SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES (SAUDIA) vs.

COURT OF APPEALS,
MILAGROS P. MORADA and HON. RODOLFO A. ORTIZ, in his capacity as
Presiding Judge of Branch 89, RTC of Quezon City
G.R. No. 122191 October 8, 1998
FACTS: Petitioner SAUDIA hired private respondent MORADA as a flight
attendant in 1988, based in Jeddah. On 1990, while on a lay-over in Jakarta,
Indonesia, she went to party with 2 male attendants, and on the following
morning in their hotel, one of the male attendants attempted to rape her. She
was rescued by hotel attendants who heard her cry for help. The Indonesian
police arrested the 2.

MORADA returned to Jeddah, but was asked by the company to go back to

Jakarta and help arrange the release of the 2 male attendants. MORADA did
not cooperate when she got to Jakarta.

What followed was a series of interrogations from the Saudi Courts which she
did not understand as this was in their language. In 1993, she was surprised,
upon being ordered by SAUDIA to go to the Saudi court, that she was being
convicted of (1) adultery; (2) going to a disco, dancing and listening to the
music in violation of Islamic laws; and (3) socializing with the male crew, in
contravention of Islamic tradition, sentencing her to five months
imprisonment and to 286 lashes. Only then did she realize that the Saudi
court had tried her, together with the 2, for what happened in Jakarta.

SAUDIA denied her the assistance she requested, But because she was
wrongfully convicted, Prince of Makkah dismissed the case against her and
allowed her to leave Saudi Arabia. Shortly before her return to Manila, she was
terminated from the service by SAUDIA, without her being informed of the
cause.

On November 23, 1993, Morada filed a Complaint for damages against

SAUDIA, and Khaled Al-Balawi (“Al-Balawi”), its country manager.
SAUDIA ALLEGES: Private respondent’s claim for alleged abuse of rights
occurred in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It alleges that the existence of a
foreign element qualifies the instant case for the application of the law of the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, by virtue of the lex loci delicti commissi rule.

MORADA ALLEGES: Since her Amended Complaint is based on Articles 19

and 21 of the Civil Code, then the instant case is properly a matter of domestic
law.
ISSUE: WON the Philippine courts have jurisdiction to try the case

HELD: YES.
On the presence of a “Foreign Element” in the case: A factual situation that
cuts across territorial lines and is affected by the diverse laws of two or more
states is said to contain a “foreign element”. The presence of a foreign element
is inevitable since social and economic affairs of individuals and associations
are rarely confined to the geographic limits of their birth or conception. The
forms in which this foreign element may appear are many. The foreign
element may simply consist in the fact that one of the parties to a contract is
an alien or has a foreign domicile, or that a contract between nationals of one
State involves properties situated in another State. In other cases, the foreign
element may assume a complex form.

In the instant case, the foreign element consisted in the fact that private
respondent Morada is a resident Philippine national, and that petitioner
SAUDIA is a resident foreign corporation. Also, by virtue of the employment
of Morada with the petitioner Saudia as a flight stewardess, events did
transpire during her many occasions of travel across national borders,
particularly from Manila, Philippines to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and vice versa,
that caused a “conflicts” situation to arise.

COURT disagrees with MORADA that his is purely a domestic case. However,
the court finds that the RTC of Quezon City possesses jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the suit. Its authority to try and hear the case is provided for
under Section 1 of Republic Act No. 7691, to wit:

BP129 Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive jurisdiction:
xxx xxx xxx
(8) In all other cases in which demand, exclusive of interest, damages of
whatever kind, attorney`y’s fees, litigation expenses, and cots or the value of
the property in controversy exceeds One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where the demand,
exclusive of the above-mentioned items exceeds Two hundred Thousand pesos
(P200,000.00). (Emphasis ours)
xxx xxx xxx
Section 2 (b), Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court — the venue, Quezon City,
is appropriate:
Sec. 2 Venue in Courts of First Instance. — [Now Regional Trial Court]
(a) xxx xxx xxx
(b) Personal actions. — All other actions may be commenced and tried where
the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the
plaintiff or any of the plaintiff resides, at the election of the plaintiff.

