14

System Stability and Out-of-Step Relaying

W. A. ELMORE

1 INTRODUCTION given by the following equation:

Since relaying systems must function properly during
system swings, it is necessary to understand the effects
of these disturbances on relay performance. Swings are
the oscillations of synchronous machines with respect
to other synchronous machines. They are caused by
changes in load, switching, and faults. A swing does
not necessarily indicate system instability. In some
cases, however, the swing is severe enough to cause
synchronous machines to go out of step. Before
examining the influence of system swings on relay
performance, three factors must be considered: steady-
state stability, transient stability, and relay quantities
encountered during swings.
A system is stable when it is able to develop
restorative forces in excess of the disruptive forces to
which it is subjected. Disruptive forces are produced by
such factors as faults, loss of excitation, or switching of
lines, transformers, or generation. Restorative forces
are produced by current flow, voltage increase, or
impedance reduction produced by fault removal and/
or line switching.
VS VR
P¼ sin f ð14-1Þ
X
where
VS and VR ¼ sending- and receiving-end voltages,
respectively
X ¼ reactance between VS and VR
f ¼ angle by which VS leads VR
See Figure 14-1.
If system resistance is not neglected, different
equations apply for the sending- and receiving-end
power. The variables, however, are essentially the same.
If phase-to-phase voltages are used, Eq. (14-1) yields
three-phase power. For this discussion, VS and VR are
taken as per unit quantities, and Eq. (14-1) gives per
unit power. If VS, VR, and X are held constant in Eq.
(14-1), the power flow is changed by varying the angle f.
As the load increases at the receiving end, synchro-
nous machines are momentarily slowed down, and the
machine-rotor inertia meets the increased load require-
ments. That is, an increase in load results in a small
reduction of system frequency until there is a change in
mechanical input via the governor or manual action.

2 STEADY-STATE STABILITY

The fundamentals of power transmission and stability

are more easily understood if both system resistance,
excluding the load impedances, and machine saliency
are neglected. In this case, the power P transmitted
over circuits connecting two portions of the systems is Figure 14-1 Simple equivalent system.

Copyright 2004 by Marcel Dekker, Inc. All Rights Reserved.

 To restore system frequency, the mechanical input to
the machines must be increased. This input must be
greater than the steady-state load requirements, since
the machines must be accelerated to a new and larger
angle. When the new angle f is reached, the mechan-
ical input will exceed the load requirements by the
amount required to accelerate the machines. The
mechanical input must then be reduced to maintain
frequency and required power transfer. Any load
change therefore results in swings or oscillations as
the system adjusts to the changes. Steady-state stability
is the ability of the system to adjust to gradual load
changes.
The extreme unstable condition occurs when f is Figure 14-2 Power transfer curve.
equal to 908. At this point, increased load conditions
could only be met by increasing VS or VR. An increase
in f would cause a reduction, rather than an increase,
in power transfer.

3 TRANSIENT STABILITY

Transient stability is the ability of the system to

properly adjust (remain in synchronism) to sudden
large changes. Again, if we ignore system resistance
and machine saliency, the power transmitted during
the transient interval P is given by the following
equation:
V0S V0R
P¼ sin f ð14-2Þ
X0 Figure 14-3 Effect on X0 of fault.
In Eq. (14–2), P is three-phase MW if and VS0
are 0
VR
0
expressed in kV (phase to phase) and X in ohms per
phase, where intact without reduction, whereas X2 and X0 are the
thevenin impedances in the negative and zero sequence
V0S ¼ voltage behind transient reactance at the
networks, respectively. XF for the ff fault is simply
sending end
X2. For the fG fault, XF is X2 and X0 in series.
V0R ¼ voltage behind transient reactance at the
Based on the normal relationship found between
receiving end
X1, X2, and X0, the relative order of severity of the
X0 ¼ reactance between VS0 and VR 0
, including
various types of faults produces the relative power-
transient reactances of the machines
transfer curves shown in Figure 14-4. The reduction of
f ¼ angle by which VS0 leads VR0
the ‘‘T,’’ of which XF is one leg, to an equivalent ‘‘pi’’
Figure 14-2 shows a power-transfer curve. Note that produces X0 which is the transfer impedance that, with
the peak value is inversely proportional to the total the voltage VS and VR, defines the peak value of the
reactance X. Figure 14-3 describes how X is influenced power-transfer curve.
by the presence of a fault, as well as the type of fault. Figure 14-5 describes a representative case of two
It is recognized that the quantity to be inserted as parallel lines with generation at each end. The power
XF in the fault representation is dependent on the type transfer curves show that a fault causes an immediate
of fault, whether 3f, ffG, ff, or fG. For the 3f drop in transmitted power from bus S to bus R because
fault, XF is 0. For the ffG fault, XF is X2 and X0 in of the fact that the ‘‘torque angle’’ m cannot change
parallel. The positive sequence network is retained instantaneously, but X0 does. This change in power

