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Advancing accountability theory and practice: Introduction to the

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DOI: 10.1016/j.hrmr.2004.02.001

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Editorial

Advancing accountability theory and practice: Introduction to the

human resource management review special edition
Dwight D. Frink a,*, Richard J. Klimoski b,1
a
Department of Management, University of Mississippi, University, MS 38677, USA
b
Department of Psychology, George Mason University, 3074 David J. King Hall, Mail Stop 3F5, Fairfax, VA 22030-4444, USA

Abstract

Over the past several years, scholars have increased their attention to the phenomenon of accountability. These
efforts come largely from social psychology, where accountability is viewed as a description of a category of causal
factors of behavior in social settings. Indeed, the developments have been substantial, and studies have been fruitful.
Undergirding these efforts are various conceptualizations of accountability which have elements in common,
although they also have some points of difference and others of unclear connectedness. In an effort to provide a
broad framework as a step toward a cogent theory of accountability, Frink and Klimoski [Frink, D. D., & Klimoski,
R. J. (1998). Toward a theory of accountability in organizations and human resources management. In G. R. Ferris,
(Ed.), Research in personnel and human resources management (Vol. 16, pp. 1 –51). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press]
advanced a role theory framework describing the accountability phenomenon. As a next step, this special edition of
Human Resource Management Review (HRMR) brings together several authors with expertise in varied theoretical
domains, and presents their views of how that framework may or may not be useful in examining their topic of
expertise. As may be expected, the result is a creative and refreshing series of papers incorporating multiple levels of
analysis and covering a spectrum of topics that are both novel for accountability perspectives as well as interesting
and important for organizational scholarship and practice. This edition begins with this introduction piece which sets
forth a synopsis of the Frink and Klimoski platform and then introduces the papers that comprise this edition.
D 2004 Published by Elsevier Inc.

1. Introduction

The drive to survive can consume organizational motivations, and strewn across the landscape of
organizational history are the wreckages of accountability failures. The list can be extensive, and we do
not need to look far for examples. Events from the Barings Bank failure to the flawed Hubble telescope

* Corresponding author. Tel.: +1-601-232-5834; fax: +1-601-232-5821.

E-mail address: frink@bus.olemiss.edu (D.D. Frink).
1
Tel.: +1-703-993-1369; fax: +1-703-993-1367.

1053-4822/$ - see front matter D 2004 Published by Elsevier Inc.

doi:10.1016/j.hrmr.2004.02.001
2 D.D. Frink, R.J. Klimoski / Human Resource Management Review 14 (2004) 1–17

mirror (Frink & Ferris, 1996) can be explained cogently as accountability failures. Indeed, the ravaging
of the Arthur Andersen accounting firm in the Enron and WorldCom debacles can be described as a
failure of accountability for the accountability watchdog (not to mention the accountability failures in
those two firms).
From the most primitive tribal systems to loosely structured alliances to the most sophisticated
production systems, social systems of any sort demand, at some level, general agreement about
expectations and rules guiding behavior. Indeed, such agreement is not only demanded, it exists by
definition, and is inherent in the very concept of ‘‘social systems.’’ That is, social systems can be defined
in terms of shared expectations. This implies that there are means to elicit conformity through
observation, evaluation, and sanction according to how people respond to those shared expectations.
Thus, accountability is at the root of viable social systems, and all the more so in formal organizations. It
is a great curiosity to us, however, that a concept so fundamental to organizations has received so little
attention from academe. Our interest is in contributing to the resolving of that quandary.
Two basic reasons drive this effort. First, without understanding accountability, organizations are likely
to fail, and we would suggest that the better we understand accountability, the better the chances of longer
term viability. Second, as this special issue bears out, accountability provides an extremely rich and
interesting body of thought for investigation and application. As we set forth in this issue, this body of
thought embraces concepts ranging from the micro domain of cognitive processing to the macro domain of
cross-cultural studies. Indeed, some might suggest that our analysis of our accountabilities and our efforts
to cope with those accountabilities is the most pervasive element underlying our decisions and actions.
This edition of Human Resource Management Review (HRMR) presents a series of papers focused on
accountability in organizations. The approach used for assembling this package was to set forth a
platform built from our views of the accountability phenomenon, and ask a sample of subject matter
experts to view their own domain of expertise from that platform. We also asked them to take a critical
view of our perspective as they deemed appropriate. The platform we propose is derived from our 1998
chapter in Research in Personnel and Human Resources Management (RPHRM; Frink & Klimoski,
1998). One aspect of that framework included a claim that it could accommodate multiple levels of
analysis. In light of that claim, the contributors were solicited to reflect different levels from the
individual through the organizational levels, and on to cultural effects.
Therefore, this edition begins with a synopsis of the platform we set forth. The succeeding papers
offer the various authors’ applications of this accountability platform to their specific domains of
expertise, beginning with the micro level of cognitive processing, moving to successively higher levels
of analysis to organizational and cross-cultural levels. Topics and authors include leadership (Erdogan,
Sparrowe, Liden, & Dunegan), trust building (Ammeter, Douglas, Ferris, & Goka), ethics (Beu &
Buckley), workplace violence (O’Leary-Kelly, Theidt, & Bowes-Sperry), organizational justice (Cro-
panzano, Chrobot-Mason, Rupp, & Prehar), and social controls across cultures (Gelfand, Lim, & Raver).
Before further description of those contributions, we turn to the platform that provides thematic
integration of those papers. This discussion is drawn directly from Frink and Klimoski (1998), and a
more complete discussion can be found there.

