G.R. No.
162777             August 31, 2004 mentioning the name of a person, who subsequent to the
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, represented by its
Chairman, BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, ESMERALDA
AMORA-LADRA, in her capacity as Acting Director IV,
National Capital Judicial Region, Commission on
Elections, and the SOLICITOR GENERAL, respondents.
Facts:
Petitioner Chavez, on various dates, entered into
formal agreements with certain establishments to endorse their
products. Pursuant to these agreements, three billboards were set
up showing petitioner promoting the products of said
establishments. 
On December 30, 2003, however, petitioner filed his certificate of
candidacy for the position of Senator.
On January 6, 2004, respondent COMELEC issued Resolution No.
6520, which contained Section 32:
 Section 32. All propaganda materials such as posters, streamers,
stickers or paintings on walls and other materials showing the
picture, image, or name of a person, and all advertisements
on print, in radio or on television showing the image or
placement or display thereof becomes a candidate for public
office shall be immediately removed by said candidate and radio
station, print media or television station within 3 days after the
effectivity of these implementing rules; otherwise, he and said
radio station, print media or television station shall be presumed
to have conducted premature campaigning in violation of
Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code.
On January 21, 2004, petitioner was directed to comply with the
said provision by the COMELEC's Law Department. He replied, by
requesting the COMELEC that he be informed as to how he may
have violated the assailed provision. He sent another letter, this
time asking the COMELEC that he be exempted from the
application of Section 32, considering that the billboards adverted
to are mere product endorsements and cannot be construed as
paraphernalia for premature campaigning under the rules.
The COMELEC, however, ordered him to remove or cause the
removal of the billboards, or to cover them from public view
pending the approval of his request.
Feeling aggrieved, petitioner Chavez filed a petition for prohibition
with the SC, asking that the COMELEC be enjoined from enforcing
the assailed provision. He urges the Court to declare the assailed
provision unconstitutional as the same is allegedly (1) a gross
violation of the non-impairment clause; (2) an invalid exercise of
police power; (3) in the nature of an ex-post facto law; (4) contrary
to the Fair Elections Act; and (5) invalid due to overbreadth.
Issue:
Is Section 2 of COMELEC Resolution No. 6520 unconstitutional?
Held:
Police power
Petitioner argues that the billboards, while they exhibit his name
and image, do not at all announce his candidacy for any public
office nor solicit support for such candidacy from the electorate.
They are, he claims, mere product endorsements and not election
propaganda. Prohibiting, therefore, their exhibition to the public is
not within the scope of the powers of the COMELEC.
Police power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty, is the power
to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order, or safety, and the general welfare of the
people. To determine the validity of a police measure, two
questions must be asked: (1) Does the interest of the public in
general, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require
the exercise of police power? and (2) Are the means employed
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and
not unduly oppressive upon individuals?
A close examination of the assailed provision reveals that its
primary objectives are to prohibit premature campaigning and to
level the playing field for candidates of public office, to equalize the
situation between popular or rich candidates, on one hand, and
lesser-known or poorer candidates, on the other, by preventing the
former from enjoying undue advantage in exposure and publicity
on account of their resources and popularity. 
Moreover, petitioner cannot claim that the subject billboards are
purely product endorsements and do not announce nor solicit any
support for his candidacy. Under the Omnibus Election Code,
election campaign or partisan political activity is defined as an act
designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular
candidate or candidates to a public office. It includes directly or
indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or support for or against a
candidate.
It is true that when petitioner entered into the contracts
or agreements to endorse certain products, he acted as a private
individual and had all the right to lend his name and image to
these products. However, when he filed his certificate of candidacy
for Senator, the billboards featuring his name and
image assumed partisan political character because the same
indirectly promoted his candidacy. Therefore, the COMELEC was
acting well within its scope of powers when it required petitioner
to discontinue the display of the subject billboards. If the
subject billboards were to be allowed, candidates for public office
whose name and image are used to advertise commercial
products would have more opportunity to make themselves known
to the electorate, to the disadvantage of other candidates who do
not have the same chance of lending their faces and names to
endorse popular commercial products as image models. Similarly,
an individual intending to run for public office within the next few
months, could pay private corporations to use him as their image
model with the intention of familiarizing the public with his name
and image even before the start of the campaign period. This,
without a doubt, would be a circumvention of the rule against
premature campaigning.
Non-impairment of contract
Section 32 is not a gross violation of the non-impairment clause.
The non-impairment clause of the Constitution must yield to the
loftier purposes targeted by the Government. Equal opportunity to
proffer oneself for public office, without regard to the level of
financial resources one may have at his disposal, is indeed of vital