Weighing the relative claims of the parties, the court a quo found it best to
hear the case in the Philippines. Had it refused to take cognizance of the case,
it would be forcing plaintiff (private respondent now) to seek remedial action
elsewhere, i.e. in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia where she no longer maintains
substantial connections. That would have caused a fundamental unfairness to
her.
Moreover, by hearing the case in the Philippines no unnecessary difficulties
and inconvenience have been shown by either of the parties. The choice of
forum of the plaintiff (now private respondent) should be upheld.

The trial court also acquired jurisdiction over the parties. MORADA through
her act of filing, and SAUDIA by praying for the dismissal of the Amended
Complaint on grounds other than lack of jurisdiction.

As to the choice of applicable law, we note that choice-of-law problems seek to

answer two important questions:
(1) What legal system should control a given situation where some of the
significant facts occurred in two or more states; and
(2) to what extent should the chosen legal system regulate the situation.

Considering that the complaint in the court a quo is one involving torts, the
“connecting factor” or “point of contact” could be the place or places where the
tortious conduct or lex loci actus occurred. And applying the torts principle in
a conflicts case, we find that the Philippines could be said as a situs of the tort
(the place where the alleged tortious conduct took place). This is because it is
in the Philippines where petitioner allegedly deceived private respondent, a
Filipina residing and working here. According to her, she had honestly
believed that petitioner would, in the exercise of its rights and in the
performance of its duties, “act with justice, give her due and observe honesty
and good faith.” Instead, petitioner failed to protect her, she claimed. That
certain acts or parts of the injury allegedly occurred in another country is of no
moment. For in our view what is important here is the place where the over-all
harm or the totality of the alleged injury to the person, reputation, social
standing and human rights of complainant, had lodged, according to the
plaintiff below (herein private respondent). All told, it is not without basis to
identify the Philippines as the situs of the alleged tort.
In applying “State of the most significant relationship” rule, to determine the
State which has the most significant relationship, the following contacts are to
be taken into account and evaluated according to their relative importance
with respect to the particular issue: (a) the place where the injury occurred;
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred; (c) the domicile,
residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the
parties, and (d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is
centered.

As already discussed, there is basis for the claim that over-all injury occurred
and lodged in the Philippines. There is likewise no question that private
respondent is a resident Filipina national, working with petitioner, a resident
foreign corporation engaged here in the business of international air carriage.
Thus, the “relationship” between the parties was centered here, although it
should be stressed that this suit is not based on mere labor law violations.
From the record, the claim that the Philippines has the most significant
contact with the matter in this dispute, raised by private respondent as
plaintiff below against defendant (herein petitioner), in our view, has been
properly established.

GEMPERLE VS. SCHENKERG.R. NO. L-18164; JANUARY 23, 1967

Facts:

This case was the result of William Gemperle’s retaliatory act when
respondent spouses Paul andHelen Schenker filed a case against him for the
enforcement of Schenker's allegedly initial subscription to theshares of stock
of the Philippines-Swiss Trading Co., Inc. and the exercise of his alleged pre-
emptive rights tothe then unissued original capital stock of said corporation
and the increase thereof, as well as for anaccounting and damages. Petitioner
alleged that the said complaint tainted his name as a businessman. Hethen
filed a complaint for damages and prays for the retraction of statements made
by Helen Schenker.Summons was personally served to Helen Schenker but
not to Paul Schenker. Helen then filed ananswer with a counterclaim, but Paul
Schenker filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the court never
acquiredjurisdiction over his person since admittedly, he is a Swiss citizen,
residing in Zurich, Switzerland, and has notbeen actually served with
summons in the Philippines.
Issue:

Whether or not the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of Paul
Schenker.