1.1. Nature of accountability

Social systems in general can be defined in terms of common sets of shared expectations for behavior.
Accountability, then, might be thought of as the adhesive that binds social systems together. Without the
 D.D. Frink, R.J. Klimoski / Human Resource Management Review 14 (2004) 1–17 3

capacity to call individual agents to answer for their actions, there is no basis for social order, for shared
expectations, or indeed, for the maintenance of any type of social system (Tetlock, 1992).
Organizational responses to the need for accountability from its members include the creation of such
mechanisms as formal reporting relationships, performance evaluations, employment contracts, perfor-
mance monitoring, reward systems (including compensation), disciplinary procedures, supervisory
leadership training, personnel manuals, etc. In addition to these formal mechanisms, organizations
promote several informal sources of accountability. These include group norms, corporate cultural
norms, loyalty to an individual’s superior and colleagues, even an emphasis on and respect for the
customers of one’s outputs. What becomes quickly obvious is the potential complexity of the web of
accountabilities in which an employee is embedded. To this myriad can be added the notion of self-
accountability (Schlenker & Weigold, 1989). Thus, we can readily see that people are constantly
influenced by the potential for scrutiny and evaluation, and indeed, they likely expect to be held
accountable.

1.2. Conceptualizing accountability

Definitions of accountability tend to revolve around two specific themes. One theme concerns the
context, that is, who and what is involved in a given situation, and the second theme involves the notion
of an evaluation and feedback activity in some form.
The first theme concerns the interpersonal context and focuses on persons in two distinct roles. One is
sometimes referred to as the ‘‘agent’’ (Adelberg & Batson, 1978; Cummings & Anton, 1990), and is the
focal person whose behavior is subject to evaluation by another. The other is often referred to as the
‘‘audience’’ or ‘‘principle,’’ and is some person or persons having opportunity and reason to observe and
evaluate the agent. Schlenker and Weigold (1989) add that people can evaluate their own behavior and
therefore self-accountability is a viable concept. Other issues of the interpersonal context include such
notions as the structural, social, and interpersonal contingencies which embed the accountability
phenomenon.
The second theme concerns the activities that are seen as elements of the accountability phenomenon.
In essence, these are activities associated with the observation and evaluation of agents, the determi-
nation of the behaviors that the agent may be compelled to defend, justify, or otherwise answer for, and
the creation of expectations for such an obligation. Finally, in order for accountability to have an
influence on behavior, there needs to be an associated reward or punishment system which makes the
evaluations meaningful to the agent (Mitchell, 1993). Accountability therefore can be explicit in
organizational policies and practices in addition to being implicit in social normative expectations.
Thus, a broad conceptualization of accountability includes both formal and informal systems,
objective and subjective evaluations and rewards, and internal and external audiences. An important
point to note here is that the presence of evaluation mechanisms is not necessarily what directly
influences behaviors. Rather, it is the expectations surrounding potential evaluations which are at the
root of our responses. The evaluative mechanisms and relationships that exist are used for the basis of
perceptions and expectations about future evaluations. Put another way, rather than seeing accountability
primarily as a state of affairs, we tend to view it as a state of mind which is derived, in part, from a state
of affairs.
Thus, accountability involves an actor or agent in a social context who potentially is subject to
observation and evaluation by some audience(s), including one’s self. There also are standards, or
4 D.D. Frink, R.J. Klimoski / Human Resource Management Review 14 (2004) 1–17

expectations against which the agent’s behaviors are compared, and the belief on the part of the agent of
some likelihood that he or she may need to answer for, justify, or defend the decisions or behaviors. In
addition, it is important that there are outcomes for the agent (i.e., sanctions, rewards, or punishments
that can be explicit or implicit, and also objective or subjective). Finally, the focus is the conduct of
behaviors or decisions by the agent (arguably under his or her own control). It is the control of the latter,
after all, that is the purpose of accountability mechanisms put in place in organizations.

2. Role theory as a framework for accountability

2.1. Role theory and accountability

Role systems theory was originally seen as a way to describe how organizations, as ‘‘contrived social
systems,’’ manage to inculcate or produce reliable behavior on the part of their members (Katz & Kahn,
1978). Accountability theory is also rooted in explanations for predictable behavior. Moreover, role theory
and accountability both place a great deal of emphasis on interpersonal relationships. Furthermore, they
both postulate a central role for interpersonal expectations, emphasize the importance of the consequence
of compliance, and link tasks and activities to individuals (e.g., Cummings & Anton, 1990; Ferris,
Mitchell, Canavan, Frink, & Hopper, 1995; Schlenker, Britt, Pennington, Murphy, & Doherty, 1994).
Besides these striking similarities regarding the structure and functioning of role systems and
accountability systems in organizations, the former perspective provides what we feel are important
new insights regarding when and where accountability is produced and the organizational systems that
are relevant. This seems to be a deficiency in current views of accountability theory. Thus, we feel that a
role systems theory perspective adds value to any treatment of accountability in work settings.
Before we get in to the details of integrating accountability and role theory, we briefly review some of
the thinking underlying the nature of roles in work settings.

