Professional Documents
Culture Documents
A Study of Group Psychoterapy
A Study of Group Psychoterapy
July, 2001.
Department of Psychology.
The University of Melbourne.
2
ABSTRACT
The view regarding social units as entities in their own right disappeared from
scientific consideration in the mid-twentieth century as much for political and
ideological reasons as scientific ones. Yet group psychotherapy rediscovered these
ideas. The problem to re-establish them scientifically is lack of empirical methodology
for investigating whole groups.
The study integrated theories of groups as psychic entities from sociology, social
psychology and group psychotherapy to form hypotheses about therapeutic groups’
functioning. Four dimensions of whole-group function were derived: Structure,
Cognitive Organisation, Affect, and Action Coherence. An observational instrument,
the “Group Function Record,” was developed, categories defined for each dimension
and a procedure established to rate minute-by-minute group function from videotaped
psychotherapy groups. Therapists’ Interventions were also recorded. The instrument
treats the group as the object of study and quality of collective functioning is rated
irrespective of members present or their roles. Reliability was established and ratings
were made of one latency and four adolescent yearlong groups.
Results substantiated an eight-phase developmental sequence derived from the
group development literature and outlined a theory of group formation. The most
challenging, but creative state was found to be when the group is whole with all
members in communication, though it is unstable and often managed by breaking into
subgroups. A linear relation existed showing that the smaller the group, the better it
functions. Groups also function best with one or two members missing, but more
absentees threaten the group’s existence. More highly organized groups are more
stable, but tend to destabilize when they become self-reflective. Homeostatic self-
correcting tendencies and a close relationship between affective and action changes
were evident. Change towards unpleasurable affect is associated with change from
cooperation to conflict and vice versa. Crises tend to be precipitated by affective
change, but correct themselves within the next minute or two. The effects of
Therapists’ Interventions towards members, the group or both were analyzed. Group
interventions initially tend to reduce functionality, followed by improvement after
several minutes; member interventions have inconsistent effects; interventions to group
and members in the same minute tend to produce immediate improved function.
The findings and their implications for therapeutic goals and technique with
3
DECLARATION
This is to certify that
(i) the thesis comprises only my original work towards the PhD,
(ii) due acknowledgement has been made in the text to all other material used,
(iii) the thesis is less than 100,000 words in length, exclusive of tables, maps,
bibliographies, appendices and footnotes.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.
Many people have assisted me to complete this project. I thank my family for
their forbearance, faith and support, my supervisors, Drs. Charles Langley, Michael
Kyrios, and Richard Bell for their interest, encouragement and assistance, Drs. Petra
Steiger and Sabar Rustomjee, as well as Nic Cecic, Niloofa Patel and Anne Forbes who
spent many hours helping develop, perfect and test the reliability of the Group Function
Record; and to Sheila Park and Gabriel Ross for generously making available tapes of
their group for the study. I am grateful to my many colleagues in the Australian
Association of Group Psychotherapists, the Royal Children’s Hospital and other child
and adolescent mental health agencies for their interest and support. I wish to
acknowledge the late Dr Patricia Leaper for the initial stimulus to make this research a
doctoral thesis.
Finally, I acknowledge the boys and girls of my groups over twenty-five years,
especially those in this study. They have been and continue to be my teachers.
6
CONTENTS.
TABLES. 15
FIGURES. 23
PREFACE. 25
2: GROUP AS ORGANISM 35
Origins. 35
Spencer and Darwinism. 35
Functionalism. 36
Systems Theory 37
Conclusion 37
5: GROUP AS BEING. 51
The collective conscience. 51
Social solidarity. 52
Individuality and cooperation. 53
Social facts. 54
The social basis of thought. 55
Social gatherings. 57
Language and the social being. 57
Impact and evaluation. 57
Conclusion. 58
9: INTEGRATION OF THEMES. 88
A science of groups. 88
REFERENCES. 369
APPENDIX 1. 415
Changing Definitions of the word “group.” 415
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TABLES.
Table 11.1. Possible relationships in different sized groups (adapted from Napier
and Gershenfeld, 1989, p. 39). 124
Table 12.1. Analysis and comparison of cognitive organization categories. 148
Table 13.1. Definitions of Affect categories with examples. 161
Table 14.1. Action Coherence categories. 176
Table 17.1. Principal components analysis of three ratings of three sessions,
showing factor loadings for each rating and total fit for all three ratings. 192
Table 17.2. Principal components analysis of a random sample of ten sessions by
three raters, showing communality for each rater and total fit for all three
raters. 193
Table 17.3. Category frequencies of all group dimensions. 194
Table 17.4. Frequency, percentages and ranks of the first 80% of group states. 196
Table 17.5. Frequencies of unlikely combinations of categories. 196
Table 17.6. Percentage of categories for each year, mean of adolescent groups
and all groups. 197
Table 17.7. Division of GFR dimensions into positive and negative qualities. 198
Table 17.8. Classification of GFR categories into 9 Condensed States. 199
Table 17.9. Division of 9 Condensed States into Functional Bands. 200
Table 17.10. Percentage of time spent in Condensed states for each group. 200
Table 17.11. Key word descriptions for group developmental phases from the
literature. 205
Table 17.12. Alignment of group development phases in various authors with
phase names. 207
Table 17.13. Proportions of Functional Bands associated with phases of group
development. 209
Table 18.1. Number of sessions in quartiles for each group. 215
Table 18.2. Percentage of Condensed States by quartiles for 1988. 215
Table 18.3. Percentage of Condensed States by quartile for 1990. 216
Table 18.4. Percentage of Condensed States by quartiles for 1992. 217
Table 18.5. Percentage of Condensed States by quartiles for 1993. 218
Table 18.6. Percentage of Condensed States by quartiles for 1996. 218
Table 18.7. Length of phases, mean period and percentage of the year spent in
16
Table 18A.2. Stability of Group Dimensions as percentage of Sessions for 1990. 465
Table 18A.3. Stability of Group Dimensions as percentage of Sessions for 1992. 466
Table 18A.4. Stability of Group Dimensions as percentage of Session for 1993. 467
Table 18A.5. Stability of Group Dimensions as percentage of Session for 1996. 467
Table 18A.6. Means of percentage of stable minutes for Group Dimensions for
each group. 468
Table 19A.1. Percentage of Cognitive Organization, Affect and Action
Coherence in Structure categories for all groups in each year quartile. 469
Table 19A.2. Percentage of Condensed States for different absentees for all
groups for year quartiles. 470
Table 20A.1. Percentage of change in Condensed States from Affect and Action
Coherence categories over three minutes for 1988. 471
Table 20A.2. Percentage of change in Condensed States from Affect and Action
Coherence categories over three minutes for 1990. 471
Table 20A.3. Percentage of change in Condensed States from Affect and Action
Coherence categories over three minutes for 1992. 472
Table 20A.4. Percentage of change in Condensed States from Affect and Action
Coherence categories over three minutes for 1993. 472
Table 20A.5. Percentage of change in Condensed States from Affect and Action
Coherence categories over three minutes for 1996. 472
Table 20A.6. Frequencies of Action change three minutes before to three minutes
after negative Affect change for all Adolescent Groups, controlling for
overlapping minutes. 473
Table 20A.7. Frequencies of Action change three minutes before to three minutes
after negative Affect change for the 1990 Latency Group, controlling for
overlapping minutes. 474
Table 20A.8. Frequency and Percentage of Condensed States in minute preceding
destructive crisis. 479
Table 21A.1. Percentage of Structure categories associated with Limits and No
Limits for all Groups for the minute in which the Limit is applied, the
preceding minute, “LAGS(STRUCTUR,1)” and the succeeding three minutes,
“LEADS(STRUCTUR,1-3).” 481
Table 21A.2. Percentage of Cognitive Organization categories associated with
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Limits and No Limits for all Groups for the minute in which the Limit is
applied, the preceding minute, “LAGS(COGNOG,1)” and the succeeding three
minutes, “LEADS(COGNOG,1-3).” 482
Table 21A.3. Percentage of Affect associated with Limits and No Limits for all
Groups for the minute in which the Limit is applied, the preceding minute,
“LAGS(AFFECT,1)” and the succeeding three minutes, “LEADS(AFFECT,1-3).” 483
Table 21A.4. Percentage of Action Coherence associated with Limits and No
Limits for all Groups for the minute in which the Limit is applied, the
preceding minute, “LAGS(ACTION,1)” and the succeeding three minutes,
“LEADS(ACTION,1-3).” 484
Table 21A.5. Percentage of Structure Categories associated with Locomotion and
No Locomotion by therapists for all Groups for the minute in which the
Locomotion occurs, the preceding minute, “LAGS(STRUCTUR,1)” and the
succeeding three minutes “LEADS(STRUCTUR,1-3).” 485
Table 21A.6. Percentage of Cognitive Organization Categories associated with
Locomotion and no Locomotion by therapists for all groups for the minute in
which the Locomotion occurs, the preceding minute, “LAGS(COGNORG,1)” and
the succeeding three minutes, “LEADS(COGNORG,1-3).” 486
Table 21A.7. Percentage of Affect Categories associated with Locomotion and no
Locomotion by therapists for all groups for the minute in which the
Locomotion occurs, the preceding minute, “LAGS(AFFECT,1)” and the
succeeding three minutes “LEADS(AFFECT,1-3).” 487
Table 21A.8. Percentage of Action Coherence Categories associated with
Locomotion and no Locomotion by therapists for all groups for the minute in
which the Locomotion occurs, the preceding minute, “LAGS(ACTION,1)” and
the succeeding three minutes, “LEADS(ACTION,1-3).” 488
Table 21A.9. Percentage of Condensed States associated with Therapists
Interventions in the minute of intervention and the following three minutes in
the 1988 group for the minute in which the Intervention is applied, the
preceding minute, “LAGS(COND9,1)” and the succeeding three minutes,
“LEADS(COND9,1-3).” 489
Table 21A.10. Percentage of Condensed States associated with Therapists
Interventions in the minute of intervention and the following three minutes in
22
the 1990 group for the minute in which the Intervention is applied, the
preceding minute, “LAGS(COND9,1)” and the succeeding three minutes,
“LEADS(COND9,1-3).” 491
Table 21A.11. Percentage of Condensed States associated with Therapists
Interventions in the minute of intervention and the following three minutes in
the 1992 group for the minute in which the Intervention is applied, the
preceding minute, “LAGS(COND9,1)” and the succeeding three minutes,
“LEADS(COND9,1-3).” 492
Table 21A.12. Percentage of Condensed States associated with Therapists
Interventions in the minute of intervention and the following three minutes in
the 1993 group for the minute in which the Intervention is applied, the
preceding minute, “LAGS(COND9,1)” and the succeeding three minutes,
“LEADS(COND9,1-3).” 493
Table 21A.13. Percentage of Condensed States associated with Therapists
Interventions in the minute of intervention and the following three minutes in
the 1996 group for the minute in which the Intervention is applied, the
preceding minute, “LAGS(COND9,1)” and the succeeding three minutes
“LEADS(COND9,1-3).” 495
Table 21A.14. Effect of Therapists Interventions accompanied by Limits
compared with those without Limits for all GFR Dimensions from the minute
of intervention to the three minutes after. 497
Table 21A.15. Percentage of difference in GFR categories with Therapists
Interventions accompanied by Limits compared with Therapists Interventions
accompanied by No Limit. Categories not shown had no differences. 498
Table 21A.16. Effect of Therapists Interventions accompanied by Locomotion
compared with Therapists Interventions accompanied by No Limits and No
Locomotion for all GFR Dimensions from the minute of intervention to the
three minutes after. 499
Table 21A.17. Percentage of difference in GFR categories with Therapists
Interventions accompanied by Locomotion compared with Therapists
Interventions accompanied by No Limits and No Locomotion. Categories not
shown had no differences. 500
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FIGURES.
Figure 13.1. Qualitative and quantitative dimensions mapping six group affective
states. 160
Figure 18.1. Percentage of unchanged minutes for GFR Dimensions in 1988. 210
Figure 18.2. Percentage of unchanged minutes for GFR Dimensions in 1990. 211
Figure 18.3. Percentage of unchanged minutes for GFR Dimensions in 1992. 212
Figure 18.4. Percentage of unchanged minutes for GFR Dimensions in 1993. 212
Figure 18.5. Percentage of unchanged minutes for GFR Dimensions in 1996. 213
Figure 18.6. Mean of percentage of stable minutes for GFR Dimensions for each
group. 214
Figure 18.7. Percentage of Functional, Sociable and Unsociable Functional Bands
for sessions in 1988 showing developmental phases. 220
Figure 18.8. Percentage of Functional, Sociable and Unsociable Functional Bands
for sessions in 1990 showing developmental phases. 222
Figure 18.9. Percentage of Functional, Sociable and Unsociable Functional Bands
for sessions in 1992 showing developmental phases. 224
Figure 18.10. Percentage of Functional, Sociable and Unsociable Functional
Bands for sessions in 1993 showing developmental phases. 226
Figure 18.11. Percentage of Functional, Sociable and Unsociable Functional
Bands for sessions in 1996 showing developmental phases. 227
Figure 18.12. Generic Graph of phases showing hypothetical percentages of
Functional Bands. 230
Figure 19.1. Change between Group Action states over a five-minute period for
all groups as a percentage of all minutes and as a proportion of all changes. 237
Figure 19.2. Net percentage change between Group Action states over a five-
minute period for all groups. 238
Figure 20.1. Frequencies of cooperation and conflict for 10 minutes before,
during and 5 minutes after Affect change for all groups. 269
Figure 20.2. Proportion of cooperative/conflictual action ratings (Cooperation
Quotient) for 10 minutes prior to 5 minutes after negative Affect change for
each group. 271
Figure 20.3. Graph of percentage of stable Condensed States and percentage of
24
PREFACE.
My training at the Royal Children’s Hospital, Melbourne emphasized the group
as the important therapeutic factor. Under the guidance of Drs. Bill Blomfield, George
Christie and members of the Group Psychotherapy Training Program, phenomenology,
anthropology, developmental psychology and psychoanalysis provided a body of theory
to inform group phenomena. It indicated that formation of functional groups should
help seriously disturbed children and adolescents unable to engage in individual
treatment because of inadequate verbal skills, inability to express psychic states or
anxiety about revealing themselves. They had usually never belonged to stable,
supportive peer groups.
In 1976 I began to conduct groups for adolescents and in 1979 groups for
younger children. The phenomena of these groups were often confusing, alarming and
chaotic. Some interventions were powerful, but others ineffectual. When the groups
seemed at their worst, members would demonstrate surprising gains, sometimes only
evident outside the group setting. Gradually over ten years, a reliable technique
developed for successful group therapy, but its relationship to the existing theories was
unclear. The group was regarded as an evolving entity; therapeutic goals were its
preservation as a place where members could belong and enjoy themselves and
maintaining the group until this was achieved. The technique came to rely on observing
several dimensions of group function as the basis for its management, which were
couched less in terms of the psychological content of events, but more in terms of the
group’s structure and function. Psychological interpretations consistently tended to
disrupt the groups. These constructs from clinical experience did not correspond
closely to what the literature described. The “group-as-a-whole” perspective in
psychoanalytically oriented group theory (Bion, 1961; Foulkes, 1974) often lacked
applicability to these groups. Formulations in the literature were often couched in
metaphors deriving from the family (Friedemann, 1974; Elliott, 1994) or intrapsychic
structures (Coleman and Bexton, 1975; Hinshelwood, 1987). However, these seemed to
be secondary to groups, which preceded the evolution of nuclear families or
individuality (Freud, 1921; Mead, 1962). It seemed important to seek theory regarding
groups as primary instead of secondary psychosocial entities formed by interacting
individuals (Allport, 1924).
The study was conceived firstly, to find and integrate theoretical sources giving
26
primacy to the group; secondly, to provide conceptual clarity and theoretical support for
whole-group constructs forming the basis of the technique; thirdly to develop a
methodology for accurately recording group function as it occurred, to examine the
phenomenology of groups independently of therapists’ impressionistic memories and
test hypotheses about group function. These aims are explored in the first three parts of
the thesis. The last two parts discuss the results in relation to the theoretical material
and provide references and appendices.
27
Background.
This study establishes a method for studying groups as entities in their own right.
Using adolescent and children’s psychotherapy groups, it develops a theory of the group
as a psychic entity, defines dimensions of its functioning and identifies basic
phenomena. It is hypothesised some findings may apply to group life generally. The
study postulates that groups can be observed as social units whose activity is distinct
from (though not independent of) their members’ interactions. Group and members
represent distinct and separate levels of analysis requiring different observational
methodologies (Agazarian and Peters, 1981; Whitaker, 1989).
Abundant theory analyzes individual psychology in groups (Napier and
Gershenfeld, 1989; Forsyth, 1990), therapeutic effects of groups on members
(Kellerman, 1979; Rutan and Stone, 1984; Yalom, 1985; Hinshelwood, 1987; Malekoff,
1997) and individual therapy within the group (Wolf, Kutash and Nattland, 1993).
However, there is less theory about the group itself (although see Kissen, 1976;
Agazarian and Peters, 1981; Whittaker, 1989; Neri, 1998; Dalal, 1988; Ettin, 1999).
Several authors suggest theoretical advances are required before important problems in
the science of groups can be resolved (Bednar and Moeschl, 1981; McCollum, 1995).
Historically, groups were excluded from psychoanalytic theory when Freud (1921)
challenged theories of the group or crowd mind and accounted for group phenomena as
intrapsychic processes of identification and attachment among members (Ettin, 1999).
There followed little interest in groups and those who pursued them were discouraged or
ostracized (Galt, 1995). In social science the problematic status of groups is often resolved
by pejorative dismissal (Catlin, 1936), as anachronistic (Kretch and Crutchfield, 1948)
or unfashionable (Watkins, 1973). However, there are repeated calls to grant social
groups the status of entities worthy of study (Warriner, 1956; Steiner, 1974, 1983; Turner,
1988); although unfashionable, the collective mind remains a scientific hypothesis
(Steiner, 1986; Sandelands and St Clair, 1993).
In group psychotherapy literature, “group-as-a-whole” is often discussed in
interpersonal terms, using family metaphors (Wells, 1980) or systems theory (Agazarian
and Peters, 1981) rather than as a discrete psychosocial entity with its own characteristics.
Bion (1961), who is identified with the group-as-a-whole approach (Rutan and Stone,
29
recent investigation into the nature of groups is related to non-scientific factors such as
fashion, funding and politics (Steiner, 1974, 1983; Sandelands and St Clair, 1993).
However, the concept group needs to be accessible to scientific scrutiny if a dimension of
group-specific processes is to be studied. To begin with, the meaning of the word itself
must be reviewed.
Group in psychology.
In psychology, group means a social unit of individuals with common qualities, in
communication, influencing each other through interaction, with a feeling of group
membership, varying from a loose mass to a compact unit (English and English, 1958;
Chaplin, 1968; Drever, 1956, 1974). Groups are “two or more persons interacting with
one another, who share a set of common goals, and norms which direct their activities, and
who develop a set of roles and a network of affective relations;” they are distinguished
from crowds where reciprocal influence is not possible; 90% of groups have less than six
members (Harre and Lamb, 1983, p. 259). This notion of group as a small, structured unit
with a set of self-created relations among members was acquired by psychology in the
1950’s.
The first social psychology texts used “group” for large, undifferentiated units
33
(Ross, 1908; Ellwood, 1912; Klineberg, 1940; Maus, 1962), then for classes, associations
or society (McDougall, 1912). “Group mind” referred to nations (McDougall, 1920; Levy-
Bruhl, 1928). Many early social psychology texts make no mention of the word (Trotter,
1916; Tansley, 1920; Dewey, 1922), including the founder of group psychotherapy in the
United States (Pratt, 1917; Rosenbaum and Berger, 1975; Ettin, 199). In the following
decades, groups indicate the individual’s immediate psychological environment (Bartlett,
1932) and become “sociological wholes … [whose unity] can be defined operationally in
the same way as a unity of any other dynamic whole, namely, by the interdependence of its
parts” (Lewin, 1948, p. 73). Group came to indicate the range of human social units whose
members had a direct psychological relationship (Klineberg, 1940; Ross, 1946; Sherif,
1948; Krech and Crutchfield, 1948). Experimental work established groups in social
psychology and it became a prominent topic from the 1950’s (Newcombe, 1950; Asch,
1952; Thouless, 1958; Brown, 1965; Watson, 1966).
Group in sociology
In nineteenth century sociology, group meant classification (Darwin, 1958; Spencer,
1876; Giddings, 1896) or large undifferentiated units such as societies, nations, classes,
clans, professions, tribes or communities (Spencer, 1876; Bosanquet, 1899; Giddings,
1896; Durkheim, 1893, 1895, 1912). Gumplowicz (1899) recognized society as a large
group composed of smaller groups and studied relations between constituent groups rather
than whole societies (Maus, 1962). The group concept lacked the internal integrity central
to its modern definition (Fairbanks, 1901; Dealey and Ward, 1905; Ross, 1905; Small,
1905; Simmel, 1908, 1955; Wolff, 1950). It was “a convenient sociological designation
for any number of people, larger or smaller, between whom such relations are discovered
that they must be thought of together” (Small, 1905, p 459; Olmsted, 1959, pp 20-21).
Cooley (1909) called intimate, cooperative associations where individualities fuse into a
whole “primary groups;” small, large and temporary groups were distinguished (Hayes,
1915). Specific social groups were studied in the 1920’s and 1930’s (Thrasher, 1927;
Maus, 1956); studies of small groups began after that (Homans, 1951; Mills, 1967). Large
and small social groups then became fundamental to sociology (Broom and Selznick,
1955; Johnson, 1961; Bottomore, 1962; Nisbet, 1970).
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Conclusion.
The concept of group has changed its early meaning and is no longer tied to
specific social forms. Although describing diverse social structures with common
properties, it usually indicates small units with structural and dynamic properties regarded
as relatively invariant across a wide range of cultures and situations. The “small group” is
a discovery of the mid-twentieth century, whose phenomena are thought to underlie social
life (Lewin, 1948; Mills, 1967; Turner, 1988) but the assumptions underlying the concept
are not explicit in social or psychological theory. A scientific theory of groups needs to
establish how the small group can form the basis of the psychical functioning of
individuals and groups. However before attempting this, the historical understanding of
groups needs to be reviewed.
Consistent with what has been found in the history of the word, historical
investigations of groups began with whole societies (Durkheim, 1964). While far removed
from small psychotherapy groups, these well-elaborated hypotheses about the nature of
collective social entities make important contributions to conceptualizing small groups as
functional units. In the following chapters, four different views of groups are described
which, while not discrete schools, share common assumptions. Firstly, society is an
organism, consisting of differentiated, specialized structures with ordered interchange and
self-maintaining integrity. Secondly, collective action by crowds forms a primitive
collective mind, fusing participants’ instinctive and affective drives, to submerge
individuality and higher functions. Thirdly, common culture and shared psychological
characteristics constitute a general, collective or group mind, incorporating language,
tradition, technology and values, extending and enriching individual existence. Fourthly,
societies and groups are beings in their own right.
These complementary conceptualizations of groups address respectively, the
organic corpus of society, undifferentiated unconscious drive states, differentiated
conscious content of the social entity and its existential identity. The view of groups in
contemporary social psychology and psychodynamic group psychotherapy completes the
review as the basis for a theoretical integration.
35
2: GROUP AS ORGANISM
The first tradition investigating large groups and societies emphasized the
intricate interconnections between their parts and conceived them to be organisms, best
understood by their total functioning. This metaphor predisposed the investigation of
whole-group characteristics analogous to anatomy and physiology. It culminated in
identifying important self-maintaining processes for enduring social units.
Origins.
Society has been compared to a living organism since ancient times by Plato, St.
Paul and others (Mackenzie, 1963). Comte (1830) called society an organism whose
institutions and relations were not created by individuals, but imposed by the group,
defined by language, customs and values (Maus, 1965, Turner, 1978; Turner, Beeghley
and Powers, 1989). Structural aspects of society were studied as interacting organs, called
social statics (Comte, 1830). Families as fundamental units formed individuals, integrating
them into the state through morality and submission to authority (Maus, 1965). Social
dynamics described social development in progressive stages like individual minds,
ultimately arriving at science and “positive” knowledge (Comte, 1830; Mazlish, 1967).
Comte emphasized the state’s role in individual life, regarding everything human above
physiology as derived from society as the “Supreme Being” of a positivist religion.
Individuals are abstractions: “Society is no more decomposable into individuals than a
geometric surface is into lines, or a line into points” (quoted in Nisbet, 1973, p. 59).
Comte established social groups as entities with life processes.
characteristics of living tissue being continuous, having definite form, organs in fixed
position and specialized tissue endowed with feeling. In society, these are functions of
communication (Spencer, 1860). Consciousness is situated in a small part of the
individual, but diffused throughout society, which lacks a sensorium. Societies exist for
their members, but organisms’ cells exist for their host (Spencer, 1876). Societies are
“hyperorganisms” (Maus, 1965) of the natural world, living their own lives (Allport,
1954).
Spencer’s inquiry was determined by his notion of organism and he did not
question its appropriateness (Rex, 1961). Others developed the idea (Von Lilienfeld, 1873;
Schäffle, 1875-8; Espinas, 1877; Worms, 1896). Although regarded with caution (Maus,
1965), the organism theory was axiomatic at the turn of the century (McKenzie, 1890;
Small, 1905; Ross, 1905; Jordan, 1927). Darwinism presupposed societies and cultures
evolved (Spengler, 1926; Toynbee, 1947; Childe, 1963). The terms ‘structure’ and
‘function’ in sociology implied a conception of society as an organism (Rex, 1961), and
were understood by their contribution to the whole.
Functionalism.
Analytical methodology and empirical research led to functionalism and its more
integrated notion of organism (Martindale, 1964). Functionalist anthropology used
organism as an analogy for social life (Radcliff-Brown, 1935, 1940, 1952); social
institutions were explained by their group-maintenance functions (Maus, 1965). Society
was conceived as an “integrated living whole” rather than Spencer’s aggregation of
organs. The social organism was not the structure; it had structure with continuity
surviving loss of members; its social life was the functioning and maintenance of its
structure (Radcliff-Brown, 1952). However, functionalism was better suited to pre-
literate societies than general sociology (Demerath and Peterson, 1967).
To emphasize social organisms’ integrity Merton (1949) introduced Cannon’s
(1932) functional principles from biology. The structure of society included the relations
between parts; social activities and cultural items had functions for the whole social
system, which all members fulfilled, and all were necessary. This “logic of procedure”
established functional requirements for organisms’ survival and was adapted to a sociology
using Freud’s distinction between latent and manifest functions. Functionalism defined
group structures and processes by their combined role in the life and maintenance of the
37
Systems Theory
Functionalism was overtaken by general systems theory, which studied open
systems across many disciplines (Von Bertalanffy, 1955, 1975). System properties
suggested common forms in different fields. Systems are “complexes of elements standing
in interaction,” unifying disparate examples; they indicate relationships between biological
organisms and “epiorganisms” such as societies: “Characteristic of organization, that of a
living organism or a society, are notions like those of wholeness, growth, differentiation,
hierarchical order, dominance, control, competition” (Von Bertalanffy, 1955, p. 127).
Systems theory incorporates teleology and directedness. Living organisms, individual
behaviour and human society cannot be conceived of without including adaptiveness,
purposiveness and goal seeking.
Systems theory avoided the organismic approach’s pitfall of emphasizing
characteristics peculiar to the organism rather than those inherent in generalized systems
(Gouldner, 1959). It provided a paradigm for social sciences. Societies as systems were
conceptualized in terms of part/whole relationships, gradients, integration, feedback,
defenses against disintegration, ontology of activity and interface of subsystems.
Biological and social systems are extended in space and integrate their parts across
boundaries. The parts that developed from earlier states, represent organisms’ past; they
have a relatively stable present state and a future of functional potentialities (Grinker,
1956). The self-creating property of “autopoiesis” connects organisms and social groups
as life forms (Maturana and Varela, 1971) introducing creative uncertainty into their
development. “Human societies are biological systems” and “any social institution is an
autopoietic system” (Beer, 1980, p. 70). Systems theory de-emphasized literal
correspondence between organism and society, but described essential organic
characteristics for social groups. However, system oversimplifies the issue, neglecting
incompatibilities between social and biological organisms (Rex, 1961) and ignores the
complexity and variety of organisms (Merton, 1949).
Conclusion
The organism hypothesis began with naïve analogies, but showed the varied
phenomena of societies can be described as mutually interconnected and governed by their
38
relation to the whole. It provided a conception of social entities not reducible to their
constituent members and described self-sustaining functions, which support their life and
purpose. In functionalism and systems theory, the organism perspective initiated by
Comte and Spencer matured rather than was superseded. Social organisms form when
members develop ordered, systemic communication joining them into a whole, whose
functions have similar integrity and purpose to bodily functions constituting the substrate
for psychic life in individuals.
39
The social organism hypothesis analysed structures and processes of large social
groups as functional units. However, an explicit notion of collective mentality was
developed in the study of the psychological characteristics of crowds and large groups.
The social problems they posed for nineteenth century society emphasised their psychic
unity and they were conceived as beings having primitive minds, an idea that can be
traced to the present.
Early theorists.
Sighele (1891) proposed that crowds formed a temporary mind, operating by laws
different from those of individual minds. The price of collective unanimity was the
antithesis of self-consciousness and loss of rational thinking, making crowds intellectually
inferior, irresponsible, destructive and criminal (McLelland, 1989). They formed
according to the law for all intelligent life that “representation of an emotional state brings
the beginnings of the same emotional state in those who observe it” (Espinas, 1877, quoted
in McLelland, 1989, p. 166). Mental processes need not be rational, deductive or abstract;
collective thinking occurs outside the brain, through individuals’ susceptibility to others’
mental representations and suggestions, enabling many to act as one. Crowds can be
creative and better than individuals, producing culture, language and revitalizing old social
structures; the state is the institutionalized crowd (Sighele, 1901).
Tarde (1903) saw crowd members as weak, primitive, irresponsible; the essential
social tie was imitation by suggestibility, since “social man is a veritable somnambulist”
(p. 76) and society is a set of suggestions causing mutual imitation. The common mental
content in crowds is ignited by a “spark of passion,” forming “a single animal, a wild beast
without a name” (Tarde, quoted in McLelland, 1989, p. 184). Crowds are criminal or
heroic, imitating whatever suggestions are given them. They are credulous, excitable or
docile to commands, influenced by images, exaggeration and appeal to emotions.
Le Bon.
Le Bon’s (1896, 1913) influential crowd theory viewed social organisms to be as
complicated as all beings, and visible social phenomena result from unconscious
processes. In crowds, conscious personality vanishes, a collective mind or “provisional
40
being” is formed like a chemical compound; members think, feel and act differently than
when individuals. Each sub-group “represents a single being” (1913, p. 113).
Suggestibility and credulity allow ideas to circulate regardless of validity; opinions become
truths, making crowds dictatorial and conservative. Crowds think in images;
hallucinations replace facts. It is difficult to implant ideas in the crowd mind, but once
done, they exert an irresistible power on members, only weakening slowly; society’s ideas
form its content, but passing infatuations and images influence it. Contradictory ideas
coexist without criticism or logical relations. It reasons by association, analogy
succession, and generalization; images take precedence over logic.
The sentiment of invincibility deriving from number dominates this being, which
shows the impulsiveness, absence of reason and exaggerated of sentiments by contagion
typical of “beings belonging to inferior forms of evolution” (p. 40). It can be heroic,
generous, cowardly or cruel, allowing nothing to come between desire and its realization.
It revolts against feeble authority, but is servile before strong ones. Images become
motives for action; conviction is like religious sentiment involving worship, fear,
submission, inability to discuss dogmas, but desire to spread them. Anyone not accepting
them is an enemy, creating intolerance and fanaticism.
Words evoke images lacking precise meaning and take on magical power.
Illusions are not diminished by facts, since crowds do not want truth. Opinions are grafted
on fixed beliefs, deriving from unalterable psychological elements of the race analogous to
anatomical formations of living beings. Leadership provides organisation, direction,
energy and the will to achieve goals. The leader’s prestige paralyses critical faculties.
Crowds are dominated by this “ancestral soul” (Le Bon, 1913). Le Bon concludes that
individual egoism weakens the race and loss of old ideals causes the racial genius to
disappear, resulting in barbarism.
Later theories.
Mussolini thought Le Bon’s work “excellent” and Hitler used his crowd
terminology and manipulation techniques (Nye, 1975; van Ginneken, 1992). Y Gasset
(1930) treats the crowd as an entity opposed to European culture with an analysis
reminiscent of Le Bon, but more complex and balanced. The thesis that group experience
is at a lower consciousness than individuality is found in Jung (1950) with
acknowledgement to Le Bon. The crowd mind was applied to collective phenomena until
41
the 1960’s; social psychology texts usually contained a chapter on the crowd or “mob
mind” with a synopsis of Le Bon (Kretch and Crutchfield, 1948; Newcombe, 1950;
Watson, 1966; Evans, 1969). The crowd as a psychic entity lost scientific credibility,
except for social philosophers (Smelser, 1963; Lang and Lang, 1965; Shibutani, 1970).
However, it persists.
Canetti (1960) follows its historical relationship to power and culture, regarding it
as a psychic entity. People surrendering to a crowd are absorbed into a circle of common
touch; fear disappears and it takes on its own life. “As soon as it exists at all, it wants to
consist of more people: the urge to grow is the first and supreme attribute of the crowd”
(p. 17). Once people feel equal in a moment of discharge, the crowd is created and
becomes a psychic entity associated with relief when the individual transcends their own
person. Hierarchical organisation is lost, freeing the crowd to violence. A command is a
“sting” in the members, as a tendency to obey and be vulnerable to influence. Crowds
can be rhythmic or stagnating, slow or quick, and classified by the predominant emotion
of the “single creature.” When it dissolves, small groups or “crowd crystals” remain
around which it may reassemble. Social institutions are “domesticated” crowds. Canetti
marks the transition from scientific theory to a literary, philosophical treatment of the
crowd entity, which does justice to the human experience of the mass as a “social animal
torn loose of its chains” (Muscovici, 1987) that can be predicted, analysed, but never
reduced to a rational formula of individuals in interaction (Reicher, 1988). It is a
precursor to contemporary research (Turner, 1988). However, its inherent conservative
political assumptions and critical attitude to social entities had less relevance outside the
tense social situation of late nineteenth century Europe.
The herd.
Trotter (1916) applied biological theory to mass psychology, postulating a herd
instinct to explain the rejection of reason and experience in favour of prejudice and
dogma in society. Human psychology is always of associated members, since solitary
individuals are unknown. Social phenomena have an instinctive quality and herd
impulses enter the individual’s mind with the value of instincts. To introspection, they
seem axiomatic, “an a priori synthesis of the most perfect sort needing no proof but its
own evidence” (p. 20). The drive to associate in groups is similar to other primary drives
sustaining life. The gregarious instinct enables other instincts to be denied, modified or
42
combined and the unit’s homogeneity compensates for loss of individual characteristics in
members enabling them to act as one. Gregarious behaviour is “a normal instinct,” the
source of opinions, credulity, beliefs, altruism, enthusiasm and power, since “the only
medium in which man’s mind can function satisfactorily is the herd” (p. 42). The
individual is more sensitive to the “voice of the herd” than other influences and feels an
unanalysable sense of comfort in the presence of other members and discomfort in their
absence. Herd approval or disapproval arise like conscience and acquire the same
discomfort as physical separation.
The herd forms “a gregarious mind” amalgamated by “intercommunication,”
binding individuals and coordinating the unit into “a single creature,” a material, social,
and psychological entity, which acquires the properties of a complex organism, subject
to evolutionary development of which members partake. Gregarious units form
collective mental entities. Individuals communicate with a common stock producing a
communal mind with a quasi-independent existence, “the deep, still spirit of the hive that
whispers in us all” (p. 205). It depends on “herd accessibility” or the sensitiveness of
individuals to the presence of fellow members. The individual, dependent on tradition,
is guided by influences outside the ego. It cannot live apart from the herd, is liable to
loneliness; its loss means loss of self. Much individual personality is invested in the
herd; deeper layers of individual minds are formed by it, tending toward homogeneity.
“Socialised gregariousness is the goal of man's development. A transcendental union
with his fellows is the destiny of the human individual, and it is the attainment of this
towards which the constantly growing altruism of man is directed” (p. 167).
The herd mind hypothesis goes beyond the crowd mind, attributing a more lasting
role to social life, which pervades individuals with a power equal to other drives. The
psychic organism of large social groups constructs, sustains and organises individual
minds. It validates participation in the formation of “gregarious” groups having the
power to reach the most fundamental structures of the individual psyche with the power
of instincts. Trotter's theory supplied a social dimension to popular accounts of
psychodynamic theories (Tansley, 1921, Peirce, 1922). However, it polarised individual
and group, casting the latter in an essentially antisocial light.
Conclusion.
The crowd and herd hypotheses propose that under certain communicational
43
In contrast to the view that organized large groups are organisms and under
particular communication conditions form an instinctive primitive mentality, a third
viewpoint considered the significance of organised cultural structures. It addressed
specific mental or psychological characteristics of societies, which were seen to embody a
mentality recognized as an entity in its own right, distinct from the individuals
constituting it, but making possible and sustaining their mentality. Emerging from
philosophy, these ideas were elaborated in sociology to become a psychological
hypothesis of the inseparability of group and individuals.
Philosophical background.
The notion of mind existing beyond the individual has a long philosophical
heritage. Plato regarded the world as “wholes,” as living beings (Hamilton and Cairns,
1972). Plotinus said “every whole is at the same time a certain being” (Taylor, 1994a, p.
42) and intelligent beings participate in a world intellect (Taylor, 1994b). Hobbes (1651)
called the state a “Great Man.” Hegel’s philosophy centred on “Geist,” meaning the
highest form of mind, spirit, or moral consciousness (Murat-Sanders, 1900) as the
Absolute, self-complete, universal “ethical substance,” created by coordinated action
(Hegel, 1807). Spirit is a being, “actual and alive;” it is consciousness itself reflected in
the minds of its members; its substance is a nation. Individuals are formed in the natural
ethical community of the family, which is “immediate or natural mind” and incorporated
into the universal family of the state (Hegel, 1807). Society is an “actual mind” that
knows and thinks itself, existing immediately in customs, mediately through the self-
conscious knowledge and members’ actions. It is intelligent substance expressed as
particular aspects in members, losing its ethical character when individual interests rend
its continuity. It is a self-knowing, self-actualising subjectivity, maintaining and guiding
its members’ individuality into its own collective life (Hegel, 1821, 1830).
British theorists.
Lewes (1879) conceived of a “General Mind” formed from the mental
accumulations of individual mental processes integrated as tradition, arts, religion, and
science by means of language (Giddings, 1896). An original philosopher, scientist and
45
members, influenced “at every moment in every thought and feeling and action in ways
which they can neither fully understand nor escape from” (p. 11). The common substance
of uniting ideas means a group of minds becomes a group-mind, but cannot exist apart
from the minds of the group members. For group minds to form, groups require
continuity, an idea of their composition and functions, interaction with other groups,
culture, organisation, differentiation and specialisation in highly organised and successful
social structures. The group’s unifying ideals and demands appear in members’ minds
with irresistible force. The bond of identification incorporating a member occurs when
the “self-regarding sentiment” extends to the group “more or less completely, so that he is
moved to work for its welfare, … by the same motives which prompt him to desire and to
work for his own” (p. 79). The national will depends on the idea of the whole nation
being present to the consciousness of individuals or it becomes a horde. National self-
consciousness is a common idea “diffused through the minds of the people” and gives it a
self so it is not “a mere agglomeration of individuals” (p. 163). Regardless of its quality,
it enhances mental homogeneity and difference from other groups, acquiring strong
sentiments and motives capable of overriding individual concerns.
McDougall’s discussion is Anglophile, analogical, descriptive and lacks
conceptual rigor. He denies the psychic unit has different qualities from the combination
of individual mental forces and his definition of mind as “an organised system of forces”
is vague, emphasizing culture and tradition. However, his personal influence and prestige
made his theory paradigmatic for critics (Ginsberg, 1921; Allport, 1954; Turner, 1988).
American theorists.
The idea of a superordinate mind supporting individual minds was common in
early American sociology (Giddings, 1896; Small, 1905; Dealey and Ward, 1905; Gillette,
1916). Each tribe or nation was considered to have a unique “social mind” and a
common, general “human mind.” The social mind is created by individual minds in
organized interaction. It is not a separate, transcendental entity, but the “organic
agreement” scattered among individual minds. It is the spontaneous, creative synthesis of
individual minds, which are also its product. It consists of repetition of individual minds
associating, reproducing and accumulating common mental content by rational discussion
and cultural exchanges founded on feelings of association. The conscious, cognitive,
social mind deliberates as rationally as the individual mind in contrast to the
47
primary groups transmitting cultural values has been disputed (Bottomore, 1962), it
became central in sociology (Timasheff, 1966; Broom and Selznick, 1968; Nisbet, 1970).
In George Mead’s (1962, 1964) posthumous works (Morris, 1962) mind and
thought as “phases of a more general, an Absolute, mind” (1936, p. 344) are worked out
more systematically. Individuals are creations of the social organism (Mead, 1962).
Social process exists prior to mind, thinking, consciousness or self, which arise through
communication within the whole. Collective mental content is logically prior to
individual content; social action supports communication as a “conversation of
gestures” developing the “significant symbol” as “that part of the act which serves as a
gesture to call out the other part of the process, the response of the other, in the
experience of the [person] that makes the gesture” (p. 268). Gestures and symbols
become the system of language. Mind results when the “empirical matrix of social
interactions” takes on a reflexive character and “enters into or becomes present in the
experience of the individuals involved in it. … Language as made up of significant
symbols is what we mean by mind” (1962 p, 190n). Action in the social organism
supersedes the body/mind split as reference point for all psychosocial ideas and is the
context for understanding mind, consciousness, thought and self.
“The field of mind must be coextensive with, and include all the components of,
the field of the social process of experience and behavior…. If mind is socially
constituted, then the field or locus of any given individual mind must extend as far
as the social activity or apparatus of social relations which constitutes it extends;
and hence that field cannot be bounded by the skin of the individual organism to
which it belongs" (p. 223n).
Mind can only come into existence in a social environment; organized social
relations and interactions create a universe of discourse presupposed by its nature.
Mead’s “entirely social theory or interpretation of mind … must be clearly distinguished
from the partially (but only partially) social view of mind” as a hereditary biological
attribute of the individual, social only in its expression. The theory that social process is
produced by minds is in direct opposition to his view “that mind presupposes, and is a
product of, the social process” (1962, p. 223-4). Individuals initially experience
themselves as objects through social relations and by means of experiential transactions
with others in an organized social environment.
49
sufficient precision.
Conclusion.
Social mind theories provide a coherent hypothesis about the primacy of group
life and its inherent mentality as a collective system interpenetrating and sustaining
personal minds. Self, thought, sentiment and action are all defined as effects of
participation in organized symbolic communication, where group membership is the
essential means of gaining access to the creative functions of the social mind and human
psychology. The small (primary) group is the medium in which the larger social
processes are rendered effective in creating individuals. Group life is the condition for
the development of mind and self, as healthy group life is for healthy psychology. The
social mind complements organism and crowd hypotheses providing a more detailed
analysis of the context for rational social life and action.
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5: GROUP AS BEING.
Social solidarity.
Durkheim (1964) describes two types of solidarity binding society together at
different stages. “Mechanical solidarity” is created by sympathy, when images of
similarity unite and reinforce each other into collective representations, while contrary
representations weaken each other. Members are attached to each other and to the
group without intermediary as material objects are connected with each other. “Organic
solidarity” results from the division of labor. Members are linked by recognition of
differences and preserve their distinctness by symbolic relationships forming boundaries
like the relationship of organs, expressed in regulative and restitutive rules governing
their relations. Repetition of different human endeavours and the extension and
growing complication of the social organism constitute organic solidarity. Social
structure begins with mechanical solidarity and collective conscience based on
similarities creating homogeneous societies or hordes (Freud, 1921); but it is inevitably
replaced by organic solidarity as individual consciences grow more than the collective
conscience; division of labor recognizes and values individual and group differences
integrating them into larger organic units.
Individuality and group membership are centripetal and centrifugal social forces,
which cannot flourish simultaneously. Individuals have to be different, but mechanical
solidarity exerts pressure towards collective identity making “the individual conscience
… a simple dependent upon the collective type … as the possessed object follows those of
its owner” (p. 130). Individuals are absorbed into a collective personality. In organic
solidarity, individuals attain a personal sphere of action as an organ in the whole, organized
according to their function. The collective conscience leaves the individual conscience
open so functions may be established that it cannot regulate. “The more this region is
extended, the stronger is the cohesion which results from this solidarity” (p. 131).
Individual conscience is strongest when the collective conscience envelops it; and the
collective conscience’s power depends on its vitality compared to the individual
53
conscience. Physical uniqueness socializes the individual, who identifies with those
similar while remaining dependent on the common society.
Social facts.
Durkheim’s (1966) methodology distinguishes psychology from social life, which
is constituted wholly of representations” (p. xli). The study of society must recognize
thoughts, actions and feelings as facts not traceable to individuals. Social facts are
common in the mind of each member, not felt as owned by individuals. They are
strengthened by repetition and only expressed fully in the whole community. For
example, legal and moral standards, religious faiths, financial systems, social practices
and currents, language, rates of marriage, birth or suicide are states of the “collective
mind” (Durkheim, 1966, p. 8); but the French word “l’ame” is broader than mind,
meaning soul, spirit, ghost; mind; feeling; essence; conscience; heart; core (Elwell 1897).
Mind as the source of human experience and action has collective existence.
Group phenomena are collective because they are imposed on all members, not
because they are general. A collective fact “is to be found in each part because it exists in
the whole, rather than in the whole because it exists in the parts” (p. 9). Social facts are
not defined by their metaphysical status as ideas, since they cannot be known by mental
activity, but must be discovered by observation like material things. The study of social
facts rests not only on their collective origin or expression throughout society, but also on
the coercion they exercise over individuals; their presence is shown by sanctions against
individuals who violate them. Social facts are not derived from individual psychology
and cannot be changed by efforts of will; “they are like moulds in which our actions are
inevitably shaped” (p. 29).
Society is not the sum of its individuals, but a system formed by association
having a reality with its own characteristics. “Individual minds, forming groups by
mingling and fusing, give birth to a being. Psychological if you will, but constituting a
psychic individuality of a new sort” (p. 103). Society does not have a separate personal
existence, but “thinks, feels, and acts quite differently from the way in which its members
would were they isolated” (p. 104).