Ruling:

Yes, although as a rule, when the defendant is a non-resident and in anaccion

inpersonam,jurisdiction over the person of the defendant can be acquired only
through voluntaryappearance or personal service of summons. But this case is
an exception to the said rule. The Supremeratiocinated:“We hold that the
lower court had acquired jurisdiction over said defendant, through service of
the summonsaddressed to him upon Mrs. Schenker, it appearing from said
answer that she is the representative andattorney-in-fact of her husband
aforementioned civil case No. Q-2796, which apparently was filed at
herbehest, in her aforementioned representative capacity. In other words,
Mrs. Schenker had authority to sue,and had actually sued on behalf of her
husband, so that she was, also, empowered to represent him in suitsfiled
against him, particularly in a case, like the of the one at bar, which is
consequence of the action broughtbyheronhisbehalf.”Briefly, in anaccion in
personamwhere the defendant is a non-resident, substituted service of
summons doesnot apply. However, by way of exception, substituted service of
summons may be effected, if the followingrequisites are present:1. The
summons is served to the spouse of the defendant2. The spouse must be
residing in the Philippines3. The spouse is appointed as attorney-in-fact of the
spouse defendant in a previous case involving thenon-resident spouse.INT'L
SHOE CO. V. WASHINGTON326 U.S. 310, 66 S. CT. 154
(1945)FACTS:International Shoe Co. was incorporated in Delaware and had
its principal place of business in St. Louis,Missouri. While the corporation did
not have an office in Washington (“State”), it employed eleven to
thirteensalesmen, who were residents of the State and who exhibited product
samples to prospective buyers from theState. The corporation compensated
the salesmen in the form of commissions for any sales from customers

IDONAH PERKINS vs. ROXAS ET AL.

GRN 47517, June 27, 1941
FACTS:
July 5, 1938, respondent Eugene Perkins filed a complaint in the CFI- Manila
against the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company for the recovery of a sum
consisting of dividends which have been declared and made payable on shares
of stock registered in his name, payment of which was being withheld by the
company, and for the recognition of his right to the control and disposal of
said shares to the exclusion of all others. The company alleged, by way of
defense that the withholding of plaintiff’s right to the disposal and control of
the shares was due to certain demands made with respect to said shares by the
petitioner Idonah Perkins, and by one Engelhard.
Eugene Perkins included in his modified complaint as parties defendants
petitioner, Idonah Perkins, and Engelhard. Eugene Perkins prayed that
petitioner Idonah Perkins and H. Engelhard be adjudged without interest in
the shares of stock in question and excluded from any claim they assert
thereon. Summons by publication were served upon the nonresident
defendants Idonah Perkins and Engelhard. Engelhard filed his answer.
Petitioner filed her answer with a crosscomplaint in which she sets up a
judgment allegedly obtained by her against respondent Eugene Perkins, from
the SC of the State of New York, wherein it is declared that she is the sole legal
owner and entitled to the possession and control of the shares of stock in
question with all the cash dividends declared thereon by the Benguet
Consolidated Mining Company.

Idonah Perkins filed a demurrer thereto on the ground that “the court has no
jurisdiction of the subject of the action,” because the alleged judgment of the
SC of the State of New York is res judicata. Petitioner’s demurrer was
overruled, thus this petition.

ISSUE:
WON in view of the alleged judgment entered in favor of the petitioner by the
SC of New York and which is claimed by her to be res judicata on all questions
raised by the respondent, Eugene Perkins, the local court has jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the action.
RULING:
By jurisdiction over the subject matter is meant the nature of the cause of
action and of the relief sought, and this is conferred by the sovereign authority
which organizes the court, and is to be sought for in general nature of its
powers, or in authority specially conferred. In the present case, the amended
complaint filed by the respondent, Eugene Perkins alleged calls for the
adjudication of title to certain shares of stock of the Benguet Consolidated
Mining Company and the granting of affirmative reliefs, which fall within the
general jurisdiction of the CFI- Manila. Similarly CFI- Manila is empowered to
adjudicate the several demands contained in petitioner’s crosscomplaint.
Idonah Perkins in her crosscomplaint brought suit against Eugene Perkins
and the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company upon the alleged judgment of
the SC of the State of New York and asked the court below to render judgment
enforcing that New York judgment, and to issue execution thereon. This is a
form of action recognized by section 309 of the Code of Civil Procedure (now
section 47, Rule 39, Rules of Court) and which falls within the general
jurisdiction of the CFI- Manila, to adjudicate, settle and determine.

