1

RESTRICTED

EVOLUTION OF MILITARY/OPERATIONAL THOUGHT

INTRODUCTION
1. The evolution of strategic thought has been a study of varied approaches and angles.
More often than not, warfare has been analysed within the narrow confines of battles,
campaigns or the generalship of those who prevailed. The difficulty is inherent in the in the
multitude of perspectives of military strategy. On the one hand there is Professor Howard’s
persuasive argument, that war is conducted in four dimensions that are operational, logistic,
social and technical. On the other hand, Edward Betwixt argues that war is conducted at the
technical, tactical, operational, strategic and grand strategic levels. Conflict can also be
divided into high, mid and low levels. Strategy can be direct or indirect and war can be
limited, general or total. But the strategic thought, as most agree, is encapsulated in five
Schools namely maritime, continental, aerospace, nuclear and revolutionary school of
thought.
2. For the understanding of modern strategic thought, most analysts believe that the
European continental school had the most profound influence on conventional warfare. To
them the Continental Strategy has remained the fountain head of conventional warfare with
naval and air components in support.
3. So what is the continental School of thought and where from a start could be made.
The term continental simply denotes the European continent and arguably, a point can be
made that Napoleonic era heralded the start of modern strategic thought. Until the sixteenth
century, little was contributed to the formulation and development of military art.
4. The eighteenth century produced great captains and military writers. Fredrick the
Great, Marshal Saxe, Guibert and Bourcet are the leading names who provided, the
conceptual edifice on which the Napoleon’s army was later built. French Revolution sparked
a trend towards mass armies, to produce the concept of “nation in arms”. Limited wars of
the old monarchs were thus replaced with unlimited wars. The Napoleonic era witnessed
major transfiguration in the conduct of war, that was centered around numerical strength,
deep penetration and rapid concentration. These developments were incisively analyzed by
the first breed of modern theorists, like Clausewitz and Jomini and made lasting imprints on
the subject of war.
5. By the turn of the nineteenth century, technology began exerting tremendous
influence on the very nature of warfare. Moltke and Schlieffen are the great names of this
period, accredited for the towering success of Prussian Army. Then came the First Word
War which saw dis-juncture between the strategy and tactics. It ended into a grinding
stalemate, with enormous costs in men and material. Thereafter, the new strategic thought

RESTRICTED
 2
RESTRICTED

is associated with the legends such as Fuller, Liddell Hart and de Gaulle. Their concepts of
indirect approach and Blitzkrieg were rejected by their own armies but were eagerly sought
by the Germans. In Russia, Tukhachevsky was the proponent of Deep Strike Doctrine and
Theory of Successive Operations. The Second World War saw unprecedented doctrinal and
technological advancement that pushed the war to its extreme limits.
6. This evolutionary process, thus, spans roughly two centuries and it would be our
endeavor to present the seminal highlights of this remarkable era within the allotted time.
Let me also confess at the outset, that having been delivered two elaborate talks by the DG
Plans (JSHQ) and DGMO on the same very topic, we feel it quiet difficult to add some thing
anew.
Aim
3. To study the evolution of operational thought against the back drop of development in
military doctrines and conduct of war from 18th Century to end of Second World War.
Sequence
4. The presentation will be conducted in two parts: -
a. Part I. Development of Military and Operational Thought from 18 th Century till
the France Prussian War. (Lt Col Arshad)

b. Part II. Development of Military Thought from era preceding First World War
till the end of Second World War.
(Lt Col Butt)

RESTRICTED
 3
RESTRICTED

PART –1
NAPOLEONIC ERA INCLUDING THINKERS PRECEDING HIM
Characteristics of Pre Napoleonic Wars
7. Wars before the Napoleon were fought, with limited means for limited objectives, by
mostly small missionary armies. These armies were very costly to maintain resultantly the
battles were not eagerly sought. War of position prevailed over war of movement. The
pursuit was not conducted due to lack of mobility and fear of desertion. Armies were
dependent on magazines for logistic support. Concept of operational cycle did not exist.
Absence of an ideology behind war resulted in lack of motivation or cause of war. The
concept of nation state was yet not fully matured and the political matrix was incomplete.
War became restricted in scope and scale, thus being indecisive most of the time. All this
was changed due to French Revolution. French introduced mass armies, divisional system,
added mobility to artillery and improved its fire accuracy. Armies instead of a single mass
became articulated whole with manoeuvrable divisions. The element of morale due to
nationalist motivation acted as force multiplier.
8. The transition is evident in the works of writers like Marshal Saxe, Frederick The
Great, Guibert, Vauban, Bullow and Bourcet, each represents a significant stage in the
history of military thinking. Their precepts and theories give us an insight into the evolution
of modern military art. An endeavour will be made to glean through their thoughts.
Thinkers Preceding Napoleon
9. Sebastien le Prestre de Vauban (1633 – 1703). His most significant
contributions to the art of war were made within his own specialities: siege craft and the
science of fortification.
a. Siegecraft. In late seventeenth and throughout eighteenth century
warfare often appeared to be an interminable succession of sieges. Reduction
of fortress was focal operation of a campaign. Vauban’s innovations in
siegecraft were designed to regularize the taking over of fortresses and
above all to cut down the losses of the besieging force. Vauban during fifty
years of his service in the field conducted nearly fifty sieges and drew plans
for over hundred fortresses.
b. System of Parallels. Vauban’s system of attacking a fortress was highly
formalised and leisurely procedure. The assailants gathered their men and
stores at a point beyond the range of the defending fire and adequately

RESTRICTED
 4
RESTRICTED

concealed by natural or artificial cover. At this point the sappers would begin
digging a trench that moved slowly toward the fortress. After this had
progressed some distance, a deep trench paralleling the point of future attack
was flung out at right angles to the trench of approach. This so – called “first
parallel” was filled with men and equipment to constitute a place d’armies.
From it, the trench of approach was moved forward again, zigzagging as it
approached the fortress. After it had progressed the desired distance, the
second parallel was constructed, and the trench was moved forward once
more, until a third and usually final parallel was constructed only a short
distance from the foot of the glacis. This system afforded greater protection to
the advancing troops, reduced their exposure to enemy fire.
c. Strategic Role of Fortifications. Vauban is believed to be the first person in
history to have an overall notion of strategic role of fortifications in defensive
as well as offensive operations. In one of his memoirs he stated that,
d. Improvement in Artillery. He made numerous experiments on a new stone-
throwing mortar. Vauban also invented ricochet fire, which was first used at
the siege of Philipsbourg.
e. Technical Education. He stressed upon the importance of technical
education and raising of regular Engineers as an arm in Army.
10. Maurice de Saxe (1696-1750). Marshal Saxe appeared on the scene at a time
when operations and act of battles were distinct and independent phases. Therefore he
considered that the battle at the outset of war delivered with purpose almost decided the
issue. He deserves to be considered first in the chain of thought that culminated in
Napoleon. Marshal Saxe’s Reverence on the Art of War was invaluable work. His concepts
are: -
a. Battle Under Conducive Conditions. He preferred avoiding battle till the
time conditions were conducive for victory against the enemy. This is
indicative from his quote ‘I am not for battles, especially at the beginning of a
war; and I am convinced that a skilful general can make war all his life without
being obliged to fight any”.
b. Balance. Saxe advocated upsetting of the opponent’s mental and physical
balance. His quote amply highlights the emphasis he laid on the notion of