2.2. Organizations as ‘‘contrived’’

Modern work organizations are created by people in order to attain valued outcomes, outcomes that
require the coordinated activities of many people. But the very nature of the goals and objectives of
organizations usually results in large and complex arrangements of work and of people at work. Thus,
managers and practitioners have long sought how to insure the rational coordination necessary for
organizational effectiveness.
To make matters worse, there are several parties who have a stake in the organization, each having
their own perspectives and interests. Within the organization are various roles and functions, and the
required coordination implies that there may be substantial overlap in the persons or constituencies to
whom one feels accountable. Furthermore, the internal activities are embedded in the context of several
external stakeholders (e.g., shareholders and society) who also have a vested interest in producing
accountability. Because of the need to satisfy (or satisfice) each of these constituencies, there is a regular
and consistent search for means of ensuring proper representation of the stakeholders’ interests in the
agents’ activities.
Because organizations are viewed as systems and because systems tend to evolve, current theories
(e.g., Katz & Kahn, 1978; Pfeffer, 1981; Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978; Weick, 1969) have identified several
 D.D. Frink, R.J. Klimoski / Human Resource Management Review 14 (2004) 1–17 5

mechanisms that seem to have come about for this purpose. These mechanisms involve the articulation
of organizational goals and hierarchical differentiation. They also include the development of
organizational roles.

2.3. The existence of organizational interdependencies

The coordination of activities within an organization requires individuals to interact with and depend
on others to accomplish their own assignments. Indeed, it is incumbent on the organization to create and
maintain these interdependencies. Sometimes, there might be no technical imperative for linking the fate
of one person to another, but, there might be a pragmatic or philosophical reason for doing so (e.g., as in
the creation of group bonus compensation schemes). Workplace interdependencies, regardless of how
they come about, have important consequences for both the worker, the designer of work systems, and
the management of the workers and systems. These revolve around the need for predictability and
control. These also give rise to organizational roles.

2.4. Organizational roles

When people are interdependent at work and must interact with each other on a regular basis, certain
patterns develop. To use Thibaut and Kelley’s (1959) term, they create and become mutually aware of a
norm for such behavior. In this context, a norm is a set of expectations about what someone ought to do
under a particular set of circumstances (McGrath, 1984). They are, in effect, rules for appropriate
behavior rooted in expectations (McGrath, 1984). We have norms for particular situations, as well as
norms for the allocation of rewards or resources. There also are norms for defining what McGrath (1984)
calls ‘‘social reality.’’ That is, we have expectations regarding beliefs, attitudes, and values about such
things as what is true, what is right, and what is valuable. As such, normative expectations can focus as
much on desired ways of thinking as ways of behaving. In fact, research on social cognition (e.g., Wyer
& Srull, 1986) informs us that we process information and then act according to scripts, including many
with a normative component.
Of particular relevance to the present discussion is that, in most work settings, norms develop around
the appropriate division of labor and activities. They prescribe what is expected, who should do it, and
when. Such norms or expectations for functionally differentiated sets of behaviors among members of a
work unit are usually referred to as roles (Katz & Kahn, 1978).
Thus, role expectations are norms that specify not only what should be done, but who should do what,
when and how (McGrath 1984, p. 201). As such, they add structure to interpersonal relations at work. A
special feature of role expectations is that they develop or come about (and are modified) as a result of
both a priori and ad hoc processes. The interactions and interdependencies that are actually occurring
there serve as the basis for mutual expectations. Moreover, although organizational expectations for key
behaviors (e.g., honesty) may be well articulated, it will be the norms for behavior, as developed and
enforced in routine work interactions, that are likely to have the greatest impact on behavior.

2.5. The content of expectations

In general, only those things that are socially valued and/or seen as useful (instrumental) become
codified in relationships. Thus, not all matters get formulated into mutual expectations. On the other
6 D.D. Frink, R.J. Klimoski / Human Resource Management Review 14 (2004) 1–17

hand, many things, such as contextual performance, do make a difference in the quality of working
together.
Role theory is eclectic in its approach to just what constitutes the content of sent expectations. Clearly,
however, there is an emphasis on workflow and related behavior. But many aspects of the social–
interpersonal environment are also implied. That is to say, norms are frequently developed and
maintained primarily because they make working together a lot easier and more pleasurable. Such
things as the level of honesty or integrity to be demonstrated, the proper responses to rule violations, or
the level of trustworthiness to exhibit are often among the first things to be clarified in work settings
(Gabarro, 1987). Critical for this process are means of encouraging, maintaining, or enforcing
compliance with the norms.

3. A platform for viewing accountability

3.1. The development and crystallization of shared role expectations

Katz and Kahn (1978) have offered a framework of the development of shared role expectations and
for the taking of organizational roles. Based on this, we offer a schematic for the processes involved in
Fig. 1. Such processes are briefly reviewed. The dynamics involved are seen by us as extremely relevant
to making the case for using a role systems perspective for modeling accountability in work settings.
Our premise for modeling predictable behavior in the workplace is that it takes place in a social
context, and involves the expectations of at least two people. Behavior is also postulated to be the result
of mutual influence processes. That is, expectations get translated into attempts at mutual influence. The
result is mutual understanding and predictable behavior.

Fig. 1. A framework of role theory and accountability.

