Balacuit vs CFI of Agusan del Norte

163 SCRA 187

FACTS
the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan pass an ordinance penalizing any person, group of
persons, entity, or corporation engaged in the business of selling admission tickets to any
movie or other public exhibitions, games, contests, or other performances to require children
between seven (7) and twelve (12) years of age to pay full payment for admission tickets
intended for adults but should charge only one-half of the value of the said tickets.
The Petitioners, theater owners, aggrieved by said ordinance, they file a complaint before
the Court of First Instance of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City assailing the constitutionality
of Ordinance No. 640.
The Court rendered judgment declaring Ordinance No. 640 of the City of Butuan
constitutional and valid.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Ordinance No. 640 is a valid exercise of police power

HELD:
YES. Ordinance No. 640 infringes theater owners’ right to property.
While it is true that a business may be regulated, it is equally true that such regulation must
be within the bounds of reason, that is, the regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, and its
provisions cannot be oppressive amounting to an arbitrary interference with the business or
calling subject of regulation. A lawful business or calling may not, under the guise of
regulation, be unreasonably interfered with even by the exercise of police power.33 A police
measure for the regulation of the conduct, control and operation of a business should not
encroach upon the legitimate and lawful exercise by the citizens of their property rights.34
The right of the owner to fix a price at which his property shall be sold or used is an inherent
attribute of the property itself and, as such, within the protection of the due process clause.""
Hence, the proprietors of a theater have a right to manage their property in their own way, to
fix what prices of admission they think most for their own advantage, and that any person
who did not approve could stay away.
Ordinance No. 640 clearly invades the personal and property rights of petitioners for even if
We could assume that, on its face, the interference was reasonable, from the foregoing
considerations, it has been fully shown that it is an unwarranted and unlawful curtailment of
the property and personal rights of citizens. For being unreasonable and an undue restraint
of trade, it cannot, under the guise of exercising police power, be upheld as valid.
Wherefore, the decision of the trial court in Special Civil Case No. 237 is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE and a new judgment is hereby rendered declaring Ordinance No. 640
unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void.

1
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. vs National Telecommunications Commission
190 SCRA 717 [GR No. 88404 October 18, 1990]

Facts: 
On June 22, 1958, Republic Act No. 2090, was enacted otherwise known as “An Act Granting Felix
Alberto and Company, Incorporated, a franchise to establish radio stations for domestic and
transoceanic telecommunications.” Felix Alberto & Co. Inc. was the original corporate name, which
was changed to ETCI with amendment of the articles of incorporation in 1964. Much later, “CELLCOM
Inc.” was the name sought to be adopted before the Securities and Exchange Commission, but this
was withdrawn and abandoned.. On May 13, 1987, alleging urgent public need, ETCI filed an
application with public respondent NTC for the issuance of a certificate of public convenience and
necessity to construct, install, establish, operate, and maintain a cellular mobile telephone system and
an alpha numeric paging system in Metro Manila and in the Southern Luzon regions, with prayer for
provisional authority to operate phase A of its proposal within Metro Manila. PLDT filed an opposition
with motion to dismiss, however NTC over ruled it. NTC granted ETC provisional authority to install,
operate, and maintain a cellular mobile telephone system initially in Metro Manila subject to terms and
conditions, one of which is that ETCI and PLDT shall enter into an interconnection agreement for the
provision of adequate interconnection facilities between applicant’s cellular mobile telephone switch
and the public switched telephone network and shall jointly submit such interconnection agreement to
the commission for approval ETCI admits that in 1964, the Albertos, as original owners of more than
40% of the outstanding capital stock sold their holdings to Orbes. In 1968, the Albertos reacquired the
shares they had sold to the Orbes. In 1987, the Albertos sold more than 40% of their shares to
Horacio Yalung. Thereafter, the present stockholders acquired their ETCI shares. Moreover, in 1964,
ETCI had increased its capital stock from Php40,000 to Php360,000; and in 1987, from Php360,000
to Php40,000,000.

Issue: 
Whether or not the transfers in 1987 of the shares of stock to the new stockholders amount to a
transfer of ETCI’s franchise which needs congressional approval pursuant to RA 2090.

Held: 
No. Section 10 of RA 2090 is directed to the grantee of the franchise, which is the corporation itself
and refers to a sale, lease or assignment of that franchise. It does not include the transfer or sale of
shares of stock of a corporation by the latter’s stockholders.

The sale of shares of stock of a public utility is governed by another law, in section 20 (h) of the Public
Service Act (CA 146). Pursuant thereto, the public service commission (now NTC) is the government
agency vested with the authority to approve the transfer of more than 40% of the subscribed capital
stock of a telecommunications company to a single transferee.
In other words, transfer of shares of a public utility corporation need only NTC approval, not
congressional authorization. What transpired in ETCI were a series of transfers of shares starting in
1964 until 1987. The approval of the NTC may be deemed to have been met when it authorized the
issuance of the provisional authority to ETCI. There was full disclosure before the NTC of the
transfers. In fact, the NTC order of November 12,1987 required ETCI to submit its present capital and
ownership structure. Further, ETCI even filed a motion before the NTC, dated November 8, 1987 or
more than a year prior to the grant of provisional authority, seeking approval of the increase in its
capital stock from Php360,000 to Php40,000,000 and the stock transfers made by its stockholders.
A distinction should be made between shares of stock, which are owned by stockholders, the sale of
which requires only NTC approval, and the franchise itself which is owned by the corporation as the
grantee thereof, the sale or transfer of which requires congressional sanction. Since stockholders own
the shares of stock, they may dispose of the same as they see fit. They may not, however, transfer or
assign the property of a corporation, like its franchise. In other words, even if the original stockholders
had transferred their shares to another group of shareholders, the franchise granted to the corporation
subsists as long as the corporation as an entity, continues to exist. The franchise is not thereby
invalidated by the transfer of shares. A corporation has a personality separate and distinct from that of
each stockholder. It has the right to continuity or perpetual succession.

2
Velasco vs Villegas
G.R. No. L-24153 February 14, 1983

Facts: In their own behalf and in representation of the other owners of barbershops in
the City of Manila, petitioners challenge the constitutionality based on Ordinance No.
4964 of the City of Manila, which prohibited the business of massaging customers of a
barber shop. They contend that it amounts to a deprivation of property of their means of
livelihood without due process of law.

Issue: Whether said ordinance was unconstitutional, and therefore an improper exercise

of police power

Held: No. The attack against the validity cannot succeed. As pointed out in the brief of
respondents-appellees, it is a police power measure. The objectives behind its
enactment are: “(1) To be able to impose payment of the license fee for engaging in the
business of massage clinic under Ordinance No. 3659 as amended by Ordinance 4767,
an entirely different measure than the ordinance regulating the business of barbershops
and, (2) in order to forestall possible immorality which might grow out of the construction
of separate rooms for massage of customers.”
The Court has been most liberal in sustaining ordinances based on the general welfare
clause. As far back as U.S. v. Salaveria, 4 a 1918 decision, this Court through Justice
Malcolm made clear the significance and scope of such a clause, which “delegates in
statutory form the police power to a municipality. As above stated, this clause has been
given wide application by municipal authorities and has in its relation to the particular
circumstances of the case been liberally construed by the courts. Such, it is well to really
is the progressive view of Philippine jurisprudence.”

3
Cabrera v. Court of Appeals
Gr No. 78673 March 18, 1991

FACTS: The Provincial Board of Catanduanes adopted Resolution to close the old road leading to the
new Capitol Building of their province and to give to the owners of the properties traversed by the new
road equal area as per survey by the Highway District Engineer's office from the old road adjacent to
the respective remaining portion of their properties. Pursuant to a deed of exchange authorized by the
Provincial Governor of Catanduanes, the exchange of properties took place. Herein petitioner, filed a
petition for "Restoration of Public Road and/or Abatement of Nuisance, Annulment of Resolutions and
Documents with Damages." He alleged that the land fronting his house was a public road owned by
the Province of Catanduanes in its governmental capacity and therefore beyond the commerce of
man. He contended that Resolution No. 158 and the deeds of exchange were invalid, as so too was
the closure of the northern portion of the said road. The CA held that pursuant to Republic Act No.
5185, municipal authorities can close, subject to the approval or direction of the Provincial Board,
thoroughfares under Section 2246 of the Revised Administrative Code. Although in this case the road
was not closed by the municipality of Catanduanes but by the provincial board of Catanduanes, the
closure, nevertheless, is valid since it was ordered by the approving authority itself. However, while it
could do so, the provincial government of Catanduanes could close the road only if the persons
prejudiced thereby were indemnified, Section 2246 of the Revised Administrative Code being very
explicit on this. Before us now, the petitioner insists that Sec. 2246 is not applicable because the
resolution is not an order for the closure of the road in question but an authority to barter or exchange
it with private properties. He maintains that the public road was owned by the province in its
governmental capacity and, without a prior order of closure, could not be the subject of a barter.
Control over public roads, he insists, is with Congress and not with the provincial board

ISSUES: 
(1) Whether or not the resolution is valid. 
(2) Whether or not the municipal, and not the provincial board has the authority to issue such
resolution.
(3) Whether or not the petitioner has sustained injuries and therefore should be indemnified.

HELD:
(1) Yes. The authority of the provincial board to close that road and use or convey it for other
purposes is derived from the provisions of RA 5185 in relation to Section 2246 of the Revised
Administrative Code. Property thus withdrawn from public servitude may be used or conveyed for any
purpose for which other real property belonging to the municipality might be lawfully used or
conveyed. Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service,
shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State.

(2) No. There is no reason for not applying the doctrine announced in Favis to the provincial board in
connection with the closure of provincial roads. The provincial board has, after all, the duty of
maintaining such roads for the comfort and convenience of the inhabitants of the province. Moreover,
this authority is inferable from the grant by the national legislature of the funds to the Province of
Catanduanes for the construction of provincial roads.

(3) No. The general rule is that one whose property does not abut on the closed section of a street
has no right to compensation for the closing or vacation of the street, if he still has reasonable access
to the general system of streets. The circumstances in some cases may be such as to give a right to
damages to a property owner, even though his property does not abut on the closed section. But to
warrant recovery in any such case the property owner must show that the situation is such that he has
sustained special damages differing in kind, and not merely in degree, from those sustained by the
public generally. Here, the petitioners failed to adduce evidence that he indeed sustained injuries.
(Damnum absque injuria)

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MAGTAJAS VS PRYCE PROPERTIES
GR No. 111097 JULY 20, 1994

FACTS:

PAGCOR is a corporation created directly by P.D. 1869 to help centralize and regulate all
games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Philippines.
PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. It leased a portion of a
building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporations, Inc., renovated & equipped the same,
and prepared to inaugurate its casino during the Christmas season.
Then Mayor Magtajas together with the city legislators and civil organizations of the City of
Cagayan de Oro denounced such project.
In reaction to this project, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City enacted two
(2) ordinances prohibiting the issuance of a business permit and canceling existing business
permit to establishment for the operation of casino (ORDINANCE NO. 3353) and an
ordinance prohibiting the operation of casino and providing penalty for its violation.
(ORDINANCE NO. 3375-93).
Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it was joined by PAGCOR
as intervenor and supplemental petitioner.
Court of Appeals declared the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit
their enforcement. 1 Reconsideration of this decision was denied against petitioners.
Hence, this petition for review under Rule 45.

ISSUE:
Whether or Not Ordinance No. 3353 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 are a valid exercise of
police power.

HELD:
NO. The ordinances enacted are invalid. Ordinances should not contravene a statute.
Municipal governments are merely agents of the National Government. Local Councils
exercise only delegated powers conferred by Congress. The delegate cannot be superior to
the principal powers higher than those of the latter. PD 1869 authorized casino gambling. As
a statute, it cannot be amended/nullified by a mere ordinance.
As to petitioners attack on gambling as harmful and immoral, the Court stressed that the
morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is
generally considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the
Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even
mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit. In the exercise
of its own discretion, the legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without
limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it
may consider sufficient. Thus, it has prohibited jueteng and monte but permits lotteries,
cockfighting, and horse-racing. In making such choices, Congress has consulted its own
wisdom, which this Court has no authority to review, much less reverse. Well has it been
said that courts do not sit to resolve the merits of conflicting theories. That is the prerogative
of the political departments. It is settled that questions regarding the wisdom, morality, or
practicability of statutes are not addressed to the judiciary but may be resolved only by the
legislative and executive departments, to which the function belongs in our scheme of
government. That function is exclusive. Whichever way these branches decide, they are
answerable only to their own conscience and the constituents who will ultimately judge their
acts, and not to the courts of justice.

5
Lim vs. Pacquing
G.R. No. 115044. January 27, 1995

FACTS:
The Charter of the City of Manila was enacted by Congress on 18 June 1949 (R.A. No. 409).
On 1 January 1951, Executive Order No. 392 was issued transferring the authority
to regulate jai-alais from local government to the Games and Amusements Board (GAB).
On 07 September 1971, however, the Municipal Board of Manila nonetheless passed
Ordinance No. 7065 entitled “An Ordinance Authorizing the Mayor To Allow And Permit The
Associated Development Corporation To Establish, Maintain And Operate A Jai-Alai In The
City Of Manila, Under Certain Terms And Conditions And For Other Purposes.”
On 20 August 1975, Presidential Decree No. 771 was issued by then President Marcos. The
decree, entitled “Revoking All Powers and Authority of Local Government(s) To Grant
Franchise, License or Permit And Regulate Wagers Or Betting By The Public On Horse And
Dog Races, Jai-Alai Or Basque Pelota, And Other Forms Of Gambling”, in Section 3 thereof,
expressly revoked all existing franchises and permits issued by local governments.
In May 1988, Associated Development Corporation (ADC) tried to operate a Jai-Alai. The
government through Games and Amusement Board intervened and invoked Presidential
Decree No. 771 which expressly revoked all existing franchises and permits to operate all
forms of gambling facilities (including Jai-Alai) by local governments. ADC assails the
constitutionality of P.D. No. 771.
ISSUE:
Whether or not PD 771 is constitutional. 
HELD:
PD No. 771 is valid and constitutional.

