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EFFECTS BASED OPERATIONS - AN ORGANIZATIONAL

ENHANCEMENT PERSPECTIVE

“One might say that the physical seems little more than the wooden hilt, while the moral
factors are the precious metal, the real weapons, the finely honed blade”

------------Carl Von Clausewitz

INTRODUCTION
1. Nations fought wars from the time immemorial to defeat their adversaries
applying different war fighting tactics and strategies suiting need of the campaigns and
battles. Such creative and ground breaking theories or concept did bring desired results
in the confrontations. Historically, the new concepts of war fighting stemmed from the
great leaders and powers of the time and were never bounded within space or time due
to global nature of warfare. For example, in the history of Islamic Battles, Muslims
surrounded the well though, did not deny the use to the enemy in 624 in Battle of Badr
and in 625 strategic use of the Hills was made by the Muslims in Battle of Uhud. Again
in 627, the great Battle of Khandaq was fought where unique use of trench was made to
defeat the superior adversary. The trench was dug to render the cavalry of the
adversary ineffective1. Subsequently, the tactics was used by the Germans in World
War I (WW I). However, the new war fighting methodologies those emerged from battles
of history were not applied in verbatim in different other battles. Those were translated
to mean own needs of the engagements. Effects-Based Operations (EBO) is one of
those kinds of concept or philosophy.

2. In conflict, those are the human who utilizes their systems and launch operations
to materialize the conflict. Therefore, fundamentally the strength of character of the
opponent is to be targeted in conflicts to have desired effects through actions. The vital
in the wake of EBO is then to focus on the strength of character of the adversary by

1
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle of the Trench accessed on 1 September 2015.

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targeting material or physical reasons and realm of her values. If a nation plans to
develop and utilize her all national assets in peace and war to support the national goals
and objectives, then, EBO is an attitude that focuses on the resources of state to trail
national goals and secure national objectives 2. EBO, one of such revolutionary war
fighting concept was originated by United States (US) in Gulf War 1991. Thereafter, it is
incorporated in the strategy by many nations.

3. Until recent time wars are fought for a prolonged period of time applying the
military power and seeking complete destruction of adversary to mean victory. But with
the changed world order and nature of conflict, it is expected that the violence will
persist for a short period of time using minimum force but achieving the mission with
less of casualties. Mass employment of fire power and force as that of World War II
(WW II) would no more be the phenomenon of war fighting. Opposing forces will try and
plan application of very minimum fire power but achieving the desired effect for mission
accomplishment. “Doing More with Less” will be the call of time and parameter for the
armed forces to prepare for war. Thus, EBO is a rather new force application concept
for military operations3.

4. The study further relates to the rapidly changing geo-strategic security framework
around the world following the post Cold War era which directly affecting the strategic
security environment also. Based on the rapidly changing and fluid security
environment, there is a disharmony between the national security policy concerns and
existing force structure4. Military organizations have no well-defined and logical methods
for force planning activities to identify the quality and quantity of force actually required
at a given time and space for useful engagements. Another important factor is the
constant budgetary constraints faced by many of the developing countries which limit
the current and foreseeable military capabilities. Thus, the long term military planning,
2
Anthony M Forestier, Effect Based Operations: An underpinning Philosophy for Australia’s External Security , p. 2.
3
Z Jobbagy, Major, Literature Survey on Effects Based Operation: A Netherlands Based Ph D Study on Measuring
Military Effects and Effectiveness (TNO Report) p. 11.
4
Ibid.

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operational planning and operational evaluation gets affected resulting absence of
coherent military force to meet the requirement of time-the EBO concept of war fighting.

5. Bulk of the works on EBO and its associated parameters are US initiated. Of
them, the majority has been produced by military organizations. It is revealed that, the
organizational readiness, behavior and philosophy of military covering all services is the
essence of correct application of EBO. Since EBO is more of philosophy and different
thinking apart from the traditional way of planning and executing the war, therefore, both
in single service and joint environment the organizational enhancement is of paramount
importance as also suggested at Annexure “A”. The divergences found in the growth,
sophistication and augmentation of current doctrine and theoretical dynamics of EBO
will have useful connotation for training of the leaders, organizational modification, and
education strategies5.

6. EBO is a concept, which seeks effect not destruction, and emphasizes on both
armed forces and civilian power to generate surging and total effects at all levels of
warfare that produces the desired strategic outcome. Effects-based approach, effects-
based targeting and effects-based thinking all contribute to EBO. EBO demands an in-
depth understanding about the enemy to determine what would bring the desired effect
and only after determining this, enemy’s critical capabilities can be identified and
friendly actions be directed to achieve that desired effect. Conduct of EBO in the army
due to its inbuilt organizational strength might be an easier task. But, the changeover
might face considerable challenges while addressing the same in other services or in
joint environment. It would possibly require change in traditions and cultures within all
services6. Overnight change in the cultures and traditions of services is not realistic. It
will take considerable length of time to make the leaders and staffs ready to know the
concept to its true meaning. After that, effects-based thinking has to be injected in
services, and joint educational programs are also to be published by organizations
those are responsible for education and training for the militaries both in single service
5
Allen W. Batschelet, Lieutenant Colonel, Effects Based Operation: A New Operational Model, p. 14.
6
Ibid.

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and joint level. Thus, overall organizational enhancement covering all the fields of
planning and execution towards effects-based thinking is inevitable.

7. EBO has long lasting and far reaching consequences across the array of military
operations throughout each service and in joint environment. So it is a must that all
stake holders understand it in a way that will produce maximum effect by applying the
every elements of power. To this effect, it is necessary to ascertain organizational
requirement for military to correctly embrace and project the model of EBO for desired
mission accomplishment.

AIM

8. To carryout in-depth study of EBO with a view to assessing the organizational

enhancement required in armed forces for its effective implementation.

HYPOTHESIS/PROBLEM STATEMENT

9. EBO is a concept or philosophy of war fighting that is being evaluated by the

militaries around the world since its inception during the Gulf War 1991. It suggest
employment of all available assets of a nation engaged in war in a way so that, the war
is essentially short lived with minimum destruction of the men and material. Thus, EBO
means to achieve desired effects at all levels of conflict with minimum force and break
the will of opponent to fight. Such phenomenon would save both time and resources.
Therefore, this philosophy of EBO contradicts with the traditional way of war fighting
where mass on mass is essentially employed and victory means the complete
annihilation of the opposing force with massive destruction of assets whether or not
necessary to achieve the desired End State. This is the Destruction-Based Operations
(DBO), which militaries are meant for.

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10. Now, introduction of EBO in militaries will not be an easy goal. Because, the EBO
philosophy of war fighting is more of psyche and planning oriented which needs to be
completely understood by all stakeholders down the chain. It will be paradigm shift from
the traditional way of thinking and planning campaigns. Effects-based planning, effects-
based execution and effects-based assessment; the three basic elements of EBO will
thus require full spectrum capacity building of men and organization. Thus,
organizational enhancements as a whole to be put in place which will need a detail
study of the EBO phenomenon to accept and apply the concept of EBO.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

11. Modern warfare increasingly underlines the requirement for security mechanism
to adapt to the new challenges. Today we are to determine as to how we will fight in
future covering following parameters7:

a. Military forces must maintain assured ability.

b. Dissuade adversaries.
c. Deter aggressors.
d. Defeat any adversary if deterrence were to fail.
e. Modernize the military force.
f. Exploit the revolution in military affairs (RMA).

12. Armed forces mean war as attrition and annihilation. Thus, focus was on
destruction of enemies and their infrastructure causing protracted nature of war. Now,
what is being thought and focused is that, there cannot be an unrestricted phenomenon
in warfare, as has been demonstrated in Gulf War, Kosovo and in Afghanistan
wherefrom the idea of EBO came into being. Future war fighting mechanism must have
a holistic approach towards all conflicts to be able to employ all elements of national
power simultaneously.8 Thus, military and non-military strategist and leaders of all tiers
7
Leonard D. Rickerman, Major, Effects Based Operation: A New Way of Thinking and Fighting, p. 6.
8
Ibid.

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of national apparatus are to plan for maintaining a credible force capable of addressing
all the parameters as stated before, and at the same time think for effects- based
execution to look through the pre, during and post conflict operations. Conflict or war, if
there is any must be short lived with minimum casualty, damage of the infrastructure
and only essential use of both hard and soft power.

13. Development and capacity building by the military forces is a continuous process
throughout the world. Nations with their established research oriented commands and
institutes do carry out evolution of the doctrines, trainings and concepts to fit in the
changing global nature of conflicts and find own Means and Ways for desired End state.
Army Training Command (ARTRAC) of India and Army Training and Doctrine
Command (ARTDOC) in Bangladesh are few of the establishments those are
responsible for maximizing effectiveness of training, formulating concepts and doctrines
which are specifically applicable in self-environment. EBO dwells within the parameter
of Ways, keeps the Means at its superb state of readiness and never compromises with
End State.

14. The concept of EBO does not contradict with this phenomenon of force
development; rather it focuses on the conceptual and philosophical ingredients of the
strategic planning for war where effect is maximized than destruction, attrition and
annihilation. Such line of thinking is also directly related with the post conflict operations
that must be planned before to tone down the possible conclusions of unintentional and
undesired penalty. The concept of EBO has inbuilt ingredients to meet this challenge
because, modern day war fighting planning emphasizes more on post conflict
consequence than pre-conflict. Wars must not be won to drop down the desired peace
at the end of conflict and sow the seeds for potential conflict 9. Therefore, a holistic
approach towards entire gamut of EBO will be necessary for organizational readiness to
adopt the concept suiting own environment.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
9
Rickerman, op. cit. , p. 9.