The petitioner expresses the fear that the respondent judge may render
judgment “annulling the final, subsisting, valid judgment rendered and
entered in this petitioner’s favor by the courts of the State of New York, which
decision is res judicata on all the questions constituting the subject matter of
civil case” and argues on the assumption that the respondent judge is without
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the cause. Whether or not the respondent
judge in the course of the proceedings will give validity and efficacy to the New
York judgment set up by the petitioner in her cross-complaint is a question
that goes to the merits of the controversy and relates to the rights of the
parties as between each other, and not to the jurisdiction or power of the
court. The test of jurisdiction is whether or not the tribunal has power to enter
upon the inquiry, not whether its conclusion in the course of it is right or
wrong. If its decision is erroneous, its judgment can be reversed on appeal; but
its determination of the question, which the petitioner here anticipates and
seeks to prevent, is the exercise by that court and the rightful exercise of its
jurisdiction.

Petition denied.

CONFLICT OF LAWS raytheon international vs rouzie gr 162894

FACTS

Brand Marine Services, Inc. (BMSI), a corporation duly organized & existing
under the laws of Connecticut, &Stockton Rouzie, Jr., an American citizen,
entered into a contract
BMSI hired Rouzie as its representative to negotiate the sale of services in
several government projects in thePhilippines for an agreed remuneration of
10% of the gross receipts.

Rouzie secured a service contract w/ the Rep. of Phil. on behalf of BMSI for
the dredging of rivers affected by the Mt.Pinatubo eruption & mudflows.

Rouzie filed before the NLRC a suit against BMSI and Rust International
(Rust) for alleged nonpayment of commissions, illegal termination, & breach
of employment contract.

The Labor Arbiter order 

ed BMSI & Rust to pay Rouzie’s money claims.

Upon appeal, the NLRC reversed & dismissed Rouzie’s complaint on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction.

Rouzie filed an action for damages before the RTC of La Union (where he was
a resident) against Raytheon International. He reiterated that he was not paid
the commissions due him from the Pinatubo dredging project w/c hesecured
on behalf of BMSI. The complaint also averred that BMSI, RUST and
Raytheon had combined & functioned as 1 company.

RAYTHEON SOUGHT THE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT ON THE

GROUNDS OF FAILURE TO STATE ACAUSE OF ACTION & FORUM NON
CONVENIENS & PRAYED FOR DAMAGES BY WAY OF COMPULSORY

COUNTERCLAIM. THE RTC DENIED RAYTHEON’S MOTION. THE CA

AFFIRMED.

Raytheon’s contention: The written contract between Rouzie & BMSI included
a valid choice of law clause, that is, that the contract shall be governed by the
laws of the State of Connecticut. It also mentions the presence of foreign
elements in the dispute, namely that the parties & witnesses involved are
American corporations & citizens & the evidence to be presented is located
outside the Philippines, that renders our local courts inconvenient forums.
The foreign elements of the dispute necessitate the immediate application of
the doctrine of forum non conveniens
W/N the complaint should be dismissed on the ground of forum non
conveniens.

b) NO.

UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS, A COURT, IN

CONFLICTS-OF-LAWS CASES, MAY

REFUSE IMPOSITIONS ON ITS JURISDICTION WHERE IT IS NOT THE

MOST “CONVENIENT” OR

AVAILABLE FORUM AND THE PARTIES ARE NOT PRECLUDED FROM

SEEKING REMEDIES ELSEWHERE.

Raytheon’s averments of the foreign elements are not sufficient to oust the
RTC of its jurisdiction over the case and the parties involved.

Moreover, the propriety of dismissing a case based on the principle of forum

non conveniens requires a factual determination; hence, it is more properly
considered as a matter of defense. While it is w/c the discretion of the trial
court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so
only after vital facts are established, to determine whether special
circumstances require the court’s desistance.

