
H1a RQ4a
Concerns
e Privacy
Online RQ3a Regulaon
Privacy Behavior 1
Literacy (Choosing
e environments)
Horizontal RQ5a
H1b
Privacy
Concerns
…about
…about …about
Unwanted
Unwanted Identy
Informaon
Informaon The
Access
Sharing
Deliberaon
RQ2a
Fig. 10.2 SEM for predictors of privacy regulation behaviors 1. Note: Two structural equation
models with latent variables were estimated. The first model included SNS use (Facebook,
Google+, StudiVZ, MeinVZ, Instagram, and Twitter) as dependent variables. The second model
included IM use (WhatsApp, Facebook-Messenger, Signal, Threema, Telegram, Hangout, Skype
and Snapchat) as dependent variables
Research Question 1a investigated whether non-situational traits such as higher

gregariousness—the tendency to be more sociable and open tow new experiences—
influence the likelihood of using certain communication applications. Generally, I
assumed that participants who scored lower on the gregariousness subscale would
be more likely to adopt privacy-friendly communication applications. With regard
to IMs, the results show that gregarious people were more likely to use Facebook
Messenger (b = 0.20, se = 0.06, 95% CI[0.08, 0.31], p < 0.001, OR = 1.37) and
Skype (b = 14, se = 0.06, 95% CI [0.03, 0.25], p = 0.015, OR = 1.25). A one-
unit increase in the gregariousness subscale increased the chance of using Facebook
Messenger by 1.37 times and the chance of using Skype by 1.25 times. A similar
trend was observed for Snapchat (b = 0.18, se = 0.10, 95% CI [−0.02, 0.38], p =
0.071, OR = 1.34). However, as the estimated coefficient was not significant at the
level of significance determined a priori, we cannot be certain that the effect size
is indeed different from zero. With regard to SNS, gregariousness was significantly
related to the likelihood of using Facebook (b = 0.21, se = 0.05, 95% CI [0.12, 0.30],
260 10 Results
Fig. 10.3 Results from the SEM predicting IM use. Note: The original probit coefficients were
multiplied by a scaling factor of 1.6 (Gelman & Hill, 2009, p. 119) and transformed into odds
ratios (OR) for easier interpretation; e.g., each one-unit increase in the latent variable online privacy
literacy decreases the chance of using Whatsapp by 27% (OR = 0.73, value < 1= reduced chance),
whereas each one-unit increase in the latent variable vertical privacy concerns increases the chance
of using Threema by the factor of 1.56 (value >1= enhanced chance). The figure shows the OR all
and 95% confidence intervals
Fig. 10.4 Results from the SEM predicting SNS use. Note: Coefficients represent odds ratios
(OR); e.g., with each one-unit increase in the latent variable vertical privacy concerns, the chance
of using Facebook decreases by 33% (OR = 0.67, value < 1= reduced chance), whereas each one-
unit increase in the latent variable gregariousness increases the chance of using Facebook by a
factor of 1.41 (value >1= higher chance)
p < 0.001, OR = 1.41) and StudiVZ (b = 0.17, se = 0.07, 95% CI [0.03, 0.32],
p = 0.021, OR = 1.32). A one-unit increase in the latent variable gregariousness thus
increased the chance of using Facebook by 1.41 times, and of using StudiVZ of by
1.32 times. A similar trend was observed with regard to Instagram (b = 0.10, se =
0.06, 95% CI [−0.01, 0.21], p = 0.071, OR = 1.17) suggesting that gregarious people
are also more likely to use Instagram. However, the effect was again not significant
at the predetermined level of significance.
In sum, the findings suggest that people scoring high on gregariousness are
more likely to use popular communication applications such as Facebook, Facebook
Messenger, and Skype. Conversely, shy people (who have low gregariousness
262 10 Results
Fig. 10.5 Results from the

SEM predicting Twitter use.
Note: Coefficients represent
odds ratios (OR); e.g., with
each one-unit increase in the
latent variable
gregariousness, the chance of
using Twitter increases by a
factor of 1.32 (value > 1=
higher chance)
scores) were not more likely to use privacy-friendly communication applications

(e.g., Threema, Signal, or Telegram), but were less likely to use the most popular
and privacy-invasive services (particularly Facebook-run services).
Research Question 2a asked whether deliberation—the tendency to be more cau-
tious and logical in making assessments—is related to using certain communication
applications. I assumed that people scoring high on the deliberation subscale would
be more inclined to use privacy-friendly communication applications. The results
revealed that deliberation decreased the likelihood of using Google+ (b = −0.25,
se = 0.08, 95% CI [−0.41, −0.08], p = 0.003, OR = 0.67). Each one-unit increase in
the deliberation subscale was associated with participants having a 33% lower risk
of using Google+. Similar trends were found for Facebook (b = −0.17, se = 0.09,
95% CI [−0.34, 0.00], p = 0.056, OR = 0.77), Instagram (b = −0.19, se = 0.10,
95% CI [−0.38, 0.01], p = 0.069, OR = 0.74), and Twitter (b = −0.16, se = 0.09,
95% CI [−0.34, 0.02], p = 0.078, OR = 0.77). Again, however, we cannot be certain
that those trends actually differ from zero. Interestingly, there was a positive trend
that deliberation increased the chance of using StudiVZ (b = 0.24, se = 0.14, 95% CI
[−0.03, 0.50], p = 0.081, OR = 1.46). With regard to IMs, deliberate people had a
lower chance of using Telegram (b = −0.32, se = 0.16, 95% CI [−0.63, −0.01], p =
0.046, OR = 0.60). All other effects were not significant. In conclusion, the findings
suggest that deliberation might have a small negative effect on the likelihood of
using popular social network sites. However, we have to bear in mind that this effect
was only significant for Google+. Deliberation thus did not positively influence the
likelihood of using privacy-friendly communication applications. It even negatively
predicted the use of the rather privacy-friendly IM Telegram.
Research Question 3a investigated whether higher online privacy literacy pre-
dicts the use of different communication applications. As higher online privacy
literacy goes along with more knowledge about the potential privacy risks associated
with certain applications, I assumed that people with higher privacy literacy
would be more inclined to use privacy-friendly applications and less likely to use
potentially privacy-invasive applications. With regard to IMs, online privacy literacy
significantly decreased the risk of using WhatsApp (b = −0.20, se = 0.05, 95%
CI [−0.30, −0.09], p < 0.001, OR = 0.73). On the other hand, it increased the
chance of using more privacy-friendly applications such as Threema (b = 0.23,
se = 0.05, 95% CI [0.18, 0.33], p < 0.001, OR = 1.45) and Signal (b = 0.31,
se = 0.08, 95% CI [0.14, 0.47], p < 0.001, OR = 1.63). However, it also slightly
increased the likelihood of using Skype (b = 0.09, se = 0.04, 95% CI [0.01, 0.17],
p = 0.020, OR = 1.16) and Google Hangout (b = 0.29, se = 0.08, 95% CI [0.14,
0.44], p < 0.001, OR = 1.59). The results further revealed that online privacy
literacy positively predicted the use of certain SNS such as Stayfriends (b = 0.13,
se = 0.04, 95% CI [0.05, 0.21], p = 0.002, OR = 1.23), Instagram (b = 0.12, se =
0.04, 95% CI [0.05, 0.20], p = 0.002, OR = 1.22), and Twitter (b = 0.25, se = 0.03,
95% CI [0.18, 0.31], p < 0.001, OR = 1.48). With each one-unit increase on the
online privacy literacy scale, participants had thus a 48% higher chance of using
Twitter. In conclusion, the findings suggest a very mixed pictures. On the one hand,
online privacy literacy positively predicted the use of some SNSs such as Stayfriend,
Twitter, and Instagram as well as some IMs such as Skype and Google Hangout. At
the same time, it lowered the chances of using WhatsApp and increased the chance
of using privacy-friendly alternatives such as Threema or Signal.
Research Question 4a investigated whether vertical privacy concerns affect the
use of different communication applications. In line with the previous literature
on online privacy concerns more generally, I assumed that higher concerns would
lead to a decreased chance of using privacy-invasive services and conversely to a
higher chance of using privacy-friendly services. People with higher vertical privacy
concerns were moreover less likely to use WhatsApp (b = −0.28, se = 0.09, 95% CI
[−0.30, −0.09], p = 0.001, OR = 0.64) and the Facebook Messenger (b = −0.32,
se = 0.06, 95% CI [−0.42, −0.21], p < 0.001, OR = 0.60), lowering the risk of
using both applications by about 36% and 40%, respectively. On the other hand,
higher vertical privacy concerns significantly predicted the use of more privacy-
friendly IMs such as Threema (b = 0.28, se = 0.08, 95% CI [0.13, 0.42], p < 0.001,
OR = 1.56), Telegram (b = 0.22, se = 0.11, 95% CI [0.01, 0.43], p < 0.001, OR
= 1.43), and Signal (b = 0.37, se = 0.15, 95% CI [0.08, 0.66], p = 0.021, OR =
1.80). In particular, each one-unit increase in the latent variable for vertical privacy
concerns increased the chance of using Threema by 56% and of using Signal by
80%. Most prominently, the results revealed that higher concerns about providers’
and institutions’ data collection practices are related to a lower likelihood of using
Facebook (b = −0.25, se = 0.05, 95% CI [−0.35, −0.16], p < 0.001, OR = 0.67),
Google+ (b = −0.12, se = 0.05, 95% CI [−0.22, −0.03], p = 0.008, OR = 0.82), and
Instagram (b = −0.15, se = 0.06, 95% CI [−0.27, −0.03], p = 0.017, OR = 0.79).
A similar trend was also found for MeinVZ (b = −0.14, se = 0.07, 95% CI [−0.29,
0.00], p = 0.052, OR = 0.80). Vertical privacy concerns, however, had no effect on
using Stayfriends or StudiVZ. These findings suggest that vertical privacy concerns
are negatively correlated with using privacy-invasive and popular IM WhatsApp
and SNSs such as Facebook, Google+, and Instagram. At the same time, users with
higher vertical privacy concerns are also more likely to use more privacy-friendly
IMs such as Threema, Telegram, or Signal.
Finally, Research Question 5a asked whether horizontal privacy concerns like-
wise affect the likelihood of using different communication applications. Concerns
about other users were less powerful in predicting application use. With regard to
264 10 Results
IMs, horizontal privacy concerns positively predicted Facebook Messenger use (b =

0.16, se = 0.05, 95% CI [0.07, 0.26], p = 0.001, OR = 1.30), but negatively affected
the likelihood of using Telegram (b = −0.18, se = 0.09, 95% CI [−0.35, −0.01], p
= 0.033, OR = 0.74). With regard to SNS, higher horizontal concerns were positively
related to Google+ use (b = 0.14, se = 0.04, 95% CI [0.07, 0.22], p < 0.001, OR =
1.25), and negatively related to Twitter use (b = −0.10, se = 0.04, 95% CI [−0.18,
−0.02], p = 0.019, OR = 0.85).
10.2.2 Manipulating the Environment
Next, I will investigate what makes people engage in different types of privacy regu-
lation behaviors within their chosen environments. Before discussing the analytical
results, I will again present descriptive results with regard to the use of different
privacy strategies and settings. Table 10.5 shows how many participants in the pre-
survey sample indicated using each privacy strategy or privacy setting offered by
the different services. The table is similarly organized as Table 8.1 (Sect. 8.2.2,
p. 193). It likewise differentiates between strategies that prevent identification and
those prevent unwanted accessibility as proposed by the theory of situational privacy
and self-disclosure. The numbers in parentheses show the proportion of users in the
ESM sample who indicated using each strategy or setting.
In the context of email use, the results show that only a few people actually try
to enhance their level of privacy. Only 16% use a non-identifiable email address and
only 11% used additional software to encrypt their email communication. Notably,
10% of the sample did not know whether their emails are encrypted or not. With
regard to the most used IM WhatsApp, about half of participants did not upload an
identifiable photograph of themselves as their profile picture, making them visually
anonymous. Furthermore, about a third (31%) used a fake name.
On Facebook, 20% had an identifiable cover photo and 67% an identifiable
profile picture (which are both visible to everyone even when the content of their
profile is only visible to friends or specific people). Also about a third (30%)
used a fake name or a pseudonym for their Facebook profile. Furthermore, almost
all respondents (94%) limited their profiles to their friends. Only 5% had an
open profile visible even to non-members of Facebook. Finally, about half of
the participants who used Facebook (56%) implemented friend lists to separate
audiences into smaller groups.
On Google+, on the other hand, most participants had no identifiable cover photo
(83%) and no identifiable profile picture (67%). Slightly more Google+ users used
a pseudonym instead of their real name (38%) compared to Facebook. Furthermore,
fewer people limited their profile to their contacts (64%) and only about a third
(26%) used circles (similar to friend lists) to classify their contacts.
Of those participants who used Skype, 63% had not upload an identifiable profile
picture, and 50% used a pseudonym instead of their real name. On Twitter, even
more users had a non-identifiable profile picture (71%) and a non-identifiable cover
Table 10.5 Privacy regulation strategies and settings in different communication applications
Visual anonymity Pseudonymity Audience segmentation Encrypting content
Non-ident. profile Non-ident. title Using fake Limiting to Using friend lists End-to-end encryption
photo photo name/address friends/followers
Email services
Yes 16 (15) 11 (8)
No 83 (85) 78 (81)
Dk 1 (0) 10 (11)
WhatsApp
Yes 49 (53) 31 (34)
No 48 (46) 65 (65)
Dk 2 (1) 3 (1)
Facebook/Facebook Messenger
Yes 31 (34) 77 (85) 30 (33) 94 (96) 56 (59)
10.2 Predicting Pre-situational Preventive Privacy Regulation
No 67 (64) 20 (14) 69 (67) 5 (3) 34 (35)

Dk 2 (1) 2 (1) 0 (0) 1 (1) 9 (6)
Skype
Yes 63 (57) 50 (54)
No 32 (38) 46 (45)
Dk 4 (5) 3 (2)
(continued)
265
Table 10.5 (continued)
266

Visual anonymity Pseudonymity Audience segmentation Encrypting content
Non-ident. profile Non-ident. title Using fake Limiting to Using friend lists End-to-end encryption
photo photo name/address friends/followers
Google+/Google Hangout
Yes 67 (72) 83 (94) 38 (50) 64 (62) 26 (30)
No 20 (28) 4 (6) 50 (48) 27 (9) 59 (67)
Dk 10 (0) 10 (0) 9 (2) 10 (28) 11 (4)
Twitter
Yes 71 (87) 90 (92) 67 (76) 34 (30)
No 24 (11) 5 (5) 28 (18) 41 (51)
Dk 5 (3) 5 (3) 5 (5) 23 (19)
Instagram
Yes 52 (62) 78 (92) 47 (50)
No 43 (38) 18 (8) 44 (42)
Dk 5 (0) 5 (0) 8 (8)
Notes: Proportion (%) of users of the respective services in the pre-survey and in the ESM sample (in parentheses) who implemented privacy regulation
strategies or used corresponding settings within these services. Sums do not necessarily equal 100% due to item non-responses. Dk = Don’t know
10 Results
photo (90%). Furthermore, many users also used fake names on Twitter (67%). On
the other hand, only 34% of all Twitter users in the pre-survey sample limited their
tweets to their followers. Finally, about half of Instagram users were non-identifiable
on their profile picture (52%). Furthermore, the majority used a fake name (78%).
About half limited their profile to their followers (47%).
On the basis of these descriptives findings, we can now move on to examining
the antecedents of privacy regulation behavior 2 (manipulating environments).
Figure 10.6 shows the basic SEM that was estimated to investigate the relevant
research questions and hypotheses. All independent variables were again modeled
as latent variables. The dependent variables (again symbolized by the only rectangle
in the figure) were dichotomous items indicating the use of different privacy
strategies or settings (e.g., 1 = used a non-identifiable profile picture and 0 = used
Gregarious- RQ1b
ness
…about …about
Provider Instuonal
Pracces Pracces
Vercal
Privacy
H1a RQ4b
Concerns
e Privacy
Online RQ3b Regulaon
Privacy Behavior 2
Literacy (Manipulang
e Environments)
Horizontal RQ5b
H1b
Privacy
Concerns
…about
…about …about
Unwanted
Unwanted Identy
Informaon
Informaon The
Access
Sharing
Deliberaon
RQ2b
Fig. 10.6 SEM for predictors of privacy regulation behaviors 2. Note: Three structural equation
models with latent variables were estimated. The first model was estimated based on all participants
and focused on email communication (n = 1440). The second model was based on all WhatsApp
users (n = 796). Dependent variables encompassed the following WhatsApp-specific privacy
regulation strategies: (1) using a non-identifiable profile picture and (2) using a pseudonym instead
of one’s real name. The last model included all Facebook users (n = 713). The dependent variables
were (1) using a non-identifiable profile and cover photo, (2) using a pseudonym instead of one’s
real name, (3) using friend lists, and (4) limiting profile access to friends
268 10 Results
an identifiable profile picture). As each participant used different communication

services and information on the use of privacy strategies and settings could only
be collected from those who used each particular service, a new model would
have to be estimated for each communication service. However, as the model is
rather complex, it also requires a pretty large sample size. I thus estimated the
model only for the most widely-used communication applications email, Facebook,
and WhatsApp which provided enough data to test the model and also allowed
for sufficient exploration of the underlying mechanisms. The first model focused
on email communication. Dependent variables hence included the use of a non-
identifiable local part of one’s email address, and the use of an encryption software.
This model was based on all participants in the pre-survey (n = 1440, 8.4% were
excluded due to missing data). The model fit the data well, χ 2 (357) = 613.42,
p < 0.001; CFI = 0.96; TLI = 0.95; RMSEA = 0.02, 90% CI [0.02, 0.03]; WRMR
= 1.15. Table B.6 in the Appendix B provides an overview of all path coefficients
estimated in the model as well as their inferential statistics. Figure 10.7 shows the
coefficient plot of the odds ratios (with their 95% confidence intervals), providing a
more concise overview of the results.
The second model focused on privacy strategies in WhatsApp communication.
This model was hence based on all participants who used WhatsApp (n = 871,
9.9% excluded due to missing data). Dependent variables were the use of a non-
identifiable profile picture and using a fake name. The model fit the data well,
χ 2 (357) = 520.83, p < 0.001; CFI = 0.96; TLI = 0.95; RMSEA = 0.02, 90% CI
[0.02, 0.03]; WRMR = 1.00. Table B.7 in the Appendix B provides an overview of
all path coefficients estimated in the model and Fig. 10.8 shows the odds ratios.
Finally, the last model investigated antecedents of using privacy strategies and
settings on Facebook and was hence based on all participants who used Facebook
(n = 922, 17.5% excluded due to missing data). Dependent variables were the use
Fig. 10.7 Results from the SEM predicting use of privacy strategies in Email services. Note: The
original probit coefficients were multiplied by a scaling factor of 1.6 (Gelman & Hill, 2009, p. 119)
and transformed into odds ratios (OR) for easier interpretation; e.g., with each one-unit increase
in the latent variable online privacy literacy, the chance of implementing end-to-end encryption
increases by a factor of 1.95 (value > 1= higher chance). The figure shows the OR and the 95%
confidence intervals
Fig. 10.8 Results from the SEM predicting use of privacy settings and strategies on WhatsApp.
Note: Coefficients represent Odds Ratios (OR); e.g., with each one-unit increase in the latent
variable online privacy literacy, the chance of using a fake name on WhatsApp increases by a
factor of 1.22 (value > 1= higher chance)
of a non-identifiable cover and profile photo (visual anonymity), using a fake name
(pseudonymity), as well as the use of friend lists and limiting the profile to contacts
(limited access), two items which measured the level of content accessibility. The
model had a good fit, χ 2 (401) = 618.83, p < 0.001; CFI = 0.95; TLI = 0.94;
RMSEA = 0.02, 90% CI [0.02, 0.03]; WRMR = 1.02. Table B.8 in the Appendix B
provides an overview of all path coefficients estimated in the model and Fig. 10.9
shows the odds ratios.
Research Question 1b investigated the effect of gregariousness on the use of
privacy strategies or application-specific settings within the chosen environments.
In the context of email communication, more gregarious people were less likely
to use a non-identifiable email address (b = −0.13, se = 0.05, 95% CI [−0.23,
−0.02], p = 0.015, OR = 0.81). In other words, with one-unit decrease on the
gregariousness subscale, participants had a 21% higher chance of implementing a
pseudonymity strategy when choosing an email address. With regard to WhatsApp,
gregariousness negatively predicted the use of a non-identifiable profile picture
(b = −0.25, se = 0.06, 95% CI [−0.37, −0.13], p < 0.001, OR = 0.67). Thus,
the chance of staying visually anonymous increased by 33% with one-unit decline
on the gregariousness scale. A similar effect was found for Facebook users. Again,
higher gregariousness negatively predicted the use of non-identifiable profile and
cover photos (b = −0.26, se = 0.06, 95% CI [−0.38, −0.14], p < 0.001,
OR = 0.66). In sum, the findings revealed that less gregarious people are more
likely to use pseudonyms in their email addresses and non-identifiable profile and
cover photos on WhatsApp and Facebook.
Research Question 2b analyzed whether deliberation was related to the use of
different privacy strategies and privacy settings in communication applications. I
generally assumed that more deliberate people would be more inclined to engage
in this second type of privacy regulation behavior. However, deliberation turned out
to be a weak predictor. Moreover, higher deliberation negatively predicted the use
of pseudonymization strategies in both WhatsApp (b = −0.23, se = 0.11, 95% CI
270 10 Results
Fig. 10.9 Results from the SEM predicting use of privacy settings and strategies on Facebook.
Note: Coefficients represent Odds Ratios (OR); e.g., with each one-unit increase in the latent
variable vertical privacy concerns, the chance of using a fake name on Facebook increases by
a factor of 1.49 (value > 1= higher chance)
[−0.46, −0.01], p = 0.043, OR = 0.69) and Facebook (b = −0.25, se = 0.11, 95%

CI [−0.48, −0.03], p = 0.027, OR = 0.67). Otherwise, deliberation had no effect
on other types of privacy regulation. Thus, in contrast to my original assumption, I
found that deliberate people were less likely to use pseudonyms on WhatsApp and
Facebook. Otherwise, deliberation did not turn out to be particularly powerful in
predicting the use of privacy strategies and settings within different communication
applications.
Research Question 3b focused on the influence of online privacy literacy on the
adoption of certain privacy regulation strategies. There was a quite strong effect of
online privacy literacy on the likelihood of implementing end-to-end encryption for
email communication (b = 0.42, se = 0.03, 95% CI [0.35, 0.48], p < 0.001, OR =
1.95). The chance of using this sophisticated content protections strategy increased
by 95% with each one-unit increase in the latent variable online privacy literacy.
More privacy-literate WhatsApp users were also more likely to use a pseudonym
(b = 0.12, se = 0.04, 95% CI [0.04, 0.21], p = 0.004, OR = 1.22). In the context
of Facebook use, however, online privacy literacy did not have a significant effect
on the use of different privacy regulation behaviors, although there was a small
positive trend indicating that greater privacy literacy increases the chance of using
non-identifiable profile and cover photos (b = 0.08, se = 0.04, 95% CI [0.00, 0.15],
p = 0.054, OR = 1.13). A negative trend was also found for the use of friend lists
(b = −0.08, se = 0.04, 95% CI [−0.15, 0.00], p = 0.053, OR = 0.88). However,
these trends have to be viewed with caution as we cannot be certain whether they
are indeed different from zero according to the predefined level of significance. In
sum, the findings revealed that people who reported greater online privacy literacy
were also more likely to implement end-to-end encryption in the context of email
communication and more likely to use pseudonyms in the context of WhatsApp use.
Regarding Research Question 4b, I found that vertical privacy concerns did
not influence the use of privacy strategies in the context of email communication.
However, higher vertical concerns positively predicted the use of a non-identifiable
profile picture on WhatsApp (b = 0.26, se = 0.06, 95% CI [0.14, 0.38], p < 0.001,
OR = 1.51) and Facebook (b = 0.25, se = 0.06, 95% CI [0.14, 0.36], p < 0.001,
OR = 1.49), and also increased the likelihood of using a pseudonym on Facebook (b
= 0.13, se = 0.06, 95% CI [0.02, 0.25], p = 0.026, OR = 1.24). Vertical privacy
concerns also modestly increased the likelihood of limiting Facebook profile to
one’s friends (b = 0.10, se = 0.06, 95% CI [−0.01, 0.22], p = 0.084, OR = 1.18).
Thus, findings revealed that greater concerns about the data collection practices
of website providers, institutions, or third parties increased the likelihood of using
anonymization strategies on WhatsApp and Facebook.
Next, I investigated Research Question 5b. With regard to horizontal privacy
concerns, I assumed that people who are more concerned about other users
compromising their privacy would be more likely to employ visual anonymization
strategies and audience segmentation strategies (e.g., using friend lists on Face-
book). However, contrary to my assumption, higher horizontal privacy concerns
only negatively predicted the use of a non-identifiable profile picture on WhatsApp
(b = −0.12, se = 0.05, 95% CI [−0.22, −0.02], p = 0.017, OR = 0.83). The
chance of using a non-identifiable profile picture decreased by 17% with each one-
unit increase on the horizontal privacy concerns scale. Horizontal privacy concerns
hence did not influence the use of privacy regulation behaviors, as I had assumed.
In contrast, they were negatively correlated with visual anonymization strategies on
WhatsApp.
Hypotheses 1a and 1b posit that higher online privacy literacy would be
positively related to both vertical and horizontal privacy concerns. Both relations
were estimated in each of the models described above. The relationship between
privacy literacy and vertical privacy concerns was generally positive, but small (β
between 0.03 and 0.10). The relationship was significant in all models except for the
model predicting the use of privacy strategies within WhatsApp, in which it turned
out to be non-significant. However, this model was based on the smallest sample
and hence had probably the weakest power to detect such a small effect. When
comparing all models, the differences between the unstandardized coefficients for
this relationship were not significant. Based on the largest sample with the highest
power, the hypothesis 1a was supported (model predicting the use of different SNS,
see p. 357 in the Appendix B: b = 0.07, se = 0.03, 95% CI [0.02, 0.12], p = 0.005, β =
0.08). With regard to Hypothesis 1b, the results revealed that online privacy literacy
was generally negatively related to horizontal privacy concerns (β between −0.06
272 10 Results
and −0.10). Thus, based on the largest sample with the highest power to detect
such a small relationship, Hypothesis 1b was not supported (model predicting the
use of different SNS: b = −0.08, se = 0.03, 95% CI [−0.14, −0.02], p = 0.009,
β = −0.07).
10.3 Predicting Situational Depth of Self-Disclosure
In the preceding sections, I have analyzed the extent to which stable personal
factors explain why some people engage in preventive privacy regulation behaviors
(both choosing and manipulating environments). In the next step of the analysis,
I investigate whether non-situational and situational factors predict the situational
depth of self-disclosure in different smartphone-based communication situations.
Thus, the following section represents the core analysis testing the major tenets
of the theory of situational privacy and self-disclosure. As outlined in Sect. 8.4,
I will first test the central supposition that self-disclosure indeed varies across
situations. In particular, I will quantify the amount of variance attributable to inter-
and intrapersonal differences in the depth of self-disclosure. Based on this initial
analysis, I will then proceed to investigating the proposed antecedents of the depth
of self-disclosure.
10.3.1 Situational Variance in Depth of Self-Disclosure
Before investigating the depth of self-disclosure, it is important to know what

