Element 1

08/07/2020
NEBOSH
International NEBOSH
Technical Certificate in
Oil and Gas Operational
International Technical Safety in
Certificate
OilElement
and Gas
1:Operational
Health, SafetySafety
and
Environmental Management in Context
Element 1: Health, Safety and
Environmental Management in Context
Element 1
Health, Safety and Environmental
Management in Context
• Learning From Incidents

• Hazards Inherent in Oil and Gas
• Risk Management Techniques Used in The Oil
and Gas Industries
• An Organisation’s Documented Evidence
© RRC
Learning From Incidents
1.1
© RRC
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Envisat ASAR satellite radar image showing large slick (black) from major Shell oil spill off
Niger Delta. Image taken December 21, 2011 at 9:30am local time. Image courtesy
European Space Agency.
© RRC
November 2019 - Residents of Cemaranaya beach clean up the oil spill from nearby
offshore oil and gas block Offshore North West Java (ONWJ) operated by state energy
giant Pertamina’s upstream unit Pertamina Hulu Energi
© RRC
Learning from Incidents

• Bhopal (1984) – Toxic-gas release
• Piper Alpha (1988) – Explosion and fire
• Esso Longford (1998) – Gas leak, explosion and
fires
• Texas City Refinery explosion (March 2005) -
vapour cloud ignited and violently exploded
• Buncefield (2005) – Oil-storage depot explosions
and fire
• Deepwater Horizon (2010) – Explosion, fire and
oil spill
© RRC
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Why investigate
accidents and near-
misses?
Should we apply the

same level of
investigation for
each?
© RRC
Types of Incident:
• Near-miss
• Accident
− Injury accident
− Damage-only
accident
• Dangerous occurrence
• Ill-health
© RRC

FIRST: Treat Injured, Secure/Make
Safe
Basic Investigation Procedures
Step 1: Gather facts.
Step 2: Analyse to determine
immediate and root/underlying
causes.
Step 3: Identify suitable corrective
measures.
Step 4: Plan the remedial actions.
© RRC
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Step 1: Gathering Information
• Secure the scene.
• Identify and interview witnesses.
• Collect factual information.
• Check documentation.
© RRC

Step 2: Analysing Information
Draw conclusions about the immediate and
root/underlying causes.
Immediate causes Underlying or root causes
E.g. a worker slips on a puddle of oil E.g. the failure to adequately
spilt on the floor – immediate causes supervise workers or provide
are the slip hazard (unsafe appropriate PPE.
condition) and the worker walking
through it (unsafe act).
Step 3: Identify Suitable Control Measures

Remedy immediate and root/underlying
causes.
© RRC

Step 4: Plan the Remedial Actions
• What must be done to fix the problems?
• What must be done as an interim measure?
(To remedy immediate and underlying/root causes)
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Cost of the remedial actions
Remedial Costs Ongoing Costs
• Buying personal protective • Carrying out regular inspections

equipment
• Replacing PPE as it wears, etc.
• Providing adequate storage
• Maintaining the storage facility,
• Putting in place inspection and with ongoing training for operators
maintenance programmes
© RRC

The Importance of Learning from Major
Incidents
Piper Alpha incident:
• Permit-to-Work systems
• Safety Management
• Rig Design
• Maintenance Systems
• Safety Training
• Safety Audits
© RRC
The outcomes of other incidents include:

• Bhopal, India - Toxic gas release (1984):
2700 dead; 50,000 seriously affected; 1,000,000
others less seriously affected.
• Buncefield, UK (2005): 40 injuries; widespread
damage.
• Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, Gulf of Mexico
(2010): 11 dead; major oil spill and
environmental damage.
© RRC
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Safety culture
Shared attitudes and beliefs and a
way of behaving.
Good safety culture:
− High regard for health and
safety
− Good perception of risk shared
by all workers
− All adopting the same positive
attitudes
− Ownership (taking
responsibility for H&S).
© RRC
Practice Exam Question