 D.D. Frink, R.J. Klimoski / Human Resource Management Review 14 (2004) 1–17 7

Because role processes are dynamic in nature, Katz and Kahn (1978) chose to capture important
features in terms of role taking. Basically, this represents a model of social exchange and influence that
results in an increment of understanding (and predictability) in a relationship. Katz and Kahn refer to this
slice of life as a role episode.
The expectations that are held out for a worker are held by someone referred to generically by Katz
and Kahn as a role sender. In one form or another, they are also thought to be held by the target of
these expectations, the person in whose behavior and attitudes we are interested. The term role sender
includes those members of the organization with whom the individual is interdependent and must
interact with on a regular basis. Two other sources of interpersonal expectations are identified in the
figure, that is, the personal traits or attributes of both the sender and target. Simply stated, our
expectations for other people are strongly influenced by our knowledge, skills, abilities, and
personality. They are also affected by the history of our relationship with someone, and with the
organization.
The role-taking perspective of role systems theory assumes that the expectations of senders (the boss,
coworker, etc.) serve as the stimulus for the target’s behavior. Such expectations are communicated to
an individual worker through a variety of means, some are direct, while others are subtle. As noted,
relevant to both the perceptual process and reactions to sent expectations are the target person’s own
expectations.
Relationships also matter. The same communicated expectations (e.g., for hard work, for honesty, and
for good service) will be perceived differently by someone, depending on the history of the relationship
between the sender and the worker. Where there has been a pleasant relationship, such expectations will
likely result in different reactions from where there has been animosity. This implies that those more
adept or skilled at reading and responding to these relationships are more likely to be successful. Thus,
social skill/intelligence should support navigating the social context of the organization.
According to theory, mutual expectations set the stage, and sent expectations are the precipitating
event. But once expectations are understood, the crux of the process is the reactions on the part of the
target (i.e., the ‘‘role episode’’).
Writers, such as Katz and Kahn (1978), Schein (1980), McGrath (1984), and others have
characterized the potential reactions of the target on a continuum of conformity relative to the sender’s
desires or wishes. The importance for our discussion is that the reactions to sent expectations in a
particular role episode will also have consequences. These are schematized in the figure as well. Theory
predicts consequences for the individual (especially his or her self-concept), the relationship of the
individual with the sender, the sender (perhaps revising his or her self-concept as well), and the system in
which the relationship is embedded.

3.2. Role taking vs. role making

Current thinking and empirical data (Morrison, 1993) support the notion that most workers are in fact
proactive in shaping their job duties, and in creating satisfying conditions in the workplace. They are, in
fact, role makers rather than passive role takers. Certainly, the level of initiation will vary somewhat,
depending on such things as the nature of the task to be performed (e.g., professional work) or
hierarchical level (i.e., amount of personal and position power of the focal person). But, by and large,
workers attempt to control their workplace destiny, and this means shaping the expectations and the
course of future interactions. This is the essence of role making. To put it another way, contemporary
8 D.D. Frink, R.J. Klimoski / Human Resource Management Review 14 (2004) 1–17

views of role theory state quite clearly that what is going on is mutual influence in relationship
management. These comments paint a picture of a focal person who is often not waiting for ‘‘sent
expectations.’’ In this regard, the focal person may be as much the catalyst for others’ expectations as a
recipient.

3.3. Role dynamics and behavior regulation

If the goal is to model behavior in work settings, role systems theory and our version of it would seem
to have merit. It recognizes that individual behavior is determined by a complex of forces operating at
several levels of analysis: the individual (target person), the dyad (role sender/target person duo), the
social (e.g., both the target and sender are embedded in multiple relationships), and the system (e.g.,
organizational policies and practices) level. Neither the ‘‘regular performance of work’’ that is of high
quality nor an ‘‘unethical act’’ can be explained simply.
Another implication of this view of the embedded nature of things is the recognition that organizational
designers, consultants, or managers can only set the stage for particular patterns of behaviors. Their plans
and wishes notwithstanding, much of the variance in behavior is driven by forces rooted in interpersonal
relationships, subject to the realities of work interdependencies and the norms that develop. To put it
another way, it reminds us to think of the prediction of behavior in probabilistic terms.
A third point worth emphasizing is that work relationships are a result of both personal and
institutional factors. The expectations held for individuals in a work relationship can indeed be affected
by policies, practices, and rules. But, it is ultimately the interpretation and application of such rules by
people in a relationship that will account for behavior.
A fourth aspect of this perspective is that it recognizes that the development of work patterns takes
time and can change. It tries to come to grips with the fact that people entering into new relationships
with work and with work colleagues are, at the outset, trying to make sense of just who they are and
what they are to do (Gabarro, 1987; Louis, 1980; Morrison, 1993). Thus, individual expectations,
reactions to expectations, and resulting mutual expectations take time to stabilize. On the other hand, our
model implies that ‘‘nothing is forever.’’ When it comes to mutual expectations, there is reason to believe
in continuous change or development. While experiencing relative equilibrium is possible (and thus,
behavior can be predictable), this equilibrium can and will be ‘‘punctuated’’ (McGrath, 1984) by events,
such as personal insight, interpersonal conflict, change in the composition of the role set, new
technology, or new incentive systems.
Finally, the dynamics of role theory highlight the notion of alignment. In this context, alignment (or
consistency) is relative to the expectations held out for the focal person. This alignment can be with
regard to self-held expectations and those of a role sender, the set of expectations being communicated
by a particular role sender (e.g., the boss), and/or sets of expectations directed to the focal person by
various members of the role set. But importantly, the concept of alignment can be used to characterize
the level of consistency that exists between expectations set up by organizational policies, and those
enacted in the workplace at the level of interpersonal communication.
Alignment implies the potential for successful influence and conformity to expectations. To put it
simply, expectancies that diverge across senders, for example, present a weaker case for conforming on
the part of the focal person. Lack of alignment usually confounds influences (expectations) from the role
set. At a minimum, it allows for increased discretion (or, in the parlance of politicians, ‘‘wiggle room’’)
in responding to any one set of expectations. Occasionally, inconsistency leads to work stress, in the
 D.D. Frink, R.J. Klimoski / Human Resource Management Review 14 (2004) 1–17 9

form of role ambiguity. Over time, it may breed cynicism. In all cases, it results in behavior that is less
predictable, and which, in the eyes of the organization, may be undesirable.

