CASE DIGESTS

(GROUP 4 OUTPUT)
Shalom Mae Barrera
Jessamae V. Docdoc
Catherine T. Labastilla
Karl Minglana
Nikka A. Peligro
Emman Carl P. Rubin

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 LIST OF CASES
1. Cayetano vs. Monsod, 201 SCRA 210 Shalom Mae Barrera

2. Cruz v. Mina, 2007 Shalom Mae Barrera

3. Reddi vs. Serbio, A.C. No. 7027, January Shalom Mae Barrera
30, 2009
4. Foodsphere, Inc. vs. Mauricio., A.C. No. Shalom Mae Barrera
7199. July 22, 2009
5. Office of the Court Administration vs. Joven, Jessamae V. Docdoc
399 SCRA 18
6. Ong vs. Atty. Unti, A.C. No. 2417, Feb. 6, Jessamae V. Docdoc
2002.
7. Tagorda, 53 Phil 37 (1929) Jessamae V. Docdoc
8. Director of Religious Affairs v. Bayot, 74 Jessamae V. Docdoc
Phil. 579 (1944)
9. Ulep v. Legal Clinic, 223 SCRA 378 (1993) Catherine T.
Labastilla
10. Dacanay v. Baker and McKenzie, 136 SCRA Catherine T.
Labastilla
349 (1985)
11. Angeles vs. Ibaez, A.C. No. 7860, January Catherine T.
Labastilla
15, 2009
12. Integration of the Phil. Bar, 49 SCRA 22 Catherine T.
Labastilla
13. Ogka Benito vs. Balindong, A.M. No. RTJ- Karl Minglana
08-2103, February 23, 2009 580 SCRA 41
14. Ogka Benito vs. Balindong supra 7.7 Karl Minglana

15. People v. Peneda, 20 SCRA 748 (1967) Karl Minglana

16. Suarez v. Platon, 69 Phil 556 (1940) Karl Minglana

17. Misamin v. San Juan, 72 SCRA 491 (1976) Nikka A. Peligro

18. PNB v. Cedo, 243 SCRA 1 (1995) Nikka A. Peligro

19. 1989 Elections of the Integrated Bard, 178 Nikka A. Peligro
SCRA 398 (1989)

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20. Leda v. Tabang, 206 SCRA 395 (1992) Nikka A. Peligro

21. Tan v Sabandal, 206 SCRA 493 (1992) Nikka A. Peligro

22. Saburnido v. Madrono 366 SCRA 1 Emman Carl P.

Rubin
23. Javier v. Cornejo, 63 Phil. Emman Carl P.
Rubin
24. Macias v. Malig 157 SCRA 762 (1988) Emman Carl P.
Rubin
25. Foodsphere vs. Macauricio A.C. No7199, Emman Carl P.
July 22. 2009 Rubin

CAYETANO vs. MONSOD

201 SCRA 210, September 03, 1991

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PRINCIPLE/S: The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases
or litigation in court. It is any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience.

FACTS: Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to

the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the
Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments. The Commission on
Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod. He took his oath of office
and assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC. Renato Cayetano opposed
the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required
qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation of Monsod's nomination, petitioner
as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition
praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.

ISSUE: Whether or not Monsod possess the required qualification of having

engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

RULING: For having passed the bar examinations, Atty. Christian Monsod is a
member of the Philippine Bar. Interpreted in the light of the various definitions
of the term Practice of law, particularly the modern concept of law practice, and
taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of
the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist,
a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of
contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor, verily more
than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years. It is well-settled that when the appointee
is qualified, and all the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission
has no alternative but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil
Service Law. The Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment on
the ground that another person is more qualified for a particular position. It
also has no authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To
do so would be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon the appointing
authority. An appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of
whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only condition that the appointee
should possess the qualifications required by law. The power of the
Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod
as Chairman of the Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-
Article C, Article IX of the Constitution.

CRUZ vs. MINA

G.R. No. 154207, April 27, 2007

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PRINCIPLE/S: Appearance before the inferior courts by a non-lawyer is
allowed, irrespective of whether or not he is a law student.

FACTS: Ferdinand A. Cruz filed before the MeTC a formal Entry of

Appearance, as private prosecutor in a criminal case for grave threats, where
his father, Mariano Cruz, is the complaining witness. He described himself as
a third year law student and justifies his appearance as private prosecutor on
the bases of Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the ruling of the
Court En Banc in Cantimbuhan v. Judge Cruz, Jr. that a non-lawyer may
appear before the inferior courts as an agent or friend of a party litigant. He
further avers that his appearance was with prior conformity of the public
prosecutor and a written authority of Mariano Cruz appointing him to be his
agent in the prosecution of the said criminal case. However, MeTC denied the
petition on the ground that Circular No. 19 governing limited law student
practice in conjunction with Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court should take
precedence over the ruling of the Court laid down in Cantimbuhan. The
petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but MeTC denied it. The petitioner
then filed before the RTC a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with Prayer
for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order against the private
respondent and the public respondent MeTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an
inferior court as an agent or friend of a party litigant.

RULING: The courts a quo held that the Law Student Practice Rule as
encapsulated in Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, prohibits the petitioner, as a
law student, from entering his appearance in behalf of his father, the private
complainant in the criminal case without the supervision of an attorney duly
accredited by the law school. Rule 138-A or the Law Student Practice Rule,
provides that a law student who has successfully completed his 3rd year of the
regular four-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law
school's clinical legal education program approved by the Supreme Court, may
appear without compensation in any civil, criminal or administrative case
before any trial court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent indigent clients
accepted by the legal clinic of the law school. The rule, however, is different if
the law student appears before an inferior court, where the issues and
procedure are relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appear in
his personal capacity without the supervision of a lawyer.

REDDI vs. SERBIO

A.C. NO. 7027, January 30, 2009

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PRINCIPLE/S: When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is
not enough that he denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue
and overcome the evidence against him. He must show proof that he still
maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of
him.

FACTS: Taking after her parents who had been involved in various charitable
activities in India, Tanu Reddi nurtured philanthropic desires in opening a
hospital with modern facilities. Immaculada Luistro, her assistant suggested
to consider engaging in the real estate business in the Philippines in order to
speed up the generation of funds. Reddi was introduced to Atty. Diosdado C.
Sebrio, Jr. who would help her acquire real properties for development and/or
resale. Three corporations were formed for her to acquire ownership of lands
in the Philippines. Respondent cajoled her into buying several parcels of land
which the complainant later on discovered that the properties were neither
owned nor for sale or that there was no existing vacant lot. The complainant’s
counsel, by letter demanded from respondent the return of US$3,000,000,
claimed to be part of the total sum of money Reddi had sent to him for all the
transactions that did not come about. No amount has been returned to
complainant prompting her to file a complaint for disbarment against
respondent. Respondent admits receiving a total of US$544,828 from
complainant which he claims that it was used not only for the purchase of
the Las Piñas property and discharge of the mortgage thereon, but also for the
setting up of the earlier mentioned corporations, as well as for the
downpayment on the Makati property and related expenses. The Court
referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation/decision but the respondent failed to appear
during the mandatory conference scheduled by the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Sebrio’s act of misrepresentation constitute

violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

RULING: The Commissioner found respondent to have committed fraudulent

acts which constitute violations of the lawyer’s oath and numerous provisions
of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). The Court finds, however,
that respondent’s dishonest and deceitful conduct with respect to the intended
transactions, real property acquisitions which turned out to be bogus, is
sufficiently established. Since respondent failed to credibly account, upon
demand, for the money held by him in trust, an element of
misappropriation, the complainant’s claim that respondent employed deceit on
her is established.  If the practice of law, however, is to remain an honorable
profession and attain its basic ideals, those enrolled in its ranks should not
only master its tenets and principles but should also, in their lives, accord
continuing fidelity to them. The requirement of good moral character is, in fact,

Page 6 of 41
of much greater import, as far as the general public is concerned, than the
possession of legal learning.