people actually shared. Altogether, participants mostly shared text (92% of all 1105
sample events), and only rarely pictures (12%), links (3%), videos (0.8%), or voice
messages (0.2%). For the purpose of this analysis, however, it does not matter
whether the disclosure consisted of only textual information or visual information.
Instead, what is important is how private participants perceived these disclosures.
In Research Question 6, I asked how much variance in depth of self-disclosure is
attributable to interpersonal differences and how much to situational circumstances.
Figure 10.10 shows all measures of the depth of self-disclosure (points) plotted
against the time at which they were measured (x-axis represents the exact time
during the course of the study). Each line represents one participant in the ESM
study and thus reveals which measurements stemmed from each participant. Lighter
lines indicate a higher average level of depth of self-disclosure. Figure 10.11 shows
the same plot for the first 12 participants and thus allows a closer inspection of
the situational variance for these participants. As shown in the legend on the right
of the figure, the color shading represents each person’s average level of depth of
self-disclosure.
As can be seen from the zig-zag pattern of most lines, the depth of self-disclosure
measurements exhibit a great deal of situational variance. Looking at the second
10.3 Predicting Situational Depth of Self-Disclosure 273
100
75
Depth of self−disclosure
50
25
0
Time
Fig. 10.10 Situational variance in depth of self-disclosure. Note: Each line represents one
participant. Points represent the self-reported depth of self-disclosure at each measurement point
over the course of the study. Light grey lines represent a high average self-disclosure, while darker
grey lines represent a lower average depth of self-disclosure
100
Depth of Self−Disclosure
75 Average
Self−Disclosure
70
60
50
50
40
30
25
Time
Fig. 10.11 Situational variance in depth of self-disclosure (excerpt). Note: Only the first 12
participants’ self-reported measures are shown. Otherwise, the figure is the similar to Figure 10.10
274 10 Results
figure, Participant 54, for example, reported a depth of self-disclosure of 11 for

the first situation, 58 for the second, 56 for the third, 18 for the fourth, and so on
(the scale ranged from 1 = not at all private to 100 = very private). We can thus
conclude that depth of self-disclosure indeed varies across situations. However, as
revealed by the differences in shading, the average level of self-disclosure also varies
across participants. For example, the second figure also reveals that Participant 70
(light grey line in the upper right corner of the figure) has a much higher average
self-disclosure than all other participants shown (MI D70 = 73.85; hence the light
color of the line). We thus have to assume that there is considerable interpersonal
difference, too.
These visual representations make clear that there is both inter- and intrapersonal
variance in depth of self-disclosure. The intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC)
quantifies the amount of variance that is attributable to interpersonal differences
(in other words: explained by personal characteristics). The ICC for depth of self-
disclosure was 0.28 (95% CI [0.22, 0.35]). This means that 28% of the variance in
depth of self-disclosure at maximum can be explained by stable personal factors.
Although the residual variance also includes potential measurement errors, this
finding nevertheless suggests that situational circumstances can explain a larger
proportion of the variance in depth of self-disclosure. As the central supposition
of the theory of situational privacy and self-disclosure is thus supported, we can
now turn to analyzing the antecedents of self-disclosure.
10.3.2 Antecedents of Depth of Self-Disclosure
Before I describe the results, let us shortly revisit some of the fundamentals of the
theory of situational privacy and self-disclosure. First, it is important to keep in mind
that a situation is defined as the entirety of circumstances that affect the behavior of a
person at a given time. These circumstances (or factors) can be divided into personal
and environmental factors (including their interactions). Personal factors, in turn,
can be further differentiated into stable personality facets or trait-like characteristics
and situational needs. Environmental factors, on the other hand, can be differentiated
into interpersonal factors and external factors.
Before we turn to the results of the multilevel analysis, it seems apt to look
at the variables from a descriptive point of view. Table 10.3 already provided a
descriptive overview of the stable personal factors measured in the pre-survey. As
can be seen, the variables were quite normally distributed (including the ESM
sample). Table 10.6 now additionally shows the psychometric properties of the
variables measured as part of the ESM study. As already seen in the previous
figures, depth of self-disclosure varied a lot over the course of the study. On
average, however, depth of self-disclosure was neither high nor particularly low
(M = 46.75, SD = 24.82). In comparison, the motivation to disclose oneself was
quite high on average (M = 64.68, SD = 21.31). The interpersonal factors revealed
a similar picture: In 60% of all situations, participants responded to a message
Table 10.6 Psychometric properties of the ESM study variables

M SD Range Skew. Kurt.
Dependent variable
Depth of self-disclosure 46.75 24.82 0–100 −0.15 −0.81
Personal factors 2: Internal factors
Need to self-disclose 64.68 21.31 0–100 −0.49 −0.24
Reciprocity 0.60 0.49 0–1 −0.39 −1.85
Interpersonal trust 76.05 21.73 0–100 −1.09 0.73
Psych. closeness 72.07 24.01 0–100 −0.94 0.28
Similarity 65.38 22.15 0–100 −0.55 −0.29
Everyday centrality 66.27 26.85 0–100 −0.71 −0.43
Audience size 27.71 94.55 1–622 4.06 16.62
Environmental factors 2: External factors
Visual anonymity 0.99 0.08 0–1 −11.65 133.76
Pseudonymity 0.17 0.38 0–1 1.76 1.08
Limited accessibility 0.99 0.12 0–1 −8.41 68.82
End-to-end encryption 0.04 0.20 0–1 4.54 18.66
Note: M = Mean, SD = Standard deviation, Skew. = Skewness, Kurt. = Kurtosis
instead of starting a conversation. Furthermore, the audience consisted of about 27

recipients on average. However, this value is misleading, as the audience included
only one person in 77.54% of situations (a result of the high prevalence of IM
conversation in the sample). Thus, the median audience size was 1. With regard
to the other interpersonal factors, we can conclude that the participants generally
rated (potential) recipients as trustworthy, felt psychologically close to and similar to
them, and considered them central to their daily lives. The large standard deviations,
however, show that these factors also varied considerably across situations. External
factors, in contrast, did not vary as much across situations. In 99% of all situations,
participants were visually anonymous and limited the content to their followers (the
default when using IMs). Only in 17% of all situations did people communicate
using a pseudonym instead of their real name and only in very few cases (4%) was
the communication end-to-end encrypted. As a result of these descriptive findings,
it was almost impossible to find effects of visual anonymity or limited accessibility
on depth of self-disclosure in the recruited sample (see also limitations in the next
chapter).
With these descriptive statistics in mind, we can now turn to the estimated
models aiming to explain situationally measured depth of self-disclosure. Table 10.7
shows goodness-of-fit measures for the estimated multilevel models. Based on the
likelihood ratio test, we can see that the inclusion of non-situational personal factors
(M1) did not significantly improve the model fit ( deviance (11) = 9.16, p =
0.329). Non-situational personal factors hence did not explain much variance on
Level 2. Including situational personal and environmental factors (M2), however,
significantly improved the model fit ( deviance (19) = 161.70, p < 0.001). All
276 10 Results
Table 10.7 Comparison of multilevel-models predicting depth of self-disclosure

M0 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5
Goodness-of-fit statistics
AIC 4982.42 4989.26 4843.56 4809.39 4804.93 4814.50
BIC 4997.44 5044.33 4938.69 4929.55 4955.13 4989.74
logLik −2488.21 −2483.63 −2402.78 −2380.70 −2372.47 −2372.25
Deviance 4976.42 4967.26 4805.56 4761.40 4744.93 4744.50
deviance (χ 2 ) 9.16 161.70 44.17 16.46 0.43
df 3 11 19 24 30 35
p 0.329 < 0.001 < 0.001 0.011 0.995
Explained variance
R21 0.00 0.15
R22 −0.03 −0.02
R2GLMM(m) 0.00 0.02 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.14
R2GLMM(c) 0.29 0.32 0.41 0.49 0.50 0.50
Note: The following goodness-of-fit statistics are shown: AIC = Akaike information criterion,
BIC = Bayesian information criterion, several statistics for the likelihood ratio tests. Furthermore,
several parameters were computed to quantify the amount of explained variance. R21 and R22
represent the amount of explained variance at each level and were calculated as described by
Hox (2010, pp. 69–78). R2GLMM(m) and R2GLMM(c) represent the marginal and conditional R2 as
proposed by Nakagawa, Schielzeth, and O’Hara (2013) which were extended to random slope
models by Johnson (2014)
in all, situational personal and environmental factors were able to explain 15%
of the variance on Level 1. Including random slopes for interpersonal assessment
and pseudonymity (M3) further improved the model fit ( deviance (24) = 44.17,
p < 0.001). However, while the explained variance of the overall model was
higher (R2GLMM(c) = 0.49), the amount of explained variance by fixed effects did
not increase (R2GLMM(m) = 0.12). Including level-specific interactions (M4) further
improved the model fit ( deviance (30) = 16.46, p = 0.011) and also increased
the amount of explained variance by fixed effects (R2GLMM(m) = 0.14). Cross-level
interactions, however, did not result in a better model fit (M5). That being said, the
final model explained 50% of the variance in depth of self-disclosure by fixed and
random effects.
Table 10.8—which is organized similarly to Table 10.7—shows the estimated
fixed effects from the multilevel analyses along side their respective random effect
variances. Below, I will first investigate the extent to which the results support
Hypotheses 2 to 3d proposed in Chap. 8 and answer the Research Questions 7 and
8 on the basis of the fourth model (M3), which can be regarded as the best fitting,
yet simplest model. The fixed effects of this multilevel model are also shown in
Fig. 10.12. Subsequently, I will look at models M4 and M5 to answer Research
Question 9. These models explore potential interactions between the factors. It is
thus important to note that these models only provide conditional effects for some
situational and non-situational factors.
Table 10.8 Results from the multilevel-models predicting situational depth of self-disclosure
M0 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5
Fixed effects
(Intercept) 4.65 (0.13)∗∗∗ 3.62 (0.83)∗∗∗ 3.15 (1.84) 3.23 (1.86) 4.43 (22.40) 3.31 (22.65)
Level 2 (non-situational)
Personal factors 1: Traits and trait-like characteristics
Age 0.04 (0.01)∗∗ 0.04 (0.01)∗∗ 0.04 (0.01)∗∗ 0.05 (0.01)∗∗∗ 0.05 (0.01)∗∗∗
Gender (female) 0.16 (0.30) 0.18 (0.29) 0.10 (0.29) −0.03 (0.29) −0.03 (0.29)
Education −0.03 (0.14) −0.09 (0.14) −0.09 (0.14) −0.10 (0.14) −0.10 (0.14)
Online privacy literacy −0.14 (0.14) −0.11 (0.14) −0.14 (0.14) −0.13 (0.14) −0.14 (0.14)
Horizontal privacy concerns −0.04 (0.17) −0.05 (0.16) 0.01 (0.16) 0.02 (0.16) 0.01 (0.16)
Vertical privacy concerns −0.07 (0.17) −0.04 (0.17) −0.11 (0.16) −0.17 (0.17) −0.16 (0.17)
Deliberation 0.03 (0.32) −0.06 (0.31) −0.11 (0.31) −0.12 (0.31) −0.13 (0.31)
Gregariousness −0.09 (0.20) −0.07 (0.19) −0.07 (0.19) −0.09 (0.19) −0.08 (0.19)
Level 1 (situational)
10.3 Predicting Situational Depth of Self-Disclosure
Personal factor 2: Internal factors

Need to self-disclose 0.24 (0.03)∗∗∗ 0.22 (0.03)∗∗∗ 0.23 (0.03)∗∗∗ 0.23 (0.03)∗∗∗
Perceived audience size (log-transformed) −0.33 (0.05)∗∗∗ −0.30 (0.05)∗∗∗ −0.96 (4.88) −0.71 (4.93)
Interpersonal assessment 0.22 (0.04)∗∗∗ 0.23 (0.06)∗∗∗ 0.25 (0.06)∗∗∗ 0.25 (0.06)∗∗∗
Level of reciprocity 0.30 (0.14)∗ 0.32 (0.14)∗ 0.36 (0.14)∗∗ 0.36 (0.14)∗
Environmental factors 2: External factors
Visual anonymity −0.34 (1.50) −0.02 (1.53) 1.90 (22.33) 3.04 (22.58)
Pseudonymity 0.24 (0.23) 0.27 (0.25) 0.33 (0.27) 0.36 (0.28)
Limited accessibility 0.99 (0.71) 0.53 (0.73) −2.39 (1.49) −2.41 (1.50)
End-to-end encryption −0.26 (0.40) −0.08 (0.40) −0.15 (0.41) −0.16 (0.43)
(continued)
277
Table 10.8 (continued)
278
M0 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5
Interactions
Same-level interactions
Perc. audience size X Limited accessibility 1.16 (0.52)∗ 1.15 (0.53)∗
Perc. audience size X Visual anonymity −0.43 (4.85) −0.67 (4.90)
Perc. audience size X Pseudonymity −0.12 (0.10) −0.13 (0.10)
Horizontal priv. conc. X Vertical priv. conc. −0.24 (0.11)∗ −0.24 (0.11)∗
Online priv. lit. X Horizontal priv. conc. 0.13 (0.17) 0.13 (0.17)
Online priv. lit. X Vertical priv. conc. −0.37 (0.18)∗ −0.37 (0.18)∗
Cross-level interactions
Horizontal priv. conc. X Interpersonal assessment −0.02 (0.06)
Gregariousness X Interpersonal assessment 0.01 (0.08)
Vertical priv. conc. X Pseudonymity −0.11 (0.26)
Deliberation X Pseudonymity 0.16 (0.54)
Online. priv. lit. X Pseudonymity 0.12 (0.29)
Random effect variances
σI2ntercept|P erson 1.86 1.92 1.89 2.02 1.95 1.95
2
σResidual 4.45 4.43 3.80 3.35 3.32 3.32
σI2nterpersonalassessment|P erson 0.15 0.15 0.15
σP2 seudonymity|P erson 0.50 0.45 0.59
Note: Fixed effects estimated by restricted maximum likelihood (REML). Numbers in parentheses represent standard errors
Basis: nP articipants = 164; nevents = 1104
∗∗∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05
10 Results
Fig. 10.12 Main effects of non-situational and situational personal and situational environmental
factors on situational depth of self-disclosure. Note: This figure shows the fixed effects of the fourth
model (M3) as well as their 95% confidence intervals. As no interactions are included in the model,
the estimates can be interpreted as unstandardized main effects. Please note that the confidence
intervals of the effects of visual anonymity (both upper and lower) and limited accessibility (upper)
are larger than −1 and 1 respectively and are thus not fully shown in the figure
In Research Questions 7a to 7d, I sought to understand how non-situational

personal factors relate to depth of self-disclosure. Overall, none of the analyzed
factors were able to explain much of the non-situational variance in depth of
self-disclosure (recall that the ICC revealed that only 28% can be explained by
differences between participants). With regard to Research Question 7a, we can
see that neither deliberation (M3: b = −0.11, p = 0.731) nor gregariousness (M3:
b = −0.07, p = 0.722) was significantly related to depth of self-disclosure. Online
280 10 Results
privacy literacy (Research Question 7b) was not related to the dependent variable
either (M3: b = −0.14, p = 0.329). With regard to the Research questions 7c and
7d, neither horizontal privacy concerns (M3: b = 0.01, p = 0.945) nor vertical privacy
concerns (M3: b = −0.11, p = 0.502) were related to depth of self-disclosure. Here,
however, it is questionable, whether the power of the study had sufficient power to
detect such potentially weak relationships (see discussion and limitations in the next
chapter).
Next, I tested Hypothesis 2. According to the theory of situational privacy and
self-disclosure, internal factors should play an important role in determining the
depth of self-disclosure in all situations. I assumed that a higher need to self-
disclose oneself will lead to a higher depth of self-disclosure. The results supported
this hypothesis: A higher need for self-disclosure was indeed positively related to
reported depth of self-disclosure (M3: b = 0.22, SE = 0.03, 95% CI [0.16, 0.29],
p < 0.001). As the predictor was group-mean centered, the slope coefficient
represents the unbiased relationship between need to self-disclose and depth of self-
disclosure, with 10 more points on the predictor scale resulting in a 2.2-point higher
depth of self-disclosure (on the original scale ranging from 1 to 100). As including
a random slope for this predictor did not improve model fit, this relationship can be
regarded as rather robust.
In Hypotheses 3a to 3b, I assumed that a higher interpersonal assessment with
regard to trust and relational closeness would be related to a higher depth of self-
disclosure. As the preliminary results suggested that trust and the three dimensions
of relational closeness were highly correlated, I estimated the relationship between
a latent overall factor and depth of self-disclosure. The results supported both
hypotheses: The more trustworthy, psychologically close, similar, and central to
their everyday life participants rated the recipients of their disclosures, the higher the
depth of self-disclosure (M3: b = 0.23, SE = 0.06, 95% CI [0.13, 0.34], p < 0.001).
The fixed effect revealed that a one-unit increase in the latent variable leads to
a reported depth of self-disclosure 2.3 points higher (again on the original scale
ranging from 1 to 100). However, the relationship between interpersonal assessment
and depth of self-disclosure did vary between participants (σ 2 = 0.15). Figure B.2
in the Appendix B shows the distribution of effects in the sample. Although the
coefficient was positive for most of the sample, a negative relationship could be
observed for some participants.
Hypothesis 3c stated that large audience sizes decrease the depth of self-
disclosure. When participants perceived a larger audience, they indeed engaged
in less deep self-disclosure (M3: b = −0.30, SE = 0.05, 95% CI [0.13, 0.34],
p < 0.001). The log-transformed predictor revealed that the depth of self-disclosure
decreases by about 3 points with each perceivable increase in audience size. The
relationship did not vary significantly among participants, suggesting a robust linear
effect of audience size on depth of self-disclosure.
In Hypothesis 3d, I assumed that the depth of self-disclosure would be higher

when participants were responding to a message from someone else than in
situations in which they initiated a conversation themselves. The findings supported
the hypothesis: Reciprocity was positively related to depth of self-disclosure (M3:
b = 0.32, SE = 0.14, 95% CI [0.05, 0.59], p = 0.020). Thus, depth of self-disclosure
was 3 points higher in situations in which participants were responding to a message
than in situations in which they started the conversation.
In Research Questions 8a to 8d, I investigated potential influences of the
external environment (physical or virtual objects, barriers, etc.). In particular,
I analyzed whether the level of protection against unwanted identification and
accessibility (whether actively selected or present by default) affected the depth
of self-disclosure. Regarding the level of identification, visual anonymity was not
significantly related to depth of self-disclosure (M3: b = −0.02, SE = 1.53, 95% CI
[−3.00, 2.95], p = 0.991). However, this finding is hardly surprising, as participants
were visually non-identifiable in almost all situations (99%). Pseudonymity, on the
other hand, was positively related to depth of self-disclosure (M3: b = 0.28, SE
= 0.25, 95% CI [−0.23, 0.78], p = 0.296), but the finding was nonstatistically
significant. Although this finding suggests that people disclose more in situations
in which they are not identifiable based on their name, we cannot be sure if this
result is actually different from zero. Nonetheless, the analysis revealed that the
relationship between pseudonymity and depth of self-disclosure varied between
participants (σ 2 = 0.50). Figure B.3 in the Appendix B shows the distribution of
effects in the sample. Although the direction of the effect varied considerably in the
sample, it was nonetheless positive for a number of participants (in accordance with
the proposed theory). Regarding the level of content accessibility, neither previously
limited access (M3: b = 0.53, SE = 0.73, 95% CI [−0.90, 1.96], p = 0.469) nor end-
to-end encryption (M3: b = −0.08, SE = 0.40, 95% CI [−0.87, 0.72], p = 0.845)
was significantly correlated with depth of self-disclosure. Again, this finding is not
very surprising, as the variance in these factors was very low in the sample.
Finally, I tested Research Question 9 to investigate whether any interactions
between the situational and/or non-situational factors could be observed. On Level
1, I analyzed whether external environmental factors moderated the relationship
between audience size and depth of self-disclosure. There was a positive interaction
between limited accessibility and audience size (M4: b = 1.16, SE = 0.52, p =
0.025), suggesting that the negative relationship between audience size and depth
of self-disclosure becomes non-significant or even positive when the horizontal
accessibility of content is limited. However, given the very small variance of limited
accessibility (communications were not limited to followers or contacts in only
12 situations), this effect is not very meaningful and may represent an accidental
finding. There were other same-level interactions that deserve more attention. For
example, there was a negative interaction between horizontal and vertical privacy
282 10 Results
1
privacy concerns on self−disclosure
Conditional effect of vertical
−1
−2 −1 0 1 2
Horizontal privacy concerns (Moderator)
Fig. 10.13 Conditional effects of vertical privacy concerns on situational depth of self-disclosure
moderated by horizontal privacy concerns
concerns (M4: b = −0.24, SE = 0.11, p = 0.023). Thus, with each one-unit increase
on the latent factor for horizontal privacy concerns, the negative relationship
between vertical privacy concerns and depth of self-disclosure becomes stronger,
resulting a decline of 2.4 additional points on the depth of self-disclosure scale.
Figure 10.13 shows the conditional effects over the full range of the moderator. As
can be seen, at particularly high levels of horizontal privacy concerns, the effect of
vertical privacy concerns on self-disclosure even becomes significant (it has to be
noted, however, that only a few people had horizontal concerns this high, as shown
by the histogram at the bottom of the figure). Finally, greater online privacy literacy
further increased the negative relationship between vertical privacy concerns and
depth of self-disclosure (M4: b = −0.37, SE = 0.18, p = 0.037). Figure 10.14
shows the conditional effects for this interaction. Again, the results revealed that the
effect of vertical privacy concerns was significant when online privacy literacy was
particularly high (once again, however, only a few people had such high privacy
literacy, as shown by the histogram).
1
privacy concerns on self−disclosure
Conditional effect of vertical
−1
−2
−2 −1 0 1 2
Online privacy literacy (Moderator)
Fig. 10.14 Conditional effects of vertical privacy concerns on situational depth of self-disclosure
moderated by online privacy literacy
Although the effects of interpersonal assessment and pseudonymity on depth

of self-disclosure varied between participants, none of the non-situational personal
factors included in the model were able to explain this variation. Thus, all cross-level
interactions included in the model (M5) were non-significant.
Chapter 11
Discussion
The present study applied the theory of situational privacy and self-disclosure to
smartphone-based communication. I presented a theoretical investigation of the
smartphone as a metamedium allowing the installation and launching of various
applications for different purposes and uses. Smartphone-based communication can
thus be characterized as a form of multimodal communication encompassing a
variety of different communication forms on different types of applications. Based
on an in-depth analysis of the most widely-used communication applications, I
identified and divided the external factors in abstract categories as proposed by the
theory of situational privacy and self-disclosure.
Within this setting, this study specifically analyzed what non-situational personal
factors influence people’s engagement with long-term preventive privacy regulations
behaviors, which must be differentiated into the choice of using certain applications
and the manipulation of the environment provided by these applications. This study
further analyzed what non-situational and situational personal factors as well as
situational environmental factors influence the depth of self-disclosure in various
Consequently, this study is the first to investigate privacy and self-disclosure
from a situational point of view, as it examined both pre-situational privacy regu-
lation processes and situational self-disclosure processes within a larger theoretical
framework. Along with a few recent studies, it is also one of the first to employ
an alternative way of collecting behavioral data that should provide more reliable
and ecologically valid insights into people’s communication practices. Specifically,
I developed a multi-method research design that allowed me to explore the entirety
of these factors in numerous communication situations over a longer period of time.
The methodical design included both traditional survey methods (to measure non-
situational personal factors and preventive privacy regulations), and a combination
of logging and experience sampling methods (to measure situationally varying
factors). I implemented an automatic event-contingent sampling technique to survey
participants right after they had used their smartphone to communicate. This study

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-78884-5_11
286 11 Discussion
thus provided empirical data on self-disclosure in several communication situations

over a longer period of time.
In this chapter, I will summarize the major findings and discuss them in light
of the proposed theory. In doing so, I will focus on the specific assumptions of the
theory and carefully speculate as to why some assumptions were not supported by
the data. Whether the findings necessitate a modification of the theory, however,
will be discussed more broadly in Part III of this book. As this study represents
in many respects a first attempt at testing the proposed theory empirically, I will
also discuss potential limitations and implications for future studies implementing
similar methodical designs. I will further offer some methodological and theoretical
considerations that should be kept in mind when interpreting the results of this
empirical investigation.
11.1 Implications
In sum, the empirical investigation revealed that non-situational personal factors are
able to predict privacy regulation behaviors to a varying degree. Vertical privacy
concerns and online privacy literacy turned out to be the most effective predictors of
both types of privacy regulation behaviors. Participants with greater concerns about
providers’ and institutions’ data collection and analysis practices were less likely
to use potentially privacy-invasive IM and SNS applications such as WhatsApp,
Facebook Messenger, Facebook, Google+, and Instagram. At the same time, these
participants were more likely to use applications that have a high level of vertical
privacy by design (e.g., Threema and Telegram) or provide option of limiting
content accessibility to providers (e.g., Signal). Participants with higher online
privacy literacy were likewise less likely to use WhatsApp, but more likely to
use Threema and Signal. However, contrary to the assumptions that higher privacy
literacy leads to the adoption of more privacy-friendly applications, Skype, Google
Hangout, Instagram, and Twitter users were also more literate than nonusers. With
regard to the use of privacy strategies and settings within these applications, a similar
picture emerges: Vertical privacy concerns increased the likelihood of using a non-
identifiable profile picture on WhatsApp and Facebook and the likelihood of using
a fake name on Facebook. Online privacy literacy also increased the likelihood of
using additional encryption software for e-mail communication and a pseudonym
on WhatsApp.
Participants’ level of gregariousness positively predicted their use of popular
applications such as Facebook Messenger, Skype, SnapChat (in trend), Facebook,
Instagram (in trend), and StudiVZ. Deliberate participants, on the other hand, were
only less likely to use Google+. Gregarious people were furthermore less likely to
use visual anonymization strategies in all three types of applications.
Our findings supported the general supposition that the situational depth of self-
disclosure varies considerably across different smartphone-based communication
situations. Only a third of the variance could be explained by individual differences,
11.1 Implications 287
suggesting that the situational variance is much higher. Internal personal factors
and interpersonal environmental factors were particularly powerful predictors of the
depth of self-disclosure. Accordingly, depth of self-disclosure was high when (1)
participants felt the need to disclose themselves, (2) prior interactions necessitated
a reaction, (3) the number of potential recipients was small, and (4) these potential
recipients were considered trustworthy, psychologically close, similar to the respec-
tive participant, and central to the participants’ everyday life in the interpersonal
assessment. Contrary to the assumptions developed in the theory of situational
privacy and self-disclosure, external factors and non-situational personal factors
were not significantly related to situational depth of self-disclosure. As expected,
I found some small interaction effects on Level 2. Vertical privacy concerns had a
stronger negative effect on situational depth of self-disclosure among participants
with greater privacy literacy and greater horizontal concerns. Furthermore, although
the effects of internal assessment and pseudonymity varied across participants, no
cross-level interactions could be identified. Hence, the investigated personal factors
were not able to explain situational variation in these effects.
In the following subsections, I will discuss these results in more detail. I will
ask, on the one hand, why certain factors turned out to be ineffective in predicting
the depth of self-disclosure, and on the other hand, to what extent such findings
falsify some of the assumptions proposed by the theory of situational privacy and
self-disclosure.
11.1.1 What Makes People Engage in Privacy Regulation