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15. EBO as a concept of war fighting to be or not to be adopted in the modern day
warfare is still a subject of discussions and experiments at all levels of planning and
decision making. There are good numbers of literatures, journals, articles and internet
sources those are describing the EBO covering its inception and implementations
aspects keeping in view the traditional outlook and fitting in the philosophy of EBO in
war fighting. As a result the parameter of challenges and opportunities to implement
EBO has emerged. Since all of the militaries are still organized, trained and made ready
for traditional planning and execution of conflicts, therefore, embracing concept of EBO
and implementing the same has been found challenging. It will require a clear
understanding of the subject as a whole and then steps to incorporate the concept.

16. Thus, this research is commenced with conceptual evolution of EBO covering
theoretical underpinning and trends in first chapter where definitions and contemporary
outlook on EBO has been discussed. Then, this will lead to the second chapter to cover
relevance of EBO to current environment. Third chapter has covered the analysis part of
the paper where impediments for implementing EBO is identified and analyzed. The
fourth chapter has dealt with the organizational enhancement required for implementing
EBO. The fifth chapter contains few of the recommendations.

GAP OF KNOWLEDGE

17. Being a new subject studied in other militaries, there are good numbers of
writings on EBO on internet in various forms. In almost all the literatures the concept of
EBO has been narrated keeping in view the current practice of war fighting and the

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need for EBO with its implications in contemporary world order. Emphasis has been put
on the philosophical aspect of the concept and a very laborious EBO cycle to be
followed starting from the planning till end of the campaigns. It has been also
highlighted to be a continuous process while the operations would be ongoing. A very
holistic approach by all stakeholders of the national power to the system is addressed to
be key factor of success. Present organizational set up, training and mind set has been
highlighted to be inadequate for implementing the concept of EBO by militaries.
Therefore, a deliberate effort has been made to identify the impediments and
organizational enhancement required to embrace concept of EBO by militaries.

MAJOR/MINOR QUESTIONS

18. Research questions are as followings:

a. What are the main cardinals of EBO?

b. Is the concept of EBO relevant in current environment?

c. What could be the hindrance to implement EBO?

d. What organizational enhancements are required to embrace EBO?

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

19. A good numbers of literatures published on EBO are studied as secondary

sources. The literatures have generally focused on the challenges and opportunities for
implementing EBO and at some places way forward was suggested. Therefore, a
comprehensive idea was gained to validate the hypothesis of the research.

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20. Major Leonard D. Rickerman in his book titled “Effects-Based Operations: A New
Way of Thinking and Fighting” has written that, a wholesome view is essential to
integrate civil and military means simultaneously in conflicts of coming days. Such
ideology supports the concept of EBO methodology. The post conflict measures are
also identified as major ingredients to avoid escalation of conflict at the end of war. At
this point, addressing the post conflict operations of vast magnitude would be an easy
task if destructions in the conflict are kept to the minimum as per the EBO philosophy.
So, Rickerman essentially emphasized on the point that the future wars those are to be
encountered are to follow the EBO methodology to succeed. “Effects-Based Operations:
A New Operational Model” written by Lieutenant Colonel Allen W. Batschelet narrates
about the parallel engagements of all systems of enemy using all elements of national
power while considering enemy as a System of Systems (SoS). Again Lieutenant
Colonel Ted T. Uchida while analyzing effects-based operations in his book titled
“Analysis of Effects-Based Operations-The Road ahead to Doing Business Differently”
has written that EBO to be thought as an attitude or psyche of looking at war fighting.
Thus EBO deals more with the mental domain of the belligerents. Such phenomenon
goes at par with the arguments made in this research while identifying the fields of
impediments and suggesting organizational enhancements which mostly deal with the
psyche or mental domain of the stake holders responsible for planning and executing
EBO.

21. The advancement of modern technology and advent of precision in munitions

have changed the nature of warfare. Therefore, we should also remain relevant with
time having the advantage of it by minimizing extra expenditure and casualties in wars.
As Brigadier General David A. Deptula in his book titled “Effects-Based Operations:
Change in the Nature of Warfare” suggests broadening the horizon of thinking by
getting out of age old notions of war fighting. All other literatures as shown in the
Bibliography are rich in ideas on EBO and are reviewed to form basic knowledge to
proceed with the research. Relevance of the literatures were found to be enough to

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justify the answers to research questions, fulfill objectives and finally validate the
hypothesis of research.

OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

22. I intend to achieve followings objectives:

a. Understanding the evolution of EBO.

b. Relevance of EBO in current environment.

c. Analysis of impediments for Implementing EBO.

d. To identify the organizational enhancement required for embracing EBO.

METHODOLOGY

23. The research has been carried out based on primary and secondary sources.
The primary sources are the interviews that have been conducted by the author and the
secondary sources are the books, journals, periodicals, different articles and websites.
The secondary is consulted to form the idea of EBO and determine the organizational
enhancement or development required for such concept. Once the basic understanding
is made based on secondary sources, the author’s personal knowledge about the basic
organization of militaries has been used to determine the conceptual understanding of
the term EBO and to ascertain the organizational readiness to embrace this concept.
The information collected from the primary and secondary sources has been analyzed
and evaluated to validate the author’s stand on the issue.
CHAPTER I

CONCEPTUAL EVOLUTION OF EBO

“Not everything that counts can be counted, and not everything that can be counted
counts”
….Albert Einstein

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General

24. The US Joint Forces Command (JFC) has faced difficulties while integrating the
concept of EBO, because of the limitations in understanding the origin of concept.
Accordingly, Doctrine Center of US Air Force had detailed a panel to find the reasons as
regards to proper understanding of EBO. It was found in the research that, concept of
EBO needs elaboration in understanding for its fruitful use and it lacks established
procedure in organization for execution.

25. A review of the historical evolution will suggest whether the concept of EBO is
gradual outcome of the thinking and planning process of the commanders from ages or
it is an old idea that has been renamed or refocused. Throughout, the military war
planners and thinkers always emphasized on creating conditions in varied spectrum of
warfare to achieve goals, objectives and policy ends that might be taken as “effects-
based” approach in present day context. Limited technology, ancient thinking process of
Clausewitz, Ulysses S. Grant and happenings of WW II to recent Gulf War has greater
impact on today’s understanding of EBO. Irregular methodology of EBO as applied in
the past could result unpredictable successes in the conflicts. The principal restrictive
feature of such phenomenon had been no (as required) or fewer technology during
those days of history10.

Theoretical Underpinning of EBO

26. EBO as a viable concept of modern warfare was put into effect in the Air
Operations of Gulf War. Successful application and the design of the operations did
validate the concept of EBO having used the advanced technology, precision guided
munitions, command and control system and the integrated stealth platforms. Colonel
Warden who was known to be the main designer of the Air Operations conducted during
Gulf War. He in his planning and application of the Air Power did identify that, the
command of the air to be viewed to be the most desirable environment to gain
successive objectives and he also emphasized on simultaneous projection of power
10
Ibid. , p. 10.

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than sequential for better effect. Effects to secure strategic objectives would be
necessary first and then conduct of military operations at operational level would bring
about required effect as the philosophy of EBO talks about. In this context, Colonel
Warden developed the five ring model and described the simultaneous engagement of
the targets at strategic, operational and tactical level to gain maximum effects. The five
ring model is illustrated below11:

Figure 1: Strategic Ring Model

27. A hypothesis of military strategic assault basing on the five levels of system
features has been characterized by Warden’s five rings model. 12 Generally, the center
ring being the leadership is expected to be targeted for overall paralyzing effect from the
strategic point of view. But, Colonel Warden did suggest simultaneous engagement of
all rings for obtaining a synergistic effect at tactical, operational and strategic level of
warfare. Analysis of such thinking is also an art of applying force targeting the will of foe
to fight putting huge psychological stress on the enemy state and force in terms of
paralyzing consequence and thus, forcing the enemy succumb to own terms earlier than
visualized. This effects-based thinking would not allow the enemy forces and the state
to shift or adjust its resources in response when it comes simultaneously at all levels of
11
https://www.google.com.pk/search?
q=warden+5+rings&newwindow=1&source=lnms&tbm=isch&sa=X&ved=0CAcQ_AUoAWoVChMI1J-
894C7yAIVYqhyCh0sVgRN&biw=1366&bih=643, accessed on 11 October 2015.
12
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Warden%27s_Five_Rings, accessed on 10 October 2015.

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conflict. Therefore, the philosophy of EBO was addressed by obtaining an approach of
short lived action with minimum destruction that goes at par with the present day EBO
thinking. Of course, the enhanced technology and information system coupled with
conflict analysis and degree of destruction evaluation of targets are all contributing
factors for such an understanding.

28. The limitation of the concept about EBO as described by Colonel Warden was
that, the entire line of thinking and power projection was service oriented, that is Air
Force Based. Major general David A. Deptula( then Director of Plans and Programs,
Headquarters Air Combat Command, USAF) evolved a new approach to EBO where he
emphasized on application of national power that is diplomatic, information and
economic alongside military power with a view to shaping the environment for better
effect. He tried to explain the enemy as a system and establish linkage between cause
and effect. His expansion of EBO came out as a way of thinking and gave an alternative
to the traditional way of thinking about war which relies on annihilation and destruction
of the enemy forces and property. Therefore, the aspect of control in war fighting
surfaced that suggests minimum use of power for effect on the systems of enemy to
enhance defeat. Major General Deptula’s approach is analogous to that of five ring
model of Warden where targeting enemy forces was less important but to create an
effect by which the organizational capability of the enemy would be reduced and
operational capability hampered. He emphasized that, the method of achieving
objectives in war through chronological attacks has changed. Now all the crucial
systems of the enemy are engaged concurrently, that is called the parallel warfare 13.
Thus, it was a system approach that relied not on the destruction of the enemy but to
prevent its desire or will to fight. This is what the cry of EBO is.

