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IJRDM
33,7 The human resource management
practice of retail branding
An ethnography within Oxfam Trading
514 Division
Stéphane J.G. Girod
Saı̈d Business School and Templeton College, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK

Abstract
Purpose – While the charity retail literature emphasizes the richness of human resource practices
among charity retailers, it rarely makes the link between these practices and their interest for
establishing charity retailers’ brands. Simultaneously, while the retail branding literature increasingly
emphasizes the central role of human resource practices for retail branding, it rarely explains how
retailers should conduct such practices. The purpose of this study is to test the recent model proposed
by Burt and Sparks in 2002 (the “fifth generation of retail branding”) which proposes that a retail
brand depends on the alignment between a retailer’s substance (vision and culture) and its perceived
image by customers.
Design/methodology/approach – The research is based on an ethnographic study conducted
within the Oxfam Trading Division, GB from October to December 2002.
Findings – The study supports the Burt and Spark’s model and makes explicit the practice of human
resource for branding. The study demonstrates that it was the alignment between the vision of
Oxfam’s top management and its new customer-oriented culture, two elements of its core substance
mediated to customers by store employees, which has enabled an improved customers’ perception of
the brand. The study also seeks to elaborate upon the Burt and Spark’s model by specifying an
ascending feedback loop starting from customers’ perception of Oxfam brand and enabling the
creation of a suitable culture and vision again mediated by store employees.
Research limitations/implications – New research should explore whether and how retailers
create synergies between human resource and marketing functions to sustain their brand image.
Practical implications – If the adoption of business practices by charity retailers is often discussed,
this study highlights that commercial retailers could usefully transfer human resource best practices
from leading charity retailers to develop their retail brand.
Originality/value – The paper is of value to commercial retailers.
Keywords Charities, Human resource management, Retailers
Paper type Research paper

1. Introduction
The increasing amount of publications on the charity retail sector over the last decade
(Broadbridge and Horne, 1994; Fox, 1998; Horne and Broadbridge, 1995) has provided
one element of the underpinning of the not-for-profit retail sector institutionalization in
the British retail landscape. However, whilst these studies have stressed the richness

International Journal of Retail &
Distribution Management
Vol. 33 No. 7, 2005
pp. 514-530
q Emerald Group Publishing Limited
0959-0552
DOI 10.1108/09590550510605587
A previous version of this paper was presented at the 8th European Conference on Retailing and
Commercial Distribution, London 2004. The author particularly thanks Jonathan Reynolds for
his illuminating comments, Tony Kent, Steve Woolgar, Ann Webb and her team at Oxfam
Trading Division’s HR department for their open and enthusiastic welcome, and the Oxford
Broad Street Shop staff for their encouragements.
and attractiveness of human resource (HR) management in some of charity retail Human resource
chains, such as volunteer management, the relationship between shops and head office, management
and the link with local communities, none has explicitly made the link between HR
practices and retail branding strategy. Contemporaneously, in the corporate branding practice
literature and in the mainstream retail literature (for profit-oriented), there has been an
increasing amount of discussion of retail branding practices stressing the importance
of HR and culture to build and sustain a retail brand (Harris and Ogbonna, 2000; Hatch 515
and Schultz, 2001). A very promising conceptual framework in this emerging direction
has been recently developed by Burt and Sparks: the “fifth generation of branding
strategy” (Burt and Sparks, 2002) which is applied in this research in the charity retail
environment. However, as highlighted by the later authors who stressed that “it is
essential to think about one of the key dimensions of corporate branding, namely
people” (p. 209), the main challenge confronted by retailers, namely how to articulate
entrepreneurial HR practices to craft a successful branding strategy, is still
under-researched. So whilst these studies increasingly acknowledge the importance of
personnel for branding strategy, they generally fail to develop some of the practical
implications of developing an appropriate HR policy. By drawing on a single case
study at Oxfam Trading Division, the holding body of the leading and oldest charity
retailer in the UK, this article seeks to bridge the gap between the two streams of the
retail literature. It shows how the Division, which was on the verge of bankruptcy in
1999, has resuscitated its retail brand by developing new and dynamic HR practices.
This link also seems to hold for the charity sector. Simultaneously, the case study
shows how open and multifaceted HR practices such as those used at Oxfam, could
serve as best practice and learning opportunities for the for-profit retail sector, casting
a renewed light on how retailers in general can link HR practices and branding
strategy. Indeed, this case study of a spectacular but not widely known turnaround
illustrates how an innovative HR policy can strengthen a retailer’s brand viewed as one
of its valuable, non-imitable and rare resources (Barney, 1991), and a crucial source of
competitive advantage. Finally, from a theoretical perspective, the case study
contributes to the retail branding literature by complementing the Burt and Sparks
framework with feedback relationships between image, culture and vision.
One explanation of the paucity of research in this area of branding development and
practice is that such studies require a specific research design, mostly based on
in-depth case studies and preferably on ethnographic research (Hammersley and
Atkinson, 1995; Silverman, 1973). Such studies necessarily involve in-depth access to
the chosen company and this may often prove an insuperable hurdle. Besides some
relatively easier access conditions to charity retailers than to much more secretive
grocery or other general merchandise retailers, it was precisely also for the opportunity
to study to what extent for-profit and not-for-profit analyses on retail branding overlap
and cross fertilize each other that Oxfam was chosen as a setting. Indeed, it could be
suggested that charity-retail is limited in its interest to for-profit retailers but in the
context of the increasing professionalization of charity retail (Broadbridge and
Parsons, 2003; Kelleben and McLaren, 1996; Sogge, 1996), it was rather hypothesized
that much could also be learnt from charity retailers by other retailers.
The paper is written as a dynamic case study, based on primary data gathered
during three months of participant-observation conducted both at Oxfam headquarters
and at the oldest Oxfam shop in the UK (Broad Street, Oxford). Before developing the
IJRDM research’s methodological guideline and the rationale for selecting Oxfam, Section 2
33,7 presents the rationale for applying the Burt and Sparks new theoretical framework for
retail branding in the context of charity retail. Section 4 illustrates why and how
Oxfam retail brand was seriously damaged in the 1990s while Section 5 shows how
empowering HR practices substantially contributed to its retail brand renewal. Section
6 explains why some of Oxfam practices are relevant for “commercial” retailers and
516 Section 7 concludes.