G.R. No. 101538 June 23, 1992

AUGUSTO BENEDICTO SANTOS III, represented by his father and
legal guardian, Augusto Benedicto Santos vs. NORTHWEST
ORIENT AIRLINES and CA

FACTS: The petitioner is a minor and a resident of the Philippines. Private

respondent Northwest Orient Airlines (NOA) is a foreign corporation with
principal office in Minnesota, U.S.A. and licensed to do business and maintain
a branch office in the Philippines.
On October 21, 1986, the petitioner purchased from NOA a round-trip ticket
in San Francisco. U.S.A., for his flight from San Francisco to Manila via Tokyo
and back. The scheduled departure date from Tokyo was December 20, 1986.
No date was specified for his return to San Francisco.

On December 19, 1986, the petitioner checked in at the NOA counter in the
San Francisco airport for his scheduled departure to Manila. Despite a
previous confirmation and re-confirmation, he was informed that he had no
reservation for his flight from Tokyo to Manila. He therefore had to be wait-
listed.

On March 12, 1987, the petitioner sued NOA for damages in the RTC of
Makati. On April 13, 1987, NOA moved to dismiss the complaint on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction, citing Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention,
reading as follows:

Art. 28. (1) An action for damage must be brought at the option of the plaintiff,
in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, either before the court
of the domicile of the carrier or of his principal place of business, or where he
has a place of business through which the contract has been made, or before
the court at the place of destination.

The private respondent contended that the Philippines was not its domicile
nor was this its principal place of business. Neither was the petitioner’s ticket
issued in this country nor was his destination Manila but San Francisco in the
United States.
Lower court granted the dismissal, CA affirmed.

ISSUE: WON the Philippines has jurisdiction over the case. (Issue raised by
the party is WON the provision of the Warsaw convention was constitutional)

HELD: No jurisdiction (the provision is constitutional)

The Convention is a treaty commitment voluntarily assumed by the Philippine

government and, as such, has the force and effect of law in this country. The
petitioner’s allegations are not convincing enough to overcome this
presumption. Apparently, the Convention considered the four places
designated in Article 28 the most convenient forums for the litigation of any
claim that may arise between the airline and its passenger, as distinguished
from all other places
CaseDig: El Banco Espanol vs. Palanca
G.R. No. L-11390;  March 26, 1918
Posted by: Rianne Fernandez

FACTS:

Engracio Palanca was indebted to El Banco and he had his parcel of land as
security to his debt which amounted to 218, 294. 10 Php while his property was
worth 75, 000 Php more than what he owed. Due to his failure to pay, El Banco
executed an instrument to mortgage the former's property. However, Engracio
left for Amoy, China and eventually died there. The mortgagor then instituted
foreclosure proceeding but since defendant is a non-resident, it was necessary to
give notice by publication.

The Clerk of Court was also directed to send copy of the summons to the
defendant's last known address but it was not shown whether the Clerk complied
with this requirement. Nevertheless, after publication in a newspaper of the City
of Manila, the cause proceeded and judgment by default was rendered.

The decision was likewise published and afterwards sale by public auction was
held with the bank as the highest bidder and the same was confirmed by the
court. However, about seven years after the confirmation of this sale, a motion
was made by Vicente Palanca, as administrator of the estate of the original
defendant, wherein he requested the court to set aside the order of default and
the judgment, and to vacate all the proceedings subsequent thereto.

On the ground that the order of default and the judgment rendered thereon were
void because the court had never acquired jurisdiction over the defendant or over
the subject of the action.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court acquired jurisdiction over the defendant and the subject
matter or the action.

HELD:

Where the defendant in a mortgage foreclosure lives outside of the country and
refuses to appear or otherwise submit himself to the authority of the court, the
jurisdiction of the latter is limited to the mortgaged property, with respect to
which jurisdiction of the court is based upon the fact that the property is located
within the district and that the court, under the provisions of law applicable in
such cases is vested with the power to subject property to the obligation created
by the mortgage. In such case personal jurisdiction over the non-resident
defendant is non-essential and in fact cannot be acquired.