3.4. Integration of role theory and accountability

At its essence, accountability in organizations can be viewed as involving elements of role taking and
role making as these unfold in the context of a history of role episodes.
While accountability theory refers to the building of self-actions–standards perceptions (Schlenker et
al., 1994), role theory also deals with such linkages, but in the form of role expectations. Both
perspectives deal with social control. Accountability theory has tended to focus on opinions, decisions or
behaviors related to moral or ethical issues (e.g., Dose & Klimoski, 1995) as noted, and role theory also
has included these (often as a discussion of the bases of role conflict), as well as issues of a more
mundane sort (work attendance and job performance generally). Moreover, at its base, accountability
implies the anticipation of an ‘‘accounting,’’ having to report or explain oneself to others in the future. In
role theory, the focal worker also anticipates facing an accounting as well, in this case, having to respond
in the future to the expectations of role senders, albeit, perhaps on shorter (e.g., even hourly) and
recurring cycles. In many ways, we argue, role theory explicates the essential components and
relationships central to accountability.
There are other useful comparisons. Accountability theory has largely been one of explaining
reactions to anticipated reviews. Thus, Ferris et al. (1995), Frink and Ferris (1998, 1999), Klimoski
and Ash (1974), Schlenker et al. (1994), Tetlock (1985, 1992), and others describe examples of both the
cognitive and behavioral consequences of having to face the expectations of (or a review by) another
party. This is almost the essence of role theory.

4. Advantages of a role perspective on accountability

There are several advantages of adopting a role theory perspective of accountability in organizations.
To further advance these notions, several specific advantages are discussed below.

4.1. A different unit of analysis

Accountability researchers have tended to focus on what might be called an ‘‘event’’—usually a

decision to be made or defended. In contrast, a major advantage of role theory is that it gives us the
notion of a ‘‘relationship’’ as a preferred unit of analysis. This implies attention to accountability
expectations as these have developed and/or are maintained between people. Such things as the duration,
quality, and predictability of the relationship between an agent and his or her principals will make a
difference in accountability outcomes.

4.2. Temporal considerations

Accountability theory has been examined largely in contrived settings. That is, agent and principal
relationships are created in a simulation and exist for a limited time period. In contrast, role theory
stresses continuity. Its logic implies the building up of expectations and the opportunity to learn the
10 D.D. Frink, R.J. Klimoski / Human Resource Management Review 14 (2004) 1–17

consequences for meeting or rejecting such expectations. It also stresses the changes that occur to both
the principal and the agent (and indeed, their relationship) as a result of this learning. While temporal
considerations include relationships, there are other important dimensions related to past events and
history that affect responses to accountability requirements.

4.3. Wide range of responses

For the most part, investigators interested in the effects of accountability have tended to focus on a
limited range of phenomena, usually its effects on cognitive processing (Tetlock et al., 1989), opinion
change (Brief, Dukerich, & Doran, 1991), and occasionally behavioral conformity (Klimoski & Ash,
1974). But expectations in a relationship will usually produce a wide range of effects. Role theory allows
for (even encourages) the prediction of a variety of potential agent behaviors in response to a principal’s
expectations, including conformity, avoidance, negotiation, rejection, and selective attention. It also
allows for attempts on the part of the agent at persuasion and, failing that, coalition building (e.g., with
other ‘‘agents’’ reporting to a common principal). Role theory predicts that, while agents will indeed
respond to accountabilities in general, these responses may be different from what was intended when
the accountability conditions were developed.

4.4. Mutual influence

Accountability theory has emphasized the consequence of facing an accounting, usually presuming
that the conditions to be faced by the agent are dictated by the principal. While this can occur in some
settings, according to role theory, it is far more likely that the terms of accountability are negotiated.
Given what we know about the dynamics of empowerment (Conger & Kaningo, 1988), we would
predict that the reactions to any accountability will be strongly colored by the extent and nature of such
negotiation processes. What is not evident in most theory about accountability is the influence that
agents are likely to have.

4.5. Individual differences

Most research on accountability has treated individual differences in agents lightly if at all. For the
most part, accountability researchers have sought to model the general case. On the other hand, role
theory emphasizes the importance of agent attributes. As diagrammed in Fig. 1, these agent differences
are seen to affect the initial expectations of both the role senders (principals) and the agent, and are
thought to operate to filter expectations communicated by the principal. Role theory also stresses the
individual differences among principals (role senders) as well. Individual differences are indeed
influential in accountability relationships, and likely are increasingly so over time.

4.6. Multiple sets of expectations

In contrast to accountability theory, treatments of role theory usually assume that expectations from
multiple principals (constituencies) are operative in most work settings. This is articulated in the concept
of the role set. More importantly, it is also assumed that there are no guarantees that there will be
consistencies across principals regarding expectations. Thus, the agent must be modeled as having to
 D.D. Frink, R.J. Klimoski / Human Resource Management Review 14 (2004) 1–17 11

define, negotiate, or otherwise balance these often conflicting expectations. Multiple expectations can
originate from a single principal, and multiple principals are likely to be a confound in an agent’s
developing of expectations.

4.7. The alignment of expectations

While the number and nature of constituencies implies the degree of consistency or alignment in
expectations that will occur (more constituents = less alignment likely), this factor in itself is worthy of
emphasis. Generally, as noted, lack of alignment brings with it the potential for conflict and stress. But
lack of alignment (consensus) also can produce liberating forces as well. Perhaps it goes without saying,
but we would generally expect more conformity and feel less discomfort facing a principal who has
expectations that are wholly consistent (aligned) with our own.