The time-honored doctrine is that all laws (PD No. 771 included) are presumed valid and
constitutional until or unless otherwise ruled by this Court. Not only this; Article XVIII Section
3 of the Constitution states:

Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions and
other executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until
amended, repealed or revoked.
There is nothing on record to show or even suggest that PD No. 771 has been repealed,
altered or amended by any subsequent law or presidential issuance (when the executive still
exercised legislative powers).

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SOCIAL JUSTICE SECRETARY ET. AL VS HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA JR
GR NO. 156052 FEBRUARY 13, 2008

Facts:
On November 20, 2001, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8027
and Atienza passed it the following day. Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described
therein from industrial to commercial and directed the owners and operators of businesses
disallowed under Section 1 to cease and desist from operating their businesses within six months
from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. These were the Pandacan oil depots of Shell and
Caltex.
But the city of Manila and the DOE entered into an MOU which only scaled down the property
covered by the depots and did not stop their operations. In the same resolution, the Sanggunian
declared that the MOU was effective only for a period of six months starting July 25, 2002. It was
extended to 2003.
Petitioners filed for mandamus in SC urging the city to implement Ordinance 8027. Respondent’s
defense is that Ordinance No. 8027 has been superseded by the MOU and the resolutions and
that the MOU was more of a guideline to 8027.

Issues:
1. Whether respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order
the removal of the Pandacan Terminals, and
2. Whether the June 26, 2002 MOU and the resolutions ratifying it can amend or repeal
Ordinance No. 8027

Held: Yes to both, Petition granted.

Rule 65, Section 316 of the Rules of Court- mandamus may be filed when any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station. The petitioner should have
a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the performance of the act and it must be the clear
and imperative duty of respondent to do the act required to be done.
Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right, or to compel compliance with a duty, which is
questionable or over which a substantial doubt exists. Unless the right to the relief sought is
unclouded, mandamus will not issue. When a mandamus proceeding concerns a public right and
its object is to compel a public duty, the people who are interested in the execution of the laws
are regarded as the real parties in interest and they need not show any specific interest.
Petitioners are citizens of manila and thus have a direct interest in the ordinances.
On the other hand, the Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as city
mayor, to "enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city. "One of these is
Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No.
8027 as long as it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts. He has
no other choice. It is his ministerial duty to do so.
These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the
statute imposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It might seriously hinder the transaction
of public business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases to question the
constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not
judicially been declared unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest to the
lowest are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it. Need not resolve the second issue.
Assuming that the terms of the MOU were inconsistent with Ordinance No. 8027, the resolutions
which ratified it and made it binding on the City of Manila expressly gave it full force and
effect only until April 30, 2003.

7
SECRETARY VS JUDGE LANTION
GR NO. 139465 OCTOBER 17, 2000

FACTS: 
The United States Government, on June 17, 1999, through Department of Foreign Affairs U.
S. Note Verbale No. 0522, requested the Philippine Government for the extradition of Mark
Jimenez, herein private respondent, to the United States. The request was forwarded the
following day by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to the Department of Justice (DOJ).
Pending evaluation of the extradition documents by the DOJ, private respondent requested
for copies of the official extradition request and all pertinent documents and the holding in
abeyance of the proceedings. When his request was denied for being premature, private
respondent resorted to an action for mandamus, certiorari and prohibition. The trial court
issued an order maintaining and enjoining the DOJ from conducting further proceedings,
hence, the instant petition. 
ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent’s entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the
proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of the Philippine Government under the RP-US
Extradition Treaty.

HELD:

NO. The human rights of person and the rights of the accused guaranteed in the Constitution should
take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contracting party, the doctrine of incorporation is
applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with a situation where there is a conflict between
a rule of the international law and the constitution. Efforts must first be made in order to harmonize the
provisions so as to give effect to both but if the conflict is irreconcilable, the municipal law must be
upheld. The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or
imply the primacy of international law over the municipal law in the municipal sphere. In states where
the constitution is the highest law of the land, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are
in conflict with the constitution.

In the case at bar, private respondent does not only face a clear and present danger of loss of
property or employment but of liberty itself, which may eventually lead to his forcible banishment to a
foreign land. The convergence of petitioners favorable action on the extradition request and the
deprivation of private respondents liberty is easily comprehensible.

We have ruled time and again that this Court’s equity jurisdiction, which is aptly
described as “justice outside legality,” may be availed of only in the absence of, and
never against, statutory law or judicial pronouncements ( Smith Bell & Co., Inc. vs.
Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 530 [1997];  David-Chan vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA
677 [1997]). The constitutional issue in the case at bar does not even call for “justice
outside legality,” since private respondent’s due process rights, although not
guaranteed by statute or by treaty, are protected by constitutional guarantees. We
would not be true to the organic law of the land if we choose strict construction over
guarantees against the deprivation of liberty. That would not be in keeping with the
principles of democracy on which our  Constitution is premised.
Verily, as one traverses treacherous waters of conflicting and opposing currents of
liberty and government authority, he must ever hold the oar of freedom in the stronger
arm, lest an errant and wayward course be laid.  
In view of the foregoing premises, the instant petition is hereby dismissed for lack of
merit.

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MUNICIPALITY OF PARANAQUE VS V.M. REALTY CORP
292 SCRA 676

Facts:

Under a city council resolution, the Municipality of Parañaque filed on September 20, 1993, a
Complaint for expropriation against Private Respondent  V.M. Realty Corporation over two
parcels of land of 10,000 square meters. The city previously negotiated for the sale of the
property but VM didn’t accept.
The trial court issued an Order dated February 4, 1994, authorizing petitioner to take
possession of the subject property upon deposit with its clerk of court of an amount
equivalent to 15 percent of its fair market value based on its current tax declaration.
According to the respondent, the complaint failed to state a cause of action because it was
filed pursuant to a resolution and not to an ordinance as required by RA 7160 (the Local
Government Code); and (b) the cause of action, if any, was barred by a prior judgment or res
judicata. Petitioner claimed that res judicata was not applicable.
The trial court dismissed the case. The petitioner’s MFR was denied.  The CA affirmed.

Issues:

1. WON a resolution duly approved by the municipal council has the same force and effect of
an ordinance and will not deprive an expropriation case of a valid cause of action.

Held:

Petitioner contends that a resolution approved by the municipal council for the purpose of
initiating an expropriation case “substantially complies with the requirements of the law”
because the terms “ordinance” and “resolution” are synonymous for “the purpose of
bestowing authority [on] the local government unit through its chief executive to initiate the
expropriation proceedings in court in the exercise of the power of eminent domain.
To strengthen this point, the petitioner cited Article 36, Rule VI of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Local Government Code, which provides:  “If the LGU fails to acquire a
private property for public use, purpose, or welfare through purchase, the LGU may
expropriate said property through a resolution of the Sanggunian authorizing its chief
executive to initiate expropriation proceedings.”
Court-No. The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of government,
which may delegate the exercise thereof to LGUs, other public entities and public utilities. An
LGU may therefore exercise the power to expropriate private property only when authorized
by Congress and subject to the latter’s control and restraints, imposed “through the law
conferring the power or in other legislations.
Sec 19, RA 7160
A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an
ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for
the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws.
Thus, the following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the power
of eminent domain:
1.  An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief
executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue
expropriation proceedings over a particular private property.
2.  The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for
the benefit of the poor and the landless.

9
3.  There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the
Constitution, and other pertinent laws.
4.  A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to
be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.
In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to exercise the power of eminent domain
pursuant to a resolution of the municipal council.  Thus, there was no compliance with the
first requisite that the mayor be authorized through an ordinance.
We are not convinced by petitioner’s insistence that the terms “resolution” and “ordinance”
are synonymous.  A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution.  An ordinance is a
law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body
on a specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a
resolution is temporary in nature.
If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise eminent domain through a mere resolution, it
would have simply adopted the language of the previous Local Government Code.  But
Congress did not.  In a clear divergence from the previous Local
Government Code, Section 19 of RA 7160 categorically requires that the local chief
executive act pursuant to an ordinance.
Moreover, the power of eminent domain necessarily involves a derogation of a fundamental
or private right of the people.[35] Accordingly, the manifest change in the legislative
language -- from “resolution” under BP 337 to “ordinance” under RA 7160 -- demands a strict
construction.
When the legislature interferes with that right and, for greater public purposes, appropriates
the land of an individual without his consent, the plain meaning of the law should not be
enlarged by doubtful interpretation.
Petitioner relies on Article 36, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules, which requires only a
resolution to authorize an LGU to exercise eminent domain.  It is axiomatic that the clear
letter of the law is controlling and cannot be amended by a mere administrative rule issued
for its implementation.
Strictly speaking, the power of eminent domain delegated to an LGU is in reality not eminent
but “inferior” domain, since it must conform to the limits imposed by the delegation, and thus
partakes only of a share in eminent domain.

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CRUZ VS COURT OF APPEALS
153 SCRA 142

FACTS:

In 1973, the subject lot, a 407 sq. m. residential lot was the subject of an application under the Land
Registration Act by the Ramos bros. Eugenio de la Cruz [petitioner] opposed. After trial, the
application was dismissed on the ground that the land was not yet reclassified and remains part of
the forest reserve. The Ramos bros. pursued the reclassification of the land and were subsequently
awarded ownership of it. Cristina Villanueva, the private respondent, subsequently purchased the
same lot from the brothers. Upon learning of the said sale, petitioner filed a complaint for
reconveyance claiming ownership of the said land having possessed and occupied it openly, publicly,
notoriously and adversely against the whole world and in the concept of an owner for more than 30
years. His complaint was dismissed. The CA affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court thus the
case at bar.

ISSUES:

Whether or not petitioner is vested with a better right over the residential lot to which he possessed
and devoted time, effort and resources

HELD:

Petitioner possessed and occupied the land after it was declared by the Gov’t as part of the forest
zone. Forest lands or forest reserves are not capable of private appropriation, and possession
thereof, however long, cannot convert them into private property.
A positive act by the government is needed to declassify land and to convert it to alienable or
disposable land. And until such declassification, there is no disposable land to speak of.

11
AQUINO JR. VS MILITARY COMMISSION
63 SCRA 546

Facts:

In September 1972, after the declaration of Martial Law, Ninoy was arrested and was placed
under custody. He was brought Fort Bonifacio. He filed for the issuance of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus which was denied by the SC. Aquino then questioned the validity of such
denial and the declaration of martial law; at the same time he questioned the authority of the
military court [No. 2] created [pursuant to GO 2-A] to try him and his other companions. He
was being charged for illegal possession of firearms, ammunition and explosives. He was
also being charged for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act and for murder. All were filed
before the military court. Aquino argued that the military court has no jurisdiction or civilian
courts are still operational and that being a civilian, his trial by a military commission
deprives him of his right to due process.

Issue:

Whether or not Aquino was afforded due process in a military court.

Held:

YES. According to Schwartz, “The immunity of civilians from military jurisdiction must,
however, give way in areas governed by martial law. When it is absolutely imperative for
public safety, legal processes can be superseded and military tribunals authorized to
exercise the jurisdiction normally vested in court.”
Neither are We impressed with petitioner’s argument that only thru a judicial proceeding
before the regular courts can his right to due process be preserved. The guarantee of due
process is not a guarantee of any particular form of tribunal in criminal cases. A military
tribunal of competent jurisdiction, accusation in due form, notice and opportunity to defend
and trial before an impartial tribunal, adequately meet the due process requirement. Due
process of law does not necessarily means a judicial proceeding in the regular courts. 14
The guarantee of due process, viewed in its procedural aspect, requires no particular form of
procedure. It implies due notice to the individual of the proceedings, an opportunity to defend
himself and “the problem of the propriety of the deprivations, under the circumstances
presented, must be resolved in a manner consistent with essential fairness.” It means
essentially a fair and impartial trial and reasonable opportunity for the preparation of
defense.
Here, the procedure before the Military Commission, as prescribed in Presidential Decree
No. 39, assures observance of the fundamental requisites of procedural due process, due
notice, an essentially fair and impartial trial and reasonable opportunity for the preparation of
the defense Section 11 of the Manual for Courts-Martial specifically provides that the “rules
of evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the courts of the Philippines
shall be applied by courts-martial.” This is applicable to trials in the military commission .
There is, therefore, no justification for petitioner’s contention that such military tribunals are
concerned primarily with the conviction of an accused and that proceedings therein involve
the complete destruction and abolition of petitioner’s constitutional rights.

12
EBRALINAG VS THE DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOL OF CEBU
219 SCRA 256

Facts:

The petitioners (Ebralinag, et al.) are elementary and high school students who were
expelled from their classes by public school authorities for refusing to salute the flag,
sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as required by RA 1265 and
Department Order No. 8 of the DepEd.
Jehovah's Witnesses admittedly teach their children not to salute the flag, sing the
national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge for they believe that those are "acts of
worship" or "religious devotion” which they "cannot conscientiously give . . . to anyone or
anything except God". They feel bound by the Bible's command to "guard ourselves from
idols — 1 John 5:21". They consider the flag as an image or idol representing the State
(p. 10, Rollo). They think the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute
and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on the State's power and invades the
sphere of the intellect and spirit which the Constitution protect against official control

Issue:

Whether school children who are members or a religious sect known as Jehovah's
Witnesses may be expelled from school (both public and private), for refusing, on
account of their religious beliefs, to take part in the flag ceremony which includes playing
(by a band) or singing the Philippine national anthem, saluting the Philippine flag and
reciting the patriotic pledge.

