A decided case on immorality of a public-school teacher

A MEDIA person asks me whether her friend, who is a wife of a public-school teacher, could
file an administrative case for immorality against her husband  (for having an illicit affair with
another and for abandoning her and/or for not providing support to her and their children). She
also asked whether she could file a case against her husband in the Professional Regulation
Commission (PRC) to revoke his license.

I said, “Yes to both.”

This question is similar to the issues involved in the Supreme Court (SC)-decided case of  Rene
Puse v. Ligaya Puse, GR No. 183678, March 15, 2010.

The relevant facts of the case (all quoted directly or paraphrased from the SC ruling) are as
follows:

Rene Puse  is a registered professional teacher stationed at S. Aguirre Elementary School, East
District, Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, while Ligaya Puse  is a barangay rural-health
midwife assigned at the Municipal Health Office of Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte.

It appears that on January 10, 1992, Rene married Ligaya at the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Daet, Camarines Norte. He had two children with her, and had a church wedding before
respondent found out that petitioner was already married. Ligaya discovered that Rene had
previously married  a certain Cristina Pablo Puse at the MTC in Laoag City, Ilocos Norte, on
December 27, 1986. Ligaya, likewise, learned that Rene has already two children with his first
wife. Thus, on August 2, 2005, Ligaya filed a letter-complaint with the director of the PRC,
National Capital Region, Manila, through the director, the PRC, Lucena City, seeking assistance
regarding Rene, against whom she had filed a criminal case for “bigamy” and “abandonment.”
Ligaya alleged, among others, that Rene has not been giving her and their children support.

In a letter dated August 16, 2005, the PRC of Lucena City directed Rene to answer the complaint
for immorality and dishonorable conduct filed by Ligaya.  Per directive, Rene submitted his
compliance, dated August 31, 2005, denying the charges against him, and stating, among others,
that “[n]a ako ay wala ng balita o komunikasyon sa aking unang asawa at ang paniwala ko ay
siya ay patay na at ang aking kasal ay nawala nang saysay.”

After due consideration of the complaint, affidavits, supporting documents and pleadings filed,
the Board of Professional Teachers, PRC, Lucena City, found a prima facie case for immorality
and dishonorable conduct against Rene.  The case was docketed as Adm. Case No. LCN-0016.
On February 16, 2007, the Board of Professional Teachers (BPT), PRC, Manila, found Rene
administratively liable of the charges and revoked his license as a professional teacher. Rene
moved for reconsideration of the decision, but his motion was denied by the BPT per resolution
dated July 9, 2007. Rene then filed a petition for review, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 100421,
before the Court of Appeals (CA) assailing the resolutions dated February 16, 2007, and July 9,
2007, of the BPT. On March 28, 2008, the CA dismissed Rene’s appeal. On June  30, 2008, the
CA denied Rene’s motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.  Rene then went to the SC. One
of the issues decided by the SC is whether the BPT has jurisdiction to hear and decide the
complaint filed by Ligaya against Rene. The relevant portions of the SC decision on the case (all
quoted directly or paraphrased from the SC ruling) are as follows:

On the first issue, petitioner Rene argues that the proper forum to hear and decide the complaint
was either the Civil-Service Commission (CSC), pursuant to CSC Resolution 991936 (Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service); or the Department of Education  (DepEd),
pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 4670 (Magna Carta for Public School Teachers). Since the charge
was for violation of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees, petitioner contends that the complaint should have been brought before the CSC.

The SC disagreed with the petitioner on this point. It ruled that an administrative case against a
public-school teacher may be filed before the BPT-PRC, the DepEd or the CSC, which have
concurrent jurisdiction over administrative cases, such as for immoral, unprofessional or
dishonorable conduct.

The SC then explained that concurrent jurisdiction is that which is possessed over the same
parties or subject matter at the same time by two or more separate tribunals. When the law
bestows upon a government body the jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving specific
matters, it is to be presumed that such jurisdiction is exclusive, unless it be proved that another
body is, likewise, vested with the same jurisdiction, in which case, both bodies have concurrent
jurisdiction over the matter.

The authority to hear and decide administrative cases by the BPT-PRC, the DepEd and the CSC
comes from RA 7836, RA 4670 and Presidential Decree (PD) 807, respectively. The SC
mentioned Section 23 of RA 7836 as the basis for this authority. Here, the BPT is given the
power, after due notice and hearing, to suspend or revoke the certificate of registration of a
professional teacher for causes enumerated therein (and one of the causes enumerated is
immoral, unprofessional or dishonorable conduct).

Thus, the SC said that if a complaint is filed under RA 7836, the jurisdiction to hear the same
falls with the BPT-PRC. However, if the complaint against a public-school teacher is filed with
the DepEd, then under Section 9 of RA 4670, or the Magna Carta for Public-School Teachers,
the jurisdiction over administrative cases of public-school teachers is lodged with the
investigating committee created pursuant to  the said section, now being implemented by Section
2, Chapter VII of DECS Order 33, Series of 1999, also known as the DECS Rules of
Procedure.  A complaint filed under RA 4670 shall be heard by the investigating committee,
which is under the DepEd, as emphasized by the SC.

The SC then explained that as to the CSC, under PD 807, also known as the Civil Service Decree
of the Philippines, particularly Sections 9(j) and 37(a) thereof, the CSC has the power to hear and
decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly with it or brought to it on appeal. As
the central personnel agency of the government, the CSC has jurisdiction to supervise and
discipline all government employees, including those employed in government-owned or
-controlled corporations with original charters. Consequently, if civil-service rules and
regulations are violated, complaints for said violations may be filed with the CSC. However,
where concurrent jurisdiction exists in several tribunals, the body or agency that first takes
cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others. Here, it was
the BPT, before which respondent filed the complaint, that acquired jurisdiction over the case
and which had the authority to proceed and decide the case to the exclusion of the DepEd and the
CSC.

The SC later on explained why there was substantial evidence to show that petitioner was guilty
of immoral and dishonorable conduct. While Petitioner claims good faith and maintains that he
married respondent with the erroneous belief that his first wife was already deceased, the SC
ruled that the issues as to whether petitioner knew his first wife to be dead and whether
respondent knew that petitioner was already married have been ruled upon by both the BPT and
the CA.

The BPT and the appellate court found untenable petitioner’s belief that his first wife was
already dead and that his former marriage was no longer subsisting. For failing to get a court
order declaring his first wife presumptively dead, his marriage to respondent was clearly
unlawful and immoral.

In the practice of his profession, he, as a licensed professional teacher, is required to strictly
adhere to, observe and practice the set of ethical and moral principles, standards and values laid
down in the aforesaid code. It is of no moment that he was not yet a teacher when he contracted
his second marriage. His good moral character is a continuing requirement which he must
possess if he wants to continue practicing his noble profession. In the instant case, he failed to
abide by the tenets of morality.

Consequently, it is but stating the obvious to assert that teachers must adhere to the exacting
standards of morality and decency. There is no dichotomy of morality. A teacher, both in his
official and personal conduct, must display exemplary behavior. He must freely and willingly
accept restrictions on his conduct that might be viewed irksome by ordinary citizens. In other
words, the personal behavior of teachers, in and outside the classroom, must be beyond reproach.
Accordingly, teachers must abide by a standard of personal conduct which not only proscribes
the commission of immoral acts, but also prohibits behavior creating a suspicion of immorality
because of the harmful impression it might have on the students. Likewise, they must observe a
high standard of integrity and honesty.

From the foregoing, it seems obvious that when a teacher engages in extramarital relationship,
especially when the parties are both married, such behavior amounts to immorality, justifying his
termination from employment.

-oOo-
Jurisdiction of administrative cases for our public-school teachers today
A PUBLIC-SCHOOL teacher asked me recently where should an administrative case against a
public-school teacher be filed?

I said, “Based on law and jurisprudence—the Department of Education [DepEd], the Civil
Service Commission [CSC] and the Professional Regulation Commission [PRC] have concurrent
jurisdiction over administrative cases involving public-school teachers.” I then quickly added,
“However, there are other cases that affirmed that the Office of the Ombudsman also has
concurrent jurisdiction over the same.”

For our readers, especially our public-school teachers facing an administrative case, I strongly
suggest that you read the following decided cases to fully understand this question of jurisdiction
of administrative cases for our public-school teachers: Rene Puse v. Ligaya Puse, G.R. No.
183678, March 15, 2010; Office of the Ombudsman v. Estandarte and the Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 168670, April 13, 2007; Melecio Alcala vs. Jovencio Villar, G.R. No. 156063,
November 18, 2003; Martin Emin  v. CSC Chairman Corazon Alma G. de Leon, G.R. No.
139794, February 27, 2002; and Armand Fabella vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110379,
November 28, 1997 (a must read for all our teachers).

The landmark case of Fabella arose sometime on September 17, 1990, when then-Department of
Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) Secretary Isidro Cariño issued a return-to-work order to
all public-school teachers who had participated in walkouts and strikes on various dates during
the period September 26, 1990, to October 18, 1990.

The mass action had been staged to demand payment of 13th-month differentials, clothing
allowances and passage of a debt-cap bill in Congress, among other things. On October 18, 1990,
Secretary Cariño filed administrative cases against several public-school teachers of the
Mandaluyong High School. The charge sheets required our public-school teachers to explain in
writing why they should not be punished for having taken part in the mass action in violation of
the following civil-service laws and regulations: grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, gross
violation of Civil-Service Law and rules on reasonable office regulations, refusal to perform
official duty, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and absence without leave
(AWOL). At the same time, Secretary Cariño ordered all of them to be placed under preventive
suspension.
In Fabella, however, the issue is not whether the public-school teachers engaged in any
prohibited activity, which may warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanctions against them as a
result of administrative proceedings. This case revolves around the question of due process of
law, not on the right of government workers to strike. The issue is not whether our public-school
teachers may be punished for engaging in a prohibited action, but whether, in the course of the
investigation of the alleged proscribed activity, their right to due process has been violated. In
short, before they can be investigated and meted out any penalty, due process must first be
observed.