Page 7 of 41
 FOODSPHERE INC. vs. MAURICIO
A.C. NO. 7199, July 22, 2009

PRINCIPLE/S: In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyer’s

language even in his pleadings must be dignified.

FACTS: Alberto Cordero bought from a grocery, canned goods including a can
of CDO Liver spread. As Cordero and his relatives were eating, they discovered
a colony of worms inside the can and the laboratory examination confirmed the
presence of parasites in the Liver spread. BFAD conducted a conciliation
hearing which the spouses Cordero demanded ₱150,000 as damages from
Foodsphere Inc., a corporation engaged under the brand name CDO.
Foodsphere refused to heed the demand, instead, they offered to return actual
medical and incidental expenses incurred by the Corderos as long as they were
supported by receipts, but the offer was turned down. With the refusal of
Foodsphere, Atty. Mauricio proposed an agreement wherein Foodsphere agreed
to settle the matter for a lower amount, and that Foodsphere will advertise in
Mauricio’s tabloids and tv shows in exchange for the withdrawal of the
complaint. Later on, Atty. Mauricio continued his attacks against Foodsphere
thus prompting the latter to file criminal and civil complaints as well as an
administrative complaint against Atty. Mauricio to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent was correct in publishing in his article
the defects of complainant’s products.

RULING:  Whatever the true motive of respondent for his barrage of articles
against complainant does not detract from the fact that respondent consciously
violated the spirit behind the "Kasunduan" which he himself prepared and
signed and submitted to the BFAD for approval. Respondent was less than
forthright when he prepared said "Kasunduan" and then turned around and
proceeded to lambaste complainant for what was supposedly already settled in
said agreement.  The actuations of respondent constituted, to say the least,
deceitful conduct contemplated under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which mandates lawyers to refrain from engaging in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. For, as the IBP found, he
engaged in deceitful conduct by, inter alia, taking advantage of the complaint
against CDO to advance his interest, to obtain funds for his Batas Foundation
and seek sponsorships and advertisements for the tabloids and his television
program. The respondent also violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which directs a lawyer to "at all times uphold the integrity and
the dignity of the legal profession."

Page 8 of 41
 OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v. JOVEN
A.M. No. RTJ-01-1646, March 11, 2003

PRINCIPLE/S: The Constitution and the Code of Judicial Conduct mandate

that judges should resolve their cases promptly within ninety (90) days from
the filing of the last pleading, brief or memorandum.

FACTS: Since April 10 up until April 11 of 2000, a team from the Office of the
Court Administartion conducted a judicial audit of the RTC Branch 29 in Bislig
City. Surigao del Sur of which Respondent Francisco Joven was the presiding
Judge. The said team reported that Respondent Judge failed to act upon render
judgments in several criminal and civil cases pending in his sala. Immediately
after the audit, Respondent Judge gave his explanation and resolved undecided
cases. In the case at bar, respondent cannot justify his delay in deciding
criminal cases nos. 1504 and 2004 and civil case no. 715 on the ground that
he was still awaiting the submission of the parties Memoranda which had been
long overdue and did not seem to be forthcoming. The filing of the Memoranda
containing the summary of issues litigated and proved is not indispensable in
the resolution of the pending cases. It is respondent’s obligation as a trial judge
to take down notes during the trial to assist him in the prompt disposition of
the cases without awaiting and relying on the Memoranda of the parties.
Respondent compulsorily retired from service and manifested his compliance
with all matters reported in the judicial audit and requested that the
administrative case be considered closed and terminated.

ISSUE: Whether or not Respondent Judge be acquitted of administrative

liability in view of his retirement and compliance with the OCA audit report.

RULING: NO. It bears to stress that the Court is cognizant of the predicament
of judges in rendering decisions on cases, especially those that involve complex
questions of facts or law. Almost always, their situation is compounded by
heavy caseloads which may at times make the allotted period to decide the
cases insufficient. Hence, the Court allows a certain degree of latitude to judges
and grants them a reasonable extension of time to resolve cases upon proper
application by the judge concerned and on meritorious grounds. In the case at
bar, respondent could have requested for a reasonable extension of time to
decide the cases pending before his sala but he did not. For failure to do so,
respondent should be held accountable. Thus, for incurring delay in rendering
the decision on the cases assigned to him which constitutes a less serious
charge under Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended,
respondent who was compulsorily retired from service as of August 21, 2001
may be penalized with a fine of not less than P10,000.00 but not exceeding
P20,000.00. Therefore, Judge FRANCISO C. JOVEN of the Regional Trial Court

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of Bislig, Branch 29, Surigao del Sur, is fined ten thousand five hundred pesos
(P10,500.00) to be taken from his retirement benefits.

Page 10 of 41
 ONG VS. ATTY. UNTO
ADM. CASE NO. 2417, FEBRUARY 6, 2002

PRINCIPLE/S: Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

FACTS: A demand-letter from the respondent as legal counsel of one Nemesia

Garganian was sent to the complainant claiming for the support of the alleged
child. A few days thereafter, the respondent wrote a letter addressed to Dr.
Jose Bueno (Agaw), an emissary of the complainant where he listed down the
alleged additional financial demands of Ms. Garganian against the complainant
and discussed the courses of action that he would take against the
complainant should the latter fail to comply with his obligation to support Ms.
Garganian and her son. It was alleged that the real father of Ms. Garganian’s
son was the complainant’s brother and that the complainant merely assumed
his brother’s obligation to appease Ms. Garganian who was threatening to sue
them. The complainant then did not comply with the demands against him.
Consequently, the respondent filed a complaint with the Office of the City
Fiscal (now Prosecutor’s Office) of Dumaguete City against the complainant, his
wife, Bella Lim, and one Albina Ong, for alleged violation of the Retail Trade
Nationalization Law and the Anti-Dummy Law. The next day, the respondent
filed another criminal complaint against the complainant, Lim, Ong and Adela
Peralta for their alleged violation of the Anti-Dummy Law. In addition, the
respondent commenced administrative cases against the complainant before
the Bureau of Domestic Trade, the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation, and the Office of the Solicitor General. According to the
complainant, these cases were subsequently denied due course and dismissed
by the aforesaid government agencies. The foregoing prompted the complainant
to file the present case for disbarment. The records show that the respondent
offered monetary rewards to anyone who could provide him any information
against the complainant just so he would have a leverage in his actions against
the latter. The complainant branded the respondent’s tactics as “highly
immoral, unprofessional and unethical, constituting malpractice of law and
conduct gravely unbecoming of a lawyer.”