Copyright 2004 by Marcel Dekker, Inc. All Rights Reserved.


Figure 14-4 Relative order of severity of fault types.
quantity DE. Power DE is the difference between
mechanical input and electrical output that, therefore,
produces acceleration of the rotating mass. With losses
ignored in this example, quantity DE is also the
difference between electrical power input and mechanic
Figure 14-5 Power transfer curves before, during, and after
line-to-line fault.
Copyright 2004 by Marcel Dekker, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
power output at the receiving end, causing deceleration
there. Both of these effects increase m.
When the fault occurs (Fig. 14-5), the transmitted
power is reduced to point E because of the increased
effective X0 , and the swing begins along E-F. At point
F, breaker A opens, and the transmitted power
increases to G. The swing then continues along G-H.
When the fault is cleared at H by breaker B
opening, the sending-end rotor kinetic energy has
increased by an amount proportional to area I, since
the mechanical input has exceeded the transmitted
electrical power. As the fault is cleared, the transmitted
power increases to J, exceeding the mechanical input
and causing the sending-end machines to decelerate
and the receiving-end machines to accelerate. Since the
velocity of a rotating mass cannot be changed
instantly, the swing continues to K, at which point
the additional sending-end rotor energy, resulting from
the fault, is completely absorbed (area II equals area I).
The velocity of the sending-end mass, with respect
to the receiving-end mass, is 0 at K. At K, the electrical
output of the sending end exceeds the mechanical
input; therefore, the swing reverses, reaching a point
N. At N, the swing reverses again. Voltage regulator
and governor action, as well as system resistance, will
dampen the oscillation, until the final operating point
is reached.
If the initial swing went to point L and the sending-
end generators still had excess rotor energy (area II
smaller than area I), the swing would continue in the
same direction. After L was passed, the mechanical
input of the sending-end generators would again
exceed the electrical output, and the swing would be
accelerated, resulting in instability with the machines
operating out of synchronism with each other. After
this, only system separation and resynchronizing of the
machines could restore normal system operation.
4 RELAY QUANTITIES DURING SWINGS
With the fault cleared and the system operating out of
step, extreme variations in voltage and current will
occur throughout the system. Figure 14-6 provides
insight into this phenomenon. A simple system is
represented with the relay of interest shown at some
intermediate point between the two sources. The relay
voltage VR is established by the angle between VS and
VU (each assumed here to maintain their predisturbance
values) and the distribution of impedances (ZS, ZL, and
ZU) between these two sources. VR will assume some
position between them. As VS, the accelerating source,
 Figure 14-6 Relay quantities for OS condition. (Shown for 908 impedance angles.)

moves in phase position with respect to VU, the apparent
impedance viewed by the relay (VR/IR) will change with
time, producing a trajectory on an R-X (resistance-
reactance) diagram such as that of Figure 14-6c.
With the depressed voltage and large current, this
swing condition (long after the fault has been success-
fully cleared) appears to be a three-phase fault. The
location of this apparent fault is at the electrical center
of the system. If this apparent impedance enters the
operating area of a distance relay, it will operate.
If VR and VU are not supported at full value, their
ratio is influential in determining the locus on the R-X