RESTRICTED
 5
RESTRICTED

balance, “In War, as in wrestling, the attempt to throw an opponent without

loosening his foothold and balance tends to self exhaustion and stalemate”.
c. Stratagems. He advocated employment of stratagems in war to force the
enemy to attack at a disadvantageous position.
d. Size of Army. He saw a limit, determined by mobility, to economic
strength of an Army and that effective strength of an Army ceases to increase
when its number causes a decline in its mobility. Saxe considered the ideal
size of an Army just under 50,000 men.
e. Organizational System. He introduced the organizational system of
division, moving in column and moving independently, covering flanks and
lines of communications with light infantry acting as skirmishers.
f. Fortifications. Saxe denounced the fortification of cities by saying, ‘I am
always astonished that no one objects to the abuse of fortifying cities’. After
exhaustive discussion on the vulnerabilities of fortified cities, he advocated
establishment of strong points in localities aided by nature, and situated to
cover the country, than to fortify cities at immense expense.
g. Mobility. He understood rapidity of movement, security of movement,
ease of manoeuvre and efficient supply systems as primary condition for
mobility. In his dictum, that ‘the whole secret of manoeuvre and combat lies in
the legs, he forestalled Napoleon’s more familiar saying that his victories were
won by the legs of the soldiers.
11. Bourcet de Pierre (1700 – 1780). Pierre de Bourcet was considered as father
of General Staff System and the greatest of Chiefs of Staff. As Spencer Wilkson remarks,
‘on every occasion when an important decision has to be made, Bourcet would write a
memorandum in which he analysed the situation and set forth in detail, with full explanation
and reasons, the course which seemed to him the best. In many cases his suggestions
were adopted and were usually justified by success, and when they were rejected, the
results were seldom fortunate’. His contributions to military thought were:-
a. A Plan of Several Branches. He propounded that a plan ought to have
several branches so that if one fails the other can be implemented.This
concept gave flexibility to commander during execution.
b. Divisional System. He organised permanent divisions of Infantry and
Cavalry. His plans of operation showed how wide distribution would be

RESTRICTED
 6
RESTRICTED

reconciled with security. He chose lines of advance, which gave lateral lines of
concentration to his division.
c. Staff System. He suggested formal structure of staff and as director at
School for Staff Officers trained the minds of the men of the future.
12. Frederick The Great (1740– 1779). Frederick the Great represents transition
from the concept of limited to total war. He stands out as great military figure of the
eighteenth century in Europe due to his victories in classic battles like Leuthen and Silesian
wars. His main contributions to the military and operational thought are: -
a. Principle of Surprise. Invading Silesia without warning in 1940, Frederick
shocked Europe with a taste of what later was to be called the “Blitzkrieg”.
Following his success in annexing territory that almost doubled the size of his
kingdom, he became a strong advocate of the use of surprise and fighting
“short and lively” battles of manoeuvre, instead of lengthy wars of slow
attrition, which he noted quickly, drain the resources and manpower of smaller
nations.
b. Offensive action. Although in practice, Frederick’s strategic thinking
remained focused on the wars of position, he favoured offensive action on the
battlefield as a means of achieving more freedom of action . He said, “A
commander deceives himself who thinks that he is conducting well a
defensive war when he takes no initiative and remains inactive. Such a
defence would end with the whole army being driven out from country that the
general meant to protect”.
c. Centralised Command. Frederick was one of the first proponents of what
we recognise today as the principle of unity of command. He insisted on exact
discipline and personally supervised the drilling of his troops so that both
officers and soldiers understood that every act on the battlefield was “the work
of a single man.” Many observers noted with admiration the skill and complete
responsiveness to command demonstrated by Frederick’s battalions and
squadrons whether marching on the drill fields or conducting intricate
manoeuvres during battle.

d. Concept of Manoeuvre. To avoid butchery as a result of frontal clash,

Frederick prized the flank attack for which he designed his famous "Oblique
Order" which allowed his columns to shift rapidly from a frontal assault and
RESTRICTED
 7
RESTRICTED

enabled it to role up the enemy’s flank with devastating effect. The superior
mobility and co-ordination of his army was unmatched on the battlefields of
18th Century Europe. Like his infantry columns, Frederick’s light artillery could
reposition quickly allowing it to reinforce a successful attack or for counter
penetration. This method was so successful that it was later adopted by
Napoleon.

e. Employment of Cavalry. Frederick set a great value on cavalry and used it

for shock action in solid tactical units. However, he failed to recognise its utility
for scouting and reconnaissance.

f. Employment of Artillery. Frederick considered artillery an auxiliary force and

not a full combat arm but he directed his artillery officers to educate
themselves in “the discriminate use of ball and canister on enemy infantry so
as to smash a hole in the enemy line to help their own infantry break through.”
Frederick is also credited by some historians as the first to develop and
employ light calibre artillery that could be drawn by two horses rather than the
heavy artillery common to Europe that required a team of six or eight draft
horses.

13. Guibert – (1743-1790). Liddell Hart called him the Prophet of Mobility. His foremost
contribution to the operational art is his assertion that an army must be employed en-mass
at the point of decision. Guibert stands in the direct line of Napoleon’s military heredity. His
influence on the evolution of Napoleonic system of war is unmistakable. While Bourcet
influenced the minds of generals, Guibert influenced the minds of military world as a whole.
His main contributions were:-
a. National Army. Guibert looked upon the idea of national armies and
blitzkrieg strategy with favour, which became a reality a generation later in
France.
b. Speed of Movement. Under Guibert’s influence the rate of advance of
Infantry was increased from seventy steps per minute to hundred and twenty
steps per minute. This gave Armies of France a vital advantage over
opponents who still adhered to customary seventy paces per minute. On this
simple, yet pivotal fact was based the conquering mobility of the new tactics.

RESTRICTED
 8
RESTRICTED

c. Divisional System. Guibert advocated the divisional system as the basis for
the new warfare of mobility. According to his conception, each division
constitutes a column. These columns, in separating on the march, move more
rapidly, cover a wider theatre, and force the enemy to turn in a desired
direction.
d. Lightening War. Within the realm of lightening war: -
(1) He visualized the lightening war combining the inherent advantages of
dispersion and concentration with those of mobility.
(2) He proposed a sudden sweep to the enemy’s rear, against his line of
communications to off balance him.
(3) He argued that advancing in flexible groups of columns capable of
varying combinations, an Army would have an inherent and vital
advantage over an enemy of superior strength .
(4) Guiberts spirit of fluidity was later manifested in Napoleons campaigns.
e. Logistic Sustenance of Armies. Guibert advocated logistic sustenance of
Armies through requisitions on the occupied countries, reduction of baggage
and release from fortified points for more manoeuvrability.
f. Art of Fortification. Guibert proclaimed that building chains of forts
made war costly, dispersing the armies in garrisons made armies larger than
necessary and military operations of sieges were needlessly long. He also
advocated that fortified points had no real defensive value against a highly
mobile army.
14. Freiherr Heinrich Dietrich von Bullow(1757-1808). Bullow like Guibert was an
Army officer with no experience of command of an Army. He was notable as critics and
reformer. A contemporary of French Revolution whose contribution to art of war are:-
a. Politics and War. Bullow like Frederick insisted on the need of a single
unifying intelligence at the head of a state. He held that under modern
conditions of strategy there could be no separation between politics and war.
Great soldiers must understand foreign affairs as successful diplomats must
understand military action.
b. Base of Operation. Bullow claims to have discovered the true key to
the concept of base of operations. He also held to old notions of the geometry
of war. The base of operation in his reckoning must be a fortified line of

RESTRICTED
 9
RESTRICTED

prepared magazines; the two “lines of operations” projected from the ends of
this base must converge upon the point under attack at an angle of at least
ninety degrees.
c. Mobility with Audacity. He urged that mobility with audacity is made
possible by reduction of baggage train and emancipation from magazines.
d. Conscription. He recommended the French system of universal
conscription with its nationalistic effect on morale.
Napoleonic Era
15. The Napoleonic Era from 1789 to 1815 witnessed a great change in the methods of
war. When Napoleon emerged on the European scene, the groundwork for a new age in
warfare in the shape of following had already been laid: -

a. French Revolution gave birth to the concept of “Nation in Arms” and all
Frenchmen became liable for military service.
b. Patriotic citizen soldiers succeeded the mercenary professionals.
c. Skirmish tactics or the loose formation replaced the straight line.
d. Divisional organisation system came into practice.
e. Lightweight artillery of great range and firing power had become available.
16. He kept his methods simple, direct, overpowering and even brutal. Aimed nothing
short of destruction of enemy forces. Showed his military genius by bringing mass to bear
against flanks of the enemy. Selected best grounds advantageous to his forces for
deployment for the battles. He gave supreme expression to the idea of victory by battle. His
battles and campaigns have been widely discussed and analysed for classical illustrations
of principles of war i.e. surprise, mobility, concentration of force and economy of force
(Italian, Ulm, Jena, and Austerlitz campaigns are the point in focus).