4.8. The importance of the primary group

The two previous sections highlight the importance of what sociologists might call the primary group
for predicting when and where accountability forces are likely to form and to be strongest. In general, the
members of the role set are implicated as the major source of such forces. The nature and clarity of their
expectations (including how they have come about), the degree of consensus in these expectations, and
the role set’s habits relative to responding to the agent’s deviance from these expectations will be critical
to predicting or modeling agent behavior. A special case of this is the frequent discovery that acts of
unethical or illegal behavior often occur in clusters, in certain locations in organizations. This is as if a
‘‘microclimate’’ (Patterson, Payne, & West, 1996) exists relative to just what expectations are operative
and/or will be enforced. Thus, organizational policies (at the system level) will not be anywhere near as
salient as work group pressures.

4.9. The dark side of accountability

Clearly, as noted at the outset of this chapter, popular treatments of the concept of accountability have
usually assumed that more accountability is better because it produces organizationally desired
outcomes. But as Frink et al. (1995) have pointed out, this is not necessarily the case. In fact, as
suggested earlier, there is a dark side to accountability where there are often undesirable effects. The
advantage of a role theory perspective is that it more completely specifies when and where these dark
side consequences are likely to occur. In essence, then, the result of accountabilities placed on an
individual will be the result of an interaction of internal and external characteristics, and this interaction
may easily lead to outcomes that are undesirable either organizationally or socially, such as in the
increased use of age stereotypes in the study by Gordon, Rozelle, and Baxter (1988).

4.10. Interpersonal vs. organizational processes

The position taken by this paper is that a role theory perspective is a superior vehicle for
understanding accountability forces in work organizations. The bulk of this section has explained
why we think that this is the case. One last argument to be put forth in this regard remains, however.
Specifically, role theory serves to bridge the several levels of analysis that must be attended to in order
12 D.D. Frink, R.J. Klimoski / Human Resource Management Review 14 (2004) 1–17

for the construct of accountability to have much in the way of explanatory or predictive power in work
settings. Perhaps not so obvious is that macro factors at the level of the organization (e.g., organizational
culture), even at the level of the industry, must be considered as well. For better or worse, these often set
the context for the expectations of members’ role set (i.e., principals).

4.11. The dynamics of accountability contexts

Role theory has proven useful for the explanation of organizations because of its consideration of
several factors and dimensions in a unified framework. As noted, these factors and dimensions have
specific applications to accountability which warrant discussion. One is that a role theory approach
incorporates a multitude of intrapersonal, interpersonal, and person–organization dynamics which helps
guide our approach to several issues. The framework developed herein suggests that variables, such as
general cognitive ability, social skill/intelligence, conscientiousness, Type A personality, generalized
efficacy, trait stress, and self-monitoring, among others, may be of particular interest. These variables
have specific implications for how individuals approach their environments, which may set the stage for
receiving and interpreting environmental cues. Other variables have specific implications for the
interpersonal and person–organization aspects of the proposed framework. Variables, such as agree-
ableness, locus of control, and personal and work values, among others, are related to how one interprets
and responds to environmental cues, and might help explain and predict behavior related to
accountability perceptions.
Another issue is related to the salience or strength of the signals from the role senders. We would
expect that responses to accountability will be related to the number and consistency of sources
promoting accountability in some form. This framework might suggest that we focus on role sender
characteristics related to signal strength of sent expectations, which in turn influences perceptions and
responses to accountability episodes. These may include size of audience, strength of organizational
culture, level of hierarchy of both principal and agent, relative position of principal(s), etc.
A related issue is the question of principal identification—just who is it we feel accountable towards?
Although formal reporting relationships and responsibilities can be quite explicit at times, there are
usually several constituencies that have a stake in what we do. There are customers, clients, coworkers,
subordinates, supervisors, suppliers, etc., who have an interest in our choices. A more refined set of
questions might then be to ask such things as what is the makeup of our role set, how stable or dynamic
is our role set, and what expectations and conditions embed those relationships? That is, how do we
determine which role senders are most influential, for what individuals, and in what circumstances?
Thus, we have offered a vehicle for developing our understanding of numerous events which can be
described in terms of the accountability phenomenon. It is definitive enough to support prediction, yet
flexible enough to permit a broad range of applications. As a test of the viability of our framework, we
move to the topical papers mentioned earlier.

4.12. This issue of human resource management review

As noted earlier, the approach used for structuring this issue is to first set for the platform that serves
as a common foundation for all the contributions. The individual papers, then, take a particular
criterion of interest to the organizational and behavioral sciences, and view that criterion from an
accountability platform. This approach offers a unifying theme, or thread while offering the individual
 D.D. Frink, R.J. Klimoski / Human Resource Management Review 14 (2004) 1–17 13