Identify sources of information that might be
used by an investigating team to determine
the causes of a workplace accident.
(8)
Suggested Answer
• Risk assessments / pre-/post accident risk assessments / all
company risk assessments
• Training or re-training / instruction records / certificates
• Health and safety information provided to employee
• Manufacturer’s instructions / safe systems of work /
standard operating procedures
• Permit-to-work documentation
• Maintenance/inspection records / statutory inspection
records
• Information from the health and safety committee / safety
representative accident report
• Monitoring / PPE issued records
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Suggested Answer
• Documents relating to previous accident
• Records of previous concerns from employees /
representatives
• Disciplinary records
• Internal accident report forms / books
• First aid / medical reports
• Accident report form to authorities
• Witness statements / enforcing authority interviews
• Log book entries / operational records / computer printouts
• Photographs / CCTV footage
(Only 8 were required)
Hazards Inherent in Oil and Gas
1.2
© RRC
SPOT THE HAZARD – TEST YOUR RISK AWARENESS
© RRC
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SPOT THE HAZARDS ANSWERS

1. Worker jumping from truck trailer
2. Fluids on rig mat
3. Slopping footwear – untied shoelace and
flapping boot tongue
4. Muck and dirt on rig mat
5. Scattered pipe on rig mat
6. Burned out light
7. Leaking drums
8. Uneven rig mats
© RRC

• Flash Point – the lowest temperature at
which sufficient vapour is given off to
‘flash’ when a source of ignition is applied.
• Vapour Density – mass per unit volume of

vapour.
• Vapour Pressure – the pressure exerted by

a vapour in equilibrium with its liquid (or
solid).
© RRC
Classification of Flammability
Flammable classification Flash Point
Extremely Flammable Below 0oC
Highly Flammable 0o– 21oC
Flammable 22o – 55oC
© RRC
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Flammability Limits
© RRC
Flammable Limits
• Lower flammable limit (LFL) or lower explosive
limit (LEL)
- Minimum concentration of fuel in air sufficient
to allow combustion to occur
- If the mixture is below the LFL, then the
mixture is too lean to burn
• Upper flammable limit (UFL) or upper explosive
limit (UEL)
- The maximum concentration of fuel in air
sufficient to allow combustion to occur
- If the mixture is above the UFL, then the
mixture is too rich to burn
© RRC
Flammable Limits
© RRC
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Explosive atmosphere situations
Explosions have occurred under the following
circumstances:
• During hot work, i.e. welding, grinding
• Where naked flames have occurred
• Where metal tools have created sparks
• Where electrical equipment has created
sparks
• Where static electricity has created sparks
© RRC

Toxicity
Ability of a chemical
molecule to cause injury
after it has reached a
susceptible site in the body.
It also applies to the

quantitative study of the
body’s response to toxic
substances.
© RRC
Substances and preparations which...
Very toxic in very small quantities can cause death or acute or

chronic damage to health when inhaled, swallowed or
absorbed through the skin.
Toxic in small quantities can cause death or acute or chronic
damage to health when inhaled, swallowed or absorbed
through the skin.
Harmful can cause death, acute or chronic damage to health
when inhaled, swallowed or absorbed through the skin.
Corrosive may, on contact with living tissues, destroy them.
Irritant through immediate, prolonged or repeated contact with
the skin or mucous membrane, can cause
inflammation.
© RRC
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Substances or preparations which, if they are

inhaled or ingested or penetrate the skin...
Sensitising are capable of eliciting a reaction by hyper-

sensitisation (on further exposure, characteristic
adverse effects are produced). May be sensitising if
inhaled or through skin contact.
Carcinogenic may induce cancer or increase its incidence.
Mutagenic may induce heritable genetic defects or increase
their incidence.
Toxic for may induce or increase the incidence of non-
reproduction heritable adverse effects in progeny and/or an
impair male or female reproductive functions or
capacity.
© RRC

Properties and Hazards of Gases
Hydrogen – (catalyst regenerator in
petroleum refining)
• Highly flammable/explosive (explosive range:
4.9 – 75%)
• Colourless and odourless
• Low density
• Low ignition energy
• Not toxic but asphyxiant in high concentrations
• Reacts vigorously with oxidants
© RRC