2. The “fifth generation of branding strategy”

It was said in the introduction that the charity retail literature stream has rarely made
the link between HR practices and retail branding. For the sake of clarity, in this study,
HR practices are defined as the set of communication, incentive and managerial
initiatives that link management and employees and shape their common culture. They
are related to the strategic organizational design which besides strategy includes the
formal structure and the governance processes (Galbraith, 1995). The novelty of the
Burt and Sparks framework, which was not developed for charity retailers and which
therefore opens up an opportunity for empirical testing in this context, is precisely to
craft this link. It derives from the idea of the necessity for retailers to focus not only on
their traditional marketing-based branding strategy, but also to align “vision, culture
and image” of the firm in the retail brand itself (p. 197). According to Burt and Sparks,
this alignment is indeed the best way for retailers to durably sustain their competitive
advantage, consumers’ loyalty, and ultimately their own revenues. If image can be
enhanced through externally oriented-marketing campaigns, visions and culture
depend on each firm’s intrinsic personality which is substance. Consequently, retailers
should not only prioritize their customers through communication and effective store-
and product-branding operations, but in addition they should make sure that their HR
practices are in line with their brand philosophy and values. Indeed, it is the store staff
that permanently interacts with customers and whose role is critical in delivering the
emotional message contained in the retailer’s brand. This specificity of the retail world
(the extensive interaction between staff and consumers) is shared by both “commercial”
and charity retailers. In both groups, the staff convey the “values that represent the
organization” (Ind, 1997). This is where the first rationale of transposing the Burt and
Sparks framework into and the idea of testing it in the charity retail sector was derived.
Partly on this basis and partly on other externally diffused messages, customers
will then evaluate the brand capital or goodwill (de Chernatony, 2001), i.e. they will
perceive how sincere the retailer is about its promises to them. Quoting de Chernatony
(1999), Burt and Sparks wrote, “the new branding model is therefore one which
emphasizes value through employees’ involvement in relationship building. Internally,
brand management is becoming culture management and externally it is customer
interface management” (Burt and Sparks, 2002, p. 196). The new branding paradigm is
decidedly stakeholder-oriented and not solely consumer-oriented. It promotes
cooperation and trust within and outside the firm. Thus, the interest of this model
for charity retailers (and “commercial” retailers alike) could be therefore to understand
that strong brands should comprise both substance and image where substance is the
internal retailer’s identity imprinting its features on the external world which
accordingly develops a more or less flattering image/perception of the retailer. This is
where the second rationale for transposing the Burt and Sparks framework comes
from. The charity retail sector has been often portrayed as a highly Human resource
stakeholder-oriented sector where the staff play a key role in linking a charity management
retailer with local communities (Broadbridge and Parsons, 2003). There is therefore an
interest in understanding how this happens and whether some of these practices could practice
be implemented by commercial retailers as well.
Moreover, Burt and Sparks’ discussion implies that if a large proportion of the
research in branding focuses on the marketing side of the branding strategy (the 517
framework’s externally perceived image and reputation) (Girod and Michael, 2003; Kent,
2003; Merrilees and Fry, 2002; Romaniuk, 2003), very few studies investigate how the
branding strategy is socially and organizationally constructed within retailers’ structures,
routines and HR practices (the framework’s culture and vision side) to influence this
image (Schultz and de Chernatony, 2002). The model refocuses our attention to the HR
practices of retail branding and on its importance for a retailer’s reputation and
legitimacy. But it certainly does not dismiss the importance of complementary marketing
actions for branding. Figure 1 shows the model’s logic which is solely descending,
however. Indeed, the managerial vision helps to shape a customer-oriented corporate
culture, which in turn influences employees’ customer-oriented actions that shape
customers’ perception of the brand. The case study casts light on equally important
ascending relationships that enrich the original model.
This was the set of interactions underpinning a successful retail brand that required
further empirical testing. The next section develops the methodology that was used to
conduct this study, and the rationale for selecting Oxfam in this context.