contributors enough latitude to explore that criterion fully using an explanatory mechanism that we
believe to be useful.
The results are outstanding, in our opinion. The approach of integrating heretofore distinct bodies has
the effect of inducing refreshing creativity into the papers. Fresh approaches that were mandated by this
process created novel applications and concepts that have substantial potential to inform and support
theory, research, and practice.
Erdogan et al. engaged an effort to expand our thinking about the realities of social contexts. This
includes notions like uncertainty, perceptual differences, and psychological contracts, as catalysts for
accountability perceptions (internal vs. external and general vs. specific), and offer a framework for
analyses of these relationships.
They draw from theories of LMX, accountability, contextual performance, expectancy, social
exchange, TMX, and POS to construct their framework and arguments. With the greater emphasis on
LMX and accountability in particular, they build on the common foundations these literatures have in role
theory (Frink & Klimoski, 1998). This results in collapsing LMX dimensions into affect and contribution-
based exchanges. As will be seen, variations on this theme are found throughout these papers.
In developing their thesis, they also differentiate internal vs. external and general vs. specific
accountability perceptions, proposing that behaviors result from accountabilities which emerge from the
LMX relationship, including the affective component. Further informing their analysis is expectancy
theory. Substituting the notion of legitimacy of accountabilities and expectations for valence, they
propose that expectancy, instrumentally, and legitimacy are influenced by the relationships and
accountabilities which embed them. They also integrate self-efficacy as a mediating variable for
expectations proposing a positive correlation between LMX and self-efficacy.
In folding these concepts, theories, and variables together, they produce a number of meaningful
testable propositions about the nature of accountability and leadership. Examples of proposed relation-
ships include affect-based exchanges and lower punishment perceptions, contribution-based exchanges
and reward instrumentally, LMX and the range of reward/punish expectations, and LMX and lower
explicit process and outcome accountabilities. They further propose that self-accountability moderates
LMX, TMX, POS, and felt accountability. Underlying of much of their discussion is the influence of
affect vs. contribution-based exchanges, which affect reward vs. punishment instrumentalities. As will
be seen, this resonates with one of the themes that runs through these papers.
The purpose of the second paper, by Ammeter et al., is to integrate literatures with similar foundations
in relationship development and perceptions. They focus on the interplay of accountability, as a
constraint, and trust, as belief in the efficacy of accountability or motives. They further underscore the
role of political skill in how those relationships, perceptions, and roles develop. From the basis of a role
theory platform for accountability, they explore commonalities between these perspectives. Noting that
accountability is a social adhesive, and that trust is an essential exchange requirement, they emphasize
the positive aspect of trust and the monitoring aspects of accountability. This perspective leads to a
suggestion that trust (i.e., positive expectancies about target behavior) and accountability (as monitoring
for the constraint of behavior) may be thought of as substitutes. Emerging in this discussion is that
accountability can focus on abilities or values, which strongly resonates with Erdogan et al.’s discussion
of affect and contribution-based LMX exchanges. Given those two bases for accountability perceptions,
it then follows that some roles may employ the affective use of trust (e.g., a supervisor delegating a client
account to a subordinate) and monitoring of accountability (e.g., an accountant checking expense
records) in the same role episode.
14 D.D. Frink, R.J. Klimoski / Human Resource Management Review 14 (2004) 1–17

Ammeter et al. also point out that navigating the complexities of these dynamic and multifarious
relationships can be facilitated by political skill. Defined in terms of knowledge, skills, and abilities
(both innate and learned) in navigating social waters, political skill includes social intelligence and the
astute use of impression management and influence tactics. An example of a straightforward prediction
is that political skill can increase trust, which can reduce monitoring. In a more clearly delineated
proposition that builds further ties with the previous paper, they post that values (affective)-based trust,
political skill, and affective-based LMX are related, while behavioral trust, monitoring, and contribution-
based LMX are related. Further exploring these constructs suggests that accountability evokes a need to
appear competent, and the choice and use of impression management for identity protection or
enhancement is moderated by political skill. From a role sender’s perspective, this might suggest that
soft influence tactics may produce a sense of obligation, which in turn insures accountability where the
relationship is value-based.
Ammeter et al.’s final exclamation point is a reminder to readers that traditional, formal accountability
systems are fading in many quarters as power- and authority-based relationships decline.
As we have discussed earlier, accountability theory, particularly our version of it, readily accom-
modates multiple levels of analysis, and this volume was designed to do so. Most accountability studies
use decision-making methodologies, as do the literatures of many of our other conceptual frameworks.
We do, however, attempt to inch upward in levels of analysis, at least in potential. Beginning with dyadic
approaches, we have moved to broaden social context issues in Beu and Buckley’s discussion of ethics
and accountability. Their purpose is to better understand the moral dimension of relationships, and how
accountability supports that dimension in a range of audiences from a single individual to multiple
stakeholders. They build their discussion primarily on the exchange perspectives of agency theory
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976), economic exchange theory, the stakeholder (vs. shareholder) model, and
social learning theory (Bandura, 1986). Particularly salient aspects of these frameworks include the firm
as a nexus of contracts (agency theory), the necessity of ethical behaviors (economic exchange theory),
and vicarious learning about social sanctions (social learning theory). The trust element resonates with
the previous paper, and the need for positive relationships carries the theories from both previous papers
forward.
After setting forth the basis of social acceptable behavior, Beu and Buckley explore predictors of ethical
choices. Their basic model describes ethical choices as determined by dispositional factors and contextual
factors. The latter include organizational norms and expectations, and their effects are moderated by
accountabilities. In addition to commonly found accountability mechanisms, we are reminded that ethical
codes produce accountability, as does a values-based climate. Such a climate requires individual
accountability with a community vs. a self-interest focus. Employing social learning theory, Beu and
Buckley posit that the values of top managers are reflected downward as vicarious learning informs
employees what behaviors are sanctioned. They further describe how the shift from a shareholder view of
the organization to the stakeholder perspective evokes a new multiplicity of accountabilities.
O’Leary-Kelly et al. follow, using accountability theory to explain the persistence of sexual
harassment despite a legal structure and strong social norms that oppose it. They focus on three key
questions: Why do harassers continue to do so? Why are their targets generally passive? Why are
observers generally silent? Their discussions are generally based on Schlenker et al., Tetlock, and our
own presentations of accountability theory. The authors also set forth the legal groundwork underlying
sexual harassment, especially hostile environment.
 D.D. Frink, R.J. Klimoski / Human Resource Management Review 14 (2004) 1–17 15