Behavior?
The first overarching research question guiding the present study asks what factors
increase or decrease the likelihood of engaging in privacy regulation behaviors. In
line with the theoretical argument that privacy is not an end itself (cf. Johnson,
1974; Westin, 1967), people should be inclined to engage in preventive privacy
regulation behaviors to create situations in which their privacy is indeed ensured,
making it possible for them to more fundamental needs (in this case, self-disclosing
in order to fulfill needs such as relationship maintenance, self-expression, etc.).
However, I also argued that such privacy regulation processes must be seen in the
wider context of media appropriation and technology adoption theories (Sect. 8.3).
Drawing from existing approaches in this field, I suggested that the process of
choosing to install and use a certain communication application is similar to the
appropriation of devices, as individuals pass through different stages in which they
evaluate the costs and benefits of adopting a given application. I argued that privacy
risks and needs are taken into account on the cost side of this mental calculus. In
the theory of situational privacy and self-disclosure, I particularly focused on non-
situational personal factors that should be related to individual privacy needs and
risk assessments.
288 11 Discussion
I proposed that several personality facets would determine whether people

engage in privacy regulation behaviors. Based on prior research (Dienlin & Met-
zger, 2017; Junglas, Johnson, and Spitzmüller, 2008), gregariousness (or reversed:
shyness) and deliberation, in particular, seemed to be possible predictors of both
types of privacy regulation behaviors. The results only partly confirm the findings of
Junglas et al. (2008) and Dienlin and Metzger (2017). On the one hand, shy people
were less likely to use popular communication services such as Facebook, Skype,
or SnapChat. In line with the findings of Dienlin and Metzger (2017), this suggests
that this personality facet is indeed connected to a desire for interpersonal and
potentially also vertical privacy and even translates into behavioral decisions. That
being said, shy participants were not more likely to use privacy-friendly applications
(e.g., Threema). They were only less likely to use popular and potentially privacy-
intrusive services (or reversed: gregarious people were more likely to use such
services). One explanation for this might be that shy participants do not necessarily
perceive real risks (at least not vertically), which is why they are not more likely
to adopt alternatives. Instead, they seek to avoid the anxiety of social interactions
and online self-presentation. Gregariousness may hence more meaningfully predict
whether people use services that offer them possibilities for social interaction and
self-presentation, but the absence of gregariousness is not necessarily a strong pre-
dictor for active engagement in privacy regulation behavior. This is also supported
by the finding that more gregarious people were less likely to remain visually
anonymous on the three studied applications. As they have generally the tendency
to be comfortable among others and seek interaction, they may not feel the need to
hide themselves. Instead, they might prefer to stay visible and recognizable, open for
communication and interaction. This interpretation seems appropriate in light of the
fact that prior research has often shown that personality traits relate to higher self-
presentation and engagement with social media (cf. Correa, Hinsley, & de Zúñiga,
2010; Hodas, Butner, & Corley, 2016; Winter et al., 2014).
Deliberation, on the other hand, was a weak predictor of engagement in privacy
regulation behavior. Although Dienlin and Metzger’s (2017) findings suggest that
deliberate people have a higher need for privacy from the government and Junglas’
(2008) findings suggest that conscientiousness is generally related to privacy
concerns, higher deliberation did not predict the use of particular communication
services in the present study, although it did decrease the chance of using Google+.
Nevertheless, its overall power to explain engagement in privacy regulation behavior
seems limited. An alternative explanation may be found in the concept of deliber-
ation itself, which is generally defined as the tendency to be more self-disciplined
and conscious about what one is doing (Costa & McCrae, 1992b). Consequently,
deliberate people may be quite aware of the risks of communication in upcoming
situations, but not necessarily inclined to engage in preventive protection strategies.
These findings nonetheless show that differences in personality can explain why
some people are more likely to use certain privacy settings than others. Even more
so, they partly explain why some people are more prone to opt out of popular
social media services than others. However, we must also question which facets
of the personality are in fact related to privacy-related behavior. A more detailed
assessment of personality structure would most likely provide a more sophisticated

and comprehensive picture. As noted in Sect. 7.4.1, traits such as the need to
belong may be important predictors of social interaction and self-presentation
and should thus be included in future investigations of the first type of privacy
regulation behaviors. The power of gregariousness to explain why people use certain
communication services also highlights the importance of including the benefit
side of the mental calculus when trying to understanding the adoption of certain
communication services.
Online privacy literacy was proposed as a central precondition for effective
privacy regulation behavior. I argued that knowledge about data collection practices
and privacy protection strategies would increase the likelihood of choosing privacy-
friendly communication services and using privacy strategies,but reduce the use
of privacy-invasive services. However, the findings only partly align with this
hypothesis. People who reported higher online privacy literacy were more likely
to use IM applications that either provided a high level of privacy by design or
provided more options to fine-tune one’s level of privacy. Higher online privacy
literacy particularly predicted the use of Threema and Signal. In contrast to the
findings of Vitak (2015, May), more privacy-literate participants were not less likely
to use Facebook. The results of the present study were thus more in line with the
findings by Masur, Teutsch, and Trepte (2017), who likewise found that higher
privacy literacy was not related to opting-out strategies.
That being said, higher privacy literacy was correlated with the implementation
of certain privacy strategies on one’s chosen services. People with higher online
privacy literacy thus actively manipulated their chosen environments to preven-
tively set the level of privacy within these communication services: People who
used additional software to encrypt their mails were more privacy-literate than
those who did not. Privacy-literate participants were similarly more likely to use
pseudonyms on WhatsApp. These findings once again complement the results of
Masur, Teutsch, and Trepte (2017), who found that higher knowledge was correlated
with pseudonymization and anonymization strategies as well as with implementing
other active privacy protection strategies (e.g., using anonymization software or anti-
tracking tools).
These findings notwithstanding, the data of the present study also showed that
online privacy literacy increased the likelihood of using Skype, Google Hangout,
Instagram, StayFriends, and Twitter. Similarly, in contrast to the findings by Bartsch
and Dienlin (2016), higher online privacy literacy did not positively predict the
use of strategies to limit content accessibility. These positive or non-significant
relationships seem to contradict the overall assumption that greater privacy literacy
predicts the use of privacy-friendly communication services or privacy regulation
strategies within one’s chosen services. The reasons for these results may be
manifold, and I can only speculate about why such patterns were found. One
explanation might be that online privacy literacy also increases through the use
of certain services. For example, Instagram users may learn a lot about privacy
simply by using this service. As Masur, Teutsch, Dienlin, and Trepte (2017)
noted, privacy literacy is more than knowing about things. It further encompasses
290 11 Discussion
reflection capabilities and procedural knowledge. The present findings may thus
show that higher online privacy literacy does not necessarily mean that people
always adopt privacy-friendly services. Instead, they suggested that people become
more knowledgeable and competent by using different kinds of services—even
potentially privacy-intrusive ones. The cross-sectional design of the present analyses
does not allow me to draw any conclusion about the direction of a potential effect.
I also assumed that higher online privacy literacy would be positively related
to vertical and horizontal privacy concerns. Whereas the first was supported, the
latter was not. Although people with high online privacy literacy were generally
more concerned about their vertical privacy, they were less concerned about their
horizontal privacy. As such, these findings were closely in line with the results
obtained by Vitak (2015, May). Taking a broader perspective, however, these results
can also be explained differently. In Sect. 6.3, I argued that a lack of knowledge
and skills may explain why people do not understand or are not aware of the
risks of online communication. Specifically, I suggested that lacking awareness and
knowledge might make people uncertain whether they are risking a loss of vertical
privacy when communicating online. Such a rationale makes sense for vertical
privacy. The more people know about data collection practices and information
flows on the Internet, the more they will understand the difficulty of preventing a
vertical privacy loss and the more concerned they will be. This argumentation is
also shared by Matzner, Masur, Ochs, and von Pape (2016). On a horizontal level,
however, the rationale might be different. Although higher privacy literacy makes
people more aware of horizontal privacy risks, it also makes them more aware of
potential ways to protect their horizontal privacy. People with greater online privacy
literacy might know how to use different communication services’ privacy settings.
They might also be aware of environmental characteristics of each service, allowing
them to meaningfully decide which services to use in order to prevent horizontal
privacy intrusions. According to this rationale, the negative relationship between
online privacy literacy and horizontal privacy concerns might not be paradoxical.
In short, understanding the impossibility of preventing vertical privacy intrusions
makes people more concerned about providers’ and institutions’ data collection
and analysis practices, while learning about ways to protect one’s privacy from
being violated by other users makes them less concerned, as they believe that such
violations are less likely to occur.
Again, due to the cross-sectional design, it is also possible that greater vertical
privacy concerns make people more prone to learning about potential risks and
privacy-related issues in online communication. Thus, greater privacy concerns
might cause people to become more privacy literate. Here again, we cannot draw
any conclusions about the direction of the relationship found.
Next, I assumed that both vertical and horizontal privacy concerns would explain
why people use more privacy-friendly communication services and why they
implement privacy strategies and settings within these services. As outlined in
Sect. 8.3, only a few studies have analyzed whether privacy concerns influence
the likelihood of using or opting out of certain communication services. Studies
focusing on Facebook use have nonetheless found that greater privacy concerns
were positively related to Facebook nonuse (Rainie, Smith, & Duggan, 2013;
Vitak, 2015, May). That said, those studies did not differentiate between vertical
and horizontal privacy concerns (the measures used tended to represent vertical
concerns). The results of the present study confirm these initial observations.
Participants with greater privacy concerns about providers’ and institutions’ data
collection and analysis practices were indeed less likely to use privacy-invasive IM
and SNS services such as WhatsApp, Facebook Messenger, Facebook, Google+,
and Instagram. Furthermore, greater vertical concerns were positively related to
the use of applications that have a high level of vertical privacy by design (e.g.,
Threema, Signal) or provide the option of limiting content accessibility to providers
(e.g., Signal). These results can be regarded as further evidence against the privacy
paradox, as privacy concerns are indeed related to this first type of privacy regulation
behavior—choosing environments with high levels of vertical privacy.
Horizontal privacy concerns were less effective in predicting communication
service use. People with greater horizontal concerns were only slightly less likely
to use Twitter and slightly more likely to use Google+. As Twitter is a rather public
platform, it makes sense that people who fear privacy intrusions by other people
are less inclined to use it. Google+, on the other hand, was the first SNS to provide
audience segmentation options (circles, a similar feature to Facebook’s friend lists).
When it was launched, Google+ was seen as an alternative to Facebook because it
provided a means of protecting against a loss of privacy resulting from increasing
context collapse (cf. Sect. 2.3 as well as Marwick & Boyd, 2010; Vitak, 2012).
However, it seems unlikely that this explains the positive relationship found in the
current study. Further research is needed to shed light on this unexpected finding.
However, I would speculate that many Google+ users do not necessarily use this
SNS as their primary communication tool. Instead, they are only members because
of the Google Hangout feature which is often a frequently used alternative to Skype
video calls in professional contexts. The positive correlation may thus have only
been found because people who work in a professional context in which a lot of
online communication takes place (particularly via video conference) also know
more about potential privacy violations and are thus more concerned generally.
However, this line of reasoning is highly speculative and would need further
empirical support.
With regard to the implementation of privacy strategies and settings within
communication services, vertical privacy concerns increased the likelihood of using
visual anonymization strategies. In the context of Facebook use, it also positively
predicted the use of pseudonymization strategies. Thus, users of the vertically
privacy-invasive platform Facebook tried to mitigate their concerns by using two
types of strategies to make them less identifiable to the provider. Again, these
findings extend prior research, which found that general privacy concerns do relate
to the use of protection measures (Baruh, Secinti, & Cemalcilar, 2017).
The findings further extend prior research on the influence of privacy concerns
on privacy regulation behaviors by differentiating between concerns on a vertical
and horizontal level. Although prior qualitative research suggests that people are
292 11 Discussion
primarily concerned about privacy threats stemming from other users (Raynes-
Goldie, 2010), causing them to engage in the second type of privacy regulation
behavior (manipulating environments by using privacy settings and strategies), this
study revealed that vertical privacy concerns are more influential in explaining why
people choose privacy-friendly services over privacy-invasive ones and predicting
the use of privacy strategies within these services—contradicting the findings by
Raynes-Goldie (2010).
In sum, the findings partly confirm and extend insights from prior research.
However, they also reveal some peculiarities. Most prominently, they uncover differ-
ences in privacy regulation behaviors resulting from the multimodal communication
practices characteristic of smartphone-based communication: The relationships
between non-situational personal factors and privacy regulation behaviors manifest
themselves differently for each type of communication service. This supports the
frequent calls of researchers that we need to analyze more than just one platform,
particularly when investigating smartphone-based communication (cf. Sect. 2.2 and
also Lampinen, 2016). But why do we find different patterns with regard to the
antecedents of using different communication services? Why do vertical privacy
concerns negatively predict the use of WhatsApp, but not the use of SnapChat or
Google Hangout, when all three companies collect and use the data provided by their
clients? Why does greater online privacy literacy decrease the likelihood of using
WhatsApp, but not the use of the Facebook Messenger, when both are provided
by the same company and similarly used to collect data from its users? Several
explanations can be brought forward, which could be considered first speculations
requiring further empirical investigation: First and as mentioned before, some
of these differences may stem from the unequal discussion and coverage of
different applications and communication services in the media (Teutsch, 2013; von
Pape, Trepte, & Mothes, 2017). Although only a few content analyses of media
discussions of this topic exist, it is apparent that the big players such as Facebook
or Google are mentioned most frequently. Many articles in the past focused on
threats arising from data collection and usage practices of SNS providers such as
Facebook (Teutsch & Niemann, 2016, pp. 10–11). People might be influenced by
these public debates and thus be more concerned about particular providers than
about the general loss of vertical privacy that can arise from any provider. This could
explain, for example, why the current study found that vertical privacy concerns are
particularly related to the use of Facebook, Facebook Messenger, WhatsApp, and
Instagram (all provided by Facebook Inc.) as media coverage of these applications
and services is simply more frequent.
A second explanation might be the huge popularity of some services compared to
others. Looking again at the descriptive results, it is clear that WhatsApp is the most
popular IM (94% of sample participants use this application). Similarly, the SNS
Facebook is used by more than two-thirds of participants (71%). People are probably
a lot more knowledgeable about these services compared to the alternatives, which
are used by barely more than 5% of the sample. Particularly privacy-friendly
alternatives such as Threema, Telegram, Signal, and Surespot were only used by a
very small number of participants in the sample, suggesting that many people do not
know about these services. This might explain why privacy literacy (remember that
it was measured using self-reports about how much one knows about data protection
and privacy on the Internet) was particularly high among participants who used such
alternatives.
As a concluding remark, the findings also provide evidence that people do indeed
try to regulate their level of privacy in future situations, supporting the notion that
privacy is only a means for fulfilling more fundamental needs. Nevertheless, it
should be noted that only a few people actually engaged in active privacy regulation
behaviors in the context of smartphone-based communication. Less than 10% of
the sample used IMs providing privacy-by-design (e.g., Threema, Telegram, or
Signal) and almost nobody indicated using the alternative SNS Ello (0.2%). The
positive relationship between online privacy literacy and the use of privacy-friendly
services suggests that many people simply lack knowledge about these alternatives.
Likewise, only 8% of respondents reported to encrypt their e-mails. On the other
hand, a large number of users of SNS such as Facebook, Google+, or Instagram
limited their profiles to their followers and applied different types of strategies to
prevent identification. Thus, it seems that choosing an environment depends more
on the perceived benefits of a certain service (a claim that is backed up by many
studies focusing on the perceived and obtained gratifications of social media use;
e.g., Joinson, 2008; Smock, Ellison, Lampe, & Wohn, 2011; Tosun, 2012). After
a service has been chosen, vertical concerns resulting from greater knowledge
and skills concerning data protection and online information flows are mitigated
by using only privacy strategies available, which primarily focus on preventing
identification (visual anonymity and pseudonymity).
11.1.2 What Determines Whether People Disclose Themselves?
In Research Question 6, I tested the major supposition of the theory of situational

privacy and self-disclosure (see Sect. 7.2 on p. 138), asking whether perceived
privacy and self-disclosure (measured in terms of the depth dimension) actually
vary across situations. The sampled situations were found to be quite diverse in
terms of level of privacy—defined according to the combination of environmental
factors present. Moreover, and as expected, the analyses revealed that a large share
of the variance in depth of self-disclosure is attributable to changing situational
circumstances, with a much smaller share (28%) depending on individual differ-
ences. Consequently, the study highlights the need to take a situational perspective
on privacy and self-disclosure. Moreover, it shows that situationally varying factors
should be expected to have greater predictive power for depth of self-disclosure, as
the larger share of the variance depends on this situational variability. This finding
also lends support to the implicit variability of privacy expressed in earlier theories:
For example, it supports the notion that the level of privacy can be either too low or
too high depending on the situational circumstances, as noted by Altman (1975).
It also supports the central assumption of Omarzu’s disclosure decision model
294 11 Discussion
(DDM; p. 83), which posits that different situations make different goals salient,
and different circumstances ultimately lead to different types and levels of self-
disclosure (Omarzu, 2000, pp. 177–178). Furthermore, along with the findings of
other experience sampling and tracking studies (see Sect. 9.1), the present study
substantiates the need to look at behavioral measures from a situational perspective.
Behaviors are inherently functions of both the person and the environment, and
both sets of factors must be considered when attempting to explain individuals’
behavioral patterns.
Drawing upon the theory of situational privacy and self-disclosure, I measured
both non-situational personal factors (assessed in the online survey before the
actual ESM study) and situational personal and environmental factors (assessed
primarily in the situational questionnaires). The findings revealed that people feel
able to disclose themselves when the potential audience is small and perceived
as trustworthy, psychologically close, similar to oneself, and central to one’s
everyday life. The need to self-disclose and prior interactions are also positively
related to depth of self-disclosure. In contrast, external environmental factors (level
of identification and content accessibility) and stable personal factors were not
significantly related to depth of self-disclosure. Interpersonal factors thus play the
most important role in determining the level of (horizontal) privacy needed to feel
comfortable self-disclosing. It seems that users primarily assess the recipients of
their disclosures in determining whether or not they should open up and reveal
themselves. This lends further support to recent claims that trust plays a pivotal
role in online privacy (e.g., Marwick & Boyd, 2014; Teutsch, Masur, & Trepte,
2018). When people communicate information about themselves to other persons,
they often cannot control further dissemination or use of this information by other
persons, groups, or entities (Trepte, 2016a) and in many cases do not want to
either. Trust is the buffering factor helping to mitigate the risks associated with
such behavior because it is the result of a rational assessment that the recipients
will behave as agreed upon or at least remain loyal to the discloser in the future (cf.
definition of interpersonal trust by Kassebaum, 2004, p. 21).
The pivotal role played by interpersonal assessments meshes well with the
existing theories of privacy and self-disclosure discussed earlier. As the measures
implemented in this study represent broad concepts subsuming a variety of specific
aspects of interpersonal relationships, the associations found with depth of self-
disclosure support Petronio’s argument that people create privacy boundaries within
which the flow of private information is based on collectively negotiated rules
(Petronio, 2002). My findings support the claim that people expect the recipient(s)
of their disclosures to behave as agreed upon or in other words as prescribed by
the established rules. They also lend credence to Westin’s concept of privacy as a
state of small-group intimacy, without neglecting the notion that privacy is a matter
of degree rather than a fixed state. Accordingly, the theory proposes that privacy
can be a form of seclusion of (a few) trusted people, which is similar to Petronio’s
concept of privacy boundaries: The level of privacy increases as the number of
people inside these boundaries decreases. My findings also indicate that the level
of privacy depends on the people involved in the transaction of information. Higher
levels of trustworthiness and psychological closeness in the discloser’s interpersonal

assessments of the recipients led to higher levels of privacy, and thus greater
circulation of private information. In this way, the current study supports the notion
that people feel particularly comfortable self-disclosing in situations with a high
level of privacy as determined by the people who have access to the information that
is shared (cf. Chap. 5 as well as theoretical arguments by Dienlin, 2015; Marwick
& Boyd, 2014; Petronio, 2002; Trepte, 2012). It has to be noted, however, that the
effect of interpersonal assessments on subsequent depth of self-disclosure varied
considerably across the participants and was even negative for some. Given this
variability, we have to keep in mind that people sometimes have to disclose parts
of their self to people they do not feel close or similar to. Many situations in which
people feel the need to self-disclose even when the recipients are not the ideally
trusted and close friends are imaginable.
That being said, self-disclosure can nonetheless be regarded as a function of
privacy, yet also—as shown by the negative relationship between audience size
and depth of self-disclosure—a way to remain private by voluntarily deciding to
not disclose private information. The present findings hence also support Westin’s
argument that privacy can also be achieved through a form of mental withdrawal
(i.e., being less open and not disclosing oneself in otherwise public circumstances).
In contrast to the assumptions expressed in the theory of situational privacy and
self-disclosure, external environmental factors and non-situational personal factors
were not related to depth of self-disclosure. Although some methodical limitations
have to be taken into account when evaluating these results (see further below), it
is nonetheless important to ask what these findings imply for the theory’s ability to
make predictions about the effect of the environment on people’s behavior.
First of all, as already proposed by Altman (1975), the effect of the environment
on individuals’ privacy-related behavior is quite complex (p. 36). As outlined in
Sect. 7.4.4, possible effects and interactions are endless and cannot be grasped with
a sufficient degree of specificity. This was the reason why I decided to reduce the
external factors to two types: protection against identification and protection against
content accessibility. Although this reduction is helpful in understanding the rela-
tionship between the environment and self-disclosure, it may subsume factors under
categories that are too broad to meaningfully influence the level of self-disclosure
when measured in empirical studies. More fine-grained differentiations may hence
help mitigate the loss of accuracy resulting from such broad categorizations.
Nonetheless, we may still ask why the proposed factors were not correlated
with depth of self-disclosure. For example, both theoretical and empirical work has
suggested that anonymity positively affects self-disclosure—particularly in online
environments (e.g., Joinson, 2001; Kiesler, Siegel, & McGuire, 1984; Spears and
Lea, 1994; Walther, 1996)—in seemingly direct contradiction to the findings of
this study. However, such a general comparison ignores the fact that the theories
of Spears and Lea (1994) and Walther (1996) have not differentiated between
different types of online communication. Instead, they focus on public types of
communication, in which anonymity may indeed be a vital factor in determining the
amount of self-disclosure an individual engages in. In the present study, however,
296 11 Discussion
only a few situations of this type were actually sampled. The majority of events were
small-group interpersonal communication situations, which are often conducted in
environments where anonymity is less important (at least on a horizontal level).
Participants were actually fully anonymous (= visual anonymity and pseudonymity)
in only 17% of all sampled situations. As such, most sampled situations took
place in environments where anonymity is not as important. As noted by Westin
(1967), anonymity is a state of privacy that allows to perform public acts and still
find freedom from surveillance and identification (p. 34). Consequently, it seems
likely that I would have found an effect of anonymity on depth of self-disclosure
had I focused particularly on public communication situations (e.g., health forums,
comments on public newspaper websites, etc.).
A similar rationale can be applied to the level of protection against unwanted con-
tent accessibility. Most sampled situations took place in small-group interpersonal
environments, in which content accessibility at the horizontal level was limited by
design. Settings such as friend lists on Facebook, circles on Google+ or generally
limiting the accessibility of one’s profile to approved contacts are particularly
important when individuals communicate to larger audiences (e.g., in semipublic
situations such as posting a status update on Facebook). Although the sampled
events included such semipublic or public situations, they were in the minority.
Instead, participants generally limited their audience to followers or contacts (in
99% of events) making it almost impossible to find the assumed effect. End-to-end
encryption was similarly only applied in 4% of the events (mostly when people used
Threema or anyone of the 8% of the participants in the ESM sample who used end-
to-end e-mail encryption) making it almost impossible to detect a significant effect.
Future studies investigating the effect of encryption on people’s self-disclosure
should hence focus on sampling more heterogeneous situations so that such external
factors actually vary.
Another explanation may further be found in the sequential order of privacy
regulation and self-disclosure processes in the theory of situational privacy and
self-disclosure. Originally, I assumed that people pre-situationally choose and
manipulate certain environments, thus determining the external factors that should
in principle affect the level of self-disclosure in those environments at any given
time. However, an alternative argument would be that choosing or manipulating
environments preventively, in accordance with stable privacy needs or concerns
in that stage of the privacy regulation process, makes it unnecessary to reassess
the level of privacy every time one communicates within these environments.
In the context of smartphone-based communication, this means that after people
have decided to use a certain application on the basis of a rational cost-benefit
assessment of this service including risks evaluations (see again Wirth, von Pape,
and Karnowski, 2008), they no longer need to assess external factors every time they
use this application to communicate with other people. Their initial decision to use
a certain environment (the pre-situational privacy regulation process) has provided
a solid foundation, making them now able to disclose themselves (situational self-
disclosure process).
This argument is closely related to the reasoning of scholars studying privacy

heuristics. Based on the work of Carey and Burkell (2009), Sundar, Kang, Wu, Go,
and Zhang (2013), Gambino, Kim, Sundar, Ge, and Rosson (2016), and Metzger
(2016, December), it can be argued that biases resulting from mental shortcuts (that
people use in situations of uncertainty) may explain why people seem to protect
or at least value their horizontal privacy, but are rather ignorant of their vertical
privacy. In this regard, interpersonal factors are important for determining depth
of self-disclosure, because they represent the easiest way of ensuring a high level
of horizontal privacy—a protection against tangible, short-term consequences (cf.
Einspänner-Pflock, 2016, p. 123). With regard to vertical privacy threats, however,
people may rely on heuristics and particularly on what Metzger (2016, December)
called the “bubble heuristic”. As people have decided to use a certain environment
in the past (pre-situational preventive privacy regulation), they feel safe now every
time they use this environment to communicate with other people. This limits
their situational awareness, and this is exacerbated by the fact that the potential
consequences are abstract, mostly intangible, and long-term (cf. also Einspänner-
Pflock, 2016, p. 123). Nevertheless, this perspective seems fruitful in making sense
of the present findings, further research is needed to clarify the exact nature of such
phenomena.1
Stable personal factors such as personality, privacy concerns, and online privacy
literacy were likewise not found to be related to depth of self-disclosure. This might
be explainable by the small share of variance in depth of self-disclosure that is
attributable to individual differences (cf. Ross & Nisbett, 2011, p. 3). Furthermore,
prior research indicated that any potential relationships ought to be small and thus
may not be detectable in the implemented study design (see limitations further
below). In light of this, the present findings do not necessary falsify the proposed
theory because the found effects were mostly in the right direction (e.g., higher
online privacy literacy, vertical privacy concerns, and deliberation were negatively
related to depth of self-disclosure) and the effect size was within the expected range
(small to moderate). As I will discuss further below, the present study did not have
enough power to detect such effects. However, as the moderation analyses indicated,
vertical privacy concerns might have a small negative effect on self-disclosure,
but only when people have high online privacy literacy. This finding supports the
assumption that people need a high level of knowledge and skills to become aware
of potential data collection practices and related privacy intrusions by online service
providers, which, in turn, lie at the root of privacy concerns. Only when people
are knowledgeable, their privacy concerns actually lower their willingness to self-
disclose (see Fig. 10.14). Although a similar rationale was proposed to explain
variation in the effects of situational external factors on depth of self-disclosure,
such cross-level interactions did not reach significance. Although some cross-
level interaction effects pointed in the right direction (e.g., higher privacy literacy
1 In Sect. 12.2, I discuss heuristics as a possible extension of the theory of situational privacy and
self-disclosure.
298 11 Discussion
positively moderated the effect of pseudonymity on self-disclosure), the study did