29. So, now looking at the systematic approach by Colonel Warden and Major
General Deptula and further linking with the evaluation of old age war fighting
methodology, one can easily understand that the concept of EBO though emerged in
recent days but it is rooted back in ancient time. In those days the desired effect was
largely based on destruction and complete annihilation of the enemy forces due to lack
13
Batschelet, op. cit. , p 3.

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of technology and armaments of precision. Thus, historical evolution of EBO provides
the systematic line of thinking in war planning and application of both military and non-
military resources throughout the spectrum of conflict to achieve desired effect for
successful accomplishment of the mission. It also highlights the need of simultaneous
engagement of the enemy attributes in joint environment. Therefore, correct
understanding, knowledge, training and mind set in joint set up is necessary for the
concept of EBO to deliver desired result (details are at Annexure “A”).

Trend of EBO

30. A categorized definition of EBO is required to develop EBO as a joint or tri-

service concept that will enhance mutual understanding and cohesion facilitating
methodology identification and comprehensive application. Various definitions and
discussions on the concept of EBO will generate broad understanding of the concept.
EBO is defined as a process by United States Joint Forces Command (USJFC). It is a
course of action in which all elements of national power including military are applied
synergistically for gaining strategic effect on the enemy in conflict 14. There are many
other definitions published in the training documents of US military including the joint
doctrine. Having realized the necessity of understanding the concept in a joint
environment, the EBO has been included in the joint doctrine of the US military.
However, the basic theme of the EBO remaining unchanged in all explanations saying
EBO as a process of influencing behavior of the enemy through the judicious application
of national power.
31. As said, the definitions of EBO may vary but the basic understanding or the
theme remaining unchanged. The best way to view EBO is to think it as an attitude, a
philosophy, a method or a course of action altogether. It is best described as five-stage
process rather an event, action or decision point 15. The five essentials within the hub are
the sequential application of the following stages 16:

14
Rickerman, op. cit. , p 17.
15
Lieutenant Colonel Ted T. Uchida, Analysis of Effect- Based Operations- The Road Ahead to Doing Business
Differently, p 4-2.
16
Rickerman, op. cit. , p 19.

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a. Knowledge.
b. Effects.
c. Application.
d. Assessment.
e. Adaptation.

32. The stages go in a cyclic order starting from the knowledge and it seeks for the
perception about the adversary, environment and self. Planning is done keeping in view
the desired end state or outcome of the operation and that is the second stage called
effects. Application is the full demonstration of national power and other resources.
Once execution is done, then the result of the effect is assessed. Finally, the adaptation
does validate the effect and the course of action already taken for a particular campaign
thereof or modify which came in as the result of effects as assessed to include in the
knowledge part of the cycle. The cycle thus is repeated.

33. EBO is not an alternative to any of the presently used form of wars, rather is a
methodology or process to maximize the effect by new way of belief in planning,
executing and assessing operations for better adaptability. This methodology is directed
on to the effects not means and that is the strength of effect based thinking. The EBO
cycle is illustrated below17.

17
Uchida, op. cit. , p 4-3.

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Figure 2: EBO as a Process

Contemporary Outlook on EBO

34. The effect based thinking or approach for war planning and executing is not a
new phenomenon as could be understood so far through different literatures,
descriptions and evolution. Study on the history of warfare and philosophy of the
veteran war thinkers and generals’ bears the testimony of such attitude in the past and
near past also. When Sun Tzu says that, the zenith of skill lies in suppressing the
enemy without fighting, he means to attack the strategy of the enemy and thus pointing
towards application of effects-based principles in war. Napoleon said, “If I always
appear prepared, it is because before entering on an undertaking, I have mediated long

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and have foreseen what may occur 18”. Therefore, the great generals’ of history did not
only project their means for complete annihilation of the enemy forces rather had also
an outlook to bow the will of enemy to own terms. Contemporary war fighting concepts,
doctrines, plans and strategy is largely influenced by the modern technologies, gadgets,
platforms, precision guided munitions etcetera in joint services environment. So,
contemporary “Effects-Based” is basically a totality for some of the best performances
of the past conflicts after having included the developed doctrine that suggests
appropriate application of contemporary capabilities 19. Here capabilities will mean the
full spectrum of Diplomatic, Military, Information and Economic (DIME) factors of
national power.

35. Effects- based war fighting and thinking in present day world order will certainly
have enhanced and dynamic approach than that of only land based or service centric
(like in WW II, the European Campaigns were mostly land based and the Pacific
campaigns were maritime. The Battle of Britain or strategic bombing of Germany’s
industrial centers were basically air battle 20) wars in the past where emphasis was on
mass against mass and complete destruction of their troops and assets. It is due to
technological advancement and fighting in joint environment where the battlefield
dynamics are fast changing with the elements of vulnerability, uncertainty, complexity
and ambiguity. Further, the application of all elements of national power besides military
will also have separate connotation. Thus, it will require everyone in the gamut starting
from the generals’ to down up to individual soldier to understand the concept of EBO to
its true spirit (details are at Annexure “A”). A joint doctrine will be necessary to educate
all in same line creating standard platform of understanding. Then, the EBO
methodology has to be shaped to meet own strategy for safeguarding the national goals
and objectives.

36. However, the concept of EBO can be understood and accepted by the nations
suiting their own requirement and keeping in view the essential enhancement that might
18
General T Michael Moseley, Chief of Staff, USAF, Air Force Doctrine Document 2, 3 April 2007, p 20.
19
Ibid.
20
Rickerman, op. cit. , p 35.

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be coming in the process. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has adopted the
concept but by giving a different identity and definition as Effects-Based Approach to
Operations (EBAO)21. Other armed forces also started to move towards this direction.
The former Defence Force Chief of Staff, General Moshe Ya’alon of Israel accentuated
that, force renovation issue must focus less on force and power, but more on effect 22.
Singapore Defence Forces sees it is an idea especially attractive to small militaries
which do not have kind of resources luxury to fight and win wars of destruction/attrition 23
(Annexure “A” is referred).

Conclusion

37. Concept of EBO had been vividly exposed in history of warfare throughout the
ages and has undergone evolution till it got some kind of recognition during air
operations of Gulf War 1991. The need for synergistic and simultaneous application of
power directed at all levels against selected targets was evaluated for wholesome
paralyzing effects aiming at short lived conflict against enemy. In the process of
evolution, need for integrating other elements of national power was identified in
conducting parallel warfare and actions directed against enemy systems was also
emphasized while considering enemy as a system.

38. As regards to definition of EBO, efforts were made to reach a common plane by
explaining EBO as a methodology, concept or philosophy to manipulate enemy’s
behaviour where focus was on effects and not on means by following a logical EBO
cycle. Though initially EBO had service centric approach, but today it has been
evaluated to be a means and delivered in joint environment.
21
NATO uses the nomenclature as Effect Based Approach to Operation (EBAO) and defines as, "The Effect Based
Approach to Operation is the coherent and comprehensive application of the various instrument of the Alliance,
combined with the practical cooperation along with involved non-NATO actors, to create effects necessary to
achieve planned objectives and ultimately the NATO end state."

22
Z Jobbagy, From Effect-Based Operations to Effect-Based Force: On Causality, Complex Adaptive System, and
Biology of War, p 33.
23
Effects-Based Operations: Obstacles and Opportunities, POINTER, Journal of the Singapore Armed Forces
(http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/publications/pointer/journals/2004/v30n2/features/feature3.html, accessed
on 23 October 2015.)

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39. Evolution of EBO is still ongoing and being examined by many nations and
militaries giving different nomenclature but keeping the theme of EBO unchanged, thus
suiting on need. Efforts are on to reach to a common understanding about EBO by all
stake holders.

CHAPTER II

RELEVANCE OF EBO TO CURRENT ENVIRONMENT

Philosophy of EBO

40. General. Conduct of EBO is guided by some dictums. It is not necessary that
these dictums are only the way to follow while conducting the military operations with an
effect based approach. However, these help to integrate planning, execution and
assessment for desired effects on the enemy as discussed previously in EBO Cycle.
Principles of EBO have wider impact on the planning and the execution without any
desired effect may negate sound planning of any magnitude. Again, assessment, as
one of the very important tool of EBO must be weighed meticulously for sound
continuation of EBO. Because, assessment provides necessary guideline for upcoming
planning and is applied to adjust operations as events unfold and changes occur in the
process24. Study of the literatures and experimental outcomes by many nations suggest
many principles of EBO as narratives describing related dynamics for EBO. A summary
of those are discussed in succeeding paragraphs with suitable headings. Those will
have impact to understand the impediments and need for implanting EBO in military
operations.

41. Actions for Effects and End State. Actions directed in EBO must be
objective oriented and have effects either intended or unintended. Intended effects

24
Moseley, op. cit. , p 16.

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hasten attainment of objectives and keep the unintended effects to the minimum. The
key is that each action is designed to produce an enabling effect 25. Effects through
action should generate environment for achieving objectives and the ultimate end state
by giving mission-oriented tasks to be implemented at all levels of war. Choosing
appropriate weapon systems thus is left at the discretion of ground commanders’ which
should then be applied keeping doctrine and strategy in mind. Platforms are not decided
first rather effect is desired. Like, the concept of “Blitzkrieg” was materialized by the
Germans for desired effect using tanks where effects were decided first, not the
means26. Figure below further illustrates the argument27.

Figure 3: Action Effect Methodology

42. Cross Dimensional Thinking. Cross dimensional thinking encompasses all

elements of national power (DIME) while planning and executing EBO for attaining the
objectives effectively and to the degree possible most efficiently. EBO must be able to
complete mission but keeping the attrition and destruction of the enemy to the minimum

25
Effects Based Operation, Discussion Paper, Australian Defence Force, p 16.
26
Moseley, op. cit. , p 16.
27
https://www.google.com.pk/search?
q=shaping+the+battlefield+situation+through+effect+based+actions&espv=2&biw=1366&bih=643&source=lnms&t
bm=isch&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiH-4KZ_t7LAhXI0xoKHcQzCUUQ_AUIBigB#imgrc=dmcTxDUFLoh_LM%3A accessed
on 26 March 2016.