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-11759 March 16, 1917  

CAYETANO LIM and MARCIANO LIM, petitioners-appellants,

vs. THE INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, Respondent-
Appellee.

under and by authority of the Chinese Immigration, Laws, it

appearing that the children arrived at the Port of Manila
accompanied by and in the custody of their mother, a Filipino
woman; that they were born in China, out of lawful wedlock; and
that their father was a Chinese person. chanroble

It is contended, on behalf of the Insular Collector of Customs, that

these children being Chinese persons are denied the right of
entrance into the Philippine Islands under the express terms of the
Chinese immigration laws. On the other hand, it is urged on behalf
of the children that they are entitled to enter, regardless of the
provisions of the Chinese immigration laws, since the admitted
facts, as it is said, disclose that they are citizens of the Philippine
Islands; and for the further reason, that their mother, who is
entitled to their custody and charged with their maintenance and
education, is clearly entitled to take up her residence in the
Philippine Islands and should not be required, to that end, to
abandon her minor children.   chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Without discussing or deciding any of the contentions of the parties

as to the rights of citizenship of these children, actual or inchoate,
we are of opinion that by analogous reasoning to that upon which
the Supreme Court of the United States held that the wives and
minor children of Chinese merchants domiciled in the United States
may enter that country without certificates, these children must be
held to be entitled to enter the Philippine Islands with their mother,
for the purpose of taking up their residence here with her, it
appearing that she is natural guardian, entitled to their custody and
charged with their maintenance and education. (U. S. vs. Gue Lim,
176 U. S. 459.) chanrobles virtual law library

In the case just cited the court said:

While the literal construction of the section would require a

certificate, as therein stated, from every Chinese person, other than
a laborer, who should come into the country, yet such a
construction leads to what we think an absurd result, for it requires
a certificate for a wife of a merchant, among others, in regard to
whom its would be impossible to give the particulars which the
statute requires shall be stated in such certificate.   chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

"Nothing is better settled," says the present Chief Justice, in Lau Ow

Bew vs. United States (144 U. S., 59) "than that statutes should
receive a sensible construction, such as will effectuate the
legislative intention, and, if possible, so as to avoid and unjust or an
absurd conclusion.   chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The purposes of the sixth section, requiring the certificate, was not
to prevent the persons named in the second article of the treaty
from coming into the country, but to prevent Chinese laborers from
entering under the guise of being one of the classes permitted by
the treaty. It is the coming of Chinese laborers that the act is aimed
against.  
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

It was said in the opinion in the Lau Ow Bew case, in speaking of

the provisions that the sole evidence permissible should be the
certificate: "This rule of evidence was evidently prescribed by the
amendment as a means of effectually preventing the violation or
evasion of the prohibition against the coming of Chinese laborers. It
was designed as a safeguard to prevent the unlawful entry of such
laborers, under the pretense that they belong to the merchant class
or to some other of the admitted classes."  chanrobles virtual law library
It was also held in that case that although the literal wording of the
statute of 1884, section six, would require a certificate in the case
of a merchant already domiciled in the United States and who had
left the country for temporary purposes, animo revertendi, yet its
true and proper construction did not include his case, and the
general terms used in the act were limited to those persons to
whom Congress manifestly intended to apply them, which would be
those who were about to come to the United States for the first
time, and not to those Chinese merchants already domiciled in the
United States who had gone to China for temporary purposes only,
with the intention of returning. The case of Wan Shing vs. United
States (140 U. S., 24), was referred to, and attention called to the
fact that the appellant therein was not a merchant but a laborer,
who had acquired no commercial domicile in this county, and was
clearly within the exception requiring him to procure and produce
the certificate specified in the act. The rule was approved, and the
differences in the two cases pointed out by the Chief Justice.   chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

