Changing global Order - Boko Haram and the

Nigeria government
1. Anatomy of a Crisis – Boko Haram and the Nigeria government

Boko Haram’s origins dates back to 2002, when a youth group declared the
government of the city of Maiduguri and the Islamic establishment to be
intolerably corrupt and irredeemable (Walker, 2012).

However, there is a general consensus that the current strife between Boko
Haram and the Nigerian government was sparked in July 2009, when
tensions between the sect and authorities reached a breaking point. Up until
that point the group had conducted its operations more or less in a peaceful
manner. In 2009 the then uncomfortable coexistence collapsed when Nigerian
security forces staged an offensive that killed at least 800 people across
several states. The action included the extra-judicial killing of the group’s
leader, Mohammed Yusuf, and deadly, often indiscriminate, attacks on other
buildings and settlements associated with Boko Haram. The group went under
ground and after a year of regrouping, emerged under the leadership of
Abubakar Shekau with a more militant agenda and brutal tactics. Since then,
there has been an escalation of attacks by insurgents and a growing response
by the Nigerian military (Adibe, 2013).

2. Motivations, conflict drivers and incentives in the Boko Haram

conflict.

Some have argued that the motivations and strategic objectives of Boko
Haram remain unclear (Allen, 2014). There are indeed many barriers to
understanding Boko Haram as little information about the organisation can be
easily verified.

However according to Adibe (2013) several theses and theories have been
proffered for the emergence of Boko Haram, that is helpful in an attempt to
understand what Boko Haram interests are. The explanations include that the
conflict is essentially another religious conflict between the two dominant
religions in the Nigeria Christianity and Islam. Proponents of this thesis stress
the religious identity of Boko Haram. However, Hussein (2013) has argued
that whilst the religious factor is important in explaining Boko Haram, and
cannot be discounted, such a view is overly simplistic.

Others have argued Boko Haram is frustrated with the plight of the citizens of
the Nigeria in particular Northern Nigerians who feel marginalised from the
current political and economic dispensation. Walker (2012) concurs with this
view of Boko Haram. Walker sees the genesis of the conflict in the belief by
Boko Haram that politics in northern Nigeria has been seized by a group of
corrupt, false Muslims and it is therefore necessary to wage war against them,
and the Federal Republic of Nigeria in order to create a “pure” Islamic state
ruled by sharia law. This second view of Boko Haram’s interest is more
feasible as an explanation for their actions and the logical conclusion perhaps
will be for the group set up a state-like organisation, operating initially on a
small scale, parallel to the federal government, but with the ultimate aim to
eventually replace the actual state.

Figure 1 below taken from Samu (2012) summarises the motivations, conflict
drivers and incentives in the Boko Haram conflict.

3. Negotiation under a competitive bargaining process.

It is hoped that by using a problem solving approach, parties might redefine

the issues at stake and not look at the problem as a conflict, but as a common
problem on which they need to work together. By realizing this, they also
realize that they might have common gains instead of competing gains. In
order to analyse the negotiation process we need to define the counterparts’
positions, interests and try to figure out their Best Alternative To Negotiated
Agreement (BATNA). This is the best alternative for each party if negotiations
break down.

3.1. The Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA) for each

party.

For Boko Haram their BATNA is to continue to use terror to highlight heir
cause with the aim to harass the Nigeria government to make concessions to
them. The BATNA for the Nigerian government is to intensify it’s the military
confrontation with Boko Haram, seeking their comprehensive defeat or their
surrender.

Each party will need to determine for itself whether its BATNA is preferable to
anything that may be achievable at the negotiating table. This means not only
that each will need to make a careful assessment of each others BATNA but
also an equally careful assessment of the spectrum of possible solutions
which may be achievable in a negotiating process. It is only then that each
may be able to make an informed decision on the question whether its
BATNA is preferable to anything that may be achievable at the negotiating
table.

In the conflict it will seem that both parties preference will be to continue with
hostilities. Boko Haram may feel that they have the upper hand as the Nigeria
government has not always shown the determination to engage with the
group militarily and would not wish for a prolonged war of attrition. So if Boko
Haram takes the view that its BATNA is preferable to anything that may be
achievable at a negotiating table, then the talking process would not be
successful and simply a 'tactic'. In fact some commentators have argued that
any talking process would be used by Boko Haram simply to justify and
secure legitimacy for their cause and reduce the Nigerian government’s
BATNA.

3.2. What is the ‘bargaining space’ in which both parties do better than
their BATNA’s.

The parties may however choose to communicate as their confrontational

strategies begin to be counterproductive and a hurting stalemate develops. In
this situation both the Nigerian government and Boko Haram will come to the
conclusion that there is no ‘better alternative to a negotiation agreement’
(BATNA). A situation where there is no BATNA to the either party is often
described as a situation when the ‘ripeness theory’ occurs a concept coined
by Zartman (2000).

The table below analyses the interest of both parties and outlines a possible
Zone of Possible Agreement (ZOPA).

Interest 1. Recognition 2. Eradication of 3. Release of

corruption Chibok girls and
other abducted
persons
Nigerian Yes Yes Yes
Government By the Demonstrate that There is
International it is committed to widespread
community as reducing pressure to
State that can corruption secure the
protect its citizen release of the
girls both from
within the country
and worldwide via
the Bring back
our girls
campaign.
Boko Haram Yes Yes Yes
By the Nigerian Declared goal Only if the
government as a and key reason release can be
an actor in the for waging war used to bargain
governing of and obtain the
Northern Nigeria release of its
members held in
Nigerian prisons.
Level of interest
coinciding

4. Mediation Strategies

Mediation is a remedy for the current stalemate in the Boko Haram conflict.
The three main strategies available to the mediator are those that focus on
the process (communication-facilitation), the content (directive) and procedure
(formulative) aspects of conflict management. We can apply these strategies
to the Boko Haram conflict and ascertain how useful they would be.
Utilising the communication-facilitation strategy a mediator will focus on
getting the parties to communicate. Such an approach has been used in
previous attempts at reaching at peaceful solution to the conflict. For example,
in September 2014 the Chadian government commenced mediating
negotiations between Nigeria and Boko Haram, aimed at securing the release
of 200 plus schoolgirls seized in April in the northeast Nigerian town of
Chibok.