Held:

No, they cannot be expelled for this reason. We hold that a similar exemption may be
accorded to the Jehovah's Witnesses with regard to the observance of the flag
ceremony out of respect for their religious beliefs, however "bizarre" those beliefs may
seem to others. Nevertheless, their right not to participate in the flag ceremony does not
give them a right to disrupt such patriotic exercises. Paraphrasing the warning cited by
this Court in Non vs. Dames II, 185 SCRA 523, 535, while the highest regard must be
afforded their right to the free exercise of their religion, "this should not be taken to mean
that school authorities are powerless to discipline them" if they should commit breaches
of the peace by actions that offend the sensibilities, both religious and patriotic, of other
persons. If they quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony while their
classmates and teachers salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic
pledge, we do not see how such conduct may possibly disturb the peace, or pose "a
grave and present danger of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health
or any other legitimate public interest that the State has a right (and duty) to prevent.

13
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ VS ALBERTO G. ROMULO ET. AL
GR NO. 157036 JUNE 9, 2004

Facts: 

GMA delivered a speech to PNP directing PNP Chief Hermogenes Ebdane to suspend the
issuance pf Permit to Carry Firearms Outside of Residence PTCFOR). Ebdane issued
guidelines banning carrying firearms outside of residence. Petitioner, Francisco Chaves
requested DILG to reconsider the implementation. The request was denied. Hence the
petition for prohibition and injunction against Executive Secretary Alberto Romulo and
PNP Chief Ebdane.
Issue: 

Whether or not revocation of PTCFOR is a violation of right to property? Whether or not

the banning of carrying firearms outside the residence is a valid exercise of police
power?

Held: 

Petition dismissed. Just like ordinary licenses in other regulated fields, PTCFOR may be
revoked any time. It does not confer an absolute right, but only a personal privilege to
be exercised under existing restrictions. A licensee takes his license subject to such
conditions as the Legislature sees fit to impose, and one of the statutory conditions of
this license is that it might be revoked. Revocation of it does not deprive the defendant
of any property, immunity, or privilege.
The basis for its issuance was the need for peace and order in the society. the assailed
Guidelines do not entirely prohibit possession of firearms. What they proscribe is merely
the carrying of firearms outside of residence. However, those who wish to carry their
firearms outside of their residences may re-apply for a new PTCFOR. This is a reasonable
regulation. If the carrying of firearms is regulated, necessarily, crime incidents will be
curtailed.

14
BANCO FILIPINO VS PALANCA
37 PHIL 921

FACTS:

Engracio Palanca was indebted to El Banco Español-Filipino and he had his parcel of land
as security for his debt. His debt amounted to P218,294.10. His property is worth 75k more
than what he owe. Due to the failure of Engracio to make his payments, El Banco executed
an instrument to mortgage Engracio’s property. Engracio however left for China and he
never returned til he died. Since Engracio is a non resident, El Banco has to notify Engracio
about their intent to sue him by means of publication using a newspaper. The lower court
further ordered the clerk of court to furnish Engracio a copy and that it would be sent to
Amoy, China. The court eventually granted El Banco’s petition to execute Engracio’s
property. 7 years thereafter, Vicente surfaced on behalf of Engracio as the latter’s
administrator to petition for the annulment of the ruling. Vicente averred that there had been
no due process as Engracio never received the summons.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not due process was not observed.

HELD: 

The SC ruled against Palanca. The SC ruled that the requisites for judicial due process had
been met. The requisites are;
1. There must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and
decide the matter before it.
2. Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the
property subject of the proceedings.
3. The defendant must be given the opportunity to be heard.
4. Judgment must be rendered only after lawful hearing.

15
ANG TIBAY VS COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
69 PHIL 635

Facts: 

The Solicitor General in behalf of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations has filed a motion for
reconsideration wherein the court has considered the legal conclusions stated in Spanish language.
The respondent National Labor Union, Inc., on the other hand, prays for the vacation of the judgment
of the majority of this court and remanded the case to the Court of Industrial Relations for new trial
averring among other issues that Toribio Teodoro claimed that there was shortage of Ang Tibay
leather shoes thus it made him necessary to lay off the members of the National Labor Union, Inc.
That the supposed lack of leather materials claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme to
systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his contract with the Philippine
Army. That the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating against
the National Labor Union, Inc. and unjustly favoring the National Workers’ Brotherhood.
Issue:

Whether or not the issues should be properly directed, resolved or determined by the Court of
Industrial Relation.

Held:

Yes, The CIR is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation. It is
more an administrative than part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be
a more receptive organ of the Government.

The CIR or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the
law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a
decision.

The CIR should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to
the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decision rendered. The
performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.

Accordingly, the motion for new trial should be and the same is hereby granted, and the entire record
of this case shall be remanded to the CIR with instruction that it reopen the case, receive all such
evidence as may be relevant and otherwise proceed in accordance w/ the requirements set forth
herein above.

16
ATTY. ROMEO L. ERECE VS LYN MACALINGAY ET.AL
GR NO. 166809 APRIL 22, 2009

FACTS:
Atty Erece was the Regional Director CHR Region 1. Macalingay et al were Erece’s
subordinates. Macalingay et al were complaining that Erece had continuously denied them
from using the company vehicle. That Erece had been receiving his Representation and
Transportation Allowance yet he prioritizes himself in the use of the vehicle. The issue
reached the CSc proper which found Erece guilty as charged. Erece contends that he was
denied due process as he was not afforded the right to cross-examine his accusers and their
witnesses. He stated that at his instance, in order to prevent delay in the disposition of the
case, he was allowed to present evidence first to support the allegations in his Counter-
Affidavit. After he rested his case, respondents did not present their evidence, but moved to
submit their position paper and formal offer of evidence, which motion was granted by the
CSC over his objection. Macalingay et al then submitted their Position Paper and Formal
Offer of Exhibits. Erece submits that although he was allowed to present evidence first, it
should not be construed as a waiver of his right to cross-examine the complainants.
Although the order of presentation of evidence was not in conformity with the procedure, still
Erece should not be deemed to have lost his right to cross-examine his accusers and their
witnesses. This may be allowed only if he expressly waived said right.

ISSUE: 
Whether or not Erece had been denied due process.

HELD: 
The SC agrees with the CA that petitioner was not denied due process when he failed to
cross-examine the complainants and their witnesses since he was given the opportunity to
be heard and present his evidence. In administrative proceedings, the essence of due
process is simply the opportunity to explain one’s side.
Due process of law in administrative cases is not identical with “judicial process” for a trial in
court is not always essential to due process. While a day in court is a matter of right in
judicial proceedings, it is otherwise in administrative proceedings since they rest upon
different principles. The due process clause guarantees no particular form of procedure and
its requirements are not technical. Thus, in certain proceedings of administrative character,
the right to a notice or hearing are not essential to due process of law. The constitutional
requirement of due process is met by a fair hearing before a regularly established
administrative agency or tribunal. It is not essential that hearings be had before the making
of a determination if thereafter, there is available trial and tribunal before which all objections
and defenses to the making of such determination may be raised and considered. One
adequate hearing is all that due process requires.

17
PEOPLE VS NAZARIO
165 SCRA 186

Facts:

Eusebio Nazario was charged in violation of refusal and failure to pay his municipal taxes
amounting to Php 362.62 because of his fishpond operation provided under Ordinance 4,
Series of 1955, as amended. He is a resident of Sta. Mesa Manila and just leases a fishpond
located at Pagbilao, Quezon with the Philippine Fisheries Commission. The years in
question of failure to pay was for 1964, 1965, and 1966. Nazario did not pay because he
was not sure if he was covered under the ordinance. He was found guilty thus this petition.

Issues:

1. Whether or not Ordinance 4, Series of 1955, as amended null and void for being
ambiguous and uncertain
2. Whether or not the ordinance was unconstitutional for being ex post facto

Held:

1. No, the coverage of the ordinance covers him as the actual operator of the fishpond thus
he comes with the term “Manager”. He was the one who spent money in developing and
maintaining it, so despite only leasing it from the national government, the latter does not get
any profit as it goes only to Nazario. The dates of payment are also clearly stated “Beginning
and taking effect from 1964 if the fishpond started operating in 1964”.
2. No, it is not ex post facto. Ordinance 4 was enacted in 1955 so it can’t be that the
amendment under Ordinance 12 is being made to apply retroactively. Also, the act of non-
payment has been made punishable since 1955 so it means Ordinance 12 is not imposing a
retroactive penalty

The appeal is DISMISSED with cost against the appellant.

18
ESTRADA VS SANDIGANBAYAN
GR 148560 NOVEMBER 19, 2001

FACTS:
Former President Estrada and co-accused were charged for Plunder under RA 7080 (An Act Defining
and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), as amended by RA 7659.
On the information, it was alleged that Estrada have received billions of pesos through any or a
combination or a series of overt or criminal acts, or similar schemes or means thereby unjustly
enriching himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage of the Filipino people and the
Republic of the Philippines.
Estrada questions the constitutionality of the Plunder Law since for him:
1. it suffers from the vice of vagueness
2. it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions
3. it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code.
Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan 8 separate Informations against petitioner.
Estrada filed an Omnibus Motion on the grounds of lack of preliminary investigation,
reconsideration/reinvestigation of offenses and opportunity to prove lack of probable cause but was
denied.
Later on, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution in Crim. Case No. 26558 finding that a probable
cause for the offense of plunder exists to justify the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused.
Estrada moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 26558 on the ground that the facts
alleged therein did NOT constitute an indictable offense since the law on which it was based was
unconstitutional for vagueness and that the Amended Information for Plunder charged more than one
offense. Same was denied.
The questioned provisions of the petitioners are Secs. 1, par. (d), 2 and 4 of the Plunder Law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime of plunder is unconstitutional for being vague.

HELD:
NO. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are
subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. The
amended information itself closely tracks the language of the law, indicating w/ reasonable certainty
the various elements of the offense w/c the petitioner is alleged to have committed.
We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in his
defense.
Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the
terms “combination” and “series” in the key phrase “a combination or series of overt or criminal
acts. These omissions, according to the petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being
impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him, hence violative of his fundamental right to due process.
A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used herein, or
because of the employment of terms without defining them.
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence most necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such
instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects – it violates due process for
failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct  to avoid;
and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of
possible “chilling effect” upon protected speech.  The possible harm to society in permitting some
unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of
others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects
of overly broad statutes. But in criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free
speech.

19
CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY VS ERICTA
122 SCRA 759

Facts:
Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 provides that at least 6% of the total area of the
memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for the charity burial of deceased persons who
are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death.
As such, the Quezon City engineer required the respondent, Himlayang Pilipino Inc, to stop
any further selling and/or transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon City where the owners
thereof have failed to donate the required 6% space intended for paupers burial. The then
Court of First Instance and its judge, Hon. Ericta, declared Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118,
S-64 null and void. Petitioners argued that the taking of the respondent’s property is a valid
and reasonable exercise of police power and that the land is taken for a public use as it is
intended for the burial ground of paupers. They further argued that the Quezon City Council
is authorized under its charter, in the exercise of local police power, ” to make such further
ordinances and resolutions not repugnant to law as may be necessary to carry into effect
and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this Act and such as it shall deem
necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve
the morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the city and the inhabitants
thereof, and for the protection of property therein.” On the otherhand, respondent Himlayang
Pilipino, Inc. contended that the taking or confiscation of property was obvious because the
questioned ordinance permanently restricts the use of the property such that it cannot be
used for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his property.

Issue:
Is Section 9 of the ordinance in question a valid exercise of the police power?

Held:
No. The Sec. 9 of the ordinance is not a valid exercise of the police power.

Occupying the forefront in the bill of rights is the provision which states that ‘no person shall
be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law’ (Art. Ill, Section 1
subparagraph 1, Constitution). On the other hand, there are three inherent powers of
government by which the state interferes with the property rights, namely-. (1) police power,
(2) eminent domain, (3) taxation. These are said to exist independently of the Constitution as
necessary attributes of sovereignty.

An examination of the Charter of Quezon City (Rep. Act No. 537), does not reveal any
provision that would justify the ordinance in question except the provision granting police
power to the City. Section 9 cannot be justified under the power granted to Quezon City to
tax, fix the license fee, and regulate such other business, trades, and occupation as may be
established or practised in the City. The power to regulate does not include the power to
prohibit or confiscate. The ordinance in question not only confiscates but also prohibits the
operation of a memorial park cemetery.

Police power is defined by Freund as ‘the power of promoting the public welfare by
restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property’. It is usually exerted in order to
merely regulate the use and enjoyment of property of the owner. If he is deprived of his
property outright, it is not taken for public use but rather to destroy in order to promote the
general welfare. In police power, the owner does not recover from the government for injury
sustained in consequence thereof.