Copyright 2004 by Marcel Dekker, Inc. All Rights Reserved.

 diagram as the swing progresses. Also, if impedances
are not pure reactance values as is assumed in
Figure 14-6, the effect can be determined using a
similar simple diagram.
Interaction between machines in complex networks
can only be determined by a large-scale digital study.
For distance relaying evaluation, actual impedance
(using line current and relay voltage) values must be
determined with respect to time for each pertinent
relay location, and each chosen switching condition,
fault location, and type.
such a swing is virtually nil. In general, zone 1 swing-
trips occur only on unrecoverable swings.
Some form of blinding is required to screen over-
reaching distance relays against tripping on severe
swings from which recovery is possible. Operating
independently, a phase-distance relay (21) will initiate
tripping when the angle between the two system
voltages is very large and increasing (Fig. 14-7).
Figure 14-8a shows that zone 1 tripping is highly
dependent on the locus of the swing ohms and
therefore the distance to the electrical center for the
case involved.

5 EFFECT OF OUT-OF-STEP CONDITIONS

5.1 Distance Relays

A distance relay (21) responsive to three-phase faults

will operate if an out-of-step (OS) condition produces
a swing locus that falls within its operating area (Fig.
14-7).
When swing ohms enter the operating area of a zone
1 relay with a circular characteristic, there is a 908
angle between the voltages at the points along the line
angle identified by the relay reach. In Figure 14-7, for
example, there must be a 908 phase displacement
between the voltage phasors at relay location A and a
point at 90% of the line length for a 90% reach zone 1
phase relay to operate on a swing. The effective
generator voltages will be displaced substantially more
than 908 (angle m in Fig. 14-7). The likelihood of a
system attaining a stable operating condition after

Figure 14-7 Source angle relationship for swing trip on the Figure 14-8 Effect of OS swings on various line relaying
system of Figure 14-6. systems.

Copyright 2004 by Marcel Dekker, Inc. All Rights Reserved.

 5.2 Directional Comparison Systems

Swing ohms entering a protected line area will produce

simultaneous high-speed tripping at the two terminals.
Only swings entering external to the line area will block
tripping, and then only if local 21S operates and/or the
remote 21P does not. For the permissive overreaching
transfer-trip or the unblock system, tripping occurs on
OS conditions only if the 21P at both terminals
operate. If tripping is to be avoided for cases where
operation takes place, out-of-step blocking must be
used.

5.3 Phase-Comparison or Pilot-Wire Systems

Phase-comparison or pilot-wire schemes are solely

current-responsive, and since swings produce a
through-current condition, tripping does not occur.

5.4 Underreaching Transfer-Trip Schemes

Out-of-step swings entering the circle of either zone 1

relay will cause tripping at both terminals when using
the underreaching transfer-trip (whether direct or
permissive) scheme.
5.5 Circuit Breakers
Figure 14-9 Maximum recovery voltage on OS trip with
breaker at electrical center.
must be initiated at a favorable angle, preferably just
before the two sources are in phase.

With the two system segments 1808 apart at the instant
of interruption, a theoretical undamped recovery
voltage of four times normal is possible. Figure 14-9
describes this phenomenon with the breaker at the
electrical center of the system. At current 0, where
interruption takes place, the voltage on each side of the
breaker must settle at a new value. In the process of
getting there, overshoot takes place as a result of the
presence of inductance and distributed capacitance in
the system. Recovery voltage is the voltage across the
breaker contacts following current interruption.
Figure 14-10 shows that this identical phenomenon
occurs even though the breaker is as far away from the
electrical center as possible. The extremely large
transient recovery voltage still appears. If the circuit
breaker has insufficient dielectric strength to withstand
this voltage, reignitions will continue until a more
favorable angle is reached. To interrupt at all, a
breaker must be capable of attempting interruption,
possibly for several seconds, at each current 0. If the
breaker cannot perform such interruptions, tripping
5.6 Overcurrent Relays
Figure 14-6 can be used to illustrate the conditions
encountered by phase-overcurrent units during swings.
Assume, for example, that an instantaneous over-
current unit set for 2.5 times full load were used in a
line connecting Vs and Vu, and that ZS þ ZL þ ZU
equals 0.765 per unit on the full-load base. During an
OS condition, the instantaneous unit would operate
because the current reaches at least 2.61 (2/0.765) times
full load when VU lags by 1808. Swings during stable
conditions will also result in higher than normal
currents, although currents will be considerably less
than during an OS condition.
5.7 Reclosing
When a fault persists after reclosing, the stability of the
system will probably be jeopardized. On the other
hand, system stability is greatly improved if the fault is