3. Methodology
3.1 Research design
The case-study strategy was chosen for two reasons. First, since few previous studies
on the influence of HR management practices on brand development in retailing

Figure 1.
The “fifth generation of
branding in retailing”
based on stakeholders’
interest
IJRDM existed, the phenomenon at stake was still relatively unexplored and not well understood.
33,7 Second, the how-type of research question requires direct access to the phenomenon
(Marshall and Rossman, 1995; Yin, 1994). However, since the objective was to analyze
changing HRM routines, culture and vision at Oxfam after a major strategic and cultural
turnaround that has substantially strengthened Oxfam retail brand’s name, a construction
of the case from an external point of view, i.e. solely through interviews and documentary
518 evidence, would not have been satisfactory. The participant-observation cycle (Schein,
1992) was then privileged since ethnography means both full immersion combined with
critical detachment for thick description (Geertz, 1973), and analysis within an
organization, not of an organization (Woolgar, 1988).

3.2 Choice of a setting

Oxfam was chosen for the interest of its new retail branding practices and because
these practices and their potential transferability are still under-represented in the
academic literature. Thus, Oxfam was chosen for its theoretical relationship with the
framework previously developed, not for statistically valid purposes. Statistical
validity is not necessarily the objective of an ethnographic study (Eisenhardt, 1989). In
addition, the recent paradox and crisis with which it was confronted in the recent past
are very insightful.
On the one hand, Oxfam’s identity has always seemed indistinguishable from retail
since the organization was created simultaneously with the opening of the historical
store of Broad Street, Oxford in 1942. The origin of the company has been intrinsically
rooted in retail activity (Fox, 1998). In late 2002 when this study was conducted, Oxfam
was a very large retailer thriving on an impressive retail network of 782 shops in the
UK and Ireland at the end of 2002 (today 800). On the other hand, talking of Oxfam as a
retail brand may sound iconoclastic. Indeed, Oxfam is generally recognized as one of
the leading private-funded institutions dedicated “to overcome poverty and suffering
in the world”, as the organization’s mission statement proudly expresses, whose
identity is rather to fight against the excesses of commercial logic and unfair trade. It
rarely comes to one’s mind that Oxfam is also engaged in a quasi business logic where
making profits is a key objective in helping to achieve these humanitarian goals. For
example, Oxfam is better known for its values of “making a difference, collaboration,
and accountability” than probably for its value of “innovation and cost-effectiveness”
(Oxfam web site). The paradox stands on the fact that to Oxfam itself, the notion of
constructing and defending its own retail brand has not always been obvious at all.
The circumstances of a severe performance decline of its retail activities and the
successful turnaround undertaken thereafter perfectly illustrate a dramatic point. The
point is that until Oxfam’s managers understood that they also had a proper retail
brand name based on trust and engagement with several million of customers and their
social expectations to defend, Oxfam could not successfully respond to the increasing
competitive logic to which it was exposed. This changing context and the way Oxfam
addressed it with more entrepreneurial HR practices seemed worth analyzing for the
benefit of other retailers.

3.3 Data gathering and analysis

The study was based on a multi-method data-gathering strategy based on primary
data:
 .
Extensive field note-taking on the spot and analytical reviews immediately after Human resource
the working days spent at Oxfam headquarters. In total, the author spent one management
full-day-a-week from October to December 2002. This participation gave him
access to all internal induction and operational meetings organized in the trading practice
team with paid staff and volunteers.
.
Extensive field note-taking and comments after each of five participant-observation
days at the Broad Street Shop, Oxford (right before Christmas 2002). 519
.
Ten one-hour, semi-structured tape-recorded and fully transcribed interviews
with area, shop, Trading Division HR, strategy and development, HR
development and volunteer managers. The Trading Division Director was also
interviewed. At the non-managerial level, formal interviews were conducted with
the trading HR team leader and the most senior volunteer of the division. The
collection was completed through several informal “corridor” interviews at all
levels of the hierarchy and across functions. These were not tape-recorded but
systematically reported in the field notes right after they took place.
.
Comprehensive scanning of the intranet.
This wealth of sources and information was an important vector of data triangulation
to avoid becoming native at Oxfam. “Going native” is one of the most important
sources of bias-introduction in this type of research (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995).
All interviews and element of the field notes were then codified and retrieved following
a succinct literature-based template but more importantly, the emerging themes from
the field (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Seven main nodes (culture, paid staff, volunteers,
customers, structure, reorganization and identity) were then constructed. This method
turned out to be effective to combine the stage of breaking up the data into smaller
components to avoid simple description with the stage of synthesis to creatively
re-aggregate the data to compare it to the Burt and Sparks framework.