not have the statistical power to detect such effects reliably.
That being said, we may nonetheless ask how much non-situational factors
can actually affect the level of self-disclosure in different situations. Throughout
the book, I have argued that it is primarily one’s interpersonal assessment of
the recipient(s) as trustworthy and psychologically close person(s) that makes
individuals disclose their feelings in times of need (internal factors). Personality
and individual characteristics may thus seem less important. However, and in line
with the above argumentation that these personal factors play an important role
in predicting privacy regulation behaviors, the specific environment in which an
individual decides to disclose may nonetheless depend on that individual’s level
of deliberation, concerns about providers’ data collection practices, and knowledge
and skills with regard to different communication services. The findings show that
some participants chose Threema instead of WhatsApp, thus making a one-time
decision to use a more privacy-friendly communication application. This once again
underscores the notion that privacy is not an end in itself. Rather, people seek to
regulate privacy in various environments, in order to be able to self-disclose in
those environments. The behavioral approach towards conceptualizing privacy by
Johnson (1974) is well suited to understanding this relationship. Privacy regulation
comprises behaviors “which enhance and maintain one’s control over outcomes
indirectly by controlling interactions with others” (p. 90). It is guided by chronic
privacy needs and concerns and dependent on the skills and knowledge of the person
who seeks to engage in them.
On a final note, the findings of the present study also support what Acquisti,
Brandimarte, and Loewenstein (2015) emphatically noted in their review of the
current literature on privacy:
Sometimes, [. . . ] privacy-seeking behavior emerges swiftly and naturally. This is often the
case when physical privacy is intruded – such as when a stranger encroaches in one’s
personal space or demonstratively eavesdrops on a conversation. However, at other times
(often including when informational privacy is at stake) people experience considerable
uncertainty about whether they should be concerned about privacy (p. 509).
The fact that interpersonal assessment determines primarily the ability to disclose
private information in smartphone-based communication might indicate that people
are still uncertain about the external circumstances of these types of online
communication. They might lack the literacy to understand these environments,
ultimately rendering such external factors ineffective in guiding their behavior.
A potential implication would be to include feelings of uncertainty as situational
personal factors in future studies and investigate the extent to which emotional
responses to situational circumstances guide people’s behavior. Assessing potential
recipients, on the other hand, is often just as quick and easy in online communication
as in offline communication (as seen in reactions to physical intrusions, as noted
by Acquisti et al., 2015). Preventing horizontal privacy violations by assessing
11.2 Limitations and Reflections 299
potential recipients is as easily realizable online as in offline communication.2 As

individuals are constantly learning about how to protect and regulate their privacy
in their daily life, they are more experienced in regulating their horizontal privacy in
offline environments, and thus try to adapt this knowledge also to privacy regulation
in online environments. Thus, the findings may suggest that many people still
have much to learn about how to deal with the new dynamics stemming from the
properties of digitally transferred information (see again Chap. 6). They may hence
experience considerable uncertainty about whether they should be concerned about
their (vertical) privacy in different smartphone-based communication situations.
11.2 Limitations and Reflections
In this section, I discuss several limitations and constraints of the present study
that should be taken into account when interpreting the results. These simultane-
ously provide avenues for future research on privacy and self-disclosure from a
situational perspective. First, I will evaluate the extent to which the present study
fits the subjective definition of a situation. Specifically, I will critically assess the
(im)possibility of measuring the environment as subjective perceptions. Second, I
will discuss the constraints of my research design with regard to its power to test the
proposed hypotheses, and particularly elaborate on the limitation that some external
factors have almost no variance. Third, I will offer some further considerations
of a methodological nature which seem important for future studies attempting to
implement a similar research design. Lastly, I will reflect on some ethical aspects
that need to be taken into account when conducting a study with this type of multi-
method research design.
11.2.1 Subjective Perceptions of External Environmental

Factors
In defining a situation as the entirety of circumstances that affect a person’s

perceptions, thinking processes, and behaviors at a given time and arguing that the
situation is construed by the individual through his or her perception of an external
reality (Sect. 7.1.3, p. 136), the theory of situational privacy and self-disclosure
drew heavily on the processing principle (Rauthmann, Sherman, & Funder, 2015,
p. 367), which posits that people’s psychological experiences of situations matter.
Consequently, it is the idiosyncratic reality perceived by the individual that drives
2 At least when potential recipients are perceivable. As the literature on the context collapse
(Binder, Howes, & Sutcliffe, 2009; Vitak, 2012) and imagined audiences (Litt, 2013) shows, such
assessments in fact may become more difficult in online environments.
300 11 Discussion
his or her behavior. We can now critically ask to what extent the present study meets
the criteria set by such a definition. More specifically, we can critically evaluate
whether the methods to measure the different types of factors correspond to the
assumption that only what people perceive drives their behavior.
With regard to the interpersonal and internal factors, the research design aligns
well with the proposed processing principle. Internal factors such as motives (as
well as the rather broad concept of need to self-disclose that was measured in the
study) are accessible to individual introspection and thus by nature representative of
individuals’ idiosyncratic perceptions of their internal needs. Interpersonal environ-
mental factors and thus also assessments of (potential) recipients’ trustworthiness
or relational closeness are likewise individual perceptions of some external reality
which may vary from person to person. Even the number of (potential) recipients
(log-transformed in the final multilevel analysis) should be a somewhat good esti-
mate of peoples’ individual perceptions of the audience size. However, it should also
be noted that this measure strongly depends on how biased people are in estimating
larger audiences. Scholars have emphasized that in situations with a potentially
large audience, individuals become dependent on their imagination (e.g., Litt, 2013,
p. 331). A study by Moll, Lücke, and Bromme (2016, September) demonstrated that
users varied in the accuracy of their assessments of actual audience size. Moreover,
the findings suggest that people assess audience in online environments differently
than in offline environments. Although the log transformation should at least partly
mitigate such biases, it nonetheless renders the measurement less precise.
That being said, the measurement of internal and interpersonal factors generally
aligned well with the processing principle that guided the definition of the subjective
situation. The measurement of external factors, however, deserves closer inspection.
First, it needs to be taken into account that the values of the external factors were
partially computed from participants’ self-reports in the pre-survey (in cases in
which they can be manipulated in a given environment, e.g., whether participants
used a pseudonym or not) and partially ascribed on the basis of the characteristics
of each environment (e.g., end-to-end encryption is integrated into the design of
Threema). In both cases, however, the measurement of these external factors did
not account for whether participants actually thought about or perceived these
characteristics of the environment in a given situations. By computing the values
of external factors, they are rather measurements of the physical reality (as denoted
by Rauthmann, Sherman, & Funder, 2015, p. 368) or physico-biological cues (Block
& Block, 1981, p. 85). They represent an objective perspective on the physical cues
(in the case of smartphone-based communication not necessarily physical in a literal
sense, but rather virtual cues that can be described similar to actual physical cues)
of an environment. For this reason, we must ask whether the finding that external
factors were not related to depth of self-disclosure is a result of this deviation from
the processing principle.
An alternative would have been to ask participants in each situation about their
perceptions of these factors and whether or not they reflected upon them before
disclosing. Although such a design would closely match the proposed subjective
definition of a situation, it is problematic for other reasons: First, asking participants
a direct question in each situation is highly suggestive. Prompting reflection about

external factors could lead participants to post-situationally give theory-driven
answers that have little in common with the actual situational processes. Of course,
similar criticism can also be formulated with regard to the measurement of internal
and interpersonal factors. However, I would argue that the bias resulting from
such ex-post measurements is higher when the matter which is reflected on by
the individual is less likely to be perceived organically. In comparison to internal
or interpersonal factors, external environmental factors are less tangible and are
less likely to come into individuals’ attention. Second, it remains unclear whether
participants were aware of the external characteristics. Although some people might
know that Threema offers them end-to-end encryption, many might not understand
what that actually means. End-to-end encryption is a technically complex procedure
and it is likely that most people do not know how it works. In consequence, it is
possible that this external factor did not have an effect on people’s behavior because
people are either not aware of it or do not understand how it affects their level of
privacy.
11.2.2 Sample, Variance, and Power Constraints
A second limitation refers to the characteristics of the sample. Due to technical

restrictions, the sample included only Android users because the application
movisensXS can currently only be used on smartphones with an Android operating
system. This has some implications for the generalizability of the findings. While
I do not believe that iPhone, Windows phone, or Blackberry users would differ
with regard to situational processes, the current findings are nonetheless only
generalizable to Android users.
A third limitation refers to the variance in the external factors, which can be
seen in Table 10.6. With regard to the level of protection against identification,
participants were visually anonymous in 99% of sample situations, but used fake
names in only 17% of sampled situations. With regard to the level of protection
against content accessibility, disclosures were visible to a preventively specified
number of recipients (e.g., only to followers) in 99% of situations, and end-to-
end encryption was only used in 4% of situations. The highly skewed nature of
these distributions made it nearly impossible to find large effects. Thus, future
studies should sample more diverse and heterogeneous environments in order
to better investigate external environmental effects. These results of this study
indicate that two potential methods would be to actively sample people who do
not manipulate their environments at all (which would result in less anonymity,
less limited accessibility, and less end-to-end encryption) or employ all types of
privacy regulations (resulting in the opposite, e.g., sampling users who implemented
end-to-end encryption in their e-mail communication). Moreover, it is important
to sample rare situations constituting situations in which some of the factors are
more pronounced (e.g., actively sampling situations involving Threema, Telegram,
302 11 Discussion
or Threema use). Given the limitations of the data collected in this study, it is still an
open question whether significant effects of external factors might be detected with
a more appropriate sampling design.
A fourth and related limitation refers to the study’s power to test some of the
assumptions it set out to test. The study had enough power to detect small to
moderate situational effects (based on the number of situations: n = 1104 disclosure
events), but only weak power to detect small non-situational effects (based on the
number of participants: n = 164): Assuming a β-error probability of 20% and a
α-error probability of 5%, the study had enough power to detect situational effects
greater than 0.084, but only non-situational effects greater than 0.215. The study
design thus did not have had enough power to detect small relationships regarding
variables at the personal level and we cannot make sensible inferences in this
regard. Even the significant interactions found on Level 2 need to be confirmed
by studies with greater power. Future studies should hence recruit larger samples
(particularly on Level 2) in order to have enough power to investigate the effects
of non-situational personal factors, such as privacy concerns, privacy literacy, and
personality facets and their interactions on depth of self-disclosure.
Due to these limitations, the findings of this study do not necessarily falsify the
claims derived from the theory of situational privacy and self-disclosure. As the
study represents a first attempt to quantify various situations and prior research on
the prevalence of situational factors was not available, I was not able to consider
more appropriate sampling strategies a priori. However, future studies investigating
similar processes should decide prior to data collection which types of factors they
want to focus on and what sampling strategy is best to achieve enough variance in
these factors resulting in enough power to detect the relationships of interest.
11.2.3 General Methodological Considerations
In the following section, I will discuss some methodological considerations of a

more general nature that should be taken into account when interpreting the findings
of this study. First, the analyses identifying antecedents of privacy regulation
behaviors were based on a cross-sectional design, which does not allow inferences to
be made about the direction of the effects. The found correlations represent merely
an initial indication that there may be an effect. Future research should extend this
finding by conducting longitudinal or observational studies. In particular, smart-
phone application adoption processes should be modeled over longer time frames
and incorporate the sequential processes suggested by diffusion theories (cf. Rogers,
2003). Similarly, although ESM studies have a high ecological validity, the analyses
of situational effects represented were likewise based on a cross-sectional design.
In this study, the questionnaires were triggered after the respective events occurred
(i.e., after an application was closed). However, for certain research questions, it
could also be meaningful to trigger the questionnaire before the respective event
(i.e., right after an application is opened) or both. Particularly implementing both
pre- and post-situational questionnaires would allow for a longitudinal study of each
situation and thus also allow causal relationships to be tested instead of correlations.
On the other hand, non-situational effects on situational self-disclosure can already
be interpreted as causal effects. As the non-situational factors were measured in the
pre-survey, they precede the situational measures and can thus be regarded the cause
for self-disclosure (given that the study’s design has enough power, as discussed in
the previous section).
Second, an inherent constraint of ESM studies is the necessity of using short
scales or even single items as measurement instruments. Although I took great care
to develop reliable and valid single items on the basis of the results of the pre-
study (see Sect. 9.3), such instruments are likely to contain measurement error,
which can only be eliminated by using multi-item scales. I chose to use short
single-item measures because a large number of factors needed to be assessed and
I did not want to overburden participants. In general, researchers implementing an
ESM design should take care to construct short situational questionnaires. However,
when a smaller number of variables needs to be measured, researchers should
consider implementing well-designed and validated short scales (e.g., 3 to 5 items
per construct) and model them as latent variables (or at least compute factor scores
to eliminate the item-specific variance).
Thirdly, although all scales measured in the pre-survey exhibited satisfactorily
model fits, they can be improved further. In particular, the subscales measuring
the two personality facets of gregariousness and deliberation only explained small
amounts of the average variance in the items (AVE < 0.40), despite their use in many
prior studies. Future research should hence implement more refined scales, probably
also including more items. My measurement of online privacy literacy can also be
criticized. Masur, Teutsch, and Trepte (2017) argued that subjective measurements
of privacy literacy can be biased, as people over- or even underestimate their skills
and knowledge. Their online privacy literacy scale (OPLIS), in contrast, represents
a multidimensional knowledge test that could have been used to assess people’s
online privacy literacy more objectively. However, as mentioned before, OPLIS
focuses only on vertical online privacy literacy. With this study, I wanted to include
both vertical and horizontal aspects of online privacy in the measurement of overall
online privacy literacy. This, along with economic constraints in the construction of
the pre-survey, was the reason why I decided to rely on people’s self-reported level
of online privacy literacy. Nonetheless, future studies should consider implementing
more objective measures of this variable, particularly given that the study by Masur,
Teutsch, and Trepte (2017) found that subjective and objective online privacy
literacy are only moderately correlated (β = 0.34). The other measures used in the
survey, however, particularly the newly developed online privacy concerns scale,
represent comprehensive measure of both horizontal and vertical privacy concerns
with good reliability and factorial validity. They should thus be applicable to a
variety of research fields.
304 11 Discussion
11.2.4 Ethical Reflections
Finally, I want to reflect on some ethical considerations associated with conducting

a study such as the one presented in this book. Such considerations are important
because in the social sciences (in contrast to, e.g., the physical sciences), the subject
matter is people. In general, research guidelines in the social sciences are based on
three main principles: The first refers to respect for persons (Hoyle, Harris, & Judd,
2008, pp. 48–49). The core of this principle is that individuals should be treated
as autonomous agents. Practically, this means that human beings should be able to
decide for themselves what research experiences they will be exposed to (p. 48). The
second principle is called beneficence (Hoyle et al., 2008, pp. 51–54) and means that
a research should not harm participants. Benefits to participant should be maximized
and potential harms minimized. A particular problem in the social sciences is that
benefits of participation in research are usually not tangible for participants. The
question is hence whether we have the right to “subject our participants to the
inconvenience and time investment of participating in our research when we can
assure them of no tangible benefit” (p. 53). Finally, the principle of justice refers
to the choice of participants (Hoyle et al., 2008, p. 54). Researchers should seek
representative samples and avoid burdening disadvantaged subsamples.
Why is it important to discuss the present study in light of these guidelines?
First, the study has a rather novel design which would not have been known to
most people prior to their participation. Second, the novel data collection procedure
included the collection of personal factors through an initial online survey, recording
people’s smartphone behavior in log data using an application designed specifically
for this purpose, and inquiring about people’s perceptions and behavior in situ over a
period of 14 days. In sum, a considerable amount of information was collected about
participants in order to investigate their privacy perceptions and self-disclosure
behaviors.
In alignment with the first principle, informed consent was obtained from
all participants in this study. As already described in Sect. 9.4.1, people were
specifically informed about the data collection procedures described above. Most
importantly, they were informed that personal information (e.g., personal content
stored on their phone, messages, browser history or the content of visited websites,
etc.) and other identifying information (e.g., names, addresses, phone numbers,
photos stored on the phone) could not be accessed. The consent form also included
information about how the data would be used (only for scientific purposes) and
that both anonymity and confidentiality would be ensured at all times. Participants
were further given the possibility to contact the researcher over the course of the
study and were able to discontinue participation at any time. Thus, respondents were
not deceived or coerced into participating. Due to this informed consent, the study
respected people’s autonomy in the decision to take part in the study.
Nevertheless, it is questionable whether participants actually understood what
type of data would be collected and whether they were able to envision how such
data could be used. The data collection methods used in this study are quite similar
to the data collection processes by providers described in Sect. 2.3.2. Throughout

this book, I have argued that people need high literacy to understand this type of
information flow and reflect on the consequences of such data disclosures. People
may hence have not necessarily been aware of what type of research they exposed
themselves to (cf. principle 1). The study itself can thus be regarded as an intrusion
into people’s privacy (despite participants’ informed consent). Thus, I compared
nonparticipants with participants in the ESM study to test whether people with
greater privacy concerns or privacy literacy were less likely to take part. I did
not find this to be the case (see Sect. 10.1.2). Nevertheless, given that privacy
literacy in the general population is low, we—as privacy researchers—should ask
ourselves whether we need to provide more detailed consent forms explaining how
participants’ data can be used, and if not (e.g., because we do not want to prime
participants unnecessarily) whether the benefits of such study outweigh the privacy
invasion we conduct as researchers.
Of course, most scientific studies (particularly those based on survey data) can be
considered a form of privacy invasion. However, the present study is novel in that
it collects more and qualitatively different data from participants (e.g., log files).
Participants were unlikely to know what type of inferences about them could be
drawn from the data they provided (even though they remained anonymous). For
this reason, I particularly ensured that the providers of the survey software and the
smartphone application encrypted the data transfer, did not store identifiers (e.g., IP
addresses) with the participants’ responses, and consented to not use the data other
than for the purpose of the study (although they are temporarily stored on their
servers). This minimized the risk that other third parties would be able to access
the data. As more and more research will be conducted in the future using data
that might be valuable for third parties, such security measures should become a
nonnegotiable requirement.
Turning to the second principle, a data collection procedure such as the one used
in this study can be considered an intervention into people’s lives. The experience
sampling method forced participants to reflect about their behavior several times
a day. As described in the method section of Part II (p. 243), such interventions
might affect people’s thoughts and behaviors over the course of the study. Already
in 1973, Kelvin noted that “an experimental study of privacy would, in a sense,
be itself an invasion of privacy, thereby destroying or distorting the phenomena it
seeks to observe in the course of the observation” (p. 249). The question is Does
conducting such studies influence people’s privacy behavior? It is for this very
reason that I conducted several tests to shed light on the intervening character of
the study. In short, although people did not seem to change their behavior, they
nonetheless indicated that they thought more about privacy and data protection as a
result of the study. If we normatively value that people think more consciously about
privacy, such an outcome can be considered as beneficial. In any event, researchers
conducting such a study should be aware that the design might influence people with
regard to the actual phenomenon they are studying. They should guarantee that the
potential outcome is beneficial for the participants and evaluate whether a debriefing
about the intervention is necessary.
306 11 Discussion
In sum, I want to highlight the necessity of reflecting the ways in which we

conduct privacy research today. To what extent do quantitative studies advance our
understanding of privacy and self-disclosure processes? Do they potentially distort
the phenomenon we hope to understand or bias the samples we base our inferences
on? What potential harms exist for participants? These questions will become more
important in the coming years as more and more researchers begin investigating
new types of data (e.g., log files) and other potentially rich data sources. An ethical
discussion about the use of such data is hence of utmost importance.
11.3 Preliminary Conclusion
The findings of the present study generally support the assumptions of the theory
of situational privacy. With regard to pre-situational privacy regulation processes,
the results suggest that greater vertical privacy concerns and greater online privacy
literacy increase the likelihood of choosing more privacy-friendly smartphone
communication applications and using privacy strategies and settings within one’s
chosen environments. Horizontal privacy concerns, on the other hand, are less
powerful in predicting application use. Personality facets such as gregariousness
and deliberation are less likely to affect this type of privacy regulation behavior
and when they do, it is to a varying degree depending on the specific application.
That being said, people generally do not engage much in either type of privacy
regulation behavior as only a few participants actually chose to use privacy-friendly
communication applications such as Threema, Telegram, Signal, or Ello.
The most important finding is that the central supposition of the theory of
situational privacy and self-disclosure—that privacy and self-disclosure vary con-
siderably across situations—was supported. Furthermore, the results from the
multi-method study revealed that people generally feel able to disclose themselves
when the potential audience is small and is perceived as trustworthy, psychologically
close, similar to oneself, and central to one’s everyday life. When the need to self-
disclose is high and prior interactions have already occurred, people engage in a
high level of self-disclosure. The study further suggests that for people with higher
online privacy literacy, vertical privacy concerns may help to reinforce information
control. Non-situational personal factors such as vertical privacy concerns may
hence only influence the level of self-disclosure when people are literate enough
to have awareness of and understand the consequences of data collection practices.
Part III
Implications and Future Perspectives
Chapter 12
Overall Discussion
I began this book with the argument that privacy and self-disclosure must be
investigated from a situational perspective. The initial starting point was the
observation that much theoretical work acknowledges the situationality of both
concepts and provides valuable rationales for such a claim, but the corresponding
empirical work has often taken a more general approach. For several reasons
outlined in Sect. 6.1, scholars have primarily focused on broader concepts such
as privacy concerns, for example. Survey studies hence have often focused on
explaining people’s general behavior as a consequence of privacy concerns or other
general measures. Intrapersonal variance in individuals’ perceptions and behaviors
and the situationally varying antecedents of both have largely been neglected. Of
course, researchers have conducted experiments designed to capture situational
processes, but as previously discussed, an inherent limitation of such experimental
work is the limited generalizability of their findings.
I have further argued that a situational perspective is particularly warranted since
the widespread use of smartphones and the corresponding emergence of multimodal
communication practices. Interpersonal communication increasingly takes place in
a variety of applications, individuals today are confronted with novel and constantly
changing environments, which determine the prevailing level of privacy and, in turn,
the psychologically perceived adequacy for engaging in self-disclosure. From this
point of view, identifying the environmental factors that influence these perceptions
and decisions situationally is an important endeavor.
Thus, the first major aim of this work was to provide a theoretical foundation
for understanding privacy and self-disclosure from a situational point of view. In
order to be applicable to various research interests, such a theory must ideally
allow situational processes to become the subject of empirical investigation—not by
focusing on particular situations, but by investigating general patterns across varying
situations. In light of the exponential growth of new information and communication
technologies, such an approach should particularly provide the tools and concepts

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-78884-5_12
310 12 Overall Discussion
to make the specific characteristics of the various new media environments people
nowadays use to communicate and socialize amendable to empirical analyses.
I therefore proposed the theory of situational privacy and self-disclosure, which
allows for the investigation of processes of revealing and concealing in various
non-mediated and mediated environments. The corresponding empirical study
illustrated how this theory can be used to measure these processes and situational
effects without losing the possibility of quantitatively detecting general patterns
of behavior. The theory has a particular focus on interpersonal communication,
specifically on self-disclosure processes. Understanding this focus and its limits is
important. For example, the theory cannot be used to explain why people relinquish
person-related information such as their name or address when registering for online
services (although the suggested perspective might also be valuable for analyzing
such processes; see also Sect. 13.1.1). It is not a comprehensive theory of privacy
that can be used to investigate all potential aspects. Due to its neutral character,
for example, it does not necessarily help with normative decisions about how much
privacy individuals should have. That being said, it provides a valuable perspective
on privacy and self-disclosure that is helpful in understanding and empirically
analyzing people’s interpersonal communication behavior from a psychological
point of view. The theory thereby deliberately consists of abstract concepts and
factors that were derived from the current status quo, yet hopefully will also be
adaptable to future trends and developments in the media industry.
In this chapter, I will first summarize the main tenets of the theory and
then proceed to discuss potential modifications and extensions. Thereby, I will
particularly evaluate whether the proposed theory needs to be modified on the basis
of the results obtained in the empirical study. As the empirical data did not support
some of the assumptions of the theory, whether these assumptions are still justified
needs to be critically evaluated. Subsequently, I will reflect on some broader points
of criticism: As any theory can be challenged with regard to its underlying scientific
paradigms, I will address two such foundational critiques, which simultaneously
provide opportunities for further extensions or modifications of the theory. More
specifically, I reflect on two novel perspectives on privacy and self-disclosure which
are currently regarded as promising approaches in the scientific community: (1)
heuristics as an explanation for seemingly irrational behavior and (2) the affordance
perspective as a means of overcoming the material-social dichotomy in studying
technology use.
12.1 Summary and Theoretical Implications
I began the development of the theory with an extensive review of the predominant
approaches to privacy and self-disclosure. I found that in the social sciences,
researchers’ goals can be more or less subsumed under four overarching research
questions (as identified in Sect. 3.2):
12.1 Summary and Theoretical Implications 311
1. What is privacy from the individual’s point of view?

2. Why do individuals need privacy?
3. How do they achieve privacy?
4. When do individuals perceive high or low levels of privacy and how does this
affect their behavior?
The theory of situational privacy and self-disclosure provides answers to all four
questions and allows them to be investigated in a unified framework. First, on the
basis of the in-depth analysis of existing theories, I derived five consecutive suppo-
sitions that constitute the theoretical backbone of the theory. These suppositions are
pivotal because they merge the insights of privacy and self-disclosure theories while
adapting to a situational perspective:
1. The level of privacy is determined by the perception of the environment and is
thus situational.
2. A certain level of privacy is needed to satisfy more fundamental needs or to
perform behaviors (e.g., self-disclosure) necessary to satisfy fundamental needs.
3. The level of self-disclosure is determined by personal factors and the perceived
level of privacy.
4. People seek certain levels of privacy (e.g., to be able to self-disclose) by choosing
and manipulating certain environments.
5. People evaluate the effectiveness of their privacy regulation, the accuracy of their
environmental assessment, and the outcome of their self-disclosures.
Building off these suppositions, I developed the actual theory, which further
differentiates between (1) pre-situational privacy regulation processes, (2) situ-
ational privacy and self-disclosure processes, and (3) post-situational evaluation
processes. Each of these components is reflected in the suppositions and is pivotal
for understanding the theory of situational privacy and self-disclosure.
In what follows, I will summarize the major tenets of the theory as answers to
the four overarching research questions in social scientific privacy research. I will
thereby critically discuss the extent to which the empirical findings support the
assumptions of the theory, and if not, whether modifications to the theory are in
order.
12.1.1 Privacy from the Individual’s Point of View
The first question asks what privacy is from the individual’s point of view.
My discussion of multidisciplinary discourses on privacy has shown that privacy
can be and has been conceptualized very differently (Sect. 3.1). Depending on
the focus of scholarship, privacy has been conceptualized as negative freedom
(discourse in political philosophy), treated as a residual category of the public sphere
(discourse in sociology), defined as a form of seclusion or condition of limited
access (legal discourse), and finally described as selective or secondary control
(psychological discourse and particularly the discourse on informational privacy).