17. Napoleonic Warfare reveals that his policy and national strategy focused on a
decisive victory against his enemies in the context of total war. He always identified the
Centre of Gravity of his enemy and oriented his effort on it. This was applicable at the levels
of National and Operational Strategy and Tactics. He conceived the campaign in totality;
identified its hard points or battles and linked strategy. He laid down five principles for
opening a campaign: -

a. First. Stressed on the use of a single line of operation, which meant that the
ultimate objective must be clear from the start and forces directed at without
wasting any effort on secondary operations.
RESTRICTED
 10
RESTRICTED

b. Second. Concentrated on the main enemy army or the army that posed a
greater degree of danger.
c. Third. Developed his manoeuvre on to the flank or rear of his enemy thus
creating psychological as well as physical dislocation.
d. Fourth. Strived to isolate various elements of the enemy’s forces to
tackle them piecemeal.
e. Fifth. While reaching for the enemy’s rear or flank he never exposed his own
lines of communication nor compromised his freedom of action. In all of his
campaign plans, he had a decisive battle in mind and every move made by his
units was geared to a possible battle situation.
18. Types of Battles. Napoleon bluntly refuted the commonly held view of the 18 th
century that movement and battle were clearly distinguishable acts of war. One pertaining
to strategy, the other to the domain of tactics. Napoleon proclaimed, “ It is often the system
of campaign that one conceives the system of battles”.
19. Napoleon’s Contributions to Modern Warfare

a. Universal Conscription. French Revolution coincided with a revolution in

war. It expanded the scope of innovation; the most important of these
innovations was the gradual adoption of universal conscription. It produced a
great increase in the number of soldiers, which lent new weight to the French
foreign policy and its policy on war. It enabled French commanders to fight
more aggressively and costly campaigns. In 1796, in Italy the new system, for
the first time, scored a decisive success. By then universal conscription had
made the French Army by far the largest in Europe.

b. Re-organization of Army

(1) Force Structure. Napoleon restructured unitary army into permanent

divisions and corps, combined infantry, cavalry, artillery and support
services. It gave the commander greater flexibility, balance and
multiplied his major operational choices.

(2) Modernisation of Artillery. Napoleon, himself a gunner officer,

organised the French artillery on modern footing. It gave revolutionary
France the most efficient and mobile artillery in the world. For the first

RESTRICTED
 11
RESTRICTED

time infantry could be closely supported by field guns in all phases of

combat, which significantly increased the striking power of the French
armies.

(3) Expansion of Staff. Napoleon expanded the staff and proliferation of

the subordinate staff made possible the control of constantly larger and
widely dispersed forces.

(4) Access to Commissioning. Commission, previously was the privilege

of aristocracy. Napoleon extended access to warfare and opened
window for new talent.

c. War as Central Element of Foreign Policy. Napoleon did not regard war as
an emergency measure, instead he made it as the central element of his
foreign policy.

d. Unity of Command. Napoleon was a strong exponent of unity of command.

He strongly felt that collective government has less simple ideas and takes
longer to make up its mind. He advocated, “Do not hold a council of war, but
take the advice of each one individually”. In war, the commander alone
understands the importance of certain things and can alone, through his will
and greater insight, conquer and overcome all difficulties. The unity of political
and military authority eliminates the friction at the top that otherwise is
inevitable. Above all it facilitates quick decisions and their rapid
implementation.

e. Diplomacy. Napoleon integrated diplomacy and violence in an effective

manner. Before undertaking war, he politically isolated a prospective
opponent. In 1805, Napoleon engaged himself in diplomatic negotiations with
Russia. He requested for an interview with Tsar Alexander, the Russian
monarch sent one of his emissaries to the French Camp to whom Napoleon
showed utmost courtesy, displayed hesitation, uncertainty and willingness to
negotiate. When the highly impressed emissary returned to Olmutz, Napoleon
flattered him by accompanying him as far as the French outposts. Little did the
Allies know about the catastrophe, that Napoleon had in the offing for them.

RESTRICTED
 12
RESTRICTED

This diplomatic engagement coupled with a rapid and crafty deployment for
the battle enabled him to secure a complete victory against Allies at Austerliz.
Period prior to the battle of Ulm is yet another example of effective use of
diplomacy by Napoleon.

f. Strategy of Central Position . When Napoleon failed to prevent the

appearance of the forces of two or more allies in the same theatre of
operations, their point of junction afforded valuable opportunities to his
recognition of political and military interaction. In 1796, in Italy he opened the
campaign that was to make his reputation, with a deep strategic penetration,
interposing his forces between Sardinian and Austrian Armies, and preventing
their junction; this was a strategy of central position, first knocking the
Sardinians out of war, and then turning on to the Austrians. He adopted the
same strategy in the Hundred Days War, operating on interior lines between
Blucher and Wellington to eliminate the Prussians, before attacking the Anglo-
Dutch Army, as soon as he believed it had been isolated.

g. Decisive Battles. Napoleon’s strategic plans and his preparations almost

always aimed at an overwhelming tactical decision i.e., a decisive battle or
battles that would eliminate the opposing field army. He pushed a strong army
so far forward that it could not be ignored but had to be fought.

THE POST NAPOLEONIC ERA UPTO WORLD WAR – 1

Antoine Henri Jomini (1779-1869)

20. Born in 1779, was a Swiss who started his career in banking and commerce,
however, inspired by the French Revolution in 1789 and the Swiss Revolution in 1798, he
gave up banking and devoted last seventy years of his life to war and its study. For about
three years he served as secretary to the minister of war and in 1802 came to Paris, to seek
wider scope for his talent and ambitions. He served as an officer on staff with Napoleon and
rose to the rank of general de brigade. In 1813, when he left French Army and joined the
Russians, he had achieved an international reputation as the historian and theorist of
modern warfare. Until his death in 1869 as a Russian general he continued to write and
publish, defending and elaborating his military theories and enhancing reputation.

RESTRICTED
 13
RESTRICTED

Throughout his service, he remained on staff and never had the chance to command any
formation.

21. Interpretation of Napoleonic Concepts

a. Decisive Points. In Napoleon’s principle of manoeuvring, placing mass of an

army so as to threaten the decisive points in a theatre of war and then to hurl
all available forces against a fraction of the enemy force defending those
points, Jomini defined decisive point as a point whose attack or capture would
imperil or seriously weaken the enemy. It could be a road junction, a river
crossing, a mountain pass, a supply base or an open flank of the opposing
army. He added that the great merit of Napoleon as a strategist lay in not
simply manoeuvring for some limited advantage, but in identifying those points
that, if lost would dislocate and ruin the enemy. In a larger theatre, or in a war
with different aims, the principle might be applied differently, but the basic
principle never changed. Almost without exception, the enemy flanks and
supply lines would define the decisive points for attack, because an army
could not survive without supplies and to threaten its base, would compel it to
fight, no matter how unfavourable the circumstances.

a. Lines of Operations. Napoleon introduced the concept of “Operations on

Interior Lines” and demonstrated it while eliminating the Prussians. Taking
lead from this concept, Jomini defined various forms of Lines of Operations as
under:-

(1) Natural or Territorial Lines of Operations . These were the rivers,

mountains, seacoasts, oceans and deserts etc. It also included fairly
permanent man made environment constricting warfare like
fortifications, political boundaries, naval bases and road networks etc.

(2) Manoeuvre Lines of Operations

(a) Interior Lines. Are these adopted by one or two armies to

oppose several hostile bodies. Their direction allows the general
to concentrate the masses and manoeuvre with his whole force
in a shorter time than the enemy.
RESTRICTED
 14
RESTRICTED

(b) Exterior Lines. They are formed by an army, which operates at

the same time on both flanks of the enemy, or against several of
his masses.

(c) Concentric Lines. They depart from widely separated points

and meet at the same point, either in advance of or behind the
base.

(d) Divergent Lines. Are those by which an army would leave a

given point to move upon several distinct points. These lines of
course require subdivision of the army.