4. 1999: annus horribilis – the retail brand damaged

Oxfam’s retail activities are coordinated by the Trading Division. This division is one
of the functional divisions of Oxfam GB, which also includes the Marketing, the
International, the Finance and Information, and the HR divisions. The Trading
Division is responsible for the development and growth of the UK shop network. It
develops the long-term strategy (property development, positioning and location,
product assortment, etc.) and sustains the retail brand. The division employed 900
persons in 2002; 700 of them were shop managers. In addition, 23,000 volunteers who
provide Oxfam with an average value of eight weeks of full-time employment per
person contribute to the retail operations.
In 1999, the division faced bankruptcy after the retail contribution plummeted from
£12 to 6 million in just one year. Although the collapse was really brutal, the analysis
made by the new executive team disclosed several major dysfunctional characteristics
that throughout the 1990s had progressively affected the link of interest and trust
between the division and its stakeholders, including its customers and staff. In
addition, a series of changing environmental factors had created a new competitive
environment. Self-complacency had to give way to effective brand management. Such a
sudden drop in revenues may seem surprising to those who think that charity retailers
are well protected behind their corporate social responsibility shield and the nobility of
IJRDM the purpose they serve. But as it unfolds, the discussion explains that an overly narrow
33,7 definition of CSR as benevolence to a community outside the organization is not
sufficient to sustain a brand, i.e. to sustain customers’ trust.
The following discussion shows that in conformity with the Burt and Sparks
framework, the external perception of a brand cannot be positive if identity-elements
such as vision and culture are not aligned with the retailer’s externally perceived
520 image. This is true especially if this discrepancy, necessarily perceived by customers,
is not compensated by dynamic external communication operations, as it is the case for
Oxfam. Simultaneously, the discussion highlights the existence of ascending
relationships essential to the retail branding mechanisms that were not specified by
Burt and Sparks. The case adds some dynamism to their model. Ultimately, the three
components of vision-culture-image positively or negatively interact in a tightly
coupled system. The negative circle of interactions is presented in this section, the
virtuous circle in the next.

4.1 Lack of retail brand vision

Senior management at the head of the division had been in place for a long time.
Success and growth had brought their tribute of added hierarchical layers, and
abundant staff which, combined with Oxfam’s traditional consultative
decision-making routines (incessant meetings), gradually led to inertia and
bureaucratic dysfunctions. Because the corporate office was seriously cut off from
the shops, few managers felt any pressure to support the retail network with a brand of
its own. The retail brand was supposed to perfectly correlate with Oxfam’s
international involvement and prestige. Oxfam brand was institutional but not
commercial. Internally, although the division was accounting for a third of Oxfam’s
total annual budget, there was no institutionalization of “retail is business” through
efficiency routines such as budgeting, controlling and strategic planning. Externally,
even though competitive pressures were actually rising with the multiplication of
charity shops, there was little perception of the need to differentiate and position the
store brand differently. The charity-retail movement, nonetheless, was gathering such
a momentum that in 1999, more than 200 charity retail chains created the British
Association of Charity Shops, with members such as Cancer Research UK, Marie Curie
Cancer Care and Save the Children. The number of charity shops actually doubled in
the 1990s (NGO Finance, 2000). This expansion of stores was providing customers with
plenty of opportunities to satisfy their generosity and good conscience, almost
indistinctively. Simultaneously, cheap clothing commercial retail chains such as
Matalan were rapidly growing. For less favoured customers, they were an alternative
for cheap prices and bargains to charity retailers such as Oxfam. Differentiating by
justifying the reasons to shop at Oxfam became highly necessary. Shop managers
regularly sent up warning messages to their hierarchy. However, due to a weak
bottom-up communication, these messages sent from the market place could not flow
up the hierarchy or when they did, they were met with indifference. Further, although
the store policy was dictated by the centre at Oxfam House, the retail network lacked a
consistent service, merchandising and supply strategy to support it. Actually, the
reporting channels from store managers to headquarters were so slow that local
initiatives could not properly flourish because they were discouraged by the time
needed to receive an answer. Improvised initiatives at the local level were unduly Human resource
precluded. management
practice
4.2 Lack of supporting retail brand culture
Although supposedly democratic, Oxfam’s culture had degenerated within the
Trading Division for two reasons. First, shopkeepers who were potential entrepreneurs 521
were bridled by the bureaucratic mechanisms. Second, volunteers, who are sometimes
on the verge of social exclusion, were considered more as a nuisance than a help. Since
shop managers were not themselves sufficiently empowered they had difficulty in
empowering their volunteers. With volunteers’ turnover rapidly rising, the costs of
training and coordinating their action was increasingly time-consuming and risky in
terms of return-on-time from a paid-staff’s point of view. True, the management of
volunteers is a complex issue for all charity retailers and NGOs (Fox, 1998). However, a
particular lack of consideration caused high proportions of dissatisfaction
(recognizable even if no auditing measure or internal survey had been put in place
yet) and consequently, Oxfam Trading Division volunteering staff plummeted from
30,000 volunteers in 1993 to 23,000 in 2002. The quality of service within shops rapidly
fell. For example, in seasonal peaks, Christmas cards and small gifts require constant
re-merchandising and thus a relatively large number of staff (permanent staff are only
three at Broad Street Shop and the 20 weekly volunteers are highly needed to allow for
a normal functioning of the three-floor store). With fewer volunteers, the level of service
to customers could not be maintained. As a result, customers found empty shelves and
more disorganized merchandise offering. They were less satisfied and bought less.
If on the market side, shop managers were struggling to enact their views, on the
bureaucratic side, the Trade Division staff were enjoying a comfortable life with little
accountability, a meeting-based culture where few decisions were made, and the
security of a quasi life-time employment. This lack of decision and the consensus rule
prevented evolution in the division’s branding vision. Improving efficiency, satisfying
customers’ wishes to keep the promises of the brand, and fund-raising were not
members’ ordinary shared beliefs and assumptions.

