Re Sanctification of Space in Albania TH

Balkan and Baltic States in United Europe.
Histories, Religions, and Cultures II
Re-sanctification of Space in Albania – The case of Sunni Islam
Matthias Bickert
Abstract
Albania is a country with different religions and a high tolerance between them. This statement
is uttered often and willingly used by Albanians, state officials, clerics as well as by foreign
media. Nevertheless, various scientists deconstruct this as self-credit and ‘myth’. Albania was
in fact during its rigid communist regime and particularly between 1967 and 1990, the first and
until today only atheistic state. During this time, all sacral buildings of the country were first
closed and then either destroyed or transformed into storages, libraries, sports-halls, and cultural
centers. Nowadays there are four major religions active in Albania: Sunni-Islam, Bektashism
as well as Orthodox Christianity and Catholicism.
Starting from this background, when paying a visit to Albania, one can observe a significant
religious re-sanctification in the country’s landscape. Since 1991 several new orthodox and
catholic churches have been constructed in different zones of Albania. Nevertheless, the amount
of new mosques is most evident amongst all religions and present in the entire country. Even
remote settlements, semi-deserted areas and so called communist new towns - cities, in which
the communist regime never permitted religious buildings–have witnessed a recent emergence
of church towers and/or minarets as urban landmarks. Besides this, the religious affiliation of
the Albanian civil society and their attendance of religious services still remain unmeasured,
leaving unclear whether Albanians are really becoming more religious in the recent years of
transition. Besides this, the modern laic Albanian state itself does not actively support the
construction of religious buildings. However, the high construction activity of new mosques in
the country is supported by foreign donators from Arabic states, and more recently from Turkey.
Considering the defective role of the state during the communist regime makes a close control
and regulation of religions a “pariah” for modern Albanian politics. What remains, are
publically unresolved topics, like the fear of religious extremism, a misbalance between spatial
and spiritual presence of religion in Albania and the question of political instrumentalization of
religion and religious symbolism by foreign investors.
The article critically discusses these topics using examples of three communist new towns in
Albania. It will at first give a synopsis on the historic and demographic setting of religion in
Albania. From this point, the relation between the religious affiliation of Albanians and the
(Islamic) re-sanctification of space will be drawn from a geographic point of view. It relies on
data from recent interviews, conducted with public administrations, religious communities,
Imams and resident population on national and local level.
Key words: religious re-sanctification, landscape, Albania, religious communities,

geography
Introduction
“Albania is a country with various religions and a high tolerance between them”.
Statements like this are often used by Albanians, state officials, clerics and foreign media.
Nevertheless, various scientists deconstruct this as self-credit and “myth”. One can only
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Balkan and Baltic States in United Europe. Histories, Religions, and Cultures II
understand this discussion, when having an eye on the country’s history. Having been in a
geographically inclined position between the Western and Eastern Roman Empire and by being
from the 15th until the early 20th century under Ottoman rule, the territory of the later founded
Albanian state came under many opposing foreign influences. This determined the consequent
flow of religiosity between Christianity and Islam and its different confessions. During
Communism, Enver Hoxha’s rigid regime showed a concerted effort to stamp out religious
affiliation which came to a head when Albania declared itself the first (and so far world’s only
officially) atheistic state. This period lasted from 1967 to 1990, during which time the Albanian
communists showed an unyielding aggression towards religion, starting from the destruction
and transformation of sacred buildings to the internment and execution of clerics and religious
leaders. Today, Albania is a secular state, which recognizes four main religions (Sunni-Islam,
Bektashism, Orthodox and Catholic Christianity) as part of its history.
The paper examines how religions in general, and Sunni Islam in particular, reappeared in
Albania’s post-socialist cultural landscape by the construction of new mosques and the
symbolic nature of this re-emergence. This raises the question “does the high occurrence of re-
sanctification of secular space as religious space match the social necessity of the local
population?” This becomes relevant when taking into account an evidence showing that a low
level of the population is actually actively engaged in attending prayer in these spaces. I will
also examine whether the construction of new mosques is in accordance with the fulfillment of
a necessity within the Albanian society, after the religious life was forced to be drawn back
from the public sphere into a solely private, familial environment.
Three case studies are presented to show the wide range of mosque-building processes
and which donors stand behind them. It is based on 16 guided interviews with state officials,
clerics and the resident population.
Theoretical approach
Within the approach of the so-called new cultural geographies, Tse (Tse, 2014, 202)
states that, “the task of geographers who deal with religion is to reveal spaces, places, and
networks as constituted by grounded theologies, performative practices of place-making
informed by understandings of the transcendent; […] they are grounded insofar as they inform
immanent processes of cultural place-making, the negotiation of social identities, and the
formations of [geo-]political boundaries, including in geographies where theological analyses
do not seem relevant.” This case study on Albania focuses on these aspects in the framework
of a religiously heterogeneous society. Especially in a time when the integration of the Western
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Balkans in the European Union has been highly discussed, the question of the religious culture
of Europe and the role of Islam is more contemporary than ever. Leitner (Leitner, 1989, 99-
100) asks for the built expression of sacral buildings in relation to the spatial interaction of
humans. Focault already recognized that space is “fundamental in any exercise of power”
(Focault, 1984, quoted by Kong, 2001 and Harvey, 2007, 45). Therefore, the topic of this paper
must be seen in the context of a regained possibility to express religious power in Albania. In
the modern urban geography, which focuses on social interactions, the case of new mosques in
transforming communist era new towns and peri-urban areas, and their functional integration
in urban interaction should be considered. New towns constructed during the communist period
are places, which due to Hoxha’s politics of Atheism, never possessed any sacral building, and
therefore should be especially studied. Leitner (Leitner, 1989, 104) formulates the thesis that
the persistence of “religious bodies” in distinct quarters is dependent on the life-time of these
structures. Therefore, one must ask for the sensual cognition and the emotional requirements of
space (Leitner, 1989, 104). Evidence for this can be found when a new mosque becomes an
illuminate exception in a degrading urban landscape, and hereby a symbol for hope and an
expectation for further future investment and increasing economic prosperity. Therefore,
questions on modernization theory must be asked. I.e., Pollack (Pollack, 1998, 23-25)
hypothesizes that besides political repression, the (industrial) modernization and growing
urbanization in the socialist states are the main reasons for a decline of religiosity during the
communist period. Henkel & Knippenberg (Henkel, Knippenberg, 2005, 6) conclude that,
“modernization has eroded the dominance of religion in society [and] the more economic
growth and the more welfare state, the more society becomes secularized or less religiously
engaged.” In contrast, the economic collapse in the socialist states caused in the early 1990s in
some countries a return of religiosity due to poverty, high rates of unemployment, and a search
for orientation in an unknown system. Nevertheless, religiosity was believed to again decline
by new modernization processes (Pollack, 1998, 22-23, 38).
When observing Albania’s recent economic development, a sort of high speed progress
can be confirmed. This would therefore correlate to a decline of religious engagement.
Nevertheless, Albania’s past and their stiff suppression of religiosity must be kept in mind when
watching the religious engagement of Albanians. What remains is the question, “Does the
current level of religious engagement within Albanian society match the high number of new
religious buildings being built throughout the country?”
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Secularization of society vs. re-sanctification of space?