The proposed theory cannot provide a more comprehensive answer to this question.
However, I believe that it can provide an alternative starting point that makes the
nuanced investigation of psychological processes of privacy in connection with self-
disclosure (or other types of privacy-related behavior) possible.
The answer to this first question is implicit in the first supposition: Privacy is
a subjective perception resulting from the characteristics of the environment in
which an individual happens to be at a given time. More precisely, the entirety of
interpersonal and external circumstances (and their interactions) determines what
level of privacy an individual perceives. This perspective is related to classical
theories of privacy that regard privacy as a form of withdrawal from social
interactions or society in general (Westin, 1967). A high level of privacy is thus
also understood as a condition of limited access (cf. Altman, 1974; Gavison, 1980)
because the (real or virtual) environment’s potential to limit the access to the self
determines the situational level of privacy. The focus on interpersonal factors also
allows the concept of privacy boundaries to be integrated into the theory (Petronio,
2002), as a high level of privacy primarily depends on the people who have access
to the information that is shared. Finally, it also aligns with the privacy process
model, which posits that the level of privacy depends on the subjective perception
of the objective privacy context (Dienlin, 2015). Although the theory thus regards
privacy as a form of limited access, it nonetheless acknowledges its incremental
nature, and also incorporates the important notion that individuals voluntarily
withdraw from social interactions (or society) into gradual levels of privacy through
privacy regulation behaviors. In contrast to Westin (1967) and more in line with
Altman (1974) or Dienlin (2015), privacy is a matter of degree resulting from the
combination of situational circumstances rather than a dichotomous state.
The proposed theory further extends these traditional approaches by specifying
what exactly determines the level of privacy: interpersonal factors (i.e., factors
related to potential recipients) and external factors (i.e., physical or virtual cues
of the environment). Interpersonal factors include all characteristics of the people
that are present in a situation or that potentially have access to the person or
personal information. The most basic interpersonal characteristic is simply the
size of the potential audience. The more people who have access to a person, the
lower the perceived level of privacy. Further interpersonal factors include subjective
interpersonal assessments of these people. Individuals evaluate other people with
regard to their trustworthiness, psychological closeness, similarity, and everyday
centrality. External factors refer to the characteristics of the physical or virtual space
in which the behavior of interest takes place. In principle, it is possible to describe
the features in infinite detail. However, the level of perceived privacy is not inferred
from the features of the external environment itself. Rather, it is their potentiality to
provide a high level of protection against unwanted identification (e.g., whether they
provide a means to remain anonymous) and unwanted accessibility (e.g., whether
they provide a means to limit access to the self through physical or virtual barriers).
It is important to note that these interpersonal and external factors determine the
level of horizontal and vertical privacy. The theory thus extends prior approaches
that did not explicitly distinguish between these two perspectives on privacy.
Furthermore, this concept of privacy does not necessarily adhere to people’s

individual concepts of privacy. As noted before, people associate various things
with the term privacy (e.g., Nippert-Eng, 2010; Teutsch, Masur, & Trepte, 2018;
Vasalou, Joinson, & Houghton, 2015). The proposed theory uses the term to describe
certain situational circumstances. Although I do not solve the challenge formulated
by Parent (1983)—providing a definition that is consistent with daily usage and
allows researchers to systematically theorize about the family of concepts to which
privacy belongs—I, nonetheless, believe that my definition is a valuable one for
studying the phenomena of interest in a precise and nuanced manner.
The theory further takes into account that different people may perceive these
interpersonal and external factors differently depending on their individual char-
acteristics. They might thus perceive different levels of privacy under similar
circumstances. As such, privacy is regarded as inherently subjective. It has to
be noted, however, that the findings of the empirical study do not support these
assumptions. Traits and trait-like characteristics were not able to explain differences
in the effects of situational factors on self-disclosure. However, the study’s power
to detect such effects was very limited. In light of this, the findings should not
be viewed as a clear falsification of the proposed assumptions. Moreover, they
do not necessarily disprove the general nature of such relationships. Instead, they
only show that particular personality facets and privacy-related characteristics of
individuals do not influence situational processes. This could simply mean that we
need to investigate other interindividual differences that exert a stronger effect on
situational relationships between environmental factors and self-disclosure. I will
discuss some such potential traits and trait-like characteristics in more detail further
below.
12.1.2 Self-Disclosure as a Function of Privacy
The second question asks why people need privacy. The proposed theory once
again aligns with classical approaches positing that privacy is not an end in itself
(e.g., Altman, 1974; Johnson, 1974; Nissenbaum, 2010; Westin, 1967). In line with
Supposition 2, it is instead regarded as a condition or the necessary circumstances
enabling the satisfaction of more fundamental needs or the performances of other
behaviors (e.g., self-disclosure), which, in turn, allow for the satisfaction of more
fundamental needs (Trepte & Masur, 2017a). What level of privacy is appropriate is
hence closely tied to the goals an individual wants to achieve. Combining this with
the answer to the first question, we can argue that the psychological value of privacy
stems from its ability to facilitate satisfaction of the fundamental need.
Again, the proposed theory focuses specifically on self-disclosure as one behav-
ior that requires privacy in order to be performed. It also draws on literature focusing
on information control and the risks of self-disclosure (Sect. 4.3), which suggests
that people only disclose when they feel it is appropriate to do so. As such, it
emphasizes the role of privacy for the satisfaction of those needs that require
self-disclosure: People need to feel safe in order to open themselves up to other

people. Self-Disclosure, in turn, may then allow primary needs such as relationship
formation and maintenance, emotional release, personal clarification, and social
validation to be fulfilled.
Although this perspective is related to the major theoretical works on privacy
and self-disclosure (Omarzu, 2000; Petronio, 2002), it has not yet been tested
explicitly. As noted in the introduction, prior research on privacy and self-disclosure
in communication science has mostly investigated relationships between stable
personal factors such as privacy concerns or attitudes and aggregated measures of
privacy-related behavior. The empirical results of this work, however, show that a
situational perspective provides more refined insights. In particular, it revealed that
the level of privacy that affects individuals’ depth of self-disclosure is primarily
determined by interpersonal factors. It thus shifts the focus from non-situational
personal factors (e.g., privacy concerns) to assessments of situational circumstances,
noting that individuals pay significant attention to the people who have access to the
information they share in particular situations, and try to assess how trustworthy and
psychologically close these potential recipients are in order to mitigate the risks of
self-disclosure.
12.1.3 Privacy Regulation Behaviors
The third question asks how individuals achieve privacy and what makes them do
so. In line with Supposition 4, the theory proposes that people actively engage
in different types of privacy regulation behaviors in order to create situations in
which they feel their privacy is sufficient and they are thus able to self-disclose.
Through privacy regulation behaviors, people exert choice and further control over
access and stimulation, as proposed by Laufer, Proshansky, and Wolfe (1973; see
also Sect. 3.3.3). In general, I postulate that it is fruitful to differentiate between
preventive, preservative, and corrective privacy regulation behaviors as privacy
regulation happens on many levels and at different points in the process of fulfilling
fundamental needs. Although people try to regulate their privacy preventively on
the basis of their stable needs and experiences, they simply cannot foresee every
potential privacy invasions or violations. Thus, preservative and corrective measures
are equally important.
The theory of situational privacy and self-disclosure places particular focus
on long-term preventive privacy regulation behaviors which can be further distin-
guished into choosing and manipulating environments with regard to their level of
privacy. People thereby actively influence the level of protection against identifi-
cation and unwanted accessibility in future self-disclosure situations. Accordingly,
the present work is one of the first to acknowledge the role of choosing particular
media in determining the level of privacy and hence answers recent calls for a
more multimodal perspective on media use (Hasebrink & Schmidt, 2013; Lampinen,
2016).
The theory furthermore identified several personality facets and trait-like char-
acteristics that influence people’s likelihood of engaging in privacy regulation
behaviors. The results of the empirical study indicated that the level of online pri-
vacy literacy and vertical privacy concerns were particularly effective in predicting
whether people engage in such behaviors. In contrast to prior research, the findings
suggest that stable personal factors affect whether people engage in active privacy
regulation behavior but are less powerful in influencing the situational decision to
self-disclose.
Finally, the theory posits that people constantly learn from their experiences by
evaluating the effectiveness of their decisions and adapting their future behavior as
a result of these evaluations (Supposition 5). Although this third component of the
theory was not tested empirically, I believe that future research will find support
for such processes. Moreover, I believe that using prior experiences with situational
processes to model future situational processes will be more successful than testing
whether negative experiences explain differences in behavior between individuals.
12.1.4 The Situationality of Privacy and Self-Disclosure
Finally, the fourth question asks about the circumstances in which people perceive
high or low levels of privacy and the extent to which this perception affects their
behavior. The theory of situational privacy and self-disclosure aims specifically at
providing a framework for understanding and analyzing this question. In line with
Supposition 3, it suggests that self-disclosure and privacy are inherently connected
such that high levels of privacy allow for self-disclosure and low levels of privacy
can be mitigated by choosing to not disclose the self. It is assumed that people
perceive interpersonal and external factors, evaluate them with regard to the level
of privacy they generate, and rationally decide whether this level of privacy is
sufficient for them to fulfill their need to disclose themselves. This view is again
closely related to the ideas of Altman (1974) who argued that people constantly
evaluate their achieved and desired level of privacy and seek to achieve an optimal
balance between the two. Such a view is also similar to the ideas expressed in
privacy calculus theory (e.g., Dienlin & Metzger, 2016; Dinev & Hart, 2006; Laufer
& Wolfe, 1977), as it acknowledges that people weigh the inherent benefits of
self-disclosure against the costs (i.e., privacy risks). However, in contrast to prior
empirical work on the privacy calculus, I did not investigate this weighing process
as a general pattern, but rather as a situational decision-making process. As such the
theory and the empirical investigation extend prior research on the privacy calculus
by providing insights from a situational perspective.
Furthermore, it is clear from the theory and the empirical results that high levels
of privacy arise when the number of recipients is small, and they are rated as
trustworthy and psychologically close. Furthermore, the study’s findings show that
people self-disclose whenever they have a high need to disclose themselves or prior
interactions with the recipient(s) require them to disclose themselves in return.
However, in contrast to the assumptions of the theory, ability of the external

environment to provide inaccessibility and protection against identification did not
affect people’s self-disclosure. Thus, people feel able to disclose themselves when
appropriate recipients are present no matter how much protection against unwanted
identification or access can be assured. We may hence ask whether these findings
disprove the theory’s predictions regarding the influence of the external environment
on people’s self-disclosure, and whether modifications of the theory are warranted.
I argue that this is not the case. Instead, based on the limitations discussed in
Sect. 11.2, we must concede that the study might not have fulfilled the necessary
requirements (specifically in terms of appropriate power and variance in the external
factors) to falsify these hypotheses. Future studies should hence ensure that these
requirements are met in order to provide more robust findings.
As already noted earlier, non-situational personal factors did not have any signif-
icant effects on self-disclosure, in contrast to the theory’s predictions. However, the
results suggest that vertical privacy concerns do have an influence of people’s self-
disclosure when individuals also have high horizontal privacy concerns, but more
importantly when they are more literate about privacy and data protection. Thus,
a certain knowledge is needed in order to be aware of potential vertical risks and
make the related concerns influence into protection behavior (less self-disclosure).
With regard to the insignificant direct effects of non-situational personal factors on
situational depth of self-disclosure, future studies should recruit larger samples in
order to provide enough power to make such effect detectable. That being said, we
can reflect on whether other personal characteristics other than those discussed in
this work might be more powerful in shaping people’s self-disclosure. In the next
section, I will discuss some potential extensions in this regard.
These empirical findings notwithstanding, I believe that the theory provides
a comprehensive framework for empirically studying privacy regulation as well
as situational self-disclosure processes. The overall framework (as derived from
the definition of a situation on p. 136) is particularly valuable, as it allows
for the simultaneous investigation of non-situational and situational personal and
environmental factors as predictors of situational self-disclosure (regardless of
which specific factors are investigated). It thus consolidates prior research analyzing
stable personal factors in aggregated survey studies, on the one hand, and specific
situational processes in experimental designs on the other hand. Thereby, it also
offers the chance to identify potential interactions between the two. Although I was
not able to detect such effects based on the obtained data, I, nonetheless, believe that
the theory provides a useful framework for studying these types of relationships and
interactions.
The present work thus extends prior privacy research in several ways. First, it
allows processes of privacy regulation, self-disclosure, and subsequent evaluations
to be analyzed simultaneously in one comprehensive framework. Second, it allows
for the detection of general patterns on a situational level. It thus acknowledges
the variance resulting from situational circumstances, yet still gives researchers the
possibility to identify the extent to which abstract factors (which are comparable
across situations) and stable personal factors affect individuals’ behavior in general.
Third, I have shown that the theory can be applied to smartphone-based communica-
tion. The findings of the empirical study revealed that people do indeed choose and
manipulate certain environments (communication applications) on the basis of their
privacy preferences and their personality. It was further shown that the depth of self-
disclosure within smartphone-based communication situations depends primarily on
internal and interpersonal factors related to the specific situation.
12.1.5 Possible Modifications and Extensions
There are many ways in which the theory of situational privacy and self-disclosure
can be extended or modified. As already highlighted in several instances throughout
the book, the number of factors chosen was deliberately small and represents what
I considered to be the most important predictors of self-disclosure in the existing
literature. The statistical model estimated in this study, however, explained only a
moderate amount of variance in the primary dependent variable. As a result, several
other factors seem worth including to increase the explained variance. The proposed
framework of personal and environmental factors is deliberately open-ended and can
easily be refined and advanced in order to better explain a given behavioral outcome.
With regard to non-situational personal factors, for example, it should be self-
evident that including perceived benefits would strengthen the predictive power.
Such an extension would also bring empirical research based on the proposed
theory closer to the existing literature on the privacy calculus (e.g., Dienlin &
Metzger, 2016; Krasnova, Veltri, & Günther, 2012). Furthermore, much research
has focused on the relationship between privacy attitudes and intentions (as
more bidirectional concepts than privacy concerns) and privacy regulation or self-
disclosure, often revealing that they mediate the relationship between concerns and
behavior (e.g., Burns & Roberts, 2013; Dienlin & Trepte, 2015; Niemann, 2016).
Other psychological variables might be interesting to incorporate, too: A study by
Hesse and Rauscher (2013), for example, revealed that alexithymia—an individual’s
inability to understand and communicate emotions—moderated the effect of privacy
orientations on the behavioral outcome of concealing. In the study, I focused
particularly on personality and privacy-related measures as trait-like characteristics.
However, in developing the theory, I also acknowledged the effects of chronic needs
on self-disclosure. Including these—and perhaps particularly the need to belong—
may provide further insights into these processes. Incorporating such concepts as
additional non-situational personal factors might hence be useful in increasing the
amount of explained variance at the second level.
With regard to situational personal factors, the empirical study can be criticized
for being too superficial. It treated internal factors almost as control variables
compared to, for example, interpersonal factors. Differentiating between several
motives or including other internal processes such as situational feelings and emo-
tions would provide a more detailed picture of how these varying personal factors
affect situational self-disclosure. Several other types of situational environmental
factors could also be considered. For example, interpersonal factors could also
include expectations with regard to the receiver, the perceived role the discloser
thinks he or she has to adopt, or prevailing norms that are implicitly shared
among the people present (see also Sect. 13.1.2). This could also involve including
notions of negotiated rules (Petronio, 2002) or transmission principles (Nissenbaum,
2010). In general, I deem it important to investigate how communicative processes
can be integrated in order to account for the networked nature of privacy in
networked environments (Marwick & Boyd, 2014). Finally, as I only investigated
two components of the model (pre-situational privacy regulation behaviors and
situational self-disclosure processes), it is also important to test the suggested
evaluation processes and analyze their effects on future privacy regulation and self-
disclosure.
Overall, I am convinced that the theory of situational privacy and self-disclosure
will be strengthened through its application. It allows for the incorporation of a mul-
titude of factors, concepts, and potentially also other micro-theoretical approaches.
In the long run, the application of the theory will show what factors are particularly
important to consider in predicting situational self-disclosure. The present study
might not be able to determine beyond the shadow of a doubt whether the proposed
factors are actually important or not. In this sense, I hope that researchers will find
the theory useful for their empirical work as continuous use and applications will
make it more versatile and adaptable to different research areas.
The potential contributions of the proposed theory notwithstanding, it is vulnera-
ble to challenges with regard to its basic underlying paradigms. Theories are always
developed on the basis of specific axioms and ways of thinking. It is thus important
to critically examine the consequences of such types of thinking and whether
alternatives exist. In the following sections, I will discuss two major paradigms
that serve as the basis of the theory. For each paradigm, I will discuss alternative
perspectives which could provide fruitful starting points for future investigations
and refinements of the theory.
12.2 First Paradigm: Individuals as Rational Agents
The theory of situational privacy and self-disclosure posits that both privacy regu-
lation behaviors and self-disclosure are goal-directed behaviors. More specifically,
it postulates that people actively engage in privacy regulation behaviors in order
to generate the environments necessary for them to be able to perform self-
disclosure with the aim of fulfilling fundamental needs. It moreover implicitly
assumes that individuals are consciously aware of the interpersonal and external
factors in different situations, interpret them with regard to their influence on the
level of privacy, and evaluate the potential risks associated with disclosure under
such circumstances.
The theory is thus based on the rational choice paradigm, which regards
the individual as rational agent who generally evaluates given information, the
12.2 First Paradigm: Individuals as Rational Agents 319
probabilities of events and possible consequences, and the potential costs and
benefits of behavior in order to decide on the best course of action. Indeed, most
studies of privacy have viewed individuals as rational economic agents. From that
perspective, “individuals are forward lookers, utility maximizers, Bayesian updaters
who are fully informed or base their decisions on probabilities coming from know
random distributions” (Acquisti & Grossklags, 2005, p. 1).
Originally developed in the economic sciences, rational choice theory is actually
a family of theories with many versions. According to Boudon (2009), it can
be summarized into six postulates (p. 180): The first postulate is that individual
decisions, actions, attitudes and so forth lie at the roots of all social phenomena.
This principle has come to be known as methodological individualism. The second
postulate refers to the principle of understanding, which states that any individual
actions can be understood and described as the results of understandable motivations
or reasons. Third, all behavior (often also referred to as action) is rooted in cognitive
processes or reasons within the individual. This principle of rationality represents
the core of rational choice theory. The fourth postulate states that these reasons
are derived from a consideration of the consequences of various actions. Fifth, it
is assumed that actors are mainly concerned with the consequences for themselves.
Finally, the sixth postulate posits that individuals are able to “distinguish the costs
and benefits of alternative lines of action and choose the line of action with the
most favorable balance” (p. 180). This last postulate is also the reason why rational
choice theories are often also called theories of utility maximization (cf. Becker,
1996; Coleman, 1994) and why humans are understood as homo oeconomicus in
neoclassical economics.
Although this general form of rational choice theory has been used to predict
individuals’ behavior, it has been even more influential in shaping how behavior
is explained in general. Many scholars have gone so far as to say that the rational
choice paradigm is the only reliable basis for a comprehensive social (and thus also
psychological) theory. For example, Coleman, (1994) argued that “[r]ational actions
of individuals have a unique attractiveness as the basis for social theory. If [. . . ] a
social process can be accounted for in terms of the rational choices of individuals,
then and only then can we say that is has been explained” (p. 1). Or as Hollis
(1977) put it: “rational action is its own explanation” (p. 21). According to Elster
(1988), the rational choice explanation is characterized by three steps: Explaining
human behavior based on the rational choice paradigm means (1) showing that it
derives from the intention of the individual (principle of intentionality), (2) showing
that these intentions stem from desires and beliefs that are themselves rational
(principle of rationality), and (3) predicting behavioral outcomes by assuming that
they represent the best means of accomplishing the individual’s goal (principle
of optimality). This way of explaining human behavior is hence based on the
methodological individualism mentioned above, meaning that scholars begin by
considering individuals’ actions and then try to understand the origins of these
actions. Individuals are seen as motivated by specific goals, and “[t]hey act within
specific, given constraints and on the basis of the information that they have about
the conditions under which they are acting” (Scott, 2010).
Many theories in different disciplines have adopted the rational choice paradigm.
In particular, it seems to be the most prominent approach toward explaining human
behavior in the social sciences because it allows predictions to be made on the basis
of relatively few variables. If human action is reducible to individuals’ rational cost-
benefit calculations, mathematical models of human behavior can be developed, and
these can be tested with empirical data. Although the benefits of such an approach
are evident, many scholars have expressed concern about the overall usability of the
paradigm and voiced criticisms of its fundamental claims.
Most notably, scholars have criticized rational choice theory for taking rationality
as the unquestioned starting point for the analysis of individual behavior. One of the
more fundamental criticisms is that rational choice theory is reductionistic and thus
falsely represents human behavior. Its own claims are said to be not objective and the
product of individual rational thinking. Elster (1988), for example, discusses several
caveats of the rational choice paradigm, particularly with regard to its inability to
explain irrational human behavior:
Rational-choice explanation may fail because the situation does not allow a unique
behavioral prediction from the hypothesis that agents behave rationally. But we should
not forget that it sometimes fails simply because people act irrationally. They yield to
wishful thinking, in the sense of letting their desires determine their beliefs or the amount
of evidence they collect before forming their beliefs (assuming that the result is below
the lower bound). Or they succumb to weakness of will, in the sense of acting for the
sake of a desire which they themselves value less highly than the remaining set of desires.
Finally, their intentions and beliefs may be subject to various inconsistencies that are also
incompatible with rational choice (pp. 63–64).
More broadly, scholars have criticized the overall concept of methodological

individualism, claiming that the rational choice paradigm views individuals as
idealized agents with perfect abilities (Nell & Errouaki, 2013). This led to the
introduction of the concept of bounded rationality, which posits that human beings
may act or think they act rationally, but this rationality is limited by access
to information, the cognitive limitations of the mind, and the time available to
make a decision (Simon, 1955). Such bounded rationality approaches represent an
extension of the more general rational choice theory and allow for the integration of
concepts such as heuristics or other irrational processes in general.
In the following subsections, I will reflect on the consequences of this paradigm
for the proposed theory. I will then consider potentially irrational behaviors that may
counterbalance the seemingly rational processes described by the theory. Finally, I
will propose the integration of a heuristic perspective as a promising extension of
the theory.
12.2.1 Rational Choice in the Proposed Theory
Although it should already be apparent from the answers to the overarching research
questions summarized earlier, I will now investigate more explicitly the extent to
which the proposed theory rests on the rational choice paradigm in explaining
human behavior. I will do so by analyzing the extent to which the assumptions
derived from the theory align with the three characteristics of rational choice
explanations suggested by Elster (1988).
The proposed theory aligns with the principle of intentionality, because it
establishes the individual as agent, several types of behavior (privacy regulation,
self-disclosure, and evaluation) as actions, and it sees these behaviors as a function
of desires (needs or motives) and cognitions (perception of environmental factors)
(cf. Elster, 1988, p. 51). With regard to pre-situational privacy regulation processes,
for example, I argued that people choose Threema (behavior) because they want
a means of communicating with other people that simultaneously allow them to
remain inaccessible to providers (set of desires) and because they perceive all other
alternatives as violating their vertical privacy and thus offering less protection (set
of cognitions). In line with the principle of intentionality, the theory thus posits
that given this specific set of cognitions, choosing Threema is the best means of
realizing this specific set of desires. In other words, the combination of cognition
and desires caused the behavior (cf. Elster, 1988, pp. 51–52). Consequently, the
theory also aligns with the principle of rationality and the principle of optimality. It
assumes that given a certain set of cognitions and desires, people rationally decide
the best options among several alternative actions to realize their desires (e.g., using
Threema instead of WhatsApp).
A similar explanation can be applied to situational self-disclosure processes.
Individuals want to disclose themselves in order to satisfy specific needs (e.g.,
relationship initiation). What Elster (1988) calls desires are described in the theory
as internal personal factors and encompass motives and needs. Individuals perceive
interpersonal and external environmental factors (cognitions) and rationally evaluate
them with regard to the level of privacy they generate. Based on the combination of
these desires (internal factors) and cognitions (environmental factors), they choose
the best available option and act accordingly (in this case, via a two-step process of
first regulating privacy and then choosing to either self-disclose or to stay reserved).1
I thus once again assume that people evaluate all available information in a situation
and rationally weigh the costs and benefits of different behavioral alternatives before
finally choosing the best available option.
The theory of situational privacy and self-disclosure thus indeed adopts a rational
choice paradigm to explain people’s privacy regulation behavior and self-disclosure.
This should not be too surprising, as it deliberately builds upon existing approaches
and empirical studies adopting the privacy calculus framework (see Sect. 6.3.1).
The assessments of benefits (in the theory subsumed under internal factors that
enforce the willingness to self-disclose) and risks (subsumed under the perception
1 I am being deliberately broad here in describing the fundamental explanatory principles.
Obviously, the cognitions that influence behavior in a given situation include not only people’s
perceptions of environmental factors but also, for example, people’s knowledge about how to
achieve certain goals and prior experiences with such situations.
and evaluation of environmental factors) are hence inherent aspects of the decision-
making process described in the theory.
Based on the critique described above, we must now ask whether such an
idealized rational decision-making process is actually warranted. First of all,
the empirical findings suggest that this way of explaining behavior is able to
meaningfully predict the behavioral outcome (of course with a certain probability
including quantifiable uncertainty). According to the empirical findings, privacy
regulation behaviors can indeed be predicted by individuals’ cognitions (measured
more broadly via more general concepts such as online privacy concerns) and
desires (measured by personality facets). Moreover, self-disclosure can be predicted
based on individuals’ desires (the situational need to self-disclose) and cognitions
(situational assessments of the potential recipients). On the other hand, the empirical
results also seem to indicate that people do not behave rationally with regard to the
threats arising from external environmental factors. The level of protection against
identification and accessibility was theoretically assumed to be relevant for depth of
self-disclosure, but the relationship turned out to be nonsignificant in the empirical
analyses. But does that mean people’s behavior is not rational?
In the limitations section of the discussion in Part II (Sect. 11.2), I argued that it
remains unclear whether people’s perceptions of these external factors differ from
what is objectively the case. In accordance with this rationale, it could be argued that
people simply do not have access to all necessary information, and their rationality
in such situations is limited by cognitive limitations of the mind. Furthermore, as
online communication is often quick, individuals might generally not have enough
time to make a rational decision (cf. the concept of bounded rationality as advanced
by Simon, 1955). Such an interpretation was already advanced by Acquisti and
Grossklags (2005) arguing that “[t]he individual decision process with respect to
privacy is affected and hampered by multiple factors. Among those, incomplete
information, bounded rationality, and systematic psychological deviations from
rationality suggest that the assumption of perfect rationality might not adequately
capture the nuances of an individual’s privacy-sensitive behavior” (p. 27). We
can assume that people do not have access to all information necessary to make
an informed decision (particularly with regard to the rather intangible external
factors of a situation), that they may not be able to process this information
even if available (e.g., because they lack online privacy literacy), and that they
might otherwise deviate from rationality by overestimating the perceived benefits,
cognitively misrepresenting the trade-offs between costs and benefits, or because
social norms suggest alternative behavioral actions. As Laufer and Wolfe (1977)
rightly conclude, the problem is that “the individual is often unable to predict the
nature of that which has to be managed [. . . ] in fact, in advanced industrial societies
there is a growing certainty about the unknowableness of the future” (p. 37).
12.2.2 Alternative: Integrating Heuristics
Based on this argumentation, people often seem bounded in their rationality. An

alternative explanation refers to the idea that people use certain heuristics under
conditions of uncertainty (due to insufficient resources for cost-benefit analyses or
lack of literacy). The decision to disclose personal information is based on beliefs
about the likelihood of uncertain events such as the misuse of this information,
unwanted dissemination, or the altering of this information. As Tversky and
Kahnemann (1975) argued, people rely on a limited set of heuristic principles
to judge such events’ probability of occurrence. These principles may reduce the
complex task of assessing probabilities to simpler judgmental operations (p. 1124).
Although heuristics are often necessary and provide individuals with fairly good
assessments of complex situations, they nonetheless lead to biases. From a more
general perspective, heuristics can be understood as an analytical approach in which
assumptions are made on the basis of very limited knowledge about the actual
circumstances. It is a form of habitualized thinking that is intuitive, fast, automatic,
and therefore not necessarily accessible to conscious awareness (Slovic, Finucane,
Peters, & MacGregor, 2004).
As Carey and Burkell (2009) have pointed out, people seem “to expend a great
deal of effort to manage and protect certain aspects of their privacy, while remaining
relatively unconcerned about other kinds of privacy threats.” (p. 66). Using a similar
rational as Tversky and Kahnemann, they contend that people rely on mental short-
cuts to deal with uncertain and complex privacy risks. Accordingly, biases resulting
from such heuristics may explain why people are, on the one hand, quite cognizant
of interpersonal factors, but seem rather ignorant about external factors affecting
their vertical privacy on the other.
Sundar, Kang, Wu, Go, and Zhang (2013) and Gambino, Kim, Sundar, Ge, and
Rosson (2016) identified several types of heuristics with regard to information
disclosure on social media. In line with Tversky and Kahnemann, they argue that
users do not always weigh the costs and benefits of certain behaviors, but that
behaviors occur due to expedient decision-making. In detail, they argue that rational
decisions are unlikely due to the time-sensitive nature of typical online activities,
which make our decisions much more impulsive (Sundar et al., 2013, p. 812).
Gambino et al. (2016) conducted qualitative interviews with users of various online
services and found that people generally relied on rather simple cues to determine
their level of privacy or security. For example, respondents indicated that they felt
safe doing online banking because of “the lock” in the address line of the browser.
Similarly, others used the incognito mode when searching for sensitive information.
In both cases, respondents did not really know whether those cues actually increased
their safety, but they said they felt more safe. From a broader perspective, a number
of heuristics have been proposed to have a strong influence on decision-making on
social media (e.g., Carey & Burkell, 2009; Gambino et al., 2016; Metzger, 2016,
December; Sundar et al., 2013). Table 12.1 provides an overview of them.
Table 12.1 Overview of heuristics (Metzger, 2016, December)