4.3 Loss of retail brand image

The effects of demoralized staff and volunteers rapidly crossed the company
boundaries. They rapidly spread to local communities with fewer volunteers asking for
positions. In smaller towns particularly, negative comments by volunteers easily
spread by word of mouth and potential customers were increasingly thinking that
Oxfam was not respecting its equality of rights principle. The trusting link between
Oxfam and the communities was damaged. Furthermore, the escalating competition
between charity retailers caused growing confusion in consumers’ minds. Consumers
would begin to perceive a difference between a growing number of chains, not only
because the newest had “nicer” stores, but also because they were carrying interesting
product lines, not necessarily based on second-hand goods. Even though charity is
charity (supposedly disinterested) and if raising money to treat cancer, to protect
children or to overcome suffering in the Third World are all generous actions, in
practice, consumers are keen on obtaining value-for-money at the same time. The
mercantile logic also applied to charity stores but Oxfam was missing this analysis.
IJRDM To summarize, the retail activity was affected by senior managers’ lack of
33,7 awareness of Oxfam’s retail brand capital and of the necessity to manage the retail
network accordingly. Because of a lack of managerial vision toward brand
management in the division, the culture (influenced by very bureaucratic informal
and formal structures) was actually inhibiting the real brand values, which could have
been transmitted to customers by the staff. Reflexively, a non-brand-oriented culture
522 prevented the emergence of an adequate managerial vision in this direction since top
managers became gradually cut off from both the retail network’s and the market’s
realities (customers’ perceived image of Oxfam stores). The bottom-up mechanisms of
branding based on direct feedback from the market and indirect information brought
up by the hierarchy were not in place or did not function properly. It is now easier to
understand that the decline of Oxfam’s reputation as a shop system was caused by the
lack of fit between identity and image. Apparently, Oxfam’s corporate brand strength
was not enough to compensate for the absence of retail brand management.
The cumulative effect of these factors which were accurately captured by the
vision-culture-image framework, are summarized in Table I. They created the
symptoms of unfit alignment between Oxfam and its environment and thus, the
conditions for a radical turnaround (Miller and Friesen, 1982; Romanelli and Tushman,
1994) where more effective retail brand management based around innovative HR
practices might be introduced.

5. 2000-2001: the turnaround – the retail brand restored

This section discusses the virtuous circle initiated by the new senior management team
who took over the division in early 2000. Supporting the Burt and Sparks framework,
the actions undertaken mainly consisted in devising a new managerial vision,
redirecting a new division’s culture driven by retail exigencies, and aligning this new
internal substance with Oxfam’s image and expectations among consumers. It further
explains how this external perception was shaped by the synergistic efforts carried out
internally on the vision and culture of the division. In addition, it illustrates how the
new management freed up or set up bottom-up mechanisms to track consumers’
perception of the brand. This, in turn, helped them to adapt their vision and the
Trading Division’s culture accordingly.
The new division’s Director brought in a full range of commercial principles, based
largely on his experience at Kingfisher. They have contributed to the restoration of the
brand asset in the UK. It seems paradoxical that commercially skilled managers have
actually resuscitated Oxfam’s traditional democratic and respect-of-difference values
by restoring three long-lost key original principles in the division: initiative,
volunteerism and entrepreneurship. Nonetheless, this finding confirms other studies in
the sector (Broadbridge and Parsons, 2003). The turnaround led to both hierarchical
delayering and downsizing (20 per cent of Oxfam House staff departed in 2000,
voluntarily or not). The timing of implementation was perfect since, as one office
employee told “everyone knew that things were getting critical and that we were on the
verge of bankruptcy”.

5.1 A new vision for the retail brand

This new vision was called the Trading Future Project. The division started to work on
store, customer and competition brand positioning. For example, a new strategic
Macro-framework Brand components Collapse 1999 Restoration 2000-2002

Identity or Vision Oxfam is a corporate brand: it is not a retail Creation of the retail brand
substance Managerial brand – no brand positioning toward Positioning of the brand toward customers: efforts in service
discourse customers Positioning of the store: renewed product assortment,
Service, supply and store appearance is introduction of new lines and qualified personnel for technical
negligible – no store brand positioning items like books and bric-a-brac. Redecoration of main stores
Oxfam does not have competitors: no brand Positioning of the brand toward competitors: leading in retail
positioning needed toward competitors best practices within the Association of Charity Shops.
Reactivation of links with the press through “Designer Ranges”
Re-institutionalization of economics: money is important but as
a mean, not as a goal
Identity or Culture Limited focus on brand management Restoration of democratic values of equal consideration and
substance Shared values, Extreme centralization with very low treatment between paid staff and volunteers
assumptions and autonomy at shop levels and high autonomy Reversal of values: entrepreneurship and improvisation at the
beliefs by staff at the headquarters level shop level, formalization and standardization in the back office
No ascending communication: shopkeepers New jargon referentials: the Trading Future programme, the
and store staff rarely heard Trampoline structure to legitimize empowerment and
Bureaucratic excess: life-time employment initiative-taking
Negligence of volunteers and even prejudice Systematic and coordinated internal communication in
among paid staff in spite of a real family-spirit bi-directional flows: intranet best practice diffusion, three new
Little need for accountability weekly and monthly bulletins
Institutionalization of administrative efficiency and annual
performance measures
Creation or redevelopment of five exchange and feedback for
Reputation Image Shops cut off from the communities due to low New credibility through new value-for-money: new attractive
Customers’ autonomy: progressive disinterest gifts items based made in protected craftshops in the Third
perception Insufficient product turnover and incoherent World; extension of the Fair Trade line to confectionery
sourcing policy: loss of value for money products; new merchandising policy: improved quality of
Shabby stores in comparison to newer second-hand products and more rapid turnover of items
competitors: loss of stature Integration of customers as Oxfam’s stakeholders: they are both
money purveyors and merchandise donors