Copyright 2004 by Marcel Dekker, Inc. All Rights Reserved.


Figure 14-10 Maximum recovery voltage on OS trip with
breaker at source.
temporary and does not reignite following reclosure.
Three-phase faults tend to be permanent more often
than other faults. They also have the most severe effect
on stability. For this reason, reclosing is often blocked
for three-phase faults and for OS conditions, but
allowed for all others.
There appears to be no advantage to the high-speed
reclosing of both terminals following an OS trip.
Reclosing one terminal, or preferably blocking trip-
ping at one terminal, will facilitate system restoration.
The second terminal can be reclosed under synchron-
ism-check relay supervision.
6 OUT-OF-STEP RELAYING
Ideally, fault relays should clear faults fast enough to
maintain stability. Also, they should not operate on
swings from which the system can recover. If a system
does go out of step, it should be split by circuit
breakers opening at a few preselected locations, in such
a way that generation and load on each side of the split
are reasonably balanced. The system should not be
Copyright 2004 by Marcel Dekker, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
split so most of the generation is separated from the
major system load.
In Figure 14-11, breaker A is in a poor location for
splitting system (1) from (2), since it would dump one
unit of load on system (2), which only generates 0.4
unit of power. Splitting the system using breakers D or
E would offer a more tolerable generation/load
balance. In this scheme, system (1) need only increase
its generation from 0.6 to 0.66 to maintain frequency.
Figure 14-11 also illustrates that OS tripping is
desirable at some points, but should be blocked at
others. This selective tripping/blocking philosophy is
basic to the intelligent application of OS relaying.
6.1 Generator Out-of-Step Relaying
Generator per unit reactances have steadily increased
over the years, and inertia constants have decreased as
machine ratings have increased. This, in turn, has
reduced critical clearing times and increased the need
for the OS relaying for generators.
Loss-of-field relays, equipped with directional units
and undervoltage supervision, may provide a measure
of OS protection for generators. Viewed from the
terminals of a large modern machine, the ohms will, in
general, fall within the machine or unit transformer
when the machine is out of step with the system. If the
swing ohms fall within the machine for the system
shown in Figure 14-11, the KLF (or KLF-1) loss-of-
field relay (40) will operate if swing ohms stay inside
the characteristic circle for 0.25 sec.
If a loss-of-field relay is used for OS sensing, the
timer must not time out for stable swings. It must
operate, however, for field failure before damage (or
further damage) can occur, and it must recognize the
fastest realistic swing rate. Generally, all these time
constraints can be satisfied. Figure 14-12 shows a
typical stable swing locus following a severe three-
phase fault.
If swing ohms pass through the unit transformer,
OS detection may not be possible with either a loss-of-
Figure 14-11 Generation and load distribution.