The laws of individual mentality do not govern group mentality; understanding
individuals does not help understand groups. The laws of group mentality can only be
studied by accepting that “we are absolutely ignorant of their nature, and that their
characteristic properties, like the unknown causes on which they depend, cannot be
discovered by even the most careful introspection” (p. xliii). When studied thus, they
55
show “qualities of consistency and regularity that are symptomatic of their objectivity” (p.
28). They exist in collective consciousness that consists of different representations to
those of individual consciousness. The causes of collective mentality states should be
sought in social facts preceding them, not among the individual consciousnesses in which
they express themselves. The origins of social processes are to be found in the internal
constitution of the group. The break in continuity between psychology and sociology is
the same as between physicochemical sciences and biology. The continuity is between
societies; other groups form groups, rather than individuals.
common by all those subject to it and forms the collective features of social imperatives.
The power of this social pressure is psychical; it does not act wholly from without, but
since society cannot exist except in individual consciousnesses, it penetrates and
organizes itself within the members.
Whatever is not absorbed into the system of collective representations attracts
only individual sentiments and lacks the strength, respect and persuasiveness of what is.
Representations expressing individual experiences are different from those aroused by
collective influences. They form two sets of mental states, “just as do the two forms of
life to which they correspond” (p. 212). Social thought makes members see things in
whatever light it pleases, because it has power and efficacy individual thought cannot
have. Individual consciousnesses are closed to each other if left to themselves and only
communicate by sign systems; but by acting in unison with common signifiers,
individuals feel themselves in unison. Collective representations impose a homogeneity
“that gives the group consciousness of itself and consequently makes it exist” (p. 231).
Collective sentiments become conscious by being attached to objects and actions and
demonstrate that “social phenomena are born, not in individuals, but in the group” (p.
231).
Durkheim contrasts individual characteristics derived from the unique sensations of
the body, with impersonal content derived from society common to all members, such as
reason and cultural representations by which “we are freed from our senses and able to
think and act with concepts” (p. 272). If reason is not impartially shared, it is not
recognized. One determinism is imposed on the psyche by the body, another by society
that leaves the actor with the impression of liberty. “The only way we have of freeing
ourselves from physical forces is to oppose them with collective forces” (p. 272).
Individual experiences may be intense, but restrictive - “passion individualizes, yet it
enslaves.” Although what is essential in the personality is social, “there can be no social
life unless distinct individuals are associated,” so the personal and social have a reciprocal
relationship that defies simplistic division. The characteristics of human nature come
from society, but society only lives in individuals. Individuals get their distinct character,
intellectual and moral culture from society; if they no longer shared beliefs, traditions and
aspirations their group would die.
57
Social gatherings.
Energy, vitality and moral forces are created and maintained through individual
participation in the collective conscience. Collective events are stimulating, arousing
and make the collective conscience dominate individuality. The function of gatherings
is to enact group representations and invigorate them by the “collective effervescence”
of energies. Communal ritual maintains and regulates society’s life and shows the
efficacy of the collective conscience. The source of moral life is from “the society of our
fellow beings;” moral forces are sustained and increased by those obtained from others,
“beliefs are active only when they are partaken by many” (Durkheim, 1954, p. 425).
Authority is built on the regularity and establishment of practices.
Lehmann, 1993). Yet he greatly influenced twentieth century sociology (Merton, 1949;
Parsons, 1951, 1968; Giddens, 1982), stimulating research in ancient (Cornford, 1957) and
modern social processes (Mauss, 1979; Jodelet, 1989) and social psychology (Doise and
Moscovici, 1983; Farr and Moscovici, 1984; Tajfel, 1984; Fraser and Gaskell, 1990).
Postmodern thought has brought renewed interest in his ideas, especially individuality and
subjectivity as produced by social processes (Matustik, 1993). While Mead and Durkheim
prompted a “paradigm shift” in sociological thought, concepts of collective conscience
and collective representations were criticized as tending to “seduce us into personalizing
society” (Habermas, 1989, p. 50). Contemporary reviews of sociological theorists show
little consideration of the central hypothesis that once constituted, societies and groups are
beings or “hyperorganisms” with their own characteristics (Lukes 1975; Turner et al.,
1989), without which, collective representations, collective conscience, group solidarity,
rules, the social basis for individuality and psychic functions are vitiated.
Conclusion.
Durkheim integrates organism concepts, engulfing of individuality in crowds and
the collective mentality of socio-cultural functions in the hypothesis of the social being sui
generis. He offers a theory of the social origin of self, collective emotional currents,
religion, law, social institutions and cultural tradition; it suggests thought, reason,
structures of sentiment and action are produced in individuals by society, which becomes
creative for its members when sufficiently complex and integrated to constitute a being by
its communicative solidarity. These ideas will be shown to identify the therapeutic
capacities of groups. However, experimental social psychology provided a different
approach to the nature of small groups and is considered next.
59
Researchers “had little to say about what actually happened within a group;” they
“varied the size or composition of the groups and observed what happened to the group
product. Instead of observing process, scholars speculated about it” (Steiner, 1974, p.
98). Many texts make no mention of the nature of groups (for example, Cartwright and
Zander, 1958; Zaleznik and Moment, 1964; Watson, 1966; Hollander and Hunt, 1971).
However, it is returning. Weick (1979) used Allport’s (1924) notion of “collective
structure” to include “everything that is in a group;” it “is assumed to be the basic
building block for the creation of larger collectivities” and “does not overlook the fact
that groups are unique” (p. 97). This uniqueness is not found in individuals, but in
“repetitive interstructured behaviors” (p. 97). While not mystical, such language is no
less vague.
Wells’ (1980) review of group-as-a-whole mentions without defining the “group’s
life and mentality” and “élan vital of the group.” The idea that “a group life exists
distinct from the individual group members” is regarded as “helpful but often
confusing.” He rejects such ideas that “leave too many unresolved and knotty
theoretical issues which cloud rather than clarify” and offers, “an alternative heuristic
concept (projective identification motif) by which to understand the group-as-a-whole
phenomenon” (p. 169). Avoiding the group mentality controversy, he uses intrapsychic
concepts, restricting him to metaphors of group-as-mother, role-differentiation,
scapegoating and interpersonal phenomena losing the group altogether.
Self-categorisation theory defined groups as categories and treated them as
entities: “social groups are reflexive in that they can act upon and change themselves”
(Wilder, 1986, p. 295). Nevertheless, criteria for groups’ existence are reductive: self-
definition by members, common fate, self-categorisations in relation to non-group
others (Brown, 1989), perception of membership, psychological significance to
members, acquisition of norms and acceptance of membership (Tajfel, 1981; Fraser,
1986; Turner, 1988). In social constructivist thought, the group is a construction of the
investigator (Becvar, Cranfield and Becvar, 1997).
leadership (Cartwright and Zander, 1958); dyads formed the basis for understanding
larger groups (Thibaut and Kelly, 1959). Bales’ Interaction Process Analysis
documented members’ exchanges and considered the group does not act, only
individuals. He advises raters to memorise members’ names so as not to “fall back on
some vague, amorphous conception of a team, a hoard (sic.), a gang, a crowd, or that
thinnest of all such abstractions, a ‘group’” (Bales, 1970, p. 64). However, Hackman
and Morris (1975) acknowledge that because of inadequate behavioural categories, lack
of analytic models, difficulty in handling inconsistencies and limitations of research
settings, “research based on the existing methodological and conceptual paradigms has
not yet succeeded in determining how group interaction process mediates between input
and output states” (p. 12). They identify the lack of a theory available to understand the
context of interaction. Coleman (1975) uses “group consciousness” unrelated to groups
to describe a developmental phase before children form a separate identity.
Later writers resort to earlier definitions such as Small’s (1905) (Barker,
Wahlers, Watson and Kibler, 1987), listing members’ characteristics or describing what
individuals require to be a group while ignoring the group itself (Alderfer, 1995). The
group is seen as “a distinct phenomenon whose characteristics are created by the shared
unconscious and conscious experiences of members as well as by the context of the
group” (Gillette and McCollom, 1995, p. 7). Group dynamics are distinct from, but
interact with individuals’ activities and larger systems; they “begin and end at the group
level” (p. 7). Although avoiding the question of the group as an entity, it becomes an
object of research.
was abundant theory about individuals and large social systems, but not the group itself.
Studies of the whole group and its processes,
“were frighteningly difficult to conduct, required lots of subject time, and were
often too big to be undertaken by one or two persons. Time from inception to
conclusion promised to be long, and there was no guarantee that all those efforts
would ever bear fruit. It was easier and less risky to deal with a fragment of the
process. … No graduate student in his right mind would have elected to
undertake a thesis that might have kept him busy until his own children were
graduate students, especially when there were lots of easier projects that could be
completed in a few months” (p. 102).
There were no new ideas since the classic studies of the 1950’s (Steiner, 1983).
At the end of his life, Allport acknowledged his criticisms of group entities equally
applied to individuals or atoms. He concluded wholeness was a product of
interdependence of parts. Social psychology failed to clarify continuity or reciprocity of
action in groups. It observed parts, but was “loath to construct unobservable wholes
from observed parts,” while believing in larger wholes not registering on the observer’s
direct experience (Steiner, 1983, p. 277); it assumed “social behavior is produced by
individuals, not groups” (p. 280). Observation of units larger than dyads was rare.
Study of individuals in social situations should be “combined and coordinated with the
almost nonexistent social psychology of collective behavior” (p. 285).
However, no theorists of group mentality maintained groups existed apart from
individuals; they were constituted by part of the individual psyche governed by the
group. If the individual is observable, the group entity must be; a framework was
required to differentiate observable collective and individual phenomena.
By the 1980’s, a field of study was defined between the extremes of “super-
individuals with their own minds” and “cumulative characteristics of group members”
(Back, 1981, p. 321). Common fate and resistance to intrusion make groups’ unity “just
as ‘real’ as that of any other object” and is “the source of power above and beyond the
power of individuals composing it. In this sense the group has an individuality, a
separate meaning for its members” (p. 338). Steiner (1986) contrasted the demise of
Durkheim’s perspective with the tendency for contemporary theorists to regard
individualistic explanations as incomplete. An unassailable point of Allport’s (1924)
individualism is that what is observable “is the individual and his actions. Groups do
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not ordinarily constitute a strong Gestalt; they rarely register in our direct experience as
entities or things” (p. 256). This sets the limits of differentiating an observational field
rather than implying anything about what is observed. Social psychology’s emphasis on
cognitivism (Eiser, 1992) with its individualistic assumptions failed to provide a
“supportive intellectual environment for the study of groups” (Steiner, 1986, p. 285). A
science of groups requires dialectic between individuals within group settings and
groups’ effect on them.
Systems theory treats groups as living organisms (Barker et al., 1987), assuming
they are composed of “elements that function together and engage in exchange
relationships with their environments … parts that hang together, that work together,
and are interdependent even though specialized in their function” (Sampson and
Marthas, 1990, p. 95). The organism metaphor implies “the whole has properties that
no element necessarily has. And these properties or characteristics of the whole affect
the behavior of each of the elements of the system” (p. 97).
Collective mentality theory is re-emerging. Sandelands and Stablein (1987)
propose the “organisation mind – the idea that organizations are mental entities capable
of thought” (p. 135). Organizations consist of behaviors not individuals and roles
participate in the social system rather than individuals. Criteria for minds “must not be
confused with individual minds” and “the concept of mind admits varying degrees of
complexity.” Scientific analysis of mind requires criteria to be “observable or predict
observables; this clearly marks the question of the existence of organization mind as one
to be decided empirically, not by formal argument” (pp. 149-150). Without evidence,
they suggest “the question remains to be settled”. Based on “reasonable criteria for the
existence of a non-reified and non-anthropomorphic mind” it is possible to develop a
“true study of organizational behavior, not just the behavior of organization members”
(p. 157).
Sandelands and St Clair (1993) propose an empirical approach to studying
group entities. In ordinary language, groups are treated as either single entities, or
“multiples” (collections) of individuals. Groups are defined as multiples of individuals
and this “bias towards the individual has limited the development of the theory of
groups” (p. 425). Both points of view must be researched. Individualistic research
promotes reductionism, avoids reification, but lacks “an orienting view of the group
entity,” like studying anatomy and physiology without knowing the animal. To
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understand groups, “it is not enough to know about people, or even to know about their
interactions and networks of communication and sentiments. It is necessary to know
also how these things relate to the nature and conduct of the group entity” (p. 431).
Evidence for group entities is gained from reports by members experiencing them as
entities, from multiples with qualitatively different dynamics from entities and cultural
recognition of entities. A group entity is “a form of life” directly perceived, a “process”
rather than a “thing” (p. 447) known to participants directly by feeling. Groups are
social facts invisible to the senses, but social science “lacks a genuine concept of group
entity” (p. 452). Until this is rectified, “there can be no theory of groups unless there
are entities to theorize about” (p. 452).
Conclusion.
The nature of groups is being questioned again after a period in which research
stagnated. The group as a psychic entity had barely been abolished before it re-
appeared in social psychology albeit as a minority view. A methodology is required to
integrate group and members. Even reductionist writers refer to groups as entities and
their indexes list group characteristics as though describing properties of things like:
“action patterns, beliefs, functions, identifications, ideology, morale, rigidity, structure,
tensions” (Krech and Crutchfield, 1948, p. 632). An implicit entity exists in the science
of groups, with consensually agreed attributes and a psychic character, but ill defined as
a system, group-as-a-whole, or collective structures. The limitation is the lack of
formulation of a theory for research without individualistic bias. This is the task of the
present study and will be approached in Chapter 9. Before doing so, the conception of
the group mentality within group psychotherapy will be reviewed.
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Burrow.
Burrow trained in psychoanalysis, but questioned its axioms (Galt, 1995). He
developed “group analysis” with patients, students and colleagues in which the group was
the therapist. He saw body-mind-society as “one tissue” (Galt, 1995); social groups are
integral wholes whose individuals form an “instinctive racial unity” binding members into
“an organic principle of consciousness” expressed biologically, socially and
psychologically (Burrow, 1927a; 1953, p. 176). He called the socio-biological entity a
“phyloorganism” (phylo- means large group) affiliated with racial or national group
characteristics (Burrow, 1953). The “common, organic consciousness” is the “matrix” of
mental life. Normal consciousness unites individuals in “social polity” to form a
“collective social mind” that provides “active images” and “gestures of self-reflective
actuality” as real as the “passive sensory images of the individual mind” (p. 88). Its
images restrict individual self-expression and it preserves itself against separation by
creating unities. Individual and social unconscious are incorporated in the organic unity
of social consciousness and interchanges between them cause individuals’ oscillating
moods. The “secret illusion” of separateness underlying responses to collective mentality
is an “affective fallacy.”
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Individuals disrupt the social organism; taking them out of context destroys it, “as
truly as we destroy the integrity of the organism composing a flower when we isolate its
petal or leaf in order to examine it apart from its structural continuity with the whole”
(Burrow, 1927, p. 165). Treating individuals ignores the societal organism of which they
are part; without it, they cannot maintain a coherent life. When individuals threaten the
integrity of the encompassing social aggregate, they struggle in unconscious collusion
with the disruptive process they embody. Neurotic phenomena are not located within
individuals even though neurotics, through self-interest, promote their impairment by
acting against the social aggregate. “But the separateness of the part is its own
destruction, concomitantly the confluence of the whole is its own conservation” (pp 152-
3). Individual neurosis reflects neurosis within the social mind as a societal lesion, since
it is produced by and creates separation from the surrounding social continuum.
Therapists cannot cure neurosis when they are part of the pathological mentality.
“The individual’s ‘symptoms’ may only be corrected through the analysis of the social
processes constituting latently the individual’s collective medium” (p. 236). Burrow’s
group analysis is the group’s analysis of members. “Group” here is a “phyletic principle
of observation” applied equally to individual and aggregate (Burrow, 1953, p. 237); it
means the social constellation “throughout the community at large, the immediate group
being a constituent of this larger unit” (Burrow, 1928, quoted in Pertegato, 1999, p. 11).
Burrow’s method developed into weekly hour sessions for about ten people.
When he published papers in psychoanalytic journals, he was expelled from the American
Psychoanalytic Society in 1933 (Galt, 1995). He continued to publish, corresponding
widely with scientists in many fields (Burrow, 1953). Neglect of his work is consistent
with antagonism to the collective perspective in the mid-century. It was subject to
censorship by individual psychoanalysis and group analysis in spite of “widespread
ransacking of ideas” from him seldom with credit by Carl Rogers, neo-Freudians and
Foulkes (Pertegato, 1998). However, he formulates the problem of neurosis from a socio-
centric point of view and shows it as a disruption between the individual and the
collective mentality.
Foulkes.
Inspired by Burrow’s papers, Foulkes (1948) began group analysis. His
inconsistent and fragmentary theorizing does not do justice to his originality (Foulkes,
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1948, 1965, Dalal, 1995). The group as an entity in its own right and intermediary
between individuals with historical and cultural processes was central to his therapy.
Social nature is “an irreducible basic fact.” The group or community is primary and the
individual “helplessly compressed into a mere particle of social groups and masses”
(Foulkes and Anthony, 1965, p. 24). The existence of individuals requires explanation
rather than that of groups. Individuals develop as much from community as family.
Individuality implies a social instinct integrating individuals into groups. Mental
processes in groups are a “concerted whole,” not a summary of individual processes.
The group-as-a-whole is “a psychological entity,” (Foulkes, 1964, p. 70), a unified
structure, a “psyche group” (pp. 75-76) with structures similar to individuals. Foulkes
postulated a group mind on the same basis as an individual mind. “The ‘Group as a
Whole’ is not a phrase, it is a living organism … it has moods and reactions, a spirit, an
atmosphere, a climate” (Foulkes, 1948, p. 140), which must be observed and treated.
Groups form both self and neurosis. Neurosis is attributed to social situations rather
than individuals (Foulkes, 1964). “Mental sickness is a disturbance of integration
within the community at its very roots – disturbance of communication” (p. 24). Health
is inconceivable without “being a respected and effective member of the group” (p. 27).
Group analysis treats the social network of disturbance through the member’s
transference to other members as part of the social world (Foulkes, 1964).
Dalal (1998) discerns two distinct discourses in Foulkes’ writing. A
“conservative” discourse retreats from the individual as abstraction of the social entity
into intrapsychic accounts of group events. The need to belong to groups is seen as a
residue of primitive states of the social instinct. The social unconscious consists of
automatic, routinized behaviours. A “radical” discourse asserts the “interconnected
nature of existence itself” (Dalal, 1998, p. 35). Culture is neither inside nor outside, it
permeates the individual. The social entity thrusts into the individual’s biological roots as
“the very structure of the psyche itself, … the container as well as the contained” (pp. 48-
49). Personal psychic processes start outside in the social world and are then internalised
as inner psychological events. The person is a function of communicational networks in
social environments. Communication is the instrument for holding communities together,
mind itself derives from the need to communicate and language creates mind in
individuals. Mind is “reframed as an interpersonal phenomenon” (p. 55) and “mind that
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is usually called intrapsychic is a property of the group” (Foulkes, 1974, pp 278). Some
of Foulkes’ radical concepts are examined.
The Group Matrix: The group-as-a-whole forms a “psychological medium” for
communications and interactions called “a common matrix inside which all other
relationships develop” and “common ground of operational relationships” (Foulkes,
1964 p. 110). Participation in groups reawakens an irresistible need to re-establish
deeply rooted modes of group behaviour. Groups take hold of isolated individuals and
evoke ancient tribal feeling that “permeates them to the very core and all their
subsequent interactions are inescapably embedded in this common matrix” (p. 235).
Individuals emerge from the common matrix where group and individuals coalesce.
Members are in “in a state of interaction, in a common field, in interpenetration and
communication. They speak now through one mouth, now through another” (p. 259).
“Active group currents” are “personified” in members. Processes in the matrix are
“transpersonal” (Foulkes and Anthony, 1965, p. 26) or “suprapersonal” (Foulkes, 1964,
p. 70), not restricted to intra-psychic, individual effects. Group events are composed of
all members, whether directly involved or not, like the “figure” of participants against
the “ground” of the group (p. 110) and manifest in communication. Individual defenses
are displayed within the matrix as communicational phenomena, but are no less intra-
psychic because of this. Communication occurs with consciousness and translates
individual unconscious material into common symbols and group expressions.
“This work in communication is the operational basis of all therapy in the
group” (Foulkes and Anthony, 1965, p. 28). The therapist focuses on the matrix as the
“total interactional field” where unconscious reactions manifest and are translated into
conscious representations within group communication (Foulkes, 1964). The group
“conductor” observes all communication, promoting all events to “the rank of
communication.” Every event has meaning within the total communicational matrix
(Foulkes and Anthony, 1965) as ideas or phantasies “in the group’s mind” (p. 257). The
conductor must balance destructive and constructive energies in the matrix.
Interpersonal relationships and events do not occur in, but between individuals and exist
through interaction. The matrix, like the network in the brain, constitutes a complex
unit defining the meaning, intensity and location in time and space of communications.
It is the operational basis of the group’s mental processes, like the lines of force of a
magnetic field passing through members as nodal points “suspended in it” (Foulkes and
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Bion.
Bion treated the group-as-a-whole and made no interventions to members (Bion,
1961; Ettin, 1999). His theory of the group psychic entity relies on well-established
Kelinian individual psychoanalytic concepts without which, he doubts “the possibility of
any advance in the study of group phenomena” (Bion, 1961, p. 8; Dalal, 1998). The
failure to develop these ideas may account for their “deification” of him (Pines, 1987).
Bion’s groups were experiential rather than psychotherapeutic (Bion, 1961). His concept
of the group entity emerged out of its unified response to his refusal to accept the role of
leader and made it a subject against him. “Group transference” is “what the group really
wants” (Bion, 1961, p. 33). The group expresses by it “saying nothing,” ignoring or
excluding him (p. 34), having a mood, insisting on its view (p. 35), having a desire about
what it does and interpreting or being disturbed by his statements (p. 36). Members talk
72
to the group as a subject itself (p. 41). The group attitude coalesces into a common mode
of functioning opposed to what the group is intended to achieve, though the members
remain committed to it. The essential role of group membership in individuality is shown
by the fact that anyone in contact with reality consciously or unconsciously estimates
groups’ attitude towards themselves. The “efflorescence or decay of the social life of the
group” depends upon this assessment, which is as important as the individual’s “sense of
touch” (p. 43). Bion develops several concepts.
Group Mentality: Members contribute anonymously to a “group mentality,”
preventing issues being confronted and avoiding personal responsibility. It ensures
consistency of contributions contrasted with the diversity of individual thought. Group
mentality is the unanimous expression of the group’s will. Members unconsciously
contribute to it and it causes aversive reactions whenever they think or behave at variance
with it. It is the machinery of “intercommunication” designed to govern group life by
assumptions. Individuals cannot keep pace with group process since a “matrix of
thought” lays within the confines of the group mentality “not within the confines of the
individual” (p. 19). It is both refuge and obstacle, providing unity, but restricting what
can be said. It is the means of attaining goals and source of frustration as members
contribute to and oppose it (p. 53). The source of this frustration is failure to take
individual responsibility for contributions. Some members overtly express group
mentality, others tacitly.
Basic Assumptions: Three group mentality states embody different assumptions
that members behave as though they share: firstly, any contact between a pair of members
has a sexual purpose; secondly, only fight or flight preserve the group, which must
survive even at the expense of the members; thirdly, the group is dependent, meeting to
obtain security from an individual, who is to protect it as an “immature organism.” Basic
assumptions are phenomenological descriptions of group emotional structures or
“emotional atmospheres” (p. 83). They unify the group like “religious” beliefs, forming a
common identity like the “herd,” but creating conflict between personal functioning and
group membership. Members submerged in the basic assumption group, achieve a “sense
of vitality” and their “inalienable inheritance as a group animal” is stimulated (p, 19).
The interface between individual and group involves changes in awareness; assumptions
are tacit, members seem to behave as if they are conscious of them as individuals, but
73
unconscious of them as group members. The group has no consciousness and is not
articulate; “it is left to the individual to be both” (p. 94).
Significant emotions for group members are determined by the assumptions.
Individuals avoid this by splitting from the group and their own “essential ‘groupishness’”
(p. 95), but then they have difficulty thinking for themselves. Members’ personal
contributions and symptoms derive from “being at one with the other members of the
emotionally reinforced group” (p. 95). Participation in basic assumptions is unavoidable,
ensuring emotions are shared. Their occurrence and transitions between them are
unpredictable. They alternate as products of group states rather than conflicting with each
other. Conflict occurs at transitions to the work group.
Basic assumptions are “group diseases” or modes of dysfunction affecting the
group rather than individuals. The “spontaneous instinctive co-operation in the basic
assumptions” is called “valency” to distinguish it from co-operation which he associates
with conscious or unconscious activity in the work group. Therapeutic groups oscillate
between assumption states and instability spreads to other groups outside them until there
is enough “inert material” of outsiders not sharing the emotional situation to form a new,
larger group that ceases to vibrate. The “violent and disagreeable mass oscillation” then
ceases (p. 125). If this is not achieved, oscillations create sub-groups that engage in
“platitudinous, dogmatic, and painless” communication, become dependent or exclude
newcomers. Basic assumptions recognise neither time nor development, but tensions
provide vitality to participants.
Proto-mental Phenomena: Bion postulates prototypic group mentalities where
physical and psychological are undifferentiated as “proto-mental” phenomena expressing
themselves only through the group, not individuals. Phenomena exist in the proto-mental
sphere long before they are demonstrable. It is a “matrix” where basic assumption
emotions “reinforce, pervade, and dominate the group’s mental life” physically and
mentally (p. 132). When an assumption manifests, the others remain in the proto-mental
system, converting into different states according to circumstances. In the proto-mental
sphere, members meeting together “has no significance whatsoever in the production of
group phenomena” (p. 132); meeting is only needed to receive interpretations from the
therapist. In the proto-mental sphere, they are already united, their responses being
created from a common base. Groups allow aspects of individual psychology to be
studied that are alien to non-group situations.
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The Work Group: The work group is an inherently group state achieved by
organization and structure giving stability and resistance to basic assumptions. Basic
assumption groups need neither structure nor organization since the unity is in the
common emotion. Members believe the group is distinct from the aggregate of members
who regress to achieve commonality. Symbolic verbal communication is a function of
work groups, whereas the ‘language’ of basic-assumption groups is debased and used as a
mode of action instead of thought. “The ‘language’ of the basic-assumption group lacks
the precision and scope that is conferred by a capacity for the formation and use of
symbols: this aid to development is therefore missing, and stimuli that would ordinarily
promote development have no effect” (pp. 185-186). Bion derives group mentality from
an undifferentiated, proto-mental level. It is as much a product of individuals as their own
psychic functioning; the group situation brings it into expression. He suggests an
instinctive basis for this valency or attachment to groups, but avoids saying what group
mentality or proto-mental states are, or relating them to the individual mind.
Bion’s work has been influential in the “Tavistock” approach (Rice, 1965; Rioch,
1970; Colman and Bexton, 1975; Colman and Geller, 1985) and seminal to many group
therapists (Gazda, 1977a; Rosenbaum, 1978; Rutan and Stone, 1984). His vagueness and
criticism of McDougall, Le Bon and Trotter led followers to deny the group entity.
“Although Bion thinks and speaks of instincts, he does not postulate a herd instinct or a
group mind” (Rioch, 1970, p. 22). Yet, Bion clearly invests the group with a mental life
and existence of its own. Others confirm that he sees groups as organisms and group
mentality as inherently collective (Lipgar, 1998). Bion’s mentality is composed of what
is rejected by members; what joins them is regressive and destructive, but this may be a
function of his method (Pines, 1987; Brown, 1996).
The Group-as-a-whole.
Other therapists postulate holistic phenomena, such as “common group tension”
(Ezriel, 1950a, 1950b) or “group focal conflict” (Whitaker and Lieberman, 1964). The
group-as-a-whole has been central to psychotherapy using group dynamics (Whitaker and
Leibermann, 1964; Whitaker, 1989) and systems theory (Agazarian and Peters, 1981).
Groups are not thought to have moods since “a group is not an organism capable of
feeling. Yet … there are times when particular moods or atmospheres develop in a group
which are undeniably detectable and in some sense belong to the group as a whole”
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(Whitaker, 1989, p. 33). Agazarian and Peters (1981) regard the group-as-a-whole is an
object of thought, a conceptual tool deduced from observations and its phenomena as
“invisible” since they cannot be seen. For Agazarian (1993), “systems do not really exist
in the real world, like people do. They exist only as ideas in your head. Each system
comes into existence only when you think and it disappears again when you don’t” (pp. 4-
5). The term “group-as-a-whole” is often used to demarcate the Tavistock approach’s
exclusive focus on the group, which has been found of limited therapeutic use (Kibel and
Stein, 1981). It is also seen as a holistic expression of group phenomena, variously
regarded as gestalt, universal, group-in-the-mind, metaphor, construct or superordinate
structure (Ettin, 1999), allowing knowledge of the group to be gained while avoiding
definition of its ontological status beyond saying it is neither fantasy nor reality (Durkin,
1989).
Conclusion.
The organism is central to both Burrow and Foulkes’ thought, linking
individuals to groups by an “instinctive” bond. Individual, self and mind are secondary
products of the continuity of social mentality; they emerge through communication in
the social organism. Psychological disturbance is a consequence of discontinuity
between individual and group. Communication is the common matrix for bridging the
gap between discrete selves. Many of the social mentality theorists’ ideas are re-
invented to serve therapeutic theory. However, Bion does not recognize the Work
Group as engaged in collective mentality, which are regressed, de-individualizing basic
assumption states, similar to phenomena described by crowd theorists. Like them, he
attributes their union to identification processes. His collective phenomena are counter-
therapeutic, although he implies much more with his concepts of proto-mental
phenomena.
The ideas common to these disciplines have been regarded as curiosities in
social science. The critique needs to be examined and they must be integrated into a
common body of theory for the empirical task at hand. These are the subjects of the
next two chapters.
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Theories of the group entity faded from the social sciences in the second quarter
of the twentieth century. By mid-century small-group research in social psychology
replaced it as the dominant paradigm except in the relatively discrete field of group
psychotherapy. The reasons will be shown to be as much ideological as scientific. In
considering their contribution to group psychotherapy, it is essential to review the
critique.
Organism theories.
Spencer’s organism theory was criticized as descriptive and analogical, rather
than analytical (McDougall, 1920) and suffered from ideological axioms that all
knowledge be systematized in evolution theory (Timasheff, 1966). However, organism
theory successively transformed with changing paradigms. Systems theory, its current
form, is accepted in orthodox social science, though somewhat disguised.
Freud’s critique.
Freud (1921) explained crowds’ uncontrolled, “primitive” characteristics as
unconscious impulses freed from repression by the conditions in large groups rather
than creating mental entities. Group organisation equipped with the individual’s
attributes preserved the characteristics extinguished by membership. Members
identified with each other through common love for the leader, creating suggestibility
and contagion. Loss of the leader-follower relation produces panic and breakdown of
the group. Individual psychology explained group mind and herd and left no room for
collective mentality. Psychoanalytic theory continues to be individualistic and
considers group dynamics in terms of identification, projection and projective
identification (Rice, 1965; Menzies-Lyth, 1970; Colman and Bexton, 1975; Colman and
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Ginsberg’s critique.
Ginsberg (1921, 1932, 1954) attacked collective mentality for thirty years. He
claimed the rationality, integration and unity of collective entities and individual
personality are exaggerated and “no coherent and self-consistent account has been
offered of the way in which the unity of social groupings is to be conceived” (1921, p.
47). Social institutions are not the result of a mind and do not embody rational
purposes; they embody conflicts, their unity often suppressing vital demands of most
members. They appear to be “‘trial and error’ experiments, groping attempts at finding
solutions for the problems and dis-harmonies of life” (p. 44). It is false to oppose
individual to society; the intrinsic social relations said to constitute individuals have no
existence outside social groupings. Individuals retain something “unique and
incommunicable,” yet their development is development of sociality. Although
relations holding members of society together are mental, social mind hypotheses are
“exceedingly dangerous,” giving society a “fictitious unity which it does not posses;” it
belittles individuality and minorities, opposing the good of society to that of individuals.
Social mind theories idealize society with higher and lower qualities than individuals.
Regarding the social mind as more enlightened and rational than individuals encourages
submission and conservatism. Personification of the whole means something can be
good for it, but not its members, allowing autocracy or aristocracy to masquerade as
democracy. Someone has to speak for the social mind no matter how infallible it may
be.
Ginsberg (1921) distinguished two types of theory. Durkheim’s maintained “a
collective consciousness in which the mental processes of individuals are fused and
compounded” (p. 51) forming the self from collective mental processes that gains
continuity and unity from society. McDougall’s proposed a “general will” formed by
the essentially social character of mental content and the self, owing its nature to
relations with others.
Critique of Durkheim.
Ginsberg attacked Durkheim’s concept of collective representations. Since there
79
unity of purpose or clear perception of ends such as we find in the best or greatest
individual minds” (p. 60). Popular idealism does not compare with the “clear-eyed
vision and steadfast devotion” in great personalities. Such phraseology reveals his
ideological partiality for the individual as reference point.
Critique of McDougall.
Ginsberg objected to McDougall’s (1920) view of mind as “an organised system
of mental or purposive forces.” A system of minds is not a mind itself, as a house built
of bricks is not a brick. He found two simultaneous group mind concepts in
McDougall. The first is “esprit de corps,” each member having a similar idea of and
strong emotional attachment to the whole group. Ginsberg said it is “out of harmony
with the facts” for nations and does not allow for complex, conflicting and discordant
views. The second concept is of group interests, ideas and values not attributable to
individual minds. He regarded this as a “dangerous” idea, confusing unity of content
and process. Groups rarely arrive at superior decisions to individuals; superior public
decisions show collective deliberation rather than collective mind. Complex group
structures lack the unity and concreteness of individual minds, which possess a core of
being not exhausted in groups. Intellectual or moral institutions are nothing in
themselves; they must be reinterpreted by each generation. The idea that society has a
mental life greater than the sum of its units is purely verbal since units cannot exist apart
from social relations. “The idea that we can get a ‘mere sum’ of isolated individuals
and contrast them with a concrete social entity is a gratuitous assumption” (p. 64).
Psychological phenomena of social wholes are “unities of mind” (p. 66), but he rejected
group mind or organism explanations as confusing content with process. “The problem
of the relation of the individual to the social wholes to which he belongs is more
complex than the theory of the social mind allows for” (p. 68). He reasoned that since it
is counter-intuitively for him, the theory cannot be valid. Finding assertions
“gratuitous” is irrelevant to their validity and declaring the hypothesis too complex is
unscientific.
Ginsberg (1954) tackled the nominalist fallacy that “to assign characteristics to
groups is by no means the same as to consider them as entities which exist
independently of the individuals which compose them” (p. 152). Applying will, mind,
purpose or other individualistic concepts to society implies a “new kind of whole which
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stands outside individuals or in which they are merged.” The complexity of multiple
intersecting, changing social structures and groups of which individuals are
simultaneously members allow no analogy to physical organisms. “Minds in relation to
each other do not constitute a mind in the sense in which each individual has a mind.
They are “relational complexes” of a peculiar kind, with characteristics of their own” (p.
158).
He gave opinion with exhortation, but cited no evidence against the view. A
mixture of assertion and value judgment obscures the possibility of sui generis entities.
Political misuse of ideas is no argument against their validity, any more than misuse of
technology is an argument against its existence. However, he was a champion of
individual rights and a major influence in the scientific rebuttal of prejudice and
pseudoscience common in the first half of the twentieth century (Ginsberg, 1956, 1960,
1961).
Later criticism.
Earlier criticisms were repeated in the middle of the century. Moore (1969)
equated the “group mind fallacy” with the “reductionist fallacy” overlooking that
although the latter is a methodological problem the former is a theoretical one. Krech
and Crutchfield (1948) typify the mixture of arguments from fashion and authority:
“Today the term group-mind is in disfavor, but the concept still plays an
important role in the thinking of … many social philosophers, and even some
social scientists. Despite its burial at the hands of F. H. Allport and others, the
group-mind concept still seems to lead a ghostly life in the thinking of many
social psychologists for the simple reason that in doing away with the group-
mind, the social psychologist seems to have been left with only the individual as
his unit of analysis, and so no social psychologist can get along without some
larger unit than the individual. Thus we find the use of such terms as group
gestalten¸ dynamic social fields, etc. – all modern terms, but frequently misused”
(p. 20).
Uncritical promulgation of such attitudes led to the idea being dismissed in passing:
“Historically, there have been social theories that developed the concept of an emerging
group mind, but these have largely fallen into disrepute” (Lana, 1976 p. 118). Parsons
(1968) called the group mind, “merely a metaphysical assumption; its employment is
82
scientifically unsound” (p. 357). Although Durkheim never reified social being as
group mind, Parsons claimed it is implied by giving reality to society’s mentality and is
due to the theory’s incompleteness (p. 363).
Other criticisms misinterpreted and reified collective mentality. The group mind
was “once used to refer to an extra-natural mind, or psyche, of a group of people” and
was “the view that groups, societies, and peoples think, feel and act as entities in
themselves, quite apart from the thinking, feeling, and acting of the individuals making
up the group” (Zadrozny, 1959, p. 141). Asch (1952) repeated this error, accusing
group mind theorists of the “anthropomorphic fallacy,” introducing,
“a profound cleavage between group forces and the individual and to fix the
relations between them in a particular manner. The group swallows the
individuals who become mere recipients of group forces…. The upshot of the
group-centered view is that men are the agents of outside conditions - that their
aims, their ways of thinking and feeling, and their very character are dictated to
them by forces over which they have no control” (p. 254).
Durkheim’s qualifier sui generis was ignored; no group mentality proponents suggest it
exists apart from the members.
Political connotations were ever-present. Klineberg (1940) says group mind
theory encourages a “romantic and mystical concept of the nation” exploited in “recent
fascist literature” (p. 330). Crowd theories were cited, ignoring more rigorous social
mind theories (Newcomb, 1950). Asch (1952) said the relationship of group to
individual,
“has a direct bearing on political questions of the relation of the state to the
individual. … The group-centred view, when carried to its conclusion, becomes
the basis for the proposition that the society – or its representative, the state – has a
will and a personality, that its interests are supreme, and that the individual exists
for the state. This proposition was in fact an explicit part of the legal doctrines of
the Nazi and fascist regimes” (p. 259).
He supported this emotional argument with fascist quotations:
“‘Not the individual, only the community has rights; there is no Magna Carta. The
individual has only duties, the violation of which constitutes a crime. The plans for
the criminal law foresee the breaking down of the primacy of the individual, and
establishment of the superiority of the community.’ (Nationalsozialistische
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Leitsätze für ein neues deutsches Strafrecht, 1935, p. 6.) ‘Fascism conceives of the
state as an absolute, in comparison with which all individuals or groups are
relative, only to be conceived in their relation to the state.’ (B. Mussolini, The
Political and Social Doctrine of Fascism, International Conciliation, 1935, p. 13.)”
(Asch, 1952, p. 259, note).
He accused Durkheim of hypostasizing group mentality “into an autonomous entity,
working through individuals but not determined by them” (p. 255), although Durkheim
(1954, 1964) said neither individual nor society can be autonomous; society operates
from within individuals as though expressing their own desires.
Group mentality appears in sociological and psychological dictionaries till the
early 1960’s (Zadrozny, 1959; English and English, 1962) then disappeared (Chaplin,
1968; Mitchell, 1969; Harré and Lamb, 1984). It was no longer discussed from the
1960’s (Johnson, 1961; Brown, 1965; Watson, 1966; Nisbet, 1970; Bottomore, 1971;
Wrightsman, 1971) indicating uncritical acceptance of consensus judgment. Brodbeck,
(1973) refered to “the scientifically disreputable past of social science – its closet
cluttered with ‘group minds’ and other suspect entities” (p. 110) as reason to condition
the consciousness, “or better” the unconscious of social scientists with “Methodological
Individualism.” Watkins (1973) glibly dismissed it: “is the behaviour of a number of
individuals ever regulated by some super-individual mental entity? … In general,
‘group-minds’ are very rightly out of fashion” (p. 153-153). Refuting a caricature of the
carefully considered theories of Durkheim, Cooley, Mead and Trotter they only
reiterated fashion without reading the authors.
Gellner (1973) mentioned the “holistic subject” in historical explanation it as
“equivalent to a ‘group mind’ theory,” adding “I take it no one is advocating this
seriously” (p. 251). Later, he said, “of course, societies not being endowed with group
minds, the question doesn’t arise for ‘the totality’” (p. 259). The idea was dismissed
rather than refuted. Even Durkheim’s admirers were reluctant to accept the group
being, saying he did not mean it and expressed himself badly (Goldstein, 1973). It was
dismissed as, “some mystical concept of a ‘group mind’” (Tajfel, 1981, p. 128) and
became a historical curiosity displaced by interpersonal processes between members.
The nature of groups themselves is ignored between the early 1960’s and the late 1980’s
(Steiner, 1974, 1983; Turner, 1988).
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Evaluation of objections.
Objections to collective mentality can be condensed into four types and evaluated for
their relevance to empirical investigations.
At the end of his life, Allport conceded this argument applied equally to atoms
and other phenomena (Steiner, 1986). The perceptual “invisibility” of groups is naïve. A
tree is not perceived as a whole yet is an entity because of the perceptual field’s structure.
Although not objects like physical persons, groups are perceptible. Perception and
cognition are constructive activities (Berger and Luckman, 1973; Rose and Kuhlwein,
1996) and in some respects, all entities are constructs (Maturana, 1988). Individuals
themselves are constructs of varied states.
The idea that group entities are emergent is simplistic, since individuals are
already elements of pre-existing groups, which are re-organised in new groups. Groups
are no more “emergent” than individuals are; both always co-existed. Groups did not
emerge from nothing any more than individuals born from other individuals are emergent;
the members forming groups always already belonged to other groups. Groups’ do not
exist because they are named, but because they are consensually validated structures of
the perceptual world.
Reification is the fallacy where abstract relationships or properties are regarded
as having independent existence (Bullock and Stalleybrass, 1986). Group entities were
never claimed as independent of their constituent individuals, but equally real. They are
constructions of interacting individuals. Groups are reified when defined as relationships
between members, but not if described as observable phenomena.
2. Functional Objection: Groups are not like people; fictitious unity is attributed
to them devaluing individuals. Although consisting of the same stuff as
individual minds, group minds lack properties of personal minds and should not
be called mind. They lack the intelligence and wisdom attributed to them and
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are subject to error and evil. Groups exhibit trial and error rather than guidance
by a mind.
Group beings do not have the same mentality as their constituent individuals;
they are sui generis (Durkheim, 1964), but this does not refute their existence. Group
entities co-exist with individuals, but have different functions from individual minds and
perhaps should not be called “mind” with its individualistic associations. They are not
formed by the same stuff as individual minds, or not all the same stuff.
A portion of individuals’ minds constitutes group mentality and there is no
assumption it should function like an individual’s mind. A relation of analogy between
individual and group is denied by all theorists.
Groups being subject to stupidity, error and evil only demonstrates that they are
as fallible as individuals, but the error and evil of individuals may also be accounted for
by groups. Collective dynamics have been used to explain communal violence and
genocide (Turner, 1985, 1987).
This objection assumes a collective subject is proposed that can speak, desire or
act. However, no proponents assert analogical attribution of individualistic subjectivity to
groups, which leads to untenable notions. Durkheim (1954) speaks of collective
conscience in which members are embedded, resembling Burrow’s (1927b) collective
consciousness, Foulkes’ (1948) matrix and Bion’s (1961) proto-mental dimension. Only
Hegel (1807) possibly describes a collective person. The collective subject is sui generis,
different from individuals, its character and expression to be determined by observation.
Regarding it as a collective person misinterprets all versions of the idea. Durkheim never
confuses collective conscience with the being of society; collective functions are activities
of the social being. Individual subjects arise within groups under circumstances not
applicable to groups themselves.
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Conclusions.
Although critics raise important theoretical problems, many arguments distort
key elements making the group mentality hypothesis untenable and they refute their
own versions. Critiques conform to fashionable deductive, empiricist methodologies
and the weight of argument is from authority, ideology and directed at political rather
than scientific implications. Objections identify it with individual human subjects,
invalidating its uniqueness and ignoring the qualifications collective mentality theorists
make to avoid this. With the breakdown of behaviorism and advent of
phenomenological and hermeneutic methodologies it is becoming respected as a
contribution to the unsolved problems of social science (Warriner, 1956; Steiner, 1983,
1986; Tuner, 1988; Sandelands and Stablein, 1987).
While not an empirical hypothesis, it structures the perceptual field as a way of
observing groups rather than being falsifiable. Falsifiability is a criterion of positivist
empirical science (Popper, 1972), but not so crucial to humanistic or hermeneutic science
(Schotter, 1975; Gauld and Shotter, 1977; Davidson, 1985). Group mentality is a meta-
psychological proposition defining the field of observation. Its existence is an
epistemological or metaphysical issue and not the subject of this study. Scientific
investigation requires a methodology for observing and interpreting phenomena defined
as social or group mentality. The scientific question is whether the hypothesis facilitates
systematic study of group phenomena, reveals regularities and informs therapeutic
technique (Gregory, 1996). Its scientific merits must rest on a coherent theory and a body
of reliable observations.
The criticisms can be interpreted as responses to ambiguities of the concepts.
The following chapter integrates the ideas reviewed into a comprehensive notion of
collective mentality as the foundation for specific concepts of group psychic life to be
operationalised and studied empirically.
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9: INTEGRATION OF THEMES.
A science of groups.
A science of groups considers them objects in their own right, constituted by
interacting members, who are studied in another discipline (Social Psychology); each
requires appropriate methodology. This study presents a methodology for studying group
psychical entities. The influence of society is mediated by peer groups (Cooley, 1909;
Durkheim, 1966; Cotterell, 1996; Harris, 1998) and group psychotherapy provides
opportunities to observe collective psychic functions and how collective mentality is
constituted in interpersonal interaction.
Many objections to collective mentality can be avoided by defining a clearer
relationship between concepts of group and individual. Although it requires theoretical
discussion beyond the scope of this study, axioms can be postulated to accommodate the
criticisms and set the study’s boundaries. These propositions are intended as heuristics to
define the field of study of group entities.
1. Group entities are not like persons, who are defined by their body, capacity to
act and use of language; groups cannot act or speak as subjects. Their
characteristics have to be determined by observation not analogy (Durkheim,
1966).
2. Group entities must exist with organic organization, continuity and a life cycle
before developing mentality (McDougall, 1920; Durkheim, 1964).
3. The group entity’s manifestation and materiality is communication in the widest
sense; its mentality is communication, organization and content (McDougall,
1920; Burrow, 1927b; Mead, 1962; Foulkes, 1964).