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is guilty of malpractice of law and conduct

unbecoming of lawyer.

RULING: Yes, Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates

lawyers to represent their clients with zeal but within the bounds of the law.
Rule 19.01 further commands that “a lawyer shall employ only fair and honest
means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present,
participate or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an
improper advantage in any case or proceeding.” The respondent’s action was
found to be malicious as the cases he instituted against the complainant did
not have any bearing or connection to the cause of his client, Ms. Garganian.

Page 11 of 41
Clearly, the respondent has violated the proscription in Canon 19, Rule 19.01.
His behavior is inexcusable. His tactic is unethical and runs counter to the
rules that a lawyer shall not, for corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit
or proceeding and he shall not do any act designed primarily to solicit legal
business.

The ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoin lawyers to act with the highest
standards of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the course of his practice of
law. A lawyer may be disciplined or suspended for any misconduct, whether in
his professional or private capacity. Public confidence in law and lawyers may
be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the Bar.
Thus, every lawyer should act and comport himself in such a manner that
would promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession.
Therefore respondent Atty. Unto is hereby declared guilty of conduct
unbecoming of a lawyer and is suspended from the practice of law for a period
of five months and sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar act
will be dealt with more severely.

Page 12 of 41
 LUIS B. TAGORDA, 53 PHIL 37 (1929)

PRINCIPLE/S: Canon 27 and 28 of the Code of Ethics

FACTS: Atty. Luis Tagorda, a member of the provincial board of Isabela, admits
that in the last general elections he made use of a card written in Spanish and
Ilocano, which in translation, read as follows:

“LUIS B. TAGORDA” Attoney; Notary Public; CANDIDATE FOR BOARD

MEMBER, Province of Isabela. (NOTE.- as notaty public, he can execute for a
deed of sale for the purchase of land as required by the cadastral office, can
renew lost documents of your animals; can make your application and final
requisites for your homestead; and can execute any kind of affidavit. As a
lawyer he can help you collect your loans although long overdue, as well as any
complaint for or against you. Come or write to him in his town Echague,
Isabela. He offers free consultation, and is willing to help and serve the poor.)

The respondent further admits that he is the author of a letter addressed to a

lieutenant of barrio in his home municipality written in Ilocano, which letter
reads as follow:

“ I would like you all to be informed of this matter for the reason that some
people are in the belief that my residence as member of the Board will be in
Iligan and that I would then be disqualified to exercise my profession as lawyer
and as notary public. Such is not the case and I would make it clear that I am
free to exercise my profession as formerly and that I will have my residence
here in Echague, I would request your kind favor to transmit this information
to your barrio people in any of your meeting or social gatherings so that they
may be informed of my desire to live and to serve with you in my capacity as
lawyer and notary public. If the people in your locality have not as yet
contracted the services of other lawyers in connection with the registration of
their land titles, I would be willing to handle the work in court and would
charge only three pesos for every registration.”

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent’s action constitutes to malpractice.

RULING: Yes, under sec. 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act
NO. 2828, providing “ The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokets, constitutes
malpractice, “ and to Canon 27 and 28 of the Code of Ethics adopted by the
American Bar Association in 1908 and by the Philippines Bar Association in
1917, to the case of the respondent lawyer. The law is a profession and not a
business. The solicitation of employment by an attorney is a ground for
disbarment or suspension. Respondent Tagorda is suspended from the practice
of law for 1 month and his services in the Sunday Tribune is reprimanded.

Page 13 of 41
 DIRECTOR OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS vs. BAYOT
74 Phil. 579 (1944)

PRINCIPLE/S: Canon 27, Code of Ethics.

FACTS: The respondent, who is an attorney-at-law, is charged with

malpractice for having published an advertisement in the Sunday Tribune of
June 13, 1943, which assured the prompt issuance of a marriage license and a
marriage arranged to the wishes of the parties through their assistance.
Respondent first denied having published the said advertisement but
subsequently admitted having caused its publication and prayed for "the
indulgence and mercy" of the Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent acted in violation of the Code of Ethics

which prohibits the solicitation of legal business

RULING: It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant

violation by the respondent of the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen
solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly
provides among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice." It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or
skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession and not a trade.
The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops to and adopts the
practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to the
public. "The most worth and effective advertisement possible, even for a young
lawyer is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional
capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of
character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.) Therefore the respondent
was reprimanded.

Page 14 of 41
 ULEP V. LEGAL CLINIC
223 SCRA 378 (1993)

PRINCIPLE/S: Rule 1.02. - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed
at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.

FACTS: Mauricio C. Ulep, petitioner, prays the Court “to order the respondent,
The Legal Clinic, Inc., to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making
advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than those
allowed by law.” That the advertisements above reproduced are champterous,
unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence
of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a
member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said
advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as hereinbefore quoted.
The respondent admit the fact of publication of said advertisement at its
instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the
rendering of “legal support services” through paralegals with the use of modern
computers and electronic machines. Respondent further argues that assuming
that the services advertised are legal services, the act of advertising these
services should be allowed supposedly 
in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of
Arizona, reportedly decided by the United States Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the service offered by respondent as advertised by it

constitutes practice of law and in either case, whether the same can properly
be subject of the advertisements herein complained of.

RULING: Yes, the Supreme Court held that the service offered by the
respondent constitute practice of law. Black defines "practice of law" as:

“The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of

legal principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his
consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting
in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings,
and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings,
conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the
giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all
actions taken for them in matters connected with the law.”

The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can
neither be seriously considered nor sustained. Its contention that such

Page 15 of 41
function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than real. But
with its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to
the client the intricacies of the law. That activity falls squarely within the
jurisprudential definition of practice of law.

Page 16 of 41
 DACANAY V. BAKER AND MCKENZIE
136 SCRA 349 (1985)

PRINCIPLE/S: Who may practice law. -  Any person heretofore duly admitted

as a member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with
the provisions of this rule, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled
to practice law.

FACTS: Respondent Vicente A. Torres, using the letterhead of Baker &

McKenzie, which contains the names of the ten lawyers, asked a certain Rosie
Clurman for the release of 87 shares of Cathy Products International, Inc. to
H.E. Gabriel, a client. Atty. Dacanay, in his reply denied any liability of
Clurman to Gabriel. He requested that he be informed whether the lawyer of
Gabriel is Baker & McKenzie and if not, what is their purpose in using the
letterhead of another law office. Not having received any reply, he filed the
instant complaint.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent are enjoined from practicing law under the
firm name Baker and McKenzie.

RULING: Yes, Baker and McKenzie being an alien law firm cannot practice law
in the Philippines. As admitted by the respondents in their memorandum,
Baker and McKenzie is a professional partnership organized in 1949 in
Chicago, Illinois with members and associates in 30 cities around the world.