Methane – (natural gas)
• Highly flammable/explosive (explosive

range:
5-15%)
• Low density (explosive mixtures can form
below low ceilings, etc.)
• Easily ignited
• Simple asphyxiant
• Odorising agent added
© RRC
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LPG (Liquefied Petroleum Gas) as Propane/
Butane – (fuel)
• Easily liquefied gas
• Highly flammable
• Denser than air, collecting at low level
• Explosive mixtures form, often readily flashing
back to the source of a leak
• Easily ignited
• Simple asphyxiant - inhalation can lead to
drowsiness
© RRC
• Reacts explosively with chlorine

LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas) – (fuel)
• Liquid gas, easily vaporises
• Highly flammable/explosive gas
• Easily ignited
• Simple asphyxiant but non-toxic
• Contact with liquefied form will cause
frostbite (very cold, boiling at -161C)
• Volume increases 630 times on vaporisation
© RRC
Nitrogen
• Non-flammable gas
• Colourless, odourless and tasteless
• Used to ‘inert’ flammable and explosive
atmospheres (vessels)
• Used as ‘cover’ layer of gas on top of flammable
and explosive substances
• Used to freeze pipes and pipeline purging
• Nitrogen in the blood decreases oxygen-carrying
capacity of the blood
© RRC
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Hydrogen sulphide
• Flammable gas
• Colourless, with intense smell of rotten
eggs
• Denser than air, accumulates at low levels
• Can travel long distances and flash back
when spark is applied
• Toxic, irritates eyes, skin and respiratory
tract and can lead to respiratory paralysis
© RRC
Oxygen

• Non-flammable but supports combustion
• Oxygen enrichment can lead to fires and
explosions
• Reacts violently with oils and greases
© RRC

Gases are used and created in the production
and processing of oil and gas.
Identify the hazardous properties of:

(a) Hydrogen. (2)
(b) Nitrogen. (2)
(c) Hydrogen sulphide. (2)
(d) Oxygen. (2)
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Suggested Answer
(a) Hydrogen:
• Highly flammable and explosive gas that forms ignitable mixtures in air over a very wide
range of concentrations (between 4.9% -75%).
• Lighter than air and forms explosive mixtures rapidly.
• Easily ignited by low-energy sparks.
(b) Nitrogen:
• Gas will asphyxiate at high concentrations.
• Liquefied nitrogen will cause cold burns.
(c) Hydrogen sulphide:

• Forms explosive mixtures with air over a wide range of concentrations (4%-46%).
• Denser than air and will accumulate in low level areas, travel long distances to an
ignition source and flash back.
• Toxic, will irritate the eyes, skin and respiratory tract and can lead to respiratory
paralysis. lt will rapidly deaden the sense of smell, so its odour cannot be relied on to
detect it.
(d) Oxygen:
• Oxygen enrichment can lead to fires and explosion.
• Will react violently with oils and greases.
• Oxygen is non-flammable, but will encourage combustion, with combustible materials
becoming more easily ignited in an oxygen-enriched atmosphere.
(a) Identify the hazardous of properties of

LNG. (3)
(b) Outline the risks associated with LNG.
(5)
Suggested Answer
(a) Hazardous properties of LNG:
• Easily liquefied and vaporised from the liquefied state.
• Forms a highly flammable odourless gas.
• Non-toxic asphyxiant gas.
(b) Risks associated with LNG:

• Forms an explosive mixture with air.
• Vapour can be ignited some distance away from a leak and the
flame will spread back to the source.
• Will exclude oxygen from the atmosphere and asphyxiate at high
concentrations.
• Contact with its liquefied form will cause frostbite.
• Catastrophic vessel failure may result in boiling liquid expanding
vapour explosions (BLEVEs).
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PROPERTIES AND HAZARDS OF