Religious affiliation in Southeast Europe
Pollack (Pollack, 1998, 39) discovered a significant mismatch between religious self-
proclamation and the actual attendance of religious services in post-socialist countries. While
the former rose after the fall of the communism, the latter stagnated or declined. Instead, the
revaluation of religion in Southeast Europe in the beginning of the 1990s was an institutional,
political and national act that was not carried over spiritually. Various Southeast European
states proclaimed a state religion and “millions of new confessors who (essentially) did not
believe in God, but rather in the nation and the nation state” started attending services
(Ivanišević, 2012a, 10, my translation). Religion became a temporary, national-political
fashion (Ivanišević, 2012a, 10). But, as the Albanian case shows, no generalization should be
made here. Unlike in Bulgaria or former Yugoslavia, in Albania between 1967 and 1990 no
attendance of religious services were possible at all. With its new democratic constitution,
Albania then took a more neutral path, and declared itself a “laic” state. Nevertheless, in 2001,
the country officially recognized the four above mentioned “traditional religions” giving them
a special status which freed them from paying taxes on registered land and property and allowed
the possibility to obtain public financial aid.
Pollack (Pollack, 1998, 19-20) also showed that the higher the degree of religious
suppression during the communist regime, the lower the religious affiliation in the following
transitional period. Therefore, i.e. in Serbia, Croatia, or Bulgaria, for centuries, the church had
applied to be the keeper and representative of a national identity (Pollack, 1998, 27). In Albania
no single religion could take this function. Besides having a majority of the population with a
Muslim background, a single religion cannot be seen as equivalent to the above mentioned
states. It is rather the religious inhomogeneity, which Albanians attribute to themselves as being
characteristically Albanian.
Religious affiliation in Albania

The data on religious affiliations of Albanians, which are often stressed by the foreign
media, are usually referring to records that are more than 70 years old. Before the 2011 census,
the last time Albanians’ religious denominations were accurately recorded was in 1942/1943
(Bartl, 1993, 587; Ceka, 2010, 221). Still today, the media often use this data to claim that
around 70% of Albanians are Muslims, 20% Orthodox and 10% Catholics. But, in fact, it can
hardly be measured how religious Albanians are in reality. There is a high discrepancy between
the statements of religious representatives, the self-declaration of Albanian citizens, and the
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actual practice of religion. By the end of the 1990’s Vickers & Pettifer (Vickers, Pettifer,
1997, 108) concluded that “there is little sign” of a mass revival of Albanians with Muslim
heritage. Additionally, religious hybridity and phenomena like crypto-Christianity blur the
often distorted image of a clean religious affiliation.
After a lengthy discussion as to whether religious affiliation should be recorded during the 2001
Census (Clayer, 2007, 10), the question was not asked. For the 2011 Census, the state
authorities decided to insert the question, but unlike the other questions, it was not obligatory
to answer it. Therefore, no comparison of the development of religious self-declaration in the
last decade can be made:
Table 1. Religious Affiliation in Albania, according to the Census 2011 (INSTAT, 2011)
Resident Percentage of resident

Religious affiliation population population
Total 2.800.138 100
Muslims 1.587.608 56,70
Bektashi 58.628 2,09
Catholics 280.921 10,03
Orthodox 188.992 6,75
Evangelists 3.797 0,14
Other Christians 1.919 0,07
Believers without
denomination* 153.63 5,49
Atheists 69.995 2,50
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Others 602 0,02
Prefer not to answer 386.024 13,79
Not relevant/not stated 68.022 2,43
*Persons who answered ‘I don’t belong to any religion, but I am a believer’
At first glance it can be observed that the group of peoplewho did not want to declare
their religion represent a larger group than the Catholics (being the second largest openly
acknowledged religious group). Compared with the often drawn public image of religious
assignment of the population, various religious representatives could not be satisfied with the
outcome of the census registration. Jazexhi (Jazexhi, 2013, 22) describes: “Some officials from
the Muslim Community of Albania have expressed their unhappiness with the census results,
claiming that according to their calculations the percentage of the Muslims was 70%.” Similar
statements have also been made by the Orthodox Church in Albania. Before results from the
2011 Census were published, the religious groups were claiming even higher percentages of
believers within the Albanian society. Catholics claimed to represent 15% of the population,
while the Muslim community believed itself to comprise between 80% or 90% of all Albanians
(Clayer, 2007, 10).
Still, 23 years of state sanctioned atheism effectively interrupted the open practice of
religious traditions by more than one generation. This generation and their descendants, whose
desires are focused on the here and now, are of material aspect in shaping the Albania of
tomorrow (Ceka, 2010, 228-229). For this reason “according to the 2007-2008 Gallup polls, 63
percent of Albanians claimed that religion does not play an important role in their lives”
(Pistrick, 2013, 76). A majority of Albanians may state that they belong to a religion, when in
fact they neither practice religious rituals nor attend any kind of religious service, nor could
they define exact differences between the religions. But what can still be concluded is that there
is a certain regional disparity of religions in the country. While Catholicism is strongest in the
northern and northwestern part of Albania, Orthodox believers are concentrated in the south
and southeastern parts of Albania, close to the Greek border. Sunni Islam can be found in the
entire country, but its share of believers of the total population must be considered biggest in
central Albania. Bektashism has its historical center in the area of the central Albanian town of
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Kruja and in several villages around Mali Tomorrit, a sacred place for Bektashis. Nevertheless,
due to the strict communist settlement policy, especially innewly built and newly populated
towns of the communist era, these relations vary more dramatically.
Externally steered re-sanctification in Albania