4. The group entity is coexistent and co-temporal with its members (Durkheim,
1954). Groups existed from the beginning and individuals emerged within them
(Freud, 1921; Harré, 1993); group mentality is not derived from individual
minds, but a different order preceding and co-existing with them (Durkheim,
1966; Mead, 1962).
5. The group entity cannot exist apart from its members, who serve individual and
group mentality at the same time (Durkheim, 1954). It does not only exist when
members are physically gathered (Bion, 1961).
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assumptions and values constituting the system within which specific sensory mental
content is given meaning common to members of a cultural group. Individual sensory
experience is given meaning by shared products of thought and knowledge. Collective
mentality denotes a framework that gives collective meaning to individual experience; it
is indicated by all that remains constant in a given human mental activity when the
specific somatosensory content changes.
For example, if a person’s conversation about their job is compared with another
conversation about their family, common features organize the different sensory content
showing their mental structures. Comparing this person’s conversation with another’s
in the same culture shows common cultural structures organizing their sensory contents.
Comparison with someone from a different culture shows other, more fundamental
structures. Such comparisons can be taken by substituting different somatosensory
content to reveal the commonalities of structure and function underlying them.
Eventually, any human beings have in common certain fundamentals of rational
consciousness that are the core of human mentality.
An alternative to Mind. Since mind or mentality has a strong individualistic,
bodily meaning, another word may help define collective mentality more clearly
without individualistic connotations. In Greek philosophy, “nous” denoted mental
operations not dependent on the senses. It referred to the rational, intellectual, knowing
part of the mind (English and English, 1958), principles beyond the manifest
phenomenal world (Jones, 1995) related to eternal truths, implying a universal, cosmic
or world mind (Rhode, 1987). It was cosmic reason and rationality (Kerferd, 1967b, p
525). It indicated thinking, ordering, planning, and universal order; it expressed the
consciousness of organisms’ life through the inherent connectedness of their organs. It
is intellectual activity analogous to perception for ideas and consciousness (Gadamer,
1998). It denotes mental functions not dependant on sensory content, whose principles
and processes are the same for all people. It may be used to define collective mentality.
Collective mentality can more correctly be called collective nous.
The ideas, principles and operations constituting nous only exist collectively.
No person embodies more than a fragment of the interconnected system. Traditionally,
philosophy and psychology privilege individual awareness by acknowledging only what
individuals express. Another point of view can focus on the system of functions defined
by nous. Logic, reason and other forms of thought exist for everyone who understands
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them to form a self-sustaining cultural system. Individuals join such a world of thought
in the same sense they join a language community. Nous exists as the medium of a
specific set of conditions of individual minds, including communication, being subject
to collective and individual interactions and being part of a social entity and cultural
milieu.
The collectivizing function of nous: The body divides people from each other.
Nous functions link people in communicational-mental-social structures through
language. To have a place in social life or in nous, sensory content must be converted
into words or other semiotic forms and rendered as linguistic products. Sensory
experience is formed in the rational structures and operations of these communications.
Mental representations form when conceptual forms structure sensory data, when word
presentations are attached to thing presentations (Freud, 1919). Individuals’ memory
images are unique, but take on cultural significance when communicated to others.
Instead of the images themselves, their verbal representations are transmitted through
social communication and subjected to organizing structures and processes independent
of sensory content. This is the functioning of nous.
Images become active in nous when freed from their specific somatosensory
forms and take communicable form (Durkheim’s, 1964, collective representations).
The sensory images are re-created by other communicating individuals, each giving
them personal colouring within the common forms. Communication and its structures
exist through individuals’ participation in organized, rational thought and expression
with common values of truth and consistency. It is co-extensive with cultural forms,
inseparable from social and communicational forms that make social organization and
ordered mental processes possible.
Nous exists in its own right since no individual sustains it; each comes into and
leaves forms existing independently of them as individuals, though they may leave their
marks on it. This is also characteristic of groups to which they belong. People are born
into social forms that pre-exist and succeed them. The individual mind’s point of
contact with nous is wherever communication occurs within any rational structure.
Initially, this is in small social groups (Cooley’s, 1904, primary groups). For large
groups, mass media, culture and ritual are the institutionalized forms for exchanges that
are spontaneous in small groups. Individuals who cannot become part of such groups
are deprived of contributing to or being structured and supported by nous.
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Personal and collective nous: Using the criterion of somatosensory content, two
domains of nous can be defined to differentiate personal and collective mental content.
When somatosensory experiences are represented mentally, they can be represented in
language, communicated and subjected to logical or moral principles. The resulting
manifest mental content consisting of personalized concepts, values and actions
constitutes personal nous. A person may think rationally about their life, make
decisions and evaluate their experiences using nous functions in their personal mind.
They may be unaware how this is structured by the organization of culture, gender,
history, moral attitudes and prejudices of their society that reflect collective nous
working through personal nous and somatosensory content. To take its place within a
wider system of meanings and values incorporating membership of society, this
personalized organization must be subject to the meanings and values of the culture that
constitute collective nous. While personal nous forms and organizes representations
within the personal mind, collective nous links them to collective representations
values, meanings and functions common to society members.
There is no clear boundary between the two, but rather a series of gradations
from collective to personal. Within collective nous, various domains can be
distinguished, like other social structures. Part is common to humanity, then large-scale
cultures such as occidental and oriental, national, class, family and eventually peer
group structures. Each provides essential elements in the organic complexity of the
whole nous organism. There are also different degrees of organization of nous. The
crowd mind, Burrow’s collective neurosis and Bion’s basic assumption group mentality
are all organized around shared sentiments, emotions and attitudes. They show only
limited logical operations, subject to cultural norms. The systemic functions are limited
to simple conjunction and disjunction of normative values. The emotive content
debases the logical system of nous.
In orderly discussion reaching a consensus, cooperative problem solving and
decisions, the personal nous activity of each member becomes an element in a common
rational structure with respect for reason, ethics, culture, history, language and forms of
action. These operations of collective nous support and organize sensory-personal
content. They lack specific content, but comprise shared structures and operations
allowing communication to have effects. This is shown in language. The choice of
words and construction of sentences and topics discussed are personal and specific, but
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rules, structures and idioms expressing them are common to all speakers and logical
operations are common to educated people. They are the same whatever the topic or
sensory content. If members fail to become part of the collective nous system, no
comprehensive order exists and no collective thought or action can take place.
Alternatively, protagonists may belong to contending groups and give collective
organization to their views and actions along “party lines.” Since language is only
sustained as a collective function, nous’ structure and functions are linguistic (in the
widest sense of the term as distinct from speech, Whorf, 1995); speech is produced by
individuals and is personal, but language with its rules is collective.
Group mentality theorists have not satisfactorily answered the question of where
collective nous is located. Placing it in a transcendent domain departs from empirical
science. However, it is similar to asking where language, culture or social structures are
located. They undoubtedly exist – but where? They are not confined to functions in
individual minds, but suspended between all those involved in them. Theoretical
developments in the categories of thought may be required to answer this. No adequate
language exists to discuss entities not identified with coherent physical objects. It is not
helpful to say that because this question cannot be answered the theory should be
abandoned. It can only be answered by more intense consideration of relevant
phenomena and ideas.
The individual and the group: For groups to become organisms and develop
psychic functions that support nous, individuals need to be integrated and fulfill their
own needs as well as the group’s. Since the medium of group nous is communication,
this means being “membered” into the communication process. The quality of
membership determines the quality of the group psychic life. Only in primitive social
organisms, capable of primitive functions does authority of a leader determine the
structure. The greatest cultural achievements are in societies with a high degree of
individuality and a strong collective life integrated by active communication and
differentiation. Personal initiative is expressed and takes on social value within the
collective organizing context of nous.
Collective mentality theorists describe the individual’s mind as sustained in the
matrix of nous. The quality of individuals’ membering into the group and ability to
serve functions in the collective organs of thought, affect and action determine the
quality of their individual psychic life. According to axiom 4 above, individual and
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The Aggregate.
The initial group state is an aggregate, a number of people brought together by
circumstances external to the group itself. It exists before interactions have occurred;
membership is extrinsic, motivated by factors outside the group. Members are bound
by the idea of the group rather than to each other. This has been called the “group to
join” (Long, 1992), “series group” (Sartre, 1991) collection, aggregate or multiple
(Sandelands and St. Clair, 1993). The prototype is a bus stop queue of people united by
interest in the bus who interact as individuals. It can be called the Nominal Group
(abbreviated as “Gn”), because being named forms the group. Its members are bound by
their identification as members of the named group. In psychotherapy groups, members
identify with each other’s wish for treatment. The reality of social forms whose
members know nothing of each other except they are members of a group was
established experimentally by the “minimal group paradigm” (Tajfel, 1981; Hogg and
Abrams, 1988).
This is not enough to form intrinsic bonds or constitute group action. Although
associated, members exhibit their own tendencies within the group context. Gn is a
collection of individuals who relate to each other, but are not a functional unit or entity.
Although a preliminary stage, groups also revert to Gn when members lose their
common identity. It ceases to function as a unit and becomes a collection of
individuals. Since it lacks entitativity (Campbell, 1958), the Nominal group cannot
support collective mentality and consists of the interpersonal interactions. Transition
from Nominal Group to entity is the initial task.
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The Organism.
A social entity forms when members communicate, develop common experience
and a shared culture of thoughts, emotions, actions, history and traditions. This
organizes their activity to constitute a group life no longer a summation of interactions.
Members experience the group as a social entity or organism to which they belong,
distinct from (though not independent of) them as individuals; their relationship to it
may conflict with individual relationships. It is indicated when members speak on
behalf of the group and place demands on each other for it rather than for themselves,
such as when encouraging members to attend meetings or remain in the group. The
group is felt as part of them (Sandelands and St. Clair, 1993) and evokes loyalty and
commitment (Campbell, 1958). This condition corresponds to the “group to form”
(Long, 1992) or “fused group” (Sartre, 1991). Members’ interactions create a social
organism and experience of belonging, not dependent on anything outside the group.
Members identify with common characteristics evoked by the group life. Membership
is “intrinsic,” related to the mutual bonds, in contrast to the Nominal Group’s
“extrinsic” bond, though both may co-exist. It can be called the Organic Group (“Go”)
and responds to events impacting upon it, re-creating itself (Maturana and Verula, 1980)
as an entity with its own life, a unit of the social world, a psychosocial organism
(Durkheim, 1966). Group processes (Cartwight and Zander, 1958; Forsyth, 1983)
involve members in interactions determined by individual factors and stereotypic forms
common to other groups. It preserves itself against threats, develops structures and
regulates its states. It corresponds to an informal recreational group. Go can manage
the problems of its existence and undertake collective action in responding to demands
from outside the group.
The social organism. Early sociologists identified large social units as hyper- or
epiorganisms with specialized functions, growing and decaying in complexity (Comte,
1830; Von Lilienfeld, 1873; Spencer, 1876; Espinas, 1877; McKenzie, 1890; Small, 1905;
Ross, 1905). They lack continuous living mass, sensorium, specialized feeling organs
and motor apparatus. Communication coordinates their functions. The functionalists
(Radcliff-Brown, 1935; Merton, 1949) showed societies were integrated living organisms
whose structures have functional significance for the whole rather than parts. The
organism’s life is the function of its structure. Systems Theory (Gouldner, 1959;
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Grinker, 1956; Maturana and Varela, 1971; von Bertalanffy, 1975; Beer, 1980) applied
characteristics of living systems such as wholeness, growth, differentiation, hierarchical
order, control, adaptiveness, purposiveness and goal seeking to groups. Communication
processes such as feedback, integration, gradients, selective boundaries, defences
against disintegration and autopoiesis are evident in social units.
Durkheim (1954, 1964) described societies as organisms either held together by
images and sentiments of similarity leading to agglutination and loss of differences
(mechanical solidarity), or by valuing complementary differences, forming collective
representations and leading to division of labor (organic solidarity). Mechanical
solidarity becomes organic solidarity as collective representations express differences
and sub-systems form like organs. Organic solidarity follows from communication
between members as the essential condition of culture, solidarity and coherence.
Groups require regulation that dominates members in return for cohesion and limited
freedom. The individual’s value is in becoming an organ rather than an absolute
monad. Trotter (1916) likened the collective entity to an animal with an instinctive
character. Burrow (1927b) called groups “phyloorganisms” held together by an
instinctive “inner organic bond,” as much biological as social or psychological;
Foulkes’ (1948) group-as-a-whole is a living organism also with an instinctive basis.
Both emphasize organized communication as the essential condition for constituting the
group.
Conclusion: When communicational interactions attain sufficient organization
and richness, members become interconnected in processes that maintain temporal
continuity and ensure every event affects all other events in the group’s life. Feedback
and homeostatic features develop like those of biological organisms such as maintenance
of activity against entropy and within limits (Goldstein, 1995). Social organisms adjust
internal and external states and preserve themselves, even at the expense of structures or
functions. Events are only understood by reference to the whole of the group’s ongoing
life. Groups become organisms when they are self-maintaining and coherently respond to
circumstances consistent with their purpose. Organized communication between
members is the condition for this organic character.
Organism and nous: What is inherent in organisms is inherent in nous. Every
element must have implications for every other element, just as every organ in a body
relates to other organs. This is denoted by “integrity,” which means, “having no part or
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element wanting; unbroken state; material wholeness, completeness, entirety,” from the
Latin integer meaning “whole, entire” (Shorter Oxford Dictionary, 1990). It is not just
that group members need to be in communication; organic integrity is illustrated by the
fact that it is inadequate for only most ideas of a discussion to be subject to the laws of
logic or most of a person’s actions to be subject to moral principles. All must be equally
affected by insertion into the system of operations; otherwise, they lack logic, meaning,
value and morality and threaten the integrity of the whole. Nous’ systemic nature is
shown by the need for consistency in its functions, which is taken for granted just as the
completeness of operation of the rules of language is accepted. Ungrammatical utterances
are given meaning in relation to these rules if possible, or else ignored.
The coherence of communication is its “organic quality.” Organic integrity is
shown when members cannot be ignored and are communicatively inter-dependent. In
this circumstance, what can be called the “Watzlawick Principle” comes into force.
Watzlawick, Bavelas and Jackson (1967) said,
“behavior has no opposite … there is no such thing as nonbehavior … one cannot not
behave. Now if it is accepted that all behavior in an interactional situation has
message value, i.e., is communication, it follows that no matter how one may try, one
cannot not communicate” (pp. 48-49).”
In the communicational organism, lack of participation or silence is a communication just
as talk. Integrity is demonstrated by participants existing for each other in a
communicative medium demanding interaction. They are bound by communicational
reciprocity; isolated personal decisions are not possible since other members provide the
context for what is decided. Connectedness or “solidarity” (Durkheim, 1964) is implied
by this situation; each member is vital to the others. Solidarity means “the fact or quality,
on the part of communities, of being perfectly united or at one in some respect” (Shorter
Oxford Dictionary, 1990). It comes into effect when communication is established in a
group. What members communicate has effects not completely determinable by them,
but is constrained by a range of possible meanings within the social code. The
possibilities are endowed with significance by the social organism.
This “communicational organism” comes into being whenever the Watzlawick
Principle is present as a criterion of organicity. Communication develops an organic
integrity and supports nous functions of rational organization with logical, moral and
emotional significance. The content of communication (and hence of members’ minds) is
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organized and integrated by the collective forms of nous. The communication process has
similar structural characteristics, irrespective of the personal, sensory content, whose
place in the communicational organism is defined by the collective nous system. The
Watzlawick Principle governs the necessity to communicate, but not the content.
Members may hope for one sort of communication rather that another, but the organism
preserves integrity provided any communication occurs. Nous organizes the content
within a collective communicational organism once all members are drawn into its
integrity. An illustrative example follows.
An intelligent, withdrawn adolescent girl has been in a group for six months,
rarely speaking except to complain about how hard she had to work for her last
prize. She distains the boisterous play of non-academic members. Eventually, she
can contain herself no longer and after warning the group, the following week she
criticises their immature behaviour and lack of interest in their problems. They
are all embarrassed, attempt to justify themselves to her, but are resentful. Her
intervention stimulates sporadic problem talk over the next few sessions. She
remains in the group and begins to join in some of their fun.
Members are bound together and cannot ignore communicational inadequacies. The girl
can neither ignore the others nor leave the group without comment and the boys can
neither ignore her nor simply reject her. They are bound in communicational solidarity
that demands they interact towards a common culture.
Collective Cognition.
The capacity to form representations, create information and perform operations
on or “process” it is analogous to individual cognition. Performing cognitive operations
requires members to coordinate their ideas and interactions around common topics
subject to the logical operations that allow problems to be solved.
Groups are capable of cognitive functioning. Sighele (1891) said as people think
with the whole nervous system, so the whole group thinks. Tarde (1903) emphasised the
uniting function of common ideas. Le Bon (1896) described crowds’ thinking as a
function of their organization, characterised by contradictions, fantasy, lack of critical
evaluation or reality; ideas are dominated by their emotional value and become persistent
sentiments linked by association. Trotter (1916) said rationality counteracts
gregariousness, but the herd’s thoughts become dogma, little affected by reason. Mead
(1962) maintained thinking derives from social intercourse and lives in social acts, not the
head. Meaning is a social process created through the conversation of gestures.
Durkheim (1954, 1964) said social communication is the basis for collective
thought. Categories of thought form from social and religious rituals. Collective
representations result from cooperation within social structures, creating shared categories
for sensory and psychical content that encounter and reinforce or counteract each other in
the collective conscience. Regulation and organization by laws is necessary for thought.
Burrow (1927b) said thought is represented as a whole in organic life. For Foulkes
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(1948), the group’s mind has the same structure as the individual’s since it is formed from
communication. Ideas must be capable of communication to be conscious; what cannot
be communicated is unconscious. Defence mechanisms occur in group communication as
in individual minds. Bion (1961) said organization allows groups to think and resist basic
assumptions. In the work group, language becomes a mode of thought.
Conclusion: As communication is organized by structural differentiation, rules
and rituals, the circulation of psychic representations and other functions constitute
cognitive processes that are not the property of individuals, but exist in the whole
organism. In holistic, unorganized crowds they are primitive, emotive judgemental,
incapable of learning. Ordered group life enables members to differentiate into subgroups
and develop logical processes internalised as the framework for individuals’ thought.
Cognition and nous: In the organism, organized communicational processes allow
ideas to undergo operations that go beyond those sustaining the communication organism
itself. Cognitive functions of the collective nous consist of operations of thought,
including the interpretive framework for perceptual functions. The communicational
organism must become organized to make logical operations possible, make decisions,
reach agreements and initiate activity. Operations require norms or rules to organize the
communicational organism. Norms impose regularity on the content; rules ensure
operations are performed on it. The communicational field is permeated with collective,
socio-linguistic and cultural structures. Cognition becomes collective the more it is
subject to higher order, abstract principles that organize all members. The following
example illustrates this.
A group of inarticulate boys discuss the plight of a member’s acquaintance, who is
systematically victimised at a railway station after school. They elaborate a fantasy
of him being pushed under a train. Their hilarity is followed by vivid descriptions
of the imagined mutilation and a series of exclamations of how much pain and
horror this would involve. This leads to anecdotes about their own conflicts with
peers, which are responded to with mutual advice and support.
Here, the group submits the sensory content of a fantasized case to common elaboration
in a series of verbal representations of images and hypothetical actions. The
consequences are represented in language and allow identification with the victim.
Members’ experience is then substituted into the cognitive structure created, allowing
them to think together about their own situations and consider solutions. The cognitive
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Collective Affect.
The group’s ability register qualitative states, adapt to events and register their
impact on its welfare is analogous to individual affect. For continued existence, it must
regulate arousal or energy within a compatible range. In Gs, this energy motivates
advantageous states reducing tension, creating comfort or creates disadvantageous states
increasing tension and discomfort. Energy states are regulated and controlled in Gs for
the performance of other group functions.
Groups have an affective life. Le Bon (1896) said in crowds, members’ affective
states spread by contagion, undermining individual thought and functions; they are
intolerant, conservative and exaggerated by imitation without modification. Images carry
emotional power within groups. Trotter (1916) said being part of a larger group being
gave comfort and difference is felt as wrong. The instinctive bond to the group manifests
in members’ affect. Durkheim (1954) shows members gain pleasure in associating.
Collective sentiments sweep through members and are replaced by differentiated states.
Collective events are arousing and affects associated with collective representations
influence individuals from outside with psychical force felt from within. Collective
sentiments are socially organized affects attached to objects and actions. Sentiments fuse
through the collective effervescence of communication. The collective part of the “soul”
dominates the individual, liberating energy and moral force. Burrow (1927b) saw affects
as residues of collective biology. For Bion (1961), basic assumptions are responses to
shared emotional states; being submerged within group mentality gives members vitality.
Conclusion: The group’s affective life follows from the vitality, arousal and
pleasure of being together. Communication and collective representations carry aversive
or rewarding energy, transmit emotions, motivate members and fuse ideas. Collective
affects are socially organized, seem to come from within individuals and exert power like
conscience, though they may be disruptive or contribute to culture and support
individuals.
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Affect and nous. The energy of communication is also collective. Personal arousal
becomes collective energy when affect is communicated. The somatosensory mind
includes physiological expressions of emotions with their hedonic qualities. Arousal
occurs at the interface between the experiences of body and mind; it is given meaning as
emotion when communicated into a social context (Harré, 1988). The energy state and its
significance are altered and meaning is found within group states. Emotion can be
directly transmitted from one person to another as “contagion,” because affective signals
take cultural, collective forms; or it may be converted into social energy through
communication within collective-rational forms. If members communicate their anger in
critical argument that is understood by and convinces others, it evokes similar affective
responses in them. The collective rational structure and cultural context determine the
communication’s affective significance and validate the original communicator’s affect as
common.
Nous manifests in communicated aspects of affect. The affect’s content derives
from individual sensory experience and somatic arousal. Emotions have social forms
that are also semiotic (collective linguistic) forms. What someone is happy or sad about
is personal, but the emotion’s form, expression and responses to it are collective
representations within a communication process. When someone describes an
emotional experience, the linguistic medium allows the recipient of the communication
to reconstruct the emotion, evoking a shared state with its own energetic properties. Not
only is the emotional form collective, but the energy also becomes collective affect as a
consequence of communication. The important affective life is not restricted to bodily
manifestations, but is shared between people with collective significance if
communicated.
Psychic energy can be defined as psychic vigor, being capable of having psychic
effects or exerting psychic force; it has affective character and aversive or rewarding
qualities for the communicational organism. Individual activity alters the energy of the
group state quantitatively and qualitatively because of the solidarity of the
communicational organism. The Watzlawick Principle can be expanded: “Once the
communicational organism is formed, it is impossible not to communicate and
impossible for the energy of members’ communication not to affect each other.” This is
illustrated in the following example:
Three adolescent girls were talking while waiting to disembark from a plane
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Collective Action.
Groups’ capacity to integrate impulses and act in a coordinated manner as a unit is
analogous to individual action. In order for Gs to act, members’ activity is coordinated
and individual actions reconciled. The group acts as a unit in relation to demands and
needs or it cannot ensure its development. Collective action requires resolution of
differences, decisions coordinated and energy regulated. Its essence is cooperativeness
of members’ actions within a common purpose or goal.
Groups are capable of collective action. Le Bon (1896) said crowds’ shared ideas
and sentiments transform into acts. Increased size and lack of structure lead to
impulsivity and irascibility. Crowds’ action is unified by leaders, who appeal to emotion
by suggestion. For Durkheim (1964), the individual’s value is as an active organ in the
whole. Undifferentiated, whole groups impose action on their members, reducing
freedom; differentiated groups integrated by organic solidarity engage in collective action
toward common goals by cooperative communication. Thought results from cooperative
action forming collective representations enabling the group being to represent itself in
ritualistic actions. Acting in unison makes members feel in unison. Burrow (1953) saw
neurosis as conflict between the individual and the surrounding social mind. The pain of
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A group of boys is anxious about being together. Everyone seems paralyzed. The
therapist sustains sporadic talk. One boy restlessly moves around the room, then
begins making paper planes. Following facilitatory comments by the therapist,
others join in. There is no communication between them except observing each
other as they do this. After a time, they throw them around the room and
comment on each other’s achievements, verbalizing intentions. “I’m gunna make
a bigger one.” “Mine’s gunna have a twist in it.” Then they express interest in
each other. “Hey look at that one!” “That’s a beauty!” Finally, the boy who
started the activity throws his plane at the half open window saying “I bet I can
get it out first.” The others join in the competition and take turns throwing and
retrieving their planes. When one boy finally gets his out the window, there is a
collective roar of jubilation; the organism has formed. The game becomes a
regular feature of the group life.
Initially, there is no communicational organism to support group action. One boy
acts individually in response to the group tension; others join the action. By his
personal action, he has intervened in the structure of group action and created a
possibility of which others take advantage. When they share common activity, the
integrity of the group communicational organism results in increasing mutuality of
action, so their individual activity builds a group action culture, converting individual
goals into group goals. An encompassing framework of meaning, intention and value is
provided in which individual actions can be inserted. Finally, the group plays a game
whose meaning depends on it being common. However, it only has this character
because of the group action within organizing functions of nous.
Part II, describes the observational instrument upon which the study is based. In Chapter
10, the function of social communication as the concrete observable element in social
phenomena is explored. In Chapters 11-14, the four group process dimensions of structure,
cognitive organization, affect and action coherence applied to collective entities are derived
from relevant theoretical background with categories for each dimension. In Chapter 15,
observational categories for therapists’ interventions are developed. Together, they
constitute the Group Function Record.
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sense of Social Identity Theory; it is a product of the social situation itself, not restricted
to the individual (Turner, 1987; Hogg and Abrams, 1988) rather than the psychiatric
meaning of feelings of unreality about the self (Freedman, Kaplan and Sadock, 1977).
Communication as a depersonalized, collective construction is a social process
enmeshing members who determine and are determined by it. Only in a hypothetical
sense can members be outside the communicational situation, just as no one can be
outside language or have another basis to grasp the meaning of their situation.
In Social Communication Theory, any message manifests the group’s whole
context and history. Its meanings and effects may be different from the sender’s
intentions and is viewed in terms of its effects on the whole social setting as much as on
the intended receiver. Irrespective of content, messages signal involvement of sender
and desire towards the receiver; their circulation creates group identity and involvement.
Messages are multi-leveled, have syntactic meaning, affective significance, embody
cultural characteristics and are part of historical events whose importance is not known
until accomplished in the future. They are relevant or irrelevant to preceding messages,
can duplicate or add information, be incomprehensible yet convey a host of
significations. Messages make participants known to each other in ways that have
nothing to do with their content. The message in Social Communication Theory is a
mode of social relationship. A communicational act takes its significance from its total
context within the social system; the act itself is part of a historical sequence of explicit
connotations and implicit insinuations influencing past or future communications pro-
and retroactively. It is the means for participants to become known and encounter each
other and their social environment.
Communication is the medium of social interaction and the purpose and means
of interaction. “Communication” derives from the Latin “communare” meaning “to
share” (Shorter Oxford Dictionary, 1990). Social communication is the means by which
people share themselves, forming communal life. It occurs through mutually
recognized acts of encounter engaging participants with each other, irrespective of
whether their meaning is understood (Mead, 1962; Joas, 1996). Individuals in an
aggregate become members of an organic unit (Go) by sharing communication and
constitute it as a functioning social entity (Gs) when collective nous manifests.
Information transmitted in communicational acts is as much the medium for social
contact as its end; properties of the communication process other than content are
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rhythmic and historical. Events from any point in the group’s past may determine
communication in a specific moment. It embodies any or all levels of personal and
social experiences. To communicate is not so much to send or receive messages, as to
join the ongoing, complex texture of communicational sociality.
certain topics, remaining silent, depending on a leader) norms develop, often persisting
for the life of the group, giving it a personality (“syntality,” Cattell, 1951). Consistency
and continuity in functioning indicate the systemic nature of the communicational
organism and the presence of nous, observable as characteristics of the group's
communication. The nous system may not be reducible only to communicational
phenomena, however it is expressed in the communicational field and is where the
group’s psychic integrity as an entity is observed. For groups to constitute themselves
as sociable entities supporting nous, the communicational field must be organized to
perform functions essential for their maintenance as living organisms, such as:
• Define membership and maintain boundaries with the environment;
• Form collective representations of members and group;
• Form collective representations of the group’s purpose and nature, common
values, attitudes and expectations;
• Represent and communicate with the external world;
• Define and regulate affective states;
• Provide feedback on the basis of the rewarding or aversive nature of events;
• Organize for cooperation and group action.
The communicational system is the medium for collective nous functions
equivalent to the individual’s psychological apparatus. As for any organism, functions
may fail, its integrity be breached and result in malfunction, loss, mutilation of organs
or death. Failure to acquire these functions leads to anti-therapeutic group cultures, loss
of members or dissolution. Such groups are unviable organisms of the genus and
deprive their members of crucial development and social education obtainable from
belonging to viable groups (Mead, 1962). Adolescents lacking access to membership of
viable groups are seriously disadvantaged (Collett, 1996).
A therapeutic aim is for the group’s communication process to constitute a
viable organism manifesting collective nous functions. If the qualities of this process
are observed and degrees of its adequacy defined, therapeutic techniques that assist (or
inhibit) the process can be examined. Members’ ability to participate in a sociable
communicational system indicates therapeutic progress. In a communion, collective
functions derive from and contribute to members’ psychic functions through
communication. The group can be observed as a functioning entity and its fluctuations
judged in terms of how well they allow the communicational system’s ability to fulfill
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the requirements of group life. The minimal characteristics for a psychic entity with
nous functions can be defined as three sets of communicational characteristics:
1. To gain knowledge and perform cognitive functions (cognition);
2. To differentiate psychic energy into affective states and regulate them (affect);
3. To act as individuals and as a group (action).
If the system of communication phenomena is observed as the concrete
expression of the group's psychical character, the task is to define processes of
cognition, affect and action as properties of the communion rather than aggregations of
members’ interactions. However, the phenomenal field of communication is complex
and several aspects need to be differentiated. Analyses of groups’ communication
processes have concentrated on defining interpersonal interactions rather than properties
of the whole group (Hackman and Jones, 1965; Bales, 1970; Shaw, 1978; Beck and
Lewis, 2000). The Group Function Record treats the group as the unit of observation
and the totality of communicational phenomena is analyzed.
of the communication process rather than its content; therefore, therapists’ verbal
interventions are categorised in terms of the object they are directed to in the communion
rather than their content. Records are also made of Limits set and therapists’ Locomotion
round the room.
These five dimensions describe group communicational structure, minimal
requirements for group cognitive capacity, affect, action and therapists’ interventions.
They do not record completed functions, but the appearance, interference and loss of
conditions for them. In following chapters, essential attributes of each dimension and
associated psychological processes are discussed. Their group-communicative aspect
allows differentiation of communicational structure, cognitive functions, affective states
and actions within the communicational field of the communion, rather than locating
them within individual members.
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The entity observed is the structure of the communicating unit. The GFR follows
aggregates of individuals changing into social units, including the whole group or
subgroups. The development of communions out of Gn is a function of the organisation
of the relationships between members (McDougall, 1920; Ettin, 1999) and corresponds
to the group’s communication structure. “Structure” means “mutual relation of the
constituent parts of a whole as determining its peculiar nature or character” and
“organised body or combination of dependent parts or elements” (Shorter Oxford
Dictionary, 1990). In psychology, structure is: “any enduring arrangement, grouping,
pattern, or articulation of parts to form a whole,” contrasted to function or process, it
“usually implies stability of the component parts” (English and English, 1962). Group
structure is “a nonrandom configuration or arrangement of elemental parts into an
organized whole; some sense of innate, evolving or patterned construction is implied”
(Ettin, 1999, p. 212). For the GFR, structure reflects members’ communicative relation.
Gs is a unit consisting of all members as parts of the whole, but the definition of group
lacks clarity. Quantitative criteria of distance between members or time spent in
association have been used (Martin and Bateson, 1996); however, they lack flexibility
for the present purpose.
dyads liable to become trivial; but they are intimate and inclined to form around what
only the two share (Simmel, 1950; Northen, 1988).
Each member of a triad can be an intermediary for the others, uniting or separating
them (Simmel, 1950). It is more difficult to maintain since the third person disrupts the
collusion that allows dyads to ignore differences in favour of commonalities (Northen,
1988). The independent factor introduces an inherently social element. Group culture
and collective identity develop in groups more than dyads. The character of the group
alters when it is large enough to form subgroups and members cannot readily remain in
contact with all others.
Large groups must divide into subgroups and add or subtract components to move
from simplistic mechanical solidarity towards more flexible organic solidarity (Durkheim,
1964) . Forming subgroups is therefore inherent to maintaining larger groups. A
structurally secure number for forming subgroups of large social or political groups is
between five and seven members (Simmel, 1950). Consequently, the average
membership of most groups is between 2.4 (James, 1953; Forsyth, 1990) and five
members (Harrè and Lamb, 1983). Groups gravitate towards dyads (Hare, 1976; Forsyth,
1990). The power of groups to create conformity rapidly increases from two to four
members. A majority of three to one is enough to induce conformity, forming a ceiling
effect with more members (Brown, 1989; Forsyth, 1990). Increasing group size
encourages de-individuation, increased aggressiveness, lowered personal responsibility or
empathy with target individuals and heightened emotionalism or arousal (Durkheim,
1964; Main, 1985; Forsyth, 1990). The power of groups to distort judgements increases
with size, but negative emotions and aggressive interactions are more likely to occur if the
dispute is between subgroups (Asch, 1953). As size increases, quality of performance,
productivity, disagreement, giving directions, opportunity for self expression and tension
release increase, though participation and tension are reduced; antagonism is greater in
odd-numbered groups (Thomas and Fink, 1966; Brown, 1989; Forsyth, 1990).
The structural effect is indicated by possible relationships with increasing size, as
shown in Table 11.1. If a three person group is taken as the defining group situation
(defining a dyad as not a group), the challenge of group situations can be estimated using
its six relationships as a “factor of increase” in the larger groups as shown in the third
column. The factor increases massively in six person groups, which are more likely to
reduce stress by forming subgroups. The factor of increase in complexity constitutes a
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Table 11.1. Possible relationships in different sized groups (adapted from Napier and
Gershenfeld, 1989, p. 39).
The larger the group, the more demanding it is for social cognition, affective
control and coordination of action. Size is a major factor for groups to solve problems
and maintain stability; the capacity to manage interactions limits viable size or causes
qualitatively different processes (Krech and Crutchfield, 1948; Mann, 1990). Though
dyads give greatest opportunities for intimacy, they create more tension since there is no
one else to relate to in a dispute (Hoffman, 1978; Northen, 1988). Triads are more likely
to exclude one person and undermine self exteem; communication is likely to be
smoother in odd numbered groups, while satisfaction and opportunity for participation
reduce above a threshold of five members. Dependency increases, while emotional
attachement, initiative and motivation reduce in larger groups (Napier and Gershenfeld,
1989).
Five people is optimal for some types of problem solving (Napier and
Gershenfeld, 1989). Assertive members have a disproportionate effect in larger groups,
since most members are more likely to allow others to lead; the larger the group, the more
inhibited some people are and the less likely to voice dissent (Hoffman, 1978). Small
groups are more attractive than larger ones, where there are reduced intimacy, sense of
personal significance or personal identification and greater heterogeneity of interests
(Napier and Gershenfeld, 1989). Members participate less in larger groups and there may
be more “social loafing” with a few dominating the interaction (Hoffman, 1978).
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These essential structural elements are located in members’ pre-group contacts with
therapists in Gn, outside the group entity.
Relationships: Established relationships, interaction and attraction patterns are
structural elements (Agazarian and Peters, 1981). They are interpersonal events, which
presuppose social communication and are formed after Go is constituted.
Intrapsychic Structures: Group structure has been compared to individual psychic
structure (Kellerman, 1979), although it is also disputed as misleading and unhelpful
(Agazarian and Peters, 1981). This is not relevant to the structure of the collective entity
and is not specified in the GFR.
Communication: Communicational patterns define group structure and determine
group character (Agazarian and Peters, 1981). However, they are conceptualised in
individualistic terms, and do not define observable structure of group entities.
Spatial and temporal boundaries: Structure has been conceptualised as spatial and
psychological boundaries between group, leader, environment, group size and physical
proximity of members (Berne, 1963; Agazarian and Peters, 1981; Malekoff, 1997).
Organisation of arrangements to suit members has been called “the logistics of caring”
(Malekoff, 1997, p. 68). This structural property defines the presence of the members in
the same place and time. Without this, social communication is not active and Go cannot
come into being. All members need to be present to be included in the structure.
Subgrouping: Forming subgroups restricts involvement, allows acting-out,
avoids therapeutic challenges and undermines therapeutic goals (Kellerman, 1979;
Yalom, 1995). They help members explore issues not confronted in the whole group,
allow them to identify commonalities, enlarge affective expression and manage needs
for control (Northen, 1988; Yalom, 1995). Subgroups enhance group cohesiveness and
express personal choices, although not always consciously or constructively (Northen,
1988). They indicate the group’s inability to confront tasks and threaten its integrity
(Bion, 1961), although they are generally accommodated and integrated (Northen,
1988). It is more difficult for groups to make decisions when they polarize into
subgroups (MacLennan and Dies, 1992). In documenting the emergence of a group
organism, subgroups represent transitional states between Gn and Gs and must be
defined and recorded as expressions of social communication.
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Detailed rating rules and criteria are provided in the Raters’ Manual in Appendix 2.
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Groups lack a unified sensory system for object knowledge, so cognition needs
to extend beyond personal phenomena as in Maturana’s (1970) comprehensive account:
“Living systems are cognitive systems and living … is a process of cognition.
This statement is valid for all organisms, with and without a nervous system. If
a living system enters into a cognitive interaction, its internal state is changed in
a manner relevant to its maintenance and enters into a new interaction without
losing its identity… Although the nervous system expands the domain of
interactions of the organism by bringing into this domain interactions with pure
relations, the function of the nervous system is subservient to the necessary
circularity of the living organization” (Maturana, 1970, p. 8).
Essential characteristics of cognition need to be described and circumstances defined
when cognitive capacity is achieved. The GFR records the emergence of cognitive
capacity out of confusion by progressive organization.
following example.
A group member reported a news item of an adolescent killed riding on top of a
train that went under a bridge. Other members asked for clarification and
confirmation; information was contributed about the line where the accident
happened and the likelihood the victim was unaware of the bridge. There were
horrified, mirthful and empathic comments about the victim and speculations
about his experience. Then jokes elaborated the theme and a consensus emerged
that he was “an idiot.” The unstated implication was they would not do it.
Other memories of train-related experiences were shared, including how to open
doors when trains are moving. A member humorously reported how an
acquaintance was pushed out of a moving train, sustaining a broken arm.
Another member expressed horror at this action, saying it was stupid, “he could
have been killed!” The reporter was scornful and abused him. The conversation
degenerated into trading insults and eventually an exchange of blows. A period
of confused activity followed without common theme or shared activity
(Adolescent Group, 1993).
Cognitive elements include news reports, memories, facts, opinions, attitudes,
speculations, jokes and value judgments related in coherent sequences allowing the
accident to be evaluated against adolescent values, eventually arriving at a consensus
judgment. The group provides the framework for a collective cognitive process
affecting everyone. Each member participates in cognitive operations transforming the
elements. Associating to other risk-taking activities facilitates further evaluative
operations. A difference of attitude between two members generates hostile affect,
organization is lost and operations interrupted. The group’s organization cannot
integrate the contradiction and fails to regulate the affect. It disorganizes, preventing
further collective cognitive activity.
Group cognition and the GFR. The group’s capacity for cognition depends on
achieving an organization within which operations can be performed that are collective,
not the function of individuals. The organization needed is a state of the communicational
field; collective cognition is a function of the organization of group communication
processes (Lewes, 1879; Cooley, 1909; McDougall, 1920; Durkheim, 1954). The
dimension for rating groups’ cognitive capacity is defined by the GFR as “Cognitive
Organization” rather than specific cognitive content or operations.
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Cognitive activity depends on relevant ideas following each other in logical order
and relations of meaning predominating over non-logical relations such as similarity or
affective value. Higher order cognition is expressed in language and linguistic structures.
The two central requirements are maintaining the topic or theme, (preserving a norm) and
functioning within logical operations (abiding by the operation’s rules). These features
can be defined for group communication. Verbal productions, non-verbal gestures or
other actions must preserve a commonly accepted theme to constitute normative
organization. Then they need to form sequences allowing common relations, operations
and meaning expressed through a set of explicit or implicit rules. Finally, they must
embody representations of the group and members if cognition is to be applied to the
group itself.
The Dimension of Cognitive Organization. The formation of Go means the
group can reconcile and integrate members’ communicational contributions to attain a
collective function. Cognitive function underpins the group acting as a unit, even if
tacitly (Polanyi, 1962). Making decisions and reconciling differences indicates
structuring of communicational content to produce shared conclusions. The decision to
play cards involves proposing an idea, communicating it, ensuring it is understood,
gaining agreement, finding cards, arranging seating, agreeing on rules, assigning roles
and depends on organization of communications between members. Norms and rules
are only achieved with a shared framework for tasks.
The conversation about the boy riding a train consists of information and
opinion that become common property of all members. The judgment that he was “an
idiot” is an operation conferring value on the information. Although pronounced by one
member, it becomes a shared value. It is predisposed to recur by association in later
conversations and becomes an operational structure of the group’s communicational
life, where impulsive, risk-taking behaviour is considered “idiotic.” This occurs
because of all members participate in communications organized to provide sequential
description, evaluation of reports and incorporate the member’s value judgment. This is
collective cognition and characteristic of nous, since no individual performs the
function, but each contributes in communication to what becomes a common result.
Group cognitive development is observable in different degrees of organization.
The first is an unorganized state, without consistency or sequencing. The second
organizational level allows acquisition of common ideas, symbols and elements with
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“a shared social reality” (Sampson and Marthas, 1990, p. 73; Baron, Kerr and Miller,
1992).
Groups accomplish goals, sustain themselves and define their relationship to
their surroundings with common attitudes, behavioural sanctions and organizing
features of group life highly resistant to change (Wilke and Van Knippenberg, 1989).
Any collective cognitive activity requires members to agree on topic, activity,
procedures, values and regulation of interaction. With normative organization,
members can maintain common topics and related attitudes in a conversation without
logical or operational outcome. Norms maintain themes, common values and meaning
contexts as the organizational framework for cognition and a framework with action
implications; cognitive norms create a collective content and style not restricted to the
summation of individual contributions. Norms are idiosyncratic (Brown, 1989); they
represent a particular cognitive environment and identity of cognitive style and conduct.
They are the first indications within cognitive organization of whole-group functioning
and the emergence of Gs. Norm systems confer collective structures on cognitive
organization such as:
• All members participate in activities;
• When some members start an activity others continue it;
• If someone talks others listen;
• If a topic is introduced other contributions are relevant;
• If communications are not understood members ask for clarification;
• If a member has a complaint, it is expressed.
Norms of communicational reciprocity underpin complex group processes. However,
they may interfere with cognitive activity. Adolescent norms are often contravened by
expressing attachment, care or admiration (Malekoff, 1997); they disrupt serious
conversation after a short time; boisterous games may constitute a narrow range of
normative activities, restricting cognitive achievement. Groups need suitable norms to
promote collective cognition as the most elementary organization permitting nous to
manifest.
Cognitive norms ensure common content and non-systemic organization in an
otherwise unorganized communicational field; they do not form a rule-based system,
but operate idiosyncratically, without reference to other norms or rules. Norms provide
shared order rather than transformations of cognitive elements. Since they lack logical
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Contrasting Norms and Rules. Rules are systemic and refer to social relations,
whereas norms only relate to specific situations. Rules are more abstract and general
than norms, requiring categories and concepts for their application; they are
conventional, but “not merely so” (Asch, 1953, p. 352). They define, generate and
regulate meanings necessary for organized communication and action, giving a
framework for individuals to participate in collective processes. The distinction
between norms and rules parallels that between conventions sustaining structures in a
concrete, static way and principles preserving organization and permitting operations
and transformations in cognitive structures. Rules of human conduct in situations
evolve, but ensure action occurs “within frames of reference delimiting the goals that
can be attained and the means of pursuing and attaining them” (Sanders and Cushman,
1984, p. 231).
Rules support each other systemically. Social situations are determined by
systems of rules having neither inconsistent nor contradictory logical relations. Rules
cannot act alone, whereas norms may. A rule standing alone is arbitrary or idiosyncratic
to the group and is a norm or convention (Searle, 1970). Rules constitute a system with
the elements they govern, such as lexical elements in language, moves in a game and
actions in social life. The rule system enables “socio-rational” transformations of
cognitive elements into meaningful structures (Chomsky, 1957; Fraisse and Piaget,
1969; Piaget and Inhelder, 1973). Rules do not indicate commonly held ideas, themes
or understandings, but common principles determining how ideas relate to form
collective cognitive products characteristic of nous. They are equally effective whether
implicit or explicit (Fox, 1977; Harré, 1984).
indicate the activity’s content or sophistication, but the group’s capacity to develop
regulatory processes by applying rules.
Representational Organization: The fourth category describes systemic functioning
that includes social representations of the group and members. These may not be fully
developed, but are implicit in the content of systemically organized communications.
There is a system of organized terms and relations effectively governing or organizing
communication and behaviour, representing the group or members, their lives, other people
or events of personal significance or their problems. It includes figurative representations
such as acting, or drawing. All members of the group or communion share in the content
of their communicational field. If someone talks about themselves or the group, but others
are not listening, the systemic character of communication fails and it is not
Representational Organization.
Table 10.1 compares the four characteristics of Cognitive Organization of the
communicational field in each of the four categories and provides examples of
conversation and activity for each category.
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SYSTEM Overall goals, purpose, Lack of systematic Overall purpose, meaning, Goal oriented, elaboration of Goal oriented to develop
meaning or purpose, goal- connectedness present, but theme together to gain understanding or sharing of
directedness of directedness, or ineffective; group information, solve problems, experience, personal problem
communication meaning; information functions for itself, not undertake actions, plan, solving, about self, life or group.
processes. not processed. performing tasks. prepare or carry out projects.
Examples Sporadic talk, not res- General conversation; Rule-based games, cards, Talking about self, group,
ponded to; mucking chatter; motor games, ball gross motor games, family, life, school in a manner
around; aimless, disorg- throwing, war games, discussion, problem solving, that increases psychological
anized activity; collapse tiggy; cheating; games not informing, debate, logical awareness and problem solving.
of organized activities; working; collapse of rules; argument, advice or sharing Caring for each other or helping.
transition states: start or a member dominates; experiences; more than one
end of session, between question/answer; agree/dis- member active.
activities, break-down agree; listening to
or end of game. therapist; argument, abuse.
Table 12.1. Analysis and comparison of cognitive organization categories.
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Biological theories.