(e) Single Line. Are those of an army acting from a frontier when it
is not subdivided into large independent bodies.

(f) Double Lines. Are those of two armies, independent or not,

proceeding from the same frontier or of those of two nearly equal
armies commanded by the same general but widely separated in
distance and for long interval of time.

(g) Secondary Lines. Those of two armies acting so as to afford

mutual support to each other.

(h) Accidental Lines. Are brought about by events that change the
original plan and give a new direction to operation.

b. Offensive Action. Although Napoleon sometimes stayed on the defensive,

until his opponent had committed and over extended himself, he preferred the
attack. He disliked purely defensive battles because he knew the value of
initiative. Jomini further explained this principle and added that deciding how
to attack, frontally or on the flanks would depend on the specific situation, but
attack itself was essential, the initiative must not be left to the enemy. Once
committed to action the commander must not hesitate. He and his officers
must, by their boldness and courage, inspire their troops to the greatest
possible effort. If beaten, the enemy must be pursued relentlessly. If victory for

RESTRICTED
 15
RESTRICTED

some reason eludes the commander, he must try again using sound principles
– massing, attacking and persisting.

c. Logistics. Napoleon ensured adequate supplies for support of his large

army, by compelling the soldiers to requisition, on the principle that “A war
feeds another war”, meaning thereby, to draw supplies of all kinds from the
country you occupy. Jomini too, regarded logistics a serious problem and his
writings on this subject indicate that he understood the important place of
supply in the scheme of mobile and expansive warfare. His experience in the
Peninsular Campaign and the Russian invasion convinced him of the difficulty
of waging successful war against a nation resorting to what we currently call
the “Scorched Earth” policy. Modern field commanders are still struggling with
the problem that bothered Jomini that of keeping supplies abreast of rapidly
moving troops.

Clausewitz (1780 -1831)

22. His contributions to military thought are many and diverse. He is the only military
thinker who covered all the spectrums of war. Clausewitz interrelated national and state
policies with the strategic aspects of warfare through the total psychological and physical
involvement of people to develop the military organisations and doctrine. Frederick and
Napoleon’s campaigns became his reference and guideline during his exposition. He did
not restrict his ideas by remaining non specific, in fact this made his writings valuable for all
times to come. He covered social, physiological and military aspect extensively. His main
thoughts were: -

a. What Is a War? According to Clausewitz war is an act of violence, intended to

compel our opponents to fulfil our will, violence must be pushed to its utmost
bounds and the disarming or overthrow of the enemy must always be the aim
of warfare. It was his concept of total war, which was applied in World War I
and World War II with the aim of completely overthrowing the enemy.
Clausewitz emphasized that organised mass violence is the only feature that
distinguishes war from all other human activities. War is an act of force and
there is no logical limit to the application of that force. It is conflict of great

RESTRICTED
 16
RESTRICTED

interests, which is settled by bloodshed, and Clausewitz uses the term

Absolute War to denote Napoleonic warfare.

b. War As an Instrument of Policy. Clausewitz’s outstanding contribution to

Napoleonic warfare is considered to be his insistence on the relationship
between war and policy. He insists that it is of paramount importance to keep
in mind the main aim of war i.e., war is nothing but a continuation of political
intercourse. The defeat of the enemy’s armed power and of his will, is not an
end in itself but a means to achieve political goals. He continues “If war
belongs to policy it will naturally take its character from policy. If policy is grand
and powerful” so will be the war, and this may be carried to a point at which
war attains its absolute form.

c. Dual War. Clausewitz was of the opinion that war can be of two kinds:-

(1) Either the object is to overthrow the enemy, render him politically
helpless, thus forcing him to sign peace on whatever conditions we
deem appropriate.

(2) Merely to occupy some of his frontier districts, so that we can annex
them or use them for bargaining at the peace negotiations.

d. Absolute and Real War. Clausewitz was great exponent of absolute war. He
advocated that real war is a composite of three elements. Its dominant
tendencies always make war a remarkable trinity, “composed of violence and
passion, uncertainty, chance and probability: and political purpose and
effects”. First element, violence and passion concern mainly the people. The
second, uncertainty and chance provide scope primarily to the courage,
determination and talent of the commander and his forces. The third, politics is
the business of the government alone. According to Clausewitz, Bonaparte’s
system of war was absolute completeness.

e. Defence as Stronger Form of Warfare. Clausewitz stresses that defence is

stronger form of warfare. The object of defence is to preserve and the offence
is to acquire. Since to preserve is easier than to acquire, the defensive form is
easier than offence. Defence has a negative object that of preserving and
RESTRICTED
 17
RESTRICTED

offence a positive object, that of conquering. We must only make use of

defence so long as our weakness compels us to do so and we must give up
as soon as we feel strong enough to aim at the positive objects. Clausewitz’s
defence is therefore a delayed offensive, or what is some times called
“Defensive-Offensive” in which the first phase is attrition and second counter
attack.

f. Concept of Friction. Clausewitz developed concept ranging in magnitude

from general significance to specific operational characteristics. Of these the
friction is one of the most comprehensive concepts. Friction refers to
uncertainties, errors, accidents, technical difficulties, the unforeseen, and to
their effects on decisions, morale and actions. Friction is the only concept that
more or less corresponds to the factors that distinguish real war from war on
paper.

g. Importance of Psychology. According to Clausewitz “war is a battle of

opposing wills – hence the breaching of the enemy’s will, should be the object
of war”. The psychological characteristics of the great leaders are the prism
through which Clausewitz interprets the feelings and abilities of average man.

h. The People’s War. During Napoleonic campaigns, the French Armies lived
on their enemy’s country, the civil population roused against them, and an
inner front was added to the outer front, both of which the invader had to
subdue. Clausewitz was one of the firsts to note the importance of such type
of warfare. He argued that the total influence of inhabitants of a country in war
is any thing but imperceptible. Everything goes on easier in our own country,
provided it is not opposed by the general feeling of the population, and the
spontaneous co-operation of the people, is in all cases most important.
Conversely, in an enemy country this applies to the invader. People’s war
should be supported by small regular detachments, in order to encourage the
inhabitants. They should not be too large, otherwise too many of enemy’s
troops will be drawn towards them, and the inhabitants will leave it to the
regular forces to fight it out.

RESTRICTED
 18
RESTRICTED

j. Concept of Culminating Point. Unless it is strategically decisive, every

offensive operation will eventually reach a point when the strength of attacker
no longer significantly exceeds that of the defender. Beyond which continuous
offensive operation risks over extension, counter attack and defeat.

k. Centre of Gravity. Identification of centre of gravity is Clausewitz’s an

important theory which he related with the concept of grand strategy, “that
point in enemy’s organism; military, political or social etc at which he must be
defeated”. A supreme judgement needs to be exercised as it can be in the
strength of armed forces, the capital, a leader, unity of interest, nationalism,
and economy, in religion or public opinion.

23. Disregard of Napoleonic Warfare

a. Policy and Grand Strategy. Clausewitz disregarded Napoleon’s concept of

waging war as a matter of policy. He was the exponent of the concept of
subordination of war to the policy. He advocated that the character of the war
must take its scores from the policy. He said, “If the policy is grand so shall be
the war”.

b. Defence Versus Offensive. Napoleon was the greatest exponent of the

offensive warfare who hardly ever started upon a war without thinking of
conquering his enemy at once in the first battle. Nevertheless Clausewitz held
that the defensive was the stronger form of warfare.

c. Centre of Gravity. It is astonishing that Clausewitz while discussing centre of

gravity does not mention Napoleon’s struggle against six ‘English coalitions’,
and his ultimate failure to win his long series of war because of his inability to
hit the common centre of gravity of the whole war.

d. Concentration of Forces. Clausewitz was in favour of rigid concentration

where as Napoleon executed the flexible concentration. In Clausewitz’s view
no portion of the force is to be separated from main body. Where as Napoleon
frequently sought to trap his enemy by dividing his army. To the contrary,
Clausewitz who took part in Jena campaign, its most notable example, was
completely ignorant of this flexible method of concentration.
RESTRICTED
 19
RESTRICTED

American Civil War (1861-65)

24. General.

a. Historians often call the American Civil War the first truly modern war. To fully
understand its significance, one must look at it in the context of a century of
rapid and drastic change, one in which new advances in industry, science and
tech would be readily applied to the conduct of war. New technology made it
possible to mass produce weapons with enhanced accuracy, power and
range. Many of the new weapons and correspondence tactics went against
the fundamental conceptions of what constituted proper conduct of war,
making change difficult and unsettling. As firepower became more effective,
warfare became more destructive. The Civil War saw the death of many
traditional modes of warfare, the adoption of new weapons, and the birth of
new inventions. It also proved how non-military inventions such as steam, rail
and the telegraph could revolutionize the way war was fought

b. This war marked a transition to a new era in strategy. It gathered up new

phenomena that had begun to influence warfare in the middle of the 19 th
century and whose consequences were to be felt in the half century that
followed. The war was fought over a vast area (620,000 square miles); three
times the size of France. Strategy, operational art and tactics were influenced
by the topography to a greater extent than any other land conflict of modern
times except possibly the Russian Civil War.