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with least expenditure of resources. Cross dimensional thinking also brush through
strategic level to down below tactical level of warfare. Thus, EBO breaks the boundary
between levels of war offering an opportunity even at tactical level action to generate
strategic effect in a given situation.

43. Multidimensional Effect. As EBO suggests parallel nature of warfare, thus

simultaneous launch of different lines of operation by all elements of national power
(DIME) will produce simultaneous effect in multiple dimensions in adversary’s system.
An effect generated by one element of the DIME may generate 2 nd or 3rd order effect at
another level or in another element of DIME 28. It is so, because all elements of national
power are projected against selected systems of the enemy simultaneously. It is done to
create desired effects in respective nodes that will have cumulative effect on the enemy.

44. Flexibility to Adjust in System Perspective. Every action in EBO is desired to

create an effect on the enemy systems and the enemy systems are considered as
system of systems (SoS) that includes Political, Military, Economic, Social, Informational
and Infrastructural (PMESII) systems of adversary 29. At the same time those effects or
the cumulative enabling effects are likely to have varying impact on own operations or
conduct of future operations in the conflict that will be conducted in the environment of
system perspective. System perspective of the operational environment is illustrated in
the figure below30. As a result, the environment of the conflict might be shaped
accordingly with continuous impacts of varying magnitude in time and space. Therefore,
the commanders’ at all levels must be flexible in thinking and accepting the need of
adjustment in planning, execution and assessment as part of EBO cycle.

28
Effects Based Operation, Discussion Paper, Australian Defence Force, op. cit.
29
Emel Meteoglu, Modular Architecting for Effects Based Operations, A Thesis Presented to the Faculty of the
Graduate School of The University of Missouri – Rola, 2007, p 1.
30
Keszthelyi Gyula, EFFECT BASED OPERATION ( A New Method of Operation Planning),
http://hadmernok.hu/kulonszamok/newchallenges/keszthelyi.html, accessed on 22 January 2016.

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Figure 3: System Perspective of Operational Environment

45. Intelligence for Comprehensive Knowledge. Success of EBO depends

on the holistic and system based view about the adversary. As discussed before, EBO
recognizes that war is a clash of multifaceted adaptive systems 31. Thus, viewing the
adversary as a complex and adaptive system of systems would direct the holistic view
on the adversary to find the systems and establish linkage between them, Because,
only finding the systems and their components is not enough to conduct successful
EBO. A complete picture of the system is necessary to discover the nodes of them for
full neutralization, thus gaining required effect by specific actions in an environment.
Herein comes the need for intelligence architecture that is capable of handling
intelligence professionally at state level and disseminate the same as required for
execution at all levels of war.

46. Physical and Psychological Effect. EBO focuses on behavior of the

adversary to shape it in such a way so that they chose to surrender early than expected
minimizing the chances of destruction and annihilation that EBO concept is against.
Thus, every action in EBO must be to attain desired effects not only in the physical
sphere but also in the cognitive psychological sphere of the opponent. Von Clausewitz
puts due importance on the psychological aspects of conflicts. He even advocates that,
the actions in war to be directed to achieve psychological leverage over enemy than

31
Moseley, op. cit. , p 17.

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that of gaining physical objective32. Perhaps, an effects-based approach may facilitate
most wanted aims to be achieved without the need for attritional warfare; however, a
thoughtful combination of both physical and psychological effects against the enemy will
accelerate the success33.

Relevance of EBO

47. General. Today our horizon of thinking must be enlarged to engulf current
potentials and come out of old design of war fighting 34. Transition is an ongoing process
in Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and often it is very difficult to adjust and adopt the
transition quickly. While EBO provides a new concept and instrument for war fighting,
then our traditional thought process might constrain shift from the past experience and
old theories because, those were built basing on those means or systems of war
fighting which still holds as the majority of armaments in hand. Today’s military doctrine
and strategy definitely suggests a different way of thinking as regards to the projection
of means at hand for obtaining greater effects than that of traditional approach. But
there remains a possibility of being hindered by old psyche of the planners and lack of
understanding in the methodology of EBO that focuses on application of all military and
non-military assets in a synergistic manner following the technique of parallel warfare.
Relevance of EBO in contemporary environment has also been agreed upon during
interviews as in Annexure “A”.

48. Quest for Drivers. The paradigm shift in war fighting is getting excessively
relevant given the overall change in the world order driven by the outlook of geo-politics
and geo-economics that prevails globally and regionally. More so, effects-based
32
“Victory normally results from the superiority of one side; from a greater aggregate of physical and psychological
strength. This superiority is certainly augmented by victory, otherwise it would not be so coveted or command so
high a price. That is an automatic consequence of victory itself. Its effects exert a similar influence, but only up to a
point. That point may be reached quickly-at times so quickly that the total consequences of a victorious battle may
be limited to an increase in psychological superiority alone”…Carl Von Clausewitz, 1780-1831. (Joshua, op. cit., p
3).

33
Grossman, op. cit.
34
Brigadier General David A. Deptula, Effects-Based Operations: Change in the Nature of Warfare, p 21.

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operations are noticeably appropriate to the variety of military operations as demanded
by the post Cold War/9-11 security environment that is prevailing across the globe 35.The
main driving force for having increased relevance of EBO in current and future conflict is
to gain the ability to deal with the challenging security environment that instructs to put
added attention on human dimension of war. The drivers as stated above are translated
in the subsequent paragraphs.

49. Asymmetric Components. Great wars in the past were fought based on
the symmetry in terms of “will” and “means”. Both the warring factions were used to be
equally strong in both these aspects. They had the ability to fill the means when lost.
Armies were regenerated consecutively and not a single battle or engagement of the
campaigns could decide the victory or defeat. Wars were prolonged till the complete
destruction of the forces were achieved breaking the will to fight. Such war fighting
concept is no more the possibility in present world when the world is experiencing very
fast changing phenomenon of polarity, power projection and balance of power.
Therefore, there would be the asymmetry between “means” and “will”. When the
stronger nation would lead in “means”, the weaker would be having strong “will”. The
success of conflict will depend on creating and exploiting the asymmetry. The larger
power will always try to attack the limited and weak “means” of the adversary taking
advantage of their strong “means”, on the other hand the opponent will try to benefit
from their “will” to cause psychological attrition of the stronger adversary. Minimum
dependence on the “means” on the part of the weaker which are likely to be targeted
using superior “means” by the stronger can effectively nullify the effectiveness of
superior “means” and force a war of psychological attrition. This is only possible by an
effects based approach36. In fact, the terrorist attack on World Trade Center in
September 2001 had changed the entire orientation of the war fighting by the regular
armies of the world. A through transformation in military operations is envisaged to coup
with the fluid and difficult global environment . Fighting the different types of irregular
adversaries with traditional outlook and concepts would no longer work. Therefore, EBO
or EBAO emerged as contemporary solutions to the complex nature of tasks those are
35
Edward A. Smith, Jr, Effects-Based Operation, (Volume 2 Number 1), p 61.
36
Ibid, p 44.

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to be performed by the forces including their employment methodologies 37. The
Quadrennial Defence Review issued by the Department of Defence in 2006 emphasizes
unambiguously the need to make the shift from “massing of forces – to massing of
effects” and from focusing on inputs (effort) to tracking outputs (results) 38. Effects-based
methodology is something modern and intellectual way of looking at the operations.
NATO also admits that, EBO permits the military operations to cover a large
perspective”39. Though, it refers mostly to the war fighting phenomenon related to
insurgency or against non-state actors, yet would be equally applicable for all other
nations from the same perspective of asymmetry in varying fields.

50. Continuum of Military Operations. War is no more the domain of military

only. It embraces peacetime humanitarian assistance to crisis response and the
engagement of final conflict. Then, post war stabilization is yet another range of
operations where besides political stake holders, the military has role to play stopping
any further scope of conflict regeneration. Therefore, division between war and peace is
really very blurred and a prolonged war fighting is not the essence of war planning.
Further, when military and non-military elements of national power are put into conflict
then, destruction and furtherance of conflict lose priority. Rather effects are focused with
less of casualty putting minimum assets in force. Conflicts often start in grey areas
without any official declaration and end of any major battle within the conflict again does
not guarantee end of hostilities. Instead, the end of one combat signals the beginning of
yet another, thus the tendency of prolonged conflict prevails. In such a situation the
leaders, both military and political do face real challenge to mean victory terms while
weighing the factors of annihilation, destruction and effect. Consequently, the EBO is a
usual and rational answer to modified security environment and the diminishing barriers
between military and political activities and outcomes 40. Again, the post conflict
operations must be forced with full weight including withdrawal of forces in a messy
situation. This demands attention. Therefore, effects-based approach is appropriate to
deal with the spectrum of military operations in a conflict. EBO offers a flexible head
37
Z Jobbagy, op. cit. , p 23-24.
38
Ibid, p 24.
39
Ibid.
40
Gyula, op. cit.

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way that can guide the leaders at policy level while applying all available elements of
national power across the full gamut of conflict to obtain national security goals 41. EBO
calls for short lived war with less of damages employing minimum required forces with
no or reduced forward-basing. Thus it has the potential to improve the current war
fighting practices42. In other words, EBO provides the effects of mass without having
massed the forces as used to be done in ancient times 43.