20
Under the provisions of municipal charters which are known as the general welfare clauses,
a city, by virtue of its police power, may adopt ordinances to the peace, safety, health,
morals and the best and highest interests of the municipality. It is a well-settled principle,
growing out of the nature of well-ordered and society, that every holder of property, however
absolute and may be his title, holds it under the implied liability that his use of it shall not be
injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right to the enjoyment of their
property, nor injurious to the rights of the community. A property in the state is held subject
to its general regulations, which are necessary to the common good and general welfare.
Rights of property, like all other social and conventional rights, are subject to such
reasonable limitations in their enjoyment as shall prevent them from being injurious, and to
such reasonable restraints and regulations, established by law, as the legislature, under the
governing and controlling power vested in them by the constitution, may think necessary and
expedient. The state, under the police power, is possessed with plenary power to deal with
all matters relating to the general health, morals, and safety of the people, so long as it does
not contravene any positive inhibition of the organic law and providing that such power is not
exercised in such a manner as to justify the interference of the courts to prevent positive
wrong and oppression.

However, in the case at hand, there is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at
least six (6) percent of the total area of an private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of
deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general
welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain
area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal
corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city
passes the burden to private cemeteries.

The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is not covered by

Section 12(t) of Republic Act 537, the Revised Charter of Quezon City which empowers the
city council to prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of population of the city and to
provide for their burial in a proper place subject to the provisions of general law regulating
burial grounds and cemeteries. When the Local Government Code, Batas Pambansa Blg.
337 provides in Section 177 (q) that a Sangguniang panlungsod may “provide for the burial
of the dead in such place and in such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance” it simply
authorizes the city to provide its own city owned land or to buy or expropriate private
properties to construct public cemeteries. This has been the law and practise in the past. It
continues to the present. Expropriation, however, requires payment of just compensation.
The questioned ordinance is different from laws and regulations requiring owners of
subdivisions to set aside certain areas for streets, parks, playgrounds, and other public
facilities from the land they sell to buyers of subdivision lots. The necessities of public safety,
health, and convenience are very clear from said requirements which are intended to insure
the development of communities with salubrious and wholesome environments. The
beneficiaries of the regulation, in turn, are made to pay by the subdivision developer when
individual lots are sold to home-owners.

21
TATEL VS MUNICIPALITY OF VIRAC
207 SCRA 1579

FACTS:
On the basis of complaints received from the residents, against the disturbance caused by the
operation of the abaca bailing machine inside the warehouse of petitioner, a committee was appointed
by the municipal council of Virac to investigate the matter. Resultantly, Resolution No. 29 was passed,
declaring the warehouse owned and operated by petitioner a public nuisance within the purview of
Article 694 of the New Civil Code. Respondent municipal officials contend that petitioner's warehouse
was constructed in violation of Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, prohibiting the construction of
warehouses near a block of houses either in the poblacion or barrios without maintaining the
necessary distance of 200 meters from said block of houses to avoid loss of lives and properties by
accidental fire. On the other hand, petitioner contends that said ordinance is unconstitutional, contrary
to the due process and equal protection clause of the Constitution and null and void for not having
been passed in accordance with law.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the Ordinance No. 13 is valid.

(2) Whether or not the appelate court erred in giving the ordinance a meaning other than and different
from what it provided by declaring that petitioner violated the same by using the warehouse for
storage of abaca and copra when what is prohibited and penalized by the ordinance is the
construction of warehouses.

(3) Whether or not the appelate court erred in refusing to take judicial notice of the fact that in the
municipality, there are numerous establishments similarly situated as appellants' warehouses but
which are not prosecuted.

HELD:

(1) Yes. The ordinance was passed by the municipal council in exercise of its police power. It is a
settled principle of law that municipal corporations are agencies of the State for the promotion and
maintenance of local self-government and as such are endowed with the police powers in order to
effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation. Its authority emanates from
the general welfare clause under the LGC.

(2) No. The ambiguity therein therefore is more apparent than real and springs from simple error in
grammatical construction but otherwise, the meaning and intent is clear that what is prohibited is the
construction or maintenance of warehouses for the storage of inflammable articles at a distance within
200 meters from a block of houses either in the poblacion or in the barrios. And the purpose of the
ordinance is to avoid loss of life and property in case of accidental fire which is one of the primordial
and basic obligation of any government.

(3) No. As to the third assignment of error, that warehouses similarly situated as that of the petitioner
were not prosecuted, suffice it to say that the mere fact that the municipal authorities of Virac have not
proceeded against other warehouses in the municipality allegedly violating Ordinance No. 13 is no
reason to claim that the ordinance is discriminatory. A distinction must be made between the law itself
and the manner in which said law is implemented by the agencies in charge with its administration
and enforcement. There is no valid reason for the petitioner to complain, in the absence of proof that
the other bodegas mentioned by him are operating in violation of the ordinance and that the
complaints have been lodged against the bodegas concerned without the municipal authorities doing
anything about it.

22
BAYANI M. ALONTE VS. HON. MAXIMO SAVELLANO
GR 131652

Facts:

Bayani M. Alonte, incumbent Mayor of Biñan, Laguna, was accused of raping Juvie-Lyn

Punongbayan with accomplice Buenaventura Concepcion. It was alleged that Concepcion
befriended Juvie and had later lured her into Alonte’s house. The case was brought before
the Regional Trial Court of Biňan. The counsel and the prosecutor later moved for a change
of venue due to alleged intimidation. While the change of venue was pending, Juvie
executed an affidavit of desistance. The prosecutor continued on with the case and the
change of venue was done notwithstanding opposition from Alonte. The case was raffled to
the Manila Regional Trial Court under J Savellano. Savellano later found probable cause
and had ordered the arrest of Alonte and Concepcion. Thereafter, the prosecution presented
Juvie and had attested the voluntariness of her desistance the same being due to media
pressure and that they would rather establish new life elsewhere. Case was then submitted
for decision and Savellano sentenced both accused to reclusion perpetua. Savellano
commented that Alonte waived his right to due process when he did not cross examine Juvie
when clarificatory questions were raised about the details of the rape and on the
voluntariness of her desistance.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not Alonte has been denied criminal due process.

HELD: 

The Supreme Court ruled that Savellano should inhibit himself from further deciding on the
case due to animosity between him and the parties. There is no showing that Alonte waived
his right. The standard of waiver requires that it “not only must be voluntary, but must be
knowing, intelligent, and done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and
likely consequences.” Mere silence of the holder of the right should not be so construed as a
waiver of right, and the courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver.
Savellano has not shown impartiality by repeatedly not acting on numerous petitions filed by
Alonte. The case is remanded to the lower court for retrial and the decision earlier
promulgated is nullified.

23
CITY OF MANILA VS LAQUIO JR
GR 118127 APRIL 12, 2005

FACTS:

On 30 Mar 1993, Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7783 entitled AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE
ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF
AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA,
PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. It
basically prohibited establishments such as bars, karaoke bars, motels and hotels from operating in
the Malate District which was notoriously viewed as a red light district harboring thrill seekers. Malate
Tourist Development Corporation avers that the ordinance is invalid as it includes hotels and motels in
the enumeration of places offering amusement or entertainment. MTDC reiterates that they do not
market such nor do they use women as tools for entertainment. MTDC also avers that under the LGC,
LGUs can only regulate motels but cannot prohibit their operation. The City reiterates that the
Ordinance is a valid exercise of Police Power as provided as well in the LGC. The City likewise
emphasized that the purpose of the law is to promote morality in the City.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance 7783 is valid.

HELD: The SC ruled that the said Ordinance is null and void. The SC noted that for an ordinance to
be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and
must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it  must also conform to the following
substantive requirements:

(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;

(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;

(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;

(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;

(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and

(6) must not be unreasonable.

The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching, is subordinate to the
constitutional limitations thereon; and is subject to the limitation that its exercise must be reasonable
and for the public good. In the case at bar, the enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of
delegated power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws.

24
GLOBE TELECOM, INC VS NTC
435 SCRA 110, 2004

FACTS
Private respondent Smart Communications, Inc (Smart) filed with the NTC a Complaint to effect the
interconnection of their SMS or texting services with petitioner Globe Telecom, Inc. (Globe). Globe
pointed out procedural defects in Smarts complaints and moved to dismiss the case. I also pointed
out that another network, Islacom, was allowed to provide such service without prior NTC approval.
The National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) ruled that both Smart and Globe were
“equally blameworthy” and issued an Order penalizing both on the ground of providing SMS under
Value Added Services (VAS) without prior approval from the NTC. The Court of Appeals sustained the
NTC Order.

ISSUES
Whether or not:
(1) Globe may be required to secure prior NTC approval before providing SMS or texting services;
(2)  SMS is a VAS under Public telecommunications Act (PTA) of 1995;

HELD
(1) NO. The NTC may not legally require Globe to secure its approval for Globe to continue providing
SMS. This does not imply though that NTC lacks authority to regulate SMS or to classify it as VAS. 
However, the move should be implemented properly, through unequivocal regulations applicable to all
entities that are similarly situated, and in an even-handed manner. This should not be interpreted,
however, as removing SMS from the ambit of jurisdiction and review by the NTC. The NTC
will continue to exercise, by way of its broad grant, jurisdiction over Globe and Smart’s SMS offerings,
including questions of rates and customer complaints. Yet caution must be had. Much complication
could have been avoided had the NTC adopted a proactive position, promulgating the necessary rules
and regulations to cope up with the advent of the technologies it superintends.  With the persistent
advent of new offerings in the telecommunications industry, the NTC’s role will become more
crucial than at any time before.
(2) NO. There is no legal basis under the PTA or the memorandum circulars promulgated by the NTC
to denominate SMS as VAS, and any subsequent determination by the NTC on whether SMS is VAS
should be made with proper regard for due process and in conformity with the PTA. The Court
realizes that the PTA is not intended to constrain the industry within a cumbersome regulatory
regime. The policy as pre-ordained by legislative fiat renders the traditionally regimented business in
an elementary free state to make business decisions, avowing that it is under this atmosphere that the
industry would prosper.  It is disappointing at least if the deregulation thrust of the law is skirted
deliberately.  But it is ignominious if the spirit is defeated through a crazy quilt of vague, overlapping
rules that are implemented haphazardly.

25
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS CAGANDAHAN
GR 166676 SEPTEMBER 12, 2008

FACTS:

Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate before the RTC. She
alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981 and was registered as a female in the
Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up, she developed secondary male characteristics
and was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) – a condition where
persons afflicted possess both male and female characteristics. She alleged that for all
interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become a male person.
Thus, she prayed that her birth certificate be corrected such that her gender be changed
from female to male and her first name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff.
Respondent testified and presented the testimony of Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department
of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital. Dr. Sionzon issued a
medical certificate stating that respondent’s condition is known as CAH. He testified that this
condition is very rare, that respondent’s uterus is not fully developed because of lack of
female hormones, and that she has no monthly period. He further testified that respondent’s
condition is permanent and recommended the change of gender because respondent has
made up her mind, adjusted to her chosen role as male, and the gender change would be
advantageous to her.
The RTC granted respondent’s petition.
Hence, this petition by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeking a reversal of the
abovementioned ruling. The OSG contends, among others, that Rule 108 does not allow
change of sex or gender in the birth certificate and respondent’s claimed medical condition
known as CAH does not make her a male.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC erred in granting the petition on the ground of her medical condition.

HELD:
No.
The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the
court must look to the statutes. Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and
corrections in entries in the civil register.
Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a
mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable
procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code. The acts, events
or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those that
occur after birth.
Respondent undisputedly has CAH. It is one of the many conditions that involve intersex
anatomy. An organism with intersex may have biological characteristics of both male and
female sexes.
In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the various
degrees of intersex as variations, which should not be subject to outright denial. The current
state of Philippine statutes apparently compels that a person be classified either as a male
or as a female, but this Court is not controlled by mere appearances when nature itself
fundamentally negates such rigid classification.
In the instant case, if we determine respondent to be a female, then there is no basis for a
change in the birth certificate entry for gender. But if we determine, based on medical

26
testimony and scientific development showing the respondent to be other than female, then
a change in the subject’s birth certificate entry is in order.
Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the
determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, like respondent,
having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here
thinks of himself as a male and considering that his body produces high levels of male
hormones (androgen) there is preponderant biological support for considering him as being
male. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at
birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed.
Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not taken unnatural steps to
arrest or interfere with what he was born with. And accordingly, he has already ordered his
life to that of a male. Respondent could have undergone treatment and taken steps, like
taking lifelong medication, to force his body into the categorical mold of a female but he did
not. He chose not to do so. Nature has instead taken its due course in respondent’s
development to reveal more fully his male characteristics.
In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on respondent concerning a
matter so innately private as one’s sexuality and lifestyle preferences, much less on whether
or not to undergo medical treatment to reverse the male tendency due to CAH. To him
belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to him should
belong the primordial choice of what courses of action to take along the path of his sexual
development and maturation. In the absence of evidence that respondent is an
“incompetent” and in the absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male
will harm other members of society who are equally entitled to protection under the law, the
Court affirms as valid and justified the respondent’s position and his personal judgment of
being a male.
We respect respondent’s congenital condition and his mature decision to be a male.
As for respondent’s change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a change of
name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the
reasons adduced and the consequences that will follow. The trial court’s grant of
respondent’s change of name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a feminine name to a
masculine name. Considering the consequence that respondent’s change of name merely
recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit in respondent’s change of name. Such a
change will conform with the change of the entry in his birth certificate from female to male.
The Republic’s petition is denied.