Figure 14-12 Stable swing following clearing of nearby
three-phase fault with the KLF relays (40)
field relay or simple distance relay. Moving the
directional unit characteristic output to point G on
Figure 14-12 would substantially increase the possibi-
lity of a false trip on a stable swing, such as GCD.
Alternatively, the time criterion could be increased to
the point where the stable swing would not trigger
relay operation, but then the fastest out-of-step swing
may not be recognized.
When the smaller characteristic is used as described
by the dotted circle of Figure 14-12, a higher degree of
security is achieved. However, it occurs at the expense
of making out-of-step recognition impossible, as well
as losing the ability to match accurately, as described
in Chapter 8, the loss-of-field relay characteristic,
steady-state stability, and minimum excitation unit
limits for the machine.
In general, devices applied for other functions (fault
detection, loss of field, thermal protection, etc.) are
unsuitable for detecting OS conditions. The use of
relaying, tailored explicitly for OS detection, is the only
dependable approach, unless extensive studies demon-
strate that other devices will suffice or instability is
improbable.
This should not be taken to mean that generator
tripping is encouraged when OS conditions develop,
Copyright 2004 by Marcel Dekker, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
but rather that OS detection may be easiest at the
generating plant. Out-of-step separation would then be
accomplished by transfer-tripping, or other suitable
means, to maintain a generation/load match, as
described above.
6.2 Transmission-Line Out-of-Step Relaying
The prime criterion in OS tripping is to maintain a
generation/load match in the islands created. If such a
match were perfect, no large load shifts and load
dropping would be required. Also, little or no
generation would be dropped. To even approximate
this ideal would, in all probability, require trip-
blocking at some locations and trip initiation at others.
Distance-relay operation on OS conditions tends to
occur at locations where the relay reach settings are
longest. There are two reasons for this phenomenon.
First, the minimum system voltage during an OS
condition tends to occur in the high-impedance
segments of the system. Second, distance relays with
long reach settings, such as those on long lines, cover a
larger area on the R-X diagram and therefore are more
likely to respond to swing conditions. Out-of-step
tripping at long-line terminals is not necessarily
conducive to ideal system splitting.
7 PHILOSOPHIES OF OUT-OF-STEP
RELAYING
Certain fundamental objectives should influence the
design of protection systems:
1. Block tripping at all locations for stable swings.
2. Ensure separation for every OS condition.
3. Effect separation at points that will leave a
satisfactory load/generation balance in each
separated area. Loads should not be inter-
rupted.
4. Block tripping or automatically reclose at one
end of any line that trips because of an OS
condition.
5. Initiate tripping while the systems are less than
1208 out of phase and the angle is closing in
order to minimize breaker stress.
6. Minimize the possibility of an OS condition
occurring by
(a) Using high-speed relaying
(b) Using a high-speed excitation system
 (c) Employing loss-of-field relays to remove a
unit that is drawing excessive reactive
power from the system
(d) Providing sufficient transmission capacity
(e) Tripping generators upon the loss of
critical transmission lines
(f) Applying generator braking resistors or
inserting series capacitors for critical faults
(g) Applying fast valving techniques
(h) Using an independent mechanism for each
breaker pole to downgrade faults from
three-phase to phase-to-phase
Although easily stated, these objectives are not so
readily achieved, particularly item 3 above.
7.1 Utility Practice
Utility practice consists of a combination of:
1. Allowing the line-protection relays to initiate
OS line tripping
2. Allowing the loss-of-field relays to initiate OS
generator tripping (when the nature of the loss-
of-field relay allows it)
3. Restricting relay-trip sensitivity at the higher
power factors
4. Blocking tripping on OS
5. Blocking reclosing on OS
6. Initiating tripping using relays designed for OS
tripping
There is no industry standard for protection-system
design; however, once the difficult functional decisions
of ‘‘what’’ and ‘‘where’’ are made, there is reasonable
consistency in the ‘‘how.’’
8 TYPES OF OUT-OF-STEP SCHEMES
Some typical systems used in OS relaying are described
here.
8.1 Concentric Circle Scheme
A concentric circle scheme for OS detection on
terminal A is shown in Figure 14-13. Customarily, an
OS relay with a characteristic as shown for 68 is added
to a transmission-line relaying system and surrounds
an over-reaching element, such as 21P. Because of