25. Effects of Technological Advancemets on Warefare

a. Advances in Small Arms. The greatest invention of the war was the “Rifled
Musket” which replaced the “Smooth Bore Musket”. It was much more
accurate, had increased combat range and was equipped with a sight. Efforts
were made to invent “Repeaters” and “Breechloaders”, however, there were
problems in the design of the weapon and the cartridge case and
manufacturing plants were not in a position to undertake mass production. In
1862 an early MG operated by hand crank called the “Gatling Gun” was
developed. These developments revolutionized warfare. Some of the
significant effects were :-
(1) Heavy reliance on fire power (the bayonet became obsolete).
RESTRICTED
 20
RESTRICTED

(2) Dramatic rise in lethality of small arms as compared to artillery and the
sword.
(3) Increased fire power doomed frontal assault and ushered in entrenched
battle field.
(4) Individual good shooting became more effective than volley firing.
(5) More reliance on individual initiative and collective loose order.
(6) Inc the power of the defender over the attacker by at least 3 : 1.
b. Changes in Infantry Tactic. The generalness of the civil war was for the
most part, products of the “Jominian School” and as such they tended to cling
to traditional Napoleonic methods and assumptions through most of the war.
Almost non of them had foreseen the tatical implication of mass-produced
rifled fire arms, and most persisted far too long in committing regiments and
brigades en masse in frontal assault. On every occasion, a frontal assault
deliered against an unshaken enemy led to costly failure. Nevertheless,
neither side learnt this lesson.
c. Defence – Stronger Form of Warfare. Throughout the war, the spade
increasingly became the complement of the rifle, until, in 1864, every battle
fought between Grant and Lee in the Wilderness of Virginia was an
entrenched one, and when Grant neared Petersburg and Richmond, both
sides became so extensively entrenched that siege warfare set in and lasted
for nearly ten months.
d. Effects on Arty. In Napoleon’s time the flintlock musket had an effective
range of at most 100 yards, and as it was out ranged by canon firing grape or
canister, the gun was the superior weapon. In 1861 the musket was replaced
by Minie Rifle, which had an effective range of at least 500 yards and as it
outranged grape and canister fire tactics underwent a profound change. The
gun had to fall back behind the inf and become a sp instead of an assault
weapon.
e. Death of the Cavalry Charge. Rifled weapons made the old kind of cavalry
warfare impossible. Traditional battle field charge disappeared. The cavalry
acted as mounted infantry using their horses to carry them rapidly to the scene
of action, dismounting and taking cover to fire. It adopted new roles in attack

RESTRICTED
 21
RESTRICTED

and defence of communication and reconnaissance. The cavalry started

depending on pistols and carbines rather than swords.
f. Concept of Absolute or Total War. Advances in tech meant turning war into
a question of economic and industrial mobilization. Increased scale of war led
to total mobilization which translated itself into Absolute or total war. War was
no longer limited to armies alone; it geared entire societies and economies to
the war effort. Rail roads and steamships allowed the transportation and
supply of troops over greater distances. This meant that virtual civilians could
be shipped to the front lines making armies in the millions possible.

Franco-Prussian War (1870 – 71)

26. Recognizing France as the only threat to the unification of Germany Bismarck
deliberately goaded Napoleon III into declaring war. The Prussian armies swept into action
and using the railways was able to mobilize their army in a matter of three weeks. The
Prussians carried out a vast concentric turning movement based on exterior lines, which
resulted in the victories of Gravelotte and Spichern and the encirclement and ultimate
surrender of Napoleon III and his last army at Sedan.

27. In blind pursuit of Clausewitzian theories the Prussian masses initially suffered heavy
casualties in the face of French rifle fire. The Prussian soon realized the need to abandon
the massed attack and instead substituted fighting in skirmishing order, using the
combination of fire and movement.

28. In contrast to Jominian preference for operations on interior line Moltke showed by
his strategy that the much wanted interior line operations was merely of relative
significance. He summed up his experiences in these words “The unquestionable
advantages of the inner line of operations are valid only as long as you retain enough space
to advance against one enemy by a number of marches, thus gaining time to beat and
pursue him and then to turn against the other who is in the meantime merely watched. If this
space however is narrowed down to the extent that you cannot attack one enemy without
running the risk of meeting the other who attacks you from the flank or rear, then the
strategic advantage of the inner line of operations turns into the tactical disadvantage of
encirclement during the battle depending chiefly upon the actions of the enemy.

RESTRICTED
 22
RESTRICTED

29. For some time after 1870 military thinkers attempted to build theories on the basis of
what had been experienced in the French – Prussian war. The tendency in France and
Germany was to abandon the mathematics of Jomini and think in Clausewitzian terms of
force tempered by Moltke’s more practical approach. In France nationalistic pride caused
the emphasis to be laid on the offensive.

RESTRICTED
 23
RESTRICTED

PART-II
EVOLUTION OF MILITARY THOUGHT SPANNING PERIOD PRECEDING WORLD

WAR-1 TO WORLD WAR-2

30. General. Gentlemen, having gleaned through the evolution of strategic thought
till mid of nineteenth century; we now proceed further into the terminal reformation phase of
military thought. This part deals with the evolutionary progression of strategic thought
spanning period from end of nineteenth century to the WW2, as per the given sequence:-

31. Sequence
a. Military Developments during the era of Armed Peace (1871-1914).
b. 1st World War and application of strategic thought during the War.
c Developments in military thought between the two World Wars.
e. 2nd World War and the application of Military thought during the War.
Military Developments During the Era of Armed Peace (1871-1914).

31. Overview of Geo-Political Situation in Europe. The stated period is marked with
significant geo-political upheavals in the European continent. On one hand the
industrial revolution had led to fierce rivalry amongst European powers, while on the
other some new powers had emerged. Towards the end of nineteenth century, the
European mosaic appeared to be quiet different.

a. Prussia. After having humbled the French and Austrian armies, Prussia
had emerged as the leading military power in main land Europe. Her size had
expanded manifold by annexing Germanic territories from Austria and the rich
region of Alsace and Lorraine from France. The War indemnity levied on
France gave her much needed finances to become an industrial and a military
giant.

b. France. After her humiliation at the hands of Prussia, France went

through an era of political and economic instability. The country was hurriedly
battered into military reforms in order to restore national prestige, As a result,
the military system was re-tailored and military thinkers started accepting
Clausewitz’s theories blindly.

c. Britain. She retained her supremacy as the unchallenged naval and industrial
power. Kept her focus on adding new colonies and a firm hold in all
continents. Her economic and military success was attributed to her naval
RESTRICTED
 24
RESTRICTED

cum maritime forces that grew stronger and stronger. Contrarily, the land
forces remained neglected and no worthwhile changes came to the fore.

d. Russia. Emerged as the largest European Empire with a relatively poor

economy but with a strong Army.

e. Austro-Hungarian Empire. Having being cut to size by Prussia in1866, the

Ausro Hungarian Empire was never able to recover and gradually lost its
relevance to European politics.
f. Ottoman Empire. Plagued by ethnic Arab uprisings and Russian advances
west of Caucasus, was gradually losing its hold on Arab and European
territories.
g. USA. Deliberately pursued policy of isolation by concentrating on its
economy and absorbing the influx of European immigrants. By the turn of the
century USA had all the potentials to challenge British supremacy as the
strongest power of the time.
32. Thus, by the close of the century, the European powers had within a generation,
added some 11,000,000 square miles of foreign territories to their homelands; an area more
than one-fifth of the land surface of the globe.