27
PEOPLE VS SILVERIO
GR NO. 174689 OCTOBER 22, 2007

FACTS:

Silverio field a petition for the change of his first name “Rommel Jacinto” to “Mely” and his
sex from male to female in his birth certificate in the RTC of Manila, for reason of his sex
reassignment. He alleged that he is a male transsexual, he is anatomically male but thinks
and acts like a female. The RTC ruled in his favour, saying that it is in consonance with the
principle of justice and equality.
The Republic, through the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the CA, alleging that there is
no law allowing change of name by reason of sex alteration. Petitioner filed a
reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a change in the “name” and “sex” entries in birth certificates are allowed by
reason of sex reassignment.

HELD:

No. A change of name is a privilege and not a right. It may be allowed in cases where the
name is ridiculous, tainted with dishonour, or difficult to pronounce or write; a nickname is
habitually used; or if the change will avoid confusion. The petitioner’s basis of the change of
his name is that he intends his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed
himself into thru surgery. The Court says that his true name does not prejudice him at all,
and no law allows the change of entry in the birth certificate as to sex on the ground of sex
reassignment. The petition was denied.

28
HIMAGAN VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES & JUDGE HILARIO MAGPAYAO
GR 113811 OCTOBER 7, 1994

FACTS:
Himagan was a policeman charged with murder and attempted murder before the RTC. In the course
thereof, the trial court issued an Order suspending him until the termination of the case on the basis of
Section 47, R.A. 6975 (Department of Interior and Local Government Act of 1990), to wit: Sec. 47.
Preventive Suspension Pending Criminal Case. — Upon the filing of a complaint or information
sufficient in form and substance against a member of the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty
imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1) day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the
accused from office until the case is terminated. Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and
shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused. Himagan filed a motion
to lift the order for his suspension, relying on Section 42 of P.D. 807 of the Civil Service Decree, that
his suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days. The RTC denied the same. Himagan went to the
SC via petition for certiorari and mandamus to set aside the orders of respondent Judge and to
command him to lift petitioner’s preventive suspension. Contentions of Himagan: (1) while the first
sentence of Sec. 47 provides that the accused who is charged with grave felonies where the penalty
imposed is six years and one day shall be suspended from office “until the case is terminated”, the
second sentence of the same section mandates that the case, which shall be subject to continuous
trial, shall be terminated within 90 days from the arraignment of the accused; (2) an imposition of
preventive suspension of over 90 days is contrary to the Civil Service Law and would be a violation of
his constitutional right to equal protection of laws. Sec. 42 of PD 807 (Civil Service Decree), which
limits the maximum period of suspension to ninety (90) days, provides: Sec. 42. Lifting of Preventive
Suspension Pending Administrative Investigation. — When the administrative case against the officer
or employee under preventive suspension is not finally decided by the disciplining authority within the
period of ninety (90) days after the date of suspension of the respondent who is not a presidential
appointee, the respondent shall be automatically reinstated in the service; Provided, That when the
delay in the disposition of the case is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, the
period of delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 47 of R.A. 6975 violates Himagan’s constitutional right to equal protection of
the laws.

HELD:
No. First. The language of the first sentence of Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975 is clear, plain and free from
ambiguity. It gives no other meaning than that the suspension from office of the member of the PNP
charged with grave offense where the penalty is six years and one day or more shall last until the
termination of the case. The suspension cannot be lifted before the termination of the case. The
second sentence of the same Section providing that the trial must be terminated within ninety (90)
days from arraignment does not qualify or limit the first sentence. The two can stand independently of
each other. The first refers to the period of suspension. The second deals with the time frame within
which the trial should be finished. Suppose the trial is not terminated within ninety days from
arraignment, should the suspension of accused be lifted? The answer is certainly no. While the law
uses the mandatory word “shall” before the phrase “be terminated within ninety (90) days”, there is
nothing in R.A. 6975 that suggests that the preventive suspension of the accused will be lifted if the
trial is not terminated within that period. Nonetheless, the Judge who fails to decide the case within
the period without justifiable reason may be subject to administrative sanctions and, in appropriate
cases where the facts so warrant, to criminal or civil liability. If the trial is unreasonably delayed
without fault of the accused such that he is deprived of his right to a speedy trial, he is not without a
remedy. He may ask for the dismissal of the case. Should the court refuse to dismiss the case, the
accused can compel its dismissal by certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or secure his liberty by
habeas corpus. Second. Petitioner misapplies Sec. 42 of PD 807. A meticulous reading of the section
clearly shows that it refers to the lifting of preventive suspension in pending administrative
investigation, not in criminal cases, as here. What is more, Section 42 expressly limits the period of
preventive suspension to ninety (90) days. Sec. 91 of R.A. 6975 which states that “The Civil Service
Law and its implementing rules shall apply to all personnel of the Department” simply means that the

29
provisions of the Civil Service Law and its implementing rules and regulations are applicable to
members of the Philippine National Police insofar as the provisions, rules and regulations are not
inconsistent with R.A. 6975.

Certainly, Section 42 of the Civil Service Decree which limits the preventive suspension to ninety (90)
days cannot apply to members of the PNP because Sec. 47 of R.A. 6995 provides differently, that is,
the suspension where the penalty imposed by law exceeds six (6) years shall continue until the case
is terminated. The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of
persons charged criminally or administratively insofar as the application of the rule on preventive
suspension is concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which can be
used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them. If a suspended policeman criminally charged
with a serious offense is reinstated to his post while his case is pending, his victim and the witnesses
against him are obviously exposed to constant threat and thus easily cowed to silence by the mere
fact that the accused is in uniform and armed. The imposition of preventive suspension for over 90
days under Section 47 of R.A. 6975 does not violate the suspended policeman’s constitutional right to
equal protection of the laws.A distinction based on real and reasonable considerations related to a
proper legislative purpose such as that which exists here is neither unreasonable, capricious nor
unfounded.

30
DUNCAN ASSOCIATION OF DETAILMAN- PTGWO VS GLAXO WELLCOME PHILIPPINES
GR NO. 162994 SEPTEMBER 17, 2004

FACTS: 

Petitioner Pedro A. Tecson (Tecson) was hired by respondent Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc.
(Glaxo) as medical representative on October 24, 1995, after Tecson had undergone training and
orientation.
Thereafter, Tecson signed a contract of employment which stipulates, among others, that he agrees
to study and abide by existing company rules; to disclose to management any existing or future
relationship by consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or employees of competing drug
companies and should management find that such relationship poses a possible conflict of interest, to
resign from the company. Code of Conduct of Glaxo similarly provides these conditions; that
otherwise, the management and the employee will explore the possibility of a “transfer to another
department in a non-counterchecking position” or preparation for employment outside the company
after six months.
Tecson was initially assigned to market Glaxo’s products in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte
sales area. Subsequently, Tecson entered into a romantic relationship with Bettsy, an employee of
Astra Pharmaceuticals3(Astra), a competitor of Glaxo. Bettsy was Astra’s Branch Coordinator in
Albay. She supervised the district managers and medical representatives of her company and
prepared marketing strategies for Astra in that area.
Even before they got married, Tecson received several reminders from his District Manager regarding
the conflict of interest which his relationship with Bettsy might engender. Still, love prevailed, and
Tecson married Bettsy in September 1998.
Tecson’s superior reminded him that he and Bettsy should decide which one of them would resign
from their jobs. Tecson requested for time to comply with the company policy against entering into a
relationship with an employee of a competitor company. He explained that Astra, Bettsy’s employer,
was planning to merge with Zeneca, another drug company; and Bettsy was planning to avail of the
redundancy package to be offered by Astra.
Tecson again requested for more time resolve the problem. Thereafter, Tecson applied for a transfer
in Glaxo’s milk division, thinking that since Astra did not have a milk division, the potential conflict of
interest would be eliminated. His application was denied in view of Glaxo’s “least-movement-possible”
policy.
Glaxo transferred Tecson to the Butuan City-Surigao City-Agusan del Sur sales area. Tecson asked
Glaxo to reconsider its decision, but his request was denied. Tecson defied the transfer order and
continued acting as medical representative in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE CASE: Because the parties failed to resolve the issue at the grievance
machinery level, they submitted the matter for voluntary arbitration, but Tecson declined the offer. On
November 15, 2000, the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) rendered
its Decision declaring as valid Glaxo’s policy on relationships between its employees and persons
employed with competitor companies, and affirming Glaxo’s right to transfer Tecson to another sales
territory.
CA sustained; MR denied.
Petitioner’s Contention: that Glaxo’s policy against employees marrying employees of competitor
companies violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution because it creates invalid
distinctions among employees on account only of marriage. They claim that the policy restricts the
employees’ right to marry; that Tecson was constructively dismissed
GLAXO argues: that the company policy prohibiting its employees from having a relationship with
and/or marrying an employee of a competitor company is a valid exercise of its management
prerogatives and does not violate the equal protection clause;
The policy is also aimed at preventing a competitor company from gaining access to its secrets,
procedures and policies; that Tecson can no longer question the assailed company policy because
when he signed his contract of employment, he was aware that such policy was stipulated therein.

31
ISSUE: 

Whether or not Glaxo’s policy against its employees marrying employees from competitor companies
is valid

HELD: 

The Court finds no merit in the petition.

Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing strategies and other
confidential programs and information from competitors, especially so that it and Astra are rival
companies in the highly competitive pharmaceutical industry.
The prohibition against personal or marital relationships with employees of competitor companies
upon Glaxo’s employees is reasonable under the circumstances because relationships of that nature
might compromise the interests of the company. In laying down the assailed company policy, Glaxo
only aims to protect its interests against the possibility that a competitor company will gain access to
its secrets and procedures.
That Glaxo possesses the right to protect its economic interests cannot be denied. No less than the
Constitution recognizes the right of enterprises to adopt and enforce such a policy to protect its right
to reasonable returns on investments and to expansion and growth.
Indeed, while our laws endeavor to give life to the constitutional policy on social justice and the
protection of labor, it does not mean that every labor dispute will be decided in favor of the workers.
The law also recognizes that management has rights which are also entitled to respect and
enforcement in the interest of fair play.21
EQUAL-PROTECTION: Glaxo does not impose an absolute prohibition against relationships between
its employees and those of competitor companies. Its employees are free to cultivate relationships
with and marry persons of their own choosing. What the company merely seeks to avoid is a conflict
of interest between the employee and the company that may arise out of such relationships.
Moreover, records show that Glaxo gave Tecson several chances to eliminate the conflict of interest
brought about by his relationship with Bettsy.
PETITION DENIED.

32
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS ROSA ARUTA
GR NO. 120915 APRIL 13, 1998

FACTS: 
P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by his informant named Benjie, that a certain “Aling Rosa” would be
arriving from Baguio City the following day, with a large volume of marijuana.  Acting on said tip,
Abello assembled a team. Said team proceeded to West Bajac-Bajac, Olongapo City at around 4:00
in the afternoon 1988 and deployed themselves near the Philippine National Bank building along Rizal
Avenue and the Caltex gasoline station. While thus positioned, a Victory Liner Bus stopped in front of
the PNB building at around 6:30 in the evening of the same day from where two females and a male
got off. It was at this stage that the informant pointed out to the team “Aling Rosa” who was then
carrying a travelling bag. Having ascertained that accused-appellant was “Aling Rosa,” the team
approached her and introduced themselves as NARCOM agents.  When  Abello asked “Aling Rosa”
about the contents of her bag, the latter handed it to the former. Upon inspection, the bag was found
to contain dried marijuana leaves packed in a plastic bag marked “Cash Katutak.” The team
confiscated the bag together with the Victory Liner bus ticket to which Lt. Domingo affixed his
signature.  Accused-appellant was then brought to the NARCOM office for investigation where a
Receipt of Property Seized was prepared for the confiscated marijuana leaves. Instead of presenting
its evidence, the defense filed a “Demurrer to Evidence” alleging the illegality of the search and
seizure of the items thereby violating accused-appellant’s constitutional right against unreasonable
search and seizure as well as their  inadmissibility in evidence. RTC convicted accused-appellant of
transporting eight (8) kilos and five hundred (500) grams of marijuana from Baguio City to Olongapo
City in violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.

ISSUE: 
Whether or not the warrantless search resulting to the arrest of accused-appellant violated the latter’s
constitutional rights.

HELD:
Yes. In the instant case, the NARCOM agents were admittedly not armed with a warrant of arrest.  To
legitimize the warrantless search and seizure of accused-appellant’s bag, accused-appellant must
have been validly arrested under Section 5 of Rule 113 which provides that:
Sec. 5: Arrest without warrant; when lawful.- A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person: (a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

Accused-appellant Aruta cannot be said to be committing a crime.  Neither was she about to commit
one nor had she just committed a crime.  Accused-appellant was merely crossing the street and was
not acting in any manner that would engender a reasonable ground for the NARCOM agents to
suspect and conclude that she was committing a crime.  It was only when the informant pointed to
accused-appellant and identified her to the agents as the carrier of the marijuana that she was singled
out as the suspect. The NARCOM agents would not have apprehended accused-appellant were it not
for the furtive finger of the informant because, as clearly illustrated by the evidence on record,  there
was no reason whatsoever for them to suspect that accused-appellant was committing a crime,
except for the pointing finger of the informant. This the Court could neither sanction nor tolerate as it is
a clear violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure.  Neither
was there any semblance of any compliance with the rigid requirements of probable cause and
warrantless arrests.

Consequently, there was no legal basis for the NARCOM agents to effect a warrantless search of
accused-appellant’s bag, there being no probable cause and the accused-appellant not having been
lawfully arrested.  Stated otherwise, the arrest being incipiently illegal, it logically follows that the
subsequent search was similarly illegal, it being not incidental to a lawful arrest. The constitutional
guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure must perforce operate in favor of accused-
appellant.  As such, the articles seized could not be used as evidence against accused-appellant for
these are “fruits of a poisoned tree” and, therefore, must be rejected, pursuant to Article III, Sec. 3(2)
of the Constitution.