In 1997, Vickers & Pettifer ( Vickers, Pettifer, 1997, 107) stated: “It remains to be seen
if Albania’s separation of state and religion can be maintained. The only tangible evidence of
activity that could affect it has been a steadily increasing number of newly-built or refurbished
mosques […]”. The implications of this observation have become even more significant in the
recent years as more religious buildings (both Christian and Muslim) continue to be built.
Various studies from different fields mention this aspect (see i.e. Ivanišević, 2012b; Clayer,
2007; Pollack et al., 1998), but a geographic approach to the Islamic re-sanctification of secular
space in Albania remains a desideratum. A geographic approach to religiosity in South-East
Europe has thus far focused primarily on the distribution of religions amongst populations (see
i.e. Henkel, Knippenberg, 2005; Bilska-Wodecka, 2005; Pollack, 1998; Bogomilova Todorova,
1998), but not on the placement of prominent structures in the built environment.
Nearly starved during the Hoxha-regime, the religious communities in Albania are today
economically too weak to fund the many new religious buildings in the country and are
therefore relying on investments from foreign donors. This external determination of religion
is seen as a major problem for some religious groups in Albania. It concerns Bektashism to a
far lesser extent, as their world center is based in Tirana and therefore fits into the nationalistic
requirement of a fully acceptable “native” religion. While the Catholic religion is traditionally
guided by the Vatican, and many Catholic clerics are not Albanian, this fact is hardly criticized
(Murzaku, 2008, 7). For the case of the Orthodox Church and Sunni Islam in Albania, the
situation is viewed as much more problematic. Critics of the Orthodox Church focus on the fact
that the Autocephalous Orthodox Church of Albania is led by Archbishop Anastasios
Yannoulatos, who is of Greek origin and would constantly try to “Hellenize” the Albanian
Orthodox Church (see Murzaku, 2008, 6). An Albanian historian and journalist said on this
topic during an interview:
“There are coming the Greeks, the Turks, the Arabians, the Americans, the Vatican.
Our politicians always had inferiority to foreigners. Nothing is said against them. The
politicians have a complex. I wish that the Albanians would have their own religion, like the
Serbs or the Bulgarians. They have a Serbian and Bulgarian Orthodox Church. Our Orthodox
Church is not even headed by an Albanian”.
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For the case of Sunni Islam, the main bone of contention is the donor driven influence
that often comes from Arabian countries. Clayer (Clayer, 2007, 15-16) stated that Islam in
Albania was re-composited due to the arrival of Islamic groups from the neighboring Balkan
countries, Arab countries, Iran, Turkey, Syria, Egypt, Indonesia, Malaysia as well as by the
European and American Muslim Diaspora. “Each of them brings its own version of Islam, its
own financial power, its own networks, its own pieces of religious corpus from which the local
actors can draw according to their sensibilities, their needs and their interests.” At this time,
most activities came from Arab NGOs (Clayer, 2007, 15-16). Accordingly, several
fundamentalist groups (Wahabi and Salafi) opened Islamic schools in the country and translated
propagandistic literature into the Albanian language (Murzaku, 2008, 4). Saudi Arabia paid for
and imported more than half a million copies of the Koran, “which so exceeded local demand
that a familiar sight in mosques in 1991 and 1992 was numerous unopened boxes of these
volumes” (Vickers, Pettifer, 1997, 102).
The re-establishment of religion gradually increased and by September 1992 already
around 100 mosques and thirty Catholic and Orthodox churches had been reopened in the entire
country. Also some 100 scholarships were granted for pupils to study in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia,
Libya, Egypt and Turkey (Vickers, Pettifer, 1997, 100). Kuwait financially supported Albania
in the early years of the transition, in order to get permission to build several mosques inside
the country. Similar actions were undertaken by the Alislamic Alouk foundation, based in the
Netherlands (Vickers, Pettifer, 1997, 102–103). Pistrick (Pistrick, 2013, 77) recognizes that,
the Sunni community “has regained in strength. Funds particularly from Turkey and Arab
countries allowed them to construct religious schools and colleges and to rebuild mosques”. As
the realignment of religious communities in Albania took place in a very young society, where
at least one generation grew up without religion, “the reestablishment of the Albanian Muslim
Community […] fell into a vacuum which was filled by foreign support. […] The many ‘village
mosques’ according to rarely standardized building plans make it easily distinguishable, if the
donoris from Turkey, Saudi Arabia or other Gulf-States” (Schmidt-Neke, 2012, 13, my
translation).
In 2012, the Muslim Community of Albania had 535 mosques under their protection
(Jazexhi, 2013, 27-28). This development changed “after the start of the United States-led ‘war
on terror’, [when] most of the Arab NGOs which were sponsoring the madrasas were removed
from the country or reduced their activities. They were replaced by Turkish organizations
(mostly of the Fethullah Gülen movement which at present runs five out of seven madrasas)”
(ibid.). Nevertheless, the many mosques created at this time, even if not operating, are a
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persistent structure in the Albanian landscape. Parallels to this can be found in Kosovo and
Bosnia, where foreign Islamic organizations are also investing in various new sacral buildings
and madrasas, whose appearances lack any regard for domestic architectural traditions
(Kołczyńska, 2012, 177).
The classic Albanian mosques are of the Ottoman type, which is consisting of a prayer
hall in domed construction, to which smaller domes may be attached in some cases. The prayer
hall has a rectangular layout. At one of its corners, a pencil-shaped minaret is attached (Schmitt,
2003, 43). For its symbolism and spatial visibility, the minaret (as well as the church tower) is
of a special interest, as these dominant architectural features are (like church towers) widely
visible in rural and urban landscapes. Numerous in appearance, they can be seen as an
expression of predominance and territorial claim. Here the Sunni Islam is different from the
architecture of the Bektashiprayerlodges, the so called Tekke or Teqe, as those do not have a
minaret (though they often rely on the verticality of the minaret like cypress tree for visual
distinction). Endresen (Endresen, 2012, 204 & 218) argues that Albania does not have a strong
tradition of religious symbols in the landscape. She hinges this on the fact that single crosses
are rarely put in the landscapes and the religious architecture would be “quite discrete” and
different from other Muslim inhabited places in the Balkans, which have many big mosques
built by foreign sponsors. Nevertheless, watching the scale of recently finished and planned
religious buildings, such as the Ebu Bekr Mosque in Shkodra, the so far largest mosque in the
Balkans, the new mosque in Fier, or the scale of the planned mosque at the Namazgjah in Tirana
(which would be several hundred m² bigger than the one in Shkodra) as well as the new
Orthodox and Catholic Cathedrals in Tirana’s center, discretion was hardly maintained in those
cases. In addition, the sheer amount of new religious buildings, which are visible in every corner
of the country, have significantly re-sanctified the post-socialist Albanian landscape.
The myth of the religious tolerance in Albania