To hold that a certificate is required in this case is to decide that the

woman cannot come into this country at all, for it is not possible for
her to comply with the act, because she cannot in any event
procure the certificate even by returning to China. She must come
in as the wife of her domiciled husband or not at all. The act was
never meant to accomplish the result of permanently excluding the
wife under the circumstances of this case, and we think that,
properly and reasonably construed, it does not do so. If we hold
that she is entitled to come in as the wife, because the true
construction of the treaty and the act permits it, there is no
provision which makes the certificate the only proof of the fact that
she is such wife.  
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In the case of the minor children, the same result must follow as in
that of the wife. All the reasons which favor the construction of the
statute as exempting the wife from the necessity of procuring a
certificate apply with equal force to the case of minor children of a
member or members of the admitted classes. They come in by
reason of their relationship to the father, and whether they
accompany or follow him, a certificate is not necessary in either
case. When the fact is established to the satisfaction of the
authorities that the person claiming to enter, either as wife or minor
child, is in fact the wife or minor child of one of the members of the
class mentioned in the treaty as entitled to enter, them that person
in entitled to admission without the certificate.

We are not advised of any provision of Chinese law which

differentiates the status of infant children, born out of lawful
wedlock, from that of similar children under the laws in force in the
Philippine Islands. We assume, therefore, that in China as well as in
the Philippine Islands such children have the right to look to their
mother for their maintenance and education, and that she is entitled
to their custody and control in fulfilling the obligations towards them
which are imposed upon her, not only by the natural impulses of
love and affection, but also by the express mandate of the law. And
it having been held on the highest authority that the general terms
of the Act were limited to those to whom Congress manifestly
intended to apply them as set forth in the foregoing opinion, and
that "nothing is better settled than that statutes should receive a
sensible construction, such as will effectuate the legislative
intention, and, if possible, so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd
conclusion," we are of opinion that the Chinese Immigration Laws
should not be construed so as to exclude infant children of a Filipino
mother, born out of lawful wedlock, seeking entrance to the
Philippine Islands for the purpose of taking up their residence with
her in her native land.   chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

It has been suggested that such a ruling opens the door to fraud
and evasion, but we are not much impressed with the force of this
suggestion, knowing as we do that the immigration authorities have
been furnished by the law with peculiarly effective machinery for its
enforcement, well calculated to defeat any attempt to make an
unauthorized or improper use of so manifestly reasonable an
exception from the literal construction and application of its general
provisions.  
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Some confusion seems to have arisen in the court below as to the

precise nature and effect of the somewhat inartificial pleadings upon
which these proceedings were submitted. The case appears to have
been submitted upon an answer to an order to show cause why a
writ of habeas corpus  should not issue upon the petition filed on
behalf of the infant children. In the form in which the answer is
couched, there is much in the contention of the appellee that the
trial court should have treated the answer as in substance and
effect a demurrer to the petition, admitting the truth of the facts
alleged therein, but praying judgment as to whether it sets forth
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and to justify the
issuance of the writ. We are inclined to think, however, that the
understanding of the parties and of the court below was that the
answer should be treated rather as in the nature of a return to a
writ of habeas corpus, accepting as true the allegations of the
petition but maintaining the legality of the detention upon the facts
thus submitted. Without considering at this time whether in habeas
corpus proceedings the respondent may, without consent of court,
demur to, instead of answering an order to show cause why the writ
should not issue, and without considering or deciding the course
which should be pursued where a respondent attempts to file a
demurrer to a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in lieu of the
return prescribed by the statute to the writ when actually issued;
we treat the answer to the order to show cause in the case at bar as
we think the parties and the court below understood it should be
treated, that is to say, as in substance and effect the return which
the Insular Collector desired to make to the writ of habeas corpus
issued or assumed to have been issued in response to the petition
on behalf of the children held in custody by him.  
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Ruling:

We conclude, therefore, that, it appearing that the respondent

Collector of Customs is detaining the petitioners under an erroneous
construction of the immigration laws, and it appearing from the
facts disclosed by the administrative proceedings that these children
are entitled to admission into the Philippine Islands, the order
entered in the court below should be reversed, and in lieu thereof
an order should be entered directing the discharge of these children
from the custody of the Insular Collector of Customs, with the costs
in both instances, de officio.
Issue:

The real question raised on this appeal is whether the Insular

Collector of Customs may lawfully deny entry into the Philippine
Islands to two children aged 8 and 14 years