turnaround
management
practice

trading future
Human resource

brand before and after the

Evolution of Oxfam retail
523

Table I.
IJRDM planning position was opened in the division for that purpose. Key stores were
33,7 progressively refurbished. Since volunteers were given increased responsibility (in
2002, 30 percent of shop managers were volunteers, i.e. 200 people), stores could attract
more volunteers and overturn the trend of resignations, which had culminated in 2000.
As a result, more staffed-stores meant more effective customer service (welcome and
advices to customers, re-assortment and well merchandised shelves) and positive word
524 of mouth in the communities. Service was also improved by different initiatives such as
the systematic acceptance of all donated goods. In the past, consumers whose
merchandise was not suitable to resale were turned down. A concerted shop managers’
initiative has led to a complete acceptance of all donated goods; Oxfam shops now
provide the service of disposing or reselling the goods according to their condition. In
parallel, the division has not only expanded its collection of Fair Trade products to
up-scale confectionery items, but it has also created a private-label range of small gifts,
which during Christmas season, highly complement normal sales. These collections
being seasonal and therefore renewable raise the attractiveness of Oxfam stores to
customers. To position the brand vis-à-vis competitors, Oxfam has taken a leading role
in the British Charity Association where it diffuses some of its best practices and where
it can stay alert to competitors’ strategic moves and innovations. Its strategic planner
seats in this association. It has also renewed its contacts with the business press with
(free) communication campaigns on designer ranges (fashion-show prototypes)
available in major Oxfam centres such as in London or Manchester. At the institutional
level, Oxfam has fully formalized different efficiency measures with systematic
budgeting and controlling within the division. Annual interview routines and
division-wide surveys have been set up both at Oxfam House and in the stores to
capture dysfunctions and dissatisfaction and to benchmark administrative procedures.
Besides store managers whose salaries are partly performance dependent, a new
reward management system has also been set for office staff. It is based on
performance evaluation, attendance and meeting of the annually agreed objectives
within teams. Shop managers are constantly updated on their store’s sales which are
compared to other similar stores. To make sure that everyone is responsive to the
pressure of meeting sales targets, figures of contributions are also constantly updated
on news bulletins. “Profitability” has been both internally and externally (among other
NGOs) legitimized and they are sustained in the corporate culture during induction
meetings to new staff and volunteers. The managerial discourse makes sure that all
members, at corporate and shop levels, are aware of and meet more ambitious financial
and sales objectives. However, it is made clear that making money is only a means, not
a goal.