interest to the public. The State has the duty to enact and
implement rules to safeguard this interest. Time and again, this
Court has said that contracts affecting public interest contain
an implied reservation of the police power as a postulate of the
existing legal order. This power can be activated at anytime to
change the provisions of the contract, or even abrogate it entirely,
for the promotion or protection of the general welfare. Such an act
will not militate against the impairment clause, which is subject to
and limited by the paramount police power.
Ex post facto law
Petitioner argued that the assailed provision makes an individual
criminally liable for an election offense for not removing such
advertisement, even if at the time the said advertisement was
exhibited, the same was clearly legal. Hence, it makes a person,
whose name or image is featured in any such advertisement, liable
for premature campaigning under the Omnibus Election Code.
Section 32, although not penal in nature, defines an offense and
prescribes a penalty for said offense. Laws of this nature must
operate prospectively, except when they are favorable to the
accused. It should be noted, however, that the offense defined in
the assailed provision is not the putting up of propaganda
materials such as posters, streamers, stickers or paintings on walls
and other materials showing the picture, image or name of a
person, and all advertisements on print, in radio or on television
showing the image or mentioning the name of a person, who
subsequent to the placement or display thereof becomes a
candidate for public office. Nor does it prohibit or consider an
offense the entering of contracts for such propaganda materials by
an individual who subsequently becomes a candidate for public
office. One definitely does not commit an offense by entering into a
contract with private parties to use his name and image to endorse
certain products prior to his becoming a candidate for public
office. The offense, as expressly prescribed in the assailed
provision, is the non-removal of the described propaganda
materials three (3) days after the effectivity of COMELEC
Resolution No. 6520. If the candidate for public office fails to
remove such propaganda materials after the given period, he shall
be liable under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code for
premature campaigning. Indeed, nowhere is it indicated in the
assailed provision that it shall operate retroactively. There is,
therefore, no ex post facto law in this case. 
Fair Elections Act
Next, petitioner urges that Section 32 is a violation of the Fair
Elections Act. According to him, under this law, billboards are
already permitted as lawful election propaganda. He claims,
therefore, that the COMELEC, in effectively prohibiting the use of
billboards as a form of election propaganda through the assailed
provision, violated the Fair Elections Act. Petitioners argument is
not tenable. The Solicitor General rightly points out that the
assailed provision does not prohibit billboards as lawful election
propaganda. It only regulates their use to prevent premature
campaigning and to equalize, as much as practicable, the situation
of all candidates by preventing popular and rich candidates from
gaining undue advantage in exposure and publicity on account of
their resources and popularity. Moreover, by regulating the use of
such election propaganda materials, the COMELEC is merely
doing its duty under the law.
Overbreadth 
A statute or regulation is considered void for overbreadth when it
offends the constitutional principle that a governmental purpose to
control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to State
regulations may not be achieved by means that sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected
freedoms.  accordance with the usual practice in nearby cities and provinces,
Penera vs. COMELEC and Andanar G.R. No. 181613,
September 11, 2009; Ponente: Chico-Nazario, J. G.R. No.
181613, November 25, 2009; Ponente: Carpio, J.
FACTS: Penera and private respondent Edgar T. Andanar were
mayoralty candidates in Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte during the
14 May 2007 elections. On 2 April 2007, Andanar filed before the
Office of the Regional Election Director (ORED), Caraga Region
(Region XIII), a Petition for Disqualification against Penera, as
well as the candidates for Vice-Mayor and Sangguniang Bayan who
belonged to her political party, for unlawfully engaging in election
campaigning and partisan political activity prior to the
commencement of the campaign period. Andanar claimed that on
29 March 2007 – a day before the start of the authorized campaign
period on 30 March 2007 – Penera and her partymates went
around the different barangays in Sta. Monica, announcing their
candidacies and requesting the people to vote for them on the day
of the elections.
Penera alone filed an Answer denying the charges but admitted
that a motorcade did take place and that it was simply in
where the filing of certificates of candidacy (COCs) was preceded
by a motorcade, which dispersed soon after the completion of such
filing. The COMELEC disqualified Penera but absolved the other
candidates from Penera’s party from violation of section 80 and 68
of the Omnibus Election Code.
September 11, 2009 Decision:
ISSUE: Whether or not the new definition of the term “candidate”
in Section 15 of RA 8436 as amended by RA 9369 is in conflict with
Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code such that premature
campaigning may no longer be committed
HELD: In denying Penera’s petition, the Supreme Court, through
Associate Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario, found that Penera and
her witnesses admitted that the vehicles, consisting of two
jeepneys and ten motorcycles, were festooned with multi-colored
balloons; the motorcade went around three barangays in Sta.
Monica; and Penera and her partymates waved their hands and
threw sweet candies to the crowd. Thus, for violating Section 80 of
the Omnibus Election Code, proscribing election campaign or