Affect is a product of neurological arousal, activating patterned brain activity
(Schore, 1994) associated with “subjective” or feeling aspects (Livesey, 1986). It
evolved as cognitive control by reward or punishment of action registered by
“immediate, inbuilt percepts of sensations and danger signals” (Livesey, 1986, p. 250).
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Affects amplify basic drives (Tomkins, 1962; Livesey, 1986) and have four functions
(Young, 1961):
• Energizing behaviour;
• Sustaining or terminating involvement in activity;
• Regulating action according to aversion or pleasure;
• Organizing future action by learning.
Primary affects are sensations of need, reward or punishment; secondary affects
generate expectancies from cognitive interactions, creating emotions. Affects register
internal states as the result of actions providing organisms with motivational
information. Drives generate distress signals at the “site of the consummatory act”
rather than the tissues, ensuring the organism acts to redress the problem; signals are
amplified as affects to ensure motivation in “drive-affect assemblies” (Tomkins, 1962,
p. 88). Affect is an innate biological motivating mechanism (Izard, 1979), more urgent
than drives (Tomkins, 1979) involving awareness of bodily-visceral responses. Basic
affects of interest or excitement, enjoyment or joy, surprise or startle, distress or
anguish, fear or terror, shame or humiliation, contempt, disgust, anger or rage are
distinguishable (Tomkins, 1980) across cultures (Ekman, 1992). Rhythms of discharge,
refractory period when energy is recouped and readiness for further discharge regulate
affect (Freud, 1920, 1924, 1938; Tomkins, 1962). Affective quality is governed by
differences in increase, maintenance and decrease of the density of stimulation;
increasing density produces startle, fear and interest; decrease creates joy; maintenance
or lack of relief causes anger and distress (Tomkins, 1980, p. 144).
Qualities of arousal organize different emotions (Grastyan, 1974; Plutchic and
Kellerman, 1980, 1990). Two dimensions have been empirically derived: an “arousal
continuum” of emotional energy of the system ranging from low to high (Mandler,
1984; Plutchik and Kellerman, 1989; Stein and Oatley, 1992) and a “hedonic
continuum” of states from positive, pleasurable to negative, unpleasurable conditions
(Young, 1961; Tellergen, 1988; Clark and Watson, 1991). A third dimension of
dominance-submission or engagement-withdrawal has been proposed (Russell and
Mehrabian, 1977; Watson and Tellergen, 1985; Russell, 1989) integrated in a
circumplex model (Plutchik, 1962; Kellerman, 1979; Watson and Tellergen, 1985;
Russell, 1989). These dimensions are found in Freud’s account of affect as consisting
of quantitative aspects of “particular motor innervations or discharges,” hedonic aspects
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Cognitive theories.
Affect provides the energy source for cognition (Green, 1977; Decarie, 1978)
since “no stimulus can evoke a psychological response unless it first triggers an affect”
(Nathanson, 1996a, p. 3). Emotions have logic and cognitive meaning (Calhoun and
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Solomon, 1984); their laws, reducible to “laws of empirical psychic life” (Scheler, 1916,
p. 220) are always directed towards something, therefore an extension of cognition
(Brentano, 1898). Cognitive theory describes emotions as a holistic and abbreviated
mode of perception, information processing, evaluation or interpretation of actual or
expected outcomes of interactions with the environment (de Sousa, 1991; Frijda, 1993).
Emotions are “cognitive appraisals, action impulses, and patterned somatic reactions”
(Lazarus et al., 1980, p. 198). They prompt action plans, lack propositional content,
syntactic structure, informational value, but function as signals for goals and coordinate
group behaviour (Johnson-Laird and Oatley, 1992). Emotions are related to social
norms, values and modes of interaction; they express “non-instrumental” behaviour as
“action tendencies” (Frijda, 1993).
Cognitive theories and the GFR. Emotions as primary appraisals imply a
cognitive capacity only possible in Gs. Group emotions can be conceptualised as
elementary collective cognitions lacking propositional content or syntactic structure that
organize groups and provide energy to collective mentality. Emotional states
redistribute resources, manage priorities and presuppose a degree of integrity of
communication evident as nous in Gs.
(Nathanson, 1996a, p. 13). Emotions are affects associated with socially constructed
experience. Basic emotions are reifications, since emotional terms indicate culturally
specific social norms (Wierzbicka, 1992). They cannot be identified with specific
behaviours within the social process (Averill, 1980b) and have been called articulations of
intentions, “vocabularies used to define situations” (Perinbanayagam, 1989, p. 77).
Emotions’ arousing intensity is a function of their perceived value in a social context
(Swanson, 1989).
Symbolic Interactionism denies there are unsocialised emotions. Emotional
stimuli arise from individuals, act upon others, yield responses and are inherently
socially positive or negative. They are “emergents” within acts in the social world like
mind, and actions in the world like spoken words, as much “outside” the body as
“inside;” yet they develop in social relations constituted by group process (Mead, 1962;
McCarthy, 1989; Coulter, 1988). Their stability and impersonality comes from their
universality as collective representations (McCarthy, 1989). Affect is socially
constructed into distinct emotions. Emotions are “intentional” and involve a “local
moral order” (Harré, 1988b, p. 8). Affect qualities have been disputed by
constructivism (Armon-Jones, 1988), but they are complex and socially structured along
a variety of dimensions (Plutchic and Kellerman, 1980, 1989, 1990).
Social and phenomenological theories and the GFR. Emotions emerge from the
forces constituting the collective organisation of the social entity. Their linguistic
structure locates them in the communicational field as elements of collective mentality
and they mediate attachments consolidating the social entity. Emotions are expressed in
communicational phenomena and their arousing function underpins social value. They
belong as much to the group as within its members. As collective phenomena of social
communication, they are applicable to groups, and identified by the GFR.
Psychoanalytic theories.
Freud described affect as the quality of psychic energy capable of transformation
into pleasure or unpleasure, depending on its distribution in the psychic apparatus.
Affect is memory plus energy produced by endogenous excitation (Freud, 1895). It
regulates the energy of the apparatus by discharge (Freud, 1900). Psychic energy
occurs in two conditions. It is “bound” by being invested in psychic functions and
maintains activity level in a controlled state. Thought is activated by energy bound to
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representations; steady release of energy provides the motive for thought, while sudden
discharge is restricted by its investment in the functions. It can also be “free” or
unbound from specific representations and seek “uninhibited discharge,” no longer
harnessed and expressing itself in affect (Freud, 1895).
Affect qualities result from “tension” within the psychological apparatus (Freud,
1895). Pleasurable hedonic quality occurs with decrease in tension and unpleasure with
increase. Tension refers to the distribution rather than either quantity or the bound/free
state of energy, where some parts of the system (or representations) have a relatively
higher investment of energy compared to others. Pleasure is reduced tension through
free distribution of energy throughout the system. Unpleasure is increased tension, with
energy unevenly constrained in some areas, while released from others. Drives manifest
in consciousness as affects; ideas allow drive impulses to develop into affect (Freud,
1915). Affects are internal perceptions arising in consciousness independently of
sensory perceptions and memories (Freud, 1923). Affect quality is not directly related
to excitation; it is a signal related to meaning and quantity related to energy as a force
(Freud, 1938). Affective life fluctuates rhythmically in strength and pleasurable quality
(Freud, 1920, 1924, 1938)
In psychoanalysis, affects are synonymous with emotion (Brenner, 1980; Jones,
1995). Emotions are the experience of non-symbolic information processing that is the
central control mechanism for human behavior (Jones, 1995), a dimension of ideas
rather than a separate phenomenon. The dominant affect is anxiety (Stein, 1991).
Psychoanalytic accounts emphasise its relationship to language as fundamentally
representational, carrying meaning when adapted to discourse, but also disrupting
meaning structures creating pleasure or pain (Plutchik and Kellerman, 1980, 1990;
Green, 1977).
There are two thresholds of quantitative intensity. Above the first, affect reaches
consciousness, enlivens and enlarges the field of perception being “invested” in psychic
functions. Above the second, it is disruptive, experienced as unpleasurable, loosed from
ideas and discharged. The thresholds activate chains of association crucial to energising
communication as well as determining content. Affect has the function of “punctuating
the signifier” (Green, 1977).
Psychoanalytic theories and the GFR. Affective processes of energy within a
system of representations are applicable to collective representations (communications)
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in a social entity. Bound and free energy, rhythm and tension as uneven distribution
within the system can be applied to the communicational field observed by the GFR.
The more highly collective mentality is developed, the more organized affective energy
is likely to be and its qualities differentiated. In Gs and Gf it is likely to be a significant
motivating and qualitative feature of collective mentality.
Group affect.
Group affect is the tension and distribution of energy throughout the social
system. It has three states: low inactive energy, medium activating energy and high,
unstable discharging energy. Affect regulates group states. Action evokes affect as
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the group organism and expresses the disposition or tension of energy throughout Go.
Tension is independent of quantity of energy or whether it is bound or discharged. In
high tension, energy does not circulate freely, but is dammed up to some extent in
members or subgroups. It is defined as the degree members participate in the
communicational organism and their contributions are accepted and circulate. It is
complemented by overt communications of pleasure or unpleasure. When
communication brings Go into existence, increasing tension threatens or damages its
integrity; relaxation and free expression in communication enhance integrity so the
whole can more fully express itself, whatever the quantity of energy.
2.1. Unpleasure - Negative Hedonic Quality (high or increasing communicational
tension) is constrained communication that may be socially construed as fear,
anger, disgust or distress. Others observe the communication from one angry
member to the recipient of the anger, who may or may not respond. There is a
constraint in angry or unhappy members not engaging in the monitoring and
mutuality of pleasurable states. With anxiety, communication is restricted,
members disengaged from common themes while others do not take account of
them, creating tension. Unpleasure occurs in Go when tension is expressed in
conflict, misunderstanding or disagreement impairing communication. In
unpleasure Go suffers reduced wholeness. Tension is impairment of free flow of
communication; the process itself is disrupted or the meaning (message) is
impaired by rejection, denial or abuse. Unpleasure takes precedence over
pleasure; when both are present in communication mixed quality is regarded as
unpleasure.
2.2. Pleasure - Positive Hedonic Quality (low or decreasing communicational
tension) is reduced tension. Communication flows freely and its functions are
performed, transferring from one member to another or creating an exchange
network connecting them. For Go pleasure results in enhanced collectivity
through successful communication; it is low tension and free flow of
communication without impediments. Members talk freely, contribute as they
wish, when one talks, all listen or laugh together. Pleasure does not imply the
system is in equilibrium, which is quantitative, it means the system reduces
tension by free flow of energy.
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phenomena.
High
DISTRESS JOY
Intensity or
activation
continuum.
DISCONTENT INTEREST
Hedonic continuum.
Negative, Positive,
Aversive, Rewarding,
Unpleasure Pleasure.
Figure 13.1. Qualitative and quantitative dimensions mapping six group affective
states.
At the lower end of the activity dimension are two inactive states. On the
aversive hedonic side, the affect is called “Boredom,” referring to boredom, sullenness,
apathy, depression and lethargy. It is low, stable inert energy level with tension,
expressing stability through inertia and unpleasurable or mixed affects. Members may
not be in active exchange but passively participating in a communion. On the positive
hedonic side, “Contentment” refers to placid states of low activity with positive hedonic
quality. It is expressed by inert energy level and low tension. It is a state of ease with
no evidence of tension; members are in a state of communion, but not necessarily active
communicational exchange. This is likely following discharge of pleasure or in
transition states between other, more aroused activities.
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PLEASURE UNPLEASURE
Definitions of action.
Action is “human conduct devised by the actor in advance … ‘act’ shall designate
the outcome of this ongoing process” (Schutz, 1953, p. 304), or “action, an objective
performance of consciousness, is at the same time the precondition for the construction of
the social world,” (Schutz and Luckmann, 1983, p. 5). Actions are social when others
appear in their purpose (Schutz and Luckmann, 1983). Social action is expressed in the
goals of social relations, which originate in the reciprocity and continuity of social action.
Action theory is “the study of human goal-directed behavior and its social basis” (Harré
and Lamb, 1984, p. 5). Action is socially steered and controlled consciously goal
directed, planned, motivated, deliberate behaviour, accompanied by emotions (Harré and
Lamb, 1984). Execution and modification of plans in the light of results of goal-directed
action have been studied (Miller, Galanter and Pribram, 1960; Clark and Crossland,
1986). Action expresses the image of the act, cognitive act, hierarchy of instructions and
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evaluation of results. It is “behavior over which an agent has exercised discretion, so that
it is goal-directed and specific to immediate situations” (Sanders and Cushman, 1984, p.
246). Social action is performed by actors understanding and adjusting to each others’
rules with reliable interpretations. Empirical investigations concern linguistic,
anthropological and experimental interaction (von Cranach and Harré, 1982); action is
integrated by communication into social contexts (Sanders and Cushman, 1984).
individual cognitions in which knowledge and value are criteria. However, “group
psychology is concerned with group goals and group actions; but until now these
collective actions have not been investigated in detail” (von Cranach and Valach, 1984, p.
297).
A goal is an “imagined state aspired to as the outcome of the action;” since
cognition is assumed to direct behaviour, “action theory is therefore cognitive theory”
(von Cranach 1982, p. 40). Goal-directed action is fundamentally social and “the
behaviour of a human actor which is consciously and purposefully aimed towards a goal,”
but has been considered as “above all individual” (Von Cranach and Valach, 1984, p.
285), placing goals outside the observable field. It studies individuals in social interaction
(von Cranach and Harré, 1982).
However, individuals’ actions are essentially actions with others and their
“intended public performance” is defined by the body and social situation; effectiveness is
determined by skill and knowledge, which are not only individual, but distributed
throughout groups. “Group action” integrates body and social situation. In social events,
individual actors’ intentions are transformed by others’ understanding in the medium of
language (Harré, 1993).
Psychological theories of action and the GFR. If individuals’ actions derive
meaning in social environments, groups must provide their context. Goals cannot be
observed if regarded as personal cognitions, but if individual action is only complete
when integrated into group action, the communicating or linguistic structure of the act
locates goals beyond the privacy of the individual mind, making them available for
observation.
part is explained in terms of the whole, not the whole in terms of the part” (p. 7). The act
is “the fundamental datum of both social and individual psychology” (p. 8).
Cooperation is possible even if individuals neither understand nor accurately
interpret each other’s communications. A group member’s gesture “calls out the proper
response” in others or provokes responses without common meaning (pp. 55-56),
consequently, social action is a dimension of psychic activity, analysable without
reduction to cognition. A collective act may be constructed by individuals with differing
(even incompatible) motives, understanding or goals. “The unit of existence is the act,
not the moment” and unfolds successive phases, synchronising social, personal and
historical dimensions (Mead, 1972).
Action becomes a social object with a significance independent of the goal. A
game of cards with a goal of winning may cause a fight that changes the group’s social
structure, though the game is successfully completed. It is part of a sequence of actions
for the group and cannot be considered as a single goal-directed event. A theory of action
in groups must acknowledge the act’s significance for the group’s history rather than
actors’ intentions. Group boundaries are defind by action, “the boundaries of social
things and of the individual as a social being are determined by contacts in social
conduct” consisting of members’ actions and their group consequences (Mead, 1972, p.
362).
Action and selves: Mind and self are products of (social) action. Identification of
self with specific acts isolates and renders it definite. Action “has a social pattern only
from the standpoint of the group … not from the standpoint of the physiological
organism” (Mead, 1972, p. 446). Participants in co-operative activity show by socially
established gestures what others are to do. Others’ actions form a “generalised other” that
becomes the representative of the self viewed from outside and the means of acquiring
values and morality. Acting towards oneself (even in imagination) permits individuals to
allign with others in cooperative ventures. Social objects and consensual meanings result
from cooperative actions rather than causing them (Denzin, 1972). To form selves, actors
adjust to others’ roles, as in games, where all understand the common goal by
participating in a common action pattern. Participation in activity with common goals is
the condition for forming selves (Melzer, 1972).
Action and cooperation. Cooperation as the condition for human action requires
attaching common meaning to gestures, imagining corresponding intentions and
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constraining actors from within as moral obligations to preserve society (Durkheim, 1954;
Parsons and Shils, 1962; Parsons, 1968). The key ideas of society manifest in collective
actions repeated within temporal structures having meaning for the whole society rather
than individuals. This “ritual attitude” (Parsons, 1968, Vol. II, p. 712) strengthens
solidarity, since each member contributes similarities (mechanical solidarity) or
complementary differences (organic solidarity) to common action. Common affective
experiences are provided by supporting common purposes that enact the social being’s
values. The social organism sustains itself by action. Action elements are not
“phenomena” in the space-time framework, they constitute their own human, purposive
structure for empirical observations (Parsons, 1968, Vol. II, p. 733). Theory of action
divides science into natural sciences and sciences of action for which space-time is
irrelevant, but include means-end schemata and “the indispensability of the subject” (p.
764). Parsons’ work established social action as central to cultural studies and continues
to stimulate discussion, but has been criticised as “fatally flawed” by being too reliant on
rationality, altruism and self-expression (Joas, 1996, p. 24).
Theory of Action and the GFR. Action is the observable matter of groups
existing in the “field of action” structured by the social organism, sustained by
cooperation. Actions reflect the organizing effects of the collective consciousness in
members, are not phenomena in space time, but created by goals, social significance and
unanticipated social effects. Observation of action in the GFR needs to take account of
goals in addition to cooperation.
Conclusions.
Action theory provides a concept of group action. Action is inherently social
and results from the selection and organization of environmental features. It is only
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understood in a social context and ‘reality’ is formed by common actions. Sense of self
and other and boundaries between individuals and groups are defined through action.
Cooperation based on a consensus of common meanings integrates other psychosocial
functions into action; social meaning results from action. Acts are constructed from
ongoing action by communication and group action fits individual acts together in
shared meanings and common purposes. Action is a central dimension of group
mentality and coordinates nous functions.
Action theory is a comprehensive theory of society. Social organisms sustain
themselves through action. Acts are units of observation and include actors, rationality,
goals, context, relationships and process in time. Norms and rules of the social milieu
sustain action and constrain actors. Ritualistic action creates social, cognitive and
affective structures through collective representations. Communicative action is
fundamental to social life. Based on language rather than consciousness, it is socially
coordinated within pre-existing structures of interaction that underpin values and
purpose; language is the medium for understanding and coordinating it. Individuality,
motives, intentions, desires and behavioural repertoires are not private ‘internal’ events,
but formed by language and culture through action. Rationality, expressed collectively
in nous, is a pattern of social action mediated by culture, not a set of cognitive rules.
Ego identity is self-recognition in intersubjectively shared communication.
Communicative action regulates social life, facilitating coordination,
cooperation and group solidarity through norms and the common fund of implicit
knowledge. Socially integrated action preserves the stability of society and
communicative practice creates a common world. Communicative action forms
boundaries between internal and external worlds, individual and group, actions,
intentions and feelings. Goals are a phase of action, directing it in the situational
context; they express social relationships and are observable characteristics of action,
rather than actors’ internal states. Communication creates coordinated cooperation and
common goals observable as structures of action. It is a dimension of psychosocial life,
expressed and observed in communicational phenomena of group life and the condition
for collective mentality (Small, 1905; Durkheim, 1964). Social communicative action
integrates individual intentions within a body of shared knowledge, norms and values to
regulate and stabilize group life and manifest nous.
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the communication process for evidence of common purpose, not fully understood or
realized or with different, though compatible purposes. Several actions may occur
concurrently, such as a game and a conversation involving players and non-players
unrelated to the game. Common action for a unified goal may occur with differences of
opinion, misunderstandings or confusion when members are not in agreement, but
without overt conflict, such as cooperative differences of opinion about a game’s rules.
Communication may not fulfill its function, in spite of members trying. In a game, they
may participate reluctantly, hesitantly or watch without joining. In conversation they
talk over each other, misunderstand, or disagree about a common topic, while
maintaining a cooperative attitude.
Discord means absence of concord or harmony, dissension, disagreement,
diversity, dissonance, confused noise (Shorter Oxford Dictionary, 1990). This is
expressed in the communicational field when members demonstrate diverse,
incompatible goals and engage in uncooperative activities disrupting each other or the
common goal. They communicate uncooperatively or without common purpose;
communication fails to be achieved or fulfill its function. Members do not try to
understand or listen to each other; communications are disagreed with or not received;
there is dissension about suggested common purposes that cannot be undertaken as
shared action. While difference of opinion is present in Accord, it becomes dispute in
Discord, which records failure to undertake group action. It may occur through
difference, disorganization or failure to manage the task. Members may refuse to
participate, disagree or repudiate the common purpose or action. Conversation lacks
agreed or consistent topic and there is disagreement without resolution. It may describe
diversity, dissension or failure to coordinate individual purposes to a common goal
through communication. Active opposition or overt conflict between members is
lacking. It describes confused and disorganized action, but not intended to damage each
other.
Contracord is coined to describe an additional category. It derives from Latin
“contra,” meaning “against;” as a prefix it means against, in opposition to, opposite, in
the opposite direction (Shorter Oxford Dictionary, 1990). Contracord therefore means -
“against or opposed to the heart or mind,” intended as a general term to cover conflict,
disunity, hostility or antagonism. Common action is not achieved because of members’
active opposition to a common purpose. Members have incompatible goals and adopt an
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oppositional attitude to group, therapist or other members. They compete, act in rivalry
and oppose common action. They counteract a common action and try to impose their
purpose or action on others. It is the least unified condition of the group, involving
coercion, hostility or aggression. Opposition and hostility are expressed in the
communicational field, which becomes a medium for disunity. There is antagonism of
members against each other, whereas in Discord, there is loss of unity or failure to
achieve common purpose. The antagonism in Contracord may be hostile, aggressive, or
coercive, against the wishes of other parties to the communicative acts. Hostility is
harming another, antagonism intends to counteract or go against their action. Members
may passively resist or disrupt another's activity without actively attempting to harm the
other. Contracord is antagonistic communication.
These criteria are summarized in Table 14.1, which compares categories goals,
quality of cohesion or cooperation and example activities. Full details of rating criteria
and rules are given in the GFR Rater’s Manual in Appendix 2.
CONCORD Members share a Members cooperate fully and There is a common, shared
common goal enabling coordinate with unanimity in activity involving all
them to coordinate collective action. Cohesion members of the
with each other’s and mutual engagement are communion coordinated
action to achieve it. high. by a common goal.
ACCORD Members’ goals are Members cooperate loosely, The activities are diverse,
different but but do not coordinate well and compatible or similar, but
compatible. While not allow different involvement or not shared. They do not
shared, they do not communication. Cohesion is interfere with each other
conflict with each low with loose engagement. and coordinate, but with
other. different goals.
DISCORD The goals are different, Members are uncooperative Activities are diverse, with
but incompatible though not oppositional. incompatible goals and
though not directly They disagree, misunderstand, interfere with each other
conflicting with each fail to coordinate. Cohesion or fail to achieve
other. is low and engagement loose cooperation. Members do
not oppose each other
CONTRA- Goals are Members may be highly Activities may be diverse
CORD incompatible; members cohesive and intensely or common, but within
coerce or impose goals engaged, but in opposition or them members actively
on others or oppose antagonism to others. oppose each other with
their goals. Cohesion is variable, antagonism.
engagement high.
Since therapists profoundly affect groups, the GFR records their activity. They
intervene throughout the life of the group assisting members to sustain pleasurable
group experiences and help their identified problems. In addition to making
psychotherapeutic interpretations (all therapists in the study had psychodynamic
training), they conversed with patients, gave instructions, set limits and gave
information.
Types of interventions.
Interpretation, confrontation and clarification are the main forms of intervention in
psychoanalytically oriented psychotherapy (König, 1991). Other therapeutic models
place stronger emphasis on education, information, advice and other involvements
(Upper and Ross, 1985). Other forms of intervention do not involve symbolic content
of the patient’s discourse (Etkin, 1995). For group psychotherapy of children and
adolescents with poorly developed verbal skills, a number of types of verbal
interventions have been discriminated (Dalal, 1995; Gordon, 1997).
1. General Interpretations are statements about events in the group providing new
meaning. Often interpretations point out significance not evident to participants
or that they do not wish to acknowledge. The overall effect of interpretations is to
change understanding, add new information or link unconnected ideas.
2. Group Interpretations are offered to the group-as-a-whole or all members. They
tend to intensify the sense of identification between members, strengthen the
group process and may stimulate interaction between isolated members.
3. Member Interpretations are to one or several individuals. They may deal with
intra-psychic issues, individual behaviour, intensify members’ sense of
individuality and increase differentiation from the rest of the group.
4. Facilitations promote interaction without interpreting, including questions about
members’ activities, drawing interactions to their attention and assisting them feel
at ease.
5. Logical Implication. Often activity has a limited perspective, not taking account
of the welfare of the whole group. Logical implication enunciates its
consequences or places logical alternatives before the group. For example, when
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a member is persecuted, it can be pointed out that if he is driven from the group,
another victim will be selected until only one person is left. Alternatives can be
placed into discussion or as interventions in a sequence of behaviour, such as
saying “instead of hitting him, you could ask him to stop.”
6. Questions. Often therapists can initiate a new train of thought or place a
conversation or activity in perspective by posing questions that engage members.
If someone is being coerced, the therapist could ask, “do you want to do what he
says?” throwing doubt on a member’s assertions and prestige or stimulating
members to develop their own views.
7. Punctuation. Repeating what is said or done helps members become conscious.
Therapists may repeat a phrase like “Oh really?” or move into the midst of a
scuffle which is becoming aggressive, interrupting the process so reflection can
occur.
8. Naming an action or behaviour for its social significance may include saying a
member is “teasing” or “bossing” another or labelling affects as anger, fear or
sadness.
9. Representation. Describing the existing state of the group, members’ disposition,
cognitive organisation, affects and action without interpretation facilitates
recognition of their function in the structure and encourages their representation in
the group. Representation consists of verbal descriptions of situations, narratives
of events or group history. Members are often unable to provide a verbal account
of what is happening since they are immersed in it. Description without
interpretation is often a powerful stimulus.
10. Limits. It is often necessary for therapists in child and adolescent groups to
remind members of the rules or re-establish boundaries. These limits are intended
to reiterate circumstances that define and maintain the therapeutic situation.
Limits serve a symbolic function of reminding members of their contract (Anzieu,
1984).
11. Locomotion. Therapists’ movement around the room is a significant intervention.
The presence of the therapist next to scuffling members restrains them.
All interventions play a part in managing the group process to sustain Go. They
are used to shape and direct the spontaneously expressed life of the group. In the
present study, it would have been valuable to examine the effect of each form of
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members.
No Intervention: Therapists do not speak during the minute.
Non-verbal interventions.
Locomotions. It is also important to record therapists’ non-verbal interventions.
In child and adolescent group psychotherapy, aggressive or destructive events may lead
to injury or damage. In such instances, therapists intervene physically by moving
around the room to be close to disruptive members or use restraint. The effect of these
interventions needs to be examined. Therapists may also move around the room for
other purposes, although these actions are harder to evaluate. “Locomotion” is rated
whenever therapists moved from their chair during the minute; “No Locomotion” is
rated when there is no change.
Details of rating criteria and rules are given in the GFR Rater’s Manual in
Appendix 2.
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In Part III, the study’s empirical section is described. In Chapter 16, a set of
hypotheses is described defining questions the study aims to investigate. Chapter 17
describes the method, reliability studies and characteristics of the data. In Chapters 18
to 21 the results of the data analysis for hypotheses related to group development,
structure, dynamics and therapists interventions are given.
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16: HYPOTHESES.
The GFR records changes in whole group function dimensions and explores four
areas: developmental process, structural conditions, dynamics or relationships between
dimensions, and the effects of therapists’ interventions. The hypotheses are described
below.
1. Group Development.
Developmental phases in psychotherapy groups are important to understand various
stages of treatment, planning, deciding about new members and managing groups.
Literature of group development is reviewed in Chapter 17. Group development is
examined in several ways using GFR ratings.
1.1. Development of Stability. Stability is an indicator of group progress. It is
hypothesised stability indicates the degree groups regulate their processes. The first
hypothesis examines change in stability over the group’s life.
H1.1. Stability of sessions will change systematically over the group’s life and
will be defined as part of a developmental sequence.
1.2. Development of Functional Quality. Development is also indicated by
change in the quality of GFR states over the course of the year. Development over the
treatment is expected to change from lower to higher functioning and include greater
conflict in the middle period.
H1.2. A developmental sequence will show lower quality early in the year,
increase in conflict and dysfunction in the middle and increased high
quality function at the end of the year.
1.3. Developmental Phases. Group development postulates identifiable phases
expressing developmental tasks. This hypothesis examines whether phases are
discernable in the data.
H1.3. Definable phases of group development will be discernible throughout the
group’s life.
2. Group Structure.
Three sets of structural hypotheses concern wholeness, size and completeness.
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3. Group Dynamics.
The theoretical development of GFR categories was based on three relatively
185
4. Therapists’ Interventions.
Therapists are expected to effect group process therapeutically. The objects of
Therapists’ Interventions are discriminated. The theory of the group entity suggests
Group Interventions are most likely to lead to improved functioning.
H4.1. Group Interventions will lead to higher GFR categories in the succeeding
minutes.
Limits should be followed by reduced conflict and unpleasure in the following minutes if
they are effective.
H4.2. Limits will be associated with decreased destructive categories in the
same or the succeeding 1-3 minutes.
If therapists use Locomotion as an additional means of managing the group, it should
also reduce dysfunctional categories in following minutes.
H4.3. Locomotion by the therapists will be associated with decreased
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17: METHOD.
Subjects and groups.
Four adolescent groups (aged thirteen to seventeen) and a latency group (aged
nine to eleven) conducted in the Child and Adolescent Mental Health Service of the Royal
Children’s Hospital, Melbourne were analysed for the study. Four adolescent groups in
1988, 1992, 1993 and 1996 and a latency group in 1990 were videoed and rated. The
groups, members and outcomes of their treatment are briefly described in Appendix 1.
The groups were similar in that members were referred because they were not responding
to individual psychotherapy and lacked peer relations; attendance was inconsistent. All
groups had membership changes, reflecting the circumstances of such psychotherapy
groups.
The investigator conducted the 1988 group alone and had a co-therapist in the
other adolescent groups; two colleagues conducted the latency group. They were all
conducted as part of the clinical service. There was no policy for the groups to have all
boys, but girls were not referred for group psychotherapy during this period. Referrals
were from the Mental Health Service and other hospital units. Each boy was assessed by
the therapists before entry; some were also treated individually by group therapists, others
were referred by their treating clinician. Conditions for joining the groups were that
members acknowledged a problem, wanted help with it and were willing to try the group.
The groups were conducted weekly during school terms. Members were seen with
parents periodically to review progress. Parents were encouraged to contact therapists
whenever they had concerns.
Rules: Agreement with the following group rules was gained at assessment:
1. Sessions are confidential.
2. No one will be hurt, including feelings hurt by verbal abuse.
3. The room will not be damaged.
4. Members remain in the room for the session.
5. Any mess that can be cleaned up at the end of the session is permitted.
6. The members will not spend time together outside the group.
The rules were explained as enabling them to gain what they want from the group;
infringements were pointed out and consequences for the group explained (Anzieu, 1984).
Sessions. The adolescent groups were held in a meeting room at 4 or 5 pm; the
latency group was conducted at 10 am. They lasted an hour. The video was activated as
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they entered. However owing to a various human and technical factors, some sessions
were not recorded. The sessions were unstructured, except for the beginning when
therapists facilitated introductions. Members were encouraged to talk about themselves
and enjoy being together. The therapists had psychodynamic training and orientation, but
did not emphasise intrapsychic issues, since most members were referred from
unsuccessful individual treatment using these techniques. The room had toys and games
in the cupboards. Cards, puzzles, paper, coloured pens and stationary were provided.
Although talking was encouraged, they often played games.
Therapeutic technique. Maintenance of the group by encouraging communication
and managing conflict was the first goal. The next goal was for all members to be
included in enjoyable, meaningful communication, express themselves freely and belong
(Gordon, 1983, 1989b; Tijhuis, 1998). They were encouraged to talk about their lives,
families and problems. Therapists facilitated rewarding interaction, since the boys had
little experience of healthy peer groups. Interventions were made to manage tensions or
antisocial activity. Therapists moved around the room to maintain control of boisterous
activity, but did not intervene in enjoyable, controlled activity.
Data collection.
All patients were told about the video recordings and the purposes for which they
would be used and parents signed a release in accordance with University of Melbourne
and Royal Children’s Hospital ethics protocols. Sessions were recorded by a camera
mounted in the room on VHS video. On several occasions, members asked to watch the
recordings and were permitted. They grew bored after a few minutes and returned to the
group. On several occasions, they became self-conscious and briefly covered the camera
lens although apart from this, it did not seem to alter the quality or content of the sessions.
The procedure for rating sessions is specified in the GFR Rater’s Manual in
Appendix 2. The rater watches the session for the first half of the minute and then makes
ratings for Cognitive Organisation and Action Coherence during the second half-minute
and for Structure and Affect in the last quarter using the GFR Rating Sheet shown in
Appendix 2. Rating sheets were converted into data files substituting numbers for
categories, adding year, minute, attendance, absentees and year for each minute. They
were collated and loaded into SPSS (Norusis, 1993) for analysis.
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Reliability studies.
Intra-rater reliability is required to show that definitions and criteria enable
consistent observations of the same session to be made; inter-rater reliability is required
to show other trained raters can make consistent observations of the same sessions using
the GFR. Statistical techniques for establishing reliability often rely on correlating
repeated ratings of the same material to measure agreement. The GFR furnishes
categorical data for which parametric techniques such as analysis of variance cannot
establish reliability. The data are repeated observations of the same subjects and not
independent, precluding non-parametric techniques (Siegel and Castellan, 1988).
Techniques for estimating rater reliability for categorical data often compare
each rater with the other raters and the average of all raters (Hall, 1974; Koslowsky and
Bailit, 1975; Cicchetti, 1976; Fliess, 1981, Beck and Lewis, 2000). However, the GFR
records variability of the group as a unitary field of observation with discriminable
dimensions representing functions of a collective entity and reliability can be defined as
the accuracy with which raters agree with the actual hypothetical variability of the
dimension, rather than each other or their average (Overall and Magee, 1992). Ratings
are compared with a “common factor” underlying raters’ performance. Reliability is the
extent to which all raters agree with the hypothesised common factor that is the group
function dimension. The common factor is estimated in the same way factors are
identified by factor analysis, where the “communality” between raters (proportion of
variance accounted for by the presence of a factor common to the sets of data) is
estimated by squaring the value of the factor loading. Individual performances are
compared with this yielding two measures of reliability:
(a) The score indicating each rater’s agreement with the common factor
hypothesised as the actual dimension (factor loading) is squared, giving a
measure of communality;
(b) The score representing percentage of variance common to all raters (total fit).
Because the ratings are of categories, ordinary principal components (requiring
interval data) cannot be used. Instead, scores are obtained using a nonlinear Principal
Components Analysis (PRINCALS in SPSS). PRINCALS enables optimal scaling
transformation of the data so the principal components can be estimated using an
alternating least squares technique to reveal the major dimensions of variation within a set
of variables (Van de Geer, 1993). The variables are each rater’s ratings of GFR
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dimensions. Each dimension is compared for each rater and factor loading and its total fit
computed. The factor loading is the amount that each rater’s ratings of a dimension
contribute to the overall variability of the data set. Total fit is the proportion of the
variance of the combined data pool for the dimension common to all raters, or the
proportion of agreement. These figures are presented as a proportion of the data set.
Table 17.1. Principal components analysis of three ratings of three sessions, showing
factor loadings for each rating and total fit for all three ratings.
Affect is the most inconsistent group dimension, which may reflect it having a
quarter minute rating time, while the others have a half-minute (see Rater’s Manual,
Appendix 2). Ratings of Therapists’ Interventions are least reliable by Communality
indicating definition of categories requires further development. However, it would be a
substantial project in itself to develop such a system and current definitions achieve
acceptable reliability. Limits are ambiguous when therapists make comments that include
other interventions. Locomotion presents difficulties of definition when therapists make
small movements or move across the minute boundary and it is understandable that its
reliability would be lower; while not meeting the criterion, they are acceptable.
Conclusion. The GFR can be reliably applied on successive occasions by the
same rater.
Method. Ten of the 119 sessions from the research groups were randomly
selected. Three substitutions were made to replace sessions of two members or short
duration ensuring a robust sample. Raters rated them over several months independently
of each other or the investigator. Rating sheets were coded and analysed using
PRINCALS.
Results. Communality and total fit for each of rater are shown in Table 17.2 for
each GFR dimension. As in the Intra-Rater Reliability study, Affect has the lowest
reliability of all group function dimensions. Limits is the only dimension to fall below the
criterion of 0.8 for total fit. It may be more difficult to rate reliably since interpretation is
ambiguous or rater’s instructions may need further refining. Lower total fit and higher
communality may indicate that although each rater had a similar proportion of ratings,
they did not always agree. Raters 1 and 2 were similar whereas Rater 3 had a higher
score.
Table 17.2. Principal components analysis of a random sample of ten sessions by three
raters, showing communality for each rater and total fit for all three raters.
This discrepancy would manifest as a reduction in the total fit even though Rater
Three’s score was higher and therefore closer to the hypothetical dimension. The
conclusion may be that Rater 3 was slightly out of step with the other two in definition of
Limits. The accuracy of this method may be reflected by the fact that Rater 1 is the
investigator and has higher communality than the other raters, suggesting his ratings
reflect the underlying group dimensions more closely than the trainees.
Conclusion: Acceptable inter-rater reliability is obtained for the GFR.
Validity.
The validity of the GFR is discussed in Appendix 1.
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AFFECT
0
Contentm 3 5
ent 1 Joy 2 Interest Discontent 4 Distress Boredom
Count Count Count Count Count Count
STRUCTURE 0 Whole Gp COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 0 Concord 10 44 286 33 1 1
ORGANISn COHER. 1 Accord 8 31 177 55
2 Discord 3 33 55 1
3 Contracord 4 5 3
1 Systemic ACTION 0 Concord 19 166 681 22 1
COHER. 1 Accord 1 41 249 15
2 Discord 22 52 42 2 1
3 Contracord 6 4 3 8
2 Normative ACTION 0 Concord 10 82 1
COHER. 1 Accord 3 131 467 46 4 25
2 Discord 53 68 90 8
3 Contracord 5 7 11 12
3 Unorganised ACTION 0 Concord 4 1 1
COHER. 1 Accord 90 192 19 1 13
2 Discord 127 71 105 14 1
3 Contracord 15 9 23 27
1 Subgp COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 0 Concord 2 2
ORGANISn COHER. 1 Accord 3 13 2 1
1 Systemic ACTION 0 Concord 51 6 61 3
COHER. 1 Accord 3 7 42 2
2 Discord 2 3
3 Contracord 1 1
2 Normative ACTION 0 Concord 1 2
COHER. 1 Accord 14 67 5
2 Discord 1 11 5
3 Contracord 1 2 1
3 Unorganised ACTION 1 Accord 12 23
COHER. 2 Discord 4 4 5 2
3 Contracord 1 5 3
2 Sub+Ind COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 0 Concord 1 7 40 9
ORGANISn COHER. 1 Accord 9 51 38
2 Discord 6 3 15
3 Contracord 1 2 1
1 Systemic ACTION 0 Concord 58 28 267 7 1 1
COHER. 1 Accord 16 148 2 2
2 Discord 4 36 19 1
3 Contracord 1 1 2 4
2 Normative ACTION 0 Concord 1 23
COHER. 1 Accord 2 72 398 30 1 12
2 Discord 4 31 41 1
3 Contracord 9 5 1
3 Unorganised ACTION 0 Concord 1 1
COHER. 1 Accord 44 169 14 3 6
2 Discord 36 57 58 11 2
3 Contracord 6 3 21 6
3 Individuals COGNITIVE 2 Normative ACTION 1 Accord 97 20 3 14
ORGANISn COHER. 2 Discord 1 4 8
3 Unorganised ACTION 1 Accord 67 11 46
COHER. 2 Discord 8 10 6
Incompatible Combinations.
A number of combinations are contradictory: Individual Structure associated
with high-level categories of Cognitive Organisation and Action Coherence;
Contentment Affect associated with Discord and Contracord in Action Coherence.
These combinations were not found. Table 17.5 sets out the frequencies of unlikely,
though not incompatible combinations. These are Boredom with Contracord,
Discontent or Distress with Concord. They may occur because the different time
interval for rating Structure and Affect compared with Cognitive Organisation and
Action Coherence. Dimensions rated at different times within the minute may produce
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Conclusion: Contradictory states were not recorded and the low frequency of
improbable combinations indicates the GFR has internal validity.
Table 17.6. Percentage of categories for each year, mean of adolescent groups and all
groups.
1993, and to a lesser extent for 1988 and 1996. For Affect, 1988 and 1992 are similar
and to a lesser extent so are 1990 and 1996; 1993 is different. For Action Coherence
1992 and 1993 are similar while 1988, 1990 and 1996 are different. Therapists
Interventions is similar in 1992, 1993 and 1996, while 1988 is similar to 1990. The
GFR differentiates groups according to their GFR characteristics, though there is no
consistent pattern. These are explored further in the results sections.
Table 17.7. Division of GFR dimensions into positive and negative qualities.
Condensed States.
To reduce the proportion of low frequency ratings, individual states were grouped
by combining states with some common categories until the total percentage was
significant. When the frequency was too low to usefully differentiate states, positive and
negative categories in Cognitive Organisation, Affect or Action Coherence were included
in the same state. Groupings were made for 25 “Comprehensive States” and 9
“Condensed States.” The Comprehensive States yielded no clearer findings than
Condensed States so only the latter are presented.
Condensed States were ranked in order of the degree to which they approach the
ideal of group function with Whole Structure, Representational Cognitive Organisation,
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pleasurable Affect and cooperative Action Coherence as the optimal state and
Individual Structure with any combination of the other three Dimensions as the least
beneficial. Structure is the most important indicator of functionality, because unless all
members are involved, the value of the process is reduced. The next most valued
dimension is Action Coherence indicating cooperation or conflict. Cognitive
Organisation is valued next, describing collective cognition. Finally, Pleasurable Affect
states are more constructive than Unpleasurable states. Rankings consider these
aspects.
The ratings comprising Condensed States are shown in Table 17.8 with names,
category codes, frequencies and percentages. They are used to analyse many aspects of
the group process. The most valued state “Functional” shown in the table is Whole
Structure, Representational cognition, pleasure and Concord. Next, “Limited
Functional” is the same state with less than Whole Structure. When the Cognitive
Organisation is less than Representational, Affect pleasurable and Action Coherence
cooperative, it is called “Sociable;” the same state in less than Whole Structure is called
“Limited Sociable.” Then come states with combinations of negative categories. The
most valued of these is “Unhappy Cooperation” including any Structure above
Individuals any Cognitive Organisation, unhappy Affect, but cooperative Action
Coherence. “Happy Conflict” is the same except for happy Affect and conflict in
Action Coherence; then “Productive Turmoil” has Whole Structure, positive Cognitive
Organisation, unpleasure and conflict. “Dysfunctional” consists of any Structure above
Individuals with negative categories for all other Dimensions. Finally, “Nominal” is
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Functional Bands.
Condensed States were further condensed into three “Functional Bands.” These
are: first, Functional and Limited Functional combined into “Functional States;”
Sociable and Limited Sociable into “Sociable States;” and all other states into
“Unsociable States.” They are shown in Table 17.9.
YEAR
1988 1990 1992 1993 1996
Col % Col % Col % Col % Col %
9
Condensed Functional 16.2% 3.2% 5.4% 8.6% 7.2%
States
Limited Functional 2.2% 12.4% 3.6% 1.7% 2.3%
Sociable 39.1% 21.3% 25.5% 32.6% 57.6%
Limited Sociable 12.3% 31.6% 31.0% 15.2% 13.0%
Unhappy Cooperation 9.4% 1.3% 6.9% 5.7% 4.7%
Happy Conflict 8.4% 17.6% 9.3% 19.9% 6.4%
Productive Turmoil 3.2% 1.0% 1.1% 1.1% 2.7%
Dysfunctional 3.6% 10.5% 10.2% 10.7% 1.5%
Nominal 5.4% 1.0% 7.1% 4.6% 4.7%
Table 17.10. Percentage of time spent in Condensed states for each group.
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1988: The group spent 67% of its time in Functional, Sociable and Limited
Sociable states and all other states were represented above 2%, indicating it was
constructive.
1990: There are high incidences of Limited Functional, Sociable and Limited
Sociable (65.3% altogether) and Happy Conflict and Dysfunctional (28.1% together),
suggesting considerable fluctuation and correspondingly less time in Unhappy
Cooperation, Productive Turmoil and Nominal. It functioned in either a limited
constructive manner or destructively with limited capacity to support mixed states.
1992: A high incidence of Sociable and Limited Sociable (56.5% together) and
Dysfunctional (10.2%) occurred. It spent significant time in Unsociable states. The
only low incidence state was Productive Turmoil (1.1%). This group was unable to
maintain high Cognitive Organisation in unhappy Unsociable states.
1993: There is high incidence in Sociable and Limited Sociable (47.8%
together), Happy Conflict and Dysfunctional (30.6% together). The low incidence was
in Productive Turmoil. The group divided its time between limited achievements of
Sociable and the Unsociable states.
1996: There is high incidence of Sociable and Limited Sociable (70.6%) and the
only low incidence was Dysfunctional, showing achievements in social activity without
being able to represent their own functioning, but avoiding Unsociable states.
interactions (Martin & Hill, 1957; Sarri & Galinsky, 1974; Janosik, 1982; Schambaugh,
1989; Yalom, 1995; Alderfer, 1995). Some are based on clinical groups (Agazarian and
Peters, 1981; Rutan and Stone, 1984; Foulkes and Anthony, 1965), others on
experiential or training groups (Bennis and Shepard, 1956; Sarri and Galinsky, 1974;
and Lacoursiere, 1980). Some consider children or adolescents (Northern, 1988 and
Malekoff, 1997), others adults (Mills, 1967 and Yalom, 1995).
Table 17.11. Key word descriptions for group developmental phases from the literature.
1: Convening. The group forms; members are tentative and unclear about how the
group will operate; they are formalized and constrained, following the therapists,
functioning individualistically. This would result in high percentages of
Functional states as they talk about the group, some Sociable as they search for a
basis to communicate and low Unsociable states, since they do not yet have
reason for conflict or emotional expression.
2: Engagement. Members’ interactions create increased involvement. Initially, mutual
dependency develops discouraging conflict, promoting superficial harmony to
avoid problems. There are less likely to be Functional states as they find it more
threatening to go beyond superficial discussion of themselves. A higher
percentage of Sociable states is likely as they communicate about “safe”
subjects, while Unsociable states would remain low, as there is not enough
involvement to cause conflict.