Albanian state authorities and clerics as well as Albanian citizens often bring to the fore
that religious tolerance is a special Albanian phenomenon. The Department of Territorial
Planning of Tirana stated in an interview that, “the construction of various sacral buildings in
the center of Tirana is evidence of religious diversity, but also of tolerance and peaceful
coexistence of the religious communities in Albania.” The often proclaimed peaceful
coexistence of Islam and Christianity is seen as truly Albanian and often connected to the
tolerance of Albanians themselves. Fueling this opinion even more, Pope Francis made the
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announcement preceding his recent visit to Albania that Albania would have, “religious
harmony like nowhere else” 1.
Nevertheless, scientists deconstruct this as a myth and speak about “serious tensions”
amongst all active religious groups in Albania (Murzaku, 2008, 3-5). Pistrick (Pistrick,
2013, 72–74) states that, “Dealing with religion [and religious tolerance] in Albania means
dealing with stereotypes, myths and politically instrumentalized data [and] the myth of religious
tolerance has found a strong resonance among Albanians and has therefore become internalized.
Up to the present day it serves as a symbolic resource for identity constructions”. The Albanian
historian and self-proclaimed Muslim activist, Olsi Jazexhi (Jazexhi, 2013, 32) confirms this
and stresses the role of Albanian politics in this matter: “Even though Communist Albania was
one of the most ruthless countries of Eastern Europe in suppressing religious freedoms, the
official myth that the state politicians have adopted after the fall of Communism is that Albania
is a country of religious tolerance and harmony.” Before an Albanian nation was created,
Albanians were more likely to define themselves by religious affiliation than by a common
language. It was not until the recently recognized Albanian religions were equally forced by the
fear of the ethno-politics of their Greek and Serbian neighbors to, “lay down hyper-ethnic
bindings and to combine to a modern ethnically defined nation […] It was only with the national
movement, when the picture of a religiously indifferent and especially tolerant nation was
drawn, which was after 1945 enforced by an anti-religious and finally official atheistic
communist state” (Schmitt, 2012, 120, my translation).
According to Murzaku (Murzaku, 2008, 5) the, “competition between the various
religious personnel has worsened during post-communism, despite continuous references to the
so-called traditional tolerance of Albanian religious communities”. To understand the
animosity, the perception of Albanian clerics’interpretation of the Albanian national hero,
Skanderbeg (1405-1468), is crucial: For the Catholics and Orthodox, but also for the Bektashi,
Skanderbeg’s defeat is the beginning of a national and religious suffering under the Ottomans.
For the Sunni Muslim clerics, the defeat of Skanderbeg is perceived as a “happy end”, by which
the national-Illyrian history of the Albanians is linearly continued by an Ottoman era (Endresen,
2010, 249-250). Endresen (Endresen, 2010, 251) sums up: “The clerics’ ideal Albanian is a
fervent patriot, fundamentally religious, and a champion of religious tolerance. He is pro-
European, democratic, embodies lIIyrian virtues, and he never mixes religion and politics.
Moreover, he respects local traditions and remains loyal to them, resisting all anti-Albanian
1
Vizionplus.tv, “Papa përvizitënnë Shqipëri, ‘harmoniafetare, siaskundtjetër’”, http://vizionplus.al/papa-per-
viziten-ne-shqiperi-harmonia-fetare-si-askund-tjeter/, accessed on 19 August 2014.
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influences. Out of this basic national model the communities mold different religious versions,
which in the clerics’ view, always conform to the original but which the other communities
may see as deviations”. Compared to the clerics’ point of view, it must be concluded that for
many Albanians religion is much less fundamental for their identity than pretending to be
religiously tolerant while in effect being religiously ignorant to the point of indifference.
Destructive past resulting in political passivity