ASSOCIATED PRODUCTS AND
CONTROL MEASURES

Anti-foaming agents - used in process and
cooling liquids to reduce problems caused by
foam, dissolved or trapped air, such as:
• Cavitation, reducing pump efficiency (and creating noise)
• Reducing the capacity of pumps and storage tanks
• Bacterial growth in the fluids
• Dirt and debris formation and surface flotation
• Reducing the effectiveness of the fluids in use
• Longer downtime for cleaning and maintenance
• Clogging of filtration equipment
• Shortened fluid replenishment times and added costs
© RRC
Anti-wetting agents – waterproof barrier

coatings.
• Protection against water ingress in harsh
environments
• Some protection against corrosion
Corrosion preventatives for fuel systems and
process pipelines.
Refrigerants, e.g. propane, ammonia, sulphur
dioxide and methane.
© RRC
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Micro-biocides, i.e. anti-bacterial treatments.
• Oil-system biocides – in oil production and water-injection

systems
• Water-injection system biocides

• Fuel-preserving biocides
• Water-system biocides – for salt and fresh-water systems.
• Special biocides – e.g. to counteract sulphate-reducing

bacteria in drilling and process platform structures and
pipelines.
© RRC

Hazards and Risk Controls for Additives
Hazards:
• Depends on inherent chemical hazard,
physical form and route of entry into the
body
Risk Controls:
• Hazardous-substance risk assessment
• Automated dosing instead of hand-dosing
• Safe storage and handling procedures
• Suitable PPE (chemical-resistant clothing,
goggles, RPE)
© RRC

Water and Steam:
© RRC
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Water and Steam:
Used in system cooling, lubrication (drilling muds),
fire deluge systems, advanced hydrocarbon recovery
methods.
• The hazards
- pressure injection of fluids into the body
- severe steam burns (including of lungs)
- Asphyxiation
• Safe handling
- Special procedures
- water and heat-proof clothing
© RRC

Mercaptans (a group of sulphur-containing
chemicals)
• Offensive odours (can be used as odorising agents)
• H2S and mercaptans removed in oil refineries and
natural-gas processing plants
• Headaches, nausea, coughing, irritation of the lungs
and eyes
• Very high concentrations - breathing difficulties,
cyanosis (turning blue), loss of consciousness and
muscle spasms
• Appropriate respiratory protective equipment (RPE) is
to be worn where potentially harmful levels may be
present
© RRC

Drilling muds (drilling fluids)
• Used in deep holes in oil and gas extraction:
− Lubricant (reduces friction and heat and
reduces the chances of friction-related
complications)
− Carrier for the materials through which drilling
takes place
• Different muds for different circumstances
(viscosity and density).
• Aqueous (water)-based, non-aqueous (oil)-based,
or gaseous fluids.
• Mineral or synthetic in nature.
© RRC
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Hazards
• Contact with additives (e.g.
diesel oil and fumes, anti-
foaming agents)
• Fire/explosion (natural gases
and flammable materials
that can be returned to the
drilling work areas).
Controls
• Fire safety precautions
• Suitable PPE
© RRC

Sludges (drilling wastes)
• Low Specific Activity (LSA) sludges may contain
naturally occurring radioactive materials (NORM), e.g.
uranium, thorium, radium, strontium
• Radiation monitoring in settling-out areas
• Removal of LSA scale from production equipment
(specialist dispersal chemicals, or high-pressure water
flushing)
• Protection of personnel (from contact and inhalation)
– may need restricted, controlled areas and classified
workers for high radiation levels
• Pyrophoric* iron - special control measures to dispose
of it
© RRC

In oil and gas production, LSA scale is
typically found in:
• The production well

• Safety valves
• Well heads
• Production manifolds
• Inside separators
• Water separators
© RRC
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Following preparation of a vessel for maintenance within an
oil and gas installation a low specific activity (LSA) radioactive
sludge was encountered.
(a) Identify TWO other pieces of workplace equipment

where the sludge may be found. (2)
(b) Outline control measures to reduce the risk to workers

exposed to the sludge. (6)
Suggested Answer (a)

• Well / well head
• Safety valves
• Production manifold / pipe work to separators
• Separator internals
• Oil coolers
• Crude oil storage tanks
• Filters / drains / dead legs
• Shale shakers
• Mud pits
1 each [max 2]
Suggested Answer (b)