Beginning with the notion that behavioral questions give rise to accountability questions, they
delineate two factors in responses to sexual harassment. The first is the focus of the response (i.e., self
vs. initiator) and the second is the mode of the response (i.e., from one’s self vs. using means supported
by others). The resulting 2  2 demonstrates that likely target choices misalign with typical organiza-
tional preferences. From the premise that perpetrators are accountable for the act, targets are accountable
for their response, and observers are accountable for their reaction, O’Leary-Kelly et al. develop ‘‘zones
of accountability,’’ including domains where the accountabilities overlap.
Continuing to build on those foundations, O’Leary-Kelly et al. explore how the uncertainties and
conflicts in roles seem to often allow ‘‘permission’’ to harass. This may be perceived because of
ambiguous role expectations, changing role expectations, competing prescriptions for behavior, the
influence of group norms, and diffusion of responsibility. Similarly, they develop conceptual bases for
victim passivity, including ambiguities embedding the event, ambiguities in prescriptions for sexual
harassment events, and ambiguities surrounding various identities associated with the event. In addressing
their third question, regarding observer nonresponse, they include, but move beyond, the traditional
bystander effects. O’Leary-Kelly et al. note that sexual harassment is clouded by a serious of ambiguities
that may tend to break down the lineages in Schlenker et al.’s (1994) accountability pyramid. In sexual
harassment, prescriptions are often unclear, the event evokes negative affective and identity responses,
observers are uncertain about the nature of the event, observers identity with the event is weak, and
pluralistic ignorance may further distance observers. Altogether, they have done an intriguing job of
developing conceptual explanations for behaviors that previously have been difficult to understand.
The next paper marks a substantive move from individuals and context to an organizational level of
analysis. Cropanzano et al. have produced a very innovative paper intended to inform perspectives of
holding corporations accountable within an individual-focused society. To support their effort, the build
from fairness theory (Folger & Cropanzano, 2001), the legal theory of juristic persons, and Argyris and
Schon’s (1978) organizational learning theory, with its concept of single and double loop learning. They
work from the notion that a ‘‘person’’ is a social construction, and events are socially constructed, thus
the same basic ideas that we collectively apply to individuals can be extended to apply to corporations.
This notion also is at the heart of our perspective of accountability, and our belief in its efficacy for
multiple levels of analysis.
The variable on which Cropanzano et al. focus is corporate behavior, offering a robust framework.
They first establish that the corporation is a juristic person and therefore accountable. Next, they describe
the psychological processes for attributing responsibility, using the would, could, and should questions
from fairness theory. The third component is a discussion of organizational tactics for coping with
accountabilities they face. Applying the notions of single- and double-loop learning, the authors describe
the focus of single-loop responses, which is on remedying what occurred, and the higher level double-
loop responses which extend the analysis to why things occurred, with an eye toward correcting the
causes. The concept of double-loop learning aligns with the role-making notion of our conceptualization
of accountability, wherein entities both learn the nature of their social roles, while attempting to
influence these role perceptions.
Cropanzano et al. explicitly build on the premises that it is the social construction of reality and the
interpretations thereof that drive organizational actions and responses, describing how these social
constructions have changed over time. From that perspective, we move another step upward in levels of
analysis to Gelfand et al.’s analysis of accountability at the cultural level.
16 D.D. Frink, R.J. Klimoski / Human Resource Management Review 14 (2004) 1–17

Gelfand et al. begin by underscoring that cultural forces are found at all levels, and are therefore a
critical element for understanding accountability. Indeed, they suggest that the nature of accountability
systems can be an indicator of cultural variables and they offer well-developed descriptions of how key
cultural variables, in combination, can play out in typical accountability systems in specific cultures. Thus,
their purpose is to advance a cultural perspective of accountability, demonstrating that what they refer to as
an accountability is the result of cultural influences at individual, integroup, and organizational levels.
These authors primarily rely on theories of culture, describing the etics and emics of accountability,
moving from universal accountability features to specifics according to specific cultural characteristics.
They employ specific cultural variables that appear to have particular relevance for accountabilities.
These include individualism/collectivism, which concerns the culture’s emphasis on individuals vs.
family or social units (i.e., the nature of people’s identity in a given social system), cultural tightness/
looseness, which concerns the clarity, strength, and perhaps formality of the norms or rules in a social
system (i.e., the nature of the prescriptions), and power distance, which concerns the nature of vertical
relationships (i.e., another dimension of one’s identity in addition to its implications for interpreting
events and the nature of prescriptions about events).
As a vehicle to describe these relationships and influences, they use the concept of an accountability
web, which is a cognitive map of social accountability norms, and which are the result of sociocultural
enculturation. Drawing from theories of culture, roles, and accountability, they note that important
features of accountabilities include the direction (who is accountable to whom), strength of account-
ability norms, number of accountability connections, and alignment of expectations among actors.
They posit that the number of connections is related to individualism/collectivism, direction is related
to power distance and strength and alignment are related to cultural tightness/looseness.
The three cultural variables together produce eight combinations that can generally describe cultures.
Selecting four specific combinations that describe a substantial number of cultures, Gelfand et al.
provide detailed descriptions of how those combinations might play out in the features of typical
accountability systems within certain cultural contexts. Examples of key features include whether the
focus is self-accountability vs. accountability to a collective, how explicit the standards are, the level of
alignment among standards and audiences, the prevalence of role sending vs. role making, and the
impact of those particular accountability webs on creativity and innovation.

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