33
LIM VS FELIX
87 SCRA 292, 1991

FACTS:
On March 17, 1989, at about 7:30 o'clock in the morning, at the vicinity of the airport road of
the Masbate Domestic Airport, located at the municipality of Masbate province of Masbate,
Congressman Moises Espinosa, Sr. and his security escorts, namely Provincial Guards
Antonio Cortes, Gaspar Amaro, and Artemio Fuentes were attacked and killed by a lone
assassin. Dante Siblante another security escort of Congressman Espinosa, Sr. survived the
assassination plot, although, he himself suffered a gunshot wound. An investigation of the
incident then followed.
Thereafter, and for the purpose of preliminary investigation, the designated investigator filed
an amended complaint with the Municipal Trial Court of Masbate accusing Vicente Lim, Sr.
et al of the crime of multiple murder and frustrated murder in connection with the airport
incident.
After conducting the preliminary investigation, the court issued an order concluding that a
probable cause has been established for the issuance of a warrant of arrest of named
accused..
On October 30, 1989, Fiscal Alfane filed with the Regional Trial Court of Masbate, four (4)
separate informations of murder against the twelve (12) accused with a recommendation of
no bail.
On November 21, 1989, petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim filed with us a verified
petition for change of venue w/c was authorized, from the RTC of Masbate to the RTCt of
Makati to avoid miscarriage of justice. The cases were raffled to Branch 56 presided by
respondent Judge Nemesio S. Felix.
Petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim filed with the respondent court several motions
and manifestations, among others was an order be issued requiring the transmittal of the
initial records of the preliminary inquiry or investigation conducted by the Municipal Judge
Barsaga of Masbate for the best enlightenment of this Honorable Court in its personal
determination of the existence of a probable cause or prima facie evidence as well as its
determination of the existence of guilt, pursuant to the mandatory mandate of the
constitution that no warrant shall issue unless the issuing magistrate shall have himself been
personally convinced of such probable cause.
Respondent court issued an order denying for lack of merit the motions and manifestations
and issued warrants of arrest against the accused including the petitioners herein.

ISSUE :
Whether or not a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by simply relying on the
prosecution's certification and recommendation that a probable cause exists.

HELD:
If a Judge relies solely on the certification of the Prosecutor as in this case where all the
records of the investigation are in Masbate, he or she has not personally determined
probable cause. The determination is made by the Provincial Prosecutor. The constitutional
requirement has not been satisfied. The Judge commits a grave abuse of discretion.

34
STONEHILL VS DIOKNO
20 SCRA 383

Facts:

Respondents herein secured a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein and/or the
corporations of which they were officers, to search “books of accounts, financial records, vouchers,
correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other
documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts,
balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers),” as “the subject of
the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense,” or “used or intended to be
used as the means of committing the offense,” which is described in the applications adverted to
above as “violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the
Revised Penal Code.”
The petitioner contended that the search warrants are null and void as their issuance violated the
Constitution and the Rules of Court for being general warrants.
The documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question may
be split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the
aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.

Issue: 
Whether petitioners can validly assail the search warrant against the corporation.

Held: 
As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no  cause of action to assail the legality
of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that
said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of
herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in
said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be. Indeed, it is well settled that the
legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and
that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal  and cannot be availed of by
third parties. Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in evidence against
them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations
adverted to above, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence
belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked
by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity. 

35
PEOPLE VS FIGUEROA
248 SCRA 679

Facts:
On August 19, 1998, RTC convicted the petitioner of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. In his
appeal before the CA, the petitioner questioned for the first time the RTC’s jurisdiction. CA, however,
considered the petitioner to have actively participated in the trial and to have belatedly attacked the
jurisdiction of RTC; thus, he was already estopped by laches from asserting the RTC’s lack of
jurisdiction. CA affirmed RTC’s decision.

Petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari. While both the appellate court and the
Solicitor General acknowledge the fact that RTC did not have jurisdiction, they nevertheless are of the
position that the principle of estoppel by laches has already precluded the petitioner from questioning
the jurisdiction of the RTC, the trial went on for 4 years with the petitioner actively participating therein
and without him ever raising the jurisdictional infirmity. The petitioner, for his part, counters that the
lack of jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter may be raised at any time even for the first time
on appeal. As undue delay is further absent herein, the principle of laches will not be applicable.

Issue:
Whether or not the case should be dismissed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the
RTC, notwithstanding the fact that the petitioner failed to raise the issue during the trial and the
alleged laches in relation to the doctrine in Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy.

Held: 
YES. SC dismissed the case without prejudice.
The ruling in Sibonghanoy on the matter of jurisdiction is the exception rather than the general rule.
For it to be invoked, laches should clearly be present; that is, lack of jurisdiction must have been
raised so belatedly as to warrant the presumption that the party entitled to assert it had abandoned or
declined to assert it.

SC clarified that in its past decisions concerning the same issue, it wavered on when to apply the
exceptional circumstance in Sibonghanoy and on when to apply the general rule enunciated as early
as in De La Santa and expounded at length in Calimlim. The general rule should, however, be, as it
has always been, that the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on
appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel. Estoppel by laches, to bar a litigant from asserting the
courts absence or lack of jurisdiction, only supervenes in exceptional cases similar to the factual
milieu of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy. Indeed, the fact that a person attempts to invoke unauthorized
jurisdiction of a court does not estop him from thereafter challenging its jurisdiction over the subject
matter, since such jurisdiction must arise by law and not by mere consent of the parties. This is
especially true where the person seeking to invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of the court does not
thereby secure any advantage or the adverse party does not suffer any harm.
Applying the said doctrine to the instant case, the petitioner is in no way estopped by laches in
assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC, considering that he raised the lack thereof in his appeal before
the appellate court. At that time, no considerable period had yet elapsed for laches to attach. True,
delay alone, though unreasonable, will not sustain the defense of estoppel by laches unless it further
appears that the party, knowing his rights, has not sought to enforce them until the condition of the
party pleading laches has in good faith become so changed that he cannot be restored to his former
state, if the rights be then enforced, due to loss of evidence, change of title, intervention of equities,
and other causes. In applying the principle of estoppel by laches in the exceptional case
of Sibonghanoy, the Court therein considered the patent and revolting inequity and unfairness of
having the judgment creditors go up their Calvary once more after more or less 15 years. The same,
however, does not obtain in the instant case.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. Criminal Case
No. 2235-M-94 is hereby DISMISSED without prejudice.

36
SOLIVEN VS MAKASIAR
187 SCRA 393, 1988

FACTS:
Pres. Cory Aquino filed a criminal complaint for libel against Beltran. Beltran argues that "the
reasons which necessitate presidential immunity from suit impose a correlative disability to
file suit". He contends that if criminal proceedings ensue by virtue of the President's filing of
her complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently have to be a witness for the prosecution,
bringing her under the trial court's jurisdiction. This would in an indirect way defeat her
privilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying on the witness stand, she would be exposing
herself to possible contempt of court or perjury. Beltran also contends that he could not be
held liable for libel because of the privileged character of the publication. He also says that to
allow the libel case to proceed would produce a “chilling effect” on press freedom.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the President of the Philippines may initiate criminal proceedings against the
petitioners

HELD:

Yes, the President of the Philippines may initiate criminal proceedings.

The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure
the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction,
considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from
requiring all of the office holder's time, also demands undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and
may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President's
behalf. Thus, an accused in a criminal case in which the President is complainant cannot
raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against
such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the
privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege
and submit to the court's jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to
waive it is solely the President's prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and
imposed by any other person.

37
ROBIN PADILLA VS CA AND PEOPLE
GR 121917 MARCH 12, 1997

Facts: 
Petitioner was involved in a hit and run accident and was later apprehended by the police
after he was chased by them. During the arrest, petitioner was found to have in his
possession two different firearms and 2 other firearms were found inside his vehicle after the
policemen saw the first two firearms he was carrying.
Petitioner was then convicted of illegal possession of firearms. Hence the present petition.

Issue: 
Whether or not the warrantless search and arrest conducted on petitioner was valid

Held:
Warrantless arrests are sanctioned in the following instances:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it.
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
Paragraph (a) requires that the person be arrested (i) after he has committed or while he is
actually committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense, (ii) in the presence of the
arresting officer or private person. Both elements concurred here, as it has been established
that petitioner's vehicle figured in a hit and run — an offense committed in the "presence" of
Manarang, a private person, who then sought to arrest petitioner. It must be stressed at this
point that "presence" does not only require that the arresting person sees the offense, but
also when he "hears the disturbance created thereby AND proceeds at once to the
scene." As testified to by Manarang, he heard the screeching of tires followed by a thud, saw
the sideswiped victim (balut vendor), reported the incident to the police and thereafter gave
chase to the erring Pajero vehicle using his motorcycle in order to apprehend its driver. After
having sent a radio report to the PNP for assistance, Manarang proceeded to the Abacan
bridge where he found responding policemen SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda already
positioned near the bridge who effected the actual arrest of petitioner. 
The five (5) well-settled instances when a warrantless search and seizure of property is
valid, are as follows:
1. warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of
the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence,
2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view", the elements of which are: 
(a). a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally
present in the pursuit of their official duties;
(b). the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where
they are;
(c). the evidence must be immediately apparent, and
(d). "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search. 
3. search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent
mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares
furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant
committed a criminal activity.
4. consented warrantless search, and

38
5. customs search.
In conformity with respondent court's observation, it indeed appears that the authorities
stumbled upon petitioner's firearms and ammunitions without even undertaking any active
search which, as it is commonly understood, is a prying into hidden places for that which is
concealed. The seizure of the Smith & Wesson revolver and an M-16 rifle magazine was
justified for they came within "plain view" of the policemen who inadvertently discovered the
revolver and magazine tucked in petitioner's waist and back pocket respectively, when he
raised his hands after alighting from his Pajero. The same justification applies to the
confiscation of the M-16 armalite rifle which was immediately apparent to the policemen as
they took a casual glance at the Pajero and saw said rifle lying horizontally near the driver's
seat. Thus it has been held that:
When in pursuing an illegal action or in the commission of a criminal offense, the police
officers should happen to discover a criminal offense being committed by any person, they
are not precluded from performing their duties as police officers for the apprehension of the
guilty person and the taking of the, corpus delicti. 
Objects whose possession are prohibited by law inadvertently found in plain view are subject
to seizure even without a warrant. 
With respect to the Berreta pistol and a black bag containing assorted magazines, petitioner
voluntarily surrendered them to the police. This latter gesture of petitioner indicated a waiver
of his right against the alleged search and seizure and that his failure to quash the
information estopped him from assailing any purported defect. 
Even assuming that the firearms and ammunitions were products of an active search done
by the authorities on the person and vehicle of petitioner, their seizure without a search
warrant nonetheless can still be justified under a search incidental to a lawful arrest (first
instance). Once the lawful arrest was effected, the police may undertake a protective
search of the passenger compartment and containers in the vehicle which are within
petitioner's grabbing distance regardless of the nature of the offense. This satisfied the two-
tiered test of an incidental search: (i) the item to be searched (vehicle) was within the
arrestee's custody or area of immediate control and (ii) the search was contemporaneous
with the arrest. The products of that search are admissible evidence not excluded by the
exclusionary rule. Another justification is a search of a moving vehicle (third instance). In
connection therewith, a warrantless search is constitutionally permissible when, as in this
case, the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe,
before the search, that either the motorist is a law-offender (like herein petitioner with
respect to the hit and run) or the contents or cargo of the vehicle are or have been
instruments or the subject matter or the proceeds of some criminal offense. 

39
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS HUANG ZHEN HUA AND JOGY LEE
GR NO. 139301 SEPTEMBER 29, 2004

FACTS:
 
Police operatives received word from their confidential informant that Peter Chan and Henry Lao, and
appellants Jogy Lee and Huang Zhen Hua were engaged in illegal drug trafficking. The policemen
also learned that Lee was handling the payments and accounting of the proceeds of the illegal drug
trafficking activities of Lao and Chan. Officer Anciro, Jr. and other police operatives conducted
surveillance operations and were able to verify that Lao and appellant Lee were living together as
husband and wife. They were able to secure search warrants, one for violation of Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 1866 (illegal possession of firearms and explosives) and two for violation of R.A No. 6425,
as amended otherwise known as the Dangerous Drug Act.
The implementation of the first Search Warrant, no persons were found in the are, however the
policemen found two kilos shabu, paraphernalia for its production, and machines and tools apparently
used for the production of fake credit cards. Thereafter, the police operatives received information that
Lao and Chan would be delivering shabu. The policemen rushed to the area and saw Chan and Lao
on board the latter’s car. Thereafter, the shoot-out resulted to death of the two suspect during the
encounter. The policemen found two plastic bags, each containing one kilo of shabu, in Lao’s car.
The policemen then proceeded to the area where to enforce the other search warrant. The policemen
coordinated with Antonio Pangan, the officer in charge of security in the building. The policemen,
Pangan and two security guards proceeded to the condominium unit. Anciro, Jr. knocked repeatedly
on the front door, but no one responded. Pangan, likewise, knocked on the door.9 until Lee peeped
through the window beside the front door. The policemen allowed Pangan to communicate with
appellant Lee by sign language and pointed their uniforms to her to show that they were policemen.
The Lee then opened the door and allowed the team into the condominium unit. 
The policemen conducted the search in all the rooms within the unit. The team proceeded with the
search and found other articles not described on the the search warrant. Huang Zhen Hua was found
sleeping in one of the rooms during the search and was surprised to see police officers. Anciro, Jr.
found two transparent plastic bags each containing one kilo of shabu, a feeding bottle, a plastic
canister and assorted paraphernalia. Anciro, Jr. also found assorted documents, pictures, bank
passbooks issued by the Allied Banking Corporation, credit cards, passports and identification cards
of Lao and Lee. Anciro, Jr. told Lee to bring some of her clothes because they were bringing her to
the PARAC headquarters. Lee did as she was told and took some clothes from the cabinet in the
master’s bedroom where Anciro, Jr. had earlier found the shabu.
 