3: Positioning. Gradually, the group becomes emotionally significant; members
experience dissatisfaction with it, conflict develops; they become counter-
dependent, test limits and struggle for power. They seek influence, but are
unwilling to resolve problems. Functional states would remain low due to the
attempt to use power, but high levels of Unsociable are likely as conflict and
anxieties express themselves, interspersed with periods of Sociable, expressing
the developing common culture. Conflicts are likely to produce fluctuations and
variations to Unsociable and make the process unstable and erratic.
4: Consolidation. For the group to continue, power relations need to be resolved by
developing norms, group culture and an agreed structure enabling the group to
make decisions and establish roles. It is unlikely to be socially mature and may
be hierarchical or dysfunctional for the long term depending on how the
conflicts are resolved. However, the group stabilizes, suggesting high
percentages of Sociable and low or fluctuating Functional and Unsociable states.
207
In Table 17.13, predicted proportions of Functional Bands for phases are summarized.
In this chapter, group development hypotheses are tested against the data.
H1.1. Stability of sessions will change systematically over the group’s life and
will be defined as part of a developmental sequence.
90
80
70
60
Struc
50 Cogn
40 Aff
30 Act
1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31
SESSION
Figure 18.1 shows waveforms with a period of between 3 and 5 sessions for
1988. Each Dimension has similar features somewhat out of phase with each other.
Stability oscillates between highs of 100% for Structure, around 90% for other
Dimensions and lows of 40-60%. The regularity and synchronisation of these
fluctuations is explored in later hypotheses.
90
80
70
60
Struc
50 Cogn
40 Aff
30 Act
1 5 7 9 11 16 18 21 23 25 27 29 31
SESSION
Figure 18.2 shows less regular wave fluctuations for 1990. Allowing for
missing sessions, it has a period of 2 to 5 sessions. Several stages are suggested.
Sessions 1 to 7 are characterized by differences in stability of Dimensions; sessions 8 to
18 fluctuate within a narrower range; sessions 19 to 22 suggest a crisis of instability
with a short period of synchronisation from session 23 to 25; the discrepancy increases
from session 26 to 31.
Figure 18.3 shows more sessions missing in 1992, but a wave period of between
3 and 5 (recorded) sessions. The discrepancy in stability between Dimensions varies
from small (sessions 13, 16, 23, 31 and 38) to great (sessions 12, 15, 19 and 36),
suggesting rhythmic alternation between degree of stability and synchrony between the
212
Dimensions.
90
80
70
60
Struc
50
Cogn
40 Aff
30 Act
3 6 8 12 14 16 18 22 25 29 31 34 36 38
SESSION
90
80
70
60
Struc
50
Cogn
40 Aff
30 Act
1 5 8 12 18 22 24 26 29
SESSION
In figure 18.4, more sessions are missing in 1993 and cautious interpretation is
needed. However, fluctuation of stability and degree of synchrony between the
Dimensions is suggested. In spite of missing sessions, the period of the waveforms is
still 3 to 5 (recorded) sessions. Sessions 1 to 5 are relatively stable, then in sessions 7 to
11 there is discrepancy between Dimensions. Sessions 11 to 17 are more synchronous,
followed by high stability in sessions 18 and 21, then unstable episodes at sessions 22
and 25 and discrepant states at the end of the year.
90
80
70
Struc
60
Cogn
50
Aff
40 Act
1 4 7 11 13 18 29 35
SESSION
Figure 18.5 for 1996, has even more sessions missing making it difficult to
interpreted. Similar rhythms between stability and synchrony of Dimensions are
evident. At session 1, the group is synchronous and at session 3 is unstable with high
discrepancy between Dimensions. There is cyclical alternation throughout the year
ending in a stable and synchronous session at session 35.
The fluctuation for all groups is within the same range. Points of instability
occur within the first 6 sessions. Sessions 7 to 9 show greater stability, with greater
synchrony and stability around sessions 22 to 24. There are peaks of stability in one or
more Dimensions at sessions 25 to 27, and for all groups except 1996 there is a crisis of
instability several sessions before the end of the year.
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Stability of all Groups. Groups were compared by calculating the mean of the
percentages of stable minutes for all Dimensions for each group. They are plotted
together in Figure 18.6, with lines broken at missing sessions. Points of synchrony are
evident. Sessions 3, 10, 18, 26-28, and 30-31 are closely related for most groups.
While values differ, the slopes are at times closely related, although there is sometimes
a lag between groups. Examples are at sessions 5-6, 10-12, 17-19, 22-25 and 29-32.
These relationships are explored in later hypotheses. The means are provided in Table
18A.6 in Appendix 3.
100
90
80
M88
70
M90
M92
60
M93
Value
50 M96
1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37
sessions
Figure 18.6. Mean of percentage of stable minutes for GFR Dimensions for each
group.
H1.2. A developmental sequence will show lower quality early in the year,
215
Year quartiles are used to examine groups’ development. Table 18.1 shows the
number of sessions in each quartile for each group, which vary because of missing
sessions. Since 1992 continued for five sessions later in the year than other group, these
were included in quartile 4 to allow other quartiles to describe consistent periods as
other groups.
Tables 18.2 - 18.6 show quartile percentages for Condensed States in each
group. Group development can be examined considering changes greater than 1% as
significant (see Chapter 17).
1988: Table 18.2 shows percentages of Condensed states for each quartile of
216
1988. In quartile 1, Sociable states dominate; little conflict occurs except with
pleasurable affect. There is limited Functional capacity. In quartile 2, Whole
Functional and Sociable states and all Unsociable states increase indicating greater
engagement is accompanied by increased conflict. In quartile 3, Functional increases
fourfold, but the group compensates by increased separation into individuals. In
quartile 4, Functional and Sociable decrease somewhat, Dysfunctional increases, but the
group cooperates more in spite of unpleasurable affect (Unhappy Cooperation).
Over the year, Limited Sociable and Nominal states change toward increased
whole group Sociable and boisterousness (Happy Conflict), which are then converted
into increased Functional, reduced Unsociable but increased Nominal states. Then most
Unsociable states reduce and cooperation in spite of unpleasurable affect increases
(Unhappy Cooperation). Maintaining cooperation with unpleasurable affect is essential
for sustaining groups.
1990: Table 18.3 shows percentages of Condensed States for 1990 quartiles. It
begins with highest percentages in subgroup and conflict states. In quartile 2, they
reduce in favor of a fourfold increase in Sociable. In quartile 3, self-reflection in
subgroups (Limited Functional) and Unsociable states increase; then in quartile 4, whole
states (Functional and Sociable) and conflict increase. The group makes only limited
progress. Limited Functional is the main early strength and the group stabilizes in
Sociable states, but while Limited Functional is reduced, conflictual states increase
fourfold. This is maintained to the end of the year though the capacity to be whole
217
increases.
1992: Table 18.4 shows percentages of Condensed States for 1992 quartiles. In
quartile 1, the group is predominantly in Limited Sociable, but unreflective. In quartile
2, whole Sociable and Unsociable states increase. In quartile 3, conflict is unchanged,
but Limited Sociable replaces whole states and Unhappy Cooperation. By quartile 4,
the group achieves a modest capacity for self-reflection, improved whole sociability,
cooperation and reduced conflict, but increased separation into individuals. The middle
quartiles show increased conflict and the group only achieves functional capacity in the
last quartile. Increased Unsociable states accompany reduced whole states.
1993: Table 18.5 shows percentages of Condensed States for 1993 quartiles.
This group spends almost half the first quartile in Unsociable states, but has some
capacity for whole group and self-reflection (Functional). The two sessions in quartile 2
show increased Sociable states, but reduced Functional and Unsociable. By quartile 3,
Functional self-reflection increases accompanied by reduced conflict and more time in
whole states. In quartile 4, Unsociable increases similar to quartile 1, while Functional
is also reduced. The group improves whole Functionality in quartile 3, but loses it at the
end of the year. Quartile 3 is the most constructive but conflict increases in quartile 4
along with loss of whole states.
218
1996: Table 18.6 shows percentages of Condensed States for 1996 quartiles.
Almost three quarters of quartile 1 is Sociable. In quartile 2, the group is more
Functional, with Unsociable similar to quartile 1. Only one session is in Quartile 3. In
quartile 4, Sociable accounts for three-quarters of time with reduced Unsociable;
Functional is maintained. The group achieves self-reflection; conflict increases then
reduces.
Summary 1.2: The proportions of Condensed States change over the year for all
groups. Although percentage changes are small, their qualitative effects on
session climate suggest important group events. A number of generalizations
can be made:
219
1.2.1. Functional states increase towards the end of the year, suggesting all
groups make therapeutic progress.
1.2.2. All groups increase their ability to unite in Sociable activity during the
year.
1.2.3. Increased Whole Sociable states are associated with increased
Unsociable states, suggesting Whole group states are more demanding
and provoke increased tension and conflict.
1.2.4. Increased Limited Sociable states are associated with decreased
Unsociable states, suggesting division of groups reduces tension and
conflict.
1.2.5. For less successful groups (1990 and 1993), when subgroup Sociable
states increase, there are increased Unsociable states, suggesting conflicts
are carried into subgroups towards the end of the year, having established
relatively stable dynamics.
1.2.6. Successful groups (1988, 1992 and 1996) manifest greatest conflict and
tension in the middle quartiles of the year. Their best functioning is in
the last quartile.
1.2.7. The less successful groups (1990 and 1993) function best in quartile 3,
but it is lost in quartile 4.
A more complex pattern of development is found than postulated by hypothesis
1.2.
Using the scheme described in Chapter 17, the eight phases were described in
terms of their expected proportions of Functional Bands (see Table 17.13). The
hypothesis was tested by computing graphs of percentage of time spent in each
Functional Band per session for each group and examining whether the phases can be
identified. Allowance must be made for the “noise” of natural fluctuations in
220
therapeutic groups. Therefore criteria for the phases may only be met in a general
sense. Each group is examined below.
Phase: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
YEAR: 1988
100
80
60
40 Cond9
% Func
% minutes
20
% Soc
0 % Unsoc
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32
SESSION
1. Convening (Session 1): The group begins with relatively high Functional, lower
Sociable and medium Unsociable percentage. However, after one session
Sociable increases dramatically and the others fall, indicating the group quickly
moves beyond superficial focus on problems.
2. Engagement (Sessions. 2-8): From session 2 there are six sessions with high
Sociable except for dips at sessions 4 and 7 in response to rises in Unsociable
states, which otherwise remain low. Functional remains low fulfilling criteria
for phase 2 between sessions 2 and 9, for seven sessions. Oscillations of
Sociable peaks and troughs alternating with Unsociable suggest the group may
have repeated the dynamic of phase 2 three times before moving on. It is a
221
phase of common activities that do not confront the problems of group life.
3. Positioning (Sessions 9-11): At session 9 Unsociable rises, Sociable falls and
percentages of all states fluctuate until Sociable dramatically increases at session
12. The rise in Functional is not predicted however. This indicates instability and
conflict for three sessions, consistent with the power struggle of this phase.
4. Consolidation (Sessions 12-16): At session 12 the increase in Sociable may indicate
resolution and formation of norms. The fall in Sociable and rise in Unsociable
at session 13 is reversed in the next three sessions. Phase 4 consists of five
sessions 12 to 16.
5. Idealization (Sessions 17-19): Session 17 initiates a drop in Unsociable and rise in
both Sociable and Functional, reflecting cooperation and communication
consistent with criteria for phase 5 of idealizing the group. This lasts for three
sessions, 17 to 19.
6. Disenchantment (Sessions 20-21): The high Unsociable in session 20 is consistent
with disenchantment and the increased Sociable of session 21 represents
possible avoidance. Unsociable peaks again at session 22. Phase 6 lasts from
sessions 20 to 21.
7. Working (Sessions 22-33): The next stage has fluctuating Unsociable, Sociable and
Functional percentages as the group works productively. Towards the end of the
year, Unsociable rises and Sociable falls although Functional also rises,
suggesting conflicts are worked with for eleven sessions between 22 and 33.
8. Separation: There is no phase 8 for this group since it lingered past session 33 with
only two members and recording was suspended.
1990: In Figure 18.8, values of Functional Bands for 1990 are shown. This
group shows different characteristics to 1988, but has missing sessions.
222
1. Convening (Session 1): The orientation phase is shown in the initial high Sociable
and Functional with low Unsociable states in session 1.
2. Engagement (Sessions 2-5): Then Functional falls, Sociable and Unsociable rise
from sessions 2-5, fulfilling criteria for phase 2. The group avoids problems
while finding common activity, but conflict grows. This phase lasts four
sessions until session 5.
3. Positioning (Sessions 6-7): At session 6, Unsociable and Sociable stabilize then fall
while Functional remains low, indicating conflict and disorganization for two
sessions to session 7.
Phases: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
YEAR: 1990
100
80
60
40 Cond9
% Func
20
% Soc
0 % Unsoc
1 5 7 9 11 16 18 21 23 25 27 29 31
% minutes 2 6 8 10 12 17 19 22 24 26 28 30
SESSION
4. Consolidation (Sessions 8-16): From session 8, Sociable increases and remains high
for nine sessions; Functional and Unsociable remain low with some fluctuation
consistent with resolving conflict to develop norms for group functioning. It
lasts until session 16.
5. Idealization (Sessions 17-18): From session 17, Functional rises sharply and
Sociable and Unsociable fall for two sessions consistent with idealization lasting
223
This group has a long period in Consolidation, possibly due to missing sessions,
which make interpretations tentative, although Idealization seems evident. Working
shows the same rhythms as 1988 and it may have extended further if later sessions were
recorded.
1992: Percentages of Functional Bands for 1992 are shown in Figure 18.9.
Convening is lacking, since session 3 is the first recorded. In contrast to 1988 and 1990,
it was not a new group; a number of members attended the previous year so a clearly
defined Convening Phase may not be present even with complete records.
formation of norms and resolution of phase 3 conflicts. The phase is long (12
sessions), suggesting the group was fixated and had difficulty stabilizing and
achieving Idealization.
Phases: 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
YEAR: 1992
100
80
60
40 Cond9
% Func
20
% Soc
0 % Unsoc
3 6 8 12 14 16 18 22 25 29 31 34 36 38
% minutes 4 7 11 13 15 17 19 24 26 30 33 35 37
SESSION
There is ambiguity about phases 3 and 4, but this may be a reflection of missing
sessions. The long period in phase 4, Consolidation, indicates it had difficulty resolving
issues of this phase.
1993: Percentages for Functional Bands in 1993 are shown in Figure 18.10.
This group continued from 1992 with some new members and has missing sessions,
making identification of phases tentative.
1. Convening (Session 1): In session 1, there is high Functional similar to 1988, but it
drops immediately and by session 3 is replaced by high Sociable and rising
Unsociable. The orientation phase lasted for one or possibly two sessions (since
session 2 is missing).
2. Engagement (Sessions 3-4): The pattern of common activity is indicated by high
Sociable and low Functional. However, it is shorter than other groups, since the
level of conflict shown by Unsociable rises sharply. It lasts till session 5, a total
of two sessions, and may reflect resumption of processes from the previous year,
although session 4 is missing, making interpretation uncertain.
3. Positioning (Sessions 5-10): At session 5, Unsociable is high, while Functional and
Sociable are low. This is consistent with power struggles, continuing for six
sessions till session 10.
4. Consolidation (Sessions 11-20): At session 11, there are signs of more stable
functioning. Although Functional remains low, Sociable rises and Unsociable
falls until session 21. Phase 4 lasts for ten sessions, although sessions are
missing.
5. Idealization (Sessions 21-23): At session 21, Unsociable is high, but Functional
226
begins to rise, continuing till session 23, a fall in Unsociable and increase in
constructive Sociable representing a focus on the group. This phase lasts three
sessions.
Phases: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
YEAR: 1993
100
80
60
40 Cond9
% Func
20
% Soc
0 % Unsoc
1 5 8 12 18 22 24 26 29
% minutes 3 7 11 17 21 23 25 28 30
SESSION
Allowing for missing sessions, 1993 shows similarities with 1992 especially in
227
phases 4 and 5. More session records may have allowed a more adequate mapping.
The peak of Functional at session 23 is placed in phase 5, but it corresponds to similar
peaks at session 34 in 1992, session 24 in 1990 and session 23 in 1988, all in phase 7.
1996: The percentage of Functional Bands for 1996 is shown in Figure 18.11.
This group continued from the previous year and more records are missing than other
groups. The group does not seem to go through phase 1, although session 1 is recorded,
since all members had been together before. Six sessions are lost between sessions 18
and 25, so the session axis does not provide even spacing for the time scale through the
year. With the data available, possible phases can be examined.
Phases: 2 3 4 5 6 7
YEAR: 1996
100
80
60
40
Cond9
%Func
20
% Soc
0 % Unsoc
1 3 4 6 7 10 11 12 13 15 16 18 25 29 31 35
% minutes
SESSION
Although many sessions are missing and 1996 is more regular than other groups,
phases can be tentatively distinguished. Groups continuing into a subsequent year may
traverse early stages more rapidly spending more time in Working.
period and percentage of the year for each phase in each group. If these results can be
generalized, similar groups may spend one session in Convening, about four in
Engagement and Positioning, but twice as much time in Consolidation. Idealization and
Disenchantment seem to require only a few sessions each, then about a third of the year
is spent in Working. When Separation occurs, it occupies a couple of sessions. The
number of groups is too small for this to be more than suggestive.
The groups vary as expected from their nature. Some groups start treatment
(1988 and 1990), others continue from the previous year (1992, 1993 and 1996). The
only one with complete continuity of personnel and therapists from the preceding year
was 1996, which may explain its rapid movement through early phases and longer
Working (although there are missing sessions which may have shown different
phenomena).
Table 18.7. Length of phases, mean period and percentage of the year spent in each
phase for each group.
Phases: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35
Table 18.8. Percentage of Condensed States in each Developmental Phase for all
Groups; arrows show the flow of percentage between states.
Table 18.9 summarizes percentages of the Functional Bands for each phase.
These fluctuations in values provide an underlying structure to an otherwise confusing
process. Arrows show the flow of a “floating” 20-30% of time that moves between
bands to show the changing process. From Convening to Engagement, it moves from
Functional to Sociable, then into Unsociable in Positioning, to Sociable again in
Consolidation and to Functional in Idealization. It falls to Unsociable in
Disenchantment and up to Functional in Working; finally, Functional and Unsociable
combine into Sociable in Separation. Although very generalized, it indicates the gross
movement which therapists may expect as groups move through the phases of therapy.
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Phase 5 Phase 6 Phase 7 Phase 8 Total all
Groups
Functional Conven- Engage- Position- Consolid- Ideal- Disench- Working Separat- Function-
Band ing ment ing ation isation antment ion al Bands
Functional 9% 6% 4% 7% 25% 11% 20% 4% 14%
Sociable 40% 73% 48% 68% 47% 44% 46% 71% 55%
Unsociable 21% 21% 48% 25% 28% 45% 34% 25% 31%
Table 18.9. Percentages of Functional Bands for each Developmental Phase and for all
groups; arrows show the flow of percentage between bands.
232
Whole: 60.3%,
Subgroups: 5.9%,
Subgroup+Individuals: 29.2%,
Individuals: 4.7%.
Because of their small percentages, all three subgroup and individual states were combined
to form a category called “Subgp/Ind” in tables or “Subgroups” in the text, totalling 39.8%
in a Dimension called “Structure #2.”
The null hypothesis predicts the frequency of other categories in different
Structures would follow proportions of 60%, 6%, 29% and 5% in Structure categories.
Table 19.1 shows percentages of Cognitive Organization, Affect and Action Coherence
categories for Structure categories for all groups. Taking a criterion of 10% difference
from the expected frequency, categories with relatively higher frequency in Whole
structure are: Representational, Joy, Concord. This suggests whole groups are more
likely to be self-reflective, have unstable, pleasurable affect and unite in common goals.
Using a 5% difference criterion, categories with lower than expected frequency
233
with inert affect and cooperate in compatible goals. They are stable but less productive.
Stable affect is constant for both structures. Individuals are likely to be unorganized
and bored.
The effect of change into and out of the Structure categories is explored in
hypothesis 2.1.2.
Subgroups to Whole.
Negative structural change reduces Joy (2.4%), Discontent (4.1%) and Distress
(1%), while Interest and Boredom increase, stabilizing pleasure and reducing
unpleasure. There is negligible affect change without structural change. Positive
change reduces Interest (4.2%) and Boredom (2.5%), and increases Joy (4.6%) and
Discontent (2.1%). The proportion of pleasure/unpleasure changes by 1.5% for
negative change and 0.4% for positive change.
Affect provides weak support for Hypothesis 2.1.2. It is interesting that change
towards decreased structural integrity stabilizes both pleasure and unpleasure (since
Boredom has lower energy than Discontent) and change towards greater structural
integrity destabilizes pleasure, (in the form of increased Joy), but stabilizes unpleasure.
Change towards subgroups reduces affective intensity, whereas change towards whole
stabilizes unpleasure, but destabilizes pleasure.
Percentages of Action categories associated with structural change are shown in
Table 19.3 to test the hypothesis for Action Coherence.
Whole-Cooperation: 28.9%;
Subgroup-Cooperation: 26.7%;
Whole-Conflict: 4.5%;
Subgroup-Conflict: 1.5%.
Total unchanging states: 61.6%.
Whole- Whole-
Cooperation 8.8%, .23 Conflict
2.5%, .06
4.5%, .12
Figure 19.1. Change between Group Action states over a five-minute period for
all groups as a percentage of all minutes and as a proportion of all changes.
oscillations within whole states and between whole and subgroup cooperation.
Figure 19.2 shows the net percentage changes when the percentage of change in
each direction between each pair of states is subtracted from each other. Although
small, they show there is a small tendency for groups to move out of Subgroup-
Cooperation into any other state and to drift through Whole-Cooperation and Subgroup-
Conflict to end in Whole-Conflict. This suggests an underlying tendency for groups to
become whole and conflictual (see chapter 21).
Whole- Whole-
Cooperation .6% Conflict
.1%
.2% .1%
.3%
Figure 19.2. Net percentage change between Group Action states over a five-
minute period for all groups.
at that state. (b) The amount of time spent in each state was allowed for by dividing
these percentages by the percentage of stable states, to describe changes as a proportion
of the total number of those states, giving a comparative indication of the likelihood that
the group will move out of each state. These are shown in Table 19.4.
Conflict states are four times more unstable in whole and eight times more
unstable in subgroup than Cooperation states. Subgroup-Conflict is more than twice as
unstable as Whole-Conflict. This is understandable since subgroups are smaller and the
effects of conflict more disruptive. However, smaller groups function better and are
more attractive to their members (see Chapter 11), suggesting subgroups are not the
same as small whole groups. It also shows group stability in cooperation is similar
irrespective of structural state. Although a low incidence of structural change is
associated with subgroups, it is significant as a proportion of its incidence. However,
the move from Subgroup-Conflict to Subgroup-Cooperation is greater than to Whole-
Cooperation suggesting that remaining in subgroups is also effective to control conflict.
Table 19.4. Proportion of change in Group Action characteristics for all groups after
five minutes.
This hypothesis concerns change in these relationships over the groups’ life.
Small trends may obscure more definite patterns specific to time of year. Change in
structural conditions over year quartiles are examined. Table 19.5 gives the proportion
of Structure categories for each quartile for all groups. There is an increase in Whole
and decrease in other categories after quartile 1.
Table 19.5. Percentage of Structure categories in each quartile for all groups.
The proportions of Structure categories occurring in each quartile are shown for
each group in Table 19.6. Whole is lowest in quartile 1, and then is similar for other
quartiles in 1988; it is lowest in quartile 1, next lowest in quartile 3 and higher for
quartiles 2 and 4 for 1990 and 1992; while 1993 and 1996 had the lowest Whole in
quartile 2, the highest in 1 and 3, probably because they continued from the previous
year. The percentage of Whole increases by 11-17% in the last three quartiles,
suggesting groups are more able to manage this state as they develop. This is achieved
quickly in quartile 2, which is understandable otherwise the group would disintegrate.
Although the years differ in proportions, they conform to this format except for 1993,
which had more inconsistent attendance (see Appendix 1). Table 19A.1 in Appendix 3
shows quartile percentages of all categories for all groups for each Structure category.
Representational, Discontent and Discord show a linear increase in each quartile.
Others are consistent or fluctuate. This does not support the hypothesis that groups
gradually develop the capacity to manage Whole structure. They acquire it quickly in
241
the quartile 1.
Structure
Whole Subgr Subg Individ
Grp oups p+Ind uals
Row Row Row Row
% % % %
YEAR 1988 Year 1 61.3% 2.4% 32.3% 4.1%
Quartiles 2 77.2% 1.5% 20.8% .4%
3 77.0% .2% 11.7% 11.1%
4 76.5% 1.0% 16.3% 6.2%
1990 Year 1 22.8% 14.6% 59.1% 3.5%
Quartiles 2 56.8% 14.0% 29.1%
3 38.6% 28.0% 33.4%
4 50.5% 13.2% 36.1% .3%
1992 Year 1 19.0% 16.4% 57.5% 7.1%
Quartiles 2 60.9% .6% 37.3% 1.2%
3 41.9% 3.2% 52.7% 2.2%
4 54.3% 4.1% 29.0% 12.6%
1993 Year 1 74.9% 3.9% 19.0% 2.2%
Quartiles 2 37.8% 43.3% 18.9%
3 80.5% .7% 14.3% 4.4%
4 68.6% 29.7% 1.7%
1996 Year 1 70.8% 19.5% 9.7%
Quartiles 2 68.7% 3.9% 25.1% 2.3%
3 93.5% 6.5%
4 89.8% 1.9% 6.8% 1.5%
Table 19.6. Percentage of Structure categories for year quartiles for each group.
Summary 2.1.3b: For Affective states, the hypothesis is not supported; both
structures show a similar movement towards Interest then Joy until quartile 4 when
there is more turbulence and unpleasure in Whole, but further stabilization in pleasure
for Subgroups.
Proportions of Structure #2 categories for group size are shown in Table 19.10.
The larger the group, the smaller the proportion of time spent in Whole. The hypothesis
is supported.
Summary 2.2: The smaller the group, the more time it spends in Whole. This
supports the hypothesis that Whole is more difficult and demanding for groups to
maintain and this increases with the size.
245
Table 19.10. The proportion of Structure #2 categories for different sized groups.
Differences in structural effects of group size were compared for other GFR
Dimensions. Table 19.11 shows the relation of group size to the proportion of each
Cognitive Organization condition in each structural condition. Groups of two members
were excluded since the structure can only be a group of two or two individuals.
Comparing all groups with different sized groups shows Representational is 5.3%
greater for groups of three in Whole and 7.3% larger for Subgroup, but is progressively
smaller in both structures for larger groups. The much higher relative proportion of
Representational in Whole than Subgroups is consistent in all sizes, suggesting the
larger the group the more difficult is self-reflection. Systemic in Subgroups is
consistent for sizes above 3 (32%-36% compared with 31% for all groups). For groups
of 3, (23.8%) a subgroup is two members. Whole is similar in three and four members
(37.7% and 40.7% compared with 34.9% for all groups), but reduces in larger groups to
24.2% for five and only 4.6% for six members. It is more difficult for larger groups to
develop rule-based Cognitive Organization, but it is also more difficult with only two,
the optimum being three or four members.
Normative increases for size in Whole (22.8% to 30.8% compared with 26.8%
for all groups), except for groups of three (26.4%). It is smallest for Subgroups in
groups of five and largest in groups of three (41.1% compared with 35.3% for all
groups). The smallest figures are Whole (22.8%) in groups of four and Subgroups
246
(26.4%) in groups of five, which usually means subgroups of four, since the most
common structure in this category is Subgroups+Individuals. Unorganized shows
greater variation. Whole increases with size from 11% for three members to 61% for
six and Subgroups increases from 19.6% for three to 27.5% for five and decreases for
six (24.6%).
Summary 2.2.1a: The larger the group, the higher is the proportion of less
organized states. This is most evident in Whole, but for Subgroups, the smaller the
group, the easier it is for Representational to occur. Units of three to four members
favor Systemic.
Table 19.12. Percentage of Affect #2 categories in Structure #2 for all groups and for
different sized groups.
Interest shows a linear decrease for Whole groups with increasing size (72.9% to
40% compared to 63.4% for all groups), while the proportion for Subgroups remains
relatively stable (between 65.2% and 72.9% compared with 69.7% for all groups). The
larger the group, the less time spent in constant affect when Whole and more time in
unstable Joy; but formation of Subgroups preserves a stable proportion of stable
pleasure (supporting Hypothesis 2.2.1.). The total value of pleasure for Whole is
between 77% and 86% for each size. Groups maintain relatively constant proportions
of pleasure/unpleasure.
There is no linear relation for Discontent, but an increase in Whole up to five
members (15.1% to 17.6%), then a decrease for six (4.6% compared to 14.7% for all
groups). For Subgroups, Discontent tends to decrease with greater group size (from
23.8% to 3.1% compared with 17.3% for all groups), supporting it as a means of solving
problems in larger groups. Distress shows a linear increase with group size in Whole
(0.5% to 9.2% compared with 2-1% in all groups) and in Subgroups ups to groups of
five (0.4% to 2.5%) with a similar level for six members.
Summary 2.2.1b: When groups increase in size, they exhibit more unstable
affect, but the proportion of pleasure/unpleasure remains relatively constant. Subgroups
248
has a stabilizing effect with a more constant value of Interest and generally lower levels
of unstable affect.
Table 19.13. Percentage of Action Coherence categories in Structure#2 for all groups
and for different sized groups.
Discord increases with group size for Whole (13.3% to 40% compared with
19.6% for all groups) and Subgroups, (10.8% to 22.8% compared with 15.8%) except
for six members, (13.6%) which is comparable to groups of four, which would be their
size. There is a similar linear increase for Whole in Contracord for increasing size (1%
to 10.8% compared with 3.7% for all groups) indicating size is crucial for conflict.
249
Subgroups reduces conflict (0.7% to 7.1% compared with 3.1% for all groups), except
for groups of six whose subgroups will be three or four members. Conflict increases
with size.
H2.2.2. The smaller the group, the lower will be the amount of change in
categories from one minute to the next.
This hypothesis concerns stability for all dimensions, so Condensed States are
used. A variable was computed comparing each minute with the preceding minute in
each session (excluding first minutes) identifying whether the state remained the same,
moved to a higher or lower value state. This allowed “positive change,” “negative
change” and “no change” to be recorded. The stability of Condensed States for
different size groups is shown in Table 19.14.
Hypothesis 2.2.2 predicts the percentage of stable minutes decreases as size
increases. This is confirmed for groups of two to five members (65.2% - 51.6%), but
stability increases for six (58.6%), indicating the stabilizing effect of subgroups of two
to four members. Positive and negative change increase with size up to five members
and fall for six members.
Summary 2.2.2: The smaller the group, the greater is the stability, unless it is
large enough to form subgroups without individuals when it functions like smaller
250
groups.
The influence of group size on the quality of group function can be examined by
comparing the distribution of Condensed States. If larger groups are more unstable,
their quality may be lower. Table 19.15 shows the percentage of all Condensed States
for different sized groups.
Table 19.15. The percentage of Condensed States by group size for all groups.
There are linear relationships for group size with every state except Productive
Turmoil and Dysfunctional. The proportion of Functional and Sociable decrease as
groups become larger as do Unhappy Cooperation, and Nominal (which also lack
conflict). By contrast, Limited Functional, Limited Sociable, Happy Conflict and
Dysfunctional increase with size, except for six members.
Findings for Hypothesis 2.1.2 indicated groups were most likely to resolve
conflict by moving to cooperation within the same structure, but Subgroup-Conflict was
the most labile state, followed by Whole-Conflict. The effect of different sizes was
compared for Group Action. Table 19.16 shows the percentage of changes between the
Group Action states for groups of different sizes.
Table 19.16. Total percentage of changes between Group Action states in different sized
groups after 5 minutes (excluding percentage of stable minutes).
There is a linear progression for all categories between groups of three to five,
except Subgroup-Conflict and Whole-Cooperation and a change at six members
reflecting the effect of subgroups. However, the linear relationship is increasing
percentage from three to five members except for Whole-Cooperation <-> Subgroup-
Cooperation, which is more likely to occur in a group of three than four or five (16.3%
to 9.9%), but more likely with six (10.6%, with all groups 14.2%). Changes between
cooperation and conflict within Whole are more likely from three to five members
(8.9% to 10.7%) and least likely with six (3.2%). Movement between Whole-Conflict
and Subgroup-Conflict increases from three to five members (0.9% to 5.9%) and falls
for six (2.8%). Change within Subgroups from conflict to cooperation increases
fourfold between three and five members (2.9% to 10.4%) and falls for six, similar to 3
members (2.9%). Change between Whole-Conflict and Subgroup-Cooperation
increases from three to six members (3.5% to 7.8%) indicating more members are more
likely to be in conflict when together. Change between Subgroup-Conflict and Whole-
Cooperation is inconsistent, showing little change between three to five members (2.9%
to 2.5%), but less for six (1.2%).
252
Since six members does not represent a pure factor of group size, cooperative
movement between whole and subgroup structures becomes less frequent with
increasing size, because there is increased conflict. Movement into and out of conflict
increases with size, but movement from whole to subgroups as a means of managing
conflict increases with size, including six members. Movement from whole to
subgroups as a strategy for resolving conflict is used more as size increases. The larger
the group, the more likely it is to develop conflict in whole or retain conflict in the move
to subgroups. However, the more members there are, the less likely it will move
between whole and subgroup structures when cooperative. The likelihood of becoming
cooperative in whole when there is conflict in the subgroups is relatively unchanged.
Summary 2.2.4: The effect of increased group size increases the likelihood of
movements between whole group conflict and subgroup cooperation.
H2.3.1. The more incomplete the group, the higher will be its functional
quality in GFR categories.
The effect of absentees is not linear. It confounds two influences: (a) loss of
problems through loss of members and (b) threat to the group’s integrity and continued
existence. Loss of one or two members reduces conflict and increases functional and
sociable tendencies, although for the loss of one member this improvement is in
Sociable not Functional. When absentees are great enough to threaten the integrity of
the group, Unsociable and Nominal states increase.
The quality of GFR categories is analyzed by comparing the effect of group size
and absentees on Action Coherence, since conflict was found to be crucial for group
function. Table 19.18 shows percentages of Action Coherence categories for group size
and absentee for Structure #2.
For groups of three or four members complete or with one absentee, there is no
effect on Concord and little effect on Accord or Discord. However, when these groups
are the remainder of larger groups with two or more absentees, there is about a 20%
reduction in Whole Concord and a corresponding increase in Accord and Discord.
Absentees greatly reduce the group’s capacity to be in Concord. Although there are
254
similar trends for Cognitive Organization and Affect, they are not as clear and
systematic as for Action Coherence, which proves highly sensitive to structural factors.
Summary 2.3.1b: When small groups result from larger groups with absentees,
their capacity to be in Concord is greatly reduced. The trend of the interaction of size
and absentee for other GFR Dimensions is not so consistent.
H2.3.2. The more incomplete the group, the more stable it will be as
shown by the amount of change in GFR categories in consecutive
minutes.
Variables were computed for each GFR Dimension comparing each minute with
the preceding one within each session to show the proportion of unchanged states and
the extent to which they contribute to Condensed stability. Table 19.20 shows the effect
of absentees on stability for Structure, Cognitive Organization, Affect and Action
Coherence.
255
Table 19.19. Absentees’ effect on Stability of Condensed States for all groups.
All GFR Dimensions do not contribute equally to the results for Condensed
States. There is only 1% increase in stability for Structure with absentees. Cognitive
Organization is similar with only 1% increased stability when two are absent, but
reduced stability of 4% with three absent. For Affect, however, one absentee increases
stability by 6%; loss of two gives an additional 6%, but loss of three reduces stability by
3%. For Action Coherence, the loss of one member increases stability by 11%, but
there is little additional stability for two, and three increases stability by 1%.
The increased stability from absent members is a result of Affect and Action
Coherence. One absentee has a pronounced effect on both Dimensions, two absentees
alter Affect, with little impact on Action Coherence, whereas the third absentee (causing
insecurity about the group’s future in 5-6 member groups) decreases the stability of
Affect, but produces a marginal increase in stability in Action Coherence. The threat to
the group’s survival is registered by increased affective instability, whereas the fewer
members, the less conflictual tension is likely (see Table 19.13).
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Summary 2.3.2a: Absentees increase stability until there are sufficient members
away to throw doubt on the viability of the group, then stability decreases. The effect is
mainly derived from Affect and Action Coherence, with little change for Structure and
Cognitive Organization.
COGNITIVE ORGANISATION
Representational Systemic Normative Unorganised
Col % Col % Col % Col %
AFFECT Contentment 2.0% 6.2% .3%
Joy 10.8% 14.1% 15.2% 25.0%
Interest 63.8% 73.0% 66.1% 44.6%
Discontent 22.6% 5.6% 13.6% 20.0%
Distress .7% .9% 1.6% 5.0%
Boredom .1% .1% 3.1% 5.4%
COGNITIVE ORGANISATION
Representational Systemic Normative Unorganised
Col % Col % Col % Col %
ACTION Concord 45.6% 64.9% 6.3% .6%
Accord 40.6% 25.0% 73.8% 52.3%
Discord 12.1% 8.7% 17.1% 38.4%
Contracord 1.7% 1.5% 2.8% 8.8%
H3.2. High, unstable Affect (Joy, Distress) and conflictual Action Coherence
categories (Contracord, Discord) will be associated with instability and
change on the other dimensions in the same or succeeding minutes.
The null hypothesis predicts the proportion of stable minutes would be constant
for each category of Affect and Action Coherence for the other Dimensions. The
proportions of minutes for each GFR Dimension for all groups in Affect and Action
Coherence categories were examined. Reduced stable minutes from the general
frequency would indicate a selective effect associated with the indicated category. The
percentage of unchanged minutes for each Dimension is:
Structure: 83.6%
Cognitive Organization: 86%
Affect: 83.5%
Action Coherence: 81%
3.2.1. Affect. The percentages of minutes in which groups remained in the same
category were calculated for each Affect category. The Hypothesis predicts a higher
percentage of change for high, unstable Affect (Joy and Distress) than for other
categories. The percentages are shown in Table 20.3. Those highlighted are higher or
lower by 5% or more than unchanged percentages for all groups.
In Structure, Contentment has 6% higher stability, but Discontent and Boredom
are lower (5.4% and 9.9%); Cognitive Organization has 8% increased stability for
Contentment. In Affect, increased stability is present for Contentment and Distress. In
Action Coherence, Contentment is significantly more stable (15.1%) but Discontent and
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Distress are lower (by 7.2% and 14.9%), and there is reduced stability for Joy.
Discontent and Distress reduce stability in Structure and Action Coherence tending
towards conflict.
AFFECT
Contentment Joy Interest Discontent Distress Boredom
Col % Col % Col % Col % Col % Col %
Structure Change Whole to Subgroups 5.2% 7.5% 7.7% 10.9% 9.2% 19.5%
No Change 89.6% 85.2% 83.9% 78.1% 83.5% 73.7%
Subgroups to Whole 5.2% 7.4% 8.3% 11.0% 7.3% 6.8%
Cognitive Change Organised to Disorganised 1.9% 6.9% 6.7% 7.3% 6.4% 12.8%
No Change 93.5% 85.9% 85.9% 84.6% 89.0% 85.7%
Disorganised to Organised 4.5% 7.1% 7.2% 8.0% 4.6% 1.5%
Affect Change Pleasure to Unpleasure 1.9% 6.9% 6.7% 7.3% 6.4% 12.8%
No Change 93.5% 85.9% 85.9% 84.6% 89.0% 85.7%
Unpleasure to Pleasure 4.5% 7.1% 7.2% 8.0% 4.6% 1.5%
Action Change Cooperation to Conflict .6% 11.3% 7.5% 16.1% 18.3% 7.5%
No change 98.7% 77.2% 83.6% 73.8% 66.1% 85.7%
Conflict to Cooperation .6% 11.6% 8.8% 10.1% 15.6% 6.8%
Table 20.3. Percentage of stable minutes in each Affect category for all GFR
Dimensions.
minutes (10% and 8.1%), but reduces in Discord and Contracord for the observed
minute (14.4% and 22.4%). For Action Coherence, stability increases in Concord for
both minutes, (13.7% and 12.4%), but Discord has decreased stability in both minutes
(28.2% and 27.9%) and Contracord (12.6% and 7.8%).
ACTION COHERENCE
Concord Accord Discord Contracord
Col % Col % Col % Col %
Structure Change. Whole to Subgroups 5.5% 9.9% 9.0% 8.9%
No Change 89.9% 80.4% 80.4% 78.4%
Subgroups to Whole 4.5% 9.6% 10.6% 12.6%
Structure Change 1 Whole to Subgroups 4.7% 8.6% 10.8% 14.2%
minute after. No Change 90.4% 81.3% 81.7% 73.7%
Subgroups to Whole 4.9% 10.1% 7.5% 12.1%
Cognitive Change. Organised to Disorganised 1.4% 9.0% 9.8% 9.5%
No Change 91.6% 82.9% 85.4% 84.2%
Disorganised to Organised 7.0% 8.1% 4.8% 6.3%
Cognitive Change 1 Organised to Disorganised 7.2% 6.4% 5.0% 7.4%
minute after. No Change 91.6% 83.9% 85.1% 82.6%
Disorganised to Organised 1.2% 9.7% 9.9% 10.0%
Affect Change. Pleasure to Unpleasure 2.2% 5.4% 22.4% 29.5%
No Change 93.5% 84.0% 69.1% 61.1%
Unpleasure to Pleasure 4.3% 10.5% 8.5% 9.5%
Affect Change 1 Pleasure to Unpleasure 7.2% 6.4% 5.0% 7.4%
minute after. No Change 91.6% 83.9% 85.1% 82.6%
Unpleasure to Pleasure 1.2% 9.7% 9.9% 10.0%
Action Change. Cooperation to Conflict 47.2% 31.6%
No Change 94.7% 84.1% 52.8% 68.4%
Conflict to Cooperation 5.3% 15.9%
Action Change 1 Cooperation to Conflict 6.6% 15.2%
minute after. No Change 93.4% 84.8% 53.1% 73.2%
Conflict to Cooperation 46.9% 26.8%
3.2.3. Trends in Condensed States for Affect and Action Coherence. Changes
for conflict in the minute after Condensed States’ occurrence are explored over a three-
minute period. Percentages of Condensed States for each minute after the rating were
computed and compared. Where there was a consistent trend for these values to
increase or decrease in each of the three minutes, the value of the third minute was
subtracted from the first and expressed as a percentage of change from the highest
figure. It was positive if it was an increase and negative if it was a decrease. This value
is a numerical indication of the trend for that Condensed State to change following the
Affect or Action Coherence category concerned, indicating the dynamic properties of
Affect and Action Coherence categories and their effect on the direction of the group
process. No clear trend is indicated by the sign “~” and unchanged values are indicated
by “=”. Computations are given for Affect#2 and Action Coherence separately in
Tables 20.5 and 20.6.
3.2.3a. Affect. Joy shows no consistent trend for Functional or Sociable states,
but increase for Unsociable states. There is a modest decrease in Interest for Functional
and Sociable states and increases in all Unsociable states. The greatest increase is for
Unhappy Cooperation. Increases are evident for Discontent in Functional and Sociable
states and decreases in Unsociable states except for Happy Conflict which is
inconsistent. There are increases in Distress for Sociable and Limited Sociable and
decreases in Dysfunctional and Productive Turmoil, which is the opposite pattern to
Joy.
Joy Interest Discontent Distress
Functional ~ -8% +34% ~
Limited Functional ~ -10% +41% =
Sociable ~ -4% +20% +4%
Limited Sociable ~ -3% +20% +25%
Unhappy Cooperation +71% +26% -34% ~
Happy Conflict +18% +7% ~ ~
Productive Turmoil +36% +19% -26% -29%
Dysfunctional +18% +14% -17% -30%
Nominal +7% +7% +7% ~
Table 20.5. Percentage of change in Condensed States from Affect#2 categories over
three minutes.
unpleasurable Affect is associated with the opposite trends, except Distress does not
have trends for Functional or some Unsociable states.
3.2.3b. Action Coherence. Similar trends as for affective states are evident for
action in Table 20.6. Cooperative action categories are associated in the following three
minutes with decreased Functional and Sociable states and increased Unsociable states;
conflictual categories are associated with increased Functional and Sociable states
(except for Contracord) and decreased Unsociable states. Aggression in Contracord
initiates movement away from Productive Turmoil and Dysfunctional towards more
constructive states.
Condensed States show Affect and Action Coherence categories have a tendency
to change towards the opposite pole of the Dimension. These results extend findings for
hypothesis 2.2. Instead of general instability, both Affect and Action Coherence initiate
trends towards the other pole of group states creating a cyclical group process.
These results throw light on groups’ development of homeostatic regulation.
Each Affect category is associated with a tendency to change to the other states: Joy has
a strong tendency towards unpleasurable, conflictual states and away from pleasurable
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cooperative states. Interest has less consistent trends to decrease constructive states, but
stronger tendencies towards Unsociable states. However, Discontent and Distress tend
toward constructive pleasurable states and reduced Unsociable states. In Action
Coherence, the same pattern is evident. The more conflictual the category is, the
stronger the compensatory tendency, indicating stabilizing, self-structuring group
process, essential for preserving social life (Turner 1988).
3.2.3c. Group Differences. If groups differed in extent and pattern of these
processes, it would suggest they indicate therapeutic progress. Groups were compared
for these relationships over the year. In Appendix 3, Tables 20A.1 – 20A.5 show
considerable variation of change in Condensed States in the three minutes following
Affect and Action Coherence categories. Although there are consistent patterns for all
groups, they differ from each other. The 1988 group shows the most comprehensive
changes, but there are inconsistencies with positive changes for Joy and Accord. The
1990 group has fewer changes overall, but similar inconsistencies. The 1992 and 1993
groups differ from each other in details with considerable variability, while 1996 has a
higher degree of stability. The pooling of data shows the overall trends, but specific
groups are less likely to show them clearly.
Summary 3.2. Unpleasure and Conflict are likely to increase group instability
in Structure, Affect and Action; however, there is a more general trend for Affect and
Action Coherence states to be associated with a trend towards their opposite as
expressed by changes in Condensed States over three minutes.
Table 20.7. Action rating at Affect Change, 10 minutes before and 5 minutes after for
all groups.
to pleasure. The frequency of conflictual Action Coherence states was compared with
Affect change or stability for the ten preceding minutes and following five minutes.
Hypothesis 3.3 predicts increased conflict for Action in minutes preceding Affect
change.