51. Joint Nature of Warfare. As said before that, wars were fought largely
based on single service approach and projection of service oriented doctrines. We may
find many of the examples of wars and campaigns in which emphasis was put on single
service employment keeping the joint effort to the minimum or not utilized at all. Even in
the industrial age of WW II, European and Pacific campaigns were service based. Now
with the advent of modern technology and smart platforms, coupled with the precision
munitions available with all services have made war fighting a joint phenomenon
(question number-7 of Annexure “A”) for gaining greater effect at all levels of war.
Specially from the pretext of desirable short lived conflicts aiming at saving valuable
assets and at the same time gaining the mission with least of casualty and destruction,
there could be no alternative but to have effects to bow down the enemy applying all
military and non-military resources of the national power. In doing so, the joint approach
to military operations is viewed logical to be able to identify the Center of Gravity (CG)
of the enemy and direct lines of operations (DIME) to unlock the Decisive Points (DPs)
for ultimate destruction of the CG. It does mean creating appropriate effects on the
enemy’s system through control and parallel warfare at all levels of engagements. To
this effect, if the origin of EBO is traced back to the conduct of air operations in Gulf
War, then, one might be confused with an understanding that, the precision strategic
strikes and stealth technology backed by the doctrines of air operations would be
enough to create desired effect on the enemy for ultimate victory throughout the
spectrum of conflict. But, the underlying spirit and concept of EBO does not support

41
Rickerman, op. cit. , p 33.
42
Lieutenant Colonel Brett T. Williams, Effect-Based Operations: Theory application and the Role of Air Power
(Chapter 5), p 134.
43
Effects-Based Operations: A U.S Commander’s Perspective, POINTER, Journal of the Singapore Armed Forces,
Vol. 31, No. 2.

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such line of thinking. History also negates such point of view when air campaigns of
WW II were supported from other two services 44. Effects are desired at strategic,
operational and tactical level. In any joint operation the effects achieved by various
services at different times and locations must contribute to the overall desired effects 45
When long distance strategic attack by Air force creates an effect on the moral of
leadership of the enemy, at the same time Ground Forces operational manoeuvre offers
advantage over the enemy dispersal creating a favourable situation for overall swift
victory with less of resources-desirable for any military operation. It is called “speedy
supremacy” that depends on the employment of a series of pounding waves of potent
strikes across many targets combining sea, air, land and space forces to affect and
manipulate the adversary’s insight and includes the physical capture and occupation of
territory if necessary46. Thus, effects-based approach is the solution.

52. Real World Operation. We may master precision, have technologically

advanced platforms, and may put required number of weapons and forces at the right
time and place. Will it suffice? Would we be able to gain victory? Possibly we may not.
We need to also look at the enemy reaction to our strategy for their survival. They might
disperse, create complex situation where own sensor may not work, make identification
problem by merging troops with the civilian in ordinary clothing 47. Therefore, the
paradigm shift would be the battle of minds and wills. The situation will grow complex,
there will be no definite start and end, possibly the experience of past will try to shape
the future of operation creating yet beginning of no end. These criterions represent a
multifaceted, chaotic ‘real world’ where attrition-based thinking and application would
not suffice. As a senior NATO General expressed during a conference, “we must think
in terms of achieving the desired effect. We must transition from attrition-based force on
force warfare to effects-based operations”48. We must look into the future operations
44
Colonel Gary Cheek, Effects-Based Operations: The End of Dominant Manoeuvre, Chapter 3, p 82. (“By claiming
so much for air power before the war (and after the war as well), airmen created false perceptions that
documentary and historical evidence simply does not support. The strategic bombing offensives contributed to
Allied victory because they supported and were supported by the efforts of Allied ground and naval forces”.)
45
Section- 10, Chapter-2, Military Methodology Book provided by NDU, Islamabad, p 2-62.
46
Josuha Ho, The Advent of New Way of War: Theory and Practice of Effects Based Operations, IDSS, Singapore,
December 2003, p 8-9.
47
Smith, op. cit. , p 45.
48
Z. Jobbagy, Effects- Based Operations and the Age of Complexity (A Critical Reflection), p 235.

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holistically and should not restrict ourselves only on the degradation part of the enemy’s
fighting power49. The result is a move to effects-based operations 50.

Conclusion

53. Relevance of EBO is better understood after having clear knowledge on a set of
philosophy of EBO that guide the actions for effect; both intended and unintended by
choosing correct platforms. EBO has the potential to generate effects at all levels of war
which are complimentary if applied simultaneously and help shaping the environment.
EBO also create multidimensional effects along separate lines of operations in regards
to time and space and those need to be evaluated with flexible mind to adjust and direct
own actions along different lines of operations for cumulative effects. Intelligence is of
prime importance in conducting EBO aimed at creating effects in both physical and
psychological domain of enemy.

54. EBO has great deal of impact due to emerging asymmetric nature of warfare.
However, in all the cases, where pre and post war operations are equally important in
modern war planning, the EBO has inbuilt potential to help in implementing those
aspects. On the other hand, interdependence of all services in joint warfare is identified
to be crucial in present day warfare where EBO, that deals with both physical and
psychological war fighting elements of enemy in complex and messy real world
operations of both present and future.

CHAPTER III

IMPEDIMENTS FOR IMPLEMENTING EBO-AN ANALYSIS

“The only thing harder than getting a new idea into a military mind is getting an old idea
out”
……Liddell Hart
49
Robert Grossman, Discourse of Action: Command, Control, Conflict and the Effect Based Approach, p 6.
50
Smith op. cit. , p 46.

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General

55. Implementing effects-based operations as a concept described in this study will

have difficulties and face enormous challenges 51. Thus, implementing the effects-based
concept in the military operations is not likely to be an easy goal from the view point of
its unclear understanding by all the services covering the full spectrum of definition,
terminologies, methodologies, dynamics and thought process. Since the origin of EBO
in Gulf War air operations, lot of studies and exercises have been conducted by various
nations to validate the concept in the joint domain where all elements of national power
were also put in the planning, executing and assessing EBO to benefit from the concept
as desired. It is fact that, the EBO concept embraces wide range of complex issues and
elements of war fighting to remain focused on the effect than outcome dwelling in all
levels of war with different dimensions. Therefore, it requires commonality in minds,
behavior and actions by all stake holders involved in the process for useful
implementation of the concept of EBO. But, the analysis of the study carried out so far
suggest few impediments as well those can be overcome (Annexure “A”). Those
identified impediments as a result of evaluation are discussed in following paragraphs.

Services and other Agency Culture

56. EBO concept and methodology takes all military and non-military assets of the
nation onboard while planning and executing operations. But, at the same time it must
be remembered that, services in the military and all other agencies have their own
cultures and training. So, any attempt to standardize the planning procedures while
orchestrating the military operations within national effort might prove
counterproductive. Differing cultures will produce reactions to military operations that
may not be understandable resulting misinterpretation and overall jeopardy. As regards
to the services culture, perhaps the most explicit challenge will be to overcome service
psyche and the denial of the concept due to “not invented here” chauvinism 52. Because,

51
Batschelet, op. cit. , p 14.
52
Ibid.

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the philosophy of EBO was experimented and applied by the US Air Force during Gulf
War.

Insufficiency of Planning Staffs

57. As it has been discussed that EBO follows a cycle which is laborious and
systematic. Every action in EBO cycle is closely linked with one another and needs
continuous evaluation to adjust or modify the actions projected for desired effect. It is
required at the beginning of war planning and more importantly during ongoing
operations which in future are likely to be versatile and dynamic in nature. Therefore,
the staff organizations at every level of war including the policy level must be well set
with required skilled manpower to handle the issue. But traditionally the militaries are
not staffed accordingly to meet the requirement of staff planning to implement EBO in
war planning and fighting. It must be well comprehended that, the proper and successful
conduct of EBO run through high risk areas as regards to intelligence and planning than
that Destruction-Based Operations (DBO). EBO become very vulnerable in want of
timely intelligence or while receiving wrong intelligence and running assessment. Lack
of planning staffs would also severely hinder the planning effort of EBO as it requires
extra work load and current staff is not sufficient for this task 53. So, lack of proper
staffing would hinder the implementation of EBO.

Dilemma between EBO and Destruction-Based Operations (DBO)

58. DBO is the conduct or directing of actions that relies more on destructions than
effects against selected targets to mean victory. The advent of technological
advancement and introduction of smart platforms covering all services has made
engagements of targets easier than ever before. When these platforms equipped with
precision munitions are available with militaries for destruction-based campaigns more
effectively and quickly, then, possibly the concept of EBO that looks for leverage could
be viewed as weaker option. For example, More than 800 sorties were delivered to hit
the Thanh Hao Bridge during Vietnam War, but desired success was not achieved,
whereas, in 1972 just four F-4Es were required to devastate the Bridge by laser guided
53
Effects-Based Operations: Obstacles and Opportunities, POINTER, Journal of the Singapore Armed Forces, op. cit.

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bombs54. At this point current generation munitions needs no explanation for employing
in DBO. The planners might think of taking no risk but total destruction due to the
traditional and cultural norms of war planning. Another aspect is that, as military option
is the last resort when all other means have failed, therefore, destruction of the
adversary’s military force and assets would be thought necessary to decisively end the
war. Most importantly, as EBO aims to achieve leverage, there could be the possibility
of leaving some target with the understanding that the cascading effect of other actions
would make them ineffective. But if the assessment is wrong than their remains the risk
of defeat. Taking calculative risk by the commanders is an important quality that must
be exercised in war. However, generally militaries are against such risk taking
phenomenon and it might not promote all at a sudden 55.