rotating apparatus inertia, significant time is required
for the torque angle to advance and the swing locus to
Copyright 2004 by Marcel Dekker, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
Figure 14-13 The concentric circle scheme for out-of-step
detection.
pass from 68 to 21P. For a fault within the 21P reach,
however, both elements operate essentially simulta-
neously. The relaying logic senses the sequence,
identifies swing or fault, and initiates the appropriate
action.
The dotted arcs of circles described as a ‘‘tomato’’
characteristic represent a popular analog implementa-
tion of the ‘‘outer’’ characteristic.
This scheme is appropriate for an OS trip-blocking
function or reclose-blocking. It is not appropriate for
OS tripping, however, unless additional logic is added.
If an external phase fault occurs close to the balance
point of 21P, as at P in Figure 14-13, for example, the
relay will respond slowly because of its low energy
level. Device 68, on the other hand, has an appreciably
higher energy level and operates faster than does 21P.
Removing remote terminal infeed on external fault
clearing following breaker failure can also produce
sequential operation of 68 and 21P. If the time in the
sensing logic is shorter than this operating-time
difference, a fault at P would be incorrectly identified
as an OS condition and would cause a false trip at A. If
the time is increased to avoid this situation, rapid OS
swings would not produce OS tripping. Adding a third
concentric circle would allow better perceptive segre-
gation of swings and faults, but could introduce load
ohm involvement. OS tripping can be achieved with
the two-concentric-circle scheme if the 68/21P operat-
ing sequence is checked and the resetting sequence is
correct.
For the three-terminal applications, infeed can
adversely affect OS blocking relays that use the
concentric circle scheme if the sequential clearing of a
three-phase fault can occur. The reach-shortening
effect of the third terminal infeed can cause an internal
 line-end fault to operate 68, but not 21P. Clearing the
infeed may then allow 21P to operate. This sequence
could cause undesirable OS trip-blocking at one
terminal. Out-of-step blocking then should not be
used in a three-terminal application unless remote
terminal coverage can be obtained with maximum
infeed.
8.2 Blinder Scheme
One form of a blinder relay has an operating
characteristic that parallels the transmission-line plot
in an R-X diagram (Fig. 14-14). A single-blinder relay
21B, gives the two linear characteristics shown.
An obvious application of this device is for limiting
the coverage of a distance relay in the load area. This is
a side benefit of the application of blinder OS relays.
A single-blinder relay plus auxiliary logic can be
used for OS tripping. Its use, however, is limited to
only those applications where OS trip-blocking of
phase-distance relays is not required, since swings
passing through the line section (on an R-X plot) will
cause operation of the line relays. A single blinder
cannot distinguish between a fault and an OS
condition until the resetting sequence is confirmed.
Such a scheme delays OS tripping until the swing is
well past the 1808 position and is returning to an in-
phase condition.
The single-blinder OS package is recommended for
causing a system splitting to occur through the tripping
of a line that is protected by a phase-comparison relay.
Figure 14-14 The single blinder scheme for out-of-step
detection.
Copyright 2004 by Marcel Dekker, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
Another application is OS tripping on swings passing
beyond the reach of the line relays (on an R-X plot).
Finally, this relay scheme is particularly well-suited for
generator OS trip applications.
The two-blinder scheme (Fig. 14-15) senses OS
conditions by observing the operating sequence of the
outer and inner blinders. A fault produces essentially
simultaneous operation; an OS condition causes the
outer blinder to operate first, followed by operation of
the inner blinder. The two-blinder scheme allows the
trip-area restriction of distance relays, OS trip-block-
ing, OS reclose-blocking, or OS tripping, regardless of
normal load-flow direction.
9 RELAYS FOR OUT-OF-STEP SYSTEMS
9.1 Electromechanical Types
9.1.1 KS-3 (68) OS Blocking Scheme
Figure 14-16 shows the configuration for the type KS-3
out-of-step blocking scheme. If ZOS operates approxi-
mately 60 msec or more ahead of 21-2, the OS relay
operates to block all or selected tripping. The OS relay
also blocks reclosing when some elements in the
system, such as zone 1 or time trips, are allowed to
operate during OS conditions.
For faults, 21-2 trip contacts or the D0 and I0
contacts of the ground relay close to short out the OS
unit coil, blocking pickup of the OS unit. This scheme
Figure 14-15 The two blinder scheme for out-of-step
detection. (I ¼ inner blinder, O ¼ outer blinder.)