5.2 A retail brand-driven culture

Organizationally speaking, the Trading Future Project was accompanied by the
Trampoline Structure, a significant piece of jargon which pinpoints how the new level
of branding-awareness has been funnelled in the division. It provides the new cognitive
framework for members to make sense of the new directions they are expected to
follow to redeploy the brand. Recent HRM innovations have reinforced the alignment
between the public’s CSR expectations and its actual practice by Oxfam. Thus, Oxfam
identity better reflects its values, hence a stronger image.
 The Trampoline structure is a system of concentric and interdependent circles Human resource
where teams interact from a centre, “the entrepreneurs” of the shop level, to a periphery management
made up of different functional services aiming at supporting the centre from
headquarters or in the regions. Now the shop and thus indirectly, the market, are the practice
centre rather than headquarters. Its goal is to raise motivation and commitment by
clearer role definition. The supporting functions are the new HR cell, the property
management cell, the product management cell in charge of seasonal collections 525
development, and the finance cell. Today, sales statistics are updated weekly on the
central board of the division main office. This is a way to make sure that everyone feels
responsible and accountable for their progress. More operationally, new positions have
been allocated to internal communication. A new trading intranet data management
position was opened; the shop-support team, which makes the liaison with shop staff
and receives their orders of goods and merchandising elements was enlarged. IT-based
communication has been highly praised for linking people better and facilitating their
productivity. The marketing manager position was suppressed, as it is now clear as the
Oxford area manager declared that “shop managers are new entrepreneurs and we are
only here to help them build their business plan. They know their job better than any
one else in the office and they should not be constantly taught what to do.” Marketing
and merchandising should not be imposed from the top; they now rely on local
initiatives, coordinated by office assistants. To stimulate initiatives and discussions, a
considerable increase of written communication has taken place. Shop staff and
volunteers dialogue, share experiences and best practices (including failed experiences
to learn from them) from store to store and with head office employees through
bulletins such as the Shop Talk monthly magazine, the Vox Newsletter (bi-monthly)
and the Links Newsletter which is published three times a year. The news also include
information on the other divisions’ activities and achievements so that a common sense
is created across organizational divisions. These newsprints are strategically used by
senior managers to shape a customer-oriented culture. The editorial board makes sure
that the main annual and strategic objectives or messages are clearly reminded in all
the issues. They are also used by the retail staff to horizontally and vertically inform
their colleagues of key market data and of new initiatives. To show raising
commitment to volunteers, a new volunteer-manager position was opened. Volunteers
also enjoy a full intranet section available to them. They are encouraged to provide
feedback to the hierarchy, including the CEO, not only through their shop managers
but also through new or reshaped fora such as regional bi-annual meetings, the
National Annual Assembly, the Regional Volunteer Panels (which meet three times a
year), the Regional National Volunteer Advisory Group and the general Question and
Answer Sessions at Oxfam House. Recruitment of volunteers is now left locally to shop
managers who are in a position to enforce their vision of Oxfam’s CSR and
respect-of-differences commitment. Indeed, as was found in the Broad Street store,
psychologically ill persons and even prisoners in rehabilitation are actually getting
their chance of inclusion within society. This alignment between promises and
expectations from a consumer’s or worker’s point of view should serve to reinforce the
positive attitude of society towards Oxfam: Oxfam sticks to its promises. In addition,
all shop members now receive training and education in the more technical areas of
their sales. The head office issues a monthly bulletin dedicated to bric-a-brac or ancient
book expertise-development and assessment. This step not only contributes to more
IJRDM accurate pricing (and avoids lost-income opportunities) but more importantly, it raises
33,7 the staff qualification level and their ability to deliver consistent and professional
messages to consumers, for instance on the value and origin of an old book. This may
raise customers’ trust and influence the emotional content of their relationship with
Oxfam. Customers feel Oxfam’s more powerful, honest and reliable identity.
Employees are much happier. The latest internal corporate survey in 2002 disclosed
526 that 52 per cent of staff and volunteers thought that Oxfam was more collaborative up
from 32 per cent in 2001. Personnel satisfaction, initiative and qualification therefore all
have an important impact on the brand identity and perception.

5.3 A strengthened retail brand image

Even if some doubt that the power of a brand can be proxied by its sales revenues,
looking at sales and contribution, as managers do, is looking at a firm’s attractiveness
which is necessarily based on a series of attributes, brand awareness included. The
Trading Future project enabled the division to turn its fortunes around. In 2002, the
division raised £15 million, improving its pre-1999 level (sales were at £11 million in
2001). Obviously, customers have been coming back to Oxfam shops. In a competitive
environment, this certainly means that they feel attracted by its brand value. They
have been attracted by innovative and good quality merchandising innovations and by
the up-scaled service. Customers are better integrated as donors and therefore as
stakeholders of the organization. This necessarily contributes to a favourable
reputation, this time based on their direct experience with Oxfam (retail brand image),
rather than on what they hear Oxfam is doing in the Third World (corporate brand
image).
This is where the analysis slightly diverges from the Burt and Sparks model.
Indeed, since their model mainly addresses strategically focused grocery or GMS
retailers, it implies that these retailers do not run the risks of mixing retail and
corporate brand names. They are confounded. Oxfam, on the contrary, has another
image with the public: the image communicated by means of its international
humanitarian campaigns, which are largely echoed in the press. So when the
framework tends to associate retail brand with corporate brand, the analysis conducted
here dissociates them and shows that developing a corporate brand is not enough for
charity retailers’ brand to succeed. Nevertheless, and in conformity with theory, the
case shows that managerial vision affects culture, reciprocally culture affects vision
and both influence customers’ perception of the retail brand image. Eventually,
enriching Burt and Sparks’ theoretical framework, to function well, retail branding
depends on senior managers’ ability to close the loop by taking into consideration the
evolution of their retail image as perceived by consumers. This happens directly by
scanning what consumers think and how competition behaves and indirectly through
the ascending feedback provided by employees in the hierarchy. Table I summarizes
these points. Figure 2 synthesizes the theoretical contribution of this study.

6. Transferring Oxfam’s HR best practices to for-profit retailers

The previous discussion has illustrated how Oxfam imported different organizational
practices from the commercial retail sector: evaluation based on financial objectives,
internal benchmarking, corporate surveys of the staff, restructuring, strategy and
vision definition. It was shown that these practices and more specifically the HRM
 Human resource
management
practice

527

Figure 2.
Theoretical contribution to
the “fifth generation of
branding in retailing”