partisan political activity outside the campaign period, Penera was
disqualified from holding the office of Mayor of Sta. Monica.
The Court declared that “there is no absolute and irreconcilable
incompatibility between Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as
amended, and Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, which
defines the prohibited act of premature campaigning. It is possible
to harmonize and reconcile these two provisions and, thus, give
effect to both.”
The Court held, further, that:
“True, that pursuant to Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as
amended, even after the filing of the COC but before the start of
the campaign period, a person is not yet officially considered a
candidate.  Nevertheless, a person, upon the filing of his/her COC,
already explicitly declares his/her intention to run as a candidate
in the coming elections. The commission by such a person of any
of the acts enumerated under Section 79(b) of the Omnibus
Election Code (i.e., holding rallies or parades, making speeches,
etc.) can, thus, be logically and reasonably construed as for the
purpose of promoting his/her intended candidacy.
When the campaign period starts and said person proceeds with
his/her candidacy, his/her intent turning into actuality, we can
already consider his/her acts, after the filing of his/her COC and
prior to the campaign period, as the promotion of his/her election
as a candidate, hence, constituting premature campaigning, for
which he/she may be disqualified.  Also, conversely, if said person,
for any reason, withdraws his/her COC before the campaign
period, then there is no point to view his/her acts prior to said
period as acts for the promotion of his/her election as a candidate.
In the latter case, there can be no premature campaigning as there
is no candidate, whose disqualification may be sought, to begin
with.
Third, in connection with the preceding discussion, the line in
Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, which provides
that “any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall
take effect only upon the start of the campaign period,” does not
mean that the acts constituting premature campaigning can only
be committed, for which the offender may be disqualified, during
the campaign period.  Contrary to the pronouncement in the
dissent, nowhere in the said proviso was it stated that campaigning
before the start of the campaign period is lawful, such that the
offender may freely carry out the same with impunity.
As previously established, a person, after filing his/her COC but
prior to his/her becoming a candidate (thus, prior to the start of
the campaign period), can already commit the acts described
under Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code as election
campaign or partisan political activity.  However, only after said
person officially becomes a candidate, at the beginning of the
campaign period, can said acts be given effect as premature
campaigning under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Only after said person officially becomes a candidate, at the start of
the campaign period, can his/her disqualification be sought for
acts constituting premature campaigning.  Obviously, it is only at
the start of the campaign period, when the person officially
becomes a candidate, that the undue and iniquitous advantages of
his/her prior acts, constituting premature campaigning, shall
accrue to his/her benefit. Compared to the other candidates who
are only about to begin their election campaign, a candidate who
had previously engaged in premature campaigning already enjoys
an unfair headstart in promoting his/her candidacy.
As can be gleaned from the foregoing disquisition, harmony in the
provisions of Sections 80 and 79 of the Omnibus Election Code, as
well as Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, is not
only very possible, but in fact desirable, necessary and consistent
with the legislative intent and policy of the law.”
… The September 21, 2009 Decision was a close fight with 8 votes
in favour and 7 against. Aggrieved, Mayor Penera filed a Motion
for Reconsideration…
The November 25, 2009 Decision:
ISSUE: Whether or not Penera is liable for premature
campaigning?
HELD: NO.
As explained by the Supreme Court in the case of Lanot vs.
COMELEC, a person who files a certificate of candidacy is not a
candidate until the start of the campaign period.
Thus, the essential elements for violation of Section 80 of the
Omnibus Election Code are: (1) a person engages in an election
campaign or partisan political activity; (2) the act is designed to
promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or
candidates; (3) the act is done outside the campaign period.
The second element requires the existence of a “candidate.” Under
Section 79(a), a candidate is one who “has filed a certificate of
candidacy” to an elective public office. Unless one has filed his
certificate of candidacy, he is not a “candidate.” The third element
requires that the campaign period has not started when the
election campaign or partisan political activity is committed.
Assuming that all candidates to a public office file their certificates
of candidacy on the last day, which under Section 75 of the
Omnibus Election Code is the day before the start of the campaign
period, then no one can be prosecuted for violation of Section 80
for acts done prior to such last day. Before such last day, there is
no “particular candidate or candidates” to campaign for or against.
On the day immediately after the last day of filing, the campaign
period starts and Section 80 ceases to apply since Section 80
covers only acts done “outside” the campaign period.
Thus, if all candidates file their certificates of candidacy on the last
day, Section 80 may only apply to acts done on such last day,
which is before the start of the campaign period and after at least
one candidate has filed his certificate of candidacy. This is perhaps
the reason why those running for elective public office usually file
their certificates of candidacy on the last day or close to the last
day.
The campaign period for local officials began on 30 March 2007