• Use of a Radiation Protection Adviser to oversee work with the
contaminated sludge
• Minimise the amount of time exposed to the sludge
• Provide RPE/PPE / wet suits / BA / rubber boots / gauntlets,
• Decontaminate equipment/surfaces after work with the sludge is
undertaken
• Cover wounds/cuts/grazes
• Do not eat/drink/smoke/ apply cosmetics in areas where sludge is
likely to be present
• Safe disposal procedures for the sludge
• Monitor radiation levels
• Display signage
• Utilise barriers to restrict access
1 each [max 6]
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Risk Management Techniques

Used in The Oil and Gas
Industries
1.3
© RRC

Used in The Oil and Gas Industries
The Purposes and Uses of Risk Assessment
Techniques
The 5 –Steps approach to risk assessment is:
© RRC

The UK Offshore Installations (Safety Case)
Regulations 2005 require that:
• All hazards with the potential to cause a major
accident have been identified;
• All major accident risks have been evaluated; and
• Measures have been, or will be, taken to control
the major-accident risks to ensure compliance with
the law – that is, a “compliance demonstration”.
© RRC
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• Hazard identification – the CORE of risk assessment.
• The main stages are:
© RRC

Qualitative vs Quantitative Risk Assessment
What’s the difference?
Qualitative (Q)
• Using qualitative methods to determine frequency and severity
Semi-quantitative (SQ)
• Where frequency and severity are approximately quantified

within ranges
Quantified risk assessment (QRA)
• Where full quantification is demonstrated
© RRC

Determining the Right Method of Risk Assessment
Qualitative (Q)
• Use this method if it is adequate for deciding on appropriate

controls.
• Record the findings and recommendations.
If not adequate, then use
Semi-Quantitative (SQ)
• Use this if it is adequate for deciding on appropriate controls.

• Record findings and recommendations.
• If not adequate, first increase the depth of modelling of the risk assessment
and see if it now meets requirements.
• If it does, record the findings and recommendations.
(Continued)
© RRC
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If not adequate, then use
Quantified Risk Assessment (QRA)
If adequate, use QRA.
If not, increase depth of the risk assessment model until it answers all questions.
Record findings and recommendations
In its Offshore Information Sheet No 3/ 2006, the UK

HSE gives more industry-specific guidance on how to
determine which risk assessment method is
appropriate.
© RRC
Outline the purpose and use of the following

risk assessment techniques:
(a) Qualitative. (4)
(b) Quantitative. (4)
Suggested Answer
Qualitative risk assessment: Quantitative risk assessment:
• Specified activity. • Specified activity.
• Comprehensive • Application of methodology
identification and to produce a numerical
description of hazards to representation.
people or the • Frequency and extent of a
environment. specified level of exposure
• The range of possible or harm.
events is represented by • Specified people or the
broad categories. environment.
• Classification of the • Enables comparison of the
likelihood and severity. results with specified
numerical criteria.
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The Starting Point Approach – examples:
• Large integrated platforms, or nodal platforms in
the North Sea –
likely to need QRA.
• Less complex installations and those with smaller
workforces, e.g. drilling installations, normally
unattended installations (NUIs) –
SQ could be suitable.
• Where clear standards/benchmarks for design and
risk reduction,
Q is often sufficient.
© RRC

Risk Estimation and Ranking of Risks
© RRC

Know your risks and what you

should be doing about them
Plan, prioritise, implement risk controls

Risk
Management
Make sure risk controls remain effective
Review and learn
© RRC
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The HSG65
safety
management
system:
PLAN
DO
CHECK
ACT
© RRC

Systems approach - Managing Hazards and
Risks at each stage
© RRC
How Risk Management Tools Are

Applied
© RRC
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Risk control of INPUTS (covering design,
selection, installation, etc):
RCS needed for: Examples
PHYSICAL RESOURCES Rigs, safety-critical equipment,
substances
HUMAN RESOURCES Recruitment/selection of staff and

contractors
INFORMATION H&S laws and standards
© RRC

RISK CONTROL of PROCESS
Area of Process Risk Examples
Production workplace Field, rig, facilities, support
systems, access, welfare
Plant & Substances Oil/gas drilling, pumping, storage
Procedures Shifts, job design