practices, which are distinct from but complement the traditional marketing-based
branding practices, affect the branding process in terms of identity, reputation and
image. At the same time, the previous section started with the paradox that
commercially experienced managers have strengthened Oxfam original values.
Reciprocally, this could mean that in some successful commercial retail organizations,
the development of empowering and attentive HR practices such as those developed at
Oxfam could find an echo. This section presents three of the possible significant
practices that commercial retailers could learn from Oxfam, a leading NGO retailer.
First, branding means networking. Indeed, in an increasingly hypercompetitive
environment, differentiation strategies will be based on the ability of firms to co-evolve
their product/store portfolios and innovation strategy, their staff’s expectations and
capabilities of interaction and message diffusion, and their customers’ shopping
experience and needs. But more than a co-evolution, this interaction will mean that
customers should be incorporated into the innovation strategy, at least to a certain
extent, and that the staff should make the link between the internal identity and these
customers’ exigencies. Adequate HRM practices will act as the discriminator between
rising and declining retail brands because personnel bridges the polar points in the
network; employees bridge structural holes necessary to innovate and thus sustain
brand leadership (Burt et al., 2001). John Lewis Partnership, well known for its bonus
system and democratic work councils is an example of successful networking in the
commercial sector. There is no proof that they were inspired by any charity practices
but the positive outcome it has generated may prove the value of this recommendation.
Second, retailers’ brands are increasingly dependent on perceived CSR commitment
(Girod and Michael, 2003). If most retailers confuse CSR with benevolence towards the
community (external world), the Oxfam case shows that to be ultimately trusted by
customers, CSR should have a broader scope and involve HRM practices. Wal-Mart’s
current judicial problems for gender discrimination at work can be devastating in the
sense that among the public, they raise the question of Wal-Mart’s sincerity in being a
IJRDM good employer with good CSR practices. In the USA, the case might seem trivial, but
33,7 viewed with European eyes, it is very much detrimental to Wal-Mart’s image
particularly at a stage where it declared its intentions to more fully expand in Europe
(Voyle and Domley, 2004). The staff satisfaction and motivation, its empowerment and
recognition, the organized improvisation philosophy (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1998), and
the quality of service they provide are all perceived by customers as key factors that
528 determine whether they will decide to trust or not the brand. If a commercial disaster
happens but if the retailer is sincere in repairing its errors thereafter, customers’ trust on
which the retail brand is based can be repaired and legitimacy restored. The case study
supports previous researches in this direction (Suchman, 1995).
Finally, the initiative given to local shop managers in terms of merchandising and
assortment in Oxfam stores is particularly original and deserves reflection for national
and international retail chain operators (particularly the apparel and specialty retail
chains). The adventurous shopping experience of visiting different Oxfam shops
contrasts with the monotony and boredom that one sometimes experiences in
successful commercial chains where one is sure to come across the same windows and
merchandise whichever store one visits. Even though the inherent nature of Oxfam
trade, based on local donations contributes to this game-oriented store brand image,
cannot be reproduced by economies-of-scale-driven strategies, more commercial chains
could leave a certain latitude to their store managers’ creativity and non-conformism.
Managers could perhaps rely more and thrive on the interesting peculiarities of their
communities. We, as customers would gain much in shopping pleasure and that would
certainly enhance our brand-loyalty toward those path-breaking retailers.

7. Conclusion
This study has sought to show that a link between charity retail and commercial retail
research streams could be made as far as retail branding is concerned. It was argued
and demonstrated that this link was made explicit by Burt and Sparks’ “fifth
generation of branding framework”. The success of a retail brand depends on a
retailer’s stakeholder-orientation. More specifically, a retailer’s substance (its vision
and culture) is perceived by its customers (image) in function of the quality of the
mediation played by its employees. Reciprocally, this mediation should be also
ascending, helping top managers to create the adapted vision and customer and
stakeholder-oriented corporate culture. By providing a detailed insight into Oxfam’s
current entrepreneurial HR practices, the case has drawn from the rich tradition of the
charity retail literature stream. It has also illustrated that best practice exchanges can
also flow from charity to commercial retailers and thus close a loop between lenders
and borrowers of innovation management. By drawing from the rich commercial retail
literature on branding, the case has evidenced why and how charity retailers also need
to build a retail branding strategy probably distinct from their corporate brand.
By providing a new perspective on both for-profit and charity retail brand
management, the cross-fertilization of the two streams of the retail literature has
created new opportunities for further research. First, retail is based on permanent
interactions between company staff and consumers. The Oxfam example shows how
retailers can improve the way employees personify and deliver the message of
corporate identity. In contexts of economic stagnation where communication budgets
are often curtailed (Schultz, 2003), focusing on entrepreneurship and employees’
motivation as alternative or supplementary ways to generate value to customers, and Human resource
thus to strengthen retailers’ brand image, may not be performance-trivial. In its management
positive section, the case illustrates the wealth and the stimulating innovations lately
introduced in Oxfam’s HR practices which could be replicated in the profit sector practice
possibly at lower costs than large scale communication campaigns that actually may
do only half of the job of sustaining a positive brand image. Future research on the
relative costs and benefits of carrying one approach instead of another or 529
simultaneously, would be highly illuminating to quantify this finding.
Second, the case’s section on dysfunctions proves how crippled managerial and HR
practices can jeopardize a retail brand. It shows that because HR practices in the retail
division were not aligned any more on Oxfam corporate values, its retail brand image
almost collapsed in the public. In terms of managerial implication, this means that
marketing and HR departments should collaborate more in their approach to branding
strategy, since it appears that simultaneous internal and external efforts should be carried
out to sustain a successful brand image. Future research could investigate whether, how
and with what results this cooperation takes place within commercial retailers. Indeed,
such a research could explain how cooperation between these two departments creates
difficult to imitate dynamic capabilities (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). It would also give
space to multi-disciplinary approaches that would enrich our discipline.

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