Type of heuristic Description
Affect heuristic People often underestimate risks, particularly for things they like
Availability heuristic People tend to judge negative consequences or events as more likely
to occur if a recent experience of such an event is salient
Optimistic bias People often overestimate the risks for others, while underestimating
the risks for themselves (similar to the third person effect)
Bubble heuristics People feel safe under certain conditions without consciously
reflecting on the circumstances of such conditions (e.g., when using
personal Wi-Fi, incognito mode, or using Threema)
Bandwagon heuristic People tend to think that a given behavior must be safe if everyone
does it
Hyperbolic discounting People rather focus on immediate gratification instead of future risks
As mentioned already in the discussion in Chap. 11, the bubble heuristic may be a
valuable explanation of the empirical results: because people decided to use a certain
environment in the past (e.g., they choose Threema over WhatsApp), they feel safe
now every time they use this environment to communicate with other people.
Furthermore, a recent study investigated whether Facebook users indeed feel that
they themselves are less susceptible to privacy risks than other people (Metzger
& Suh, 2017). Based on 1156 Facebook users, the authors found that many
users did exhibit this kind of comparative optimism. However, this bias did not
significantly affect people’s average self-disclosure. I would nonetheless argue that
such heuristics may still account for situational variance in self-disclosure, but
future studies implementing meaningful measures of these cognitive heuristics to
study situational effects are needed.
In sum, individuals may not navigate networked environments as rationally
as they themselves think. It thus seems fruitful to adopt a heuristic approach
when investigating people’s privacy perceptions and related behavior, as this might
provide further explanations of why users’ behavior often does not react rationally
to objective privacy threats. The work of Carey and Burkell (2009), Sundar et al.
(2013), Gambino et al. (2016), and Metzger and Suh (2017) can be considered as
promising starting points for future investigations.
12.3 Second Paradigm: Subjective Reality
The theory of situational privacy and self-disclosure argues that people’s behavior
can only be meaningfully affected by what they actually perceive (Sect. 7.1). It thus
assumes that the situation “as it is perceived” rather than “as it is” influences peo-
ple’s behavior (cf. also Magnusson, 1981b, pp. 3–5). This view can be challenged
for denying the autonomy or constraining power of social structures (cf. Scott,
2010). As Faraj and Azad (2012) noted, such a paradigm results in “psychological
12.3 Second Paradigm: Subjective Reality 325
investigations of technology as a reflection of the reality “out there” by the cognizing

subject” (p. 238). Recent works emphasize the need to better theorize the relation
between the technical and the social in order to better understand phenomena related
to technology use (Evans, Pearce, Vitak, & Treem, 2016; Leonardi & Barley, 2008;
Treem & Leonardi, 2012). In particular, it has been argued that such a constructivist
view limits our understanding of technology use because it does not adequately
incorporate the notion of materiality (Leonardi, 2013; Orlikowski, 2000). The theory
of situational privacy and self-disclosure can certainly be challenged from this
perspective, as it aims at understanding individuals’ privacy regulation behavior
(which refers to choosing or manipulating certain technology) and self-disclosure
(which happens within a certain technology).
In this section, I will discuss this criticism with regard to the proposed theory
and whether the theory does indeed neglect the materiality of the technology
use it seeks to explain. Subsequently, I will present a possible alternative—the
affordance approach—which may provide a richer understanding of the technology
appropriation or use process (Faraj & Azad, 2012, p. 237). Although inconsistencies
in the use of the term affordance have emerged since its initial development (Evans
et al., 2016), it nevertheless represents an attractive approach for communication
research as it takes neither a materialist, nor a constructivist view and thus can
“bridge observations about technology use with our broader understanding of
technology at individual, group, and organizational levels” (p. 3). I will summarize
the main ideas and theoretical implications of this perspective and reflect whether
such an approach represents an alternative point of view on privacy and self-
disclosure or provides a useful extension of the proposed theory.
12.3.1 Constructivism in the Proposed Theory
While subjective situationalism forms the basis of the proposed theory and its
application to the study of person-environment interaction, the materiality of the
environment is not totally neglected. The theory requires an analysis of the features
of the studied environment and, in turn, how these affect the perceived level of
privacy that is assumed to influence people’s behavior. However, it simply posits
that certain features determine the level of privacy in a certain, predefined way.
For example, end-to-end encryption—which can be regarded as a feature of some
IM services—is said to determine the level of content accessibility, which is in turn
(more or less) said to affect the perceived level of privacy. Or similarly, being able to
upload a profile picture is a typical feature of SNS and thus a distinct characteristic
of this type of environment. The theory posits that the type of picture uploaded
matters in defining the level of visual anonymity.
So, on the one hand, the theory takes a materialist view by describing specific
features of environments and assuming that these features determine the level
of perceived privacy, which in turn affects subsequent behavior such as self-
disclosure. On the other hand, it takes a constructivist view by arguing that only what
people perceive can meaningfully affect their behavior. As noted in the limitations
section of the previous chapter, this discrepancy is both evident and problematic
in the empirical investigation of such factors. From a materialist point of view,
we should measure the features of the environment. From a constructivist point
of view, we need to measure people’s perceptions of these features. As noted
before, both perspectives are problematic as they deny either the agency of the
individual or the agency of the social structure. As a result, the theory still remains
underspecified when it comes to the relationship between external factors and
individuals’ perception and behavior, which also makes the empirical investigation
less meaningful in this regard (cf. again Sect. 11.2).
We may thus ask whether alternative perspectives and approaches to understand-
ing the environment-person relation exist. The question is whether this relation
can be better understood by redefining or reinventing the theoretical link between
social relations and technology (Faraj & Azad, 2012, p. 237). One approach that has
recently sparked considerable scholarly interest is the affordance perspective.
12.3.2 Alternative: Integrating Affordances
The term affordance was originally coined by the perceptual psychologist Gibson
(1986), who argued that animals do not perceive the qualities (or properties) of an
object, but rather what type of activities the object would be useful for (p. 119).
From this it follows that although the features of an object are common to each
person or animal who encounters them, the affordances of that object can be
different. Affordances must hence be understood as relative to the person or animal
at hand, and thus depend on the posture and behavior of the actor (pp. 118–
119). Gibson further noted that affordances—sometimes also called offerings of
the environment—can be beneficial or injurious (p. 127). In contrast to prior
theories of perception, which emphasized an organism-centric processing model
of cognition, Gibson developed the affordance concept to emphasize the reciprocal
and immediate relation between the environment and an organism (Faraj & Azad,
2012, p. 249). The concept has since been adopted and further refined in various
disciplines, and has been used in design and human-computer interaction research to
understand how technologies can be better designed (e.g., Norman, 1990). However,
the perspective developed in this area was often very narrowly focused on the object
that needed to be designed in a particular way in order to foster a certain type of
behavior.
Today, a relational view of affordances is more prevalent. Affordances are
thus neither properties of people nor artifacts of the environment. Instead, they
are constituted in relationships between people and the materiality of the things
(whether physical or virtual) with which they come in contact (Treem & Leonardi,
2012, p. 146). Affordances are hence not independent of people, but also not
independent of materiality. Because people are different and have different goals
and possible actions, they perceive an object as affording different possibilities for
action (Evans et al., 2016; Treem & Leonardi, 2012). More explicitly, Faraj and
Azad (2012) suggest that
An affordance is a multifaceted relational structure, not just a single attribute or property
or functionality of the technology artifact or the actor. That is, affordance is often realized
via the enactment of several mutuality relations between the technology artifact and the
actor (i.e., mutuality is the existence of reciprocal relations among role, line-of-action,
practice/routine, and artifact material/functional bundle) (p. 254).
Based on a content analysis of 82 communication-oriented scholarly works on

affordances, Evans et al. (2016) found significant inconsistencies in the use of the
term. The results revealed that scholars often misunderstood features or outcomes
for affordances. As a consequence, the authors proposed three criteria which need
to be confirmed in order to identify an affordance (pp. 5–6): The first is that
the proposed affordance cannot be the object itself or a feature of the object,
which should be evident from the definitions provided above. Second, the proposed
affordance cannot be an outcome, as affordances invite or offer behaviors and other
outcomes, but they are not the outcome itself. The outcome is always connected to
the goal of the actor. The third criterion is that an affordance must have variability.
Although this three-step process of identifying affordances seems practical, it
may nonetheless be insufficient. The authors themselves use these criteria to argue
that persistence is an affordance claiming that it is not an object or feature of social
media, nor is it an (behavorial) outcome, and that it varies across platforms. In
Sect. 2.1.1, however, I argued that persistence can be regarded as a property of
digital information because it describes the materiality of such information.2 So
while it could indeed be argued that persistence is not a feature of social media,
I argue that it is nonetheless a feature of the artifact digital information. So is
persistence an affordance? Just I can easily say digital information is persistent, I
can also ask whether this specific materiality of digital information affords or offers
something different to people with different characteristics. For some people, for
example, the persistence of digital information might suggest that they only share
information in online communication they would not mind being accessible long
after they shared it (the affordance or action possibility). It is hence important to
understand on what type of object or artifact I am focusing when investigating
affordances.
Despite the different applications of the concept, affordances provide a two-
sided or relational perspective on the materiality of the technology and the social
aspects and characteristics of the actor. Many scholars have consequently regarded
the affordance approach as a promising one for overcoming the subject-object or
agency-structure dichotomies that are characteristic of much of the research in this
area (Faraj & Azad, 2012, p. 238). As such, it allows a richer interpretation and
understanding of findings as well as novel ways of theorizing human-technology
interactions, particularly because it offers the opportunity “to frame [. . . ] insights
2I use the term materiality here in line with Treem and Leonardi (2012), who argued that it refers
to the features of an artifact regardless of whether it is a piece of hardware or software (p. 146).
in relation to higher-level characteristics as opposed to the idiosyncratic features

of a particular technology or site. The affordance framing enables [the researcher]
to consider the materiality of a technology [. . . ] without the technologically
deterministic assumptions of ‘impact’ that historically accompany the introduction
of any new communication technology” (Ellison & Vitak, 2015, p. 206).
Based on this description of the overall affordance approach, we can now ask
whether such a two-sided perspective extends the theory proposed here or would
be better regarded as an alternative point of view. In developing the theory, I
argued, for example, that there are two ways in which the first type of personal
factors (personality and other trait-like characteristics) may affect the level of self-
disclosure: On the one hand, they can directly influence the subsequent behavior
in a linear manner (e.g., extroverted people will be more likely to disclose
themselves). On the other hand, I argued that they might moderate the effects of
environmental factors on self-disclosure (e.g., a high level of protection against
content accessibility has a lower effect on self-disclosure for a very gregarious
person). For the latter types of effects, we could also use an affordance lens: A high
level of protection against content accessibility (which can be regarded as a feature
of an online communication service such as Threema) suggests to (some) people
that they can openly share and discuss private matters. A potential outcome would
hence be that people disclose themselves more. However, as an affordance is not
only defined by the feature but rather by how the individual sees the feature, we can
additionally argue that different people might perceive this feature differently. Less
literate users, for example, might simply not perceive this affordance. For them, this
affordance would be hidden (Gaver, 1991, p. 80)
We could take a similar perspective with regard to many of the assumed
relationships and interactions between the first type of personal factors and the
environmental factors and their influence on self-disclosure that are explicated in
the theory of situational privacy and self-disclosure. However, we may question to
what extent this extends our understanding of these effects. At first glance, it seems
that this approach merely represents an alternative point of view. However, I believe
that three points seem worth stressing.
First, the affordance approach shifts our focus to the specific features of different
communication services without losing sight of the agency of the user. The theory
of situational privacy and self-disclosure posits that certain external factors have
a linear effect on the level of self-disclosure, and that these might be moderated
by personal factors. An affordance perspective tells us additionally that behavioral
outcomes result from the way a user perceives the environment which is in turn
a result of individual characteristics and action capabilities. It thus sharpens our
view for different uses of the same objects or artifacts and challenges the overall
linear effect. It allows us to critically challenge the assumption that particular
environmental factors even have an effect at all. Several scholars have argued that
objects or artifacts (or environments more generally) may have different types
of affordances, of which some are more perceptible than others (Gaver, 1991;
Norman, 1990). Gaver (1991) even argued that “affordances per se are independent
of perceptions” (p. 80).
One application of such a differentiation has been described in the context of

online privacy (Trepte 2015, 2016a, 2016b). Trepte (2015) differentiates between
“cold” and “warm” affordances of social media (p. 1). She argues that users
generally perceive the warm affordances resulting from social media’s inherent
functions and features, which suggest that users share, interact, and keep in touch.
Cold affordances, on the other hand, stem from the technical and legal infrastructure
of social media and counterbalance the behavior suggested by warm affordances.
The information flow between users and providers, for example, affords users to be
more deliberate in their postings and sharing behavior. However, cold affordances
are less perceivable or “hidden” (Gaver, 1991, p. 80). This type of affordance
perspective might hence also explain the nonsignificant relationships between
external factors and depth of self-disclosure observed in the empirical study. These
features of the communication services may represent “cold” affordances that do
not necessarily translate into actual behavior.
Secondly and related to the first point, the affordance approach also tells us
to look for the most perceptible affordances of a given technology. With regard
to the theory of situational privacy and self-disclosure, it would be interesting to
investigate the affordances of different types of communication applications (and
more specifically, their unique features) are. By focusing on affordances instead of
environmental factors, we might be able to explain more meaningfully why people
communicate in certain ways when using different communication applications. For
example, we might find that instant messengers primarily afford asynchronous and
permanent connectedness and that the specific features discussed and analyzed in
the theory of situational privacy and self-disclosure are less influential because their
affordances are hidden or at least less “warm” (Trepte, 2015).
Lastly, an affordance perspective might provide a more fine-grained approach to
designing technology. In the next chapter, I will discuss some societal implications
related to this claim. One is to design communication applications that not only
afford the sharing of private information, but also afford people’s reflection on their
behavior, conscious privacy-related decisions, and engagement in more deliberate
self-disclosure. The affordance approach—as described, for example, by Norman
(1990)—can be quite valuable for investigating how communication services should
be designed in order to make privacy affordances more salient and perceptible.
Chapter 13
Overall Conclusion and Outlook
Based on the results of this study and the existing literature on online privacy
literacy, it seems that only a few people are actually knowledgeable or self-reflective,
and consequently engage in effective privacy regulation behavior. A peculiar finding
of this study is that external environmental factors (i.e., those that need to be
assessed in order to identify one’s level of protection against identification and
unwanted access by third parties) are not necessarily very powerful in shaping
people’s behavior. Although more privacy-literate people are more likely to adapt
their self-disclosure to their (vertical) privacy concerns, it nonetheless seems that
many individuals behave in networked environments just as they do in offline
environments: they mostly rely on interpersonal assessments to evaluate the risks
associated with self-disclosure. At the same time, these findings emphasize the
pivotal role of online privacy literacy. In light of the overall findings of this
theoretical and empirical investigation of online privacy and self-disclosure, it is
evident that people may generally lack the literacy to confront the privacy-related
dynamics discussed in Chap. 2.
From a normative point of view, we need to engage with this finding and ask
ourselves what we can do to make individuals less uncertain and more empowered
in new media environments. This last chapter thus offers important prospects
for future research and more importantly suggests some practical implications
for individuals and for society as a whole. Although the theory of situational
privacy and self-disclosure provides a framework for studying and consequently
understanding privacy and self-disclosure processes, it is nonetheless up to future
research to further validate its claims and assumptions. The following reflections
and considerations should therefore be taken into account when doing so.

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-78884-5_13
332 13 Overall Conclusion and Outlook
13.1 Prospects for Future Research
Although I have already provided a number of prospects for future research in the
previous chapters drawn from limitations of the empirical study and general points
of criticism, I will now offer some considerations regarding the future of privacy
research and how the proposed theory can support the investigation of privacy issues
in new areas.
In the present work, I attempted to provide a comprehensive psychological
theory that aids in understanding and predicting privacy regulation behavior and
self-disclosure. The theory was deliberately composed of rather abstract concepts
and components in order to ensure their long-term applicability. In the empirical
investigation, I focused on smartphone-based communication the analysis of which
I deemed particularly important for today. In the future, however, new dynamics,
societal changes, platforms, communication services, and devices will need to be
examined as they will present new threats or modifications to individuals’ handling
of information and online behavior. Most likely, they will further challenge concepts
and theories of privacy and self-disclosure.
Large social media companies such as Snapchat and Facebook have recently
announced that they will further develop and integrate augmented and virtual reality
features into their portfolio in the near future (Barrett, 2017, April 18; Flynn, 2017,
April 18; Hautala, 2017, April 18). Furthermore, many companies are likely to
increasingly use artificial intelligence to enhance usability through conversational
agents such as so-called chatbots (The Economist, 2016, April 09). All of these
technological developments may compromise individuals’ privacy in a number of
ways. For example, augmented reality, which refers to systems or applications that
combine real and virtual objects in a real environment, register (or align) real and
virtual objects with each other, and run interactively, in three dimensions, and in
real-time (Azuma, 1997; Krevelen & Poelman, 2010), require access to a variety
of sensor data, including video and audio feeds, GPS data, accelerometer readings,
and so on to deliver their intended functionality (Roesner, Kohno, & Molnar, 2014,
p. 91). Users thus automatically give providers large amounts of personalized data
when they use such systems. Privacy risks also arise for other people or bystanders,
as the sensors may randomly record them and pass that information to providers or
other third parties as well (Roesner et al., 2014, p. 91).
Another example are conversational agents such as Apple’s Siri, Microsoft’s
Cortana, or Amazon’s Alexa, which can also become privacy-invasive. These chat-
based computer programs are often designed to exhibit human-like behavior based
on artificial intelligence and have the with the ultimate goal of performing various
tasks for their users (Vassallo, Pilato, Augello, & Gaglio, 2010, p. 357). Research
has started to investigate the persuasive potential of such programs (Fogg, 2003).
As a result, scholars have recently discussed conversational agents’ potential to
violate people’s privacy (CPDPconferences, 2017). In particular, they warn that
conversational agents might be designed to elicit self-disclosure from individuals.
Research is needed to investigate this notion (see also Braun, 2017).
13.1 Prospects for Future Research 333
These two examples provide only a brief outlook into the future of mediated
interpersonal communication. In what follows, I will discuss three broader privacy-
related aspects which I believe will be pivotal for understanding and also for safely
adopting any of these technological developments. In doing so, I will highlight
how the situational perspective proposed in this work may help us understand and
analyze these issues.
13.1.1 Disclosure of Personal Information
In the theory of situational privacy and self-disclosure, I set out to combine research
on privacy and self-disclosure. I argued that linking the two research areas would
provide a more comprehensive picture of great use to current investigations of
interpersonal communication. Although the present work suggests that such a
focus is warranted, it should nevertheless be borne in mind that such an approach
neglects other privacy-related behaviors. As argued earlier, such a strong emphasis
on self-disclosure is inherently one-sided and potentially also positively biased (see
Sect. 4.3 and in particular Crowley, 2017; Parks, 1982). Because self-disclosure is
defined as the intentional sharing of information about the self to another person
or group of people, it primarily refers to interpersonal communication processes.
However, many of the current scientific and societal debates around online privacy
emphasize the threats of non-interpersonal information transfer processes such as
the provision of personal information to providers and institutions.
By personal information, I refer to “any information relating to an identified or
identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable person is one who can
be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification
number or to one or more factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental,
economic, cultural or social identity”.1 Personal information thus also includes
so-called meta-data which can be described as data that provides information
about other data (see Sect. 2.1.1). I deem continuous research on people’s personal
information disclosure particularly important for the following reasons:
First, most vertical privacy threats do not (only) arise from individuals exhibiting
high levels of self-disclosure. Instead, they originate from the socio-technical
infrastructure of online services, which allow providers of all types as well as gov-
ernmental institutions to access and record an unprecedented amount of information
about individual users. Specifically, since former NSA contractor Edward Snowden
revealed the extent to which the NSA has been collecting and analyzing personal
information about US citizens as well as monitoring communication worldwide
(Greenwald, 2014), scholars should investigate why people seem to “give away”
their personal information to providers and institutions.
1 I here refer to the definition provided by the European Union Directive (European Parliament and
Council of the European Union, 1995).