People Leadership, competence
© RRC

Reducing Risks to ALARP
© RRC
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Concept of ‘As Low as Reasonably

Practicable’ (ALARP)
• ALARP covers risk at levels of some
uncertainty:
- Unacceptable risk - risk cannot be justified
at this level.
- ALARP (tolerability region):
• At the higher risk end, a benefit is desired
and risk reduction is impracticable.
• At the lower risk end, the risk is tolerable if
the cost to reduce it would outweigh the
benefits.
- Acceptable risk - the risk is negligible.
© RRC
OTHER RISK MANAGEMENT TOOLS

Other Risk Management Tools – HAZOP
What are the key principles?
• Purpose - to identify any deviations from design
intent, their causes and consequences.
• Useful at design stage of hazardous
installations/processes.
• Multi-disciplinary team and brainstorming
• Uses guide words to identify deviations, e.g.
MORE, LESS
• Devise actions to reduce risk down to acceptable
level.
© RRC
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HAZID
What are the key principles?
• Purpose - to identify all hazards for later

risk assessment
• Uses “brainstorming”, aided by key words.
• Useful when considering changes to
existing plant layout.
© RRC

FMEA - the key principles
• Commonly used to calculate the failure, or malfunction, of
components in an assembly, piece of equipment, or the
operation of a plant
• Lists individual components, and examines each of their
individual failures, and the effects of any such failure, on the
system as a whole
• Begins with the question: “If this item fails, what will the
result be?”
• Can be used during the design stages of a new process, or
reviewing the safe operations of an existing process, to
identify and fix potential problems before they occur
© RRC

Industry-Related Process Safety Standards
Promote concepts of inherently-safe and risk-based
design i.e. ‘design it out’
Design-it-Out Examples
principles
Hazard elimination Discontinue, substitute (non-
hazardous)
Consequence Substitution (less hazardous),
reduction reduced inventory, spill
containment, separation/isolation
Likelihood Reduction Simplify, clarify, redundant
systems, ignition-source removal
© RRC
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Industry-Related Process Safety

Standards
• Inherently-safe and risk-based design
concepts, and engineering codes and good
practice, are the foundations for onshore
and offshore operational safety.
• Inherently-safer designs - designs where
the design engineers use a variety of
techniques to achieve risk reduction
through design (the “design-it-out”
principle).
© RRC
Hazard Elimination
Hazard elimination - get rid of the hazards as

a first priority:
• Eliminate use of a hazardous material.
• Substitute with a less hazardous material.
• Discontinue the operation.
© RRC
Consequence Reduction
Consequence reduction - find a less hazardous

solution to the same design objective:
• Reduce quantities of hazardous materials.

• Contain and evacuate spillages.
• Separate the operation from critical areas to
reduce exposure to adjacent operations and
personnel.
© RRC
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Likelihood Reduction
Likelihood reduction - reduce the probability

of a hazardous event happening:
• Reduce the potential for human error through

simplicity of design.
• Control ignition sources.
• Provide redundancy and alarms.
© RRC
Inherently-safe and risk-based design concepts

are the foundations for onshore and offshore
operational safety.
(a) Outline what is meant by ‘inherently-safer design’.
(2)
(b) Identify the THREE principal concepts of
inherently-safer design. (3)
(c) For each concept, outline, with examples, methods
that could be used to achieve each concept. (15)
Suggested Answers
(a) (c)
• Engineers use a Hazard elimination:
variety of techniques • Eliminate use of a hazardous
to achieve risk material.
reduction through
design. • Substitute with a less hazardous
material.
• "Design-it-out”
principle. • Discontinue the operation.
Consequence reduction:
(b) • Reduce quantities of hazardous
• Hazard elimination. materials.
• Consequence • Contain spills.
reduction. • Separate the operation from critical
• Likelihood reduction. areas and reduce exposure to
adjacent operations and personnel.
Likelihood reduction:
• Reduce the potential for human
error through simplicity of design.
• Control ignition sources.
• Provide redundancy and alarms.
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Sources of Written, Recognised Good Practice
include:
• (UK) HSE Guidance and ACoPs
• National or local government guidance
• International or national standards (BS, CEN,
CENELEC, ISO, IEC, etc.)
• Industry-specific or sector guidance from trade
federations, professional institutions, etc.
© RRC