Page 17 of 41
 ANGELES VS. IBAÑEZ
A.C. No. 7860, January 15, 2009

PRINCIPLE/S: This is a complaint for disbarment for notarizing the

“Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale” without a notarial commission and
in the absence of the affiants.

FACTS: Atty. Amado Ibañez allegedly notarized an “Extrajudicial Partition with

Absolute Sale” without having the authority to notarize such as he did not have
a commission as notary public at that time. The petitioners further denied
executing the said document or, that they ever appeared before respondent
Atty Ibañez for this purpose. He stated that his failure to require the presence
of the parties to the “Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale” is wholly
justified because of the assurance of complainant Rosalina Angeles that the
signatures appearing in the said documents were indeed those of he co-heirs.
The respondent also alleged that almost all the complainants submitted their
residence certificates, the numbers of which were recorded in the
acknowledgement portion of the document.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent violated his oath as a lawyer and the Code
of Professional Responsibility when he notarized the “Extrajudicial Partition
with Absolute Sale” in the absence of the affiants.

RULING: The Supreme Court held that respondent violated his oath as a
lawyer and the Code of Professional responsibility when he notarized the
“Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale” in the absence of the affiants.
Respondent himself admits that he merely relied on the representation of
Rosalina Angeles that the signatures appearing on the “Extrajudicial Partition
with Absolute Sale” subject of the present complaint are those of her co-heirs.
Respondent claims that he reposed confidence upon Rosalina Angeles because
she is his confidential secretary. Unfortunately for respondent, he cannot
exculpate himself from the consequences of his recklessness and his failure to
comply with the requirements of the law by relying on his confidential
secretary.

Page 18 of 41
 INTEGRATION OF THE PHIL. BAR,
49 SCRA 22
PRINCIPLE/S: Article VIII, Sec. 13 of the Constitution, "to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission
to the practice of law."
FACTS: Republic Act No. 6397 entitled “An Act Providing for the Integration of
the Philippine Bar and Appropriating Funds Therefore” was passed in
September 1971, ordaining “Within two years from the approval of this Act, the
Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the
Philippine Bar”. The Supreme Court formed a Commission on Bar Integration
and in December 1972, the Commission earnestly recommended the
integration of the bar. The Court accepted all comments on the proposed
integration.
ISSUES:
1. Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine Bar?
2. Would the integration of the Bar be constitutional?
3. Should the Court ordain the integration of the Bar at this time?

RULING: In ruling on the issues raised, the Court first adopted the definition
given by the Commission to “integration” in this wise: “Integration of the
Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer population of
the Philippines. This requires membership and financial support (in reasonable
amount) of every attorney as conditions sine qua non to the practice of law and
the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.” The
term “Bar” refers to the collectivity of all persons whose names appear in the
Roll of Attorneys. An Integrated Bar (or unified Bar) perforce must include all
lawyers.

Complete unification is not possible unless it is decreed by an entity with

power to do so; the State. Bar integration therefore, signifies the setting up by
government authority of a national organization of the legal profession based
on the recognition of the lawyer as an officer of the court.

Designed to improve the positions of the Bar as an instrumentality of justice

and the rule of law, integration fosters cohesion among lawyers, and ensures,
through their own organized action and participation, the promotion of the

Page 19 of 41
objectives of the legal profession, pursuant to the principle of maximum Bar
autonomy with minimum supervision and regulation by the Supreme Court.

On the first issue, the Court held that it may integrate the Bar in the exercise
of its power “to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure
in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law.” Indeed, the power to
integrate is an inherent part of the Court’s constitutional authority over the
Bar.

The second issue hinges on the following constitutional rights: freedom of

association and of speech, as well as the nature of the dues exacted from the
lawyer, i.e., whether or not the Court thus levies a tax. The Court held:

1. Integration is not violative of freedom of association because it does

not compel a lawyer to become a member of any group of which he is
not already a member. All that it does is “to provide an official
national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and
incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a member.” The
lawyer too is not compelled to attend meetings, participate of
activities, etc. The only compulsion is the payment of annual dues.
Assuming, however, that it does compel a lawyer to be a member of
an integrated bar, the court held that “such compulsion is justified
as an exercise of the police power of the state”
2. Integration is also not violative of the freedom of speech just because
dues paid b the lawyer may be used for projects or programs, which
the lawyer opposes. To rule otherwise would make every government
exaction a “free speech issue.” Furthermore, the lawyer is free to
voice out his objections to positions taken by the integrated bar.
3. The dues exacted from lawyers is not in the nature of a levy but is
purely for purposes of regulation.

As to the third issue, the Court believes in the timeliness of the integration.
Survey showed an overwhelming majority of lawyers who favored integration.

Page 20 of 41
 OGKA BENITO V. BALINDONG
A.M. NO. RTJ-08-2103 FEBRUARY 23, 2009

PRINCIPLE/S:

 A patent disregard of simple, elementary and well-known rules

constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
 Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper
considerations, are sufficient defenses in which a judge charged with
ignorance of the law can find refuge. However good faith in situations
of fallible discretion inheres only within the parameters of tolerable
judgment and does not apply where the issues are so simple and the
applicable legal principles evident and basic as to be beyond possible
margins of error.

FACTS: On May 3, 2005, complainant Dr. Edna S.V. Ogka Benito filed a case
for Grave Misconduct in the Office of Ombudsman against Municipal Treasurer
Mamarinta G. Macabato and Mayor Hadji Amer R. Sampiano of Municipality of
Balabagan, Lanao del Sur for the refusal of the two to pay her salary as vice
mayor since being sworn into office despite repeated demands. On May 16,
2016, the Ombudsman found the respondents guilty and imposed a penalty of
suspension from office without pay for a period of 9 months and directed DILG-
ARMM to immediately implement the said decision. Thereafter the Secretary of
DILG-ARMM issued an order (D.O.) No. 2006-38 to implement such decision.

Meanwhile, on September 4, 2006, Treasurer Macabato and Mayor Sampiano

filed a petition for Certiorari and prohibition in the RTC of Malabang Lanao
then presided by respondent judge Rasad G. Balindong with a prayer to annul
and set aside (D.O.) No. 2006-38 of the DILG-ARMM and prohibit its
implementation. On the same date, respondent issued an order granting a TRO
effective for 72 hours directing the Regional Secretary of the DILG-ARMM to
cease and desist from implementing the order. In an order dated September 6,
2006, respondent extended the TRO for a period of 20 days. On September 25,
2006, respondent issued another order for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction directing the Regional Secretary to cease, desist and refrain from
implementing D.O. No. 2006-38. On October 5, 2006, respondent rendered a
decision annulling D.O. No. 2006-38. These orders and decision were annulled
by the Court of Appeals on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the RTC over
the petition.

In a complaint dated April 30, 2007, complainant Dr. Edna S.V. Ogka Benito,
charged respondent Judge Rasad G. Balindong with gross ignorance of the law.
Complainant asserted that, despite the clear provisions of the law and

Page 21 of 41
procedure, respondent took cognizance of of the petition and issued the TROs,
writ of preliminary injunction and October 5, 2006 decision.