Hoxha’s strict communism was guided by a deep nationalism and his legitimation of
power was built on the fight against foreign invaders. Therefore, a historiography was created
that showed the Albanian people as constantly exposed to foreign intruders, starting from the
Illyrians fighting against the Roman Empire, Skanderbeg’s battle against the Ottomans,
potential Slavic and Greek intrusion during the nation-building process and the Partisan’s
skirmishes against Italian and German occupation. During Hoxha’s reign, scenarios of foreign
invasion were created to consolidate his power. Besides all western, free market economies,
states of the eastern bloc were also continuously declared as enemies of the Albanian people.
At first it hit Tito’s Yugoslavia (1948), but also the USSR in the1960s. Especially after the
break with China in 1978 and the beginning of the autocentric development, anti-nationalism
was one of the highest committable crimes in communist Albania. To this effect “religious
ideology” was made an anti-nationalist arch-enemyon the same level as capitalism and
revisionism. Therefore, it was not religion, but its ideology, which needed to be fought (Steiner,
1978, 340-341).
After a speech by Enver Hoxha on the 6 February 1967, all sacral buildings (more than
2,000 2), among them around 740 mosques, were closed by the communist regime. Later, if
there was no special cultural, historic or architectural value, they were either destroyed and their
materials used for the construction of profane buildings, or they were transformed into cultural
centers, sports halls, cinemas, storage depots, barns etc. (Steiner, 1978, 339; Bartl, 1993, 608–
609). The clerics were either forced to take on mundane work, or sentenced to death (Steiner,
1978, 340; Bartl, 1993, 610). Bartl (Bartl, 1993, 610) mentions that in 1971, 14 Catholic
clerics were left in the entire country, of which twelve were sent to work in labor camps and
two had gone into hiding.
No other southeast European country carried out such a severe destruction and
transformation of religious buildings into libraries, sport centers, etc., as was done in Albania.
2
Steiner (1978, 339) mentions 2071, Bartl (1993, 608) 2035, Ceka (2010, 223) 2160 and Pistrick (2013, 77)
2169 closed sacral buildings.
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In fact, in Romania and Bulgaria it was quite the contrary. There, the Orthodox Church stayed
an important authority in the state. With the help of “nationalistic rhetoric” it was able to
maintain its power even after the political transition (Buchenau, 2012, 81). Tse, 2014 (as in
Sopher, 1967) argues that communism, by being antithetic to it, developed from theological
thought and can be seen as “quasi-religious”. Therefore it similarly affected the built
environment and geographical landscape, i.e., with the construction of more than 1,000 abstract
socialist monuments (so called lapidars). In effect, religious architecture was replaced by a
socialist architecture that set about re-conquering and redefining Albania’s built landscapes.
The modern Albanian state is well aware of its destructive role during its communist
past. Therefore, political actions and rhetoric are very passive when it comes to religion, making
it a kind of contaminated topic. The legal basis for the construction of sacral buildings is loose
and follows more the character of a guideline. Principally, granting permission for a new sacral
building is a decentralized process, if the construction site is not of national importance.
According to an interview with the Department of Territorial Planning, there are no general
limitations to the number, location and architecture of sacral buildings. Instead, “the proposed
developments have to adapt to and respect the urban parameters defined in the local master
plans” of the corresponding communes (Sopher, 1967). These local master plans also account
for potential locations of sacral buildings along with the general land-use plan. Like any master
plan, it is exposed and published to the civil society in “traditional means” (ibid.), meaning that
suggestions or objections to the construction of a sacral building would then have to be
expressed to the concerned planning authorities by the public. Besides the passive adoption of
these urban plans, a weak civil society means an active public participation is neither offered in
response to the general master plan nor to the construction of new sacral buildings in particular.
Case Studies
In poor, economically and socially decaying environments, new sacral buildings create
a rare exception to the norm. Vickers & Pettifer (Vickers, Pettifer, 1997, 100) assume that for
Albania’s peripheral zones, this is a calculated aspect of the foreign investment in spatial re-
sanctification of space:
“In the Muslim village of Koplik – which is no more than a cluster of two-room cottages
with small courtyards, joined by a series of dirt paths which in winter are churned into a
swirling sea of mud by the hooves of cows and horses – an enormous newly-built yellow-painted
mosque stands in the square, paid for by the Saudi Arabian government. Looking majestically
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out of place, it stands alone in an inhospitable, poor and miserable locality. The inside is richly
carpeted and Korans are piled high along the walls”.
It is this contradiction between the secular, often underdeveloped and remote, post-
socialist environment, which was of special interest for the following case studies. For this
reason, the case of three mosques outside the bigger Albanian regional centers will be presented
as follows: the new mosque in Klos, the new mosque in Kodër-Bërxull, and the new mosque
(and church) in Memaliaj.
Fig. 1. The new mosque in Klos, Photo: M. Bickert, April 2014
In 2011 a new mosque was built in Klos, a northern Albanian town created during the
communist period. The town has a current population of 2,177 people (Komuna Klos, 5). The
mosque was funded by the “Friendship Society” (Alb.: Shoqata Miqësia), originating from
Kuwait. The town, formerly an important hub for chrome production, is facing severe economic
decline since the collapse of the communist regime. The town’s new mosque is located at its
southeastern end, next to a rundown loading station for chrome. This creates a distinct contrast
to the old, degrading, socialist housing of the surrounding area. The logic behind this investment
might seem questionable without further investigating the construction process.
Klos is a small regional centre surrounded by several communes. From a total of 7,873
people (INSTAT, 2013a, 85) in the region, reportedly 95% are of Muslim origin. Before 1967
there were several mosques located in the surrounding villages. The main mosque was in the
nearby village of Klos-Katunt. All of these were destroyed after the 1967 reforms. Klos itself
did not have any sacral buildings. Only after 1990 did the first mosque-like prayer space begin
operating inside a residential building in the centre of town.
107
Since the 1990s several requests came from the citizens as an initial appeal for the
construction of a mosque in Klos, expressing the necessity of a mosque in the area. After a
cooperation of the Albanian Muslim Community, the local administration and the Shoqata
Miqësia, the new Mosque and its adjacent facilities were finally to be built in 2011 for a sum
of around 100,000 €. While visiting the mosque, several people were found in and around the
building, using it as a place for meeting and praying. For the Friday prayer, reportedly around
100 people from the whole area come to the mosque, as it is now the main mosque in this area.
On being asked if there were any aspects related to the origin of potential donors for the mosque,
the mayor stated: “We and the people are not interested in where the funds come from. It is
important that they built it.” The Myfti added:
“[Kuwait] has more an Islam light. But the acceptance amongst the people is not
connected to where the funds come from, if it is from Arabians, Kuwait, Turkey. The people
want a mosque. They do not go behind this and say: ‘This was built by Arabians, this was built
by the Turks, etc.’. For them it is enough that they builta mosque.
Also, in terms of architectural design, apart from general construction guidelines, there
were no special requirements coming from the donors:
“We were calculating the number of believers and according to this, different projects
were designed and it was chosen the design that would fit the necessity of the required size”.
According to the current Imam, the result of the whole process and the cooperation with
the local administration especially on the given land for the mosque is totally satisfying. He
only stressed that the late completion of the project in 2011 was unfortunate, because the
mosque was, “very necessary”. The reason for this was that the owner of the originally proposed
ground did not want a mosque to be built on it. Only after the commune donated a different plot
of land for the mosque, the construction works could start.
Besides the actual religious service, the mosque is offering various other social
activities. It has small teaching rooms and several public computers where they offer free
“religious courses” as well as basic computer courses with free internet access provided to the
local youth. According to the Imam, there are also plans for giving English lessons. For
religious holidays (i.e., Bayram) members of the Shoqata Miqësia come in order to finance and
organize the donation of food and goods. Therefore, the Imam sees the mosque, “also as a
contribution to the economic situation of the town and helping to address the issue of poverty
amongst the people.” It should be noted that besides the mosque and its social services, no
infrastructural investments or other “donations” to the town were promised or connected with
108
the construction of the mosque. Being asked if the fact that the donors for the mosque were
from foreign places, which might have their own interests and might create conflicts, the mayor
replied that for places like Klos any foreign investments would be something good, “because
there are no other investments”.
During prayer time, I was able to conduct an interview with a group of locals who were
not attending service, but sitting in a café close to the mosque. They expressed that they are
“laic”, and stressed that they prefer to drink Raki [a local spirit] instead of attending service,
but that their wives would regularly attend the mosque. They also said that they believe in God,
but do this in a more private way. While having the muezzin calling in the background, they
were asked if they are offended by this, as it had never before existed in a town like Klos. They
replied to the contrary, that they “admire” that the mosque is here now. When questioned as to
whether or not the people of Klos were asked if they wanted to have a mosque, they stated that
“everyone agreed to it”.
It can be concluded that the new mosque in Klos was of high necessity. Thisis underlined
by the broad acceptance of it. Furthermore, the cooperation with the local administration
seemed harmonious and their contribution helped to solve the conflict of land ownership. The
realistic and goal orientated approach of all participating parties created a commonly
satisfactory result. It was also shown that for the believers, as well as for the investors, a
representative location (i.e., close to the city centre) was not of high importance. The conflict
free building permission in order to carry on without problems was of much higher importance.
As the examples below will show, this aspect may vary strongly.
109
Fig. 2. The new mosque in Kodër-Bërxull, Photo: M. Bickert, August 2014
In the village of Kodër-Bërxull, a new mosque was built in 2008. The small settlement
is part of the commune of Bërxull, and lies in the peri-urban area, some 20 km northwest of the
center of Tirana. It is close to Albania’s only international Airport. Being located on top of a
ridge, once arriving by plane at Tirana International Airport, the new mosque is widely visible.
The village itself remains invisible, lying in a depression of the hill.
At first glance, several aspects of the mosque building process were equal to the case in
Klos. According to local residents, the majority of inhabitants are of Muslim origin, but “some
of them” are not practicing religion. Also, in Kodër-Bërxull, the request to build a new mosque
came from the inhabitants. Historically there had been several mosques existing in the
surrounding area which were destroyed under communism. The first new mosque was built
downhill in Bërxull, but was reportedly too far for regular attendance of the villagers up on the
hill. The main attempt to build a mosque in Kodër-Bërxull came from an elderly man, who,
along with his three sons, is now functioning as the caretaker of the mosque. After trying to
collect money from other villagers around, in order to build the mosque by themselves, they
were able to collect around 300,000 Lekë (ca. 2,100 €). With this money, they started to build
the foundations for the mosque. The necessary land was a donation from the husband of the
110
caretaker’s sister-in-law. After a while, it was made clear that they would not be able to raise
enough funds to finish the mosque:
“We have asked one part [of the villagers] close to the destroyed mosque, but they did
not react well. [We wanted] that we invest together as the whole neighborhood there, but they
did not agree with this. They did not show an orientation for starting this work. This is why we
started from our own workforce”.
Furthermore, a building permit was needed, so the initiators reached out to the Muslim
Community. After getting connected with the United Arab Emirates’ office of the “Red
Crescent” funds for finishing the mosque were given. Apart from this, no other conditions for
the project existed regarding architectural design, size, etc. The sketch came from a local
construction engineer and was executed by the caretaker’s sons. Besides being donated land,
the location of the mosque is of high importance for the people attending the mosque.
Nevertheless, there seemed to be a dispute in justifying the location:
Woman: “The mosque is there also for the view on the hill. This place was our idea.”
Q: “So, was it an intention to create a symbol?”
Woman: “Yes”.
Man: “Yes, also the view is important. But most important was that the place is
convenient for the inhabitants, and that the land was a present”.
Woman: “But also for the beauty of the location. […] There are other locations along
the road, but [this location now] is more for the view. There was once even a pilot coming here,
a Turk, and he was impressed by the mosque, so to say… after he had seen it. He came only for
curiosity after having seen it”.
Man: “Yes, here are descending all the planes, all of them turn here and approach for
landing […]. At the foot of this hill, for example, is a lot of traffic towards Tirana and there are
coming and passing a lot of foreigners from the airport and here are passing all the tourists,
so it is like a road that connects all places”.
By investigating the construction history behind the seemingly lonesome mosque on a
prominent slope near Tirana’s airport, it became clear that there was a certain, but limited
necessity for its construction. The suppression of religion during communism created a desire
to express religious freedom. The desire was strong enough to start creating a place of worship
even with the (initial) absence of foreign investors. In response to the question posed at the
beginning of this paper, the case of Kodër-Bërxull exemplifies the fulfillment of a long lasting
necessity, to deliver religiosity from its private, familial environment, back into the public
sphere. When visiting the site of the mosque on a Monday, the service was attended by only
111
three people, being the caretaker and his sons. Other villagers around merely expressed hopes
for further investments connected with the mosque: “A new road was made as a project for the
mosque, and we hope that one day we will find someone, who will invest more.” The strong
landmark that the new mosque creates now cannot be seen as the main intention behind it.
Nevertheless, it is a gladly accepted side effect for the faithful. Compared to its very limited
local importance, being used by single persons as a place of worship, the symbolic geographic
positioning of the mosque certainly amplifies its power over the landscape.
Fig. 3. The new mosque in Memaliaj, Photo: M. Bickert, Agust 2014
112
Fig. 4. The new church in Memaliaj, Photo: M. Bickert, August 2014
Memaliaj’s development is stereotypical of communist new towns. Founded as a coal