and ended on 12 May 2007. Penera filed her certificate of
candidacy on 29 March 2007. Penera was thus a candidate on 29
March 2009 only for purposes of printing the ballots. On 29 March
2007, the law still did not consider Penera a candidate for
purposes other than the printing of ballots. Acts committed by
Penera prior to 30 March 2007, the date when she became a
“candidate,” even if constituting election campaigning or partisan
political activities, are not punishable under Section 80 of the
Omnibus Election Code. Such acts are within the realm of a
citizen’s protected freedom of expression. Acts committed by
Penera within the campaign period are not covered by Section 80
as Section 80 punishes only acts outside the campaign period.
Congress has laid down the law — a candidate is liable for election
offenses only upon the start of the campaign period. This Court
has no power to ignore the clear and express mandate of the law
that “any person who files his certificate of candidacy within [the
filing] period shall only be considered a candidate at the start of
the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of
candidacy.” Neither can this Court turn a blind eye to the express
and clear language of the law that “any unlawful act or omission
applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the
campaign period.”
In layman’s language, this means that a candidate is liable for an
election offense only for acts done during the campaign period, not
before. The law is clear as daylight — any election offense that may
be committed by a candidate under any election law cannot be
committed before the start of the campaign period. In ruling that
Penera is liable for premature campaigning for partisan political
acts before the start of the campaigning, the assailed Decision
ignores the clear and express provision of the law.
G.R. No. 147571       May 5, 2001
SOCIAL WEATHER STATIONS, INCORPORATED and
KAMAHALAN PUBLISHING CORPORATION, doing
business as MANILA STANDARD, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Facts: Petitioners brought this action for prohibition to enjoin the
Commission on Elections from enforcing §5.4 of RA. No.9006
(Fair Election Act), which provides Surveys affecting national
candidates shall not be published fifteen (15) days before an
election and surveys affecting local candidates shall not be
published seven (7) days before an election. Petitioners argue that
the restriction on the publication of election survey results
constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech
without any clear and present danger to justify such restraint. They
claim that SWS and other pollsters conducted and published the
results of surveys prior to the 1992, 1995, and 1998 elections up to
as close as two days before the election day without causing
confusion among the voters and that there is neither empirical nor
historical evidence to support the conclusion that there is an
immediate and inevitable danger to tile voting process posed by
election surveys. They point out that no similar restriction is
imposed on politicians from explaining their opinion or on
newspapers or broadcast media from writing and publishing
articles concerning political issues up to the day of the election.
Consequently, they contend that there is no reason for ordinary
voters to be denied access to the results of election surveys, which
are relatively objective.
Issue: Whether COMELEC restriction on survey during the
Election period constitute a violation of the Freedom of
Expression.
Held: Yes, the court hold that §5.4 is invalid because (1) it imposes
a prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and
total suppression of a category of expression even though such
suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental
interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other
than suppression of freedom of expression.
This form of ad hoc balancing predictably results in sustaining the
challenged legislation and leaves freedom of speech, expression,
and the press with little protection. For anyone who can bring a
plausible justification forward can easily show a rational
connection between the statute and a legitimate governmental
purpose.
In enunciating a standard premised on a judicial balancing of the
conflicting social values and individual interests competing for
ascendancy in legislation which restricts expression, the court laid
the basis for what has been called the “balancing-of-interests”, the
“balancing” test requires a court to take conscious and detailed
consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given
situation or type of situation.
In the actual application of the “balancing-of-interests” test, the
crucial question is: how much deference should be given to the
legislative judgment?
Although the urgency of the public interest sought to be secured by
Congressional power restricting the individual’s freedom, and the
social importance and value of the freedom so restricted, “are to be
judged in the concrete, not on the basis of abstractions,” a wide
range of factors are necessarily relevant in ascertaining the point
or line of equilibrium. Among these are:
(a) the social values and importance of the specific aspect
of the particular freedom restricted by the legislation;
(b) the specific thrust of the restriction, i.e., whether the
restriction is direct or indirect, whether or not the
persons affected are few;
(c) the value and importance of the public interest sought
to be secured by the legislation — the reference here is to
the nature and gravity of the evil which Congress seeks to
prevent;
(d) whether the specific restriction decreed by Congress
is reasonably appropriate and necessary for the
protection of such public interest; and
(e) whether the necessary safeguarding of the public
interest involved may be achieved by some other
measure less restrictive of the protected freedom.
G.R. No. 205357               September 2, 2014
GMA NETWORK, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
SENATOR ALAN PETER "COMPAÑERO" S.
CAYETANO,Petitioner-Intervenor.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 205374