As a defense, respondent judge claim that the said orders and decision were
made in good faith.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge is guilty of Gross ignorance of the

law.

RULING: Yes, the taking cognizance of the petition; issuance of a TRO and writ
of preliminary injunction is a blatant disregard of basic rules constitutive of
gross ignorance of the law. He proceeded against settled doctrine, an act
constituting gross ignorance of the law or procedure.

A patent disregard of simple, elementary and well-known rules constitutes

gross ignorance of the law. Judges are expected to exhibit more than just
cursory acquaintance with laws and procedural rules. They must know the law
and apply it properly in good faith. They are likewise expected to keep abreast
of prevailing jurisprudence. Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives
or improper considerations, are sufficient defenses in which a judge charged
with ignorance of the law can find refuge. However good faith in situations of
fallible discretion inheres only within the parameters of tolerable judgment and
does not apply where the issues are so simple and the applicable legal
principles evident and basic as to be beyond possible margins of error.

When respondent entertained SCA No. 12-181, issued a TRO and writ of
preliminary injunction and subsequently granted the petition, he acted
contrary to law, rules and jurisprudence. In doing so, he consented to the filing
of an unlawful suit, in violation of the Lawyer’s Oath. A judge who falls short of
the ethics of the judicial office tends to diminish the people’s respect for the law
and legal processes. He also fails to observe and maintain the esteem due to
the courts and to judicial officers. Thus, respondent violated Canons 1 and 11
of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).

Page 22 of 41
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. PINEDA
20SCRA 748 (1967)

PRINCIPLE/S: A prosecuting attorney, by the nature of his office, is under no

compulsion to file a particular criminal information where he is not convinced
that he has evidence to prop up the averments thereof, or that the evidence at
hand points to a different conclusion.

FACTS: Respondents Tomas Narbasa, Tambac Alindo and Rufino Borres were
indicted before the CFI of Lanao del Norte, as principals, in five (5) separate
cases, four for murder and 1 frustrated murder. Two of the three defendants
moved for a consolidation of the cases "into one (1) criminal case." Their plea is
that "said cases arose out of the same incident and motivated by one impulse."
Giving the nod to defendants' claim, respondent Judge, in an order dated May
13, 1966, directed the City Fiscal to unify all the five criminal cases, and to file
one single information. He also ordered that the other four cases be dropped
from the docket."

The City Fiscal resisted the foregoing order, sought reconsideration, upon the
ground that "more than one gun was used, more than one shot was fired and
more than one victim was killed." The defense opposed.

On May 31, 1966, respondent Judge denied the motion to reconsider. He took
the position that the acts complained of "stemmed out of a series of continuing
acts on the part of the accused, not by different and separate sets of shots,
moved by one impulse and should therefore be treated as one crime though the
series of shots killed more than one victim;" and that only one information for
multiple murder should be filed, to obviate the necessity of trying five cases
instead of one."

Seeking to annul the respondent judge’s orders, the People came to the
supreme court on certiorari with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction,
and for other reliefs.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge erred in ordering the fiscal to
consolidate the 5 criminal cases into 1 criminal case.

RULING: Yes, a prosecuting attorney, by the nature of his office, is under no

compulsion to file a particular criminal information where he is not convinced
that he has evidence to prop up the averments thereof, or that the evidence at
hand points to a different conclusion. This is not to discount the possibility of
the commission of abuses on the part of the prosecutor. But a prosecuting
attorney should not be unduly compelled to work against his conviction. It is
very logical that the prosecuting attorney, being the one charged with the

Page 23 of 41
prosecution of offenses, should determine the information to be filed and
cannot be controlled by the off ended party."

The impact of respondent Judge's orders is that his judgment is to be

substituted for that of the prosecutor's on the matter of what crime is to be
filed in court. The question of instituting a criminal charge is one addressed to
the sound discretion of the investigating Fiscal. The information he lodges in
court must have to be supported by facts brought about by an inquiry made by
him. It stands to reason than to say that in a clash of views between the judge
who did not investigate and the fiscal who did, or between the fiscal and the
offended party or the defendant, those of the Fiscal's should normally prevail.
In this regard, he cannot ordinarily be subject to dictation.

Criminal prosecution may be blocked in exceptional cases. A relief in equity

"may be availed of to stop it purported enforcement of a criminal law where it is
necessary (a) for the orderly administration of justice; (b) to prevent the use of
the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner; (c) to avoid
multiplicity of actions; (d) to afford adequate protection to constitutional rights;
and (e) in proper cases, because the statute relied upon is unconstitutional or
was 'held invalid.' Nothing in the record would as much as intimate that the
present case fits into any of the situations just recited.

Page 24 of 41
 SUAREZ V. PLATON
69 PHIL 556 (1940)

PRINCIPLE/S: An inferior tribunal in the performance of a judicial act within

the scope of its jurisdiction and discretion cannot be controlled by mandamus.

FACTS: Petitioner herein, Fortunato N. Suarez, the deputy provincial fiscal of

Tayabas, Perfecto R. Palacio, charged Lieutenant Vivencio Orais and Damian
Jimenez in the justice of the peace court of Calauag with the crime of arbitrary
detention. The case was docketed as criminal case No. 6426. While the case
was pending, on petition of the accused, the provincial fiscal of Tayabas,
Ramon Valdez y Nieto, reinvestigated the case. After such reinvestigation, he
filed a motion for the dismissal of the case. Fortunato N. Suarez, the petitioner
herein, on May 5, 1936, asked the court to appoint Attorney Godofredo Reyes
as acting provincial fiscal to handle the prosecution, alleging that the provincial
fiscal had no courage to prosecute the accused. On May 11, 1936, Attorney
Godofredo Reyes entered his appearance as private prosecutor, and vigorously
objected to the motion of dismissal filed by the provincial fiscal.

On August 14, 1936, the then presiding judge of Branch I of the Court of First
Instance of Tayabas, Hon. Ed. Gutierrez David, after hearing, denied the
motion, ruling that there was prima facie case against the accused. The court,
upon petition of the provincial fiscal, designated Deputy Provincial Fiscal
Perfecto R. Palacio to handle the prosecution. Fiscal Palacio, apparently of the
same opinion as the provincial fiscal, declined to proceed, and moved that
another prosecutor be designated in his stead. Accordingly, the provincial fiscal
of Sorsogon, Jacinto Yamson was assigned to handle the prosecution of the
case. Fiscal Yamson after going over the case likewise entered a nolle prosequi.
So, on September 23 1936, he moved for reconsideration of the court's order of
August 14, 1936, denying the motion for dismissal presented by the provincial
fiscal over and above the objection of Attorney Godofredo Reyes.

Later, Judge Serviliano Platon, one of the respondents herein, was appointed to
preside over case No. 6426 and after consideration of all the facts and proofs
submitted, dismissed the case, holding that the evidence was insufficient to
convict the accused of the crime charged. From this order, the petitioner
appealed but On June 30, by a closely divided court, the appeal was dismissed.
Hence, the present petition with prayer to issue the peremptory writ of
mandamus to compel the respondent judge to reinstate the criminal case
which had been ordered dismissed by the said judge.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge committed a grave abuse of

discretion in dismissing the case.