33. Military Thought Preceding World War – 1. In the years after 1871 France, Italy,
Austria, Hungary, and Russia, followed German style of military service, and General Staff
System. As the proficiency of the general staffs increased across Europe, more number of
men could be mobilized in less time and with this, the importance of modernised war, mass
armies, grand logistics and national resources for military strategy came into limelight. The
new trends in warfare appeared to have been influenced by Clausewitzian approach to
warfare.

34. The military thinking of the time was influenced by a number of theorists and
historians under different schools of thought;-

a. The Prussian – German School of Strategic Thought The transformation

of Prussian Army from relative insignificance to one of total supremacy is
credited to their War Minster, Von Roon, General Scharnhorst, President Von
Bismarck, the CGS Von Moltke and his successor FM Schlieffan. For reasons
of their military contributions, I will focus on two personalities namely Moltke
and Schlieffan.
RESTRICTED
 25
RESTRICTED

(1) Field Marshall Von Moltke (1800-1891) Was appointed as the

Prussian chief of the General staff in 1857. He was a graduate of Berlin
Military Academy which was then headed by Clausewitz. He planned
and fought Austro–Prussian (1866) and Franco-Prussian (1870-1871)
wars that re-laid the political map of Europe.

(a) From Napoleon he learnt the movement is the soul of war,

therefore railways should become the prime-movers of strategy.
Developed extensive railway network to effect rapid mobilization
and superior concentration of forces against French and
Austrians.

(b) From Clausewitz he learnt that statecraft and general ship are
closely related and as a result took keen interest in politics and
foreign affairs.

(c) Moltke, agreed with Clausewitz that battles were the primary
means of breaking the will of the enemy. The offensive according
to Moltke was “the straight way to the goal” whereas the defence
was “the long way around”.

(d) He advocated seeking decision through envelopment and

outflanking manoeuvre. He became famous for his skilful
conduct of operations on the exterior line.

(e) With the invention of breach loading rifle, he was the first one to
infer enormity of its destructive power and concluded about the:-

i. Futility of frontal attacks

ii. Envelopment as the means to victory.
(g) Appreciated that since armies are growing larger and larger,
future command demanded decentralisation.

(h) As a strong proponent of decentralization, he was of the opinion

that no good plan can hold good beyond the initial clash,
therefore commanders must exercise initiative but in accordance
with a common doctrine. Therefore, detailed orders were to be
replaced with general directives.

RESTRICTED
 26
RESTRICTED

(j) He most notable contribution has been the formulation of

hypotheses concerning threat from France and Russia.

(2) Schlieffen. Count Alfred Schlieffen was a battle hardened soldier and
an able general who took over as CGS of Prussian Army on the death
of Von Moltke in 1890. His salient contributions are as under:-

(a) Like Moltke he stressed on achieving decisive victory by battle.

(b) Strategic envelopment became his concept to win a war. By

massing against enemy flank, he intended not only to throw him
off balance but also to deprive him of recovery options.

(c) He modernised the German Army by introducing Machine Gun,

signal equipment, motorised vehicle and quick firing artillery.

(d) He developed his famous Schlieffen Plan that aimed at first

defeating the enemy in the West and then to deal with the threat
from East. This was the essence of the plan with which the
Germans entered the first World War.

(e) He formulated 16 plans against France, 14 against Russia and

19 for a two front war. The French campaign and the decisive
battle of Tannenberg in WW-1, were indeed his brain child.

c. The French School France, the defeated power in 1870-71, was directly
affected by the genius of Moltke and the military inventiveness of Prussia. The
country was hurriedly battered into military reforms in order to restore national
prestige, As a result, the military system was re-tailored and military thinkers
started accepting Clausewitz’s theories blindly, substantiated as under:-

(1) On the face of country’s material weakness, their thinkers like Du Picq,
General Bonnal and Marshall Foch, started professing all out offensive
with emphasis on morale and motivation, while ignoring altogether the
developments in the field of firepower and communications.

(2) Marshal Foch is said to be influenced by Clausewitzian theories

without discrimination. To his shallow reckoning, destruction of the
enemy’s main army became the only means to the end.

RESTRICTED
 27
RESTRICTED

(3) Instead of seeing tactics as one of the tools of strategy, Foch made
strategy merely a conduit pipe to tactics.

(4) Foch correctly understood Clausewitz emphasis on material factors

such as armament but arrived at astonishingly wrong conclusion that
any improvement in firearms is bound to strengthen the offensive.

(5) Indoctrinated with the Clausewitzian theory of mass and offensive spirit,
Foch’s disciples believed that they only had to attack with greater
ardour to be victorious.

d. The Anglo-American Military Experience.

(1) USA The United States was unique among the world’s major powers
in that neither introduced compulsory military service or maintained a
Nation-in-Arms. Until 1890 the United States was preoccupied with
westward expansion across the North American continent

(2) The only important US contribution in this period was about the naval
warfare by Admiral Mahan (1840-1914). In his work, he empasised
upon the critical interrelationship between sea power, commerce and
colonial expansion in a country’s foreign policy.

(3) Britain. Britain, like America, rejected any form of compulsory

peacetime military service. Even in World War I, Britain resisted general
conscription until 1916. Britain’s contribution to the development of
strategy during this period was also at Sea rather than on Land.

1st World War and Application of Strategic Thought During the War

35. An Overview of WW-1 (1914-1918). World War-I which was essentially a politico-
economic war was waged between Central Powers comprising Germany, Austro
Hungarians, Ottomans and Bulgaria and the Allied Powers included Britain, France,
Belgium, Japan, Russia, Greece and Serbia with USA as associate power. The stalemate
caused by spade, bullet and barbed wire, with an increased role of the quick firing Artillery,
rusted the minds of the belligerents who despite the new inventions, could not draw the
requisite benefits.

36. By the end of 1914, the war had become a stalemate on both the eastern and
western fronts and had bogged down into trench warfare from Switzerland to the English
RESTRICTED
 28
RESTRICTED

Channel. Machine Gun and Artillery took over the battlefield. The War became a classic
example of arrested strategy. To break the stalemate the tank and poison gas were tried but
in vain. Britain’s naval blockade to starve Germany took an added significance. By this time
the German nation and its army had reached a point of acute exhaustion because of which
Germany asked for an armistice.

9. The war therefore, ended more due to the collapse on inner front, rather than the
genius of military brilliance of Allies. With out going in to the details of this war, the planning
and conduct of the war was predominantly influenced by Clausewitzian theories and
Napoleonic practices tabulated as under : -

a. The Clausewitzian theory of Absolute war proved anything but right. Repeated
mass attacks on the face of accurate and improved weapons systems made
the war extremely expensive. As Liddel Hart observed “Of what use is a
decisive victory in battle if we bleed to death as a result of it.” At the end the
issue was decided by economic factor rather than by any decisive victory.

b. The war clearly witnessed subordination of strategy to tactics. Wars of

manoeuvre got bogged down into wars of positions due to the domination of
spade, wire obstacles, machine gun and artillery.

c. Manoeuvre got degenerated into war of attrition as superior tactical mobility

nullified strategic manoeuvre or exploitation.

d. The theory of Mass could not stand the test of time against the lethal effect of
machine gun. Similarly, the Clausewitzian belief that superiority in numbers
becomes more decisive was proved wrong by the Germans against the
Russians in the Battle of Tannenberg.

e. The movement of huge masses became an art in itself. Railroads and motor
transport became important the primary means of mobility.

f. Foch’s theories were also no exception. The lethal effect of machine gun, the
extreme congestion of the frontages and the use of barbed wire proved the
fallacy of morale alone to be the battle winning factor.

g. The firepower of modern weapons undermined the effectiveness of the attack.