Figure 14-16 The type KS-3 out-of-step blocking scheme.
is recommended for short-to moderate-length lines. It
should not be used on long lines, where the load might
operate the ZOS unit.
9.1.2 KST (68) OS Tripping Scheme
Figure 14-17 illustrates the KST scheme of OS
tripping. After sensing an OS condition in the same
way as the KS relay, telephone relays T1 and T2 add
two requirements: The 21-2 relay (for example, the
KD-10 phase-distance relay) must operate for 100
msec, and 21-2 resets 60 msec or more ahead of ZOS.
On a swing, ZOS operates first to energize OS. If 21-2
does not operate before 60 msec, OS operates. Then
when 21-2 operates, the AR relay, T1, is energized. If
both ZOS and 21-2 remain closed for 100 msec, T1
operates. As the swing moves out, 21-2 resets first,
deenergizes AR, and permits the energization of T2
through AR back contacts if ZOS is still closed. If ZOS
does not reset for 60 msec, T2 operates to trip and
block reclosure as shown.
A fault that operates ZOS and 21-2 together (or
within approximately 60 msec) will have no effect
because the short around the OS coil will be
Copyright 2004 by Marcel Dekker, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
Figure 14-17 The KST out-of-step tripping scheme.
maintained. The zone 2 timer would time out and
trip in the scheme shown.
9.2 Solid-State Types
9.2.1 SDBU-1 (21B), SI-T (50), ARS (94), OS
Tripping Scheme
For the single-blinder OS tripping scheme (Fig. 14-18),
swings from the right to left cause B1 to operate, B2 to
operate, B1 to reset, and then B2 to reset. It is of no
consequence whether B1 is initially operated by load
and B2 does not subsequently reset.
Device 50 (SI-T relay) is sensitively set and operates
at a current level above maximum zero power factor
interchange, line charging, or transformer-magnetizing
current. The device operates when a swing begins and
prohibits load pickup trip.
Thus, AND 2 operates when B1 and 50 operate with
B2 reset to identify the swing origin in the positive F
region. After 4 msec, the feedback circuit holds the
upper input AND 2. AND 4 has an output when the
swing moves between B1 and B2 to operate both
blinders. If AND 4 output persists for 20 msec and the
swing moves across B1 to reset it, AND 6 has an
output. An output from AR occurs 20 msec later for
tripping and reclose block.
Swings originating to the left of B1 traveling left to
right produce identical action through AND 1, AND
3, and AND 5. The restricted trip feature prevents
tripping on recoverable swings. B1 and B2 may be used
to supervise the tripping of a phase-distance relay.
 Figure 14-18 The SDBU-1 out-of-step tripping scheme.