mining town in the early 1950s on a bend of the Drino River in southern Albania, the town’s
population is of mixed origin due to the communist’s settlement policy. Until the 1990s, there
were three distinct groups of citizens with Orthodox, Sunni and Bektashi backgrounds. After
the collapse of the mining sector in the early 1990s, and before a road corridor to Gjirokastra
and Greece was expanded in the beginning of the 2010s, Memaliaj’s location was highly
remote. Without an economic engine, the town faces diminishing investment activity and a
constant loss of population. The town’s population fell from a former high of around 7,000
inhabitants in 1990 down to 2,647 inhabitants, as measured in the 2011 census (Sjöberg,
1990, 219; Schmidt-Neke, Sjöberg, 1993, 482; INSTAT, 2013b, 84).It is worth noting that a
large portion of the Greek Orthodox population emigrated to Greece, while others migrated to
Tirana after the fall of the communism. It is guessed that around 15 to 20 Orthodox families (of
whom not all are practicing believers) are still living in the town. The majority of people have
Muslim backgrounds. Until the early 2000s the town never had a religious building. Instead,
several traditional “sacred places” of the Bektashi religion could be found in the surrounding
villages. When passing the southern outskirts of the town along the new road, two buildings
attract attention: a comparably new Orthodox church and an even newer mosque.
113
Surrounding the history of both buildings, several ambiguities appear that cannot be
completely explained. Both buildings remain closed and after several attempts no direct contact
to responsible persons could be made. Eventually, it was possible to contact the caretakers of
the church, officials from the municipality (including the mayor), as well as several locals, to
conduct interviews.
It became clear that the Orthodox Church was the first of the two buildings, erected from
2003 to 2005, while the mosque was constructed between 2011 and 2013. According to the
caretakers for the church, a priest holds service “every 15 days, once per month or every two
months”, when around 15 people attend the service. Each Sunday the two caretakers themselves
go to pray at the church. According to a group of local youngsters, the mosque only operated
in the beginning for a few months, but then abruptly closed:
“We are actually Muslims, but we never went there, because they didn't allow someone
inside. We wanted to go and see how it was built or how it is inside, but no one let us in. In the
beginning it was working. But there were just those ten to twelve people with a beard, those
ones, who have built it.I heard them speak Albanian. I think they came from Tirana”.
Also, the municipality seemed unsure of exactly where the investment for the mosque
came from:
“I think they have come from Tirana… what is this…? We are absolutely not interested
in those [people, who are] with the religion, but… What is there in Tirana? The headquarters,
the Muslim Community. Yes, they are from the Muslim Community. […] But in fact, neither of
them [church and mosque] is working. No activity, nothing”.
Besides its hazy background, in a town like Memaliaj, where investments are rare, every
new construction activity arouses a heightened level of interest. For this reason, the locals
seemed lesser interested in the background of the construction than in potential activities or
development that would be connected with it:
“When the Mosque came, we were curious to see what happened. [We thought] that
there would be more development in the town, that they will make fests. But even if here are
more ‘Muslims’, more activities, more investment came from the church. They brought the kids
together, made fests and camping. They also had religious lessons in the afternoons. But I
wasn't allowed to go to the camps, because I didn't go to their lessons. They made these lessons,
prayers, and singing for Jesus. But the mosque? They did nothing”.
When remembering also the activities of the mosque in Klos, this hope seems to be
reasoned. The appearance of both, mosque and church, creates a high contrast to the rest of the
114
largely decaying communist town. Due to their location on the city’s southern outskirts, their
size, and their respectively dominant minaret and church tower, they are widely visible. But,
when approaching the church, it can be observed that the gates of the surrounding fence are
closed, the churchyard overgrown, and most of the church’s windows are thrown in by stones,
indicating that not everyone might agree to its presence. Also the mosque cannot be accessed.
It is also surrounded by a fence and heavily guarded by dogs. Compared to other, foreign funded
mosques, there was no plaque or other reference to who financed it, or where they were from.
The municipality appears also to have a problem with the location of these new religious
buildings. It is less their location on the outskirts of town that is seen as problematic by the
municipality, and more the fact that both church and mosque are close to each other and
surrounding the town’s only high school.
“They have built in such a way that the school is in the middle. There are also Christians
here. And now they built this object in order to say that there are not only them, but also
Muslims. […] It is pitiful, because we have three schools here. And now, the church lies close
to the school. And without asking, later on, also the mosque was built close to the school. I think
that there is something not good here. And I say that this is against the church. As someone
allowed the church to be built close to the school, they built also the mosque next to the school
and now the school lies in the middle. I was not the mayor at this time, but I would have neither
allowed that the church nor that the mosquebe built next to the school. […] It looks like it
influences them [the pupils]. […] And both, the church and the mosque wanted with force those
places where they are now, because before it was planned to build those objects somewhere
else. But they insisted to have it here”.
According to the municipality, there is also a problem with the property. The mayor
states that there is a difference between the bought surface of the land, and what is occupied by
the mosque. For this reason the municipality tried to contact the authorities to dissolve the
problem:
“We have sent some papers, but we do not know to whom to address this, because no
one takes the responsibility for this. The Muslim Community should activate what they build,
but on the other side they have burdened us as a municipality, because they took territory, and
according to the law, they do not have to pay taxes for this. We have ordered to destroy the
fence surrounding the mosque, because it is occupying a bigger surface than they have. If not,
they will be punished. This, I have also sent to the Muslim Community. But I think they will not
react at all. [Addressing the author:] Help us that no problems are created here, because it
[the fence] should be destroyed”.
115
The fact that the land was purchased is different from the other cases mentioned before.
Both in Klos and Kodër-Bërxull it was a main concern for the investors that the ground was a
donation in order to avoid problems with the local residents and state authorities. On the other
hand, in this case the municipality is relatively restrained in their retaliatory actions. By sending
letters to the religious communities but not following up with any enforcement measures, as
well as by openly asking for help, it is shown that actively opposing religion or even destroying
parts of a religious site is unthinkable in post-socialist Albania. No state authority wants to
produce what might be seen as a symbolic action signaling out a religious community like this,
even if it concerns an illegal construction.
It can be concluded that the presence and the location of both religious buildings in
Memaliaj is highly connected with the creation of landmarks in the built environment. The
mayor concluded that the construction of the new mosque “could be because of a rivalry with
the church.” This conclusion may also be drawn in other areas with a distinctly mixed
population. The Albanian South, which is the primary recipient of Greek Orthodox investment,
offers the perfect breeding ground for a religious battle over spatial dominance of sacred
structures in the built environment. Especially in economically depressed areas, these new
religious buildings signal a kind of investment that prays on the passivity of state officials and
the public in expressing their true religious needs, desires and identities. The end result of these
efforts is at times the creation of a permanent landmark, transmitting an image of outward
religiosity in an otherwise non practicing community. These new religious structures can go far
to distort the perception of religious identity in the communities where they are built.
Endresen (Endresen, 2012, 205-210) showed how the placement of crosses on hilltops
near the North Albanian town of Shkodra and the Central Albanian town of Elbasan created
strong disputes between Christian and Muslim clerics. Selim Muça, the former head of the
Albanian Muslim Community, said about the incident that, “religious symbols should be placed
in their institutions and not on hills and mountains.” (Endresen, 2012, 207 as in Dushi, 2006).
The main impetus for the Muslim community’s disgruntlement is the infringement on the
secular space. There is still the belief that outside of the physical ground of churches and
mosques, Albanian land should be secular (Endresen, 2012, 2016). According to Orthodox
Archbishop Yannoulatos, those crosses may be seen as a reaction to the many new mosques:
“When you count the thousands of minarets […] there are very few crosses. […] Nobody has
an objection when you see a minaret – Albania is full of minarets. [And that] Christian symbols
are legitimate as long as the community members want it.” (Endresen, 2012, 207-208 as in
Yannoulatos, 2005). The case of Memaliaj proves these statements wrong. It clearly shows how
116
foreign donors and other stakeholders can misuse the myth of religious tolerance along with
political and public passivity in a time of general economic depression, to carry out their
ideological battles in physical space by re-sanctifying the Albanian landscape.
Conclusion
Henkel & Knippenberg (Henkel, Knippenberg, 2005, 6) hypothesized that “as far as
the religious market structure is concerned, one could expect that religious involvement would
be greater when religious competition is at a higher level. This religious competition depends
on the rate of religious pluralism and the relationship between church and state. The more the
state regulates religious affairs, the more it hinders and consequently diminishes religious
involvement”. For the case of Albania and its four “traditional” confessions, this hypothesis
must clearly be confirmed. The question is what happens without those regulations? A
definition of collective identity and religious denomination in Albania is often accompanied by
Pashko Vasa’s expression that, “the religion of the Albanians is Albanianism”. Nevertheless,
religious symbols are symbols of Albanianism when following the myth of religious tolerance
that there is no single, dominating religion, only a coexistence of faiths. For this reason, the
self-proclaimed and socially expected reaction of many Albanians would be to praise the
presence of many religious buildings, even if one does not attend them at all. The religious
tolerance of many Albanians therefore is merely a religious indifference. Both the state’s and
the public’s passivity is what gives space to sometimes uncontrolled building activity in order
to show territorial claim. In some other cases, new religious buildings do fulfill a real need
expressed by the citizens who attend services. More problematic in these cases was the ability
to gather the necessary funds for construction. In especially remote places, for which donors
are hard to find, faithful members of the community had to face long periods of waiting and
repeated requests to get an adequate place of worship. Still, the resulting symbolism of the
landmark may be more impressive than its effective usage.
One could criticize the process by asking the question, “why didn’t the state authorities
make a survey or hold public meetings to investigate the local residents’ agreement with the
construction of new religious buildings?” But due to most Albanians’ religious indifference, its
results would hardly be representative. Building a new mosque in a Muslim majority
community without prior consent or approval from its residents appears to be less problematic
than trying to do so in a community where the religious affiliations are mixed or there is no
active civic movement visible, as this might cause resentment and trouble down the road. The
refusal of donations from fellow villagers (Kodër-Bërxull), and even more telling, the destroyed
117
windows of the Orthodox Church in Memaliaj, can be seen as indicative of this. Still, even if
some new religious buildings have very limited attendance, it is hard to dispute that many
residents still connect the investments with a pragmatic hope for development. For the presented
cases, the two foreign investors seemed to develop a realistic overview on architectural style
and size before making a donation, differing from the supposedly Albanian construction in
Memaliaj. The question of whether or not Albania is a geopolitical plaything being fought over
by the regional and global powers of Christianity and Islam, where foreign donators distort the
country’s cultural landscape to express their presence and influence, can neither be fully denied
nor be completely confirmed. The case studies showed that both, “necessary” and
“unnecessary” investments do exist.
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Balkan and Baltic States in United Europe.