Inadequate Intelligence Architecture

59. The EBO cycle starts with the knowledge. It means developing complete insight
into adversary, environment and self. Then, understanding the methodology of EBO
deals with understanding the adversary System of Systems (SoS) for effects-based
planning and execution. The effect caused on one system of the adversary might have
secondary or unpredicted cumulative effect on other systems that would generate
reaction on own actions requiring necessary modification in future or successive actions
for victory. Thus, in EBO, laborious and real time information is pre-requisite for
continuous evaluation, assessment and adjustments in actions for desired effect.
Hence, comprehensive and well staffed intelligence architecture is must for launching
EBO in any conflict. The present set up of intelligence architecture at various level of
war planning is based on the traditional mindset of waging war where destruction and
annihilation of enemy forces and facilities are focused and thus contributes in the same
manner. Inadequacy of traditional intelligence set up has also been supported as
described at Annexure “A”. Therefore, appropriate intelligence set up will be required at
various level of planning to address the EBO methodology and steps of EBO 56:

54
Ibid.
55
Ibid.
56
Meteoglu, op. cit. , p 11-16.

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a. Effects-Based Analysis (EBA).
b. Effects-Based Planning (EBP).
c. Effects-Based Execution (EBE).
d. Effects-Based Assessment (EBAS).

Absence of Strategic Guidance

60. Present day war fighting will be conducted in a complex adaptive environment
which will be different in different time and space. Nations prepare their militaries to
deter adversaries through wholesome application of elements of national power as
suited at given environment. Thus, the National Security Policy (NSP) and other agency
policies including the Defence Policy are framed based on the geo-strategic
environment of the world and the region as applicable. As intelligence analysis and
combat assessment is integral part of the planning process for EBO, therefore
knowledge about the potential adversaries must be continuously sought and own
actions are conceptualized for desired effect through actions during conflict. At this end,
not every potential adversary will have same Systems of System (SoS) to be attacked
for desired end state, further those will be rapidly changing during the conflict. Thus, a
clearly stated strategic guidance will be required to engage different adversaries during
need. Herein, the need for Defence Policy that will provide the militaries to prepare and
apply actions for desired effect and ultimate victory comes in as important ingredient to
apply EBO in military actions. At the same time application of other elements of national
power will also have their own role to play towards speedy surrender of the enemy by
targeting their crucial nodes of the systems simultaneously.

61. Scenario building, formulating hypothesis and translating the same into concept
of operation to be applied during conflict do not contradict with the part of the
methodology of EBO, rather it complements the process. Only thing is that, the enemy
once considered as the system and the critical node of the system is to be targeted for
desired effect, then, it must be understood that the systems and nodes for all potential
adversaries are not same to be taken by applying different elements of national power.
Therefore, selection of lead hypothesis is important and that would be derived from the

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policies as a result of farsighted strategic guidance those will be different for different
adversaries based on the social, cultural, economic and military development of the
different adversaries. For most of the militaries of the developing nations lack of
strategic guidance and well-articulated Defence Policy is the major impediments for
implementing the EBO methodology.

Lack of Interagency Coordination

62. EBO methodology shows the way to plan better and execute campaigns. But in a
joint environment the Joint Force Commander would need a theatre level interagency
coordination element57. As an example, the US Central Command had liberty of action
plan and carry out operations in Afghanistan. In a sense, such freedom of action is
desirable. But in Vietnam War there had been sufficient guidance from Washington. In
operations where military objectives are limited, the political, economic and diplomatic
issues tend to dominate the military decision making. In this context, the EBO, wherein
the other elements of national powers are exerted alongside the military, the
commanders are confronted with unclear military objectives and political concerns to
decide the employment of military. In this kind of situations, the commander has no
alternatives but to work intimately with political guidance to orchestrate military and non-
military actions under the strategic umbrella. EBO necessitates the framework to
coordinate all elements of national power applied towards the common end state. In
doing so, commanders require interagency contribution with their staffs 58. But given the
scenario, traditional interagency coordination is not enough for conducting EBO in any
kind of conflicts. Details are in question number-4 of Annexure “A”.

Gap Between EBO and Military Development

63. Military development should take place keeping in mind the requirement of EBO
in terms of men and material. The arms race around the world is perceived to be taking
place in response to the acquired conventional capability of the potential adversaries
and not keeping the application methodology of EBO in considerations. Therefore, the

57
Williams, op. cit. , p 149.
58
Ibid, p 150.

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militaries are growing in size in terms of men and arsenal putting heavy pressure on the
economy of the states, specially the third world developing countries. But if we think of
EBO and its ingredients of effects-based thinking, effects-based targeting and effects-
based assessment to attain the ultimate military and political aim, then the traditional
military development and psyche of such line of thinking would appear meaningless.
Rather, the budget could be utilized in some other sector to mean real socio-economic
development of the country and still remain prepared militarily to thwart any aggression
by potential adversary.

64. Therefore, so long the common understanding of EBO would not be inculcated in
the minds of strategic decision makers alongside the military strategic leaders; the
development of the militaries will only mean the traditional tendency of muscle flexing
which would not bring home desired step forward towards the concept of EBO. Still
militaries are lacking in this field and thus the phenomenon goes against the conceptual
understanding and philosophy of EBO.

Conclusion

65. Induction of new philosophy of war fighting being within the ambit of military
methodology is likely to face challenges while being enforced simultaneously with all
other elements of national power. EBO is no exception. It would be highly difficult to
accept and practice something new that suggest minimum use of resources to cause
less of destructions as done traditionally in war fighting.
66. Therefore, impediments for implementing EBO over a wide range of parameters
covering both physical and psychological domain of organizations including civil
agencies and individuals cannot be overemphasized. Also, EBO being heavily
dependent on effects based thinking, planning, execution and assessment, required
expertise and technology has no alternative for successful conduct of EBO. Presently,
the traditional mindset and organizational/mental mobility is not enough as narrated in
the chapter. Thus, conduct of EBO would be impeded.

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CHAPTER IV

ORGANIZATIONAL ENHANCEMENT REQUIRED TO IMPLEMENT EBO

“Military revolutions have taken place throughout history, and one of the greatest may
be underway now. They involve major changes in the conduct of war and in military
organization and administration, both reflecting and further influencing wider
technological, political, administrative, and social change ”
-------------------------Christopher Bellamy

General

67. Organizational enhancement to implement EBO in militaries does not restrict

itself to only limited parameters of machineries involved in war planning and executing.
It covers a wide range of fields of military. It has been understood so far that, the
philosophy of EBO is different than that of traditional DBO. Thus, implanting the concept
of EBO that deals with the effects, not primarily the means applied to conflicts and win
will need paradigm shift in understanding the whole gamut of EBO to derive benefit out
of the EBO concept. Doctrines and methodologies those were developed by militaries
over years to fight traditional attrition based war are to be modified to fit in the EBO
methodology and conduct. Further, when EBO applies all elements of national power
simultaneously targeting the adversary systems for desired effect, then there is a need
for supreme mutual understanding and coordination during, before and even after the
conflict between militaries and other governmental agencies. Therefore, to develop the
similar thinking and psyche in line with EBO a wholesome approach will be necessary.
Effects-based thinking, effects-based planning and effects-based execution will only be
possible if all stake holders are taken on board and develop.

68. So, organizational enhancement will mean entire spectrum of cultural,

psychological, educational, philosophical and structural enrichment of the machineries
involved in war fighting of a nation. Keeping in view the underpinning meaning of EBO,
all establishments and their manpower starting from the basic training till the highest

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level of professional education needs to be brought under the same kind of program
that will develop the entire system to think, plan, execute and assess effects-based for
maximum outcome from EBO. Such approach to develop the organizations and prepare
to accept the EBO methodology in war fighting is described in following paragraphs.

Effects-based Professional Military Education (PME) and Training

69. Education develops intellectual skills, critical thinking, and creativity to allow one
individual to come up with reasoned solutions to unpredictable problems. EBO
methodology and philosophy is such a phenomenon that requires a clear mindset and
understanding beginning with the definition to the application for true operational
planning which focuses on the effects not assets those are exerted in military action.
Nature of EBO is still undergoing changes and evaluation. In such point in time, an
approach which is based on proper education would allow necessary argument to dwell
on the spirit and strength of old and new notions to study EBO for its further
implementation59. The personnel including leaders of all tiers and men those who are
charged with the responsibility of implementing the concept of EBO on ground must
educate themselves with effects-based terms and remain focused on the broader
perspective. Details are at Annexure “A”.

70. Thus, PME on EBO methodology would require holistic approach on the
education system of the militaries beginning from the basic education and training in the
academies and centers. In the same way whole curriculum of the training institutions
also would require paradigm shift from the traditional education of military personnel to
the effects-based psyche and orientation. Initiation of such initiative over long practiced
education of traditional war fighting will no doubt generate chaos and confusion, but it
would not accelerate if not started at some point of time and press forward. Thus, EBO
related change in the education system and the institution is must for its embracing and
implementing.

59
Effects-Based Approaches to Operations: Canadian Perspective ( Colonel Randall Wakelam, Effects-Based
Professional Military Education, Chapter 9, p 126)

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Effect Assessment Methodology Development

71. Effects as desired out of military or non-military actions need to be assessed at

all levels of war in EBO. Such assessment would then also guide the planners to modify
and adjust the actions in various domains of adversary for cumulative effects to
paralyze the enemy earlier than expected, thus finalizing the orchestrated
demonstration of all elements of national power towards achievement of final victory.
Therefore, assessment methodology development cell organized and equipped with
appropriate staffs and gadgets would be necessary for implementing the EBO
methodology. Such organizations are not part of military planning in the traditional
parameters of war planning. Hence, benefits from the concept of EBO could only be
derived if such organizations are set up at individual services level and in Joint
Headquarters level once established during joint warfare.