Page 25 of 41
RULING: No, respondent judge in granting the motion for the dismissal of the
case did not abused his discretion so flagrantly as to justify, in the interest of
justice, a departure from the well-settled rule that an inferior tribunal in the
performance of a judicial act within the scope of its jurisdiction and discretion
cannot be controlled by mandamus. This is especially true in a matter
involving the examination of evidence and the decision of questions of law and
fact, since such a duty is not ministerial.

Provincial Fiscal Ramon Alvarez y Nieto filed a motion to dismiss the same
case. Thereafter, the same fiscal Perfecto R. Palacio, who filed the case, even
moved for its dismissal on ground that there is no basis for prosecution of the
case. Lastly, Fiscal Jacinto Yamson likewise entered a nolle prosequi. (NOLLE
PROSEQUI. — A written argument presented by the prosecuting attorney
stating that he does not believe the evidence sufficient to warrant a conviction
is not a withdrawal of the charges.) All prosecutors assigned the said criminal
case believed no sufficient basis for the prosecution of the case and prayed for
its dismissal.

the prosecuting officer "is the representative not of an ordinary party to a

controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as
compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a
criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be
done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the
law, the two fold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer.
He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor . But, while he may strike hard
blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain
from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to
use every legitimate means to bring about a just one,"

Page 26 of 41
 MISAMIN V. SAN JUAN
72CRA 491 (1976)
PRINCIPLE/S: The serious consequences of disbarment or suspension should
follow only where there is a clear preponderance of evidence against the
respondent. The presumption is that the attorney is innocent of the charges
preferred and has performed his duty as an officer of the court in accordance
with his oath.
FACTS: Jose Misamin, complainant, filed a complaint for malpractice against
the respondent, Attorney Miguel San Juan. The respondent appeared as
counsel for the New Cesar's Bakery in a proceeding before the NLRC while he
held office as captain in the Manila Metropolitan Police. During those time, he
allegedly conspired with complainant’s counsel to mislead complainant to
admit having received his separation pay and for giving protection to aliens.
The respondent contended, however, that the law did not prohibit him from
such isolated exercise of his profession. He contends that his appearance as
counsel, while holding a government position, is not among the grounds
provided by the Rules of Court for the suspension or removal of attorneys.
During the set hearings, aside from the failure of the complainant’s counsel to
appear several times, no competent and adequate evidence was also submitted
to support the claims of the complainant although later on he decided to have
his complaint withdrawn.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent, as member of the Bar, be found in
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
RULING: No, the administrative complaint against respondent was dismissed
for lack of evidence. Respondent’s practice of his profession not withstanding
his being a police official, is not embraced in Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Revised Rules of Court which provides the grounds for the suspension or
removal of an attorney. The respondent's appearance at the labor proceeding
notwithstanding that he was an incumbent police officer of the City of Manila
may appropriately be referred to the National Police Commission and the Civil
Service Commission.

Page 27 of 41
 PNB V. CEDO
243 RA 1 (1995)
PRINCIPLE/S: It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by
express conflicting consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the
facts. Within the meaning of this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interest
when, in behalf on one client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to
another client requires him to oppose (Canon 6, Canons of Professional Ethics).
FACTS: Respondent Atty. Telesforo Cedo, while in still in the employ of PNB,
participated in arranging the sale of steel sheets in favor of Milagros Ong Siy.
He even "noted" the gate passes issued by his subordinate in favor of Mrs. Ong
Siy. When a civil action arose out of this transaction, respondent who had
since left the employ of complainant bank, appeared as one of the counsels of
Mrs. Ong Siy.
Similarly, when the same transaction became the subject of an administrative
case filed by complainant bank against his former subordinate Emmanuel
Elefan, for grave misconduct and dishonesty, respondent appeared as counsel
for Elefan only to be later disqualified by the Civil Service Commission.
Moreover, while respondent was still the Asst. Vice President of complainant’s
Asset Management Group, he intervened in the handling of the loan account of
the spouses Ponciano and Eufemia Almeda with complainant bank by writing
demand letters to the couple. When a civil action ensued between complainant
bank and the Almeda spouses as a result of this loan account, the latter were
represented by the law firm "Cedo, Ferrer, Maynigo & Associates" of which
respondent is one of the Senior Partners.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent violated the Code of Professional Ethics
by appearing as counsel for individuals who had transactions with complainant
bank in which respondent during his employment with aforesaid bank had
intervened?
RULING: Yes, the respondent violated the Code of Professional Ethics. The
disquisition on conflicting interest applies with equal force and effect to
respondent in the case at bar. Having been an executive of complainant bank,
respondent now seeks to litigate as counsel for the opposite side, a case against
his former employer involving a transaction which he formerly handled while
still an employee of complainant, in violation of Canon 6 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics on adverse influence and conflicting interests. It is

Page 28 of 41
unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent of
all the parties concerned after the disclosure of facts. A lawyer represents
conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend for
that which duty to another client requires him to oppose.

Page 29 of 41
 1989 ELECTIONS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR
178 SCRA 398 (1989)
PRINCIPLE/S:

 The Integrated Bar is strictly non-political, and every activity tending to

impair this basic feature is strictly prohibited and shall be penalized
accordingly (Section 4, Article I, IBP By-Laws).
 A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law
or at lessening confidence in the legal system (Rule 1.02, Canon 1, Code
of Professional Responsibility).
FACTS: National officers of the IBP were elected by the House Delegates and
proclaimed as officers on June 3, 1989. The new set of officers were set to take
their oath of office but was suspended by SC en banc amidst widespread
reports received by some members of the Court from lawyers who had
witnessed or participated in the proceedings and the adverse comments
published in the columns of some newspaper about intensive electioneering
and overspending by the candidates, led by the main protagonists for the office
of president of the association, namely, Attorneys Nereo Paculdo, Ramon Nisce,
and Violeta C. Drilon, the alleged use of government planes, and the officious
intervention of certain public officials to influence the voting, all of which were
done in violation of the IBP By-Laws which prohibit such activities.
The Court en banc formed a committee to conduct the inquiry. A total of forty-
nine (49) witnesses appeared and testified in response to subpoenas issued by
the Court to shed light on the conduct of the elections.
ISSUE: Whether or not IBP by-laws were violated.
RULING: Yes, IBP by-laws were violated. A basic postulate of the IBP, heavily
stressed at the time of its organization and commencement of existence, is that
IBP shall be non-political in character and that there shall be no lobbying nor
campaigning in the choice of members of the Board of Governors and of the
House of Delegates, and of the IBP officers, national or regional, or chapter.
The fundamental assumption was that officers, delegates, and governors would
be chosen on the basis of professional merit and willingness and ability to
serve.