The Concept of Hazard Realisation – What If?, e.g. loss of
containment leading to hydrocarbon release
Issue to consider Examples
from HCRs
Major Sources System piping, flanges, valves, SBTs,
instrumentation
Operational causes Wrongly-fitted equipment (gas
compression), incorrect operation (human)
Procedural causes Non-compliance with procedure (human)
© RRC

CONSIDER WORST CASE:
What? Major HCR (> 25kg)

Where? From piping/instrumentation;
On gas compression unit, close to
accommodation;
With uncontrolled ignition sources.
When? Highest occupancy; deluge system on manual.
How? Poor maintenance, incorrect fittings and not
correctly tightened.
© RRC
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No PPM
No Fire No
Fighting Detection
Equipment Equipment
Why?
No
Poor
Emergency
leadership
Plan
Poor Poor fire

response training
© RRC

Taking it further
• HCR ignited by electrical fault
1
• Explosion and fire engulf the canteen

2
• All 34 workers in canteen lost

3
• Gas compression unit destroyed by blast

4
• Gas process operation lost – long downtime

5
© RRC

No
warning
of HCR
No water
No EER
for
plan
deluge
No Why? Long
trained
release
response
duration
team
Fire
Personnel fighting
elsewhere media not
available
© RRC
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Working down the possibilities in each
scenario, begin to eliminate, or reduce some
of the consequences and probability, e.g.
IF THEN
Accommodation NOT next to ….we may not lose 50% of our
compression plant crew
Fire deluge system is NOT on Water will be available

manual override automatically to deal with the
fire…
© RRC

The Concept of Risk Control Barrier Models – “bow-tie”
© RRC
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08/07/2020
Suggested Answer
(a)
i. Hazard – Hydrocarbon gas (cloud)
ii. Hazard Control Barriers
i. Pipe blank
ii. Permit to Work
iii. Recovery Measures
i. Firewater Deluge System
ii. ESD
iv. Consequence – Catastrophic damage to hydrocarbon gas plant.
(b) Reasons for involving all workers in the development of barrier
models.
i. Ensures best practice is shared and learning is disseminated from
previous incidents.

The Swiss-Cheese Barrier Model
© RRC
Barrier Models
“The Swiss-Cheese model”
Source: OGP
© RRC
E2-
33
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The Use of Modelling (software) for Risk
Identification
• Thermal radiation models
• Blast-zone models
© RRC

The Use of Modelling (software) for Risk
Identification
Can estimate, for example:
• The evaporation rate of flammable liquids;
• The dispersal patterns of leaking
vapours/gases;
• The likely types, effects and scale of any fires
and explosions - the rate of pressure rise,
maximum pressure, intensity of thermal
radiation, blast zones
© RRC
An Organisation’s
Documented Evidence
1.4
© RRC
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An Organisation’s Documented
Evidence
Typical Examples in the UK:
• Safety Case (offshore)
• Safety Report (Onshore)
Typical Legal Requirements/Good Practice:
Notification required to regulator at design stage (or
when moved, or change of use).
Regulators require safety case/safety report
submission for each installation type.
Installation cannot operate until SC/SR accepted by
regulator (regulator will inspect installation).
© RRC
Evidence
The Purpose of Documented Evidence such
as Safety Cases and Safety Reports is:
To ensure that duty-holders design/operate

their facilities safely, i.e. measures are in
place to identify potential for, prevent and
mitigate major accidents.
© RRC
Evidence
The Typical Content of Safety Cases and Safety Reports
Identify major accident hazards – use risk assessments, bow-
tie diagrams, design calculations, etc.
1
• Each hazard scenario
2
• Threats to safety and their causes
3
• Barriers to prevent those threats
4
• Consequences of each threat were it to be realised
5
• Recovery measures required
6
• Factors that could escalate the hazard, or its consequences
© RRC
35
08/07/2020
Evidence
Evaluate major accident risks and measures
taken (or to be taken).
• Identify each hazard/incident scenario
1
• Assess frequency criteria