ISSUES: 
Whether or not the articles not specified in the search warrant, are inadmissible evidence.
 
HELD: 
No, Admittedly, Anciro, Jr. seized and took custody of certain articles belonging to the appellant and
Lao which were not described in the search warrants. However, the seizure of articles not listed in a
search warrant does not render the seizure of the articles described and listed therein illegal; nor does
it render inadmissible in evidence. Such articles were in plain view of Anciro, Jr. as he implemented
the search warrants and was authorized to seize the said articles because of their close connection to
the crime charged. An example of the applicability of the ‘plain view’ doctrine is the situation in which
the police have a warrant to search a given area for specified objects, and in the course of the search
come across some other article of incriminating character. An object that comes into view during a
search incident to arrest that is appropriately limited in scope under existing law may be seized
without a warrant. Finally, the ‘plain view’ doctrine has been applied where a police officer is not
searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an
incriminating object.
 
It cannot be denied that the cards, passbook, passport and other documents and papers seen by the
policemen have an intimate connection with the crime charged. The passport of the appellant would
show when and how often she had been in and out of the country. Her credit cards and bank book
would indicate how much money she had amassed while in the country and how she acquired or
earned the same. The pictures and those of the other persons shown therein are relevant to show her

40
relationship to Lao and Chan. The Supreme Court ruled that Huang Zhen Hua should be acquitted on
the ground of reasonable doubt, but that the conviction of Lee should be affirmed.

RAMIREZ VS COURT OF APPEALS

248 SCRA 590

Facts:
A civil case damages was filed by petitioner in the RTC alleging that the private respondent in a
confrontation in the latter’s office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a “hostile and furious
mood” and in a manner offensive to petitioner’s dignity and personality,” contrary to morals, good
customs and public policy.” In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the
event and sought moral damages, attorney’s fees and other expenses of litigation in the amount of
P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests and other reliefs awardable at the trial court’s discretion.
The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation
made by petitioner.

As a result of petitioner’s recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the
confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled “An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping
and other related violations of private communication, and other purposes. Petitioner filed a Motion to
Quash the Information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a
violation of R.A. 4200. the RTC granted the Motion. From the RTC’s order, the private respondent
filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court, which forthwith referred the case to the CA.
Respondent CA declared the RTC’s order null and void, and holding that the allegations sufficiently
constitute an offense punishable under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. Petitioner filed a MR which the CA
denied. Hence, the instant petition.

Issue:
Whether the recording of a “Private Conversation” without the consent of both of the party is a
violation of R.A. 4200.

Held: Yes, Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, ” An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other
Related Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes,” provides that it shall be unlawful
for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word,
to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept,
or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or
dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described. The
aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all
the parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape
recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute
ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. The
statute’s intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use
of the qualifier “any”. Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, “even a
(person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation with another without the
knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator. The unambiguity of the express words of the
provision, therefore plainly supports the view held by the respondent court that the provision seeks to
penalize even those privy to the private communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one
does not distinguish.

41
GARCILLANO VS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE COMMITTED ON PUBLIC INFORMATION
GR NO. 170338 DECEMBER 23, 2008

FACTS
Petitioners in G.R. No. 179275 seek to disallow the Senate to continue with the conduct of the
questioned legislative inquiry on the issue of “Hello Garci” tapes containing the wiretapped
communication of then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio
Garcillano, without duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional
requirement.
The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on oral argument that the
Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in
newspapers of general circulation only in 1995 and in 2006. With respect to the present Senate of the
14th Congress, however, of which the term of half of its members commenced on June 30, 2007, no
effort was undertaken for the publication of these rules when they first opened their session.
Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated publication by arguing that
the rules have never been amended since 1995 and, despite that, they are published in booklet form
available to anyone for free, and accessible to the public at the Senates internet web page, invoking
R.A. No. 8792.

ISSUE
Whether or not the invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792, otherwise known
as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid publication through the
internet is a substantial compliance of the constitutional requirement of publication.

HELD
NO.
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that [t]he Senate or the House of
Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The requisite of publication of the rules is
intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process.
R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional
equivalent of a written document only for evidentiary purposes. In other words, the law merely
recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being the original) of electronic data messages
and/or electronic documents. It does not make the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and
regulations.
 
Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in violation of the
Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these consolidated
cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have
caused the publication of the rules, because it can do so only in accordance with its duly published
rules of procedure.

42
FRANCISCO CHAVEZ VS RAUL M. GONZALES
GR NO. 168338 FEBRUARY 15, 2008

Facts :
Sometime before 6 June 2005, the radio station dzMM aired the Garci Tapes where the parties to the
conversation discussed "rigging" the results of the 2004 elections to favor President Arroyo. On 6
June 2005, Presidential spokesperson Ignacio Bunye (Bunye) held a press conference in Malacañang
Palace, where he played before the presidential press corps two compact disc recordings of
conversations between a woman and a man. Bunye identified the woman in both recordings as
President Arroyo but claimed that the contents of the second compact disc had been "spliced" to
make it appear that President Arroyo was talking to Garcillano. On 11 June 2005, the NTC issued a
press release warning radio and television stations that airing the Garci Tapes is a "cause for the
suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or authorizations" issued to them.5 On 14
June 2005, NTC officers met with officers of the broadcasters group, Kapisanan ng mga Broadcasters
sa Pilipinas (KBP), to dispel fears of censorship. The NTC and KBP issued a joint press statement
expressing commitment to press freedom

Issue :
Whether or not the NTC warning embodied in the press release of 11 June 2005 constitutes an
impermissible prior restraint on freedom of expression

Held :
When expression may be subject to prior restraint, apply in this jurisdiction to only four categories of
expression, namely: pornography, false or misleading advertisement, advocacy of imminent lawless
action, and danger to national security. All other expression is not subject to prior restrain Expression
not subject to prior restraint is protected expression or high-value expression. Any content-based prior
restraint on protected expression is unconstitutional without exception. A protected expression means
what it says – it is absolutely protected from censorship Prior restraint on expression is content-based
if the restraint is aimed at the message or idea of the expression. Courts will subject to strict scrutiny
content-based restraint. If the prior restraint is not aimed at the message or idea of the expression, it
is content-neutral even if it burdens expression The NTC action restraining the airing of the Garci
Tapes is a content-based prior restraint because it is directed at the message of the Garci Tapes. The
NTC’s claim that the Garci Tapes might contain "false information and/or willful misrepresentation,"
and thus should not be publicly aired, is an admission that the restraint is content-based The public
airing of the Garci Tapes is a protected expression because it does not fall under any of the four
existing categories of unprotected expression recognized in this jurisdiction. The airing of the Garci
Tapes is essentially a political expression because it exposes that a presidential candidate had
allegedly improper conversations with a COMELEC Commissioner right after the close of voting in the
last presidential elections. The content of the Garci Tapes affects gravely the sanctity of the ballot.
Public discussion on the sanctity of the ballot is indisputably a protected expression that cannot be
subject to prior restraint. Public discussion on the credibility of the electoral process is one of the
highest political expressions of any electorate, and thus deserves the utmost protection. If ever there
is a hierarchy of protected expressions, political expression would occupy the highest rank. The rule,
which recognizes no exception, is that there can be no content-based prior restraint on protected
expression. On this ground alone, the NTC press release is unconstitutional. Of course, if the courts
determine that the subject matter of a wiretapping, illegal or not, endangers the security of the State,
the public airing of the tape becomes unprotected expression that may be subject to prior restraint.
However, there is no claim here by respondents that the subject matter of the Garci Tapes involves
national security and publicly airing the tapes would endanger the security of the State. The alleged
violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law is not in itself a ground to impose a prior restraint on the airing of
the Garci Tapes because the Constitution expressly prohibits the enactment of any law, and that
includes anti-wiretapping laws, curtailing freedom of expression. The only exceptions to this rule are
the four recognized categories of unprotected expression. However, the content of the Garci Tapes
does not fall under any of these categories of unprotected expression.

43
BAYAN, KARAPATAN, KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS VS EDUARDO ERMITA
GR NO. 169838 APRIL 25, 2006

FACTS:
The first petitioners, Bayan, et al., allege that they are citizens and taxpayers of the Philippines and
that their rights as organizations and individuals were violated when the rally they participated in on
October 6, 2005 was violently dispersed by policemen implementing Batas Pambansa (B.P.) No. 880.
The second group consists of 26 individual petitioners, Jess del Prado, et al., who alleged that they
were injured, arrested and detained when a peaceful mass action they held on September 26, 2005
was preempted and violently dispersed by the police. They further assert that on October 5, 2005, a
group they participated in marched to Malacañang to protest issuances of the Palace which, they
claim, put the country under an “undeclared” martial rule, and the protest was likewise dispersed
violently and many among them were arrested and suffered injuries. The third group, Kilusang Mayo
Uno, et al., allege that they conduct peaceful mass actions and that their rights as organizations and
those of their individual members as citizens, specifically the right to peaceful assembly, are affected
by Batas Pambansa No. 880 and the policy of “Calibrated Preemptive Response” being followed to
implement it. KMU, et al., claim that on October 4, 2005, a rally KMU co-sponsored was to be
conducted at the Mendiola bridge but police blocked them along C.M. Recto and Lepanto Streets and
forcibly dispersed them, causing injuries to several of their members. They further allege that on
October 6, 2005, a multi-sectoral rally which KMU also co-sponsored was scheduled to proceed along
España Avenue in front of the University of Santo Tomas and going towards Mendiola bridge. Police
officers blocked them along Morayta Street and prevented them from proceeding further. They were
then forcibly dispersed, causing injuries on one of them. Three other rallyists were arrested.
All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880, some of them in toto and others only Sections 4, 5, 6,
12, 13(a), and 14(a), as well as the policy of CPR. They seek to stop violent dispersals of rallies under
the “no permit, no rally” policy and the CPR policy recently announced.
Petitioners Bayan, et al., contend that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is clearly a violation of the
Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights
treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory. They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before
one can stage a public assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present
danger. It also curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause
as the time and place of a public assembly form part of the message for which the expression is
sought. Furthermore, it is not content-neutral as it does not apply to mass actions in support of the
government. The words “lawful cause,” “opinion,” “protesting or influencing” suggest the exposition of
some cause not espoused by the government. Also, the phrase “maximum tolerance” shows that the
law applies to assemblies against the government because they are being tolerated. As a content-
based legislation, it cannot pass the strict scrutiny test.
Petitioners Jess del Prado, et al., in turn, argue that B.P. No. 880 is unconstitutional as it is a
curtailment of the right to peacefully assemble and petition for redress of grievances because it puts a
condition for the valid exercise of that right. It also characterizes public assemblies without a permit as
illegal and penalizes them and allows their dispersal. Thus, its provisions are not mere regulations but
are actually prohibitions. Furthermore, the law delegates powers to the Mayor without providing clear
standards. The two standards stated in the laws (clear and present danger and imminent and grave
danger) are inconsistent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not B.P. No, 880 which delegates powers to the Mayor provides clear standards.
HELD:
Yes. As to the delegation of powers to the mayor, the law provides a precise and sufficient standard –
the clear and present danger test stated in Sec. 6 (a). The reference to “imminent and grave danger of
a substantive evil” in Sec. 6 (c) substantially means the same thing and is not an inconsistent
standard. As to whether respondent Mayor has the same power independently under Republic Act
No. 7160 is thus not necessary to resolve in these proceedings, and was not pursued by the parties in
their arguments. The so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in our legal
firmament and must be struck down as a darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely confuses our
people and is used by some police agents to justify abuses. On the other hand, B.P. No. 880 cannot
be condemned as unconstitutional; it does not curtail or unduly restrict freedoms; it merely regulates
the use of public places as to the time, place and manner of assemblies. Far from being insidious,

44
“maximum tolerance” is for the benefit of rallyists, not the government. The delegation to the mayors
of the power to issue rally “permits” is valid because it is subject to the constitutionally-sound “clear
and present danger” standard.
GERONA VS SECRETARY OF EDUCATION
106 PHIL 11, 1969

FACTS:
On June 11, 1955, Republic Act No. 1265 was approved and went into effect. Acting upon Section 2
of said Act, the Secretary of Education issued Department Order No. 8 for the rules and regulations of
compulsory daily flag ceremony in all public and private schools. Petitioners’ children attending the
Buenavista Community School in Masbate, refused, to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and
recite the patriotic pledge contrary to the requirement of Department Order No. 8. As a result, they
were expelled from the said school. Other children similarly situated who refused or failed to comply
with the requirement about saluting the flag are under threats of being also expelled from all public
schools in the Philippines.
Petitioners belong to Jehova’s witness, an unincorporated body teaching that the obligation imposed
by law of God is superior to that of laws enacted by the State. They wrote to the Secretary of
Education petitioning that in the implementation of this flag ceremony, their children attending school
be allowed to remain silent and stand at attention with their arms and hands down and straight at the
sides and that they be exempted from executing the formal salute, singing of the National Anthem and
the reciting of the patriotic pledge, giving their reason for the same. However, this was denied.
Petitioners maintained that the Philippine Flag is an image and therefore to salute the same is to go
against their religious belief. They also claimed that the flag salute is a religious ceremony and any
participation thereof is forbidden by their religious belief.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not the Department Order No. 8 violates the constitutional right to freedom of religion?