Page 30 of 41
 LEDA V. TABANG
206 SCRA 395 (1992)
PRINCIPLE/S:

 A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false statement or

suppression of a material fact in connection with his application for
admission to the bar (Rule 7.01, Canon 7, Chapter II of the Code of
Professional Responsibility).
 A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court (Canon 10 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility).
 A lawyer should do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in
Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the court to be misled by any
artifice (Rule 1001, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility).
FACTS: On 1976, respondent and complainant contracted marriage which was
performed under Article 76 of the Civil Code as one of exceptional character.
The parties agreed to keep the fact of marriage a secret until after respondent
had finished his law studies and had taken the Bar examinations, allegedly to
ensure a stable future for them. When the respondent finished his studies, he
then applied to take the Bar. In his application, however, he declared that he
was "single." When he was about to take his Oath after passing the bar,
complainant blocked him by instituting a complaint claiming that respondent
had acted fraudulently in filling out his application and, thus, was unworthy to
take the lawyer's Oath for lack of good moral character. However, the
Complainant later on filed a Motion to Dismiss stating that the respondent and
her had reconciled. Hence, the respondent was then allowed to take his Oath.
Less than a year later, the complainant again filed a Petition for Disbarment
against the respondent allegedly for being not of good moral character among
others. Respondent avers that his marriage to the complainant was void from
the beginning in the absence of the requisites of Article 76 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent lacks good moral character and violated the
Code of Professional Responsibility?
RULING: Yes, there is respondent's lack of good moral character. He has
resorted to conflicting submissions before this Court to suit himself and
engaged in devious tactics with Complainant in order to serve his purpose. In
so doing, he has violated Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Courts are entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty from the
lawyers appearing and pleading before them. It cannot be overemphasized that
the requirement of good moral character is not only a condition precedent to

Page 31 of 41
admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for
remaining in the practice of law.

Page 32 of 41
 TAN V. SABANDAL
206 SCRA 493 (1992)
PRINCIPLE/S: Practice of law is not a matter of right. It is a privilege bestowed
upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are also known
to possess good moral character
FACTS: Respondent Nicolas Sabandal passed the 1978 Bar Examinations but
was denied to take his oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys because of a charge
of unauthorized practice of law against him. The charge was instituted by the
Government in 1985 and was brought about because of respondent's
procurement of a certificate of free patent over a parcel of land belonging to the
public domain and its use as security for a mortgage in order to obtain a loan.
The controversy, however, was eventually settled by mere compromise.
From 1984-1988, Sabandal filed Motions for Reconsideration, all of which were
either denied or "Noted without action." The Court, however, on 10 February
1989, after considering his plea for mercy and forgiveness finally allowed him
to take the lawyer's oath. Before a date could be set for Sabandal's oath-taking,
complainants each filed separate motions for reconsideration against Sabandal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent may be admitted to the practice of law
considering the he already submitted three testimonials regarding his good
moral character, and his pending civil case has been terminated.
RULING: No, his petition must be denied. Time and again, it has been held
that practice of law is not a matter of right. It is a privilege bestowed upon
individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are also known to
possess good moral character. It should be recalled that respondent worked as
Land Investigator at the Bureau of Lands. Said employment facilitated his
procurement of the free patent title over the property which he could not but
have known was a public land. This was manipulative on his part and does not
speak well of his moral character. It is a manifestation of gross dishonesty
while in public service, which cannot be erased by the termination of the case
and where no determination of guilt or innocence was made because his suit
has been compromised. This is a sad reflection of his sense of honor and fair
dealings.
Although the term “good moral character” admits of broad dimensions, it has
been defined as “including at least common dishonesty.” It has also been held
that no moral qualification for membership is more important than
truthfulness or candor.

Page 33 of 41
 SABURNIDO V. MADRONO
366 RA 1

PRINCIPLE/S: Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility commands

all lawyers to at all times uphold the dignity and integrity of the legal
profession. Specifically, in Rule 7.03, the Code provides: “A lawyer shall not
engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
shall be whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession.”

FACTS: Complainants filed an administrative case against respondent alleging

that the latter has been harassing them by filing numerous complaints against
them, in addition to committing acts of dishonesty. At the time the present
complaint was filed, the three actions filed against Venustiano Saburnido had
been dismissed while the case against Rosalia Saburnido was still pending;

Previous to this administrative case, complainants also filed three separate

administrative cases against respondent which resulted in the latter’s
dismissal as a judge and forfeiture of retirement benefits;

In a resolution dated May 22, 1996, the Supreme Court referred the matter to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and
recommendation. The IBP concluded that complainants submitted convincing
proof that respondent indeed committed acts constituting gross misconduct
that warrant the imposition of administrative sanction. The IBP recommends
that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year;

The SC examined the records of the case and find no reason to disagree with
the findings and recommendation of the IBP.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent committed gross misconduct in the filing of

numerous cases against complainants.

RULING: Yes, the respondent committed gross misconduct. Respondent's act

of filing multiple complaints against complainants evinces vindictiveness, a
decidedly undesirable trait whether in a lawyer or another individual, as
complainants were instrumental in respondent's dismissal from the judiciary.
The SC sees in respondent's tenacity in pursuing several cases against
complainants not the persistence of one who has been grievously wronged but
the obstinacy of one who is trying to exact revenge. Respondent's action erodes
rather than enhances public perception of the legal profession. It constitutes
gross misconduct for which he may be suspended.

Respondent Atty. Florante E. Madroño is found GUILTY of gross misconduct

and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one year with a WARNING that

Page 34 of 41
a repetition the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely. The SC
finds suspension to be a sufficient sanction against respondent. Suspension is
not primarily intended as a punishment, but as a means to protect the public
and the legal profession.

Page 35 of 41
 JAVIER V. CORNEJO
63 PHIL. 293

PRINCIPLE/S: Mutual bickerings and unjustifiable recrimination, between

brother attorneys detract from the dignity of the legal profession and will not
receive any sympathy from the Supreme Court.

FACTS: Complainant Atty. Javier was the lawyer of Severina Teodoro in a civil
case where Severina won. The court awarded P195.00 in her favor and said
amount was delivered by the opposing party to Javier as Severina’s lawyer.
Javier however failed to deliver the fill amount to her. Severina and her son
then made demands for Javier to turn over the money and they warned him
that if he fails to do so, they shall be filing a complaint against him in the
Supreme Court. Javier failed to return the money. Subsequently, Severina
hired the services of another lawyer, Atty. Silverio Q. Cornejo, the respondent
of the herein case, who sent a demand letter to Javier. Javier failed to pay yet
again so Atty. Cornejo assisted Severina in filing an administrative complaint
against Javier. The admin complaint against Javier was eventually dismissed.

After said dismissal, Javier filed an administrative case against Cornejo

accusing the latter of threatening him (by way of the demand letter) and
instigating Severina Teodoro to file an administrative case against him.

ISSUE: Whether or not the administrative complaint of Atty. Javier has merit.

RULING: No. The language used in the demand letter is not threatening. It
was an honest effort on the part of Respondent Atty. Cornejo to serve the
interest of his client. The lawyer owes entire “devotion to the interest of his
client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights and exertion of
his utmost learning and ability”, to the end that nothing be taken or be
withheld from him, save by the rules of law, legally applied.

Respondent Atty. Cornejo could not have instigated Severina Teodoro to file the
administrative complaint. Severina already knew of what remedy to seek
against Javier if he fails to deliver what’s due to her even before she hired
Cornejo. This is evident when she warned Javier that she’ll be filing an
administrative complaint against him if he’ll fail to pay up.