2
• Assess consequence criteria

3
• Assess EER facilities and requirements

4
• Identify and assess risk control measures against ALARP

5
© RRC
Evidence
Arrangements for audits and audit reports
Adequate SMS in place

Major accident prevention policies (in the
case of safety reports)
Identify safety-critical elements in place to

manage major accident hazards
Details of the emergency plan.

© RRC
Organisations must have documented

evidence that their safety systems are
adequate.
Outline the purpose of:
(a) the safety case. (4)
(b) the safety report. (4)
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Suggested Answer - Safety Case

Legally required in some countries; Offshore Installations
(Safety Case) Regulations 2005 (OSCR) require UK operators
of all installations to prepare a safety case.
Required to ensure that those involved in offshore activities

design, construct, commission and operate their facilities in
order to reduce the risks to the health and safety of those
working on the offshore installations, or in connected
activities to as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP).
Demonstrates that the duty-holder is capable of controlling

major accident risks effectively.
Core document for checking that risk controls and safety

management systems are in place and operate as they
should.
Suggested Answer - Safety Report

Contributes to preventing major accidents on sites having
specified amounts of hazardous substances, normally
onshore.
Demonstrates measures are in place to prevent major

accidents and limit consequences to people and the
environment.
Systematically examines the site activities, and the potential

for major accidents, and what is or is going to be done to
prevent them.
Shows use of a systematic process to arrive at the risk

controls, showing the depth to which you have gone to
develop them. It shows you can correct any shortcomings.
37

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08/07/2020

• Learning From Incidents

Learning From Incidents

Learning From Incidents

Learning From Incidents

Learning from Incidents

Learning from Incidents

Should we apply the

Learning from Incidents

Learning from Incidents

Learning from Incidents

Step 1: Gathering Information

• Secure the scene.

• Identify and interview witnesses.

• Collect factual information.

Learning from Incidents

Step 3: Identify Suitable Control Measures

Learning from Incidents

(To remedy immediate and underlying/root causes)

Learning from Incidents

Cost of the remedial actions

Remedial Costs Ongoing Costs

• Buying personal protective • Carrying out regular inspections

Learning from Incidents

Learning from Incidents

The outcomes of other incidents include:

Learning from Incidents

Practice Exam Question

Hazards Inherent in Oil and Gas

Hazards Inherent in Oil and Gas

SPOT THE HAZARD – TEST YOUR RISK AWARENESS

SPOT THE HAZARDS ANSWERS

Hazards Inherent in Oil and Gas

• Vapour Density – mass per unit volume of

• Vapour Pressure – the pressure exerted by

Hazards Inherent in Oil and Gas

Extremely Flammable Below 0oC

Highly Flammable 0o– 21oC

Flammable 22o – 55oC

Hazards Inherent in Oil and Gas

Hazards Inherent in Oil and Gas

Hazards Inherent in Oil and Gas

It also applies to the

Hazards Inherent in Oil and Gas

Substances and preparations which...

Very toxic in very small quantities can cause death or acute or

Hazards Inherent in Oil and Gas

Substances or preparations which, if they are

Sensitising are capable of eliciting a reaction by hyper-

Hazards Inherent in Oil and Gas

Hazards Inherent in Oil and Gas

• Highly flammable/explosive (explosive

Hazards Inherent in Oil and Gas

Hazards Inherent in Oil and Gas

Hazards Inherent in Oil and Gas

Hazards Inherent in Oil and Gas

Hazards Inherent in Oil and Gas

• Colourless and odourless

Practice Exam Question

Identify the hazardous properties of:

(c) Hydrogen sulphide:

Practice Exam Question

(a) Identify the hazardous of properties of

(b) Risks associated with LNG: