‫ﺗﺤ ﻠﯿﻞ ﻫ ﻔﺘﻪ‬

‫ ﭼﮕﻮﻧﻪ ﻣﯽﺗﻮان ﭘﯿﺮوز ﻧﺒﺮد ﻧﻔﻮذ در ﺧﺎورﻣﯿﺎﻧﻪ ﺷﺪ‬:‫ﻋﻨﻮان ﺗﺤﻠﯿﻞ‬

Foreign Affairs :‫ﻧﺎﺷﺮ‬
‫ ﺟﺎﺷﻮآ ﻟﻨﺪﯾﺲ )ﻣﺪﯾﺮ ﻣﺮﮐﺰ ﻣﻄﺎﻟﻌﺎت ﺧﺎورﻣﯿﺎﻧﻪ در داﻧﺸﮕﺎه‬،(‫ اﺳﺘﯿﻮ ﺳﺎﯾﻤﻦ )اﺳﺘﺎد رواﺑﻂ ﺑﯿﻦاﻟﻤﻠﻞ در ﮐﺎﻟﺞ ﮐﻠﺒﯽ‬:‫ﻧﻮ ﯾﺴﻨﺪﮔﺎن‬
َ
(‫اوﮐﻠﻮﻫﺎﻣﺎ( و اﯾﻤﻦ ﻣﻨﺼﻮر )رﺋﯿﺲ ﺳﺎﺑﻖ ﺑﺨﺶ ﺧﺎورﻣﯿﺎﻧﻪ و آﻓﺮﯾﻘﺎ در ﺷﻮرای اﻣﻨﯿﺖ ﻣﻠﯽ اﺳﺮاﺋﯿﻞ‬
‫ ﻣﺮﺗﻀﯽ ﺣﺎﺟﯽآﺑﺎدی‬:‫ﺗﻠﺨﯿﺺ و ﺗﺮﺟﻤﻪ‬
‫ آ ﮐﺎدﻣﯽ رواﺑﻂ ﺑﯿﻦاﻟﻤﻠﻞ‬:‫ﻣﻨﺒﻊ‬

The United States and its partners in the Middle East have two problems with Iran. One stems from
Tehran’s penetration of neighboring states; the other, from its nuclear program, which could yield
weapons if left unchecked. The two issues are linked strategically and politically: an Iran with nuclear
weapons capability would likely be emboldened in its regional adventurism. And Iranian
adventurism empowers those in Washington and in the Middle East who favor imposing, rather than
negotiating, limits on Iran’s nuclear program.

‫ ﯾﮑﯽ از اﯾﻦ ﻣﺸﮑﻼت از ﻧﻔﻮذ اﯾﺮان در ﮐﺸﻮرﻫﺎی ﻣﻨﻄﻘﻪ و‬.‫اﯾﺎﻻت ﻣﺘﺤﺪه و ﺷﺮﮐﺎی آن در ﺧﺎورﻣﯿﺎﻧﻪ ﺑﺎ اﯾﺮان دو ﻣﺸﮑﻞ دارﻧﺪ‬
‫ اﯾﻦ‬.‫دﯾﮕﺮی از ﺑﺮﻧﺎﻣﻪ ﻫﺴﺘﻪای اﯾﻦ ﮐﺸﻮر ﻧﺸﺄت ﻣﯽﮔﯿﺮد ﮐﻪ اﮔﺮ ﺑﺎ آن ﻣﻘﺎﺑﻠﻪ ﻧﺸﻮد ﻣﯽﺗﻮاﻧﺪ ﻣﻨﺠﺮ ﺑﻪ ﺗﻮﻟﯿﺪ ﺳﻼح ]ﻫﺴﺘﻪای[ ﺷﻮد‬
ً
‫ اﯾﺮاﻧﯽ ﺑﺎ ﺗﻮاﻧﻤﻨﺪی ﺗﺴﻠﯿﺤﺎت ﻫﺴﺘﻪای اﺣﺘﻤﺎﻻ در ﻣﺎﺟﺮاﺟﻮ ﯾﯽ‬:‫دو ﻣﺴﺌﻠﻪ از ﻧﻈﺮ راﻫﺒﺮدی و ﺳﯿﺎﺳﯽ ﺑﻪ ﯾﮑﺪﯾﮕﺮ ﭘﯿﻮﻧﺪ ﺧﻮردهاﻧﺪ‬
‫ و ﻣﺎﺟﺮاﺟﻮ ﯾﯽ اﯾﺮان ﺑﻪ ﮐﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﮐﻪ در واﺷﻨﮕﺘﻦ و ﺧﺎورﻣﯿﺎﻧﻪ ﻃﺮﻓﺪار اﻋﻤﺎل ﻣﺤﺪودﯾﺖﻫﺎ ﺑﺮ‬.‫ﻣﻨﻄﻘﻪای ﺧﻮد ﺟﺴﻮرﺗﺮ ﺧﻮاﻫﺪ ﺷﺪ‬
.‫ ﻗﺪرت ﻣﯽدﻫﺪ‬،‫ﺑﺮﻧﺎﻣﻪ ﻫﺴﺘﻪای اﯾﺮان و ﻧﻪ ﻣﺬاﮐﺮه ﺑﺮ ﺳﺮ آن ﻫﺴﺘﻨﺪ‬

Addressing Iran’s regional advances is therefore vital. But the manner in which the United States and
its regional partners have so far tried to do so has failed. Military force and comprehensive sanctions
have not stymied Iran’s regional activities. On the contrary, they have done the opposite. Today, Syria
and Lebanon are more dependent on Iran than ever before. The United States and its Gulf partners
should consider a fresh approach that makes use of their wealth and countervailing soft power.

‫ اﻣﺎ ﺷﯿﻮهای ﮐﻪ اﯾﺎﻻت ﻣﺘﺤﺪه و ﺷﺮﮐﺎی ﻣﻨﻄﻘﻪای آن ﺗﺎ ﮐﻨﻮن ﺳﻌﯽ‬.‫ﺑﻨﺎﺑﺮاﯾﻦ ﭘﺮداﺧﺘﻦ ﺑﻪ ﭘﯿﺶرویﻫﺎی ﻣﻨﻄﻘﻪای اﯾﺮان ﺣﯿﺎﺗﯽ اﺳﺖ‬
‫ ﻗﺪرت ﻧﻈﺎﻣﯽ و ﺗﺤﺮﯾﻢﻫﺎی ﻫﻤﻪﺟﺎﻧﺒﻪ ﻣﺎﻧﻊ ﻓﻌﺎﻟﯿﺖﻫﺎی ﻣﻨﻄﻘﻪای اﯾﺮان‬.‫ﮐﺮدهاﻧﺪ ﺗﺎ اﯾﻦ ﮐﺎر را اﻧﺠﺎم دﻫﻨﺪ ﺷﮑﺴﺖ ﺧﻮرده اﺳﺖ‬
‫ اﯾﺎﻻت ﻣﺘﺤﺪه و ﺷﺮﮐﺎی آن در ﺧﻠﯿﺞ‬.‫ ﺳﻮرﯾﻪ و ﻟﺒﻨﺎن ﺑﯿﺸﺘﺮ از ﻫﻤﯿﺸﻪ ﺑﻪ اﯾﺮان واﺑﺴﺘﻪاﻧﺪ‬،‫ اﻣﺮوز‬.‫ ﺑﻠﮑﻪ ﻧﺘﯿﺠﻪ ﻋﮑﺲ دادهاﻧﺪ‬.‫ﻧﺸﺪهاﻧﺪ‬
.‫ﻓﺎرس ﺑﺎﯾﺪ رو ﯾﮑﺮدی ﺗﺎزهای را در ﭘﯿﺶ ﺑﮕﯿﺮﻧﺪ ﮐﻪ از ﺛﺮوت و ﻗﺪرت ﻧﺮم ﺧﻨﺜﯽﮐﻨﻨﺪه آﻧﻬﺎ ﺑﻬﺮه ﻣﯽﮔﯿﺮد‬

The United States needs to recognize that Iran does not hold its neighbors in a coercive vise. Rather,
Iran has asserted itself in the Middle East in large part through the exercise of considerable soft
power. In Iraq, Iran has served as refuge and crucial ally to Shiites who resisted Saddam Hussein, the
United States, and the Islamic State, also known as ISIS, in successive conflicts. The Syrian
government sees Iran as having come to its rescue in 2012; since that time, Tehran has helped
President Bashar al-Assad retain control of many strategically important territories, and Iranian
charities have rebuilt schools in one of Syria’s most destroyed cities, Deir ez-Zor. Iran has been
embedded in the Lebanese political system for nearly 40 years, and in Yemen, it has benefited from
the destruction wrought by its adversaries, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

‫ ﺑﻠﮑﻪ اﯾﺮان ﺗﺎ ﺣﺪ زﯾﺎدی ﺑﺎ اﺳﺘﻔﺎده از‬.‫اﯾﺎﻻت ﻣﺘﺤﺪه ﺑﺎﯾﺪ ﺑﭙﺬﯾﺮد ﮐﻪ اﯾﺮان ﻫﻤﺴﺎﯾﮕﺎن ﺧﻮد را ﺑﻪ روﺷﯽ اﺟﺒﺎری در ﮐﻨﺘﺮل ﻧﺪارد‬
‫ اﯾﺮان ﭘﻨﺎﻫﮕﺎه و ﻣﺘﺤﺪ ﺣﯿﺎﺗﯽ ﺷﯿﻌﯿﺎﻧﯽ‬،‫ در ﻋﺮاق‬.‫ ﺧﻮد را در ﻣﻨﻄﻘﻪ اﺛﺒﺎت و ﺣﻔﻆ ﮐﺮده اﺳﺖ‬،‫ﻣﯿﺰان ﻗﺎﺑﻞ ﺗﻮﺟﻬﯽ از ﻗﺪرت ﻧﺮم‬
‫ دوﻟﺖ ﺳﻮرﯾﻪ‬.‫ اﯾﺎﻻت ﻣﺘﺤﺪه و دوﻟﺖ اﺳﻼﻣﯽ ﯾﺎ داﻋﺶ در ﻧﺒﺮدﻫﺎی ﭘﯽ در ﭘﯽ ﻣﻘﺎوﻣﺖ ﮐﺮدهاﻧﺪ‬،‫اﺳﺖ ﮐﻪ در ﺑﺮاﺑﺮ ﺻﺪام ﺣﺴﯿﻦ‬
‫ ﺗﻬﺮان از آن ﻣﻮﻗﻊ ﺑﻪ رﺋﯿﺲﺟﻤﻬﻮر ﺑﺸﺎر اﺳﺪ ﮐﻤﮏ ﮐﺮده اﺳﺖ ﺗﺎ ﮐﻨﺘﺮل‬.‫ ﺑﻪ ﮐﻤﮏ آن آﻣﺪ‬۲۰۱۲ ‫اﯾﺮان را ﮐﺸﻮری ﻣﯽداﻧﺪ ﮐﻪ در ﺳﺎل‬
‫ ﮐﻪ ﯾﮑﯽ از ﺷﻬﺮﻫﺎﯾﯽ اﺳﺖ ﮐﻪ‬،‫ﺑﺴﯿﺎری از ﻣﻨﺎﻃﻖ ﻣﻬﻢ راﻫﺒﺮدی را ﺣﻔﻆ ﻧﻤﺎﯾﺪ و ﺧﯿﺮﯾﻪﻫﺎی اﯾﺮاﻧﯽ ﻣﺪرﺳﻪﻫﺎﯾﯽ را در دﯾﺮاﻟﺰور‬
‫ ﺳﺎل اﺳﺖ ﮐﻪ در ﻧﻈﺎم ﺳﯿﺎﺳﯽ ﻟﺒﻨﺎن ﺣﻀﻮر دارد و در ﯾﻤﻦ‬۴۰ ‫ اﯾﺮان ﻧﺰدﯾﮏ ﺑﻪ‬.‫ ﺑﺎزﺳﺎزی ﮐﺮدهاﻧﺪ‬،‫ﺑﯿﺸﺘﺮﯾﻦ ﺗﺨﺮﯾﺐ را داﺷﺘﻪ اﺳﺖ‬
.‫از و ﯾﺮاﻧﯽ ﮐﻪ ﻋﺎﻣﻞ آن رﻗﺒﺎی اﯾﻦ ﮐﺸﻮر ﯾﻌﻨﯽ ﻋﺮﺑﺴﺘﺎن ﺳﻌﻮدی و اﻣﺎرات ﻣﺘﺤﺪه ﻋﺮﺑﯽ ﺑﻮدهاﻧﺪ ﻧﻔﻊ ﺑﺮده اﺳﺖ‬

Iran’s soft power stems in part from the long history of Sunni Arab domination over regional
minorities, whether these have been Shiite, Christian, heterodox, or Kurdish. In many parts of the
region, “secular” nationalist regimes confront Sunni fundamentalist opposition movements, such as
those represented by the Muslim Brotherhood, al Qaeda–aligned militias, or ISIS.
‫ﻗﺪرت ﻧﺮم اﯾﺮان ﺗﺎ ﺣﺪی رﯾﺸﻪ در ﺗﺎرﯾﺦ ﻃﻮﻻﻧﯽ ﺳﻠﻄﻪ اﻋﺮاب ﺳﻨﯽ ﺑﺮ اﻗﻠﯿﺖﻫﺎی ﻣﻨﻄﻘﻪ‪ ،‬اﻋﻢ از اﻗﻠﯿﺖﻫﺎی ﺷﯿﻌﻪ‪ ،‬ﻣﺴﯿﺤﯽ‪ ،‬ﻣﺮﺗﺪ‬
‫ﯾﺎ ﮐﺮد‪ ،‬دارد‪ .‬در ﺑﯿﺸﺘﺮ ﺑﺨﺶﻫﺎی ﻣﻨﻄﻘﻪ‪ ،‬رژ ﯾﻢﻫﺎی ﻣﻠﯽﮔﺮای »ﺳﮑﻮﻻر« ﺑﺎ ﺟﻨﺒﺶﻫﺎی اﭘﻮزﯾﺴﯿﻮن ﺑﻨﯿﺎدﮔﺮای ﺳﻨﯽ ﻣﺎﻧﻨﺪ آﻧﻬﺎﯾﯽ‬
‫ﮐﻪ در ﻗﺎﻟﺐ اﺧﻮان اﻟﻤﺴﻠﻤﯿﻦ‪ ،‬ﻧﯿﺮوﻫﺎی ﺷﺒﻪﻧﻈﺎﻣﯽ واﺑﺴﺘﻪ ﺑﻪ اﻟﻘﺎﻋﺪه ﯾﺎ داﻋﺶ ﺧﻮد را ﻧﺸﺎن ﻣﯽدادﻧﺪ‪ ،‬ﻣﻘﺎﺑﻠﻪ ﻣﯽﮐﻨﻨﺪ‪.‬‬

‫‪Turkey, too, has used soft power to project its regional influence. Ankara has a visible humanitarian,‬‬
‫‪military, and intelligence presence in regional hot spots, and it exercises growing—and‬‬
‫‪destabilizing—political sway by empowering trusted partners, which are usually aligned with‬‬
‫‪political Islam. Turkey encourages economic investment and facilitates trade, establishes religious‬‬
‫‪institutions and mosques, and finances cultural activities affiliated with Turkey and orthodox Islam.‬‬
‫‪It also builds bases, exports weapons, conducts training operations, and offers intelligence support‬‬
‫‪directly and through private companies or nongovernmental organizations.‬‬

‫ﺗﺮﮐﯿﻪ ﻧﯿﺰ ﺑﺮای ﻧﻤﺎﯾﺶ ﻧﻔﻮذ ﻣﻨﻄﻘﻪای ﺧﻮد از ﻗﺪرت ﻧﺮم اﺳﺘﻔﺎده ﮐﺮده اﺳﺖ‪ .‬آﻧﮑﺎرا ﺣﻀﻮر ﺑﺸﺮدوﺳﺘﺎﻧﻪ‪ ،‬ﻧﻈﺎﻣﯽ و اﻃﻼﻋﺎﺗﯽ‬
‫ً‬
‫ﻣﺸﻬﻮدی در ﻧﻘﺎط ﺣﺴﺎس ﻣﻨﻄﻘﻪ دارد و ﺑﻪوﺳﯿﻠﻪ ﺗﻘﻮ ﯾﺖ ﺷﺮﮐﺎی ﻣﻮرد اﻋﺘﻤﺎد ﮐﻪ ﻣﻌﻤﻮﻻ در ﺻﻒ اﺳﻼم ﺳﯿﺎﺳﯽ ﻗﺮار دارﻧﺪ اﻋﻤﺎل‬
‫ﻧﻔﻮذ ﺳﯿﺎﺳﯽ ﻓﺰاﯾﻨﺪه و ﺑﯽﺛﺒﺎتﮐﻨﻨﺪه ﻣﯽﻧﻤﺎﯾﺪ‪ .‬ﺗﺮﮐﯿﻪ اﻗﺪام ﺑﻪ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﯾﻪﮔﺬاری اﻗﺘﺼﺎدی و ﺗﺴﻬﯿﻞ ﺗﺠﺎرت ﻣﯽﻧﻤﺎﯾﺪ‪ ،‬ﻧﻬﺎدﻫﺎی ﻣﺬﻫﺒﯽ‬
‫و ﻣﺴﺎﺟﺪ اﺣﺪاث ﻣﯽﮐﻨﺪ و از ﻓﻌﺎﻟﯿﺖﻫﺎی ﻓﺮﻫﻨﮕﯽ واﺑﺴﺘﻪ ﺑﻪ ﺗﺮﮐﯿﻪ و اﺳﻼم ارﺗﺪوﮐﺲ ﺣﻤﺎﯾﺖ ﻣﺎﻟﯽ ﻣﯽﮐﻨﺪ‪ .‬اﯾﻦ ﮐﺸﻮر ﻫﻤﭽﻨﯿﻦ‬
‫ﭘﺎﯾﮕﺎه ﻣﯽﺳﺎزد‪ ،‬اﺳﻠﺤﻪ ﺻﺎدر ﻣﯽﮐﻨﺪ‪ ،‬ﻋﻤﻠﯿﺎتﻫﺎی آﻣﻮزﺷﯽ اﻧﺠﺎم ﻣﯽدﻫﺪ و ﺣﻤﺎﯾﺖ اﻃﻼﻋﺎﺗﯽ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﯿﻢ و از ﻃﺮﯾﻖ ﺷﺮﮐﺖﻫﺎی‬
‫ﺧﺼﻮﺻﯽ ﯾﺎ ﺳﺎزﻣﺎنﻫﺎی ﻣﺮدم ﻧﻬﺎد اراﺋﻪ ﻣﯽدﻫﺪ‪.‬‬

‫‪Both Iran and Turkey have figured out how to project regional influence through a combination of‬‬
‫‪hard and soft power. The United States has relied instead on hard power and economic sanctions,‬‬
‫‪both of which have had the unintended consequence of inviting ever deeper Iranian and Turkish‬‬
‫‪inroads into the region.‬‬

‫ﻫﻢ اﯾﺮان و ﻫﻢ ﺗﺮﮐﯿﻪ ﻣﺘﻮﺟﻪ ﺷﺪهاﻧﺪ ﮐﻪ ﭼﮕﻮﻧﻪ ﻧﻔﻮذ ﻣﻨﻄﻘﻪای را از ﻃﺮﯾﻖ ﺗﺮﮐﯿﺒﯽ از ﻗﺪرت ﺳﺨﺖ و ﻧﺮم ﺑﻪ ﻧﻤﺎﯾﺶ ﮔﺬارﻧﺪ‪ .‬در ﻋﻮض‬
‫اﯾﺎﻻت ﻣﺘﺤﺪه ﺑﻪ ﻗﺪرت ﺳﺨﺖ و ﺗﺤﺮﯾﻢﻫﺎی اﻗﺘﺼﺎدی ﺗﮑﯿﻪ ﮐﺮده اﺳﺖ ﮐﻪ ﻫﺮ دوی آﻧﻬﺎ ﻣﻨﺠﺮ ﺑﻪ ﭘﯿﺎﻣﺪ ﻧﺎﺧﻮاﺳﺘﻪ ﭘﯿﺶروی ﻫﺮﭼﻪ‬
‫ﻋﻤﯿﻖﺗﺮ اﯾﺮان و ﺗﺮﮐﯿﻪ در ﻣﻨﻄﻘﻪ ﺷﺪهاﻧﺪ‪.‬‬
Washington might get better results by mobilizing Arab soft power instead. The comparative
advantage the Gulf states hold over both Iran and Turkey, after all, is not their military capability but
their wealth. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have access to deep credit markets, immense sovereign
wealth funds, and large hard-currency reserves. If the United States were to encourage its allies to
use such wealth effectively, it could counter Iran’s regional influence without unnecessary recourse
to sanctions or escalatory threats.

‫ ﺑﺮﺗﺮی ﻧﺴﺒﯽ ﮐﻪ ﮐﺸﻮرﻫﺎی ﺧﻠﯿﺞ ﻓﺎرس‬،‫ ﺑﺎﻻﺧﺮه‬.‫واﺷﻨﮕﺘﻦ ﻣﻤﮑﻦ اﺳﺖ ﮐﻪ ﺑﺎ ﺑﺴﯿﺞ ﻗﺪرت ﻧﺮم اﻋﺮاب ﻧﺘﺎﯾﺞ ﺑﻬﺘﺮی ﺑﻪ دﺳﺖ آورد‬
‫ ﻋﺮﺑﺴﺘﺎن ﺳﻌﻮدی و اﻣﺎرات ﻣﺘﺤﺪه ﻋﺮﺑﯽ ﺑﻪ ﺑﺎزار اﻋﺘﺒﺎری‬.‫ﻧﺴﺒﺖ ﺑﻪ اﯾﺮان و ﺗﺮﮐﯿﻪ دارﻧﺪ ﻧﻪ ﺗﻮاﻧﻤﻨﺪی ﻧﻈﺎﻣﯽ ﺑﻠﮑﻪ ﺛﺮوت آﻧﻬﺎ اﺳﺖ‬
‫ اﮔﺮ اﯾﺎﻻت ﻣﺘﺤﺪه ﻣﺘﺤﺪﯾﻦ ﺧﻮد را‬.‫ ﺻﻨﺪوق ﺛﺮوت ﻣﻠﯽ ﺑﯽاﻧﺪازه و ذﺧﺎﯾﺮ ﻋﻈﯿﻤﯽ از ارزﻫﺎی اﺣﺘﯿﺎﻃﯽ دﺳﺘﺮﺳﯽ دارﻧﺪ‬،‫ﻋﻤﯿﻖ‬
‫ ﻣﯽﺗﻮاﻧﺪ ﺑﺪون ﺗﻮﺳﻞ ﻏﯿﺮﺿﺮوری ﺑﻪ ﺗﺤﺮﯾﻢﻫﺎ ﯾﺎ ﺗﻬﺪﯾﺪات ﺗﺸﺪﯾﺪﮐﻨﻨﺪه‬،‫ﺗﺸﻮ ﯾﻖ ﻧﻤﺎﯾﺪ ﮐﻪ از اﯾﻦ ﺛﺮوت ﺑﻪﻃﻮر ﻣﺆﺛﺮ اﺳﺘﻔﺎده ﻧﻤﺎﯾﻨﺪ‬
.‫ﻧﻔﻮذ ﻣﻨﻄﻘﻪای اﯾﺮان را ﺧﻨﺜﯽ ﻧﻤﺎﯾﺪ‬

Tacitly recognizing these realities will be difficult for the United States, which has for so long
committed itself to objectives that it cannot actually produce. Washington has tended to view the use
of economic and soft power to cajole or contain illiberal forces as a kind of appeasement. But—as
Iran has itself demonstrated—soft power is a potent instrument in any realist foreign policy, such as
the one now called for in the Middle East. Properly leveraged, soft power could ultimately obviate
the need for the harder kind.

‫ﺗﺼﺪﯾﻖ ﺿﻤﻨﯽ اﯾﻦ واﻗﻌﯿﺎت ﺑﺮای اﯾﺎﻻت ﻣﺘﺤﺪه ﮐﻪ ﺑﺮای ﻣﺪت زﯾﺎدی ﺧﻮد را ﻣﺘﻌﻬﺪ ﺑﻪ اﻫﺪاﻓﯽ ﮐﺮده اﺳﺖ ﮐﻪ در واﻗﻊ ﻧﻤﯽﺗﻮاﻧﺪ‬
‫ واﺷﻨﮕﺘﻦ ﺗﻤﺎﯾﻞ داﺷﺘﻪ اﺳﺖ ﺗﺎ اﺳﺘﻔﺎده از ﻗﺪرت ﻧﺮم و اﻗﺘﺼﺎدی ﺑﺮای ﻓﺮﯾﻔﺘﻦ ﯾﺎ ﻣﻬﺎر ﻧﯿﺮوﻫﺎی‬.‫ﺑﻪ آﻧﻬﺎ ﺑﺮﺳﺪ اﻣﺮی دﺷﻮار ﺧﻮاﻫﺪ ﺑﻮد‬
‫ اﻣﺎ ﻫﻤﺎﻧﻄﻮر ﮐﻪ اﯾﺮان ﻧﺸﺎن داده اﺳﺖ ﻗﺪرت ﻧﺮم اﺑﺰاری ﻧﯿﺮوﻣﻨﺪ در ﺳﯿﺎﺳﺖ‬.‫ﻏﯿﺮﻟﯿﺒﺮاﻟﯽ را ﺑﻪﻋﻨﻮان ﻧﻮﻋﯽ از ﺳﺎزش در ﻧﻈﺮ ﮔﯿﺮد‬
‫ ﻗﺪرت ﻧﺮﻣﯽ‬.‫ ﻣﯽﺑﺎﺷﺪ‬،‫ﺧﺎرﺟﯽ واﻗﻊﺑﯿﻨﺎﻧﻪ ﻣﺎﻧﻨﺪ ﻫﻤﺎن ﭼﯿﺰی ﮐﻪ اﮐﻨﻮن در ﺳﯿﺎﺳﺖ ﺧﺎرﺟﯽ ﻧﺴﺒﺖ ﺑﻪ ﺧﺎورﻣﯿﺎﻧﻪ ﺑﻪ آن ﻧﯿﺎز اﺳﺖ‬
ً
.‫ﮐﻪ ﺑﻪ درﺳﺘﯽ ﻣﻮرد اﺳﺘﻔﺎده ﻗﺮار ﮔﯿﺮد ﻣﯽﺗﻮاﻧﺪ ﻧﻬﺎﯾﺘﺎ ﻧﯿﺎز ﺑﻪ ﻧﻮﻋﯽ ﺳﺨﺖﺗﺮ از اﯾﻦ ﻗﺪرت را ﻣﺮﺗﻔﻊ ﺳﺎزد‬

Using the wealth of Gulf allies to counter Iranian influence is not without its drawbacks. Many in the
U.S. policy community may distrust the governments of the Arab petrostates, particularly Saudi
Arabia, given its alleged murder of the journalist Jamal Khashoggi, persecution of liberal dissidents,
and prosecution of the war in Yemen. Moreover, Gulf money could easily wind up, as it has in the
‫‪past, lining the pockets of corrupt regional politicians while doing little to advance such politically‬‬
‫‪complicated agendas as democratic reform or the protection of minority rights in the region.‬‬

‫اﺳﺘﻔﺎده از ﺛﺮوت ﻣﺘﺤﺪﯾﻦ ﺧﻠﯿﺞ ﻓﺎرس ﺑﺮای ﺧﻨﺜﯽﺳﺎزی ﻧﻔﻮذ اﯾﺮان ﺑﺪون ﻣﺸﮑﻞ ﻧﯿﺴﺖ‪ .‬ﺑﺴﯿﺎری در ﺟﺎﻣﻌﻪ ﺳﯿﺎﺳﯽ اﯾﺎﻻت ﻣﺘﺤﺪه‬
‫ً‬
‫ﻣﻤﮑﻦ اﺳﺖ ﺑﻪ دوﻟﺖﻫﺎی ﮐﺸﻮرﻫﺎی ﻧﻔﺘﯽ ﻋﺮﺑﯽ اﻋﺘﻤﺎد ﻧﮑﻨﻨﺪ‪ ،‬ﻣﺨﺼﻮﺻﺎ ﻋﺮﺑﺴﺘﺎن ﺻﻌﻮدی ﺑﺎ ﺗﻮﺟﻪ ﺑﻪ اﺗﻬﺎم ﻗﺘﻞ روزﻧﺎﻣﻪﻧﮕﺎر‬
‫ﺟﻤﺎل ﺧﺎﺷﻘﭽﯽ‪ ،‬ﺷﮑﻨﺠﻪ ﻣﺨﺎﻟﻔﯿﻦ ﻟﯿﺒﺮال و ﺑﻪراه اﻧﺪاﺧﺘﻦ ﺟﻨﮓ در ﯾﻤﻦ‪ .‬ﻋﻼوه ﺑﺮ اﯾﻦ‪ ،‬ﭘﻮل اﯾﻦ ﮐﺸﻮرﻫﺎ ﻣﯽﺗﻮاﻧﺪ ﺑﻪ آﺳﺎﻧﯽ ﻫﻤﺎﻧﻨﺪ‬
‫ﭼﯿﺰی ﮐﻪ در ﮔﺬﺷﺘﻪ رخ داده اﺳﺖ از ﺟﯿﺐ ﺳﯿﺎﺳﺖﻣﺪاران ﻓﺎﺳﺪ ﻣﻨﻄﻘﻪ ﺳﺮ در آورد و ﮐﻤﮏ ﭼﻨﺪاﻧﯽ ﺑﻪ ﭘﯿﺶﺑﺮد ﻃﺮحﻫﺎی ﺳﯿﺎﺳﯽ‬
‫ﭘﯿﭽﯿﺪه ﻣﺎﻧﻨﺪ اﺻﻼح دﻣﻮﮐﺮاﺗﯿﮏ ﯾﺎ ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺖ از ﺣﻘﻮق اﻗﻠﯿﺖ در ﻣﻨﻄﻘﻪ ﻧﮑﻨﺪ‪.‬‬