By accepting the terms and conditions of use, individuals accept that they will
constantly provide personal information and meta-data, which can then be combined
into elaborate client profiles from which a variety of inferences about specific
individuals can be drawn. In fact, most websites, applications, or other online
service providers are less interested in the content of a particular communication,
but more interested in personal information such as addresses, preferences, shopping
records, web searches, phone logs, surfing behavior, location information, media
consumption, and the meta-data related to it, which is when, where, with what
device, and with what software individuals performed any of the listed online
activities. As Acquisti (2014) noted, “progresses in data mining, business analytics,
and so-called big data, have the potential for magnifying the size and augmenting
the scope of economic benefits and dangers alike” (p. 77). Through large-scale
analyses of consumer or surfing behavior, companies are able to offer individuals
the right product at exactly the right time, adapt product prices to individual
spending capacities, and draw inferences about preferences and present content on
that basis. As noted in Sect. 2.3.2, they may be able to manipulate the individual
without him or her being aware of it (see also Calo, 2014). Lyon (2014) has further
shown that big data tendencies in this regard are also supportive of expanded and
intensified surveillance. From a general point of view, I hence suggest that future
research should adopt a more holistic view of horizontal and vertical privacy and
develop theories that incorporate both self-disclosure and information disclosure
(or conversely also information control as defined by Crowley, 2017).
Second, in comparison to self-disclosure processes, the disclosure of personal
information and meta-data is often less conscious or even ignored by individuals.
Previous research has shown that people seldom take the time to read online
service provider’s terms and conditions or the privacy policies. Steinfeld (2016),
for example, found in an experiment with 128 graduate students that presenting
a website privacy policy by default significantly increases the time and effort
participants put into reading it. However, when participants had the option of
accepting website terms and conditions without reading the policy (which seems
to be the predominant practice of online service providers), they will generally
forgo reading the document. Another recent study with 717 participants showed
that interactive privacy policies are more likely to affect users’ trusts in the provider
(Aïmeur, Lawani, & Dalkir, 2016), revealing that people show greater trust in
providers when they can opt in or opt out of each term in the privacy policy
(p. 376). I hence suggest that future research focuses particularly on theorizing
and analyzing the psychological processes of information and meta-data disclosure.
Although a few studies—who mostly adopted a privacy calculus perspective and
used experimental designs—have investigated information disclosure in the context
of electronic commerce (e.g., Dinev & Hart, 2006; Metzger, 2004, 2006), such
empirical investigations are highly underrepresented (compared to research focusing
on self-disclosure on SNSs).
The situational perspective advocated by the theory of situational privacy and
self-disclosure represents a promising starting point for such investigations. For
example, website registration processes can be studied in a similar way as self-
disclosure processes. Scholars could identify non-situational personal factors as

well as situational personal and environmental factors and study their effect on the
likelihood of accepting privacy policies or disclosing personal information such as
one’s real name, address, email, or banking information in a variety of different
settings.
Third, a situational perspective—combined with an affordances perspective—
may make it possible to study whether certain design features could be implemented
to make people more aware about the type of information collected and analyzed by
providers or make them reflect more about their behavior. Recently, several scholars
have investigated such a so-called nudging approach (Thaler & Sunstein, 2009)
in first exploratory studies (Acquisti, 2009; Almuhimedi et al., 2015; Balebako &
Cranor, 2014; Choe, Jung, Lee, & Fisher, 2013; Wang et al., 2013). A nudge can
be regarded as “any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s behavior
in a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing their
economic incentives” (Thaler & Sunstein, 2009, p. 6). For example, Almuhimedi
et al. (2015) found that their 23 study participants benefited from nudges showing
them how often some of their sensitive data was being accessed by apps. The
findings showed that 95% of participants reassessed their application permissions,
and 58% further restricted some of these permissions. Wang et al. (2013) conducted
an exploratory field study with 21 Facebook users in which they implemented
three different types of privacy nudges on Facebook. The nudges included showing
visual cues about the potential audience of a status update, time delays before a
post was published, and a sentiment nudge which provided users with feedback
on the content of their status update (e.g., “Other people might perceive your
post as negative”). The findings revealed that the time delay nudge was mostly
perceived as annoying, but the other two nudges made participants more aware of
their privacy and self-presentation. I would argue that more research on methods
that raise users’ awareness during actual usage of online communication services is
much needed. The situational framework proposed in this book may be a useful way
to study the effectiveness of such nudges while controlling for all other factors that
simultaneously influence people’s behavior.
The sentiment nudge is particularly interesting as it might give people a sense
of what companies might infer about them based on their online behavior. Future
research should investigate to how design such extensions or softwares in order to
support people’s decision-making. Do Thi Duc (2017), an artist and web designer,
developed a browser extension called data selfie which makes inferences about
individual Facebook users on the basis of their Facebook activities. It is designed
to run in the background when people use Facebook. It records data such as clicks,
length of time spent on different posts, and so forth, and uses this data to make
inferences about personality, probable opinions, and political attitudes. It remains
unclear whether the data selfie actually has the potential to make people reflect about
their behavior. However, the exploratory study by Padyab, Päivärinta, Ståhlbröst,
and Bergvall-Kåreborn (2016) discussed earlier showed that confronting people
with inferences that can be made on the basis of their provided data can indeed make
them more concerned about and more deliberate in posting information online.
13.1.2 Privacy Invasion Beyond Individual Control
Related to this first perspective is another important development that fundamentally

challenges existing theories of privacy and thus needs to be considered in future
research. Some scholars have recently argued that traditional concepts of privacy
do not suffice to capture the threats arising from new technologies such as big data
analysis or ubiquitous computing. The problem is that these new technologies and
analytical procedure threaten privacy of individuals whose data is only indirectly
involved or whose data has not even been collected (e.g., Baruh & Popescu, 2015;
Mai, 2016; Matzner, 2014).
Let us consider the following example: an online shopping provider (e.g.,
Amazon) collects data about a client’s shopping record or his or her search history.
From these data, they can infer what products the client is generally interested in
or even what spending capacity he or she might have. Based on these analyses,
providers present the client with specific offers, products he or she might like. In this
case, the individualized buying experience is provided with the client’s consent (due
to his or her agreement to the privacy policy). However, these data are also used on
new clients who have not yet provided any data. Imagine now someone who goes to
an online shopping platform for the first time. He or she uses anti-tracking services
and anonymization tools to obfuscate his or her identity. Although this individual
does not share any information about him- or herself while looking at products, he
or she is nonetheless presented with information about other users who bought what
he or she intends to buy. Data miners do not necessarily need or want to know who
you are, but they want to know what you are like (Matzner, 2014, p. 98). Similarly,
research has shown that providers of SNS are able to draw conclusions about non-
members based on the information that members provide. Horvát, Hanselmann,
Hamprecht, and Zweig (2012), for example, have shown that the seeming innocuous
knowledge about confirmed contacts between members, on the one hand, and their
e-mail contacts to non-members, on the other hand, is sufficient to deduce a large
proportion of relationships between non-members.
Traditional concepts of privacy mostly rely on the premise that the individual is
able to control who has access to his or her information. This premise is challenged
dramatically if third parties are able to deduce information about a person without
actually collecting data from that person. The main interest of data surveillance
is often not actual personal identifying information but so-called data derivatives
which allow inferences to be made about just about anyone (Amoore, 2011). As
Matzner (2014) puts it: “privacy is not enough privacy in the context of ubiquitous
computing and big data.” Or as Mai (2016) rightly concludes: “In the age of big data,
a significant concern is how new personal information is produced by business and
organizations through predictive analysis.” (p. 199). Likewise, Baruh and Popescu
(2015) argue that privacy frameworks that focus on self-management fail to protect
individual privacy and even undermine privacy as a collective good. Thus, future
research hence needs to develop theories and concepts of privacy incorporating this
notion.
But how can it be incorporated in the theory of situational privacy and self-
disclosure? One approach would be to integrate the concept of contextual integrity
(Nissenbaum, 2010). As noted earlier, contexts are stable sets of characteristics
which shape perceptions of privacy and are culturally developed and negotiated.
Situations, on the other hand, refer to the individual’s perspective on the self
and the environment. From this, it follows that contextual characteristics become
the circumstances of a given situation. Context-relative informational norms—
the key concept of Nissenbaum’s theory—may thus guide people’s behavior and
could hence be integrated as interpersonal environmental factors in the theory
of situational privacy and self-disclosure. Through communication and societal
discussion, we must establish norms which include the notion reflecting individuals’
privacy can be endangered by the behavior of others. If norms guide people’s
behavior, the negotiation of such a norm may protect individuals against these types
of privacy invasions.
13.1.3 Understanding Online Privacy Literacy
A last consideration refers to the role of online privacy literacy, which also relates
to the previous two aspects and might offer a useful direction for future research
and studies. The present study has shown that people with higher online privacy
literacy also tend to use more privacy-friendly communication applications. At the
same time, the study also revealed that only a few people use such applications
(e.g., less than 10% who use Threema, Signal or Telegram). Moreover, the findings
of the ESM study showed that external factors—whether they impair or protect
people’s privacy—do not significantly influence people’s self-disclosure. Although
the previously described limitations also have to be taken into account, these
findings may be explained by a lack of knowledge, as discussed in Sect. 6.3. The
findings further revealed that for people with greater online privacy literacy, vertical
privacy concerns became a significant negative predictor of self-disclosure.
Based on such a rationale, the findings could be interpreted in the following
way: Because people are not very knowledgeable about application providers’
data collection practices and know little about the socio-technical infrastructure
of these online applications, they simply are not aware of these environmental
characteristics, meaning that their behavior in these environments is not influenced
by them. In light of these results (and also based on the work of Hoofnagle, King, Li,
& Turow, 2010; Masur, Teutsch, & Trepte, 2017; Park, 2013; Trepte et al., 2015),
it seems that online privacy literacy is a pivotal factors in fostering more privacy
regulation behavior and more conscious self-disclosure.
That being said, the existing literature on the relationship between online privacy
literacy and privacy regulation behavior—which is often only cross-sectional—
does not conclusively reveal whether higher literacy actually enables people to use
certain privacy regulation strategies (e.g., Hoofnagle et al., 2010; Masur, Teutsch, &
Trepte, 2017; Park, 2013). Masur, Teutsch, Dienlin, and Trepte (2017) have recently
argued that current definitions regard online privacy literacy as a multi-dimensional

knowledge construct, which might be the reason why higher literacy does not
necessarily translate into actual behavior in experimental studies. They argue that
online privacy literacy must be defined as a combination of awareness, factual
knowledge, self-reflection capabilities, procedural knowledge (i.e., concrete skills),
the motivation to change one’s current behavior, and the motivation and willingness
to maintain the new behavior. In their process model of online privacy literacy, they
note that an individual has to go through several steps before actually achieving a
behavioral change. For example, before individuals actually disclose less informa-
tion in networked environments (e.g., in Facebook, Instagram, or SnapChat), they
have to become aware of the potential threats resulting from these socio-technical
environments and from the information flow occurring therein. They then have to
reflect on these risks with regard to their own life circumstances (e.g., whether actual
negative experiences are likely) and also reflect the societal consequences of their
behavior (e.g., whether they are contributing to an economic model they do not want
to support). Subsequently, they have to learn new skills or acquire information about
alternatives services (e.g., learning about Threema or Ello), and finally also picture
themselves using the alternative service or implementing the respective behavior
and the consequences of such a behavioral change in their daily lives. If they finally
accept this new self and consequently deem the behavioral change relevant and
appropriate, they might decide to disclose less.
So far, the model is only theoretical. Although qualitative research suggests that
especially young children and adolescents have considerable difficulty connecting
their interaction and identity needs with their online privacy (e.g., Einspänner-
Pflock, 2016, p. 203), thus supporting the model’s fundamental claim that knowl-
edge itself is not enough, future research needs to investigate the connection
between online privacy literacy and privacy regulation or self-disclosure more
closely. Scholars should build upon the proposed process model of online privacy
literacy and investigate the extent to which the different aspects actually affect peo-
ple’s behavior. It should be analyzed whether the outlined process is comprehensive
and actually leads to behavioral changes in the proposed stepwise manner. I hence
advocate for continuous striving to understand the role of online privacy literacy and
analyze how far proposed components of awareness, knowledge, reflection, skills,
and motivation relate to each other, as well as how they individually affect privacy
regulation behavior and self-disclosure. If such a comprehensive model can indeed
explain some of the seeming irrationalities in people’s behavior found in this and
other prior studies, the next step would be to research and understand how online
privacy literacy can be raised and promoted in the population.
In the next section, I will discuss some implications of this reasoning for both the
individual and for society at large. I will further provide some initial suggestions
about how to increase online privacy literacy. Future studies, however, need to
address this more profoundly and analyze which of the suggested methods work
and which do not.
13.2 Societal and Practical Implications 339
13.2 Societal and Practical Implications
In this final section of this book, I want to address perhaps the most important
question in research on privacy and self-disclosure: What do the insights gained
from scientific work imply for the individual and for society at large? Nissenbaum
(2010) noted that we are currently living through a discontinuity, a disruption which
resulted from the rapid adoption and infiltration of digital information technologies
and which is characterized by schisms that are often experienced as violations of
privacy (p. 231). Several authors have argued that we are currently witnessing the
advent of information capitalism, which is slowly reducing the value of privacy by
supporting and encouraging the disclosure of more and more information (Castells,
2009; Sevignani, 2016).
We thus have to ask ourselves how we want to react to this disruption. We need to
reflect what privacy is worth to us and what we want to do to protect it. In line with
the rationale provided in this book, I argue that we need privacy in order to fulfill
certain fundamental needs that are important for our psychological well-being (e.g.,
Trepte and Reinecke, 2011a), but also for the flourishing of democratic societies
(e.g., Seubert, 2016). In the most basic terms, it is clear that both individuals and
society have to engage with privacy much more than ever before. We have to talk
about it, engage in a two-sided debate, negotiate the norms and rules related to it,
and try to better understand how privacy serves as a precondition for individual self-
determination. We have to engage in this discussion more deeply and with more
foresight regarding potential technical and cultural developments (Trepte, 2016a,
pp. 167–169). Most importantly, we have to do so in a way that includes everyone
at all levels of society (p. 167).
In my opinion, increasing online privacy literacy is the fundamental requirement
for this outlined process to take place. From my point of view and in line with
the process model of online privacy literacy developed by Masur, Teutsch, Dienlin,
et al. (2017), the purpose of a comprehensively conceptualization of online privacy
literacy is to empower individuals to make their own decisions about what they want
to disclose to other people, providers, and institutions, instead of simply reacting
to the propositions of online services providers. They need to be able to protect
their information and data against horizontal and vertical access or violations in
line with their individual privacy needs. They need to be able to use simple as
well as sophisticated privacy regulation strategies (which includes being able to
choose the communication media that best fit their individual needs, being able
to further manipulate it via provided options and settings, and using particular
software or extensions to implement more complex technical procedures such as
encryption or anonymization), and finally to reflect on the societal status quo
and actively participate in democratic processes, thereby contributing to a socio-
technical environment based on negotiated and democratically accepted values.
However, the development of such a comprehensive form of online privacy
literacy is difficult for several reasons: First and as already discussed in Part II,
communication in networked environments is becoming increasingly multifaceted.
Second, technological progress is fast and applications are constantly changing.

Third, it requires the development of skills and habits that cannot be learned by
acquiring information alone. Fourth, it requires reflecting on and changing one’s
behavioral habits in ways that cannot be learned upfront, but have to be tried and
tested by individuals over longer periods of time. Thus, increasing online privacy
literacy can only be achieved by using different methods and encouraging individual
behavioral change while also initiating structural transformations.
In the following subsections, I will suggest several options which I believe can
help us seize this challenge as an opportunity to increase the individual’s self-
determination ability. I have deliberately formulated them as broad desiderata which
can be adapted to the work of politicians, practitioners, teachers, parents, and
individuals alike.2
13.2.1 Providing More Sustainable Education and Information
In general, I advocate for a stronger emphasis on and refinement of online privacy

literacy education not only for children and individual citizens, but also for parents,
teachers, university faculties, politicians, and practitioners. In order to have a
meaningful and sustainable impact, online privacy literacy must be acknowledged
as an important issue for all areas of society and in all types of educational systems.
Education takes place on various levels: Obviously, parents teach their children,
teachers instruct and educate pupils, and university faculty members or professors
teach students. However, we need to think more broadly, too: product providers also
teach users, developers teach practitioners, researchers teach policymakers, and so
on. In what follows, I will suggest some methods that I believe can help increase
online privacy literacy in a variety of societal contexts.
The following suggestions are loosely based on the nine factors that Pungente
(1985) suggested as fundamental requirements for the successful development of
media education. Just like media literacy, online privacy literacy is a complex topic
which is mostly typically covered in existing curricula. As such, education about
online privacy literacy must become a sort of grassroots movement in which scholars
and teachers take major initiative in trying to understand it, lobbying for it, and
taking steps to implement it (see also de Abreu & Mihailidis, 2014). As a basic
recommendation, I argue that it is important to spur people to reflect about their
behaviors and attitudes in order to spark their motivation to engage with privacy
more deeply. The goal is to make people more mindful and critical with regard
to their online privacy. The ultimate objective is to make people self-determined.
2 As research in this area is scarce, these considerations reflect my personal views, and future
research is needed to substantiate the claims made. For the time being, I advise the interested
reader to take my suggestions as initial thoughts aimed at inspiring individual and societal debates.
An effective educational program cannot be based on simply informing or at worst

warning people about the negative consequences of their current behavior.
First, parents can increase their children’s online privacy literacy by construc-
tively engaging with their media use and communication habits. Research on
increasing media literacy has shown that active mediation can help mitigate the
negative effects of children’s TV use (e.g., Nathanson, 1999, 2001, 2002; Nathanson
& Cantor, 2010). Active mediation can be thought of as talking with children about
their media use (Nathanson, 2002, p. 2007). In order to increase online privacy
literacy, parents may start by reflecting the benefits and risks of using certain
applications to communicate with friends and family together with their children.
Such interpersonal mediation, however, needs to be positive and constructive. It
should aim at sparking children’s motivation to learn more about the topic and
investigate and seek information by themselves. The findings of the empirical
investigation of smartphone-based communication have shown that self-disclosure
is heavily connected to the goals and motives associated with it. Parents hence need
to understand the gratifications that children think they obtain from communicating
on these applications and understand that these gratifications are valuable to them.
Only then can they move on to explain negative aspects children might have
neglected to consider. A non-understanding parent telling a child to simply stop
using a certain application will certainly not succeed in producing a behavioral
change.
Second, I propose that teachers in schools and universities investigate how
aspects of online privacy, information about the socio-technical infrastructure of the
Internet, and the workings of the information economy fit into existing curricula.
From my point of view, education on this topic should not be provided by creating
new subjects or disciplines such as “online privacy” or more broadly “Internet
studies.” Instead, aspects of online privacy should be investigated and integrated
into all subjects. References should be provided whenever suitable and necessary. A
history teacher, for example, can provide factual knowledge about how the Internet
was developed and how it affects individuals. A political or social science teacher
can teach pupils what online business models exist, how information is generated
and used, and how these practices may do harm from an individual as well as from
a societal point of view. The key is to investigate how these issues can be integrated
into already existing subjects. Furthermore, making people reflect on their behavior
is of utmost importance—not condemning it or establishing safety rules that do
not mesh with students’ interactions in their everyday life. In Germany, special
media institutes (ger. Landesmedienzentren) exist that provide related teaching
materials. These concepts and programs can be regarded as a starting point from
which a comprehensive educational program can be developed.3 Authorities within
the educational system should further support the developments of educational
programs by establishing guidelines, providing resources such as standard text
books and materials (including not just learning material, but also necessary media
3 For examples of such teaching materials, see: http://unterrichtsmodule-bw.de/.

such as computers and other digital devices), and ensuring that appropriate curricula
are developed. Experts on online privacy and data protection need to be hired,
work as constant consultants, and offer in-service training for teachers. Relatedly,
professional organizations have to be founded to connect researchers, educational
authorities, teachers and parents, offer conferences and workshops, and establish
evaluation instruments in order to constantly improve related efforts.
Third, I encourage software developers and online service providers to think
about how they can provide education and information about online privacy and
data protection when designing products and applications. The results of the present
study suggest that it will be necessary to make external constraints and factors that
influence the perceived level of privacy more salient. As discussed above, one way
would be to implement features or nudges that raise people’s awareness about the
risks or consequences of their online behavior. I would not advocate a departure
from providing people fast and efficient ways of communication. Instead, I believe
that a successful instant messenger is one that allows both privacy protection and
effective communication—not one or the other. On the other hand, Sevignani (2016)
argues that we also need a general de-commodification of privacy: Services need to
be non-commercial rather than rooted in the surveillance-based advertising business
models of current platforms (p. 219). Role models could be platforms such as
the online encyclopedia Wikipedia (Firer-Blaess & Fuchs, 2014) or SNSs such as
Diaspora (Sevignani, 2015), or Ello (2016).
Fourth, I further encourage online service providers whose business models are
based on collecting, analyzing, or selling their users’ information to revisit their
company goals and reflect on how they align with principles such as appropriation,
consent, transparency, external control, and confidentiality (Grimm & Bräunlich,
2015). It is their duty to inform and explain the information flows and uses to their
clients and provide possibilities for users to give consent, or alternatively options
to opt out. I agree with the US Department of Health, Education and Welfare
(1973), which posited that “a record containing information about an individual
in identifiable form must, therefore, be governed by procedures that afford the
individual a right to participate in deciding what the content of the record will
be, and what disclosure and use will be made of the identifiable information in
it” (p. 40). I would also add that it must be the companies’ duty to propagate and
explain these procedures in a simple and digestible form to their clients.
Fifth, I advocate for greater political and financial support of research in this area.
Politicians have to acknowledge the necessity of increasing online privacy literacy
and thus provide the financial and structural means to conduct related research and
implement related educational systems and programs at all levels of society. Many
of the structural transformations outlined in the second point can only be established
with rigorous support from politicians and policymakers.
13.2.2 Fostering Political Deliberation
Recent discussions have focused on whether individuals should be held responsible

for their own privacy protection (e.g., Matzner, Masur, Ochs, & von Pape, 2016).
Even with increased online privacy literacy, individual data protection will simply
not be feasible in many instances—particularly protection against data collection
by online service providers (pp. 280–287). In light of this, advocating for more
online privacy literacy in order to support more individual privacy protection can
be regarded as a form of responsabilization, which have undesired effects such
as neglecting political responsibility, fostering further inequalities between users,
and generally asking too much of the individual (p. 303). Thus, I would argue
that data protection must become a collective and profoundly political endeavor
(Matzner et al., 2016, p. 303). As Solove (2008) emphatically noted, “privacy
involves not only individual control, but also the social regulation of information”
(p. 29). The Snowden revelations have brought us back to the fundamental questions
concerning the public-private distinction (cf. Sect. 3.1): To what extent are the state
and corporations allowed to interfere in the private sphere of citizens? How can
we protect ourselves against such interferences? Should we even have to protect
ourselves?
When individual control is no longer feasible and the environments in which
we communicate are provided by companies who want to collect as much data
as possible about us, political engagement and participation might be the only
way to change the status quo. Although fostering a form of do-it-yourself data
protection may indeed not be the ideal solution (Matzner et al., 2016; Trepte,
2016a), I nonetheless argue that increasing comprehensive online privacy literacy
will generally make people more aware of these threats and dynamics. Furthermore,
it will make individuals more motivated to reflect on and understand the processes
that led to these risks. It will provide citizens with the knowledge and reflection
capabilities to take up social responsibility. In the end, the individual might simply
recognize that his or her individual decisions affect society and that certain actions
(e.g., voting for a party that supports fair data regulation) can have a positive impact
on the structure of society and mitigate the prevailing unequal power structures
between global information companies and individual users (Rössler, 2001; Seubert,
2016). As noted by Rössler (2001), the notion of control in concepts of privacy can
also be understood as a democratically legitimized form of control (p. 137 and see
also control-based definitions of privacy in Sect. 3.1).
This type of political deliberation thus refers to people’s motivation to change the
status quo, vote for representatives who value privacy, and improve the regulation
of companies’ and institutions’ data use. The legal sciences have long investigated
the transformations of privacy and data protection and thus can offer solutions to
the existing weaknesses in the legislative system (for an overview, see, e.g., acatech,
2013; Gusy, Eichenhofer, & Schulte, 2016; Gutwirth, Leenes, & de Hert, 2015).
Social responsibility and the willingness to enforce such solutions can only be
elicited by increasing online privacy literacy in the many ways I tried to outline
in the previous section.
13.3 Conclusion
In this work, I have argued that we must take a situational perspective on privacy
and self-disclosure in order to understand them from a psychological point of view.
To provide a theoretical foundation for this claim, I have advanced the theory of
situational privacy and self-disclosure. Yet, as Solove (2008) noted, “[theories] are
not lifeless pristine abstractions but organic and dynamic beings. They are meant to
live, breathe and grow. Throughout their lifetimes, they will, it is hoped, be tested,
doubted, criticized, amended, supported, and reinterpreted” (p. ix). One day, they
might even be rejected. Nevertheless, a theory—however fallible it may be—may be
useful in addressing particular problems and gaining deeper understanding, which,
in turn, might facilitate the development of newer and more refined theories.
Empirical findings likewise never perfectly reflect the real world. Our statistical
models are based on predictions, and such predictions come with many assumptions
and uncertainties. Accordingly, they must be understood as general patterns, as
small insights into the complex mechanisms of the world, rendering certain events
(in this case a particular form of human behavior) more likely than others.
Nonetheless, collected data can be misleading. As human beings (and certainly
as researchers), we tend to think that we are better at predictions than we really
are. Even worse, we might see patterns where there is just noise. Nonetheless, by
collecting data and running models in order to test our assumptions, we may from
time to time find support for our theories and thus discover certain truths about the
world or about us, which again helps us to progress, to understand, and consequently
to collectively shape a different, hopefully better world.
With these considerations in mind, I believe that the proposed theory of
situational privacy and self-disclosure is a valuable approach for investigating the
complexities of privacy and self-disclosure in varying situations and particularly in
mediated or networked environments. Applied to the context of smartphone-based
communication, the theory has proven to be useful for investigating a variety of
antecedents of both pre-situational preventive privacy regulation behaviors and situ-
ational self-disclosure processes. A novel multi-method approach combining survey,
tracking and experience sampling methods was found to be an ideal approach
towards collecting empirical data to test the assumptions of the theory. Overall, the
findings suggest the following: Vertical privacy concerns and online privacy literacy
are important predictors of both types of preventive privacy regulation behaviors,
yet are less powerful in explaining situational self-disclosure. Instead, particularly
internal personal factors and interpersonal environmental factors were able to
predict the depth of self-disclosure in varying situations. Individuals thus performed
deeper levels of self-disclosure when they felt the need to disclose themselves, prior
interactions necessitated a reaction, the number of recipients was small, and they
perceived them as trustworthy, psychologically close, similar, and central to their
everyday lives. Neither external environmental factors (e.g., level of anonymity),
nor non-situational personal factors (e.g., privacy concerns) were significantly
correlated with depth of self-disclosure. However, interaction analyses showed that
13.3 Conclusion 345
vertical privacy concerns do have an influence on self-disclosure behavior among

people with higher privacy literacy. That being said, the results showed that only a
few people have that much privacy literacy. People are thus generally unaware of
the vertical privacy threats arising from environmental characteristics (e.g., the level
of content accessibility to third parties). In light of this, I advocate for more research
aimed at understanding the role of online privacy literacy. I further recommend the
development of effective education programs in order to increase online privacy
literacy both among individuals and on a societal level.
Appendix A
Additional Tables and Figures to Chap. 9
See Tables A.1, A.2, A.3, A.4, and A.5.
Table A.1 Psychometric properties of the pre-study items measuring depth of self-disclosure
(Bazarova, 2012)
Item M SD Range Skew. Kurt. λ
How would you rate the information that you
have shared with your Facebook friends/this
person? (α = 0.83, ω = 0.84, AVE = 0.57)
Not at all intimate–very intimate 2.20 1.54 1–7 1.10 0.07 0.79
Not at all private–very private 3.12 1.82 1–7 0.46 −0.89 0.87
Not at all personal–very personal 3.51 1.83 1–7 0.21 −1.19 0.67
Not at all confidential–very confidential 2.36 1.59 1–7 0.96 −0.19 0.67
Note: M = Mean, SD = Standard deviation, Skew. = Skewness, Kurt. = Kurtosis, λ = Factor
loadings in the confirmatory factor analysis. All items were measured on a 7-point scale (e.g., in
the case of the first item: 1 = not all private to 7 = very private)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-78884-5
Table A.2 Psychometric properties of the pre-study items measuring online privacy concerns
348

How concerned are you about. . .
Factor 1: Concerns about providers
(α = 0.86, ω = 0.86, AVE = 0.67)
. . . website providers (e.g., Facebook, Google,. . . ) recording and using your surfing behavior? 3.64 1.03 1–5 −0.54 −0.46 0.79
. . . website providers (e.g., Facebook, Google. . . ) sharing your data with unknown third parties? 4.02 0.93 1–5 −0.89 0.30 0.80
. . . website providers (e.g., Facebook, Google. . . ) tracking your online behavior and thereby getting information 3.87 1.01 1–5 −0.65 −0.50 0.86
about you?
Factor 2: Concern about institutions
(α = 0.90, ω = 0.90, AVE = 0.76)
. . . institutions, public agencies, or intelligence services monitoring your online communication? 3.49 1.22 1–5 −0.31 −1.05 0.83
. . . not having insight into what institutions, public agencies, or intelligence services do with your data? 3.94 1.06 1–5 −0.88 0.11 0.87
. . . institutions, public agencies, or intelligence services collecting and analyzing the data that you share on the 3.70 1.11 1–5 −0.59 −0.59 0.92
Internet?
Factor 3: Concerns about other users
(α = 0.81, ω = 0.81, AVE = 0.68)
. . . other people (e.g., employer, acquaintances, neighbours. . . ) getting information about you without your 3.30 1.20 1–5 −0.04 −1.19 0.73
consent?
. . . other people (e.g., employer, acquaintances, neighbours. . . ) sharing information about you with other people 3.21 1.10 1–5 0.05 −1.10 0.92
without your consent?
. . . other people posting information about you (e.g., photos, address. . . ) on the Internet without your consent? 3.28 1.17 1–5 −0.02 −1.20 0.76
Factor 4: Concerns about identity theft
(α = 0.66, ω = 0.66, AVE = 0.49)
. . . people on the Internet might not being who they claim to be? 2.82 1.10 1–5 0.24 −0.65 0.69
. . . another person stealing and using your identity on the Internet? 2.59 1.22 1–5 0.35 −0.94 0.72
Note: M = Mean, SD = Standard deviation, Skew. = Skewness, Kurt. = Kurtosis, λ = Factor loadings in the confirmatory factor analysis. All items were
measured on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 = not at all concerned to 5 = very concerned
A Additional Tables and Figures to Chap. 9
A Additional Tables and Figures to Chap. 9 349
Table A.3 Psychometric properties of the pre-study items measuring need to disclose
Item M SD Range Skew. Kurt.
When I shared the post/message. . .
. . . I had a strong need to disclose something. 2.93 1.37 1–5 −0.13 −1.36
. . . I didn’t have to disclose something (reversed). 3.07 1.36 1–5 0.10 −1.32
. . . I desired to communicate with other people. 2.66 1.35 1–5 0.17 −1.32
. . . I didn’t have necessarily have a desire to say 3.36 1.30 1–5 −0.19 −1.21
something (reversed).
In general, my need to disclose something was. . . 50.60 27.66 1–101 −0.28 −1.14
Note: M = Mean, SD = Standard deviation, Skew. = Skewness, Kurt. = Kurtosis. All items were
measured on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree, except for
the last generic item which was measured on a scale ranging from 1 = very low to 7 = very high
Table A.4 Psychometric properties of the pre-study items measuring interpersonal trust
(Larzelere & Huston, 1980)
Overall scale
(α = 0.96, ω = 0.96, AVE = 0.82)
My Facebook friends/this person are/is 3.54 1.61 1–5 −1.05 0.14
primarily interested in their/his/her own welfare
(reversed).*
There are times when my Facebook friends/this 3.43 1.64 1–5 −0.82 −0.41
person cannot be trusted (reversed).*
My Facebook friends/this person are/is always 3.04 1.52 1–5 −0.60 −0.55 0.94
honest and truthful.
I feel that I can trust my Facebook friends/this 2.91 1.62 1–5 −0.31 −1.01 0.94
person completely.
My Facebook friends/this person keep/keeps 3.09 1.48 1–5 −0.69 −0.16 0.89
their/his/her promises.
I feel that my Facebook friends/this person 3.70 1.57 1–5 −1.23 0.59
do/does not show me enough consideration
(reversed).*
My Facebook friends/this person treat/treats me 3.42 1.52 1–5 −1.02 0.18 0.82
fairly and justly.
I feel that my Facebook friends/this person can 3.21 1.60 1–5 −0.65 −0.64 0.92
be counted on to help me.
Generic item
How much do you trust your Facebook 54.88 37.80 1–101 −0.30 −1.40
friends/this person?
loadings in the confirmatory factor analysis. All items were measured on a 5-point scale ranging
from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree, except for the generic item which was measured
on a slider ranging from 1 = not at all to 101 = very much
* Removed during factor analysis due to low factor loading resulting from reversed coding
350 A Additional Tables and Figures to Chap. 9
Table A.5 Psychometric properties of the pre-study items measuring relational closeness (Vange-
listi & Caughlin, 1997)
Factor 1: Psychological closeness
(α = 0.93, ω = 0.93, AVE = 0.77)
I feel close to my Facebook friends/this 2.83 1.62 1–5 −0.20 −1.14 0.85
person.
I like my Facebook friends/this person. 3.71 1.46 1–5 −1.43 1.25 0.86
My Facebook friends’/this person’s opinion 2.96 1.57 1–5 −0.40 −1.00 0.91
is important to me.
My Facebook friends/this person are/is 3.26 1.53 1–5 −0.73 −0.32 0.89
important to me.
Factor 2: Similarity
(α = 0.94, ω = 0.94, AVE = 0.75)
My Facebook friends/this person and I like 2.88 1.36 1–5 −0.52 −0.40 0.89
a lot of the same things.
My Facebook friends/this person and I share 2.77 1.36 1–5 −0.38 −0.52 0.93
a lot of the same attitudes about things.
My Facebook friends/this person and I have 3.04 1.40 1–5 −0.65 −0.25 0.90
very different values (reversed).
My Facebook friends/this person and I are 2.66 1.34 1–5 −0.28 −0.61 0.72
very similar.
My Facebook friends/this person and I have 2.71 1.35 1–5 −0.40 −0.65 0.90
a similar outlook on life.
Factor 3: Everyday centrality
(α = 0.93, ω = 0.93, AVE = 0.82)
I see my Facebook friends/this person very 2.74 1.46 1–5 −0.10 −0.77 0.92
often.
My Facebook friends/this person are/is 2.87 1.51 1–5 −0.21 −0.88 0.92
important in my daily life.
I talk very often with my Facebook 2.92 1.56 1–5 −0.23 −0.93 0.87
friends/this person.
Generic items
How much do you like your Facebook 67.53 31.88 1–101 −1.08 0.09
friends/this person?
How similar are/is your Facebook 45.57 32.18 1–101 −0.22 −1.35
friends/this person to you?
How often are you in contact with your 51.11 35.86 1–101 −0.11 −1.38
Facebook friends/this person?
from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree, except for the generic items, for which the
answers ranged from 1 to 101 and were formulated as appropriate responses to the respective
questions (e.g., in the case of the first question: 1 = not very much to 101 = very much)
Appendix B
Additional Tables and Figures to
Chap. 10
See Tables B.1, B.2, B.3, B.4, B.5, B.6, B.7, and B.8; Figs. B.1, B.2, and B.3.
Table B.1 Psychometric properties of items measuring smartphone affinity and online privacy
literacy in the pre-survey
Smartphone affinity (Lee, Karnowski, von Pape, and Cionea, 2016)
(α = 0.85, ω = 0.86, AVE = 0.61)
When I forget my cellphone at 3.49 1.85 1–7 0.22 −1.13 0.76
home, I feel incomplete.
My cellphone is an important part 4.15 1.79 1–7 −0.21 −1.03 0.88
of me.
My cellphone is an extension of 3.95 1.74 1–7 −0.01 −1.00 0.78
me.
I like to use my cellphone. 5.18 1.35 1–7 −0.82 0.56 0.66
Subjective online privacy literacy
(α = 0.91, ω = 0.92, AVE = 0.75)
I am able to understand and 4.68 1.41 1–7 −0.49 −0.27 0.83
evaluate questions about data
protection and privacy on the
Internet.
I feel like I understand the most 4.60 1.43 1–7 −0.49 −0.38 0.91
important things related to data
protection.
I know a lot about data protection 4.32 1.46 1–7 −0.22 −0.62 0.91
and online privacy.
I feel like I know more about 4.11 1.51 1–7 −0.10 −0.53 0.80
data protection and privacy on the
Internet than most other people.
from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-78884-5
352
Table B.2 Psychometric properties of personality items measured in the pre-survey

Gregariousness (Costa & McCrae, 1992b)
(α = 0.71, ω = 0.72, AVE = 0.40)
I usually prefer to do things alone (reversed). 3.86 1.48 1–7 0.13 −0.79 0.61
I shy away from crowds of people (reversed). 3.97 1.67 1–7 0.08 −0.95 0.68
I like to have a lot of people around me. 3.83 1.45 1–7 0.07 −0.62 0.80
I’d rather vacation at a popular beach than an isolated cabin in the woods. 3.14 1.64 1–7 0.46 −0.60 0.42
Deliberation (Costa & McCrae, 1992b)
(α = 0.65, ω = 0.66, AVE = 0.34)
Over the years I’ve done some pretty stupid things (reversed). 3.64 1.57 1–7 0.18 −0.78 0.34
I always consider the consequences before I take action. 5.14 1.16 1–7 −0.59 0.36 0.68
I often do things on the spur of the moment (reversed). 4.30 1.36 1–7 −0.24 −0.58 0.53
I rarely make hasty decisions. 4.86 1.29 1–7 −0.50 −0.25 0.81
measured on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree
B Additional Tables and Figures to Chap. 10
Table B.3 Psychometric properties of the items measuring online privacy concerns in the pre-survey
How concerned are you about. . .
Second-order factor 1: Vertical privacy concerns
Factor 1a: . . . about website providers
(α = 0.87, ω = 0.87, AVE = 0.70) 0.87a
. . . website or app providers recording and using your surfing behavior? 5.02 1.57 1–7 −0.57 −0.51 0.82
. . . website or app providers sharing your data with unknown third parties? 5.54 1.39 1–7 −0.93 0.31 0.79
. . . website or app providers tracking your online behavior and thereby getting 5.20 1.48 1–7 −0.72 −0.16 0.89
information about you?
Factor 1b: . . . about institutions
(α = 0.90, ω = 0.90, AVE = 0.76) 0.88a

. . . institutions, public agencies, or intelligence services monitoring your online 4.79 1.69 1–7 −0.38 −0.91 0.87
communication?
. . . not having insight into what institutions, public agencies, or intelligence services 5.22 1.63 1–7 −0.71 −0.45 0.84
do with your data?
. . . institutions, public agencies, or intelligence services collecting and analyzing the 4.88 1.68 1–7 −0.43 −0.87 0.90
data that you share on the Internet?
Second-order factor 2: Horizontal privacy concerns
Factor 2a: . . . about information access
(α = 0.86, ω = 0.85, AVE = 0.66) 0.87a
. . . other people getting information about you without your consent? 4.63 1.55 1–7 −0.28 −0.78 0.82
. . . other people finding information about you online? 4.04 1.56 1–7 0.08 −0.76 0.77
. . . other people search information spying on you on the Internet? 4.12 1.61 1–7 0.09 −0.83 0.85
353
354
Table B.3 (Continued)

Factor 2b: . . . about information sharing
(α = 0.91, ω = 0.91, AVE = 0.78) 0.94a
. . . other people spreading information about you without your knowledge? 4.67 1.63 1–7 −0.27 −0.86 0.90
. . . other people sharing information about you (e.g., photos, address, contact 4.55 1.60 1–7 −0.23 −0.85 0.86
information. . . ) with other people without your consent?
. . . other people publishing information about you (e.g., photos, address, contact 4.63 1.67 1–7 −0.22 −0.97 0.89
information. . . ) on the Internet
Factor 2c: . . . about identity theft
(α = 0.83, ω = 0.87, AVE = 0.69) 0.83a
. . . people on the Internet not being who the claim to be? 4.35 1.65 1–7 −0.11 −0.87 0.58
. . . an unknown person claiming to be you on the Internet? 4.39 1.84 1–7 −0.07 −1.18 0.91
. . . someone misusing your identity on the Internet? 4.71 1.75 1–7 −0.30 −1.00 0.92
measured on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 = not at all concerned to 7 = very concerned
a Second order factor loadings
B Additional Tables and Figures to Chap. 10 355
Table B.4 Antecedents of IM use: overview of all regression coefficients

95% CI
b se Lower Upper p β
Research Question 1a
WhatsApp ← Gregariousness 0.11 0.09 −0.07 0.29 0.221
Skype ← Gregariousness 0.14 0.06 0.03 0.25 0.015
Facebook Messenger ← Gregariousness 0.20 0.06 0.08 0.31 <0.001
Threema ← Gregariousness −0.02 0.08 −0.18 0.13 0.751
Telegram ← Gregariousness −0.05 0.09 −0.22 0.12 0.559
Snapchat ← Gregariousness 0.18 0.10 −0.02 0.38 0.071
Google Hangout ← Gregariousness −0.12 0.14 −0.40 0.15 0.376
Signal ← Gregariousness −0.05 0.14 −0.32 0.22 0.718
WhatsApp ← Deliberation −0.15 0.20 −0.55 0.24 0.442
Skype ← Deliberation −0.20 0.12 −0.44 0.03 0.092
Facebook Messenger ← Deliberation −0.09 0.11 −0.31 0.13 0.424
Threema ← Deliberation 0.01 0.15 −0.29 0.31 0.944
Telegram ← Deliberation −0.32 0.16 −0.63 −0.01 0.046
Snapchat ← Deliberation −0.23 0.20 −0.61 0.15 0.240
Google Hangout ← Deliberation 0.18 0.35 −0.51 0.87 0.612
Signal ← Deliberation 0.29 0.33 −0.36 0.95 0.384
WhatsApp ← Online priv. lit. −0.20 0.05 −0.30 −0.09 <0.001
Skype ← Online priv. lit. 0.09 0.04 0.01 0.17 0.020
Facebook Messenger ← Online priv. lit. 0.02 0.04 −0.05 0.10 0.543
Threema ← Online priv. lit. 0.23 0.05 0.13 0.33 <0.001
Telegram ← Online priv. lit. 0.06 0.06 −0.06 0.17 0.314
Snapchat ← Online priv. lit. 0.11 0.08 −0.05 0.27 0.191
Google Hangout ← Online priv. lit. 0.29 0.08 0.14 0.44 <0.001
Signal ← Online priv. lit. 0.31 0.08 0.14 0.47 <0.001
WhatsApp ← Vertical priv. conc. −0.28 0.09 −0.45 −0.11 0.001
Skype ← Vertical priv. conc. 0.01 0.06 −0.10 0.12 0.905
Facebook Messenger ← Vertical priv. conc. −0.32 0.06 −0.42 −0.21 <0.001
Threema ← Vertical priv. conc. 0.28 0.08 0.13 0.42 <0.001
Telegram ← Vertical priv. conc. 0.22 0.11 0.01 0.43 <0.039
Snapchat ← Vertical priv. conc. −0.11 0.12 −0.35 0.13 0.374
Google Hangout ← Vertical priv. conc. 0.13 0.13 −0.12 0.37 0.321
Signal ← Vertical priv. conc. 0.37 0.15 0.08 0.66 0.012
WhatsApp ← Horizontal priv. conc. 0.11 0.07 −0.04 0.26 0.140
Skype ← Horizontal priv. conc. −0.03 0.05 −0.13 0.06 0.472
Facebook Messenger ← Horizontal priv. conc. 0.16 0.05 0.07 0.26 0.001
(continued)
356 B Additional Tables and Figures to Chap. 10

95% CI
Threema ← Horizontal priv. conc. −0.07 0.07 −0.20 0.06 0.297
Telegram ← Horizontal priv. conc. −0.18 0.09 −0.35 −0.01 0.033
Snapchat ← Horizontal priv. conc. 0.12 0.11 −0.09 0.33 0.276
Google Hangout ← Horizontal priv. conc. −0.04 0.11 −0.26 0.18 0.749
Signal ← Horizontal priv. conc. −0.16 0.13 −0.42 0.09 0.205
Hypotheses 1a and 1b
Vertical priv. conc. ← Online priv. lit. 0.07 0.03 0.00 0.13 0.046 0.07
Horizontal priv. conc. ← Online priv. lit. −0.07 0.04 −0.14 0.00 0.060 −.06
Correlations
Vertical priv. conc. ↔ Horizontal priv. conc. 0.72 0.08 0.56 0.87 <0.001 0.58
Online priv. lit. ↔ Deliberation 0.08 0.02 0.04 0.13 <0.001 0.17
Online priv. lit. ↔ Gregariousness −0.07 0.04 −0.14 0.01 0.069 −0.07
Deliberation ↔ Gregariousness −0.07 0.02 −0.11 −0.03 <0.001 −0.19
Note: Whenever the outcome variable is binary, b represents probit coefficients. WLSMV; χ 2 (489)
= 730.19, p < 0.001; CFI = 0.95; TLI = 0.94; RMSEA = 0.02, 90% CI [0.02, 0.03]; WRMR =
0.96, n = 970
Table B.5 Antecedents of SNS use: overview of all regression coefficients

95% CI
Facebook use← Gregariousness 0.21 0.05 0.12 0.30 <0.001
Google+ use ← Gregariousness 0.04 0.04 −0.05 0.13 0.372
StudiVZ use ← Gregariousness 0.17 0.07 0.03 0.32 0.021
MeinVZ use ← Gregariousness 0.14 0.11 −0.08 0.35 0.214
Stayfriends use ← Gregariousness −0.05 0.06 −0.16 0.07 0.403
Instagram use ← Gregariousness 0.10 0.06 −0.01 0.21 0.071
Twitter use ← Gregariousness 0.00 0.05 −0.09 0.10 0.962
Facebook use ← Deliberation −0.17 0.09 −0.34 0.00 0.056
Google+ use ← Deliberation −0.25 0.08 −0.41 −0.08 0.003
StudiVZ use ← Deliberation 0.24 0.14 −0.03 0.50 0.081
MeinVZ use ← Deliberation 0.17 0.20 −0.22 0.56 0.399
Stayfriends use ← Deliberation −0.18 0.10 −0.38 0.03 0.091
Instagram use ← Deliberation −0.19 0.10 −0.38 0.01 0.069
Twitter use ← Deliberation −0.16 0.09 −0.34 0.02 0.078
Facebook use ← Online priv. lit. 0.01 0.03 −0.05 0.07 0.739
Google+ use ← Online priv. lit. 0.05 0.03 −0.01 0.11 0.119
StudiVZ use ← Online priv. lit. 0.00 0.05 −0.09 0.09 0.977
MeinVZ use ← Online priv. lit. 0.12 0.07 −0.02 0.26 0.089
Stayfriends use ← Online priv. lit. 0.13 0.04 0.05 0.21 0.002
Instagram use ← Online priv. lit. 0.12 0.04 0.05 0.20 0.002
Twitter use ← Online priv. lit. 0.25 0.03 0.18 0.31 <0.001
Facebook use ← Vertical priv. conc. −0.25 0.05 −0.35 −0.16 <0.001
Google+ use ← Vertical priv. conc. −0.12 0.05 −0.22 −0.03 0.008
StudiVZ use ← Vertical priv. conc. 0.01 0.07 −0.12 0.15 0.843
MeinVZ use ← Vertical priv. conc. −0.14 0.07 −0.29 0.00 0.052
Stayfriends use ← Vertical priv. conc. −0.02 0.06 −0.13 0.10 0.770
Instagram use ← Vertical priv. conc. −0.15 0.06 −0.27 −0.03 0.017
Twitter use ← Vertical priv. conc. −0.02 0.05 −0.12 0.09 0.732
Facebook use ← Horizontal priv. conc. 0.01 0.04 −0.06 0.09 0.762
Google+ use ← Horizontal priv. conc. 0.14 0.04 0.07 0.22 <0.001
StudiVZ use ← Horizontal priv. conc. −0.04 0.06 −0.15 0.08 0.537
MeinVZ use ← Horizontal priv. conc. 0.08 0.07 −0.05 0.21 0.242
Stayfriends use ← Horizontal priv. conc. 0.05 0.05 −0.05 0.14 0.328
(continued)

95% CI
Instagram use ← Horizontal priv. conc. 0.02 0.05 −0.08 0.11 0.756
Twitter use ← Horizontal priv. conc. −0.10 0.04 −0.18 −0.02 0.019
Horizontal priv. conc. ← Online priv. lit. −0.08 0.03 −0.14 −0.02 0.009 −0.07
Correlations
Vertical priv. conc. ↔ Horizontal priv. 0.74 0.06 0.62 0.87 <0.001 0.58
conc.
1.09, n = 1460
Table B.6 Antecedents of using certain privacy settings and strategies on email services: overview
of all regression coefficients
95% CI
Research Question 1b
Pseudonymity ← Gregariousness −0.13 0.05 −0.23 −0.02 0.015
End-to-end encryption ← Gregarious- 0.02 0.06 −0.09 0.13 0.729
ness
Pseudonymity ← Deliberation −0.01 0.10 −0.20 0.19 0.942
End-to-end encryption ← Deliberation −0.11 0.11 −0.32 0.10 0.299
Pseudonymity ← Online priv. lit. 0.04 0.04 −0.04 0.11 0.335
End-to-end encryption ← Online priv. 0.42 0.03 0.35 0.48 <0.001
lit.
Pseudonymity ← Vertical priv. conc. 0.06 0.06 −0.05 0.18 0.280
End-to-end encryption ← Vertical priv. 0.08 0.06 −0.04 0.19 0.197
conc.
Pseudonymity ← Horizontal priv. conc. −0.03 0.05 −0.12 0.06 0.449
End-to-end encryption ← Horizontal −0.04 0.05 −0.13 0.06 0.476
priv. conc.
Horizontal priv. conc. ← Online priv. −0.06 0.03 −0.12 0.00 0.042 −0.06
lit.
Correlations
conc.
Online priv. lit. ↔ Deliberation 0.10 0.02 0.06 0.14 0.001 0.18
1.15, n = 1440
Table B.7 Antecedents of using certain privacy settings and strategies on WhatsApp: overview of
all regression coefficients
95% CI
Visual anonymity ← Gregariousness −0.25 0.06 −0.37 −0.14 <0.001
Pseudonymity ← Gregariousness 0.00 0.06 −0.12 0.12 0.994
Visual anonymity ←Deliberation −0.08 0.11 −0.30 0.14 0.471
Pseudonymity ← Deliberation −0.23 0.11 −0.46 −0.01 0.043
Visual anonymity ← Online priv. lit. 0.02 0.04 −0.06 0.10 0.659
Pseudonymity ← Online priv. lit. 0.12 0.04 0.04 0.21 0.004
Visual anonymity ← Vertical priv. concerns 0.26 0.06 0.14 0.38 <0.001
Pseudonymity ← Vertical priv. conc. 0.06 0.06 −0.07 0.19 0.353
Visual anonymity ← Horizontal priv. conc. −0.12 0.05 −0.22 −0.02 0.017
Vertical priv. conc. ← Online priv. lit. 0.03 0.03 −0.04 0.10 0.419 0.03
Horizontal priv. conc. ← Online priv. lit. −0.11 0.04 −0.19 −0.03 0.004 −0.10
Correlations
conc.
1.00, n = 871
Table B.8 Antecedents of using certain privacy settings and strategies on Facebook: overview of
all regression coefficients
95% CI
Visual anonymity ← Gregariousness −0.26 0.06 −0.38 −0.14 <0.001
Pseudonymity ← Gregariousness 0.09 0.06 −0.03 0.21 0.124
Using friend lists ← Gregariousness 0.02 0.06 −0.09 0.13 0.723
Limiting access ← Gregariousness 0.12 0.08 −0.04 0.27 0.144
Visual anonymity ← Deliberation −0.01 0.11 −0.23 0.20 0.896
Pseudonymity ← Deliberation −0.25 0.11 −0.48 −0.03 0.027
Using friend lists ← Deliberation 0.14 0.11 −0.07 0.36 0.185
Limiting access ← Deliberation 0.10 0.13 −0.14 0.35 0.404
Visual anonymity ← Online priv. lit. 0.08 0.04 0.00 0.15 0.054
Pseudonymity ← Online priv. lit. −0.03 0.04 −0.11 0.06 0.543
Using friend lists ← Online priv. lit. −0.08 0.04 −0.15 0.00 0.053
Limiting access ← Online priv. lit. 0.04 0.04 −0.04 0.12 0.328
Visual anonymity ← Vertical priv. conc. 0.25 0.06 0.14 0.36 <0.001
Pseudonymity ← Vertical priv. conc. 0.13 0.06 0.02 0.25 0.026
Using friend lists ← Vertical priv. conc. −0.05 0.06 −0.16 0.07 0.434
Limiting access ← Vertical priv. conc. 0.10 0.06 −0.01 0.22 0.084
Visual anonymity ← Horizontal priv. −0.01 0.05 −0.10 0.08 0.825
conc.
Using friend lists ← Horizontal priv. 0.06 0.05 −0.03 0.16 0.196
conc.
Limiting access ← Horizontal priv. −0.05 0.06 −0.16 0.06 0.367
conc.
Horizontal priv. conc. ← Online priv. −0.10 0.04 −0.18 −0.03 0.007 −0.09
lit.
Correlations
conc.
Online priv. lit. ↔ Gregariousness −0.08 0.02 −0.13 −0.04 <0.001 −0.20
1.02, n = 922
.55
Vertical Horizontal
privacy privacy
concerns concerns
.87 .88 .87 .94 .83
1a 1b 2a 2b 2c
.82 .79 .89 .87 .84 .90 .82 .77 .85 .90 .86 .89 .58 .91 .92
Item 01
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Item 14
Item 15
Fig. B.1 Confirmatory factor analysis of the online privacy concerns scale. Note: Robust maxi-
mum likelihood estimation: χ 2 (84) = 497.08, p <0.001; CFI = 0.97; TLI = 0.96; RMSEA = 0.06,
90% CI [0.05, 0.06]. Numbers represent standardized factor loadings
10.0
Depth of self−disclosure
7.5 30
5.0 20
Frequency
2.5
10
0.0
0
−6 −4 −2 0 2 4 −0.5 0.0 0.5
Interpersonal assessment Random effects distribution
Fig. B.2 Random slopes and random effect distribution of the effect of interpersonal assessment
on depth of self-disclosure
40
7.5
Depth of self−Disclosure
30
Frequency
5.0
20
2.5
10
0.0 0
0 1 −1.5 −1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
Pseudonymity Random effect distribution
Fig. B.3 Random slopes and random effect distribution of the effect of pseudonymity on depth of
self-disclosure
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Philipp K.

Situational Privacy and

ISBN 978-3-319-78883-8 ISBN 978-3-319-78884-5 (eBook)

Library of Congress Control Number: 2018943236

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2019

Printed on acid-free paper

The following book presents my attempt to rationalize one major argument: in

Stuttgart, Germany Philipp K. Masur

Part I The Theory of Situational Privacy and Self-Disclosure

3.2.3 Privacy Regulation Behavior .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

6.3 Further Considerations and Implications .. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125

Part II Empirical Investigation of Smartphone-Based

Part III Implications and Future Perspectives

A Additional Tables and Figures to Chap. 9 . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 347

B Additional Tables and Figures to Chap. 10 . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 351

Processes of revealing and concealing private information are inherently connected

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2019 1

disclosing private information. In a similar way, we could investigate other person-

1.1 A Situational Perspective

All behavioral theories in communication science and psychology more or less

context-dependent (Acquisti et al., 2015; Dienlin, 2015; Nissenbaum, 2010; Smith

and self-disclosure has been acknowledged in the theoretical literature, a consistent

1.2 Overall Research Goals

I believe a comprehensive investigation of this concept may help to understand

The impact of media on social relationships, communication, and other aspects of

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2019 13

2.1 Technical Properties of Online Communication

What characterizes online communication? And to what extent does it differ

2.1.1 Digital Information

Replicability Because digital information is simply combinations of binary code,

2.1.2 Networked Environments

These five properties allow information to be transmitted electronically and, in turn,

2. Hypertextual perspective. We can also look at the underlying structures of the

2.2 Characteristics of Online Communication

Next to the technical aspects of online communication, we should consider how

tics of online communication (also known as computer-mediated communication

2.2.1 Hyperpersonal Interaction

2.2.2 Permanently Online and Permanently Connected

2.2.3 Multimodal Communication Practices

A second important aspect of contemporary online communication is its multimodal

2.3 Privacy-Related Dynamics in Networked Environments

As early as 1985, Joshua Meyrowitz proclaimed with regard to the impact of

2.3.1 Horizontal Dynamics

Horizontal dynamics refer to interactions between human beings. In traditional

2.3.1.1 Scalability of Information

Unlike in offline contexts, information shared within networked environments may

distribution both by increasing the accessibility of the original content and by

2.3.1.2 Unprecedented Convergence of Social Contexts

In an attempt to theorize the new electronic media landscape at the time,

2.3.1.3 Blurring of Public and Private Spheres

An unavoidable consequences of the context collapse, and also of the architecture

2.3.2 Vertical Dynamics

2.3.2.1 Commodification of Information

Webster (2000) argued that “prioritizing technology as the centre-piece of change”

2.3.2.2 Unconscious Manipulation and Malleability

Lately, Chambers (2017) has noted that we may currently be witnessing “a

2.3.2.3 Data Mining and Ubiquitous Surveillance

The unprecedented proliferation of big data-processing technologies and the accu-

technology provides governments, public agencies, and intelligence services with

2.3.3 Preliminary Summary

Looking at the impact of new communication and information technologies on

2. Due to these properties of digital information, online communication envi-

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2019 33