Table 20.7 shows the frequencies of conflict and cooperation for affective
change or stability in the same minute, preceding 10 and subsequent five minutes. The
first and last five minutes of each session were excluded to avoid overlapping across
sessions. The figures for the row “Action Rating at Affect Change” are frequencies of
cooperative or conflictual Action Coherence ratings in all minutes in which there is
negative, positive and no Affect change. Most of the unchanged Affect is Cooperation
(3518 or 69.9%) and Conflict (719 or 14.3%). Change accounts only for 15.8%.
Table 20.8. Mean percentage of cooperation and conflict minutes of the 10 minutes
before, minute of negative Affect change and 5 minutes after.
Expressed as percentages, the range for conflict for the 10 minutes before Affect
change is 25-33%, and 37-40% for the 5 minutes after the change. They are compared
in Table 20.8 by expressing the average of pre- and post-change frequencies for
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cooperation and conflict as percentages, and comparing them with the percentage for
the minute of change. A massive change in action in the minute of change is indicated.
Table 20.9. Mean percentage of cooperation and conflict minutes of the 10 minutes
before, minute of positive Affect change and 5 minutes after.
Mean percentages are given in Table 20.9 for the preceding 10 minutes, the
minute of change and the 5 minutes after. There is little difference for the mean
percentage for the preceding minutes and the change, but there is an increase of the
mean by 10% for conflict after the change. However, if the penultimate minute pre-
change is excluded, mean percentages are 68% cooperation and 32% conflict, showing a
change toward conflict in the penultimate minute, reversed for positive Affect change.
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Summary 3.3.1c: Conflict and cooperation proportions alter little when there is
no Affect change.
3.3.1d. Graph of Affect changes. Figure 20.1 shows the data in graph form.
The rhythmic nature of the values is evident with a symmetrical relationship between
cooperation and conflict values.
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3.3.1e. Cooperation Quotients for Affect changes. The figures can be more
efficiently described by forming a single figure by dividing the cooperation value by the
conflict value to express the proportion of cooperation in relation to negative, positive
and no Affect change. This is called the “Cooperation Quotient” (CQ). The higher this
figure is, the greater the proportion of cooperation over conflict. CQ’s for figures in
Table 20.7 are given in Table 20.10.
Relatively consistent values occur before Affect change. At the change, the CQ
decreases indicating negative Affect change is associated with increased conflict with
and this continues for five minutes. Positive Affect change is associated with lower CQ
in the previous minute and a four-fold increase at the change, returning to the values in
minute 2 pre-change. Unchanged Affect is associated with a small increase in
cooperativeness in the preceding and the observed minute.
270
The groups were examined for consistency with these findings. Table 20.11
shows proportions of cooperative and conflictual ratings in each group. Each group has
different values and pattern over the period. All show significant reduction in CQ.
Unpleasurable Affect change is associated with increased conflict ratings, persisting for
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five minutes after the change. The 1996 group is more erratic, ranging from values of 6
to 34 before the change, stabilizing between 2.9 and 4.8 afterwards. The difference in
values between adolescent and latency groups suggests a higher proportion of
conflictual ratings for the Latency (1990) group, but a similar pattern. These figures are
graphed in Figure 20.2, showing the similarity of pattern in the CQ over the time period.
The discrepancy for 1996 suggests different patterns may occur in other groups.
7
Proportion of Cooperative/Conflictual Ratings
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3.3.1f. Controlling for overlapping data. The figures above were selected from
within sessions. If two or more minutes showed Affect change within ten minutes, they
would be counted several times in the tables shown above. A designated minute might
be one minute before Affect change at minute x, but three minutes before another Affect
272
change in minute y, and five minutes before another Affect change in minute z. The
results may be an artifact of not discriminating these minutes.
To control for this, the data pool was split to differentiate Adolescent groups
from Latency. Then only minutes with negative Affect change, but without change in
the preceding three minutes were selected. Significant differences would be evident
within three minutes before or after the change. The proportion of cooperation to
conflictual minutes showing positive and negative Affect change was computed. These
are shown for all adolescent and the latency groups in Tables 20A.7 – 20A.8 in
Appendix 3. The same patterns were found, confirming the findings are valid in spite of
the overlap in pooling data.
3.3.2. Comparison of Affect change with other GFR Dimensions. Tables 20.12 –
20.14 show combinations among Structure, Cognitive Organization, Affect and Action
Coherence showing proportions of positive and negative ratings for five minutes on
either side of the change in the dimension examined.
Negative change as the most variable function provided the basis for comparison.
Action Coherence and Affect are the only Dimensions with a difference between the
values in the minute of change, the preceding and subsequent five minutes. All others
show no appreciable effect.
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Summary 3.3: Action changes tend to coincide with Affect changes, last
for one minute and return to the previous state. This correspondence is absent from
other GFR Dimensions.
negative features of the crises or intervening periods may enable them to be managed.
H3.4.1. The group’s function will alter before and after the appearance
of specific crisis categories or combinations.
3.4.1. Crisis Events within Sessions. Destructive crises were defined as states
involving high, unpleasurable Affect (Distress) and aggression (Contracord). As shown
in Table 20.15, crises for all groups occur within five periods separated by at least 3
sessions without crises (although gaps in the data influence these findings). Crises
occur in each quartile, but each group has its own pattern. They tend to be later in
quartile 1, in the middle of quartile 2 and earlier in the last two quartiles. The 1992
group continued longer so there were later events.
Table 20.15. Number of Sessions for each group in which destructive crisis events
occur, compared by quartiles.
Summary 3.4.1: Crises occur throughout the year, but in distinct periods within
quartiles.
Table 20.16. Percentage of Structure #2 categories for 5 and 1 minutes before and in
Distress crises for all groups.
Percentages of GFR categories for five and one minutes preceding and at
Distress crises are shown in Tables 20.16 – 20.19 to examine this hypothesis. Structure
categories in Table 20.16 remain relatively constant approaching Distress incidents;
66% of Distress events occur in Whole, which increases slightly from the preceding five
minutes. Distress is more likely to occur in Whole Structure.
Percentages of Cognitive Organization categories approaching and at Distress
crises are shown in Table 20.17. The groups’ cognitive functioning is more likely to
become Unorganized in the preceding minute and Distress events are associated with
increased probability of Unorganized (55%), indicating it is more likely with a loss of
cognitive organization, although it occurs in all states.
are shown in Table 20.19. Action Coherence moves steadily into increasing conflict
with a sharp rise in aggression in the minute of the Distress event. Contracord doubles
in the preceding minute of Distress, showing that sometimes (21%), it precedes Distress
as suggested in Hypothesis 3.3.
Table 20.18. Percentage of Affect categories in 5 and 1 minutes before and in Distress
crises for all groups.
Table 20.19. Percentage of Action Coherence categories in 5 and 1 minutes before and
in Distress crises for all groups.
Summary 3.4.2a: Distress is more likely to occur when groups are in Whole
structure, deteriorating Cognitive Organization, any category of Affect and increasing
conflictual Action Coherence.
3.4.3. Contracord Crises. In the same way, characteristics of the group process
approaching Contracord crises were examined in Tables 20.20-20.23.
Table 20.20. In the preceding five minutes leading up to a Contracord event, there is a
slight trend towards increased Whole Structure. Five minutes before it is 57%, one
minute before it is 60% and in the minute of the crisis, it is 65%. Contracord is more
likely to occur in Whole but may occur in any Structure.
Table 20.20. Percentage of Structure #2 categories for 5 and 1 minutes before and in
Contracord crises for all groups.
Table 20.23. Percentage of Action Coherence categories in 5 and 1 minutes before and
in Contracord crises for all groups.
Summary 3.4.2b: Contracord crises may occur in any state, but are associated
with deteriorating Cognitive Organization, increasing unpleasurable states and may
occur over a period of minutes and be longer-lasting than Distress. Action Coherence
becomes increasingly conflictual until Contracord occurs.
3.4.4. Group Size and Absentees for Crises within Sessions. Size and absentees
of sessions in which crises occur are shown in Tables 20.24 and 20.25.
Crises are more likely in groups of four or more members when there are one or
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no absentees. In the sessions following these with destructive crises, there were fewer
members for 10 sessions, more members for 4 sessions, the same number of members
for 10 sessions and in 6 instances there are no records or it was the last session of the
year. There is a 30% risk some members will not attend following a destructive crisis.
Summary 3.4.4: Crises occur more often in larger groups with one or no
absentees, and there is a 30% risk of members missing the next session.
3.4.5a. Session Quality. Graphs of the means of Condensed States for sessions
are shown for each group except 1996 (which had few crises) in Figures 20A.1 – 20A.4
in Appendix 3. The crisis sessions are by no means the least Functional; there are
sessions with high and low quality.
Summary 3.4.5a: Destructive rises may occur at any time and seem to be
associated with specific events rather than of session quality.
Table 20.26. The frequency and percentage of Condensed States in the five minutes
leading to crisis events.
Summary 3.4.6: Crises are most likely to occur within an Unsociable period
especially after Happy Conflict, but there is a 55% chance of there being constructive
states in the five minutes immediately before it.
in their occurrence may allow them to be anticipated and managed. Crisis sessions are
defined in two ways: (a) low quality indicated by low percentage of Constructive
Condensed States for the session and (b) the unstable Condensed States.
The percentage of Constructive Condensed States for each session (taken as the
percentage of minutes in which the group is in either Functional or Sociable states) and
stability of Condensed States (taken as the number of consecutive minutes the group
remains in the same Condensed State) are shown in Figure 20.3 for 1988. Quality
Crisis sessions are defined as those with more than 50% Unsociable states or more than
half the average of the data set. Stability Crisis sessions are defined as those with below
45% stability of Constructive Condensed States.
Figures 20A.9 – 20A.11 in Appendix 3 show graphs for three other groups.
Stable minutes show oscillation in synchrony with the percentage of Constructive states
although which is the lowest varies. Using the <45% criterion, stability crises overlap
but do not coincide with the quality crises and occur in sessions 4, 7, 11, 17, and 30.
There are such clearly defined fluctuations, that it is tempting to see trough sessions as
crises because of the relative change from previous sessions. In this case, sessions 9,
13, 19, 22 and 33 would need to be added.
YEAR: 1988
100
90
80
70
60
50
% Stable Mins
40 % Constructive
30 States
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33
SESSIONS
Quality crises occur in sessions 9, 11, 13, 17, 20, 29 and 31. Other troughs are
in sessions 4, 7, and 26. There is greater differentiation between these two dimensions
in the second half of the year, suggesting crises become modified by only occurring on
one dimension at a time. The crisis would be greater when Unsociable and unstable
together. Figures 20A.9 – 20A.11 in Appendix 3, demonstrate similar patterns occur for
all groups with individual variation.
Summary 3.5: Groups move through a series of crises that influence the
process, but their structure is complex and there are different types of crises.
Session Stability
Valid Cumulative
Percent Percent
Valid Trough 28.9 28.9
1 pre-trough 9.7 38.6
2 pre-trough 4.7 43.3
3 pre-trough 1.7 45.0
4 pre-trough .9 45.9
5 pre-trough .8 46.6
10 pre-trough .9 47.5
8 pre-peak .7 48.2
4 pre-peak .9 49.1
3 pre-peak .8 49.9
2 pre-peak 6.8 56.7
1 pre-peak 11.4 68.1
Peak 31.9 100.0
Total 100.0
Table 20.27. Percentage of sessions forming troughs, peaks and intermediate sessions
in stability cycles for all groups.
3.6.1. Session Stability. Table 20.27 shows the percentage of sessions forming
peaks, troughs or other positions for stability cycles. Peaks and troughs constitute 60.8%
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of the sample; including immediately preceding sessions, they form 81.9%. Two-thirds
of sessions involve a change of direction and over 80% of sessions are in cycles only
two sessions long. The percentage of GFR Dimension categories are shown for the
positions of sessions in stability cycles in Table 20.28. Structure varies by less than 2%.
This is surprising since it would be expected that stability troughs might show less
Whole than stability peaks.
For Cognitive Organization, the highest Representational is in troughs (19.3%)
while peaks have the lowest (10.4%). Peaks have the highest Systemic (43.6%), 1 pre-
trough has the highest Normative (33.8%) and 1 pre-peak has the highest Unorganized
percentage (26.1%).
Table 20.28. Percentage of GFR Dimension categories for peaks, troughs and
preceding sessions for stability cycles in all groups.
This suggests peak sessions are the end of a rising stability trend and the figures
show the culmination of a constructive process most active during the upward
trajectory, and the beginning of a reversal towards the other pole. The peak is not the
culmination of constructive group function, but the end of a process that will not
continue in the following session. The quality of peaks has the cause of the trajectory
change inherent in them. Perhaps the combination of low Representational and high
Systemic in peaks indicates groups become passive, less self-reflective and Systemic
organization provides the stability. If this continued, the group would stagnate;
therefore it destabilizes in the following session towards greater variety. The highest
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Summary 3.6.1: Troughs are the end of a trajectory of increasing instability and
the beginning of a stabilization trajectory. The close relationship between pre-troughs
and peaks indicates that after a peak the trajectory falls slightly in many instances and
then descends sharply to the trough. Hence, pre-trough sessions are closer to peaks than
troughs.
285
Quality peaks or troughs constitute 65.6% of sessions, and 82.8% with the
immediate preceding session. Only about 20 sessions (17%) out of 119 are not within
this 3-session quality cycle. Figures are similar to session stability.
Session Quality
Valid Cumulative
Percent Percent
Valid Trough 29.0 29.0
1 pre-trough 10.2 39.1
2 pre-trough 4.8 44.0
3 pre-trough 1.9 45.8
5 pre-trough .8 46.6
6 pre-trough 1.0 47.6
10 or more pre-peak 1.7 49.3
8 pre-peak .7 50.1
7 pre-peak .7 50.8
6 pre-peak .7 51.5
2 pre-peak 5.0 56.4
1 pre-peak 7.0 63.4
Peak 36.6 100.0
Total 100.0
Table 20.29. Percentage of sessions forming troughs, peaks and intermediate sessions
in quality cycles for all groups.
In Table 20.30, percentages of GFR Dimension Categories are shown for quality
cycles. In Structure, the lowest proportion of Whole is in troughs (54.5%), the highest
in pre-trough (68.6%). This is similar to peaks and repeats the pattern found in stability
cycles that pre-troughs are closer to peaks than troughs, suggesting they are better
considered as “post-troughs.” The higher proportion in pre-troughs indicates groups are
most likely to be whole just before a trough when they are least likely to be whole.
In Cognitive Organization, groups are most likely to be in Representational in
pre-troughs or peaks (18% or 17%) and least in troughs (13%). The highest Systemic is
in peaks (42.8%) and lowest in troughs and pre-troughs (27% and 29%). Peaks have the
lowest proportion of Normative and Unorganized (26% and 14%). Highest Normative
286
is in pre-peak (32%) and Unorganized in troughs (29%). Groups are most likely to be
in Systemic or Representational in quality peaks, but equally likely to be in
Representational before a quality trough or after a peak. For Cognitive Organization,
troughs are indicated by higher Normative and Unorganized. The highest quality is
determined by Systemic and Representational. High Systemic leads to peaks, but
Representational continues high after the peak. Peaks are closer to the subsequent
session than the preceding. Troughs have the highest Unorganized, and the same
proportion of Normative with pre-peaks (post-troughs). They are better understood as
post-peaks instead of pre-troughs, emphasizing peaks and troughs as changes of
trajectory having greater affiliation with later sessions than the preceding.
Table 20.30. Percentage of GFR Dimension Categories for peaks, troughs and
preceding sessions for session quality cycles in all groups.
For Affect, highest Joy is in pre-trough (21%) followed by pre-peak (18%). Joy
is significantly higher in peaks (17.5%) than troughs (13.2%), indicating that although
Joy is unstable, it is more likely to occur in high quality sessions. Highest Interest is in
pre-trough (69.6%) although is equally likely in all types of sessions. Lowest
proportions of unpleasure are in pre-troughs (9.4%). Although Discontent is highest in
troughs (19.3%) as expected, Distress is higher in peak and pre-peak (2%). This
appears contradictory, but session quality is the percentage of Functional and Sociable
287
Condensed States.
In those sessions where the greatest proportion of time is in constructive states, a
significant amount of time is spent in unpleasure. In high quality states, Affect is more
likely to be mixed than Cognitive Organization. However, it supports peaks as being
the beginning of a change of trajectory with Distress indicating increased unpleasure.
Pre-troughs (or post-peaks) have highest pleasure and troughs lowest, again indicating
change in trajectory.
For Action Coherence, highest Concord is in pre-troughs (43.2%) followed by
troughs (30.4%). Accord is highest in pre-peak (57.2%), followed by troughs (50.7%).
The highest conflict categories are in peaks (20.2% and 4.5%). This seems to contradict
them as high quality sessions until the measure of percentage of constructive minutes is
remembered. The figures indicate sessions with high Functional or Sociable also have
high conflict. Groups are more liable to conflict in their highest quality than in the other
states. Quality peaks contain the basis of reduction in quality and change in the
trajectory. The lowest conflict is in pre-troughs (post-peaks) suggesting they change
trajectory from peaks.
Session Quartiles
1st 2nd 3rd 4th
Affect Joy 13% 15% 16% 20%
#2
Interest 70% 68% 66% 60%
Discontent 16% 15% 15% 17%
Distress 1% 2% 3% 3%
Action Concord 23% 32% 37% 29%
Coherence Accord 62% 48% 39% 42%
Discord 14% 18% 19% 23%
Contracord 1% 2% 5% 5%
Table 20.31. Percentage of Affect and Action Coherence categories for session
quartiles for all groups.
Session lengths vary and quartiles are calculated so variability falls in the third
quartile making it a larger than the others, but retaining the integrity of the first and last
quartiles. Joy increases to quartile 4, while Interest falls. Discontent remains relatively
stable, but comparatively, Distress becomes more frequent in the second half.
Dynamics resulting in Distress take time to develop and tend to increase throughout the
session.
Concord is more frequent in quartile 3 and Accord decreases in quartiles 1-3,
increasing again in quartile 4. Discord and Contracord increase in each quartile,
suggesting that conflict increases with time, which has been found in other contexts and
will be shown in relation to Therapists’ Interventions.
Summary 3.7: The hypothesis is not supported. Crises are more likely to occur
in the second half of sessions with Contracord in quartile 4.
289
YEAR
1988 1990 1992 1993 1996
Therapist Interventions Group Intervention Subtable % 10.4% 9.8% 8.4% 7.0% 7.1%
Member Interventn Subtable % 38.9% 39.4% 59.0% 48.6% 59.7%
Group & Member Int Subtable % 13.9% 18.3% 14.1% 31.1% 13.0%
No Intervention Subtable % 36.9% 32.5% 18.5% 13.3% 20.2%
Limits by set Therapists No Limit Subtable % 89.0% 75.1% 80.4% 69.4% 94.9%
Limit set Subtable % 11.0% 24.9% 19.6% 30.6% 5.1%
Locomotion by No Locomotion Subtable % 90.9% 58.1% 82.6% 61.9% 98.5%
Therapists Locomotion Subtable % 9.1% 41.9% 17.4% 38.1% 1.5%
Table 21.1. Percentage of Therapists’ Intervention, Limits, and Locomotion for each
group.
throughout the minute, whereas group function Dimensions are rated from a 15 or 30
second sample of the minute; hence, the relationship between group state and
intervention is unclear. The data are therefore “noisy,” obscuring and reducing
significant relationships to small percentages. Trends are described, assuming they
point to effects that would be larger and more significant with a more sensitive rating
system.
YEAR
1988 1990 1992 1993 1996
Year 1 Therapist Group Intervention Subtable % 9.5% 6.0% 10.1% 7.8% 4.3%
Quartiles Interventions Member Interventn Subtable % 35.3% 46.1% 50.0% 53.2% 69.6%
Group & Member Int Subtable % 22.5% 7.9% 17.5% 23.4% 11.3%
No Intervention Subtable % 32.7% 40.1% 22.4% 15.6% 14.8%
Limits by set No Limit Subtable % 87.4% 86.7% 78.7% 64.5% 91.1%
Therapists Limit set Subtable % 12.6% 13.3% 21.3% 35.5% 8.9%
Locomotion No Locomotion Subtable % 89.0% 65.3% 82.5% 64.1% 99.2%
by Therapists Locomotion Subtable % 11.0% 34.7% 17.5% 35.9% .8%
2 Therapist Group Intervention Subtable % 11.7% 10.2% 8.7% 16.7% 11.1%
Interventions Member Interventn Subtable % 36.9% 30.5% 61.2% 46.7% 54.7%
Group & Member Int Subtable % 15.0% 8.8% 14.0% 27.8% 14.7%
No Intervention Subtable % 36.4% 50.5% 16.1% 8.9% 19.5%
Limits by set No Limit Subtable % 80.9% 89.5% 71.7% 82.2% 95.8%
Therapists Limit set Subtable % 19.1% 10.5% 28.3% 17.8% 4.2%
Locomotion No Locomotion Subtable % 81.8% 69.8% 79.2% 65.6% 98.0%
by Therapists Locomotion Subtable % 18.2% 30.2% 20.8% 34.4% 2.0%
3 Therapist Group Intervention Subtable % 13.5% 13.0% 6.9% 5.9% 6.5%
Interventions Member Interventn Subtable % 39.5% 35.8% 60.6% 54.0% 78.3%
Group & Member Int Subtable % 10.2% 25.9% 14.8% 32.7% 13.0%
No Intervention Subtable % 36.8% 25.4% 17.7% 7.4% 2.2%
Limits by set No Limit Subtable % 93.5% 63.2% 71.5% 73.5% 100.0%
Therapists Limit set Subtable % 6.5% 36.8% 28.5% 26.5%
Locomotion No Locomotion Subtable % 95.3% 46.6% 70.4% 55.5% 100.0%
by Therapists Locomotion Subtable % 4.7% 53.4% 29.6% 44.5%
4 Therapist Group Intervention Subtable % 7.2% 10.0% 8.3% 3.8% 4.9%
Interventions Member Interventn Subtable % 43.4% 44.2% 61.1% 38.6% 50.5%
Group & Member Int Subtable % 8.4% 29.8% 12.2% 38.1% 12.6%
No Intervention Subtable % 41.1% 16.0% 18.3% 19.5% 32.0%
Limits by set No Limit Subtable % 93.8% 63.0% 90.2% 64.4% 97.1%
Therapists Limit set Subtable % 6.2% 37.0% 9.8% 35.6% 2.9%
Locomotion No Locomotion Subtable % 97.1% 53.0% 90.3% 65.7% 98.1%
by Therapists Locomotion Subtable % 2.9% 47.0% 9.7% 34.3% 1.9%
Table 21.2. Quartile percentages for Therapists’ Intervention, Limits, and locomotion
for each year.
The percentage of categories for each GFR Dimension was computed for each
type of intervention for the minute before, minute of intervention and following three
minutes for all groups. They are shown in Tables 21.3 – 21.6. The percentage for each
minute was compared with the preceding minute to show changes in distribution.
291
H4.1. Group Interventions will lead to higher GFR categories in the succeeding
minutes.
Change in Dimensions for Therapists Interventions were examined for the five-
minutes described.
Structure:
Group Interventions shift from Whole to Subgroup+Individuals by 2% in the
intervention minute, then a drift of 1% in the next two minutes is reversed by 1% in
292
Table 21.3. Percentage of Structure categories for all groups from one minute before
“LAGS(STRUCTUR,1)” to three minutes after Therapists’ Interventions
“LEADS(STRUCTUR,1-3).”
Cognitive Organization:
For Group Interventions, Representational and Systemic move 1% to Normative
and Unorganized in the intervention minute; in minute 1 after, 1% of Normative
changes to Unorganized; in minute 2, 1% from Representational to Systemic, then in
minute 3, 1% from Unorganized to Representational. Group Interventions produce a
drift to lower Cognitive Organization in the first two minutes, but in the third, delayed
self-reflection emerges.
Table 21.4. Percentage of Cognitive Organization categories for all groups from one
minute before, “LAGS(COGNORG,1)” to three minutes after Therapists’ Interventions,
“LEADS(COGNORG,1-3).”
cognitively disorganizing for the group, constructive effects follow a minute later.
Group and Member Interventions split in the intervention minute with 1%
change from Systemic to Representational and 2% from Normative to Unorganized. In
minute 1 after, there is 1% reversal from Unorganized to Normative and Systemic; in
minute 2, a further 2% from Unorganized to the higher categories. This drift continues
in minute 3 with 1% change from Unorganized and Representational to Systemic and
Normative. Computations for the next two minutes showed it remains stable in minute
4 and then Unorganized increases again in minute 5. If the group can cognitively
integrate the intervention, it provokes self-reflection; if not, it increases Unorganized in
the intervention minute; then there is a drift to higher organization for three minutes,
Group and Member Interventions are stressful when groups are poorly organized.
No Intervention shows 3% move to Systemic from the other categories in the
minute of consideration. In minute 1 after, 2% reverses from Systemic to Normative,
reversed in minute 2 towards Representational and Unorganized and continues in
minute 3. Not intervening is associated with groups organizing themselves in Systemic,
then organization deteriorating over three minutes.
Group Interventions reduce organization for several minutes, with delayed self-
reflection. Member Interventions initially lower organization, then groups oscillate
between Systemic and Normative, similar to No Intervention, indicating Member
Interventions, being directed to individuals, have negligible effect on group Cognitive
Organization. The most stable organizations are Systemic and Normative; oscillation
between these is the most likely natural state. However, Group and Member
Interventions increase organization over three minutes, producing different effects to
either alone. Cognitive Organization is sensitive to interventions. Changes persist, but
do not necessarily return to the previous state. Constructive consequences only emerge
after three minutes. Interventions may work for several minutes before further
intervention is required. Too frequent interventions may cause confusion since groups
cannot assimilate them, but need several minutes to cognitively “process” them.
Affect:
Group Interventions in the intervention minute stabilize Joy and Discontent
towards Interest by 3%. In minute 1 after, this is partially reversed with 1% change to
Joy and Boredom; it then oscillates for two minutes. Group Interventions stabilize
295
Table 21.5. Percentage of Affect categories for all groups from one minute before,
“LAGS(AFFECT,1)” to three minutes after Therapists’ Interventions,
“LEADS(AFFECT,1-3).”
296
Action Coherence:
Table 21.6 shows the proportions of Action Coherence categories for Therapists
Interventions for five minutes after the interventions.
Group Interventions in the intervention minute show conflict reduced 3% and
cooperation increased, which oscillate for two minutes. Group Interventions improve
cooperation, which then oscillates with conflict.
Member Interventions in the intervention minute show 1% Concord move to
Accord, reversed in minute 1 after, then Discord moves 1% to Accord in minute 2,
reversing in 3, and increasing Concord. This remains stable to minute 5. Member
Interventions break the unanimity of Concord, but increase it for the next five minutes,
while Accord and Discord oscillate.
Group and Member Interventions show 3% increased Discord from cooperative
categories in the intervention minute, reversing in minute 1 after, and maintained for
three minutes. Discord decreased 8% in total from the intervention minute to minute 3
after, while Concord and Accord increase by 4% each. Group and Member
Interventions have a lasting effect increasing cooperation.
No Intervention shows increased Concord from Accord and Discord in the
minute of consideration, then a persisting trend for Concord to reduce and Discord to
increase by 5% over three minutes. No Intervention shows a drift towards increased
Discord and decreased Concord for three minutes.
297
Table 21.6. Percentage of Action Coherence categories for all groups from one minute
before, “LAGS(ACTION,1)” to five minutes after Therapists’ Interventions,
“LEADS(ACTION,1-5).”
initial effect and then oscillate, suggests it is the most elastic but least sensitive
dimension. Therapists need to constantly attend to it and expect interventions to have
only a minute’s effect.
Characteristics of Interventions.
Generalizations about effects of interventions are also suggested.
Group Interventions have a pronounced effect, increasing lower categories
immediately, except for Action Coherence. For Structure, Cognitive Organization and
Affect the full benefit does not occur for about three minutes. Properly timed Group
Interventions are powerful agents of change, but demanding and temporarily
disorganizing; benefits require several minutes to emerge, and may need time to work
before being repeated.
Member Interventions have no initial effect on Structure or Affect, and only
slight perturbation of the natural background variation in Cognitive Organization and
Action Coherence. Member Interventions alone are ineffective in changing groups.
Group and Member Interventions are most effective, differing from either alone.
For Structure and Cognitive Organization, higher categories are immediately increased,
but Affect and Action Coherence respond to unpleasure and conflict, reversing them in
the following minute. There is less oscillation after the initial change than with other
interventions and more stable effects over three minutes. It is the most powerful
intervention (Battegay, 1999), but should be allowed to work over several minutes.
No Intervention allows the background “Brownian movement” of dimensions to
be glimpsed. Structure is most stable, tending not to change in the short term.
Cognitive Organization oscillates slowly between Systemic and Normative. Affect is
the least stable, oscillating rapidly between Interest and Discontent, while Action
Coherence drifts towards Discord. Cognitive Organization and Affect may have self-
correcting tendencies; Structure has inertia and may need intervention to change it, but
Action Coherence needs constant attention to avoid drifting into conflict.
299
Structure: There is little effect on Structure indicating Limits are not set because
of Structural change. In the minute after the Limit, there is a 1% change from
Subgroups to Whole, which ceases in minute 2.
Cognitive Organization: There is 8% increase in Unorganized at the expense of
other categories in the minute of Limit, indicating conditions provoking Limits. The
following three minutes drift towards higher organization. Representational and
Normative increase by 3% in minute 1, Systemic by 1% in minute 2 and Normative by
2% in minute 3. Groups increase self-reflection following Limits, and Unorganized
states tend towards Normative. Limits improve Cognitive Organization reducing
Unorganized by 9% for up to three minutes.
Affect: Unpleasurable states increase by 4% with Limits, indicating the
situation requiring them. In minute 1 post-Limit, Affect is stabilized by reducing Joy
and Distress, and also increasing Interest and Discontent by 2%. In minute 2, Joy and
Discontent reduce, while Interest increases by 2%, another 2% in minute 3 makes an
increase of 6% in Interest. Limits stabilize Affect towards pleasure for up to three
minutes.
Action Coherence: The situation requiring Limits shows 7% increased Discord
300
and Contracord. In minute 1 post-Limit, Accord increases 4%, with conflict reducing.
In the next two minutes, a drift to cooperation is shown by reduced Contracord of 3%
and Discord of 6%. Limits reduce conflict for up to three minutes.
These findings are also summarized in Table 21.7.
Summary 4.2: Limits have a negligible effect on Structure, but produce higher
Cognitive Organization, stabilize Affect, reduce Unpleasure and Conflict, persisting for
up to three minutes.
Locomotion occurs when therapists move around the room. They may set
Limits, assist members cleaning up and other activities or move towards members
anticipating conflict. The incidence of Locomotion for all groups is 20.8%. Its effects
on GFR Dimensions are shown in Appendix 3 in Tables 21A.5 – 21A.8. They are
summarized below.
Locomotion by Therapists
No
Locomotion Locomotion
Limits by set Therapists No Limit Table % 73.2% 9.0%
Limit set Table % 5.9% 11.9%
Table 21.8. Percentage of coincidence of Limits and Locomotion for all groups.
Limits by set
Locomotion by Therapists Therapists
No No Limit
Locomotion Locomotion Limit set
Therapist Group Intervention Layer % 7.0% 2.0% 7.4% 1.6%
Interventions Member Interventn Layer % 37.2% 10.3% 38.1% 9.5%
Group & Member Int Layer % 10.5% 6.5% 10.8% 6.2%
No Intervention Layer % 24.4% 2.1% 26.0% .5%
In Part IV, the results are discussed in four sections. In Chapter 22, their
implications for the Group Function Record are discussed and the usefulness of the
dimensions evaluated. Then findings for hypotheses are discussed in Chapter 23,
followed by a discussion of implications for developmental phases in Chapter 24. The
findings’ implications for the theoretical background are discussed in Chapter 25.
Finally, further research is considered in Chapter 26. However, before this, a synopsis
of the results is provided.
Synopsis of Results.
Groups were found to function rhythmically on all parameters with a wavelength
of 2-3 sessions and less regularly within sessions, supporting their organic nature.
Instead of a regression towards the mean, peak and trough sessions demonstrated a
tendency towards starting the new trajectory rather than fulfilling the preceding one,
suggesting change is an inherent property of extreme states. The higher the
functionality of a state, the more likely it is followed by more dysfunctional states in the
next few minutes and vice versa. Like organic homeostatic functions, stability is
preserved by rhythmic alternation between limits. Instability is proportional to group
size; one or two absentees tend to increase stability; more threaten group survival and
decrease stability.
Although clinically most members progressed well, increase in frequency of
therapeutic goal states is relatively small over the year. They tend to occur in resolving
dysfunctional states, allowing the group to resume enjoyable sociable activity and
demonstrate regulatory functions. Changes in how states are managed are qualitative.
Self-representation occurring briefly after each conflict enables problems to be resolved
preserving the group. Learning to manage the pleasurable stimulus of social life means
encouraging Whole states while allowing Whole-Subgroup rhythms until sufficient
Systemic organization has developed. The greater the size, the more demanding is the
group. An eight-phase developmental process was demonstrated in changes of the
relative proportions of Functional, Sociable and Unsociable states over the year.
Structure is a stable dimension, with groups tending to oscillate slowly between
Whole and Subgroups. Therapeutic goal states are most likely in Whole, which is most
demanding and least stable. While more stable, Subgroups is less 308
constructive, representing avoidance. Moving to Subgroups resolves conflict when
effective common rules are lacking; when they are present, conflict tends to be resolved
within Whole. The Whole/Subgroup rhythm assists in regulating groups; as they
become more stable, groups creatively use Whole states. Group Interventions increase
the likelihood of Subgroups; Group and Member Interventions increase Whole.
Cognitive Organization oscillates between Systemic rules and non-systemic
organization (Normative or Unorganised). It is easier for smaller groups to achieve
higher organization, especially Representational. The homeostatic regulatory
mechanism comprises any shared system of rules; those of a game or conversation
regulate tensions as effectively as social rules. Norms can also achieve this if they form
a comprehensive “corpus” governing behaviour. Systemic rules manage affect, but
deteriorating Cognitive Organization (from Systemic to Normative or Unorganised) is
associated with increasing unpleasure, conflict and interactional crises threatening the
group. Observing Cognitive Organization enables therapists to anticipate changes in
both Affect and Action Coherence. Therapists Interventions act like organizational
factors and Limits act as auxiliary rules.
Affect is the least stable dimension, oscillating between pleasure and unpleasure
from one minute to another. Unpleasurable states destabilize Structure and Action
Coherence. Action Coherence change anticipates Affect change when groups are in
Normative or Unorganised states and therapists following affective cues will lag behind
the process. However, when groups are in Systemic organization with rules containing
the process, unpleasurable Affect can be expressed before conflict breaks out. Groups
recover from Affect crises within a minute or two. This does not seem to depend on
Therapists Interventions, though they help. Dysfunctional states tend towards pleasure
in succeeding minutes; while high functional states tend towards unpleasure.
Therapists’ Interventions briefly stabilize Affect.
Action Coherence tends to drift towards increasing probability of conflict with
time. Therapists Interventions tend to reverse this; constant interventions are required
to maintain cooperation. Conflict is particularly likely in Representational, but constant
in all Structures and other levels of Cognitive Organization. It is proportional to size,
larger groups showing more conflict. Conflict is resolved by a mutually accepted system
of rules that provide guidelines for resolution of actions. Unsociable states tend towards
cooperation, Functional states toward conflict in the next few minutes. 309
Aggressive crises occur when Cognitive Organization deteriorates, impairing rules,
loosening the regulating system holding action in a common frame. Systemic rules
organize the numerous possible relationships into a single prescribed set. The most
powerful means of therapists intervening is by verbal representation of Action
Coherence states and their consequences.
Therapists’ Interventions have a different “half life” for each dimension.
Although any intervention may work, Group Interventions tend to last 1-2 minutes and
encourage lower Structure and Cognitive Organization unless the group has good
organization. They temporarily stabilize Affect, increase cooperation and seem to
“pressure” the group and require the group to be in Systemic organization to be
interpreted. Group and Member Interventions tend to last for 2-5 minutes and produce
more sustained, uniformly constructive changes to Whole, higher Cognitive
Organization, stabilizing pleasure and lasting cooperation after a delay of 2 minutes.
Member Interventions have inconsistent effects, little different to No Intervention.
Limits and Locomotion increase the effect of other Interventions. Locomotion responds
to deteriorating organization or cooperation, and provides a stimulus to self-regulation.
22. DISCUSSION 1: THE GROUP FUNCTION RECORD. 310
Structure.
The structure of social communication (Sigman, 1987) is the primary
dimension determining relationships and units to be rated. The findings showed
Structure was the most reliable dimension and in defining the units to be rated, provided
a valuable means of analysing group phenomena. Structure is a stable dimension, slow
to react and changes tending to persist. A difference in phenomena was found between
whole and subgroups, but little difference between subgroup/individual categories.
Whole is the most creative structure. Subgroups are more stable, but less creative with
predominantly normative or unorganised Cognitive Organization. Systemic
organization, stable affect, unpleasure and conflict have constant proportions for all
structures. Cognitive Organization and high-energy pleasure are related to wholeness,
rather than size. Movement to subgroups helps groups leave whole unsociable
conflictual states and stabilise unpleasure. Conflict is as likely in subgroups as in
whole, but subgroups are more likely to change structure to avoid conflict and this
effect is stronger for larger groups.
Change in communication structure is an important self-regulating mechanism
in managing unsociable states, but may only be effective for some types of conflict
situations (see Chapter 23, Durkheim, 1964; Simmel, 1950; Northern, 1988). Conflict
produced in Systemic organization (such as rule-based games) is not resolved by
transition to subgroups, which would destroy the game, further destabilising the group.
However, where conflict concerns decisions in Normative or Unorganised situations,
structure change terminates the activity and source of conflict. Structural 311
change may successfully avoid conflict when group organization is deteriorating or
undeveloped; but within logical systems conflict can be resolved since common rules
provide the means of reconciling problems distinct from personal sentiments (Collett,
1977). Rules need to be implemented or they will be devalued and rendered obsolete
(Harré 1993). It can be concluded that movement to subgroups is likely to stop conflict
and unpleasure in deteriorating organization; but common rules resolve conflict within
systemic organization without structural change. Structural change is a self-regulating
mechanism in the absence of common rules or systems for conflict resolution
(Cartwright and Lippitt, 1976). Resolving conflict without breaking structure requires
an agreed rule system establishing what is common, with shared values by which
decisions can be made.
Structural change disrupts communication to solve problems (Bion, 1961;
Yalom, 1995). When communication is broken, the systemic organic nature of
communication (organic solidarity) is replaced by normative or unorganised interplay of
forces with a more mechanical quality (Durkheim’s, 1964 mechanical solidarity).
Subgrouping splits communication, replacing collective representations with specific
subgroup representations. For the group entity, collective representations become self-
representational, but splitting structure sets aside self-representations temporarily since
the whole is lost. It does not solve problems, which re-emerge in continuing tension as
the new structure settles down. Subgroups are more readily stressed by conflict.
Rhythmic structural restlessness therefore indicates groups’ failure to establish common
adherence to systemic organization and collective representations capable of self-
regulation.
The collective organism seems most self-reflective when whole; stabilisation in
subgroups is at the expense of self-representation (Kellerman, 1979). When individuals
split and repress conflicts from consciousness, loss of awareness follows. Structural
change in groups is likened to repression in individuals (Bion, 1961; Yalom, 1995).
Therapeutic: Technique should promote common systemic representations, placing
contending ideas within them; the logic of the system enables them to be
reconciled.
Cognitive Organization.
Cognitive Organization defines four degrees of collective organization of the
communication process to describe group cognitive function. It was the second most
reliable dimension. It tends to alternate between Systemic and Normative organization
before stabilising in Systemic. Normative and Unorganised organization are most likely
in subgroups, Representational most common in whole and Systemic is constant.
Representational is easier to attain in smaller groups, since integrating members into a
common cognitive unit becomes more complex as numbers increase (Napier and
Gershenfeld, 1989). It is unaffected by absentees.
The rule system of Systemic organization is associated with the greatest stable,
pleasurable affect, followed by Representational, then Normative, with Unorganised
having the least. Self-representations challenge group function, while normative or
unorganised groups disorganise easily and lose homeostasis. Systemically organised
rules that manage social and psychic energies constitute social organisms’ self-
regulating homeostatic system (Anzieu, 1984). However, only members’ commitment
to rules makes them work (Harré 1993). Rules are collective representations of group
identity and safeguard members’ mutually acknowledged need for the group
(Durkheim, 1964). The power of rules belongs to the whole group, not the influence of
particular members or therapists; they make all members equal and related to each other
and apply to whatever happens (Wittgenstein 1953; Werhane, 1992). They are an
impersonal representation of the group entity, since they cannot belong to any member,
only to the whole (Durkheim, 1964; Collett, 77; Harré 1993). Groups need to be
encouraged to make rules into a system of collective representations.
Technique: Self-regulation involves a system of rules to organise members. Their
condition for success is not their orientation towards psychological issues, but
their common acceptance and expression of the group’s reason for existing.
Therapists must articulate and promote these themes in discussion and avoid the
impression they impose rules on the group.
Affect.
The GFR defines Affect as the collective energy states of the communication
process. It was the least reliable of the four group dimensions, being rated from a
shorter time interval. Affect is inherently highly reactive, tending to oscillate between
pleasure and unpleasure without stabilizing (Bion, 1961; Ettin, 1999). The larger the
group, the more unstable affect is, though the proportions of pleasure to unpleasure
remain constant regardless of size or structure. One or two absentees stabilize affect,
but more destabilize and threaten the group. Affect does not alter Cognitive
Organization, but most stable affect occurs in systemic organization. Unpleasure is
most likely to cause instability in structure and action. Cooperation in 316
common goals tends to stabilize the current affective state. Affective instability seems
to resolve into rhythmic fluctuations (Bion, 1961; Ettin, 1999). Unsociable groups are
more likely to move towards pleasure and Sociable groups towards unpleasure. Affect
and action form a functional pair of dimensions, with change in one reflecting change in
the other. Their rhythms determined the fundamental dynamic of all groups studied.
However, the rhythmic instability also means affective crises are often short and self-
correcting.
Any affective state may precede crises of distress, which are more likely in whole
structure, deteriorating organization and conflict. Deteriorating organization seems the
important indicator, since affect destabilises when the regulating system breaks down,
provoking crises. However, the stimulus for the crisis often comes from action since what
is done evokes affects. Although not shown in ratings, it appears deteriorating
organization fails to regulate action, causing conflict to erupt and stimulate distress.
Deteriorating organization may predict affect change better than action may, since affect
is so closely tied to action that it changes within the rating interval, while change in
organization may be evident a minute or more before. Although affect does not influence
organization, it is affected by it, suggesting it is a consequence of cognition and action,
consistent with cognitive theories of affect (see Chapter 13; Lazarus, et al., 1980; de
Sousa, 1991; Fridja, 1993). Unpleasure is also associated with the highest quality
sessions and inherent to group functioning. Therapists interventions tend to stabilize
affect oscillations. Limits further stabilize affect, reduce unpleasure and increase self-
regulation. Locomotion is not stimulated by affect
Technique: Affect expresses effects of other dimensions. Affects are shown to be
consequence rather than cause of group process. Therapists can anticipate and
manage crises by observing and basing interventions on organization and action
rather than affect. Intervening tends to stabilize affect.
Action Coherence.
The GFR defines Action Coherence as the quality of cooperation or conflict in
the communication process. It is the third most reliable dimension and its inherent
characteristics are sensitivity and responsiveness to events, with a tendency to drift
steadily towards increased conflict. Action Coherence has an intimate relationship to
structure of communication, which itself is a form of action (Harbermas, 1984, 1989;
Harré, 1993). Conflict within inadequate organization breaks communication;
consequently, promoting communication re-integrates structure. Conflict is likely to
cause structural change by forcing issues out of communication and therefore out of
group representation (Foulkes, 1964).
Technique: Structure is defined by communication. Stimulating separated members or
subgroups to communicate integrates groups and confronts conflict through
action.
1. Group Development.
Several implications of the findings for group development can be considered.
1.1. Rhythmicity.
The results for H1.1 did not show progressive change throughout the year for
any dimension. Instead, the rhythmic waveform was observed. The fact that a similar
pattern is evident for all aspects of group function revealed by the GFR, suggests
rhythmicity is a fundamental property of groups (Bion, 1961; Malekoff, 1997; Ettin,
1999). Continuity of progressive change between sessions was not supported as a
criterion of therapeutic progress. The findings show group functioning is
multidimensional, not linear (Kellerman, 1979; Ahlin, 1996) and must be evaluated
rhythmically rather than against linear “progress.” It suggests that rather than attaining
goal states, therapeutic achievements are associated with groups repeatedly entering and
leaving states while maintaining functionality.
Rhythmicity may be a general property of social entities, not restricted to these
groups (Durkheim, 1964; Bion, 1961). If so, group process needs to be conceptualized
in terms of its rhythmic character. If critical periods of rhythmic group development
exist (Lewis et al., 2000), interventions need to be synchronized with developmental
phases to make greatest use of the natural process. Allowing for missing data, the
period in these groups is about three sessions. It may be valuable for group conductors
to know whether they are on an ascending or descending trajectory of the natural
rhythm in deciding upon interventions.
The findings in relation to crises indicate natural rhythms help bring groups out
of their difficulties. Therapeutically desirable states may also be self-limiting in spite of
therapists or members efforts to shorten or prolong them, like the social organism’s
natural breathing rhythm. Groups may progress in their own rhythm and therapists are
likely to feel inactive or may intervene too much if they do not wait to see if
problematic states self-correct (Kennard, Roberts and Winter, 2000). 321
Technique: Groups’ rhythmicity may alter therapists’ understanding of events and
interventions; allowing for natural rhythmic change may be an important support
to resolve group problems.
Each group developed its own “personality” reflected in the pattern of states and
changes. These characteristics may reflect the relationship between those individuals
and the group experience they need. One group, for example (1993), may need to spend
time in Unsociable states for members to resolve aggressive tendencies, while another
such as (1996) may spend more time in Sociable for self-centered members to learn to
play by rules. Groups’ progress may be best judged by its quality and members’ change
relative to themselves, rather than independent criteria.
Technique: Therapists need to consider the life of the group as a whole and be cautious
of prescribing preconceived states as therapeutic.
2. Group Structure.
Some findings for the effects of groups’ structure have implications for
therapeutic technique.