Peace negotiations with terrorist organisations are not easy and will require a
mediator, a person whom both the government and terrorist organisation trust.
There will probably be the need for a mediator that will able to exert some
control over proceedings.

Both parties to the conflict think their BATNAs tops the other party, for this
reason the mediation in this conflict may benefit from involving a “powerful
carrot” to satisfy interests. There is however at the moment no such mediator
with the necessary clout and influence on both parties to play this role. So we
should concentrate on the first two mediation strategies.

4. What is the realistic outcome of the practical application of the

tools of mediation and conflict resolution to the Boko Haram
conflict?

There are opportunities for successful mediation between the Nigerian

government and Boko Haram. A comparative analysis of the interests of both
parties demonstrates that there are opportunities and grounds for a possible
agreement or Zone of Possible Agreement/ZOPA. It should be not be
anticipated that the solution will be quick or easy, however there are
opportunities in that both parties have been unable to demonstrate that their
current approach will be able to achieve their objectives. In the case of the
Nigerian government the inability of the security forces to eradicate the
menace that is Boko Haram and guarantee the safety of its citizens. Boko
Haram on the other hand will be keen to demonstrate to its supporters that
their violent methods is achieving results by bringing the Nigerian government
to make concessions to the group. The opportunities will need a mediator to
work on the willingness of both parties to seek a peaceful solution to the
conflict. However, note that according to Zartman (2003) the willingness or
“ripeness” for negotiation is a matter of perception and therefore will requires
persuasion” where “mediators have an important role to play in capitalising on
the parties’ perception of ripeness.

However, channels of information have been severely damaged and there

other barriers of culture and ideology that have to be taken into account in the
negotiation process. In addition terrorist groups often lack organisational
structures that would ensure a path to negotiations. Boko Haram is said to
lack such an organisational structure with which government can engage it in
a meaningful dialogue. However this may just be posturing on the part of the
Nigeria government as the map below clearly demonstrates a much more
organised entity.

Figure1: Hypothetical Organisational Structure of the Boko Haram under

Abubakar Shekau.

It may be possible to reward Boko Haram and if they are cooperative by

accepting them as a negotiating partner. Doing this should not necessarily
mean that the state is acknowledging or accepting all Boko Harams objectives
or actions. It simply means the Nigerian government is merely offering them
an olive branch. Offering terrorists and their supporters a real and credible
chance of achieving some of their objectives without violence will challenge
the terrorists’ claim that they have no other choice than to resort to violence.
Bibliography

ADIBE, JIDEOFOR (2013). What do we really know about Boko Haram?

In MANTZIKOS, IOANNIS ed. (2013) Boko Haram, Anatomy of a Crisis, e-
International Relations (Bristol, UK) Availabe at http://www.e-ir.info/wp-
content/uploads/Boko-Haram-e-IR.pdf (Last visited on 7, November 2014)
Allen, Nathaniel (2014). The Boko Haram insurgency, by the numbers. The
Washington Post, 6 October 2014. Available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/10/06/the-boko-
haram-insurgency-by-the-numbers/ (Last visited on 9 November 2014)

Hussain, Solomon (2013). Boko Haram, Identity and the Limits of Counter-
Terrorism In MANTZIKOS, IOANNIS ed. (2013) Boko Haram, Anatomy of a
Crisis, e-International Relations (Bristol, UK) Availabe at http://www.e-
ir.info/wp-content/uploads/Boko-Haram-e-IR.pdf (Last visited on 7, November
2014)

Pruitt, D.G. (2007). Readiness Theory and the Northern Ireland Conflict,
American Behavioral Scientist July 2007 50:1520-1541

Pruitt, D.G., (2005) Wither Ripeness Theory, Working Paper No. 25, Institute
for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University (2005) p. 6
available at: http://scar.gmu.edu/wp_25_pruitt.pdf (Last visited, 7 November
2014)

Walker, Andrew (2012). What Is Boko Haram? SPECIAL REPORT, UNITED

STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE Availabe at
www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR308.pdf (Last visited on 7, November 2014)

Samu, Maiwa’azi Dandaura (2012).

BOKO HARAM CONFLICT RESEARCH/ANAYSIS & MANAGEMENT
PREVENTIVE COUNTERTERRORISM AND SUSTAINABLE
PEACEBUILDING: NIGERIA AND BOKO HARAM CASE STUDY. Center for
Justice and Peacebuilding Eastern Mennonite University, USA Available at
http://www.academia.edu/6777526/BOKO_HARAM_CONFLICT_RESEARCH
_ANAYSIS_and_MANAGEMENT_PREVENTIVE_COUNTERTERRORISM_A
ND_SUSTAINABLE_PEACEBUILDING_NIGERIA_AND_BOKO_HARAM_CA
SE_STUDY (Last Visited on 8 November 2014)
Zartman, I. William (2003). "Ripeness." Beyond Intractability. Eds. Guy
Burgess and Heidi Burgess. Conflict Information Consortium, University of
Colorado, Boulder.
http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/ripeness (last Visited on 9
November 2014)