72. To this effect, other governmental agencies would also come into play, because
concerted application of all elements of national power would also generate effects
simultaneously in respective domains. So, Joint Interagency Coordination Group,
Effects Working Group, Joint Effects Cell, Joint Targeting Coordination Board etc may
also be established to effectively embrace the concept of EBO 60.
Effects- Based Planning, Execution and Assessment

73. Traditional war planning does not necessarily focuses on the effects those would
be generated out of actions applied and assess the implications of those effects on own
and that of adversary. Typical military actions are attrition or destruction-based and
success is measured on the outcome of an action which means annihilation. Adversary
is not considered as a System of Systems (SoS) and thus further link of the effect
generated in one of the systems of the adversary is not analyzed to verify own action
and direct the next action for desired end state. Application of all elements of national
power targeting the different nodes of the enemy systems simultaneously is also not
viewed with due considerations that would bring the enemy in own terms earlier than
60
All these machineries are examples from US or Coalition forces organizational model whenever a Joint
Task Force Headquarters is formed. It is not mandatory to mimic the same model but militaries may take
assistance from US or Coalition forces model to suit the requirement.

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expected causing less damage to own and enemy. EBO is essentially directed for this
purpose.

74. Thus, the planning staffs must develop the psyche to think for effects on the
enemy from the very beginning of war planning to address the application of all
elements of national power meticulously on selected targets for desired effects.
Selection of appropriate target at all levels of war is also very crucial for applying the
correct assets. So, thinking effects-based is important in executing EBO. Therefore,
effects-based thinking, planning and assessment are key to success in EBO that must
be accepted organizationally. Traditionally, the “Ends” of strategy is planned to be
reached through massing of forces. But if focus is directed on effects which otherwise
should be the “Ends” of strategy, then possibly we will be able to think differently and
perhaps it is the most effective way to gain same objectives but with less of resources 61.

Integrating Information Operations (IO) into EBO

75. Information operations (IO) have now become primary military capability and
being taken as one of the military core competencies. IO has also emerged as a very
important career field in services like other war fighting fields. As EBO has been
discussed relevant in the real world operations, the history of operations in Balkan’s and
in Afghanistan has experienced the application of IO. Thus, there is a need to integrate
the IO in to EBO for desired effects to be achieved. Further, the concept of EBO speaks
about the necessity of influencing the adversary’s behavior and actions where IO has
very important role to play and create effects in the adversary’s system for finally
paralyzing their will to prolong the conflict and thus be successful in applying the IO
means as a national power for effective EBO.

76. IO begins much before the manoeuvres and continues even after the conflicts
are over. Initiation of IO, its monitoring, modification and effects analysis is a mammoth
task that requires establishment of IO cell within the Joint Headquarters with
professional information warriors. Creating these professionals through comprehensive
academic education and training program is to be materialized through services
61
Deptula, op. cit. , p 26.

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education system and thus will need separate set up. Still IO is not being considered to
be a complete strategy as the other war fighting concepts and strategies even in the
modern militaries. Normally IO tends to remain inbuilt in all levels of command
arrangements and it is not considered as a major separate capability or force multiplier.
Therefore, the visibility of IO is something which remains blurred for its effective
integration into operational planning by the commanders 62. Therefore, IO as one of the
tool of national power to be projected while conducting EBO needs organizational set up
and trained professional in services for successful implementation and thus derive
benefits of EBO. Traditional attrition-based thinking and thus planning IO would not
create desired effects in adversary’s behavior and systems that EBO focuses.

Developing an Organizational Culture of EBO

77. Organizational culture is the function of societal culture and how the leaders
behave professionally in their respective discipline. To create an organizational culture
conducive to EBO, development of organizational machinery is essential. The command
and control of the armed forces need to be arranged in such a manner so that it
facilitates implementation of EBO. Therefore, the headquarters and echelons need to be
designed for EBO and effort needs to channel for buying, sustaining, and organizing the
necessary resources, and training and educating the people to exploit these
possibilities. At this point, it is the mobilization of knowledge which is the most
important process for the development of organizational culture conducive to EBO. That
said, how information obtained through sensor- derived electronic or mechanical media
is processed by human expertise through intuitive and cognitive analysis and how they
are passed along down the lower command are important aspect to create the
organizational culture for EBO.

Minimizing Gap Between Concept, Practice and Development

62
Larry K. Wentz and Lee W. Wagenhals, Integration of Information Operations into Effects-Based Operations:
Some Observations, (http://sysarch.gmu.edu/main/media/publications/docs/241P.pdf accessed on 23 January
2016) p 10.

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78. Force development is a continuous process and takes place through vision of
any nation. We are to keep in mind that force development goal is a laborious and
strategic vision that also include huge budget. Therefore, such development must not
lose sight of strategic guidance relating to the potential adversary and doctrinal aspects
thereof. It may not be always possible to study the strategic environment of the future to
be at par with the situations forward but then effects-based thinking in all services might
well minimize gap between the conceptual or doctrinal development and practices. If
psyche of EBO is sufficiently engraved in the minds of strategic leaders of all tiers, that
will link the forces development including procurement of equipment and human
resources development with effects-based thinking and planning. Because, EBO
focuses on philosophy or different strategy of war fighting and this has less to do with
equipment. Thus, if gap between concept, practice and force development remains big,
then it will mean waste of national budget affecting specially the developing countries.
Thus, a holistic approach is needed for concept, practice and development to embrace
EBO by any militaries or nation as whole.

Joint Doctrine

79. Future wars are not likely to be fought in single service environment. Joint nature
of warfare will thus require a joint doctrine for effective projection of power by respective
services. In case of EBO to be truly incorporated for its appropriate application during
conflicts, the joint doctrine for traditional war fighting will not be logical and will not serve
the purpose. It is because; the EBO methodology includes all elements of national
power to be projected simultaneously against potential adversary for attaining desired
effect at all levels considering enemy as a System of Systems (SoS). The US Joint
Forces Command as a pre-document before finalizing the joint doctrine for the
combatant commands and respective services has published a hand book on EBO and
circulated to all concern63. Such steps are required to develop common understanding,
perception building and providing a base line to all stakeholders to think effects-based in
education, training and practices. Such endeavour will develop the force as a whole with
63
The Hand Book is published and circulated with message from US Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting
Center.

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required psyche to accept the EBO methodology and implement. The joint doctrine
when published will then be understood with less or no difficulties. Thus, the joint
doctrine needs to be developed covering a wider field and accommodate all related
concepts and training requirements to support the EBO methodology.

Interagency Capacity Building

80. The effective application of EBO for desired effect lies in the appropriate capacity
building of all agencies of the nation those will be used against the potential enemy
during conflict. In the present day context, it will be no more the phenomenon for only
military power to be projected and win. It is seen that, all other governmental agencies
those are required to be performing their role during war in support of the military
apparatus, know very little about the entire mobilization scheme to fit in the process
from the very beginning till end. Further, when EBO seeks for application of all elements
of national power, related agencies beyond the DIME elements should automatically be
activated to endure the war effort of the nation. So, all related agencies of the nation
must also grow at par with each other for having needed endurance to mutually support
the directed actions of some element or agency in need and at the same time be ready
to supplement efforts gaining desired effects out of EBO methodology. Thus,
interagency coordination, cooperation and applicable capacity building has no
alternative.

Conclusion

81. Some of the essential organizational parameters need to be enhanced to

overcome the hindrances for conducting fruitful EBO. The parameters are not limited to
only those as described. There could be many more those are likely to emerge during
the process of implanting EBO gradually. But the crux is that, if the methodology of EBO
is to be embraced by the militaries, then, the organizational improvements as identified
must start at some point of time. Obviously it would take time to mature and obtain
recognition after having gone through different stages of experiments and trials.

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82. Here organizational enhancement does not necessarily mean the structural
development, but it is meant for a wide spectrum of enhancement covering large fields
of conceptual, methodical, educational, cultural, psychological and doctrinal parameters
primarily in Armed Forces and related civil machineries those would become part of
EBO in the process as per EBO methodology.

83. The aspects of enhancement those are explained covering “why” and “how” are
not exclusively included in recommendations.

CHAPTER V

RECOMMENDATIONS

84. In view of the study carried out in this paper and after having found the
impediments to embrace EBO along with the organizational enhancement parameters
identified, following recommendations are made:

a. To inculcate the basic and common understanding about EBO in military,

there is a need for change in the education and training system in all military

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training institutions/establishments. Therefore, wholesome attention is required
for qualitative modification in training syllabus and the same should be enforced
at all levels. No doubt, it would be challenging and arduous task. Therefore, any
attempt to change training syllabus overnight must be avoided. All services
should endeavour to run the changed curriculum initially as “test and trial” and
then implement gradually with required modifications.

b. Effects-based culture development in all government agencies including

military will be of immense importance to embrace EBO philosophy. No doubt,
this is time consuming affair and arduous. It needs top down approach. So,
strategic guidance in the form of policy directives should be published and
circulated to all agencies of the government amplifying the concept of EBO and
respective response desired out of them.

c. There remains a gap between military and non-military apparatus of

nations in preparation and planning of campaigns. While synergy is essential to
benefit out of EBO concept, both party should work in harmony before, during
and even after any conflict. Therefore, establishment of interagency coordination
cell is must with representation from all elements both during peace and war.

d. In EBO, actions are projected combining both military and non-military

resources to generate effects in various tiers of enemy’s system aiming at the
fulfillment of politico-military objectives. So, naturally, any of the elements might
have primacy over another at any point of campaign. Hence, mutual
understanding and cohesion between agencies has no alternative. It will require
development of mutual respect and dependence between the stakeholders. So,
psychological development must be fostered and sustained by the stakeholders
while thinking and executing EBO.

e. Real time information will play vital role in EBO. Intelligence set up in
traditional war fighting thus will be inadequate to keep pace with planning,
execution and assessment cycle of EBO. There should be enhanced intelligence

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architecture at appropriate levels to meet the requirement of information and
processing it for successful conduct of EBO.

f. The necessity of a joint doctrine cannot be over emphasized in case of

applying EBO. A joint doctrine must be in vogue to inculcate and educate the
EBO methodology by all services minimizing gap of understanding and exact role
play by the services while executing EBO. In doing so, a draft joint doctrine
should be formulated by a Board of Officers’ including all services and circulated
to all stakeholders for their comments and suggestions. Thereafter, the final joint
doctrine should be published keeping provision of required changes as and when
needed.

g. Militaries must develop to meet the potential threat. But it should be at par
with the doctrine that suggests application of EBO. Further, all other agencies of
the nation must also acquire necessary capability to support military elements.
Hence, interagency capacity building should not be ignored. A comprehensive
National Security Policy (NSP) will thus be required which would then provide
enough guideline to all other policies so as to develop individual agencies and
remain prepared to work in harmony with necessary capability.

h. It may be argued that, conduct of EBO is technology based and requires

enhanced organizational set up and thus may not suit the developing nations
owing to their budgetary constraints and smaller size of the militaries. But such
arguments are addressed adequately to establish the fact saying that, rather
EBO philosophy which seeks for effect and not necessarily destruction thus
conduct of EBO even by the smaller and relatively weaker militaries is possible
following the conduct mechanism of EBO. Therefore, the concept and
applicability of EBO can equally benefit both developed and developing countries
(details are at Annexure “A”).