2.1. Whole-Subgroup Structure. 322
Findings for H2.1.1 indicate a complex pattern of different group states for
whole or subgroup structural conditions. Rule-based cognitive activity, stable pleasure,
unpleasure, cooperation about different goals and conflict are constant for all structures,
indicating groups are likely to encounter problems in both whole and divided structures
and that all structural conditions demand therapeutic work. However, therapeutic goal
states are less common in subgroups where less organized cognitive activity,
cooperation with separate goals and inert affect are more likely. Nevertheless, high
quality states occur in subgroups and may enable groups to become whole (Northen,
1988, Yalom, 1995). Increased unstable pleasure in whole reflects Durkheim’s (1954)
hypothesis that “social effervescence” is a product of groups meeting together and the
inherent pleasure of association in whole states seems to destabilize the structure.
Perhaps socially troubled adolescents are unable to manage such pleasure and this is an
important therapeutic goal for them.
Technique: It is as important to help adolescents have pleasure and manage arousal,
especially in whole structure, as it is to focus on their intra-psychic and
antisocial problems.
Self-reflection and Concord were most likely in whole structure, but so was
unstable, high pleasure. Whole is a demanding, but creative structure; groups need to
move into and out of it to master it.
Technique: While whole structure is most creative, groups must learn to manage it by
movement into and out of it; inhibiting this dynamic may be counterproductive,
causing repeated loss control and destructive states.
3. Group Dynamics.
The findings for hypotheses concerning dynamics showed several important
features of group processes.
4. Therapists Interventions.
Therapists’ interventions rest on slight proportions (1% or greater) of frequency
change of categories in the three to five minutes following them. These net changes are
clues to their global effects. Interventions are defined by the object they are directed to
and vary from abstract psychological interpretations to simple descriptive statements.
Some interventions change group states, others do not (Dalal, 1995). The net effect may
be caused by only a small proportion of that intervention. The fact that Member
Interventions do not appreciably affect ratings of whole group process validates the GFR,
since it would not expect interventions to individuals to influence the whole organism.
Talking to the group entity in Group Interventions changes it, though tends to initially
lower functional levels. It affirms groups as psychic entities, since they respond to being
addressed (Battegay, 1999). Further analysis of forms of intervention and content of
group process may provide additional insight into this relationship.
Group Interventions increased the probability of lower categories in Structure and
Cognitive Organization; initially stable pleasure and cooperation increase, followed by
oscillations. They stimulate the group when static or resistant to confront issues and
challenge it to respond to its own states. Therapists talk about the group to the group
(König, 1991), so the content is self-representational; therefore Group Interventions
indicate how the group responds to Representational stimuli. Response to these
interventions would gauge how well the group can handle collective representations and
indicate therapeutic progress (Azima, 1989).
Technique: Group Interventions stimulate the group and challenge it when 332
resistant or stagnant. Responses to their self-representation indicate groups’
ability to confront themselves.
Group and Member Interventions are most effective in all dimensions (Battegay,
1999), continuing for up to three minutes. Presumably, this is due to relating the activity
of members to the group. The therapeutic purpose is to enable members to form groups.
It is in harmony with therapeutic goals by its form, irrespective of content. Individual
members need to become “organs” of groups and therapists need to talk about this
relationship. Group and Member Interventions are likely to articulate the relationship
between member and group, facilitating communication. Therapists need to verbally
represent the relationship, bringing it to consciousness so groups can work with it. The
members lack experience of groups and are often unable to communicate their effect on
the group or it on them. Many interventions may name events in relation to participants
and group (Azima, 1989, Rachman, 1989; Gordon, 1997).
Technique: Therapists need to articulate relationships between members and group to
develop a language to understand the effects on individuals and the whole.
Limits and Locomotion are effective interventions managing the group and
reducing destructive states. Limits added to Group and Member Interventions enhance
their effects and last several minutes. Locomotion is a response to deteriorating cognitive
organization and conflict. Physical proximity turns out to be an effective 333
stimulus for the group to control itself regardless of what else happens (MacLennan and
Dies, 1992; Malekoff, 1997).
Technique: Close physical proximity is an effective intervention to maintain order and
control in groups and indicates therapists need to move around the room.
The indications derived from the analysis of therapists’ interventions give the
basis for a technique which is not restricted to content, but provides tentative directions
for using both the object of the intervention and the therapists’ personal movement as
additional dimensions to their intervention. Since these are already present in all
interactions with the group, these principles allow for some systematic exploration of their
relationship with content of intervention.
24. DISCUSSION 3: GROUP DEVELOPMENT 334
1. Convening.
The group initially belongs to the therapists, who set the agenda and bring
members to treatment; it consists of individuals needing to establish communication and
common understanding as the Nominal Group (Gn). Members depend on therapists
creating the group and respond to their lead, functioning as an “extrinsic” group, whose
reason, control and direction come from outside it. Tensions are avoided by external
influences; individual behaviour is motivated to engage in the group (Lewis, Beck,
Dugo and Eng, 2000). 335
The group is the commonality among members, as a common idea (the “group
to join,” Long, 1984) formed by getting to know each other and discussing rules and
expectations, where the group itself is the focus. Members initially have in common
only what therapists tell them. The therapeutic task is initially beyond their grasp and
they must first seek commonalities to form a group (Ettin, 1999). They need to
communicate, but lacking common experience, the content comes first from the
therapist, then from the commonalities they find. When communication is established,
individual experience is complemented by a common structure in the communicational
dimension. Members seek Sociable activity to develop shared experience as group
content and make the group their own. The therapists define the functional, self-
representational content. This phase is short-lived if the group becomes an entity. If it
persisted, the group would be didactic, reliant on therapists and fail the therapeutic task.
The first stage requires considerable self-representation to find common content or the
collectivity cannot form. This explains the high percentage of Functional. Where
groups continue from the previous year, the tendency is reduced.
The phase is called “Convening,” in reference to convening the tissue of
communication that defines the group’s existence, enabling the Watzlawick Principle
(see Chapter 9) to operate and establish dimensions of group function. Convening
describes the formation of the material basis (communication) of the collective
organism before any self-sustaining process has begun within it. Once continuity of
self-sustaining communication is formed, the group becomes a Social Group (Gs)
however rudimentary, marking the transition from Convening to the next phase of
Engagement.
2. Engagement.
From the interpersonal perspective, Phase 2 describes members taking flight
from self-disclosure to avoid the anxiety of group membership (Bennis and Shepard,
1956). However, the term “avoidance” pre-supposes that members recognize problems,
but lack successful group experience and do avoid them as threatening. “Flight” into
predominantly Sociable activity facilitates shared experience and cooperation, but does
not address their experiences. It also provides a body of non-threatening experience to
create sufficient sense of belonging for members to accept therapy. Dependence
expresses their need for each other and the group. 336
Taking the perspective of the group being, this phase is the opposite of
avoidance; it is “engagement” in non-conflictual activity by establishing spontaneous
communication. If it does not occur, members become bored, leave and the group fails,
or it becomes educational rather than therapeutic. The natural movement in the second
phase is away from formal content, towards shared experience about whatever can be
communicated. Social problems are communication problems (Sigman, 1987), but
sustained social communication establishes the group and is therapeutic; therefore,
avoidance of problems is also engagement in group-forming communication. Most
communication is likely to be about familiar, shared experiences. “Therapeutic” self-
referential material is less likely, since it is more problematic. The group’s social body
forms of communication, common experience, shared events and history. The
communication derives from awareness of others and the desire to engage with them in
Sociable activity. As this occurs, the experience of the group changes from “otherness”
defined by the therapist to “shared-ness” and “own-ness” as they contribute their
content into the communication body.
Communicational integrity forms in Engagement; members are incorporated into
the tissue of social communication and begin to feel the group as a common, collective
structure (Rachman, 1989). The indication for this is in each member recognizing the
group as an independent entity to which they belong. This is implicit in members’ talk
about the group, referring to other members as “we” and “us.” As they get to know
each other, identifications form around commonalities, constituting the group being by
mechanical solidarity based on similarities and common images binding members, but
leaving little room for differences (Durkheim, 1964). This is expressed in high
proportions of Sociable and low Functional and Unsociable states. In Engagement, the
group entity assembles itself from members as “organs,” forming a communication
body to unite them through common (Sociable) activity. The group has come into
being, but lacks consensual (Functional) collective representations of itself. Conflict
between members’ individual needs and the group’s requirements leads to the next
phase.
3: Positioning.
The third phase begins as members acquire ownership of the group and develop
conflicting expectations about it. They assert desires about their position. 337
Problems appear that have previously made group membership difficult and the
capacity for constructive activity diminishes. Unsociable activity increases as members
try to make the group what they want and resist each other or the group. When
members express their desires in the group, it loses “otherness” and becomes an
extension of themselves; but conflict is created between being individuals and becoming
organs of the collective entity (Durkheim, 1964). The emerging sense of membership
of a collective unit creates concern about the position each will occupy.
“Positioning” describes members working out their place in the structure they
are building. “Group-ness” forming from the common content in Engagement is felt to
be their “own-ness.” If successful, it makes the group their own social structure in
which they can express themselves. Members want the group as an opportunity to
express their interests; enjoyment of it encourages satisfaction, but motivates conflict as
personal drives collide (Burrow, 1927b). Social problems are evoked. If membership
cannot be put before self-satisfaction, the group loses members. Feeling recognized and
valued by the group motivates compromises. High proportions of Unsociable states
indicate fragmentation, disorganization, unpleasurable affect and conflict. Positioning
concerns members’ desire for belonging conflicting with their fear of engulfment, past
painful social experiences and independence. Its dynamics manifest interpersonal
tensions and struggles for dominance, motivated by attempts to gain power over the
group to reduce anxiety.
The conflict is between whether “the group exists for me or I exist for it.”
Members want to make the group an extension of themselves or become part of it, but
risk losing personal identity for an unknown gain in social identity. At this stage,
members cannot make the group itself an object, because it lacks collective
representations. Consequently the conflict manifests in the interpersonal dimension.
Instead of the group being felt as the threat, other members are. When someone
dominates, what they want becomes what the group wants, such as when a member
insists the group plays a card game for several sessions. Joining the activity is joining
the group, but this puts the member under the influence of the dominant individual who
demands others do what they want and conflict develops. Others become dissatisfied;
eventually someone resists the domination and refuses to play.
For the group to progress, members must express differences and similarities in
their interaction. The mechanical solidarity of Engagement must change to 338
organic solidarity, with division of labor in the sense of recognizing each other’s
different needs. Positioning expresses the conflict between mechanical solidarity
asserting similarity interpreted by dominant members as membership criteria, and
organic solidarity placing differences within a framework of the common need for
therapy. The conflict is expressed in tension about what can and cannot be
communicated and how the communicational tissue preserves its integrity (Malekoff,
1997). For the group to continue it must achieve tolerance for difference and
relationships organised on another basis than power (MacLennan and Dies, 1992;
Hopps and Pinderhughes, 1999).
In Positioning, the group entity, having formed from members as heterogeneous
organs, has to “shake down” into a working unit serving the whole rather than
individuals. It establishes the possibility of being an organism. The group entity’s
existence provokes tension between individuality, membership and collectivity. It has
to cope with collective experiences that are not always gratifying and develop self-
regulating processes to manage Unsociable states or there can be no change in group or
members. Common communication has to provide an integrated body for members and
the group. Consequently, although the proportion of Unsociable states is high, so is
Sociable, whereas Functional is low because of the lack of collective representations.
4. Consolidation.
In this phase, members achieve an agreed basis for functioning. They develop
norms and rules, resolve problems and achieve shared group-maintenance activity.
Self-representation (Functional) is less likely than Sociable activity, because the group
cannot yet confront problems. Conflict and unhappiness (Unsociable) occur, but are
resolved. The social unit is secured, allowing group building to continue to
“consolidate” the group entity. The group becomes the members’ own place.
Satisfaction arises from membership of the collectivity rather than personal
gratification. Common experience creates norms and shared expectations. A
developing common history forms a collective identity in which the group’s rules are
expressed. If this does not happen, the group fails or members leave because they
cannot achieve the compromise membership requires.
Consolidation describes the group achieving security in collective identity
(Rachman, 1989.) The conflicts of Positioning may continue. Powerful 339
members may not relinquish their drive for power, subordinates may not exercise their
rights, but the therapeutic process attains a mutual structure that may be a compromise
or collusion depending on how Positioning is resolved. At the conclusion of
Positioning, members accept the group not being what they want it to be and more than
they expected. In Consolidation, they begin to experience organic solidarity (Durkheim,
1964), being organs of an entity greater than themselves, regulated to give satisfaction.
Members accept the group’s sovereignty and conflicts resolve for the collective welfare,
because the group becomes more important than personal desires.
In Consolidation, the group organism forms collective representations consisting
of shared ideas that give it psychic existence; group functionality is established and
membership enjoyed. The collective entity consolidates itself. This requires a high
proportion of Sociable and lower Unsociable, while Functional is also low since the
group is only beginning to achieve collective representations by the end of this phase.
The growing sense of security and satisfaction leads to a qualitative change in the
group, arising from members achieving a collective identity, which introduces the next
phase (Rachman, 1989).
5. Idealization.
The hopes members brought to the therapeutic situation arise in the next phase.
Consolidation must culminate in recognition of successfully constituting the group and
be expressed as a sense of collective well-being. With the emerging capacity to enjoy a
collective identity (perhaps for the first time), members hope it will provide all they
want. However, because they expect more than it can give, these hopes are unrealistic.
They relate to a common “imaginary group” consisting of each one’s ideal rather than a
mutual, actual one (Agazarian and Peters, 1981). It alienates them from genuine
collectivity. In this phase of “Idealization,” the group becomes an object in members’
experience because of their successful involvement, indicated by the high proportion of
Functional self-reflective communication; Sociable may also be high, indicating
common activity, but Unsociable is low.
Idealization follows Consolidation. Members’ hopes are aroused by the “own-
ness” forming high expectations because norms and group identity are successfully
formed. The group entity’s self-awareness is indicated by Representational in the high
proportion of Functional states. Members readily refer to the group and its 340
consolidation is expressed in the Functional capacity. Idealization emerges quickly and
lasts only 1-3 sessions since it is unstable. It occurs because limits have not yet been
found; they belong to the next phase (Shambaugh, 1989). The imaginary group almost
immediately fails to live up to expectations. In the previous phase, the group entity
gained functionality from the Sociable activity. Because of the consolidation of the
entity’s existence, Idealization describes a brief period in which it responds to the
vitality associated with its own psychological functioning by high proportions of
Functional self-representation states. Perhaps it could be said the entity “celebrates” its
existence and this threatens members’ feeling of incorporation, stimulating them to
regain personal identity against group identity introducing the following phase.
6. Disenchantment.
The imaginary group of Idealization is unsustainable. Almost as soon as it
forms as a tacit collective representation, it provokes disappointment. Conflict and
tension erupt from unrealistic ideals of the group and members must confront problems
preventing them accepting the group as it is. This is essential preparation for the
Working phase and involves “Disenchantment” or dissolution of the idealized group
(Bennis and Shepard, 1956; Schambaugh, 1989). It is inevitable that something
unrealistic, fabricated from the hopes of the group’s early success must be lost in this
phase if the group is to discover what is not possible and accept failures instead of
swinging between idealization and rejection of social life. This may include losing
control, testing limits and feeling frustrated. Disenchantment is a crisis likely to be
expressed in rebellion or conflict; it has the highest proportion of Unsociable (44.5%)
after Positioning (47.3%).
For the group entity, this phase occurs when communication regulates members
so they do not only utilize the group for personal satisfaction. Disenchantment indicates
re-appearance of the tensions resulting from the group’s organs also being individuals
who cannot give themselves completely to it. Failure to be disillusioned would mean
increasing involvement and ultimately loss of identity. Resolution of Disenchantment
requires members to convert hopes into clearer expectations and substitute limited
satisfaction for idealized gratification. Group existence must be put before self, making
the group more durable; reduced expectations form a shared identity compensating for
personal disappointments. Members can begin working, since the group 341
becomes safe enough to bring their problems into an environment that expects less, but
feels theirs. However, this crisis may involve regression to Positioning and reworking
the process if they cannot relinquish ideals. In Disenchantment, the group being
confronts its conflicts and limitations and in doing so, shows it can successfully regulate
disorganized, unpleasurable and conflictual states to maintain its life.
7. Working.
In this phase, the group oscillates between Unsociable and Functional states with
considerable Sociable activity. Members have achieved sufficient belonging to feel
attached to each other and it is their group; they tolerate conflict, resolving problems
threatening the group (Ettin, 1999). The group is resilient; as problems are worked on,
conflict leads to Functional activity; periods of satisfying Sociable activity reward
members for persisting in being together and motivate continuing involvement and
problem-solving. “Working” involves fluctuations in all three bands of Condensed
activity.
The group is a shared space, neither “other” nor “own,” but “ours.” As
Functional Group (Gf) it offers members a new category of social experience. The full
range of social phenomena occur with mutual acknowledgment and shared commitment
to care for self, others and group in spite of hostility an conflict. It opens when the
group successfully emerges from Disenchantment and enters a state where all
conditions rhythmically alternate in a self-preserving and self-regulating entity. It
manages harmonious, boring and conflictual states with homeostatic functions avoiding
dismemberment. The group entity is stable, balancing group and individual needs
through rhythmic interchange (see Chapter 23). Each state is complemented and
compensated by others later in the session or subsequent sessions. The collective entity
shows its life and integrity through the rhythmic fluctuation across the variety of states
to develop a complex, creative existence. However, it is hard to acknowledge the end of
the group, since this may be the first experience of belonging, and this introduces the
final phase.
8. Separation.
In this phase members confront loss and separation associated with the group
ending. In spite of conflicts, it should provide increased recognition of the 342
group’s role in members’ lives. However, adolescent groups are often unable to
confront loss, since they may not have belonged before and do not know what it means
to lose a group. Their avoidance of self-reflective Functional states in this phase is not
only defensive, since high Sociable states also express shared cooperative and enjoyable
activity that has been the core of the group (Wardi, 1989). Separation often celebrates
and re-creates earlier phases of Engagement or Consolidation with similar proportions
(Functional 3-7%, Sociable 67-73% and the lowest proportion of Unsociable 21-23%).
In the face of ending, the group entity may try to maintain itself and avoid
dismemberment by reverting to patterns similar to Consolidation, avoiding
Representational, which would confront the reality of ending, but also conflict states
that would threaten the group (Peternel, 1991; Etting, 1999).
This phase is called “Separation” rather than termination, because members have
to integrate the group so that it continues to affect them. If ending is threatening, it
leads to denial or rejection and “disintegrating” rather than integrating the group
(Wardi, 1989). It is not just a matter of mourning and loss, but re-constituting the group
as a symbolic element in their experience and reference point for the future. There is
insufficient data to draw conclusions about this phase other than suggesting it exists.
There was never a full ending since all groups continued the following year. However,
a tentative conclusion is that for the group entity, the high proportion of Sociable and
low Functional and Unsociable in this phase may indicate the failure of collective
representations to deal with the group’s disbanding. Consequently, the denial of
termination is as though the group prefers to “fall asleep” in unrepresented Sociable
activity, rather than confront its own demise and the grief that would provoke.
Overview.
Developmental dynamics and vicissitudes of phase sequences are also possible
(McCollom, 1995). Their order may vary if things go wrong, but they are hypothesised as
an essential sequence for forming functional group entities. Vicissitudes may include not
fulfilling phase requirements, becoming fixated, advancing and regressing within or
between phases, jumping and aborting phases or traumatic events disrupting continuity of
development (Ahlin, 1995). The sequence identified becomes a framework to identify
such dynamics. It shows how the group entity forms, consolidates and settles to work on
its task. Such an overview may define strategies or tasks for each stage and 343
guide aspects to focus on at each phase.
Relevance of development phases. The value of a developmental scheme
depends on how it is used. Rigid application will obscure the unique individuality of
each group and inhibit effective treatment. However, if a developmental sequence
exists, its recognition is comparable to the role of understanding child development in
individual psychotherapy. Although treatment may not aim to achieve developmental
tasks, it is the context for understanding the problems; neglecting development is a
failure in responsible treatment, but development is not the end in itself. The treatment
outlined here aims to bring groups into existence; it cannot only follow the
developmental sequence, but takes members’ experiences and the particular group
events into account. The present system is more complex than others reviewed; none
include all eight phases (however, see Lewis et al., 2000). Although more cumbersome
for treatment, this sequence has been validated empirically, may be more discrete in its
specification of phenomena and less suitable to simplistic programmatic use.
Clinical relevance of the phases. It would be inimical to therapy if treatment
pushed groups through preconceived developmental tasks. Knowledge of
developmental phases provides a context to evaluate group phenomena and inform
interventions. Understanding phases may enable problems in sessions to be interpreted
as part of the natural oscillations of the therapeutic journey rather than failures. It may
enable moments to be mapped in relation to the whole process. Therapists may focus
interventions non-prescriptively around the phase tasks as a background to interpreting
events (Lewis et al., 2000). It describes a group-building process, since the phases are
identified in the whole group. The developmental phases may provide a framework to
interpret group process longitudinally over the group’s lifespan, indicating a sequence
of distinct dynamics to be negotiated (Ettin, 1999).
Implications for length of treatment. A developmental sequence may also point
to requirements for the length of treatments. A Group Forming Paradigm of treatment
(Gordon, 1997; see Chapter 9) may necessitate groups having sufficient sessions to
allow for the sequence of processes and relative length of these phases as part of a
complete treatment. Too short a treatment may restrict the necessary group-forming
processes and set them at cross-purposes with the formal aims of groups (Ettin, 1999).
Treatment outcomes. If personal therapeutic attainments are associated with
being a functional organ of a group being, then treatment outcomes may 344
correlate with groups successfully completing these developmental phases.
25. DISCUSSION 4: THEORY. 345
The Crowd.
Crowd psychology describes homogeneous, poorly structured collective mentality
lacking self-regulation reactive to impulse with unstable affect. Crowds are primal
communicational organisms incapable of symbolic processing. In the GFR, this is whole
structure, normative organization. Without systemic organization, cognitive integration is
concrete and arbitrary; communication is unrestrained by systemic rules, it is governed by
the values, emotions and impulses of the moment without regard to wider implications or
consequences. Cognitive organization governs functionality essential to self-regulation.
Crowds form around similarities (Le Bon, 1923) in mechanical solidarity
(Durkheim, 1964) when communicational organisms stabilise from unstructured,
disorganized states or when systemic entities deteriorate, replacing rules with sentiments.
The group’s history provides normative organization as customs, but not systemic rules.
Implanting ideas is difficult, but once done, they persist as stereotypic, uncompromising,
non-logical sequences of images; they are uncritical of contradictions, influenced by
emotional appeals, analogy, high-sounding phrases and images (Le Bon 1923). “Crowd
mind” refers to the Continuity, Integrity and Order in this type of communicational
organism and is specifiable as a set of GFR states and could be studied as such.
Technique: Uncontrolled groups function as crowds. Their inability to reason means the
cognitive capacity required by interpretive interventions is absent. Principles of
managing crowds are effective for highly aroused normative or unorganized
groups.
348
“Social instincts” (McDougall, 1920; Trotter, 1916) are expressed in the GFR as
normative collective representations drawing individuals into cooperative action
coherence. They act from within and are unquestioned because collective representations
of their arbitrary origin are lacking. Self-representational cognition breaks the power of
norms allowing independent thinking. Influential individuals or “crowd crystals”
(Canetti, 1960) assert norms, defy rules, command members, instigating action and
expressing normative justification for their actions. Activation of norms “stings”
members subject to them into conformity because of the lack of systemic organization.
For example: Bill laughs at Jim’s appearance for not doing what he demands,
successfully pressuring others to join in humiliating Jim, who may then miss sessions or
leave the group. Bill asserts the norm that leaders determine what members do and
disobedience is punished. Therapists can relate norms to the therapeutic rules by Group
and Member Interventions: “Bill you are bossing everyone to do what you say or be
punished; is that what you others think too? This makes the group like school, but won’t
help your problems;” or, “Bill, you were picked on yourself like you are doing to Jim, but
you’ve all joined the group to help each other.” The GFR suggests this would tend to
increase functionality, giving a moment of self-reflection and cooperation.
Technique: Therapists need to articulate and challenge emergent norms to be replaced by
rational, collective rules. Interpretation is ineffective for managing rule-breaking
or norms activated in crowd states, because systemic cognitive organization is
lacking. Describing actions, naming motives and articulating normative
assumptions provide representations of the therapeutic purpose and self-
representations (Gordon, 1997).
These concepts can be defined in observable terms within the GFR. In crowd
states, normative ideas are selectively aroused and torn from their relationship to other
norms governing group functioning. They act like prescriptive or proscriptive rules
(Forsyth, 1983, see Chapter 12). Unless exposed as norms, they must be obeyed as a
condition of membership. Non-reflective, aroused communicational organisms enact
sentiments. In splitting or scapegoating, the normative idea is: one subgroup or person is
the problem and must be rejected to solve it. The problem for crowd states is to regulate
energy enough to move from norms to systemic rules.
Regulation of action derives from cross-referencing ideas within rule 349
systems. One member may feel hostile because his (normative) prestige is threatened, but
is prevented from enacting hostility by other norms, such as group purpose or losing face.
Affectively aroused norms must be cross-referenced to other elements in the norm
“corpus” or they are immediately enacted. Cross-referencing is a product of the
communicative continuity and integrity in social life, not personal cognitive development
(Mead, 1962). The system of cognitive elements is synonymous with members’
communicational relationships, which convert cognitive relations into social actions with
affective consequences. Continuity and Integrity ensure mutual respect (or power
relations) and refer personal ideas to the normative corpus. Group Integrity and Order
impose integrity and order on individual thought and action. Therapists promote this by
articulating sequences leading to misunderstandings, responsibility for interactions,
egocentric assumptions about the group being for personal enjoyment or understanding of
scapegoat’s actions (MacLennan and Dies, 1992).
Technique: Therapists must intervene in crowd dynamics when selective arousal of
normative ideas begins and distribute arousal by verbalising links to other ideas in
the normative corpus or rules. Enactment of one norm (collective representation)
is modified by activating others.
Meaning, consciousness and self come into being through members taking the
position of the other towards themselves, (Mead, 1962) making possible abstract,
systemic relationships. Normative phenomena do not imply reciprocity and must become
systemic. For example, normative leadership structures apply to one member who is the
leader; other members feel they have no influence. However, when ideas of leading,
following and influence are made reciprocal so everyone should be included in each
situation according to a principle, such as who has the best idea, it becomes a systemic
rule, allowing members to experience their own capacities and how they are seen. Self-
forming occurs by verbally representing members’ impact on others and giving this
meaning within a framework of therapeutic values. Such interventions 352
promote meaning, consciousness, self-reflection and representational cognitive
organization.
Technique: Members must be helped to take the position of the other towards themselves.
Therapists need to relate normative elements to each other, articulate logical
relationships, inconsistencies, contradictions or lack of relationship to encourage
systemic and representational organization within cooperative action.
The self as “an eddy in the social current,” (Mead, 1962, p 182) describes it
coming into being through rhythmic group process. Eddies do not form in a viscous
medium; only changing relationships allow members to meet self-forming needs.
However, unorganized change is chaos; eddies form in the rhythms of a complex,
organized medium. The group process must be flexible enough to constantly present new
situations to members, but fluctuations must be part of a series where particular states
regularly reappear as reference points for the rest of the process. For example, periods of
stability lead to dissatisfaction and conflict and then restoration of cooperation and
enjoyment. Socially immature individuals must learn by consequences of mistakes.
Reverting to less functional group states can gradually be recognised as consequences of
self-indulgent, anti-social acts and then can become the subject of interpretive
interventions. Group instability and lability are inherent to therapeutic change.
Technique: Therapists need to work within group process rhythms. Fluctuations can be
used to demonstrate causes and consequences. Eddies in the social current of
group process confer a sense of self on members when therapists articulate them
with Group and Member interventions.
This confirms the importance of cognitive organization and systemic rules as the
means of achieving the regulation that constitutes rhythmicity and enables self and mind
to be nurtured. The rules of systemic organization interconnect, cover all situations, allow
each person a place and enable the group to undertake logical processes. An intact corpus
of norms may also achieve concrete integration. The communicational organism
reciprocally relates each person’s contribution to all others forming a cognitive system
resting on significant symbols as collective representations. Group thought is expressed
as cooperative action coordinated by the system or corpus. In the social mind, there is no
purely “mental” process divorced from action as the inner experience of a 353
collective subject, since action is inherent to mentality (Mead 1962; Harbermas, 1989).
Action places communication beyond individuals, in the intersubjective space
(Merleau-Ponty, 1976; Gordon, 1985) where social phenomena exist. Individual
contributions forming a residue of collective representations, within consensual rules or
norms constitute social mind. The products are not inner mental events in individuals, but
collective action in regulated group life (Durkheim 1954). An aroused idea or norm
stimulates the system to reassert itself, re-connecting it to other ideas or norms, modifying
its expression. Scapegoating in a systemically regulated group causes one or other
member to intervene with something like: “come on, let’s get on with the game,” or “no, I
don’t think he should leave.” Power hierarchy cannot over-ride individual judgements
coordinated by common commitment to the collective purpose.
The GFR’s differentiation of group function dimensions confirms the importance
of cognitive organization for developing collective mentality. GFR categories allow the
development of collective mental life to be differentiated according to the organizing
principle of the collective cognitive functions. They can be understood as structural
conditions that groups rhythmically move into and out of, rather than forming a linear
sequence, which is not found by the GFR.
Initially, groups emerge from an unorganized state. Normative structures organize
contributions as similarities, asserting that everyone should be the same; complementary
relationships such as leader/follower are specified. Differences threaten norms and evoke
sanctions. For example, when the norm is leader/follower, the presence of a leader/leader
structure results in power struggles. The collective normative corpus forms over time as
norms are inter-related by being successively enacted within action coherence. The
corpus integrates each norm with others so they are not torn from their context. This
regulates arousal. Action is subject to the implicit goals of the corpus, which are concrete,
contingent, imperative or prescriptive; they assert, “You must or must not do this.” When
norms in a corpus are broken, they are replaced by new norms. If enough are broken, the
group becomes unorganized. The normative corpus is the group’s initial cultural identity.
Gradually, the symbolic system of rules allows flexible organization to develop in
the paradigm of the rules of language (Whorf, 1995). Structure describes relationships;
rules describe the actions conforming to it. They are abstract, non-contingent, logical and
teleological, governing action flexibly towards goals; they specify meaning of sentences,
content of discussions or winners of games. They are not prescriptive, but 354
constitutive, allowing different means to achieve the same end (Collett, 1977a). Rules
allow for differences, and specify pure relations such as how disputes are decided (Harré,
1977). They apply to any content as abstract nous structures in discourse, organising
contributions and reconciling differences. Rules are usually implicit and only effective if
no one owns them and all submit to them. The rule system comes from beyond the group
and allows collective thinking to occur. It already exists and is invoked by someone
obeying or transmitted by identification, suggestion or power relationships. Rule-
following needs to become a norm.
Whereas a normative corpus is conservative, rule systems are innovative,
especially if there are rules about making rules. The game is an inadequate paradigm for
human rule-systems (Wittgenstein, 1953) since a game’s end cannot be changed, whereas
in culture, both ends and means change, but rule-fully (Harré, 1972, 1977). Rules
distribute arousal to the whole system and activate additional rules to preserve goals;
rather than prescribing actions, they create options defining actions according to
circumstances. Breaking rules and displacing collective gaols by individual or sub-group
goals activates other rule systems or destroys them, causing reversion to normative or
unorganized states.
The social mind’s collective system includes contingent norms organized as a
corpus (culture and social structure) and teleological rule systems and is described as nous
(see Chapter 9). It is the members’ mental infrastructure; nous or social mind is a
development of the communicational organism upon which its Continuity, Integrity and
Order depend. Dysfunctional communication is reflected in loss of social mentality.
Technique: Before groups can think, regulate themselves or learn from experiences, they
must attain communicational Continuity, Integrity and Order. Therapists need to
promote these at every opportunity, since the social communication organism is
the supportive medium of the social mind.
Society as a Being.
GFR dimensions and categories can interpret phenomena discussed in Durkheim’s
account of the social being. The totality of common ideas and sentiments forms a
collective conscience (Durkheim, 1964) constituted by revealing what members have in
common and their shared activity. Membership at least is common. Rules and enjoyment
are essential for social units, since the pleasure of communing is attractive and 355
coercive (Durkheim, 1954) demonstrated by increased unstable pleasure in whole
structure. Coerciveness is indicated by the simultaneous increase in conflict. Whole
states require systemic rules to be functional.
Technique: Therapists should encourage implicit commonalities of problems,
predicaments or attitudes to be articulated. Naming extends communication,
helping form the collective conscience. Pleasure in whole structure needs
containment with common rules to help members temper the arousal of
associating.
Social facts are distinct from individual manifestations (Durkheim, 1966). Group
phenomena do not occur because they are general, but they are entailed by membership,
as group functions repeated in the individual, because they are in the whole. They are
strengthened by repetition, but only in their totality in the whole group; the strength is not
common, but collective in the group. Arbitrary norms become social facts. Events early
in the history of groups such as aggressive outbursts or loss of members are coercive and
have enduring effects. Anti-therapeutic norms develop easily such as leaving the room or
absenteeism, need to be changed by persistent, repeated interventions (Bion, 358
1961). Common patterns link the past to current sessions.
Technique: Once tendencies are incorporated into the group as collective phenomena,
they are only changed by persistent, repeated interventions by therapists.
Articulating what is common to members individually and collective group
structures distinguishes collective characteristics from individual manifestations.
It helps groups develop collective self-representations allowing members to
express themselves.
The categories and framework of thinking come from organized group action and
rituals; collective representations form from rhythmic cooperation (Durkheim, 1956).
Action unites members, imposing common structures on experience, taking members out
of their “egocentrism” into a common communicative world. Relations between
members, actions and group events are common as are ideas and general relations
(Durkheim, 1956) and make communication possible. They are lawful (systemic),
providing a framework for thinking, because all members are involved rather than their
content or type of order. Normality is being in collective forms of thought, emotion and
action (Durkheim, 1956); the group provides a microcosm for experiencing normality
(Burrow, 1953).
Technique: Therapists do not need to work for a specific order or set of rules; any
effective rules will further the therapeutic goal and create the experience of
normality.
Integration of Themes.
The GFR defines observable group phenomena constituting an order distinct from
individual behaviour. It emphasises thinking in the whole system (Sighele, 1891; Mead,
1962), and group cognition as organization of action rather than “internal” processing of
mental representations. Groups have no internal space in which this processing happens,
they “think with their limbs.” Group mentality exists in action; thinking occurs in the act
of communication.
Technique: Therapy should focus on talking about the meaning of what is said and done
as enacted cognitive process rather than members’ internal mental representations.
Affects are organized energy states where the group takes hold of members.
Pleasure is essential for organicity and binds members symbiotically into the group,
(Gordon, 1989b, 1991) but to become creative requires regulation of affect. If social
experience is not enjoyable, socialization is distorted. However, it requires social
competence to manage emotional arousal in groups. In the GFR, regulating unstable
affect in whole structure allows members to participate in collective mentality.
Sentiments translate directly into action when there is insufficient cognitive organization;
but adaptation of common or compatible goals occurs through organization of
communication, as does reconciliation of incompatible goals. Otherwise group action is
impossible and the group is damaged.
Technique: Therapists must articulate how members’ goals relate to each 361
other and the group and show how they share fundamental goals like pleasure in
being together and getting well as the basis of reconciliation.
Conclusion.
The GFR allows these concepts to be operationalised into observational terms in
the group context and made available for developing theoretical strategies and guidelines
in therapeutic technique.
26. DISCUSSION 5: CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH. 362
This study submits group psychotherapy based on the group entity approach to
an empirical examination describing and testing hypotheses about processes. Some
conclusions and suggestions for further research can be drawn from it.
Theory.
Part I showed how the heritage of group entity theory lost currency against
ideological threats of the twentieth century (Allport, 1954). Except for Burrow (1927b,
1956), most theory is philosophical or sociological and lacks applicability to practical
social situations. The most important issue in the twentieth century has been protection
of individuality (Jordan, 1927; O’Neill, 1973), which was seen as threatened by group
entity theories (Ginsberg, 1956, 1960). Psychoanalysis and other individualistic
theories gained precedence, even in sociology (Ginsberg, 1961) and succeeded in
theorizing contemporary issues. Social theory moved from exploring the nature of
social life and individuality towards social interaction (Mills, 1967) and empirical issues
(Collins, 1985). In the twenty-first century the survival questions are protecting
individuality, but also integrating individuals into groups, groups into societies and
societies into global community (Matustik, 1993).
The social organism, crowd mind, social mind and social being theories have
much to offer to these questions; the relevance of their conclusions to empirical findings
was discussed in Chapter 25. A gap remains between these theories and the dominant
individualistic paradigm, although contemporary group entity theories in social
psychology (Sandelands and Stablein, 1987; Sandelands and St. Clair, 1993) and group
psychotherapy (Foulkes, 1990; Brown and Zinkin, 1994; Brown, 1996; Dalal, 1998) lie
between them. Theoretical work is required to apply group entity theory to the small
group situations it claims are central to communal life and individuality (Cooley, 1909;
McDougall, 1920; Mead, 1962; Durkheim, 1964). Their therapeutic potential needs to
complement individualistic theories (Ettin, 1999).
In Chapter 9, an integrative theory of the collective mind proposed the term nous
to refer to the inherently collective part of mentality. The difficulty with this notion for
the present study is its philosophical formulation. While the philosophical and
epistemological task of defining a field of collective mental phenomena precedes its
scientific investigation (Toulmin, 1972; Harré and Secord, 1972), the 363
concept remains theoretical. However it can become a clinical heuristic in individual
and group therapy (Gordon, 2000). Personal and collective mentality needs clearer
differentiation and a theory of their developmental relationship is required. This study
is a starting point for these tasks.
The GFR.
The GFR’s central concept is social communication. While continually
emphasized in group entity theories, communication is rarely defined with precision.
The conceptualizations of Social Communication Theory (Sigman, 1987) define
communication with sufficient clarity to do justice to the complexity of group
phenomena. Observable criteria for communication in Structure are only a beginning.
Although its reliability is high, more can be done to describe this field of
communication. Empirical studies of interpersonal communication (Duncan and Fiske,
1977; Siegman and Feldstein, 1979; Tronik, 1982; Goody, 1995) need to be reviewed to
give greater rigor to the GFR.
The theoretical base for other dimensions and categories were not derived from
group entity theories, which were too general. They were conceptualized to preserve
continuity between dimensions of individual psychic function and collective mentality
(cognition, affect and action), since group entity theories argue for common psychic
content in groups and individuals (McDougall, 1920; Durkheim, 1964). The GFR
dimensions were specified by analyzing essential characteristics of cognition, affect and
action and conceptualizing them in collective communication. The theory could be seen
as an eclectic collection of convenient constructs and the GFR merely an observational
tool. More rigorously establishing the theoretical dimensions may prove them more
than an observational framework. A set of concepts describing group functions relevant
to fundamental psychological constructs is needed to establish a group entity field of
investigation. Without this, the group entity will not be integrated with individualistic
psychology, will lack relevance and disappear again. Further theoretical work is needed
to establish group function dimensions to be operationalised in observable
communicational phenomena.
To increase the GFR’s power, low frequency combinations need to be collated
into more balanced states. However, too few categories may obscure some
relationships. Only 180 of 384 possible combinations of categories 364
occurred, none above 10% frequency. To reduce the possibilities in Structure, Whole
and Subgroups/Individuals provided sufficient differentiation as Structure #2; in Affect,
Contentment and Boredom were combined with Interest and Discontent with little loss
as Affect #2, reducing possible combinations to 128. Remaining low frequency states
(Representational, Distress, Concord and Contracord) are all important. Further
reducing the number of states must be balanced with retaining sensitivity to infrequent,
but influential states. To determine whether the low frequencies for some categories
depend on these groups or the GFR, other groups must be rated.
Combining categories into nine Condensed States reduced complexity.
However, some important states were obscured; the crowd state (see Chapter 25) needs
to be extracted as a separate state from Sociable (51% of states), since movement
between crowd and more organized states may be as important as achieving Functional
states (Slater, 1966; Kissen, 1976a, 1976c; Bennis, 1976; Gordon, 1985). Productive
Turmoil (1.9%) could be combined with Dysfunctional (7.3%) with little loss. A
limitation of the GFR is that ratings are made from different portions of the minute.
Cognitive Organization and Action Coherence ratings are made from thirty seconds, but
Structure and Affect from fifteen seconds, because thirty seconds proved too long for
reliability. Findings could reflect time sampling differences of 50% for Cognitive
Organization and Action Coherence and 25% for Structure and Affect. Ratings may
also be made from different portions of the minute and not be simultaneous
observations. In these groups, much happens in a minute and it can be asked how the
rated portion of the group’s functioning relates to that not rated.
Consistent application of rating criteria should ensure important phenomena
within the minute are recorded (see GFR Rater’s Instructions in Appendix 2). This
could be tested by comparing a sample of sessions rated every thirty seconds and each
minute. Cognitive Organization and Action Coherence would be rated in fifteen-second
criteria, consistent with Structure and Affect.
The variability of time criteria may explain why some reported relationships
represent small changes in proportions. Shorter time sample ratings may strengthen
these trends by increasing the frequency of instances. More sensitive ratings seem
unlikely to change some persistent features (for example, rhythmic oscillations).
However, in examining relations such as between affect change and action, it may be
possible to demonstrate the clinical impression that action change precedes 365
affect change.
Another problem is the GFR’s specialization for socially dysfunctional boys.
Although these groups pose questions about fundamentals of social interaction and
group formation, they did not develop sophisticated group function. The GFR is
designed to record fundamentals, but lacks sensitivity for adults talking about their
problems. It must be adapted for other social situations. Criteria for rating categories
need to be re-defined for groups restricted to conceptual, verbal communication. This
could all be considered “re-calibrating” the instrument and may require other categories
to differentiate functional states.
Structure may require differentiating degrees of involvement in whole group
communication rather than only its interruption (Fuhriman and Burlingame, 2000). In
Cognitive Organization, Unorganized may describe ideas not following in logical
sequence. Normative may describe sequential conversation lacking conclusions.
Systemic may describe logical conversation progressing toward a goal, and
Representational reserved for psychological interpretations rather than mere reference to
self of group. It could be analyzed into talk with different degrees of therapeutic value,
such as conversation where anecdotes dominate from analysis, self-recognition or
insight (Simon and Agazarian, 2000). In Affect, people with more highly differentiated
emotional lives may require the pleasure/unpleasure distinction to be differentiated
qualitatively rather than in terms of stability and quantity (Karterud, 2000). It may be
necessary to differentiate socially structured emotional states, such as group climate
(Ahlin, 1996) rather than simple energy categories. Action Coherence categories can be
re-defined in terms of degrees of cooperation, difference or antagonism in conversation
(Benjamin, 1999). Distinctions within Discord between constructive debate and
defensive disagreement may be required. Cooperative conversation about daily events
in Accord may need to be distinguished from coordinated contributions attempting to
find common aspects of different experiences. Therapists Intervention dimensions
including both object of the intervention (as categorized) and type of intervention would
clarify their effects.
The GFR could also be modified to evaluate committee meetings, social groups,
informal peer groups, school classes, educational groups, team meetings or other work
groups; structured, time-limited therapy groups could be compared with long-term
groups. Despite its limitations, the GFR has proved itself by answering 366
some questions, revealing phenomena and raising new questions that could not have
been asked before.
Group Development.
The identification of discrete developmental phases is significant, but only an
initial indication. Theoretical and empirical research is needed to demonstrate group
entities’ developmental processes more rigorously. Stages by which collective
mentality emerges need to be researched, their communicational requirements
understood and techniques for facilitating them identified. Are phases discrete periods
in which developmental processes need to unfold, or group-constituting processes
integrating members into organic units? If the latter is true, they may not be restricted
to episodes. The relative uniformity of phases may be a product of the groups’
uniformity. Although developmental functions were recognized by examining discrete
phases, once defined, they might be freed from the sequence and seen as group-forming
processes to be sought in the content instead. A phenomenological account of group
activity constituting functions of Convening, Engagement, Positioning, Consolidation,
Idealization, Disenchantment, Working and Separation is needed, then sought in other
situations. Theoretical work may enable more precise mapping of group conditions to
identify therapeutic or counter-therapeutic states (Lewis et al., 2000). This would also
allow more sensitive consideration of interventions promoting these processes. The
generality of developmental phases and rhythmicity also needs to be established with
other groups.
Content analysis of sessions in each phase is needed to relate them to
hypothesized processes, but may need interpretation since they are unlikely to
demonstrate issues overtly. Questions to be addressed are: What typical Engagement
phenomena constitute the group? How do they compare with Consolidation phenomena?
What are session themes of Idealization Functional peaks and Disenchantment troughs?
What are themes of peaks and troughs of stability and quality in Working?
Characteristics of interpersonal process in peak and trough sessions and the role of rhythm
in successful outcome are important to understand collective development. Interpersonal
interaction may need examination in relation to themes of developmental stages and
group the entity’s process (Davis, Budman and Soldz, 2000). Content analysis may show
how interpersonal themes serve the group entity’s development, since it is 367
expressed in the totality of interpersonal phenomena oriented towards a goal of
entitativity. Phenomena at the boundaries between developmental phases and whether it
is possible to detect qualitative and content differences in sessions need to be examined
(Lewis et al., 2000). Whether they are phases or processes, forming a conceptual frame
for their interpretation is important.
Hypotheses.
Some hypotheses may benefit from re-formulation and re-testing. The
association between Therapists Interventions and processes identified in Dynamics
needs investigation. Interactions in the minute or two before various changes could be
analyzed and compared with the content of successful and unsuccessful interventions.
Size may be the most important factor for those patients whose treatment is
unsuccessful or have difficulty remaining in groups and needs further investigation as a
therapeutic dimension to be matched to patients’ needs (Ettin, 1999). Psychological
work happens at a price of group function (illustrated by the turbulence of the Working
phase); the goal of forming self-maintaining groups needs to be balanced against their
psychological function. The therapeutic value of self-maintaining groups compared to
psychologically oriented process needs clarification, perhaps with comparative studies.
Patients may be more suited to either group-forming or psychologically oriented
treatments (Gordon, 1997; Malekoff, 1997). Alternatively, these aspects may dominate
different phases of the same group’s life. Structure and action dimensions were most
sensitive to affective tension (unpleasure) and responsible for instability. Clearer
conceptualization of interventions for managing communicational structure and action
in the group and members is required. Better understanding of psychosocial processes
constituting homeostatic mechanisms governing rhythms will enable therapists to
coordinate with them. More sensitive GFR ratings can investigate affective and action
change to provide better understanding of group crises and their management. Molar
effects may camouflage powerful or ineffectual therapists’ interventions; they may be
clarified by examining session content when identified phenomena occur and provide
indications for therapeutic technique.
368
Conclusion.