HELD:

No. The Philippine flag is not an image that requires religious veneration rather it is a symbol of the
Republic of the Philippines, of sovereignty, an emblem of freedom, liberty and national unity. The flag
salute is not a religious ceremony but an act and profession of love and allegiance and pledge of
loyalty to the fatherland which the flag stands for. Through the authority of legislature, the Secretary of
Education was duly authorized to promulgate Department Order No. 8. The requirement of
observance of the flag ceremony or salute provided for in the said order does not violate the
Constitutional provision about freedom of religion and exercise of religion. In enforcing the flag salute
on the petitioners, there was absolutely no compulsion involved, and for their failure or refusal to obey
school regulations about the flag salute they were not being persecuted. If they chose not to obey the
flag salute regulation, they merely lost the benefits of public education being maintained at the
expense of their fellow citizens, nothing more.

In requiring school pupils to participate in the flag salute, the State through the Secretary of Education
was not imposing a religion or religious belief or a religious test on said students. It was merely
enforcing a non-discriminatory school regulation applicable to all alike whether Christian, Muslim,
Protestant or Jehovah’s Witness. The State was merely carrying out the duty imposed upon it by the
Constitution which charges it with supervision over and regulation of all educational institutions, to
establish and maintain a complete and adequate system of public education, and see to it that all
schools aim to develop among other things, civic conscience and teach the duties of citizenship. (Art.
XIV, section 5 of the Constitution).

Petitioners’ children were properly excluded and dismissed from the public school they were attending
for failure and refusal to participate in the flag ceremony.

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VICTORIANO VS ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS’ UNION
59 SCRA 54

FACTS:
Victoriano was an employee of the Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. As such employee, he was a member
of the Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union which had a closed shop agreement with the Company that
membership in the Union shall be required as a condition of employment for all its permanent
employees.
Prior to its amendment, Section 4(a)(4) of Republic Act No. 875 allows the employer to require as a
condition of employment membership in a labor organization, if such organization is the
representative of the employees. However, the provision was later amended by the enactment of
Republic Act No. 3350, which reads: … “but such agreement shall not cover members of any religious
sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization”.
Being a member of a religious sect that prohibits the affiliation of its members with any labor
organization, Victoriano presented his resignation to the Union. In turn, the Union asked the Company
to dismiss Victoriano  from the service in view of the fact that he was resigning from the Union as a
member. This prompted Victoriano to file an action to enjoin the Company and the Union from
dismissing him. The Union assails the constitutionality of RA No. 3350, contending that it infringes on
the fundamental right to form lawful associations guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. 

ISSUE:
Whether or not RA No. 3550 is unconstitutional for infringing on the fundamental freedom to form
associations.

HELD:
No. As ruled by the Supreme Court:
“RA No. 3350 merely excludes ipso jure from the application and coverage of the closed shop
agreement the employees belonging to any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members
with any labor organization. What the exception provides, therefore, is that members of said religious
sects cannot be compelled or coerced to join labor unions even when said unions have closed shop
agreements with the employers; that in spite of any closed shop agreement, members of said
religious sects cannot be refused employment or dismissed from their jobs on the sole ground that
they are not members of the collective bargaining union. It is clear, therefore, that the assailed Act, far
from infringing the constitutional provision on freedom of association, upholds and reinforces it. It does
not prohibit the members of said religious sects from affiliating with labor unions. It still leaves to said
members the liberty and the power to affiliate, or not to affiliate, with labor unions. If, notwithstanding
their religious beliefs, the members of said religious sects prefer to sign up with the labor union, they
can do so. If in deference and fealty to their religious faith, they refuse to sign up, they can do so; the
law does not coerce them to join; neither does the law prohibit them from joining; and neither may the
employer or labor union compel them to join. Republic Act No. 3350, therefore, does not violate the
constitutional provision on freedom of association.”

46
DOMINADOR TARUC VS BISHOP PORFIRIO DELA CRUZ
GR NO. 144801 MARCH 10, 2005

FACTS :
The antecedents show that petitioners were lay members of the Philippine Independent Church (PIC)
in Socorro, Surigao del Norte. Respondents Porfirio de la Cruz and Rustom Florano were the bishop
and parish priest, respectively, of the same church in that locality. Petitioners, led by Dominador
Taruc, clamored for the transfer of Fr. Florano to another parish but Bishop de la Cruz denied their
request. It appears from the records that the family of Fr. Florano’s wife belonged to a political party
opposed to petitioner Taruc’s, thus the animosity between the two factions with Fr. Florano being
identified with his wife’s political camp. Bishop de la Cruz, however, found this too flimsy a reason for
transferring Fr. Florano to another parish Taruc tried to organize an open mass to be celebrated by a
certain Fr. Renato Z. Ambong during the town fiesta of Socorro. When Taruc informed Bishop de la
Cruz of his plan, the Bishop tried to dissuade him from pushing through with it because Fr. Ambong
was not a member of the clergy of the diocese of Surigao and his credentials as a parish priest were
in doubt On June 28, 1993, Bishop de la Cruz declared petitioners expelled/excommunicated from the
Philippine Independent Church Because of the order of expulsion/excommunication, petitioners filed a
complaint for damages with preliminary injunction against Bishop de la Cruz before the Regional Trial
Court of Surigao City, Branch 32. They impleaded Fr. Florano and one Delfin T. Bordas on the theory
that they conspired with the Bishop to have petitioners expelled and excommunicated from the PIC.
They contended that their expulsion was illegal because it was done without trial thus violating their
right to due process of law

ISSUE :
Whether or not the court has jurisdiction

HELD :
The SC hold the Church and the State to be separate and distinct from each other. "Give to Ceasar
what is Ceasar’s and to God what is God’s." upon the examination of the decisions it will be readily
apparent that cases involving questions relative to ecclesiastical rights have always received the
profoundest attention from the courts, not only because of their inherent interest, but because of the
far reaching effects of the decisions in human society. [However,] courts have learned the lesson of
conservatism in dealing with such matters, it having been found that, in a form of government where
the complete separation of civil and ecclesiastical authority is insisted upon, the civil courts must not
allow themselves to intrude unduly in matters of an ecclesiastical nature The SC agree with the Court
of Appeals that the expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution/organization is a
matter best left to the discretion of the officials, and the laws and canons, of said
institution/organization The amendments of the constitution, restatement of articles of religion and
abandonment of faith or abjuration alleged by appellant, having to do with faith, practice, doctrine,
form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church and having reference to the power of
excluding from the church those allegedly unworthy of membership, are unquestionably ecclesiastical
matters which are outside the province of the civil courts

47
SILVERIO VS COURT OF APPEALS
GR 94284 APRIL 8, 1991

FACTS:
Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 20 (4) of the Revised Securities Act in
Criminal Case of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. In due time, he posted bail for his
provisional liberty.
More than two (2) years after the filing of the Information, respondent People of the
Philippines filed an Urgent ex parte Motion to cancel the passport of and to issue a hold-
departure Order against accused-petitioner on the ground that he had gone abroad several
times without the necessary Court approval resulting in postponements of the arraignment
and scheduled hearings.
Overruling opposition, the Regional Trial Court issued an Order directing the Department of
Foreign Affairs to cancel Petitioner’s passport or to deny his application therefor, and the
Commission on Immigration to prevent Petitioner from leaving the country. This order was
based primarily on the Trial Court’s finding that since the filing of the Information, “the
accused has not yet been arraigned because he has never appeared in Court on the dates
scheduled for his arraignment and there is evidence to show that accused Ricardo C.
Silverio, Sr. has left the country and has gone abroad without the knowledge and permission
of this Court”. Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the right to travel may be impaired by order of the court

HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the foregoing condition imposed upon an accused to make
himself available at all times whenever the Court requires his presence operates as a valid
restriction of his right to travel. A person facing criminal charges may be restrained by the
Court from leaving the country or, if abroad, compelled to return. So it is also that “An
accused released on bail may be re-arrested without the necessity of a warrant if he
attempts to depart from the Philippines without prior permission of the Court where the case
is pending.
 
         Petitioner takes the posture, however, that while the 1987 Constitution recognizes the
power of the Courts to curtail the liberty of abode within the limits prescribed by law, it
restricts the allowable impairment of the right to travel only on grounds of interest of national
security, public safety or public health, as compared to the provisions on freedom of
movement in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions.

48
 GESITE VS COURT OF APPEALS
GR NO. 123562-65 NOVEMBER 25, 2004

FACTS:
On September 17, 1990, a regular school day, about 800 teachers in Metro Manila had a mass
action, assembled in front of the DECS offices to air their grievances and did not held classes. DECS
Secretary Isidro Cariño, brushed aside their complaints, warning them they would lose their jobs for
taking illegal mass actions.  He then ordered the teachers to return to work within twenty-four (24)
hours, otherwise they will be dismissed from the service, directed the DECS officials to initiate
immediate administrative proceedings against those found disobedient.
Petitioners Gesite, Lamoste, Macalindog and Agaton were included  to those who did not report
for work on September 19-21, 1990.  Hence, the DECS Secretary filed administrative complaints
against them for defying his return-to-work order.  They were charged with grave misconduct, gross
neglect of duty, gross violation of the Civil Service Law and Regulations, refusal to perform official
duty, gross insubordination, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and absence
without official leave.
Despite receipt of notice to file their answer within seventy-two (72) hours but not more than five
(5) days, petitioners failed to do so.  Consequently, they were deemed to have waived their right to
controvert the charges.  They were found guilty as charged and ordered dismissed from the service. 
Subsequently, this penalty was reduced to nine (9) months suspension for petitioners Adelaida
Macalindong and Guia Agaton and six (6) months suspension for petitioners Leonora Gesite and Fe
Lamoste.
Petitioners  appealed to the Merit System Protection Board, but it was denied. On appeal to the
Civil Service Commission (CSC), the same was also denied for lack of merit. They are found liable for
“conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service” on the ground that they “acted without due
regard to the adverse consequences of their action which necessarily resulted in the suspension and
stoppage of classes, to the prejudice of the pupils/students to whom (they) were responsible.” The
CSC imposed upon them the penalty of six (6) months suspension without pay. Their respective
motions for reconsideration were denied.

ISSUE:
                 Whether or Not the mass action launched by the Public school teachers from Sept. up to the
first half of Oct. constituted a concerted and unauthorized stoppage of, or absence from performing
the duty as teachers due to economic reasons is valid.

HELD:

            The issue in joining the mass actions, failed to hold classes to the prejudice of their students
while the petitioners have the right to assemble peaceably to air their grievances, however they
should have exercised such right in a lawful manner.It is undisputed fact that there was a work
stoppage and that petitioners’ purpose was to realize their demands by withholding their services.
Despite the constitutional right to form associations under the Constitution, employees in the public
service may not engage in strikes, mass leaves, walkouts and other forms of mass actions that will
lead to temporary stoppage or disruption of public service. The right of government employees to
organize is limited to the formations of unions or associations only, without including the right to
strike. (Bangalisan vs. CA, 276 SCRA 619)
The petitioners are not therefore entitled to their salaries during their suspension because the general
proposition is that a public official is not entitled to any compensation if he had not rendered any
service.

49
 WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioners.
BATANGAS CATV INC VS THE COURT OF APPEALS
GR NO. 138810 SEPTEMBER 29, 2004

FACTS:
On July 28, 1986, respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Resolution No. 210 granting
petitioner a permit to construct, install, and operate a CATV system in Batangas City. Section 8 of the
Resolution provides that petitioner is authorized to charge its subscribers the maximum rates
specified therein, “provided, however, that any increase of rates shall be subject to the approval of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod.

Sometime in November 1993, petitioner increased its subscriber rates from P88.00 to P180.00 per
month. As a result, respondent Mayor wrote petitioner a letter threatening to cancel its permit unless it
secures the approval of respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod, pursuant to Resolution No. 210.

Petitioner then filed with the RTC, Branch 7, Batangas City, a petition for injunction alleging that
respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod has no authority to regulate the subscriber rates charged by
CATV operators because under Executive Order No. 205, the National Telecommunications
Commission (NTC) has the sole authority to regulate the CATV operation in the Philippines.

ISSUE :
May a local government unit (LGU) regulate the subscriber rates charged by CATV operators within
its territorial jurisdiction?

HELD:
No.

The logical conclusion, therefore, is that in light of the above laws and E.O. No. 436, the NTC
exercises regulatory power over CATV operators to the exclusion of other bodies.

Like any other enterprise, CATV operation maybe regulated by LGUs under the general welfare
clause. This is primarily because the CATV system commits the indiscretion of crossing public
properties. (It uses public properties in order to reach subscribers.) The physical realities of
constructing CATV system – the use of public streets, rights of ways, the founding of structures, and
the parceling of large regions – allow an LGU a certain degree of regulation over CATV operators.

But, while we recognize the LGUs’ power under the general welfare clause, we cannot sustain
Resolution No. 210. We are convinced that respondents strayed from the well recognized limits of its
power. The flaws in Resolution No. 210 are: (1) it violates the mandate of existing laws and (2) it
violates the State’s deregulation policy over the CATV industry.

LGUs must recognize that technical matters concerning CATV operation are within the exclusive
regulatory power of the NTC.

50