Out-of-step block of reclosing is not available with this

complement, unless OS trip is used.
The above scheme is recommended for generator
OS sensing, because its logic requires that swing ohms
emerge from the side of the relay characteristic
opposite to that from which it entered. That is, there
must be a reversal of power flow as viewed from the
machine terminals, and the reversal must occur during
high current. These two conditions will not be satisfied
unless the machine is out of step with the system. A
low-current reversal can, however, occur during
motoring.
This scheme, or its equivalent, supervised by an
over-current or distance relay, is the most secure
available for generator OS tripping. A severe but stable
swing, such as shown in Figure 14-12, cannot cause
misoperation, regardless of the timing involved in the
transient.

9.2.2 Lens Scheme

One significant variation of the blinder scheme uses a
lens and single-blinder line characteristic as described
in Figure 14-19 for out-of-step tripping. It is also
equipped with a reactance-type characteristic to
restrict the reach of the system to the desired extent.
Various areas are established (inside the lens, right of
the blinder, left of the blinder, above the reactance line, Figure 14-19 Lens scheme for out-of-step tripping GZX-
below the reactance line) and, by the addition of 104.

Copyright 2004 by Marcel Dekker, Inc. All Rights Reserved.

 sequence and timing logic, can determine the origin
and termination of swings and the time involved in
passage, thus identifying out-of-step conditions.
9.2.3 Double-Blinder OS Tripping and Blocking
Scheme
Figure 14-20 contains the logic for out-of-step sensing
used in MDAR 2.5. 21BO and 21BI are the outer and
inner blinder units, respectively. 3fF is an input from a
phase selector identifying the fact that no unbalanced
fault exists (not fG, not ff, not ffG). IAL signifies
that current above a preselected level exists.
The logic differentiates between a swing and fault
through the sequence of operation of 21BO and 21BI.
If it is a swing, the optional blocking (shown as
switches OSB1, OSB2, and OSB3) of each of three
distance units is obtained. The inner blinder supervises
(permits) tripping of each of the distance units to avoid
any possibility of load trip not resulting from a swing
condition.
Logic is included to permit delayed OS tripping ‘‘on
the way out’’ to minimize the possibility of breaker
damage during tripping or ‘‘on the way in’’ to
minimize the possibility of thermal damage to a
transmission line. The terms ‘‘way in’’ and ‘‘way out’’
refer to the trajectory of the ohmic value seen by the
Figure 14-20 Out-of-step trip logic used in MDAR 2.5.
Copyright 2004 by Marcel Dekker, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
relay and the point at which tripping is initiated (on the
way into the inner-blinder operating region or on the
way out of the operating region of the outer blinder).
10 SELECTION OF AN OUT-OF-STEP RELAY
SYSTEM
The key ingredients in out-of-step relaying are
identification and strategy. Identification is possible
using any of the schemes described, though a higher
order of security is mandatory for those schemes to be
used for OS tripping. Also, OS identification is
dependent on suitable voltage and current relation-
ships being present at the point of application of the
relaying system to clearly recognize an OS condition
when it occurs. Strategy relates to action required once
an OS condition has been identified. The choices are
OSB (out-of-step block of tripping), OST (out-of-step
trip), and OSBR (out-of-step block of reclosing).
The electrical center is not a fixed point in a system.
Indeed, several electrical centers may be present for a
given swing condition. Further, the electrical center
moves as the number of generators and switching
conditions vary. For the particular unstable case under
consideration, the ohmic value (and angle) manifested
at the relay location must be known with respect to
 time to assure that proper recognition is possible. In
general, a system study is required for this.
Out-of-step blocking is less critical than OS tripping
in terms of identification of the swing and security. OS
blocking must respond only when the blocked device
responds. Swings producing ohmic values beyond the
reach of, say, a supervised zone 2 phase-distance relay
need not be recognized by the OS detection scheme.
Also, a fault appearing on the R-X diagram between
the characteristics of an OS relay and a phase-distance
relay that is used with it can falsely identify an OS
condition with impunity, whereas OS tripping under
the same circumstances could not be tolerated.
Stated simply, (1) OS blocking should be applied
when swing-produced trips are possible but are intol-
erable, and (2) OS tripping should be applied when
tripping will not naturally occur and tripping must take
place for an optimum generation-load match following
Copyright 2004 by Marcel Dekker, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
separation of the two system segments that were out of
synchronism. Even when ‘‘natural tripping’’ occurs (the
distance relays applied for other functions operate for
the OS condition), OS sensing is required to block
reclosing. Reclosing following a legitimate OS trip is
futile and should not be attempted.
Blinders aid natural tripping by providing a screen-
ing effect against undesired tripping in response to
large power swings that are stable. This is particularly
useful in long-line applications that require large
impedance settings on distance relays, making them
more susceptible to tripping on load.
Out-of-step relaying is as much art as science,
requiring a realistic appraisal of what is possible, what
is probable, and what is certain. It may, in particular
areas of a complex system, be less expensive to
universally apply out-of-step blocking rather than to
deduce where it is needed.