After enumerating the requirements provided by law (particularly Republic Act (RA) 4670,
otherwise known as the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers—the primary law that governs
the conduct of investigation in administrative cases filed against public-school teachers) and
existing rules issued by DECS at that time (now the DepEd), the Supreme Court (SC) resolved to
affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals (CA) and ordered the unqualified reinstatement of
our public-school teachers and the payment to them of salaries, allowances, bonuses and other
benefits that accrued to their benefit during the entire duration of their suspension or dismissal.

Thus, the SC affirmed the CA’s ruling that the public-school teachers’ dismissal was effected
without any formal investigation, or  while there was a semblance of investigation conducted by
the DECS, its intention to dismiss the public-school teachers was already manifest when it
adopted a procedure where it shifted the burden of proof to the public-school teachers, instead of
the DECS proving its case against the public-school teachers. The SC then emphasized that it
will never countenance a denial of the fundamental right to due process, which is a cornerstone
of our legal system.

In the landmark cases of Emin v. De Leon and Alcala  v. Villar, the principle of estoppel by
laches was applied to bar a petitioner/public-school teacher from impugning CSCs (in Emin) and
Ombudsman’s (in Alcala) jurisdiction over an administrative case.

The opposite happened in Ombudsman v. Estandarte, where the public-school teacher

respondent consistently protested the referral of the case back to the Ombudsman, and demanded
that the same be remanded to the DECS. She refused to participate in the proceedings before the
Ombudsman precisely because she believed that jurisdiction was already vested on the DECS
Region VI. Here in Ombudsman v. Estandarte, the SC ruled that jurisdiction once acquired is
not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated. When the
complainants filed their formal complaint with then-DECS (Region VI), jurisdiction was vested
on the latter. It cannot now be transferred to petitioner upon the instance of the complainants,
even with the acquiescence of the DECS and petitioner.

The author’s answer as to the concurrent jurisdiction over administrative cases against public-
school teachers as above stated is clearly elucidated in the SC decided case of   Rene
Puse v.  Ligaya Puse (which I also discussed generally in our last column).
In Puse v. Puse, it was ruled that an administrative case against a public-school teacher may be
filed before the Board of Professional Teachers (BPT)-PRC, the DepEd or the CSC, which have
concurrent jurisdiction over administrative cases, such as for immoral, unprofessional or
dishonorable conduct. The SC then explained that concurrent jurisdiction is that which is
possessed over the same parties or subject matter at the same time by two or more separate
tribunals.

When the law bestows upon a government body the jurisdiction to hear and decide cases
involving specific matters, it is to be presumed that such jurisdiction is exclusive, unless it be
proved that another body, is likewise, vested with the same jurisdiction, in which case, both
bodies have concurrent jurisdiction over the matter.

The authority to hear and decide administrative cases by the BPT-PRC, the DepEd and the CSC
comes from (RA) 7836, Rep. Act No. 4670 and Presidential Decree (PD) 807, respectively. The
SC mentioned Section 23 of RA 7836 as the basis for this authority. Here, the Board is given the
power, after due notice and hearing, to suspend or revoke the certificate of registration of a
professional teacher for causes enumerated therein (and one of the causes enumerated is
immoral, unprofessional or dishonorable conduct).

Thus, the SC said that, if a complaint is filed under RA 7836, the jurisdiction to hear the same
falls with the BPT-PRC.

However, Puse also stated that if the complaint against a public-school teacher is filed with the
DepEd, then, under Section 9 of RA 4670, the jurisdiction over administrative cases of public-
school teachers is lodged with the investigating committee created pursuant to said section, now
being implemented by Section 2, Chapter VII of DECS Order 33, Series of 1999, also known as
the DECS Rules of Procedure.  A complaint filed under RA 4670 shall be heard by the
investigating committee which is under the DepEd, as emphasized by the SC. (Please see also
DepEd Order no. 49, series of 2006, or the Revised Rules of Procedure of DepEd on
Administrative Cases).

The Supreme Court then explained in Puse that as to the CSC, under PO 807, also known as
the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines, particularly Sections 9(j) and 37(a) thereof, the CSC
has the power to hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly with it or
brought to it on appeal.

As the central personnel agency of the government, the CSC has jurisdiction to supervise and
discipline all government employees, including those employed in government-owned or
-controlled corporations with original charters. Consequently, if civil-service rules and
regulations are violated, complaints for said violations may be filed with the CSC.
However, where concurrent jurisdiction exists in several tribunals, the body or agency that first
takes cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction over the case and which had the
authority to proceed and decide the case, to the exclusion of the others. Thus, if an administrative
case is filed with the DepEd against a public-school teacher first (or initially with another
agency, like Ombudsman the CSC but was immediately referred to the Deped without the former
hearing the case and the latter actively investigating the case in accordance with the DepEd rules
on administrative proceedings), then the DepEd acquired jurisdiction over the administrative
case and it has the sole authority to proceed and decide the case to the exclusion of the
Ombudsman and the CSC.

-oOo-