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CONCLUSIONS

85. There could be different opinions as regards to the concept of EBO, its
methodology and credibility in applications. Some might have service centric approach
while describing EBO taking in to considerations of its origin during Gulf War in light of
air power that was projected for effects against the adversary, whereas, to someone it
could be an ancient idea sold in new wrap. But fact remains that, the EBO thoughts
have gone through very exhaustive experiments and war gaming process by the
developed nation’s militaries of the West, NATO and other technologically advanced
nations in search of its viability and applicability not only in single service but in joint
environment. The result of such efforts came out encouraging and at the same time
suggested new methods of projecting power to benefit maximum out of EBO in a
complex environment where adversary is considered as a system and EBO launched
against that system could generate desired effects at various nodes and links of the
system ensuring quick psychological break down of the adversary. Thus, effects not
destruction could succeed to reach desired end state.

86. It must be understood as a very important factor that, EBO looks for the outcome
not necessarily the input that traditionally militaries focus on while planning and
executing operations. If desired outcome of any action is focused from the very
beginning, then, it will invariably guide the war planners to follow a discipline in
formulating plans and observing executions for achieving objectives and the ultimate
end state. The process will also question on the tasks to be performed and purpose of
those tasks. EBO tries to find link between these two factors before taking any action
during operations. As EBO means the synergistic application of all elements of national
power, thus the task-purpose equation can definitely identify the magnitude and kind of
force to be projected in a given mission. It will save both time and resources those are
very critical while conducting operations. Thus, unnecessary destruction of enemy
forces and their infrastructure can be avoided following the EBO philosophy of planning
and executing operations as Law of Hague also establishes the rights and obligations of

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belligerent in the conduct of military operations that limits means of harming the
enemy64.

87. Further, technological advancement enabling all the services to closely

communicate with each other with enhanced synergy in joint operations. Though use of
EBO has been observed throughout the history in varying magnitude, technology and
precision munitions now yielding greater combat power for desired effects in multi-
dimensional operations covering land, air, sea, space, electro-magnetic spectrum and
psychological domain. Therefore, such dynamics of warfare could bring in the EBO
philosophy to be applied for desired effects at all tiers of adversary making them weak
in all possible domains by generating required effects. So, such phenomenon of
contemporary use of technology might be seen as a force multiplier while thinking,
planning and executing EBO in present day war fighting and beyond.

88. To be on the point, the end of Cold War and the contemporary events embracing
the asymmetric nature of warfare have totally changed the environment in which the
future battles will be fought and operations undertaken. The entire scenario would
represent a domain where it would be difficult to identify boundary between peace and
war. Diplomatic, political and economic standpoint will look unclear. In such an
environment the traditional mindset of war planning would invariably be insufficient to
determine objectives and direct actions for desired outcome or final victory. Today, if the
answer to the question on conduct of war remains within the scope of 20 th century’s
doctrine, training, weapon and systems based on service parochial, then possibly we
will be heading towards wrong direction ignoring realities of warfare those we would be
facing. If we are only trained on use of hammer, then every situation ahead would look
like nails. Militaries must prepare themselves to use new tools and concepts in
emerging battle space. Any lack of enthusiasm in accepting new methodology and
concepts suiting the present day need will only drag us backwards. Further, if militaries
wait for the final refinement of any new concept before adopting, possibly it would be
too late or never adopted. EBO is such a concept of time that must be addressed with

64
Lecture conducted by Mr Ahmed Rauf (Advocate) on “Critical Issues of PASO: International Law, Humanitarian
Intervention and Right to Protect” in NDU on 08 March 2016.

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full vigour to derive benefits out of it and meet the challenges of present day war
fighting.

89. EBO stratagem is to task line of attack that connects attacks on selected targets
to achieve needed effects narrated in the objective. The rationalization must be
homogeneous and expressed in doctrine so that the expressions and definitions appear
same to all stakeholders at all levels. Strategic military planners must develop effects
based campaign that can operate in an environment where constraints are imposed by
the political stakeholders, yet objectives are chosen and actions are directed in way so
that other elements of national power can also project required power towards
achievement of respective effects against the adversary. As a whole the efforts directed
would be able to achieve the political end state. It is all about the synergistic application
of all resources as per the EBO concept.

90. However, destruction-based attacks by the services will possibly remain at all
times. But we must remember and believe that, EBO is the future of warfare. War
planners should not forget that the International Humanitarian Law (IHL) or the Law of
War protects those who are not or no longer taking part in fighting 65. It must be
understood in an interagency construct in joint nature of warfare from the beginning of
conceptual acceptance to implementation and systematic evaluation through continuous
assessment following EBO cycle for full benefit.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books/Literatures/Journals (Downloaded from Internet)

1. Liutenant Colonel Allen W. Batschelet, Effects-Based Operations: A New

Operational Model?, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013.

2. Major Z. Jobbagy, Literature Survey on Effects-Based Operations, TNO Report,

Oude Waalsdorperweg 63, PO Box 96864, 2509 JG, The Hague, The Netherlands.

65
Ibid.

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3. Dr. Edward A. Smith, Jr, Effects-Based Operations: The Way Ahead, 9th
International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium, September
14-16, 2004 Copenhagen, Denmark.

4. Colonel Gary Cheek, Effects-Based Operations: The End of Dominant

Manoeuvre, Chapter 3.

5. Keszthelyi Gyula, Effect Based Operation (A New Method for Operation

Planning), New Challenges in the Field of Military Science International Scientific
Conference, 7-8 November 2006, Selected Papers.

6. Brigadier General David A. Deptula, Effects-Based Operations: Change in the

Nature of Warfare, Published 2001 by Aerospace Education Foundation 1501 Lee
Highway, Arlington, Virginia 22209-1198 Tel: (703) 247-5839 Fax: (703) 247-5853.

7. Major Leonard D. Rickerman, Effects-Based Operations: A New Way of Thinking

and Fighting, School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and
General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

8. Joshua Ho, The Advent of New Way of War: Theory and Practice of Effects
Based Operations, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore, December
2003.

9. Z. Jobbagy, Effects-Based Operations and the Age of Complexity (A Critical

Reflection).

10. Effects Based Operations (Discussion Paper), Directorate of Future War fighting
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11. Robert Grossman, Discourse of Action: Command, Control, Conflict and the
Effects Based Approach, National Defence Headquarters, 101 Colonel By Drive Ottawa,
ON, Canada, K1N 0K2 613 990 7436.

12. Effects-Based Approach to Operations: Canadian Perspective.

13. Military Methodology Book, Chapter-2, Section-10.

14. Emel Meteoglu, Modular Architecting for Effects Based Operations, Master
Theses, Curtis Laws Wilson Library.

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15. Lieutenant Colonel Brett T. Williams, EBO: Theory, Application and the Role of
Air Power (Chapter 5), file:///E:/Backup%208-09-15/Downloads/nps04-120803-06.pdf.

16. CPT Choy Dawen, Effects-Based Operations: Obstacles And Opportunities

(Published in the POINTER Journal of The Singapore Armed Forces), 2004.

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Perspective (Published in the POINTER Journal of The Singapore Armed Forces),
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Australia’s External Security, Special Edition:Effects-Based Strategy, Volume 2 Number
1(2006).

19. General T. Michael Mosley, Air Force Doctrine, Document 2, 3 April 207.

20. Lieutenant Colonel Ted T. Uchida, Analysis of Effects-Based Operations-The

Road Ahead to Doing Business Differently, AF/XOCW, 1911 N Ft Myer Drive, Suite
1200, Arlington, Virginia 22209.

Interviews

21. Interviews were carried out in the form of questionnaire amongst ten NSWC
2015/16 participants covering participants from both developed and developing
countries.

Internet Sources

22. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle of the Trench.

23.https://www.google.com.pk/search?
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WoVChMI1J-894C7yAIVYqhyCh0sVgRN&biw=1366&bih=643.

24. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Warden%27s_Five_Rings.

25.http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/publications/pointer/journals/2004/v30n2/features/f
eature3.html.

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26. http://hadmernok.hu/kulonszamok/newchallenges/keszthelyi.html.

27. http://sysarch.gmu.edu/main/media/publications/docs/241P.pdf.

28. file:///E:/Backup%208-09-15/Downloads/For%20Effects-based%20Operations
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29. https://www.google.com.pk/search?
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&bih=643&source=lnms&tbm=isch&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiH-
4KZ_t7LAhXI0xoKHcQzCUUQ_AUIBigB#imgrc=dmcTxDUFLoh_LM%3A.

Lectures

30. Lecture conducted by Mr. Ahmed Rauf (Advocate) on “Critical Issues of PASO:
International Law, Humanitarian Intervention and Right to Protect” in NDU on 08 March
2016.

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