‫‪Efforts to roll back Iranian and Turkish regional influence by force have not worked. Fortunately,‬‬
‫‪there is an alternative. The United States is much better at promoting capitalism and free trade than it‬‬
‫‪is at regime change. Washington should make constructive use of the Gulf states’ desire to reengage‬‬
‫‪with Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq, rather than restraining it. In so doing, the United States can achieve its‬‬
‫‪strategic goals while leaving the people in the region better off and minimizing prospects for military‬‬
‫‪escalation.‬‬
‫ﺗﻼشﻫﺎ ﺑﻪﻣﻨﻈﻮر ﻋﻘﺐ راﻧﺪن ﻧﻔﻮذ ﻣﻨﻄﻘﻪای اﯾﺮان و ﺗﺮﮐﯿﻪ ﺑﻪوﺳﯿﻠﻪ زور ﮐﺎرﺳﺎز ﻧﺒﻮدهاﻧﺪ‪ .‬ﺧﻮﺷﺒﺨﺘﺎﻧﻪ‪ ،‬ﺟﺎﯾﮕﺰ ﯾﻨﯽ وﺟﻮد دارد‪.‬‬
‫اﯾﺎﻻت ﻣﺘﺤﺪه در ﺗﺮو ﯾﺞ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﯾﻪداری و ﺗﺠﺎرت آزاد ﻧﺴﺒﺖ ﺑﻪ ﺗﻐﯿﯿﺮ رژ ﯾﻢ ﻋﻤﻠﮑﺮد ﺧﯿﻠﯽ ﺑﻬﺘﺮی دارد‪ .‬واﺷﻨﮕﺘﻦ ﺑﺎﯾﺪ اﺳﺘﻔﺎده ﺳﺎزﻧﺪه‬
‫از ﺗﻤﺎﯾﻞ ﮐﺸﻮرﻫﺎی ﺧﻠﯿﺞ ﻓﺎرس ﺑﺮای ﺑﺮﻗﺮاری ارﺗﺒﺎط دﯾﮕﺮﺑﺎره ﺑﺎ ﺳﻮرﯾﻪ‪ ،‬ﻟﺒﻨﺎن و ﻋﺮاق داﺷﺘﻪ ﺑﺎﺷﺪ و ﻧﺒﺎﯾﺪ آن را ﻣﺤﺪود ﻧﻤﺎﯾﺪ‪.‬‬
‫اﯾﺎﻻت ﻣﺘﺤﺪه ﺑﺎ اﻧﺠﺎم اﯾﻦ ﮐﺎر ﻣﯽﺗﻮاﻧﺪ ﺑﻪ اﻫﺪاف راﻫﺒﺮدی ﺧﻮد دﺳﺖ ﯾﺎﺑﺪ‪ ،‬ﻣﺮدم ﻣﻨﻄﻘﻪ را در ﺷﺮاﯾﻂ ﺑﻬﺘﺮی ﻗﺮار دﻫﺪ و دورﻧﻤﺎی‬
‫اﻓﺰاﯾﺶ ﺗﻨﺶ ﻧﻈﺎﻣﯽ را ﺑﻪ ﺣﺪاﻗﻞ رﺳﺎﻧﺪ‪.‬‬

‫واژﮔﺎن ﮐﻠﯿﺪی‪:‬‬

‫ﻧﺸﺄت ﮔﺮﻓﺘﻦ‪ ،‬رﯾﺸﻪ داﺷﺘﻦ ‪Stem:‬‬

‫ﻣﺎﺟﺮاﺟﻮ ﯾﯽ ‪Adventurism:‬‬
‫ﻣﺎﻧﻊ ﺷﺪن ‪Stymie:‬‬
‫ﺑﺮاﺑﺮیﮐﻨﻨﺪه ‪Countervailing:‬‬
‫ﺗﺸﮑﯿﻞ ﺷﺪه‪ ،‬ﺑﻪوﺟﻮد آﻣﺪه ‪Wrought:‬‬
‫ﺳﻠﻄﻪ ‪Domination:‬‬
Hot spots: ‫ ﻧﻘﺎط ﺣﺴﺎس‬،‫ﻧﻘﺎط داغ‬
Sway: ‫ ﻗﺪرت‬،‫ﻧﻔﻮذ‬
Inroad: ‫ﭘﯿﺶروی‬
Sovereign Wealth Fund: ‫ﺻﻨﺪوق ﺛﺮوت ﻣﻠﯽ‬
Hard currency: ‫ارز اﺣﺘﯿﺎﻃﯽ‬
Recourse: ‫ﺗﻮﺳﻞ‬
Cajole: ‫ﻓﺮﯾﻔﺘﻦ‬
Potent: ‫ﻧﯿﺮوﻣﻨﺪ‬
Obviate: ‫ﻣﺮﺗﻔﻊ ﮐﺮدن‬
Dissident: ‫ﻣﺨﺎﻟﻒ‬