The tank, however, offered fresh possibilities in redressing the balance
between defence and the offensive.

RESTRICTED
 29
RESTRICTED

h. New means of communication, telephone, radio-telegraphy and the airplane

enabled prompt execution of orders and unified command over scattered
forces.

i. With the advent of aircrafts, aerial reconnaissance enabled a commander to

gain some insight into the enemy’s intentions and movements.

j. Lastly, the Aim of war should be peace. WWI, instead produced, revolutions
and a sick Europe.

Development of Military Thought During the Inter World Wars Period

37. The horrendous sufferings and the cost of First World War, on the face of bankrupt
strategies, attracted the inquisitive minds of renowned thinkers like Liddel Hart, JFC Fuller,
Tukhachevski and Marshal Ogarkov. These, along with the other thinkers sought to
improve the cost benefit equation, through a subtle shift towards indirect and psychological
dimensions of war. Their contributions are covered in the succeeding paragraphs:-

38. Major General JFC Fuller (1878-1966). British army officer, military theoretician, and
a war historian, Fuller became one of the founders of modern armed warfare. As COS of the
British tank corps from December 1916, he planned the surprise attack of 381 tanks at the
Battle of Cambrai in November 1917; that happened to be the first massed tank assault in
the history of warfare. Some details of Fuller’s thoughts are as following:-

a. Mechanised/ Mobile Warfare

(1) Fuller had correctly appreciated the tremendous impact of tanks. To

him tanks when used in mass, provide the answer to restore
maneuver. Remained convinced that armour forces would make
strategic and operation envelopment more decisive and efficient.

(2) Gauging the potentials of tanks, he said, “No longer is movement by

fire the tactical pivot of battle, but movement in order to fire”.

(3) Also that the psychological effect that the tanks produced through bold
employment caused what he termed as “strategic paralysis”.

(4) Advocated line of least resistance. In case where flanks were not
available for exploitation they would have to be created through
penetration by tanks.

RESTRICTED
 30
RESTRICTED

b. Defensive Operations. Fuller’s advocated following;-

(1) Defended area should comprise mutually supporting anti tank
positions where mines be used to replace barbed wire.
(2) Tanks should be used first to canalize the attacker followed by swift
counter attack. Successful defence system should have a combination
of protective power and mobile armour components.
(3) Objective in defense should be to separate enemy’s offensive
component from its base.
c. Strategy In defining strategy he was of the view that:-
(1) Objective of Strategy is to paralyse the enemy command and
control system. In manoeuvre warfare, the aim should be dislocation of
enemy’s command organization and not just the destruction of forces.
(5) Linked technological developments with the character of war while
highlighting increased tempo to reduce time frame of operations.
(6) Through movement, he suggested the psychological dislocation of the
enemy by striking in his rear.
(4) According to him war could be reduced to a science with definite
principles. The aim of tactics was to secure military activity, while
strategy sought to secure movement.
d. His postulates are:-

(1) The internal combustion engine has introduced an entirely new era in
warfare.

(2) Two new weapons i.e tank and aircraft would dominate future wars. In
future, cooperation between tanks and aircraft is likely to dominate,
than that between infantry and tank.

(3) The cost of the mechanized armies would limit their size, leading to
smaller armies.

(4) In manoeuvre warfare the aim should be the dislocation of enemy’s

command and organization.

(5) An effective way of destroying the organization of enemy is by attacking

command Headquarters, thus unhinging the enemy from his joints.

RESTRICTED
 31
RESTRICTED

(6) Disorganization of enemy’s reserve is necessary as “reserve are the

capital for victory”.

(7) Future wars would be fought due to economic reasons.

(8) The aim of war is peace and not victory; therefore, peace should be the
ruling idea of policy and victory only the means towards its
achievement.

39. Basil Liddell Hart (1895-1970). His experience and observance of the new
technologies mainly tanks and aircraft caused him to produce an array of military thoughts.
Gentlemen, some details of his revolutionary working are:-

a. Mechanized Warfare. He advocated over the coordinated use of aircraft

and tank, drawing strength from mobility, surprise, and indirect approach. His
concept of “expanding torrents” using mechanized forces was the basis of
Germans Blitzkrieg. His concept, implied:-

(1) Progressive infusion (induction) and the simultaneity of action for

engagement of enemy at multiple tiers.

(2) Grouping of mechanized infantry for defeating enemy behind the held
obstacle.

(3) Targeting communication centers/Headquarters and causing paralysis

upon enemy through deep manoeuvres.

(4) That the new advents should not dictate the strategy rather the reverse
should be true.

b. Strategy He observed:-

(1) Strategy is the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the
ends of policy.

(2) The grand strategy is combined application of all the instruments of

national policy to achieve the national objectives.

(3) The aim of strategy is to achieve dislocation of enemy, a situation that

equates to psychological paralysis.

c. Indirect Approach

RESTRICTED
 32
RESTRICTED

(1) Liddel Hart maintained that unless one is decisively superior, a direct
approach will result in self exhaustion.

(2) Through indirect approach, Liddel Hart proposed to dislocate enemy, as

follows:-

(a) In Physical Terms

i. Upset the enemy’s disposition through compelling a

sudden change of front.

ii. Separate his forces.

iii. Endanger supplies.

iv. Threaten route of withdrawal.

(b) In psychological terms it meant being put to a disadvantageous

position with mental inability to recover.

(3) Basically through indirect approach Liddel Hart intended to shatter

enemy’s will, with least own losses. He maintained that, “Real target in
war is mind of the enemy commander not the bodies of his troops”.

40. In brief, his postulates are :-

a. Strategy is the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfil the ends
of policy.

b. Tactics is the application of strategy on lower plane, and strategy in-turn is the
application on a lower plane, of grand strategy.

c. Grand strategy is to coordinate and direct all the resources of a nation towards
the attainment of the political purpose of war.

d. Grand strategy looks beyond the war to subsequent peace.

e. Strategy of indirect approach implies striking hard and quick at the opponent’s
weakest point to achieve a rapid and decisive victory; physically, it takes the
line of least resistance; mentally, the line of least expectation.

f. Military Strategy depends for success on:-

(1) Sound calculations of the ends and means.

RESTRICTED
 33
RESTRICTED

(2) Economy of force.

(3) Diminishing the possibility of resistance by exploiting the elements of

movement and surprise.

g. The deeper the armed forces advance, the greater will be psychological
dislocation of the enemy.

41. Marshal Tukhachevskii (1893-1937). Tukhachevski was a military theorist, and a

great modernizer who reformed Red peasant Army into a professional one. In 1923, he
became the Chief of Operations of the Army and in 1926 took over as Chief of Staff and
from then until his execution in 1937. In his postulates, he emphasized integration of
diplomacy with industrial development and military power. He forecasted the effects of
technical innovation and new weapons on the future war, which included: -

a. He laid technical foundations of Soviet armoured,

mechanized and airborne forces.

b. Asserted the need to develop transport and communication

means for modern armed forces.

c. Propounded concept of mobile defence to be conducted by

Red Army until mobilization was completed.

d. Concept of Simultaneity . Tukhachevski applied this

concept of simultaneity, by amalgamating the broad front engagement concept
with the simultaneous engagement and penetration of different depth echelons
of the enemy; using long range artillery, motorized infantry, tanks, airborne
force and fifth columnist.

e. Deep Battle Concept. In 1929, Tukhachevskii enunciated

the concept of deep and rapid battle as: -

(a) Attacking echelons, made up of infantry formations supported by

tanks and artillery, break in the first enemy defensive area over a
frontage of 6 – 8 Kilometres.

(b) This was to be followed by tanks and motorized infantry

formations to develop the penetration up to a depth of 60 – 100
Kilometres for neutralizing enemy’s MSR and Headquarters.

RESTRICTED
 34
RESTRICTED

(c) Light bomber were to attack deep targets while aviation was to
isolate target area from enemy’s strategic reserve.

(d) Airborne forces would interdict Headquarters, communication

and supply organization.

(e) Tukhachevski influenced and highlighted the need for

mechanized airborne forces rather than simple airborne forces to
ensure that they had sufficient tactical mobility to organize themselves
before the enemy mobile reserve can neutralize them.