Histories, Religions, and Cultures II

Re-sanctification of Space in Albania – The case of Sunni Islam

Key words: religious re-sanctification, landscape, Albania, religious communities,

Secularization of society vs. re-sanctification of space?

Religious affiliation in Albania

Resident Percentage of resident

Total 2.800.138 100

Muslims 1.587.608 56,70

Bektashi 58.628 2,09

Catholics 280.921 10,03

Orthodox 188.992 6,75

Evangelists 3.797 0,14

Other Christians 1.919 0,07

Atheists 69.995 2,50

Others 602 0,02

Prefer not to answer 386.024 13,79

Not relevant/not stated 68.022 2,43

*Persons who answered ‘I don’t belong to any religion, but I am a believer’

Externally steered re-sanctification in Albania

The myth of the religious tolerance in Albania

Destructive past resulting in political passivity

Fig. 1. The new mosque in Klos, Photo: M. Bickert, April 2014

Fig. 2. The new mosque in Kodër-Bërxull, Photo: M. Bickert, August 2014

Fig. 3. The new mosque in Memaliaj, Photo: M. Bickert, Agust 2014

Fig. 4. The new church in Memaliaj, Photo: M. Bickert, August 2014

Memaliaj’s development is stereotypical of communist new towns. Founded as a coal

Henkel, R. and Knippenberg, H. (2005) Secularisation and the rise of religious

Vickers, M. and Pettifer, J. (1997) Albania: From Anarchy to a Balkan Identity,

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