Page 36 of 41
 MACIAS V. MALIG
157 RA 762 (1988)

PRINCIPLE/S: Lawyers must at all times treat each other, and as well their
clients, former clients and the rest of the community, with that personal
dignity, courtesy and civility rightly demanded of members of the ancient
and learned profession of the law.

FACTS: This is an administrative case instituted by complainant Atty. Manuel

Y. Macias against respondent Atty. Benjamin B. Malig for suspension or
disbarment upon grounds of malpractice and violation of the lawyer's
oath. The charge by Atty. Macias in his sworn Complaint dated 14 June 1982,
maybe summed up as follows:

1. He [Atty. Malig] acted as counsel for Rosario M. Llora in Special

Proceedings No. 70878 of the then Court of First Instance of Manila
although Atty. Macias was still her attorney of record.

2. He harassed Atty. Macias to withdraw his appearance in: (a) Special

Proceeding No. 70878, and (b) Civil Case No. 73335 of the then Court of
First Instance of Manila, which became G.R. No. L-34395 of this Honorable
Court; and he intimidated Atty. Macias into signing: (a) the Waiver (Exhibit
"C"), (b) the Substitution of Counsel in Civil Case No. 73335 (Exhibit
"R"), and (c) the substitution of counsel in Special Proceeding No. 70878
(Exhibit "S").

3. He did not substitute Atty. Macias in Civil Case No. 65763 but claimed
for Himself the attorney's fees of Atty. Macias.

4. He extorted from Atty. Macias, the sum of P10, 000.00.

5. He corruptly induced the late Judge Joel Tiangco to lift Atty.

Macias attachment on a property belonging to the Lloras without notice to
Atty. Macias.

6. He actively assisted the Lloras to dispose of all their properties in

the Philippines and remit the proceeds to Australia in fraud of Atty. Macias.

In turn, respondent Atty. Malig in his "Comment with Countercharges"

dated 1 September 1982 sought the disbarment of complainant Atty.
Macias. The countercharges against Atty. Macias are the following:

1. Atty. Macias made an unethical solicitation of case-the settlement of the

estate of Rosario Legarda de Valdes.

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 2. He instituted a patently baseless and malicious action, Civil case
No. 109585, before the Regional Trial Court in Manila for attorney's
fees and damage against Antonio Ma. Llora, Rosario M. Llora and their
family-owned corporations.

3. He maliciously and irresponsible charged Atty. Malig and his clients with
having "exacted" and "extorted" from him the sum of P10,000.00

4. He maliciously and irresponsibly charged Atty. Malig and the late Judge
Joel Tiangco with corruption in the lifting of an attachment.

5. He made an unethical representation of a client.

6. He maliciously and irresponsibly charged Atty. Malig and his clients, the
Llora spouses, with fraudulent disposition of the latter's properties
and salting the proceeds [in] Australia.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was candor and fairness towards the other
professional colleague.

RULING: YES both lawyers are guilty for the acts they did which are
unbecoming to the other lawyer.

The Court is not prepared to condone by passing over subsilentio the

misconduct of which complainant and respondent are guilty one vis- a-vis the
other. Each party here has shown himself to be too ready to believe the
other guilty of serious misconduct in the practice of the profession to
which they both belong while vehemently asserting his own good faith. Each
party here was too anxious and willing to make serious accusations against the
other which the exertion of reasonable diligence along with simple courtesy
would have shown to be unwarranted by the facts and the records. Each
attorney here was too prone to use intemperate and offensive language
in describing the professional behavior of the other.

Complainant Macias insisted that respondent Malig "extorted" P10, 000.00

from him. The dictionary meaning of "to extort" is "to obtain from an unwilling
or reluctant person by physical force, intimidation or the abuse of legal or
official authority" (Webster's Third New International [1981, ed.].) Clearly,
extortion is an unethical act and may well be criminal. "Harassment" and
"intimidation" are other similarly unethical and offensive acts that
complainant Macias so freely ascribed to respondent Malig "Corruption" with
which complainant in Macias accused both respondent Malig and the
deceased Judge Tiangco is an even more deplorable term.

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Upon the other hand, respondent Malig was not to be outdone and referred to
complainant Macias as "denizen" of a "jungle" who "prey[s] upon his brother
lawyer [and] his [own] clients" and likened him to "a baneful snake biting the
hand of the client who fed him" The Court would also take judicial notice
of the fact that complainant Macias has more than once in the past
been rebuked by this Court in relation to his conduct vis-a-vis clients
and former clients. We hold that complainant Macias and respondent
Malig are both guilty of conduct unbecoming a lawyer and an officer of
the court.

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 FOODSPHERE VS. MACAURICIO
A.C. NO7199, JULY 22. 2009

PRINCIPLE/S: A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media

regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a
party.

FACTS: Alberto Cordero (Cordero) purportedly bought from a grocery in

Valenzuela City canned goods including a can of CDO Liver spread. As
Cordero and his relatives were eating bread with the CDO Liver spread, they
found the spread to be sour and soon discovered a colony of worms inside the
can. This was complained before the BFAD. After conciliation meetings between
Cordero and the petitioner, the Corderos eventually forged a KASUNDUAN
seeking the withdrawal of their complaint before the BFAD. The BFAD thus
dismissed the complaint. Respondent, Atty. Mauricio, Jr., who affixed his
signature to the KASUNDUAN as a witness, later wrote in one of his
articles/columns in a tabloid that he prepared the document.

Complainant filed criminal complaints against respondent and several others

for Libel and Threatening to Publish Libel under Articles 353 and 356 of the
Revised Penal Code before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City and
Valenzuela City. The complaints were pending at the time of the filing of the
present administrative complaint. Despite the pendency of the civil case
against him and the issuance of a status quo order restraining/enjoining
further publishing, televising and broadcasting of any matter relative to the
complaint of CDO, respondent continued with his attacks against complainant
and its products.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent violated the Code of Professional

Responsibility.

RULING: Yes. Respondent suspended for three (3) years from the practice of
law. The above actuations of respondent are also in violation of Rule 13.03 of
the Canon of Professional Responsibility which reads: “A lawyer shall not make
public statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to arouse
public opinion for or against a party.”

The language employed by respondent undoubtedly casts aspersions on the

integrity of the Office of the City Prosecutor and all the Prosecutors connected
with said Office. Respondent clearly assailed the impartiality and fairness of
the said Office in handling cases filed before it and did not even design to
submit any evidence to substantiate said wild allegations. The use by
respondent of the above-quoted language in his pleadings is manifestly
violative of Canon 11 and the fundamental Canon 1 also of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which mandates lawyers to “uphold the

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Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
processes.” Respondent defied said status quo order, despite his (respondent’s)
oath as a member of the legal profession to “obey the laws as well as the legal
orders of the duly constituted authorities.” Further, respondent violated Canon
8 and Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandate, and
by failing to live up to his oath and to comply with the exacting standards of
the legal profession, respondent also violated Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which directs a lawyer to “at all times uphold the
integrity and the dignity of the legal profession.”

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