ABC DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 205592

MANILA BROADCASTING COMPANY, INC. and

NEWSOUNDS BROADCASTING NETWORK,
INC., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 205852

KAPISANAN NG MGA BRODKASTER NG PILIPINAS
(KBP) and ABS-CBN CORPORATION, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 206360
RADIO MINDANAO NETWORK, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
FACTS:
            The five (5) petitions before the Court put in issue the
alleged unconstitutionality of Section 9 (a) of COMELEC
Resolution No. 9615 limiting the broadcast and radio
advertisements of candidates and political parties for national
election positions to an aggregate total of one hundred twenty
(120) minutes and one hundred eighty (180) minutes, respectively.
They contend that such restrictive regulation
on allowable broadcast time violates freedom of the press, impairs
the people’s right to suffrage as well as their right to information
relative to the exercise of their right to choose who to elect during
the forth coming elections
                Section 9 (a) provides for an “aggregate total” airtime
instead of the previous “per station” airtime for political
campaigns or advertisements, and also required prior COMELEC
approval for candidates’ television and radio guestings and
appearances.
ISSUE:
                Whether or not Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No.
9615 on airtime limits violates freedom of expression, of speech
and of the press.
HELD:
                YES. The Court held that the assailed rule on “aggregate-
based” airtime limits is unreasonable and arbitrary as it unduly
restricts and constrains the ability of candidates and political
parties to reach out and communicate with the people. Here, the
adverted reason for imposing the “aggregate-based” airtime limits
– leveling the playing field – does not constitute a compelling state
interest which would justify such a substantial restriction on
the freedom of candidates and political parties to communicate
their ideas, philosophies, platforms and programs of government.
And, this is specially so in the absence of a clear-cut basis for the
imposition of such a prohibitive measure.
                It is also particularly unreasonable and whimsical to
adopt the aggregate-based time limits on broadcast time when we
consider that the Philippines is not only composed of so G.R. No. 212398               November 25, 2014
many islands. There are also a lot of languages and dialects spoken
among the citizens across the country. Accordingly, for a national EMILIO RAMON "E.R." P. EJERCITO, Petitioner,
candidate to really reach out to as many of the electorates as vs.
possible, then it might also be necessary that he conveys his HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EDGAR "EGA
message through his advertisements in languages and dialects that Y" S. SAN LUIS, Respondents.
the people may more readily understand and relate to. To add
all of these airtimes in different dialects would greatly hamper the
ability of such candidate to express himself – a form of
suppression of his political speech.
G.R. No. 205728               January 21, 2015
THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE
MOST REV. BISHOP VICENTE M. NAVARRA and THE
BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL
CAPACITY, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION
OFFICER OF BACOLOD CITY, ATTY. MAVIL V.
MAJARUCON, Respondents.
classified by petitioners as comprising “Team Patay,” while those
who voted against it form “Team Buhay.”
                Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither
sponsored nor paid for by any candidate. Petitioners also conceded
that the tarpaulin contains names ofcandidates for the 2013
elections, but not of politicians who helped in the passage of the
RH Law but were not candidates for that election.
ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the size limitation and its reasonableness of

FACTS:
2.
                On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2)
tarpaulins within a private compound housing the San Sebastian
Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet 3.
(6′) by ten feet (10′) in size. They were posted on the front walls of
the cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the 4.
message “IBASURA RH Law” referring to the Reproductive Health
Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is
the subject of the present case. This tarpaulin contains the heading 5.
“Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as either “(Anti-RH) Team
Buhay” with a check mark, or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an “X” 6.
mark. The electoral candidates were classified according to their
vote on the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known 7.
as the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were
the tarpaulin is a political question, hence not within the ambit of
the Supreme Court’s power of review.
Whether or not the petitioners violated the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies as the case was not brought
first before the COMELEC En Banc or any if its divisions.
Whether or not COMELEC may regulate expressions made
by private citizens.
Whether or not the assailed notice and letter for the removal
of the tarpaulin violated petitioners’ fundamental right to freedom
of expression.
Whether the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-
based or content-neutral regulation.
Whether or not there was violation of petitioners’ right to
property.
Whether or not the tarpaulin and its message are considered
religious speech.
 
HELD:
 
FIRST ISSUE: No.
                The Court ruled that the present case does not call for the
exercise of prudence or modesty. There is no political question. It
can be acted upon by this court through the expanded jurisdiction
granted to this court through Article VIII, Section 1 of the
Constitution..
                The concept of a political question never precludes
judicial review when the act of a constitutional organ infringes
upon a fundamental individual or collective right. Even assuming
arguendo that the COMELEC did have the discretion to choose the
manner of regulation of the tarpaulin in question, it cannot do so
by abridging the fundamental right to expression.
                Also the Court said that in our jurisdiction, the
determination of whether an issue involves a truly political and
non-justiciable question lies in the answer to the question of
whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or
functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our
courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or
instrumentality of the government properly acted within such
limits.
                A political question will not be considered justiciable if
there are no constitutionally imposed limits on powers or
functions conferred upon political bodies. Hence, the existence of
constitutionally imposed limits justifies subjecting the official
actions of the body to the scrutiny and review of this court.
                In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost deference
to the right to free speech. Any instance that this right may
be abridged demands judicial scrutiny. It does not fall squarely
into any doubt that a political question brings.
SECOND ISSUE: No.
                The Court held that the argument on exhaustion of
administrative remedies is not proper in this case.
                Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies, it is clear that the controversy is already ripe for
adjudication. Ripeness is the “prerequisite that something had by
then been accomplished or performed by either branch or in this
case, organ of government before a court may come into the
picture.”
                Petitioners’ exercise of their right to speech, given the
message and their medium, had understandable relevance
especially during the elections. COMELEC’s letter threatening the
filing of the election offense against petitioners is already an
actionable infringement of this right. The impending threat of
criminal litigation is enough to curtail petitioners’ speech.
                In the context of this case, exhaustion of their
administrative remedies as COMELEC suggested in their pleadings
prolongs the violation of their freedom of speech.
THIRD ISSUE: No.
                Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and
jurisprudence to support their position that they had the power to
regulate the tarpaulin. However, the Court held that all of these
provisions pertain to candidates and political parties. Petitioners
are not candidates. Neither do they belong to any political party.
COMELEC does not have the authority to regulate the enjoyment
of the preferred right to freedom of expression exercised by a non-
candidate in this case.
FOURTH ISSUE: Yes.
                The Court held that every citizen’s expression with
political consequences enjoys a high degree of protection.
                Moreover, the respondent’s argument that the tarpaulin is
election propaganda, being petitioners’ way of endorsing
candidates who voted against the RH Law and rejecting those who
voted for it, holds no water.
                The Court held that while the tarpaulin may influence the
success or failure of the named candidates and political parties,
this does not necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The
tarpaulin was not paid for or posted “in return for consideration”
by any candidate, political party, or party-list group.
                By interpreting the law, it is clear that personal opinions
are not included, while sponsored messages are covered.
The content of the tarpaulin is a political speech
Political speech refers to speech “both intended and received as a
contribution to public deliberation about some issue,” “fostering
informed and civic minded deliberation.” On the other hand,
commercial speech has been defined as speech that does “no more
than propose a commercial transaction.” The expression resulting
from the content of the tarpaulin is, however, definitely political
speech.
FIFTH ISSUE: Content-based regulation.
                Content-based restraint or censorship refers to
restrictions “based on the subject matter of the utterance or
speech.” In contrast, content-neutral regulation includes controls
merely on the incidents of the speech such as time, place, or
manner of the speech.
                The Court held that the regulation involved at bar is
content-based. The tarpaulin content is not easily divorced from
the size of its medium.
                Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of
invalidity, and this court has used the clear and present danger
rule as measure.
                Under this rule, “the evil consequences sought to be
prevented must be substantive, ‘extremely serious and the degree
of imminence extremely high.’” “Only when the challenged act has
overcome the clear and present danger rule will
it pass constitutional muster, with the government having the
burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality.”
                Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents
failed to justify the regulation. There is no compelling and
substantial state interest endangered by the posting of the
tarpaulin as to justify curtailment of the right of freedom of
expression. There is no reason for the state to minimize the right of
non-candidate petitioners to post the tarpaulin in their private
property. The size of the tarpaulin does not affect anyone else’s
constitutional rights.
SIXTH ISSUE: Yes.
                The Court held that even though the tarpaulin is readily
seen by the public, the tarpaulin remains the private property of
petitioners. Their right to use their property is likewise protected
by the Constitution.
                Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective
confiscation of private property or constitutes an arbitrary or
unreasonable infringement of property rights is void, because it is
repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of due process and
equal protection of the laws.
                The Court in Adiong case held that a restriction that
regulates where decals and stickers should be posted is “so broad
that it encompasses even the citizen’s private property.”
Consequently, it violates Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution
which provides that no person shall be deprived of his property
without due process of law.
SEVENTH ISSUE: No.
                The Court held that the church doctrines relied upon by
petitioners are not binding upon this court. The position of the
Catholic religion in the Philippines as regards the RH Law does not
suffice to qualify the posting by one of its members of a tarpaulin
as religious speech solely on such basis. The enumeration of
candidates on the face of the tarpaulin precludes any doubt as to
its nature as speech with political consequences and not religious
speech.
Doctrine of benevolent neutrality
                With religion looked upon with benevolence and not
hostility, benevolent neutrality allows accommodation of religion
under certain circumstances. Accommodations are government
policies that take religion specifically into account not to promote
the government’s favored form of religion, but to allow individuals
and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. Their
purpose or effect therefore is to remove a burden on, or facilitate
the exercise of, a person’s or institution’s religion.
                As Justice Brennan explained, the “government may take G.R. No. 206020, April 14, 2015
religion into account . . . to exempt, when possible, from generally
applicable governmental regulation individuals whose religious 1-UNITED TRANSPORT KOALISYON (1-
beliefs and practices would otherwise thereby be infringed, or to UTAK), Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON
create without state involvement an atmosphere in which ELECTIONS, Respondent.
voluntary religious exercise may flourish.”

FACTS:

On January 15, 2013, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No.

9615, which provided for the rules implementing R.A. No. 9006 in
connection with the May 13, 2013 national and local elections and
subsequent elections.  Section 7 thereof, which enumerates the
prohibited forms of election propaganda, pertinently provides:

SEC. 7. Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda. –

During the campaign period, it is unlawful:

xxxx

 (f) To post, display or exhibit any election campaign or

propaganda material outside of authorized common poster areas,
in public places, or in private properties without the consent of the
owner thereof.

(g) Public places referred to in the previous subsection (f) include

any of the following:

xxxx
5.  Public utility vehicles such as buses, jeepneys, trains, taxi cabs,
ferries, pedicabs and tricycles, whether motorized or not;
6. Within the premises of public transport terminals, such as bus
terminals, airports, seaports, docks, piers, train stations, and the
like.
The violation of items [5 and 6] under subsection (g) shall be a
cause for the revocation of the public utility franchise and will
make the owner and/or operator of the transportation service
and/or terminal liable for an election offense under Section 9
of Republic Act No. 9006 as implemented by Section 18 (n) of
these Rules.
Petitioner sought for clarification from COMELEC as regards the
application of REsolution No. 9615 particularly Section 7(g) items
(5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), vis-à-vis privately owned
public utility vehicles (PUVs) and transport terminals. The
petitioner then requested the COMELEC to reconsider the
implementation of the assailed provisions and allow private
owners of PUVs and transport terminals to post election
campaign materials on their vehicles and transport terminals.
The COMELEC en banc issued Minute Resolution No. 13-0214,
which denied the petitioner’s request to reconsider the
implementation of Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to
Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615.
ISSUE:
                Whether or not Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation
to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615 are constitutional.
 
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the said provisions of Resolution No.
9615 are null and void for being repugnant to Sections 1 and 4,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f),
of Resolution No. 9615 are prior restraints on speech
                Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f),
of Resolution No. 9615 unduly infringe on the fundamental right of
the people to freedom of speech.  Central to the prohibition is the
freedom of individuals, i.e., the owners of PUVs and private
transport terminals, to express their preference, through the
posting of election campaign material in their property, and
convince others to agree with them.
Pursuant to the assailed provisions of Resolution No. 9615, posting
an election campaign material during an election period in PUVs
and transport terminals carries with it the penalty of revocation of
the public utility franchise and shall make the owner thereof liable
for an election offense.
The prohibition constitutes a clear prior restraint on the
right to free expression of the owners of PUVs and
 transport terminals.  As a result of the prohibition,
owners of PUVs and transport terminals are forcefully
and effectively inhibited from expressing their
preferences under the pain of indictment for an election
offense and the revocation of their franchise or permit to
operate.  of
 
The assailed prohibition on posting election
campaign materials is an invalid content-neutral
regulation repugnant to the free speech clause.
                A content-neutral regulation, i.e., which is merely
concerned with the incidents of the speech, or one that merely
controls the time, place or manner, and under well-defined
standards, is constitutionally permissible, even if it restricts the
right to free speech, provided that the following requisites concur:
1. The government regulation is within the constitutional
power of the Government;
2. It furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest;
3. The governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of
free expression; and
4. The incidental restriction on freedom of expression is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
Section  7(g)  items  (5)  and  (6)  of  Resolution  No.  9615  are
content-neutral regulations since they merely control the place
where election campaign materials may be posted.  However, the
prohibition is still repugnant to the free speech clause as it fails to
satisfy all of the requisites for a valid content-neutral regulation.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f),
Resolution No. 9615, are not within
the constitutionally delegated power of the COMELEC
under Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution.  Also,
there is absolutely no necessity to restrict the right to free speech
of the owners of PUVs and transport terminals.
The COMELEC may only regulate the franchise or permit
to operate and not the ownership per se of PUVs and
transport terminals.
In the instant case, the Court further delineates the constitutional
grant of supervisory and regulatory powers to the COMELEC
during an election period.  As worded, Section 4, Article IX-C of
the Constitution only grants COMELEC supervisory and regulatory
powers over the enjoyment or utilization “of all franchises or
permits for the operation,” inter alia, of transportation and other
public utilities.  The COMELEC’s constitutionally delegated
powers of supervision and regulation do not extend to the
ownership per se of PUVs and transport terminals, but only to the
franchise or permit to operate the same.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 are
not within the constitutionally delegated power of the
COMELEC to supervise or regulate the franchise or
permit to operate of transportation utilities.  The posting
of election campaign material on vehicles used for public transport
or on transport terminals is not only a form of political expression,
but also an act of ownership – it has nothing to do with the
franchise or permit to operate the PUV or transport terminal.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 are
not justified under the captive-audience doctrine.
The captive-audience doctrine states that when a listener
cannot, as a practical matter, escape from intrusive
speech, the speech can be restricted. The “captive-
audience” doctrine recognizes that a listener has a right
not to be exposed to an unwanted message in
circumstances in which the communication cannot be
avoided.
A regulation based on the captive-audience doctrine is in the guise
of censorship, which undertakes selectively to shield the public
from some kinds of speech on the ground that they are more
offensive than others.  Such selective restrictions have been upheld
only when the speaker intrudes on the privacy of the home or the
degree of captivity makes it either impossible or impractical for the
unwilling viewer or auditor to avoid exposure.
Thus, a government regulation based on the captive-audience
doctrine may not be justified if the supposed “captive audience”
may avoid exposure to the otherwise intrusive speech.  The  would be placed on its buses.
prohibition  under  Section  7(g) items  (5)  and  (6)  of  Resolution 
No.  9615 is not justified under the captive-audience doctrine; the
commuters are not forced or compelled to read the election
campaign materials posted on PUVs and transport terminals.  Nor
are they incapable of declining to receive the messages contained
in the posted election campaign materials since they may simply
avert their eyes if they find the same unbearably intrusive.
Lehman’s case not applicable
The COMELEC, in insisting that it has the right to restrict the
posting of election campaign materials on PUVs and transport
terminals, cites Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, a case decided
by the U.S. Supreme Court. In Lehman, a policy of the city
government, which prohibits political advertisements on
government-run buses, was upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court. 
The U.S. Supreme Court held that the advertising space on the
buses was not a public forum, pointing out that advertisement
space on government-run buses, “although incidental to the
provision of public transportation, is a part of commercial
venture.”  In the same way that other commercial ventures need
not accept every proffer of advertising from the general public, the
city’s transit system has the discretion on the type of advertising
that may be displayed on its vehicles.
In Lehman, the political advertisement was intended for PUVs
owned by the city government; the city government, as owner of
the buses, had the right to decide which type of advertisements
Lehman actually upholds the freedom of the owner of the utility
vehicles, i.e., the city government, in choosing the types of
advertisements that would be placed on its properties.  In stark
contrast, Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615
curtail the choice of the owners of PUVs and transport terminals
on the advertisements that may be posted on their properties.
Also, the city government in Lehman had the right, nay the duty, to
refuse political advertisements on their buses.  Considering that
what were involved were facilities owned by the city government,
impartiality, or the appearance thereof, was a necessity.  In the
instant case, the ownership of PUVs and transport terminals
remains private; there exists no valid reason to suppress their
political views by proscribing the posting of election campaign
materials on their properties.
Prohibiting owners of PUVs and transport terminals
from posting election campaign materials violates the
equal protection clause.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 do not only
run afoul of the free speech clause, but also of the equal protection
clause.  One of the basic principles on which this government was
founded is that of the equality of right, which is embodied in
Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
It is conceded that the classification under Section 7(g) items (5)
and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 is not limited to existing conditions
and applies equally to the members of the purported class. 
However, the classification remains constitutionally impermissible
since it is not based on substantial distinction and is not germane
to the purpose of the law. A distinction exists between PUVs
and transport terminals and private vehicles and other
properties in that the former, to be considered as such,
needs to secure from the government either a franchise
or a permit to operate.  Nevertheless, as pointed out
earlier, the prohibition imposed under Section 7(g) items
(5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 regulates the
ownership per se of the PUV and transport terminals; the
prohibition does not in any manner affect the franchise
or permit to operate of the PUV and transport terminals.
As regards ownership, there is no substantial distinction between
owners of PUVs and transport terminals and owners of private
vehicles and other properties.  As already explained, the ownership
of PUVs and transport terminals, though made available for use by
the public, remains private.  If owners of private vehicles and
other properties are allowed to express their political
ideas and opinion by posting election campaign materials
on their properties, there is no cogent reason to deny the
same preferred right to owners of PUVs and transport
terminals.  In terms of ownership, the distinction
between owners of PUVs and transport terminals and
owners of private vehicles and properties is merely
superficial.  Superficial differences do not make for a
valid classification.
The fact that PUVs and transport terminals are made
available for use by the public is likewise not substantial
justification to set them apart from private vehicles and
other properties.  Admittedly, any election campaign material
that would be posted on PUVs and transport terminals would be
seen by many people.  However, election campaign materials
posted on private vehicles and other places frequented by the
public, e.g.,commercial establishments, would also be seen by
many people.  Thus, there is no reason to single out owners of
PUVs and transport terminals in the prohibition against posting of
election campaign materials.