(f) His concepts were further developed in 1942 as Deep Operation

Theory, which envisaged employment of three to four echelons during
an offensive.

42. Marshal Orgarkov. An attritionist by thinking, he advocated:-

a. Conduct of modern war with a large standing army.

b. Believed on offensive as the best kind of strategic action.

c. He was also an advocate of operation through deep penetration.

Application Of Military Thoughts during World War II

43. In terms of evolution of military thought, the Second World War was more impressive
in the realm of practice than theory. On the battlefield, the most notable feature was the
return of hard hitting mobile warfare, based on tanks and close air support; organised
around “Blitzkrieg Concept”. In the air, the tactical utility of aircraft was proved time and
again. Naval warfare also underwent significant changes with the emergence of sub
marines and aircraft carriers. Joint Operations came to fore as the an indispensable feature
of decisive battles. While there was much that was novel in this war, importance of ground
forces remained the key to success at all levels of operational strategy. Since about eight
different conduct related presentations on World War 2 have to follow this presentation,
therefore, here I shall touch upon aspects concerning doctrinal application.

44. Germany. It would be correct to say that Germans were the most receptive to the
fresh ideas of mechanized warfare. Liddel Hart was correct to say, “History shows that as a
rule, Armies learn from defeat but not from victory that it is the losing side which turns to

RESTRICTED
 35
RESTRICTED

account the lessons of a war, while the victors become dangerously complacent”. Salient
aspects of German strategy are as under;-

a. Benefiting from the thoughts of Fuller and Liddel Hart, Germans evolved
Blitzkrieg. It employed concentrated air power offensively, to pre-pare the way
for advancing armour. Unlike the earlier doctrine, it aimed more at the
disorientation and dislocation of the enemy’s command system. This was to be
achieved by deep penetration into the enemy’s rear areas.

b. Germany reorganized its army on the lines as suggested by the military

thinkers and adopted the new technique during attack against Poland. Waves
of bomber hitting the communication, the rail roads thus snarling the polish
mobility. Through a double envelopment, use of armour, air and mobility
infantry, Warsaw was approached. In about a month, country capitulated.

c. The military thoughts of Fuller and Liddel Hart were put to even better test
during French campaign. The classic air borne operations inside Belgium and
Holland were launched to seize airfields and bridges and the famous Belgian
fortress Eben-Emael. The bombers destroyed business sector of Rotterdam.
This whole, the psychological paralysis through knocking out the nerves,
forced Dutch to surrender within 4 days. Another surprise lay in Ardennes, a
country deemed unfit for large scale tank operation. German panzer groups
having achieved a total surprise, led to sea, behind British and French armies,
thus the strongest of the defence were bypassed to strike a severe blow to
French military might.

d. The action was repeated in North Africa by Rommel on rather more heroic
lines. The psychological effects of the tanks mobility and surprise use,
coupled with the CAS and ability to bypass and attack in the rear produced
amazing victories. Rommel displayed a legendary fig in Generalship,
remained in front to take spot decisions.

e. Blitzkrieg owed a lot to the Germans revolutionary handling of tactical air

support. They welded aircraft into a weapon system of tactical warfare within
the concept. This was amply demonstrated during polish, French and North
African campaigns.

RESTRICTED
 36
RESTRICTED

45. Russians. Tukhachevski was fit on course to convert the Russian Army in line with
the modern concepts of mechanized warfare when during Army’s purges of 1937-38, he
was arrested and subsequently executive. However, development in Soviet military strategy
took continued steadily with improvements in the organizational structure of the armed
forces and military doctrines. Salient features as under:-
a. Soviet military doctrine catered for integrated campaigns with a distinct
preference for Offensive Action. Soviets believed that it is through decisive
offensive action that a total victory could be achieved This was manifested
by the extensive mechanisation of the forces, and by large scale induction of
strong offensive weapons, tanks and aviation.
b. Their Deep Operation Theory called for mechanised and motorized
formations with airborne and aviation troops to cooperate with one another.
Due to evident lack of experienced leadership and the tremendous losses of
units, manpower and equipment during initial battles on Eastern Front, forced
the Soviets to temporarily abandon hopes for conducting their unique style of
blitzkrieg.
c. Regarding Defence, the Soviet Concept was revolved gaining time for
mobilization to be completed and then go over to strategic offensive. The
transitory period was meant for tactical counter attacks and on relying on fixed
defence fortifications. During the war, their defensive technique and ability to
regroup and strike back startled Germany. Battle of Stalingrad, winter
operations of 1941-1942 and the their summer offensive of 1943 against thr
German Army are some apt examples of their resilience and viable
operational concepts.
46. France, Great Britain and USA. These nations having seen the horrors of WWI
and observing victory, became complacent. They were slow to accept new ideas, and
therefore slow to react. The Nations like France and Great Britain producing people of the
caliber of Fuller, Liddel Hart and De Gaulle remained in a negative state of Inertia. Their
victories were more due to an enormous weight of their forces, economy and strength,
coupled with exhaustive state of Germany rather than displaying classic manoeuvre.

47. Conclusions of World War-II

a. At different stages of WW II, the Soviets as well as the Germans

displayed a penchant for a blitzkrieg style of war at the operational level.
RESTRICTED
 37
RESTRICTED

Blitzkrieg concept assimilated by German Army resulted in astounding tactical

and operational success.

b. Concept of combined arms; advantages of the indirect approach

and the logic of the rapid thrust to the operational depth were the significant
implications of the German and Soviet methods of war.

c. Soviet material superiority also contributed to its success.

d. Germans enjoyed harmony between their tactical and operational

levels of war but could not co-relate it at the strategic/policy levels. This was
essentially due to unattainable political aim imposed by Hitler on its military.

e. Soviets initially suffered tactical and operational defeats, however,

later Soviet could overcome German blitzkrieg by executing a Blitzkrieg in a
style of its own.

f. German Army of WW II was involved with the military traditions of

Clausewitz, Moltke and Schlieffen. This heritage of “decisive battle” was
further overstated by the manoeuvre orientation of combined arms of
Guderian.

j. At the beginning of WW II, Americans did not practice and had no doctrine for
operational art but did have a conception of strategy and tactical.

k. The invent and use of the nuclear device was also a submission to the
Clausewitz propagation of total war. The end of war brought another divided
Europe and this time more devastated.

CONCLUSION

43. In this presentation, we have gleaned through the concepts of classical Thinkers
which were perfectly employed by Napoleon during his campaigns. We also traced the
contributions of modern theorists, Clausewitz, Jomini and impact of their thoughts on Franco
Prussia and American Civil War. While earlier thinkers concentrated more on the
operational or military aspect of war, it was Clausewitz who entered the realm of
metaphysical factors and tackled war as a social and political phenomenon. Thereby taking
into account the application of all the elements of national power rather than military alone.

RESTRICTED
 38
RESTRICTED

44. While reviewing the evolution of military and operational thought it can be clearly
seen that military science has gone through changes because of the changes in means.The
military innovations of the nineteenth century, as already pointed out, had largely to do with
industrialization and scientific advances. Rail roads communication infra structure
revolutionized the movement of men and material, the concentration of troops and logistics.
Firepower underwent a total transformation. The electric telegraph altered the relationship
between the front and the rear. Nations became more and more involved in war, as war was
increasingly seen as a national affair. During World War – I, along with mass propaganda, a
series of new weapons made their appearance: the submarine, the tank and the airplane. In
World War – II, the Germans used tactics based on mobility of tanks and aircraft against
their enemies, who were still fighting the war with old tactics.

45. Technological advances are so rapid that theories are outdated as fast as weapons.
Even though the art of warfare is largely governed by the certain principles established
through the experience of the theorists and practitioners war alike. However, it remains
variable, since the conditions under which it operates are changing all the time. Therefore,
the military thought needs to be seen in its correct perspective to determine its validity under
the existing environments.

“AS WATER HAS NO CONSTANT FORM, THERE ARE NO CONSTANT

CONDITIONS FOR WAR”

SUN TZU

RESTRICTED