The study’s findings result from operationalising an unfashionable collective
mentality paradigm. While intra-psychic and interpersonal views complement this view,
the GFR takes up the challenge for theoretical advances to guide empirical work (Bednar
and Moeschel, 1981, Steiner, 1986). The observational technique assumes the validity of
submitting the social mentality thesis to scientific investigation. Its results affirm the
group entity hypothesis’ value as a heuristic for group psychotherapy of children and
adolescents. It can be applied to other populations, techniques and domains of social
activity. If observed appropriately, groups - even of disorganized adolescents –
demonstrate order and rhythmicity not evident in the complex phenomenological
experience of therapists. This study is a beginning at constituting structural dimensions
for observing the collective reality of human existence and understanding its therapeutic
power.
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APPENDIX 1. 415
Changing Definitions of the word “group.”
The following definitions show the transition of the meaning of group over the
years:
“A cluster, crowd or throng; an assemblage, either of persons or things; an
assemblage of figures or objects in a certain order or relation, or having some
resemblance or common characteristic, in painting or sculpture” (Library Dictionary
of the English Language, 1872).
“A number of persons or things standing near together, knot, cluster; a number of
persons or things belonging or classed together or forming a whole” (Concise
Oxford Dictionary, 1964).
“A collection or assemblage of persons or things considered as a unit;
aggregation, cluster. A number of persons or things having in common certain
characteristics, interests etc.,” (Funk and Wagnall's Dictionary, 1980).
The Groups.
A brief synopsis of the groups, their members and progress in the course of
treatment is provided. All names and certain identifying details have been changed to
protect confidentiality.
Adolescent Group, 1988. One of the five members had been in a previous group.
All 33 sessions were recorded. Members finished at sessions 17 (Mick) and 30 (Sid).
Their problems were:
Bill: Social isolation, aggressive behaviour, school refusal.
Dom: Epilepsy and social problems.
Sid: Behaviour problems.
Peter: Anxiety, previous history of psychosis, school refusal.
Mick: Anxiety, school refusal, aggressive behaviour.
Sid dominated the group for the first half of the year, organising card games.
Conflict escalated when Mick and Dom challenged his leadership. Bill and Peter were
submissive. Mick had difficulty joining in and kept bringing sexual themes and conflict
to the group. After he left, the group was more unified and talked about problems. When
Sid left in November, the remaining three spent whole sessions talking about 416
themselves and their problems.
Mick’s mother brought him to the group each week from a country town 3 hours’
drive from the city, because of his aggression at home and school refusal. However, by
mid year his behaviour had improved. He had recommenced at school and she no longer
felt his condition warranted the weekly trip. Sid’s behaviour also improved although
there were several crises during the year. He left when his family moved to the country.
His mother was pleased with his progress and said his behavior problems at home had
subsided. He had abandoned his attempts to control the group with card games and
participated fully in the conversations. Bill, Dom and Peter became steadily more
involved with each other during the year and spent the last few months together
discussing a wide range of personal and adolescent life issues. Bill arranged to start at
school the following year. Peter gained greater confidence and in the following year
started at a technical college. Dom’s epilepsy continued to give him difficulties, but he
became more socially adept, made friends at school and was happier. Bill and Dom
continued in the group in the following year.
Adolescent Group, 1992. The group began with six members, three of whom
were in the previous year’s group. Members left at sessions 4 (Jack) and 14 (Brad).
New members started on sessions 19 (Ned) and 23 (Eddie). There were 38 sessions; 11
were not recorded. Members’ problems were:
Brad: Genetic syndrome, behaviour problems.
Ben: Genetic syndrome, mild intellectual disability, aggressive behaviour,
social problems.
Phil: Genetic syndrome, mild intellectual disability, behavior and social
problems.
Jack: Behavior problems.
Jim: Behavior problems.
Ernie: Emotional and behavior problems, sexual behavior problems.
Ned: Juvenile offender, behavior problems.
Eddie: Behavior problems, depression, peer relationship problems.
Ernie talked and joked incessantly avoiding problems and dominated this group.
The dynamics of membership were played out in war games led by Ernie for 417
much of the year. Some members wanted to discuss problems, but Ernie tended to
derail conversations. Ned’s arrival in May unified the group and reduced Ernie’s power
and Eddie contributed further to this. The group cared for the two intellectually
disabled boys (Ben and Phil). Towards the end of the year school problems were
discussed.
By the end of the year, Ernie had become less extreme and avoidant, although he
was still reluctant to communicate about his feelings. Brad had been in the group the
previous year and left at session 14 when his parents moved to the country. His
behaviour had improved and he was attending school regularly. Ben’s conflict with
peers at school diminished and Phil’s uncontrolled eating and other behaviour problems
also diminished. Ben and Phil were reluctant to engage with the others at the start of the
year and tended to play together separately. By the end of the year, they were included
and participated in the conversation.
Jack’s family situation was very disturbed and he had no support to attend the
group. He stopped after the 4th session. Jim was a depressed, isolated boy who was
constantly teased by peers. In the group he took every opportunity to talk about his
problems and family difficulties. Ned had charges pending for car stealing and other
offences. He was isolated and his peer contacts were restricted to exploitative
relationships with other offenders. During the group, he was protective of Ben and Phil
and enjoyed the interaction and games with the others. However, he often engaged in
hostile, belligerent talk designed to provoke the therapists. During the year, he became
more cooperative and seemed more willing to acknowledge his personal problems.
Eddie changed noticeably through the year. While at first tentative and detached, he
soon relaxed and joined the games, laughing and enjoying the activity. He began to
discuss some of his personal and family problems and this occasionally put him out of
step with others. He took every opportunity to talk, although he was not very articulate.
By the end of the year, he no longer had problems at school and was much happier. He
continued the following year.
Adolescent Group, 1993. The six initial members were from the previous group.
New members commenced at sessions 5 (Jay), 11 (Jake) and 27 (Aron). Brad returned
at session 18. Ben ended on session 29. Several members had prolonged absences.
There were 30 sessions; 12 were not recorded. Members from the previous 418
year were: Brad, Ben, Phil, Ernie, Ned and Eddie. Other members’ problems were:
Jake: Antisocial and aggressive behaviour problems.
Andy: Behaviour problems.
Jay: Anxiety disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, school refusal.
Ned attended from juvenile detention, was hostile, antagonistic and motivated by
getting the time out of custody. Unlike the previous year, he was belligerent, attacked
the intellectually disabled boys and was generally hostile, provocative and conflictual.
In the first half of the year Ernie continued to instigate war games as he had the
previous year. Ben and Phil were out of their depth in the increasingly conflictual group
with reduced support. Ben’s behaviour deteriorated at school with increased fighting
and defiance towards teachers, while Phil became more reserved. The decision was
taken to finish Ben’s time in the group at session 29 since he was beginning to lose the
achievements he had gained.
Jake and Andy commenced during the year. They were highly conflictual,
denigrated the other members and said they did not want to attend. Jake did not persist
with the group, while Andy finished the year. Jay joined late in the year, having been in
the 1990 Latency group three years earlier. When he entered secondary school, his
behaviour had deteriorated, he became more anxious and was unable to attend. In the
group, he was active and disruptive, tending to incite conflict. However, his anxiety
reduced by the end of the year. Eddie attended less regularly in the last term and
seemed frustrated that the rest of the group was not able to talk about themselves.
However, he continued to manage well at home and at school.
Towards the end of the year there was more conversation by group members
about themselves. This group was not as successful as the previous year, largely
because of Ned’s disruptive attitudes.
Adolescent Group, 1996. Three members had been in the group the previous
year. Brad had also been in the 1992 and 1993 groups. There were 35 sessions; 19
were not recorded. New members commenced at sessions 4 and 29. In addition to
Brad, there were:
Bert: Socially withdrawn, mild intellectual disability.
Sam: Depression, bereavement, social isolation. 419
Geoff: Social withdrawal, behaviour problems.
Tony: Anxiety disorder, social withdrawal.
Brad rejoined the group the previous year on a magistrate’s order following
involvement in a burglary incited by peers. His parents had returned to the city and he
was attending a technical college. During the group he turned 18, making him
significantly older that the others; his behaviour stabilised, he established a relationship
and went to live with his girlfriend’s family. He demonstrated insight into his problems
and a decision to manage his life appropriately. Bert was highly restricted when first
joining the group, but in the course of the year, he became more confident, joined the
games and talked about himself. His mother reported considerable improvement and he
began attending school; he continued in the group the following year. Sam had been in
the group the previous year. He suffered from depression following the death of his
mother and had been very isolated and bullied at school; in the group, he interacted
sporadically. During the year, he became more outgoing and began to enjoy himself,
taking a dominating role in organising activities and talking readily about various events
in his life. He began to make friends at school.
Geoff joined at the 4th session and was isolated and passive. By the end of the
year, however, he was engaging actively in the sessions and interacting with the other
members. His parents reported improvement at home and school. Tony was fearful and
restricted in his interactions and refused active participation for the first half of his time in
the group (he joined at session 19). Towards the end of the year, he began to interact,
participate in games and joke with the other members. His parents reported great
improvement in his participation in the family and his anxiety decreased. All except Brad
and Geoff continued in the group the following year.
Stable card games occupied most of the sessions. They were usually started by
Brad, who functioned as an auxiliary therapist, keeping order and interpreting the others’
behavior like a good-natured older brother. They talked about their lives during the
games and reluctant members gradually joined in. It showed maturity attributable to the
second year of stable groups.
Latency Group, 1990. This group consisted of six boys, although two stopped at
sessions 11 (Isi) and 17 (Len) and two started at session 18, (Tim and Jay). 420
None had been in groups before. There were 31 sessions; 6 were not recorded.
Isi: Chronic medical condition, social problems.
Len: Social withdrawal, behaviour problems.
Shaun: Behaviour problems.
Ken: Physical handicap, anxiety disorder, mild intellectual disability.
Bob: Behaviour problems.
Don: Anxiety, social problems.
Tim: Social problems
Jay: Behaviour problems, anxiety disorder (subsequently in the 1993 group).
Content Validity.
Content validity refers to how adequately the domain to be measured by a test
is represented in its items (Gregory, 1996). For the GFR, this means how adequately
the definition of communication covers the domain of social communication and how
adequate the Dimensions and their categories are to define group functions.
The validity of the conception of communication needs to be considered. The
GFR bases its observations on the fact of communication rather than its content (Simon
and Agazarian, 2000), context (Davis, 1977), purpose or direction (Ahlin, 1996). While
other techniques, document interpersonal “interaction” (Bales, 1980; Fuhriman and
Burlingame, 200; Kelly, 2000), the GFR regards this as a derivative of communication.
The description of communication adopted is that of Social Communication Theory
(Sigman, 1987, see chapter 10). Validation of such a broad definition of
communication and its presence or absence needs to be conducted by critically
analyzing other conceptions of communication and comparing their definitions of
communicative phenomena with those adopted. One approach would be to ask naïve
observers to judge the presence or absences of communication between 423
members from selected video segments and compare this with ratings defined by the
GFR. This could be augmented by replication studies and by applying the GFR to other
types of group.
The content validity of the dimensions and categories depends on how
adequately they represent the possible range of functional states within the dimensions.
The GFR assumes the existing categories cover possible states on each dimension for
adolescent groups. It is possible other types of groups may spend most of their time
within one or two states as presently defined. For example, a group of articulate adults
may remain in Functional Condensed state much of the time as they spend the sessions
discussing their problems. This requires the validity of the present categories to be
linked to the type of group and may mean that they would need to be re-structured to
provide sensitivity to the functional states relevant for the group to be observed (see
Chapter 26). Such requirements could be defined in relation to the therapeutic goals of
the group concerned. Some comments about each dimension are provided below.
Structure: The dimension of Structure will be validated by the existence of
communication since it documents the existence and extent of communication within
the group.
Cognitive Organization: This dimension is based on the notion that
communication is the fundamental context for the development of mind itself
(Durkheim, 1954; Mead, 1962; Burrow, 1927b; Foulkes, 1974; Flick, 1998) and the
dimensions are those of functional mind itself. Their validity rests on their relationship
with the relevant domains of social science – cognition, affect and action. However,
since the functionality of the mental dimensions is the object of observation rather than
their content, the definition of the dimensions is rudimentary compared to their
complex, sophisticated description in psychology, whose main concerns are with
content and processes rather than their existence. This is shown by the lack of
definition of cognition itself in texts describing its structures and functions (Newall,
1990; Posner, 1991). It is defined in a philosophical context (Gregory, 1987;
Honderich, 1995). Whereas “cognitive science” is the blanket term subsuming
cognitive phenomena in much contemporary thought (Posner, 1991; von Eckardt, 1993;
Audi, 1999), the GFR is intended to detect the emergence of cognitive capability within
the communicational field and so categories intend to differentiate states describing the
functional capacity of groups to undertake their therapeutic task. The 424
categories are defined from a review of theories of cognition to describe degrees of
organization (see Chapter 12). To validate them, independent examinations of the
fundamental organization of cognition would be required and they would then need to
be operationalised for the group situation.
Affect: The categories for Affect are derived from a review of emotion theory and
are intended to define fundamental aspects of affective quality applicable to groups.
Since they are affective properties of communication, they define the range of possible
states of hedonic quality and quantity. The same problem exists as for cognition, that the
literature concentrates on the content of affective states rather than their fundamental
character (Tomkins, 1961; Stein, 1991; Fridja, 1993). Content validation would require
independent analysis of the manifestations, interpreting them for the group
communicational context and then determining if they are encompassed by GFR
categories.
Action Coherence: The dimension of Action Coherence describes properties of
the field of group communication pertaining to cooperation or conflict. Rather than the
content of group action, the GFR records the emergence of the preconditions for group
action. As discussed in Chapter 13, the dimension of action is neglected in
psychological theory (Shotter, 1975) and is more commonly used in social theory
(Habermas, 1984, 1989; Joas 1991) and philosophy (Lennon, 1990). It has been used in
phenomenological psychology, but not for communication as such (von Cranach and
Harré, 1982). The content validity of this dimension of group communication needs to
be established by ensuring the present categories adequately describe the possible range
of coherence of communicational states. Like Cognitive Organization, it may be
necessary to add differentiations for other types of groups.
Therapists Interventions, Limits, Locomotion: Content validity should be
adequate for these dimensions since they are restricted to describing presence of
absence of various forms of communication by therapists.
Criterion-related Validity.
Criterion-related validity describes the extent to which the GFR estimates
performance on another criterion or measure. This might be conducted by rating the
same sessions with other instruments and showing whether findings are consistent, or
predictive of GFR performance. The problems here is again that the GFR 425
records group function and validation would need to be by other techniques estimating
group function. This may be done with test situations where more functional groups in
GFR terms would be predicted to perform better on tasks, such as problem solving or
other techniques from experimental social psychology (e.g., McLintock, 1972;
Berkowitz, 1976; Eiser, 1986; Tajfel and Fraser, 1986; Hewstone, et. al, 1993).
However, to show how well the GFR indicates group function towards
therapeutic goals, it would need to be compared with other group instruments. The
closest instrument to the intent of the GFR is the Matrix Representation Grid (Ahlin,
1996), which records dimensions of boundary character, communication flow, imagery,
emotional climate, self-disclosure, acceptance, relating pattern and authority pattern,
each with five ranked categories. Although it differs from the intent of the GFR, ratings
of the same material with both instruments should provide points of comparison and
validation. Other instruments for analyzing group change (Beck and Lewis, 2000)
could provide helpful validation of some aspects of GFR function. Those analyzing
communication are most likely to be helpful. The Group Emotionality Rating System
(Karterud, 2000) records verbal statements in categories representing fight, flight,
dependency, pairing, neutrality and mixed emotionality using Bion’s (1961) theory and
is likely to identify some Affect and Action Coherence categories. The Group
Development Process Analysis Measure (Lewis et al., 2000) may validate some GFR
findings on group development. While it postulates nine stages, they are described in
interpersonal interactional terms. The Psychodynamic Work and Object Rating System
(Piper and McCallum, 2000) may intersect with the notion of functionality postulated
by the GFR. Although it rates communication, it is content oriented towards specific
verbal messages related to personal psychodynamic themes. The System for Analyzing
Verbal Interaction (Simon and Agazarian, 2000), in spite of being restricted to
interpersonal and verbal communication, may also validate some GFR categories.
Another method of developing criterion-related validity would be by matching
members’ outcome with GFR functionality of sessions and evaluation of members’
social functioning, capacity for cooperation and communication skills, using formal
instruments and comparing the GFR findings.
Finally, criterion-related validity can be demonstrated by detailed content
analysis of sessions in parallel with the GFR ratings. Since the GFR describes group
states in terms of observable characteristics, narrative descriptions of the 426
events and interpersonal interactions will enable the character of the ratings to be
matched with the events. This can be done with high or low functional minutes and
sessions. Criteria of what independent therapists consider high or low quality function
could be developed and judged in relation to the content and then matched that with
GFR ratings.
Criterion-related validity was demonstrated by the GFR to the extent that the
progress of the groups were reflected anecdotally in members’ progress. The 1988,
1992 and 1996 groups were all associated with constructive outcomes for all members
at the end of the year. However, the 1990 and 1993 groups, which showed deterioration
in functional quality in the final term of the year and high levels of conflict were
associated with loss of members and some members not achieving personal therapeutic
goals.
Construct Validity.
Construct validity concerns validity of theoretical constructs or the concepts the
instrument purports to measure (Aiken, 2000). A construct is normally regarded as a
quality or trait on which individuals differ and the instrument registers (Gregory, 1996).
However, the GFR is not measuring, but recording the capacity for collective mentality
as indicated in collective functioning of group entities. This characteristic of functional
collective mentality is operationalised by GFR dimensions and categories. In tests,
construct validity is normally established by comparing results of the test with other
tests, procedures and findings to demonstrate convergent validity where similar
characteristics produce consistent results, or demonstrate discriminant validity where
different constructs or tests produce results that allow them to be discriminated
(Gregory, 1996).
GFR categories purport to provide an inclusive description of group structure,
cognitive organization, affect and action coherence. Comparison of GFR findings with
other group instruments (Beck and Lewis, 2999) should provide opportunities to
establish both convergent and discriminant validity since some factors are similar and
others are different to GFR measures. For example, there should be relationships
between instruments rating content of communication and GFR ratings describing
quality. Affect and Action Coherence on the GFR should be related to “Emotional
Climate” and “Boundary Character” on the Matrix Representation Grid 427
(Ahlin, 1996); conflict in Action Coherence on the GFR should be associated with
“Fight” on the Group Emotion Rating System (Karterud, 2000).
The constructs of GFR dimensions are derived from a diverse body of theory to
articulate concepts for a collective mentality theory. The task is not only to compare the
GFR with other instruments, but also to test them against as wide a range of theories as
possible to determine if their phenomena, states or characteristics can be described with
the existing categories or modifications that do not violate the integrity of the
dimensions.
A test of discriminant validity would be to apply the GFR to other types of
groups and identify whether there were phenomena that could not be described by the
dimensions and categories (allowing for their sensitivity to vary as discussed above).
Rating other types of groups would test other factors likely to influence construct
validity such as developmental stage, group differences and effects of interventions
(Gregory, 1996).
Internal Validity.
Internal validity ensures that causal inferences can reliably be made from the
results because of adequate controls for confounding of variables. The study is
descriptive, not an experiment; the method is designed to make observations of the
functionality of the social unit in adolescent psychotherapy groups and develop a
methodology to define and record group phenomena, based on a body of theory.
Threats to internal validity do not arise as they would in an experiment with
independent and dependent variables (Shaughnessy and Zechmeister, 1997). However,
in the results, some analyses did show risks to internal validity and control procedures
were undertaken to ensure reliable inferences could be drawn. For example, 428
when considering the influence of change in Affect and Action Coherence over several
minutes (see Chapter 20, hypothesis 3.3), the pooling of data necessarily counted
overlapping minutes. This was controlled by excluding overlapping data and ensuring
that the same trends were present in the modified data pool (which was the case, see
Chapter 20, section 3.3.1f).
Internal validity is often established by randomization, use of control groups and
other procedures designed to restrict the variables present (Shaughnessy and
Zechmeister, 1997). However, this study was designed to develop an empirical basis
for a mode of observation to show that complex social situations could be rendered
coherent. In the course of the groups, threats to internal validity were present. They
included extraneous variables impacting on the groups such as change of building
during 1996, failure of video records of sessions, loss of subjects, inconsistent
attendance and continuity of membership from one year to another. Some of these
factors could be controlled in the analysis by splitting the data pool to compare
differences such as loss of members compared with size of intact group and with
absentees (see results, Chapter 19, section 2.3.1b). This revealed differences of effect,
which however, did not negate other findings.
The internal validity of the GFR is supported by the fact that when the
distribution of combinations was examined (see Chapter 7, section 4) no contradictory
combinations were present. However, 204 of the possible 384 combinations of
categories were not observed. These combinations need to be examined and compared
with those that occurred to ensure internal validity was not compromised (see discussion
in Chapter 26). It could be argued that the occurrence of less than half of the
combinations suggests the GFR is more than twice as detailed as it needs to be. On the
other hand this may be a function of the restricted repertoire of communicational
function these groups demonstrated. Other groups may produce more or different
combinations. This could only be ascertained by rating other types of groups. More
work needs to be done to establish the GFR’s internal validity.
External Validity.
External validity describes the extent to which findings can be generalized
beyond the groups examined. Although little can be said about this from an empirical
point of view, the inclusion of a Latency Group (1990) in the study showed 429
that it demonstrated definite characteristics setting it apart from the adolescent groups
and was successfully rated by the GFR. The differences shown by the GFR suggest it
was sensitive to the different quality of groups of different age. However, this needs to
be repeated on other groups of various ages, conducted by other therapists and non-
therapeutic groups to establish its usefulness. It could also be used to rate appropriately
recorded educational or recreational groups.
Rob Gordon
University of Melbourne
STRUCTURE
Structure describes the communicating units within the group in a given minute.
UNORGANIZED: Common terms are not shared, inconsistent or not sustained for more
than 30". Contributions are simple declarations or actions, lack development of
ideas, have no sequential or constructive relation to others. Norms or rules absent;
overall meaning or purpose absent. Tasks not undertaken; information not
processed or responded to.
Examples:
• Talk in which members make comments which are not taken up or developed by
others; no consistent theme or topic for > 30".
• motor play, mucking around, uncoordinated activity lacking common theme; there
is no agreed "game".
• periods of confusion or disorganization
• when more organized activities collapse
Include: replies to comments lacking connectedness or sequence;
Exclude: question and answer and agree- or disagreement.
General Criteria
* Rate the highest functioning sub-group.
* Rate the organizational level which best describes the communication for the minute
or at least 30 seconds.
* When organization fluctuates or no clear rating is possible, rate Unorganized.
* If only 1 member talks and the others are not participating, rate Normative,
regardless of the organization of the member concerned.
435
Cognitive organization describes four different levels of organization of the
communication process. It presumes that members contribute to communications, which
have some relation to each other and content in themselves. It is the extent of organization
of the communication process itself. Four aspects of the communication structure are
distinguished in order to evaluate the structural aspects. They comprise (1) common
themes or terms; (2) the contributions which members make to the communication
process; (3) the relations between these contributions; (4) the systemic aspects of the
communication as a whole. Although these elements cannot be defined in detail for each
observation, they are described in the table below to assist in observing and judging the
process.
TERMS & Terms include any No common Common terms and Common terms, Common terms
THEMES common elements terms, inconsistent topics, shared by allow for elaboration refer to self or
which allow topics, themes or topics; members of common ideas group
ideas to be shared, members have and creation of a
actions or themes of their own themes group culture
communication, and topics.
CONTRI- Communicative acts Basic content, not Guided and bound by Themes are Contributions
BUTIONS of the members: developed or topics. Basic, descriptive, elaborated in a elaborate self or
utterances, actions, elaborated, narratives, reports not logical structure, group
responses idiosyncratic and expressing development There is a point or representations
inconsistent of ideas. One person relevance to the or refer to them.
may dominate sequence; bound by
rules and purposes
RELAT- Relations between No relations, or Relations present, but not Relations are logical, Logical and
IONS contributions, only rudimentary logical structures or sequential, with a associative
articulations related relatedness argument, only com- developmental order relations
to each other or between parison, similarity, agree and relevance. allowing the
operations that may contributions. /disagree, reply, sequ- Rules guide and theme to be
be undertaken by the encing; rules and norms direct the process, elaborated for
group. present but incomplete or may be implicit the whole group
ineffective
SYSTEM Overall goals, No system, no Overall meaning and Goal oriented, Goal oriented to
purpose, meaning purpose, direction connectedness, but not contri-butions to develop and
and directedness of or overall problem solving, elaborate on each understanding,
the communi-cation meaning. exchange and other to solve share or solve
process as a whole. communication are problems, gain problems about
reason enough. knowledge or the group or
undertake actions. selves
436
AFFECT
Affect describes the energy level and emotional quality within the group’s
communication. The affect does not necessarily have to be observed in each member.
One or two members may manifest a strong emotional state that influences the whole
group even though not all the other members can be said to share the same emotion.
Affect in this sense indicates the emotional state which is present within the group as a
whole in each minute according to the criteria below. These record the general affective
state of the group rather than attempting to describe the members’ specific emotions. Six
categories for group affect are derived from the matrix of two dimensions of quantity of
energy and hedonic quality as shown in the table below. Although specific emotional
names are given, they are intended to indicate group-affective states rather than the
emotions of individuals. The following table describes the energy level and hedonic
tension in the communication process.
PLEASURE UNPLEASURE
UNSTABLE Joy Distress
STABLE Interest Discontent
INERT Contentment Boredom/Apathy
BOREDOM: Unpleasurable mood leading to an inactive state of the group with little
overt communication or emotional expression; the communion is maintained but
there is a lack of significant energy among the members. Interpersonal tension is
present. No emotions > 30", Tension > 15".
Examples:
• Anger,
• Boredom,
• Paralysis,
• Frustration,
• Disappointment.
• Moods of sadness,
• Inability to tackle problems or engage in active communication about issues,
General Criteria:
* Unpleasure is rated when there is a mixture of positive and negative emotion since
this creates interpersonal tension.
* 15 seconds (quarter of a minute) is the minimum time for the presence of 439
unpleasure, instability or tension. This is best taken as a continuous period, but
may be cumulative over the course of the minute.
* Fluctuation needs to occur for more than 15 seconds for Joy or Distress.
* Rate the most obvious affective state in the minute.
* Rate Interest or Discontent when fluctuations occur for less than 15".
* Rate Discontent or Distress when unpleasurable tension is manifested by at least one
member.
* Contentment and Boredom are demonstrated by the majority of members even if one
member is more active.
440
PLEASURE UNPLEASURE
Definitions Rewarding hedonic quality, Aversive hedonic quality,
expresses increased together- expresses increased inter-
ness or shared emotional personal tension in the form of
states, decreased interpersonal separateness and different
tension, happiness, enjoyment, emotional states; anger
expressions of pleasure eg unhappiness, displeasure eg,
gestures, smiles, pleasant cries, facial grimaces, gestures;
modulations of the voice;
UN- Emotional energy level JOY: Pleasurable, unstable DISTRESS: Unpleasurable,
STABLE fluc-tuates, involving emotion, exultation, happi- unstable emotion, unhap-
discharge, reduction and ness, pleasurable excitement, piness, anger, grief, sadness,
increase. This can't be gladness, mirth, delight, en- unpleasurable excitement
maintained within the joyment expressed intensely, expressed with intensity,
communication process. It leading to marked fluctuations leading to fluctuation and
interrupts syntactical in energy and disrupts disruption in the syntactical
messages, shown in para- communication with non- communication process by
linguistic communication. syntactical contributions. paralinguistic phenomena.
Examples Jokes, laughter, boisterous, Anger, tears, shouting, abuse,
excited talk and play cries of pain, rage or
exclamations of pleasure, frustration, hits or jeering,
gestures, slapping on the back, teasing and mocking laughter
STABLE Emotional energy is main- INTEREST: Pleasurable DISCONTENT: Unpleas-
tained at a stable level for emotion maintained at a stable urable emotion at a stable
more than half the minute level that motivates continuing level, motivating continued
without discharge or involvement or becoming engagement even though in-
marked fluctuations. It more engaged in syntactic volving tension, frustration or
motivates maintenance of communication or the current dissatisfaction. Commu-
the current state of the activities. nication is maintained at
communication process. existing levels or increased.
Examples Pleasant conversation, Complaints, arguments and
modulated interaction in the disagreements accompanied by
context of a talk, game or other tension and aversive em-otion;
activity, interest as shown by teasing, criticism of a less
attention or questions to ensure intense type, talk about worries
contact. Talk of interest or and unhappy exper-iences
satisfaction of curiosity involving empathic responses.
INERT Energy level low, emotion CONTENTMENT: Pleas- APATHY: Unpleasurable
not expressed overtly; lack urable states involving little emotions leading to inactive
of arousal, may involve expressed emotion and state of the group with little
minimal communication, maintaining a communion that overt communication; com-
lack of syntactical does not involve significant munion maintained but lack of
messages, but contact overt exchange. significant energy
maintained.
Examples Quiet and unemotional states Boredom, frustration, paralysis
in which the group is in inability to tackle problems or
contact but not actively engage in active
exchanging such as following communication about issues,
a satisfying experience. moods of sadness, anger,
disappointment
441
ACTION COHERENCE
This describes the group's capacity to act as a group. Group action involves the
capacity to adopt a common goal and to cooperate in achieving it. The categories indicate
the stages from collective action where group members cooperate with each other through
to adopting diverse or incompatible goals or become uncooperative or oppositional
towards each other or the group goal. The ratings describe the condition of the
combination of all activities occurring in a group or subgroup; e.g. a game of cards with a
concurrent conversation. These processes are defined in terms of the observable acts
within the communication process.
Mixed Coherence: Where there are 3 or more fluctuations in the degree of
coherence throughout the minute or 30" rating interval such that no category adequately
describes the group's state, this is regarded as mixed coherence and is rated in terms of the
lowest (or most incoherent) category of activity present. Fluctuations involve a change in
coherence category to the lower category even though this may only last a few seconds.
CONCORD: All act as one in the pursuit of a common goal, expressed as a common
activity or concurrent activities in which each plays a cooperative role. There is a
clearly observable group action involving all members of the group or dominant
subgroup. All concurrent activities must be have the same degree of coherence.
This must occur > 30".
Examples:
• A closely coordinated discussion in which members maintain a theme and make
cooperative contributions;
• A game (irrespective of its organizational complexity - the cooperation and
common goal are rated).
ACCORD: Members demonstrate diverse, but compatible goals which are not
contradictory to each other. This must apply to all concurrent activities within the
unit. They act in cooperation, but not with a common activity. Rate this category
when the common goal or activity are failing or incomplete. There may be
differences, but cooperation occurs. There is no conflict. This must occur > 30".
Examples:
• Conversation which lacks goal or common theme;
• Games when there is a failure to maintain the goal or one or more members
remains within the structural unit but does not participate in the activity or
share the goal;
• Lack of coordination where the group fails to achieve an end; members are
engaged in different or unrelated activities but there is no particular
uncooperativeness or conflict; debates or constructive arguments which
preserve a goal or purpose.
• Competitive games, eg fighting of skittles as long as they agree to play.
of discord interspersed with higher coherence, this is mixed coherence and rated as
Discord. This must occur > 30".
Examples:
• Competition for resources, role, position or space,
• Disagreements about what to do or how to play a game,
• Argument or teasing while engaged in a cooperative game,
• Good natured teasing where the other is not really intended to be hurt,
• Arguments or disagreements resulting in threatening or disruption to the
conversation or activity with no active conflict or disagreements but a lack
of common activity or cooperation.
CONTRACORD: A member or members act against others with incompatible goals and
adopt an oppositional attitude to the group, therapist or other members. This
includes aggression, hostility, antagonism. It involves active opposition towards
others. This must occur > 5". Where there is mixed coherence with several
moments of Contracord not extended for the minimum 5" it is viewed a mixed
coherence and rated as Contracord.
Examples:
• Abuse,
• Coercion and intimidation,
• Fighting, hostile argument,
• Forcing others against their will,
• Verbal or physical threats of aggression,
• Taking or commandeering resources or space by force actual or threatened,
• Destructive behaviour, talk or action intended to hurt another or damage the group
or activity.
General Criteria
• Rate the largest or best functioning sub-group.
• Rate the category which best describes the minute (more than 30 seconds) for
Concord, Accord and Discord.
• Rate Contracord when ever a significant episode (more than 10" duration) of
opposition occurs within the minute
• Rate Discord and Contracord when one or more members act in a disruptive of
conflictual manner.
• Where the degree of cooperation and categories fluctuate throughout the minute,
rate it as Discord.
• Consider all concurrent activities in making the rating. It should reflect the
combined state.
443
THERAPISTS' INTERVENTIONS
The therapists' communications to the group or members are rated in terms of
being addressed to the group as a whole or to the members as individuals.
General Criteria
• The first three categories are rated mutually exclusively.
• Limit and locomotion are checked for each minute in which one or more of these
interventions occurs. The number of interventions is not recorded, only that at
least one occurred.
• Where an intervention overlaps a minute boundary, do not rate it in the second
minute unless it lasts more than 30 seconds.
• In the case of a dialogue between the therapist and one or more members, regard
the separate comments as though they comprise one intervention, unless
there is a 30 second break between comments.
• If an intervention starts at the end of 1 minute, but only part of the first sentence is
in that minute rate it in the next minute.
• Where the therapist addresses both group and member in an interaction, rate both
group and member intervention.
• Where no member is specified, and the object of the intervention is unclear, rate as
group intervention.
• When the therapist talks about a member, mentioning their name, but not talking
directly to the member, assume the group is being addressed about the
member.
445
GFR EXAMPLES
Draft 10.
The following examples indicate the ratings to be given to typical phenomena in
adolescent groups
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS
STRUCTURE & AFFECT: Rate the 15" that shows the best Structure or the worst Affect.
COGNITIVE ORGANIZATION & ACTION COHERENCE: Rate the first 31+" unless a
clear rating is not possible, then start rating the second 30" and rate the greatest part
of the minute.
STRUCTURE
Rate the best structure that is observable for 15" in the minute.
Absent members: when a member temporarily leaves the room, or is off camera and
cannot be seen or heard, treat as an individual and rate as SUBGROUP +
INDIVIDUAL.
Late arrivals: when only some members arrive on time and others arrive after the group
has started, rate those in the room at the time as though the group consists of them.
Looking: When a member is looking at the group from a distance, rate as a separate
INDIVIDUAL unless there is evidence of reciprocity in communication. If one
member just glances across from time to time while otherwise looking away and is
not otherwise involved or following the process, count them out of the communion
as an INDIVIDUAL.
Off Camera: when one member is off camera and there are no cues to their activity, count
as separate from the Communion and therefore as an INDIVIDUAL. When there
are two or more members off camera in the same part of the room and voices can
be heard, assume they are communicating and form a communion or SUBGROUP.
Same Activity - but separate: When a member separates himself from the communion
physically but continues to engage in the common activity (such as to prepare
something for the game) include him in the communion. This could be seen as
parallel play
Silence: When members are silent for the whole minute, rate as INDIVIDUALS unless
there is observable non-verbal communication between them.
Sitting together: If two or more members are close together, such as sitting on a couch,
rate as being in communion and forming a SUBGROUP even if not actually
communicating unless one member is talking to someone and ignoring the other
who is obviously not attending to the other.
COGNITIVE ORGANIZATION
Rate the best organization, which is evident for 30" in the minute. Rate the first
30"unless it is variable or ambiguous. If so, then rate as much of the second 30" as
required to get a 30" segment to rate.
Anecdotes disconnected: Where the anecdotes are not closely related and the members do
not seem to associate to each other's anecdotes and the sequence is not connected,
rate as NORMATIVE.
446
AFFECT
Rate the worst Affect evident for 15" within the minute except for JOY, which is
given preference over INTEREST.
Boredom: only rate this when members are showing BOREDOM by their expressions and
actions, e.g. yawning, slouching, gazing around etc. Do not rate BOREDOM just
because they are silent or inactive, this is rated as INTEREST if there is evidence
447
ACTION COHERENCE
Rate the worst Coherence evident for 30" in the minute. Rate the first 30" unless it
is variable or ambiguous. Then rate as much of the second 30" is necessary to obtain a
rating of 30".
Brief Discord: To rate DISCORD there must be at least 3 expressions of discord over 30".
Where there are brief moments of DISCORD lasting 5" or so, only rate as
DISCORD if there are at least three in 30".
Contracord: Examples of CONTRACORD include hitting, verbal abuse, swearing
intended to denigrate or hurt, pushing, kicking or other aggressive words or action.
Conversation: When talking together, CONCORD is rated when there is union in the
activity in the form of well-coordinated turn-taking and maintaining the theme or a
sequence of anecdotes on a common theme. This may include joke sessions,
movie anecdotes, discussion of events etc. If there are discrepancies in theme,
rhythm or sequencing, rate ACCORD.
Individual: When only one member is visible and there are no observations possible of
the others or there is only one member, rate as ACCORD
Individuals: When there are only INDIVIDUALS, rate the COHERENCE as ACCORD,
since they have individual goals, but since they are not communicating they must
not be incompatible.
Joking teasing: When there is teasing of one member by another, whether this is in a
joking way or with animosity, rate as DISCORD, even when this is done in a
conversational form.
Misunderstandings: When these occur between members of a communion such that the
communication is impaired, rate as DISCORD.
Questions and discussion: When all participants contribute to the discussion and share in it,
rate as CONCORD.
Silence: When members are silent for the minute, rate as ACCORD since they have
compatible goals.
Topics: In conversations, when there is agreement in the topic and common degree of
involvement (not necessarily verbal contributions though) rate CONCORD.
THERAPISTS' INTERVENTIONS
Overlaps: Where an intervention overlaps the boundary of a minute, if it only lasts a
448
couple of seconds in one minute, rate it in the minute that contains most of the
intervention. Rate an intervention in the minute in which it originates.
Non-verbal interaction: Do not count nods, "Mm-hm", looking while listening to a
member. Only rate verbal responses.
449
AFFECT: Energy level and hedonic tension in the communication process. > 15".
CONTENTMENT Inert, pleasurable, emotional states. Emotion & Tension < 15"
High energy, unstable pleasurable emotion.
JOY
Fluctuation > 15"; Tension < 15"
INTEREST Stable pleasurable energy. Fluctuation & Tension < 15"
DISCONTENT Stable unpleasurable or mixed emotion. Fluctuation < 15"; Tension > 15"
DISTRESS High energy, unstable, unpleasurable or mixed emotion.
Fluctuation & Tension > 15".
BOREDOM Low energy unpleasurable or mixed emotional states.
Emotion < 15"; Tension > 15"
450
MEMBER One or more members are addressed, but not all members of the
INTERVENTION group or subgroup.
GP & MEMBER Both group and one or more members are talked to within.
INTERVENTION
LIMIT A limit is set on the members, a rule is invoked or some attempt is
made to verbally or physically restrict the members' activity.
LOCOMOTION The therapist changes position in the room during the minute.
Table 17A.1. Frequencies for all GFR Categories for Adolescent Group 1988.
453
AFFECT
0
Contentment 1 Joy 2 Interest 3 Discontent 4 Distress
Count Count Count Count Count
STRUCTURE 0 Whole Gp COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 0 Concord 11
ORGANISn COHER. 1 Accord 4 29 1
2 Discord 2 9 2
3 Contracord 2 1
1 Systemic ACTION 0 Concord 2 13 65
COHER. 1 Accord 1 4 73 1
2 Discord 2 11 8 1
3 Contracord 2 1
2 Normative ACTION 0 Concord 1 2
COHER. 1 Accord 5 58 1
2 Discord 6 15 17
3 Contracord 3 2 4 3
3 Unorganised ACTION 1 Accord 20 46
COHER. 2 Discord 35 28 33 4
3 Contracord 5 4 11 8
1 Subgp COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 0 Concord 2
ORGANISn COHER. 1 Accord 9 1
1 Systemic ACTION 0 Concord 51 2 44 3
COHER. 1 Accord 3 2 31 1
2 Discord 2
3 Contracord 1
2 Normative ACTION 0 Concord 1 1
COHER. 1 Accord 9 38 1
2 Discord 9 2
3 Contracord 1 2 1
3 Unorganised ACTION 1 Accord 3 8
COHER. 2 Discord 3 3 3 1
3 Contracord 1 3 2
2 Sub+Ind COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 0 Concord 10
ORGANISn COHER. 1 Accord 1 13 1
2 Discord 2 2
3 Contracord 1 2
1 Systemic ACTION 0 Concord 29 6 126 4
COHER. 1 Accord 76
2 Discord 2 17 9 1
3 Contracord 1
2 Normative ACTION 1 Accord 1 91 2 1
COHER. 2 Discord 11 14
3 Contracord 6 5
3 Unorganised ACTION 1 Accord 3 38 1
COHER. 2 Discord 7 26 10 3
3 Contracord 4 2 16 1
3 Individuals COGNITIVE 2 Normative ACTION 1 Accord 9 1
ORGANISn 3 Unorganised COHER.
ACTION 1 Accord 1
COHER. 2 Discord 2 1
Table 17A.2. Frequencies of all GFR Categories for Latency Group 1990.
454
AFFECT
1 Joy 2 Interest 3 Discontent 4 Distress 5 Boredom
Count Count Count Count Count
STRUCTURE 0 Whole Gp COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 0 Concord 8 31 2 1
ORGANISn COHER. 1 Accord 13 26 14
2 Discord 8 8
3 Contracord 1
1 Systemic ACTION 0 Concord 3 12 2
COHER. 1 Accord 4 26 2
2 Discord 2 3 6 1
3 Contracord 1
2 Normative ACTION 0 Concord 15 1
COHER. 1 Accord 61 181 14 3 5
2 Discord 13 26 42 7
3 Contracord 1 3 2 3
3 Unorganised ACTION 1 Accord 20 49 3 4
COHER. 2 Discord 16 10 19
3 Contracord 1 1 3 6
1 Subgp COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 1 Accord 1 1
ORGANISn 1 Systemic COHER.
ACTION 0 Concord 3 7
COHER. 1 Accord 3 6
2 Discord 1
2 Normative ACTION 0 Concord 1
COHER. 1 Accord 5 23 1
2 Discord 1 1 1
3 Unorganised ACTION 1 Accord 9 13
COHER. 2 Discord 1 1
2 Sub+Ind COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 0 Concord 5 10
ORGANISn COHER. 1 Accord 4 14 11
2 Discord 2 1 2
1 Systemic ACTION 0 Concord 4 10 1
COHER. 1 Accord 2 13
2 Discord 3 3
3 Contracord 1 2
2 Normative ACTION 0 Concord 1 16
COHER. 1 Accord 56 193 15 9
2 Discord 3 12 14 1
3 Contracord 1 1
3 Unorganised ACTION 1 Accord 21 85 6 2 3
COHER. 2 Discord 9 7 32 6 2
3 Contracord 4 4
3 Individuals COGNITIVE 2 Normative ACTION 1 Accord 42 1 9
ORGANISn COHER. 2 Discord 6
3 Unorganised ACTION 1 Accord 29 2 13
COHER. 2 Discord 1
Table 17A.3. Frequencies of all GFR Categories for Adolescent Group 1992.
455
AFFECT
0
Contentment 1 Joy 2 Interest 3 Discontent 4 Distress 5 Boredom
Count Count Count Count Count Count
STRUCTURE 0 Whole Gp COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 0 Concord 8 1 14
ORGANISn COHER. 1 Accord 8 5 35 10
2 Discord 1 5 5
3 Contracord 1 2 1
1 Systemic ACTION 0 Concord 14
COHER. 1 Accord 4 14 1
2 Discord 1 2 1
2 Normative ACTION 0 Concord 5 19
COHER. 1 Accord 3 46 96 14 5
2 Discord 26 14 8 1
3 Contracord 1 4
3 Unorganised ACTION 0 Concord 2 1
COHER. 1 Accord 22 45 8 2
2 Discord 45 21 33 8 1
3 Contracord 8 2 5 10
1 Subgp COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 1 Accord 2 1
ORGANISn 1 Systemic COHER.
ACTION 1 Accord 1
2 Normative COHER. 1 Accord
ACTION 2
COHER. 2 Discord 1
3 Unorganised ACTION 2 Discord 1 1
COHER. 3 Contracord 2
2 Sub+Ind COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 0 Concord 1 3
ORGANISn COHER. 1 Accord 1 5 1
2 Discord 2
1 Systemic ACTION 0 Concord 23 1
COHER. 1 Accord 7
2 Normative ACTION 1 Accord 11 51 2 1
COHER. 2 Discord 1 5 3
3 Unorganised ACTION 0 Concord 1 1
COHER. 1 Accord 11 19 1
2 Discord 15 11 10 1
3 Contracord 2 1 1
3 Individuals COGNITIVE 2 Normative ACTION 1 Accord 18 2 2
ORGANISn 3 Unorganised COHER.
ACTION 1 Accord 5 11
COHER.
Table 17A.4. Frequencies of all GFR Categories for Adolescent Group 1993.
456
AFFECT
0
Contentment 1 Joy 2 Interest 3 Discontent 4 Distress 5 Boredom
Count Count Count Count Count Count
STRUCTURE 0 Whole Gp COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 0 Concord 1 22 1
ORGANISn COHER. 1 Accord 2 34
2 Discord 4
1 Systemic ACTION 0 Concord 16 47 225 8
COHER. 1 Accord 15 88 2
2 Discord 7 19 14
3 Contracord 1 2 2
2 Normative ACTION 0 Concord 1 4
COHER. 1 Accord 3 48 6 1 4
2 Discord 2 6 4
3 Contracord 1
3 Unorganised ACTION 0 Concord 1
COHER. 1 Accord 5 17 2
2 Discord 3 3
1 Subgp COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 1 Accord 2
ORGANISn 1 Systemic COHER.
ACTION 0 Concord 7
COHER. 1 Accord 2
2 Normative ACTION 1 Accord 3
COHER. 2 Discord 1
3 Unorganised ACTION 1 Accord 1
2 Sub+Ind COGNITIVE 0 Representational COHER.
ACTION 1 Accord 8 7
ORGANISn COHER. 2 Discord 1
1 Systemic ACTION 0 Concord 6 7 31
COHER. 1 Accord 3 7 1
2 Discord 3
2 Normative ACTION 0 Concord 2
COHER. 1 Accord 2 3 25 2 1
2 Discord 2 5
3 Unorganised ACTION 1 Accord 5 11 2 1
COHER. 2 Discord 1 3 2
3 Individuals COGNITIVE 2 Normative ACTION 1 Accord 19 3
ORGANISn 3 Unorganised COHER.
ACTION 1 Accord 15 1
COHER.
Table 17A.5. Frequencies of all GFR Categories for Adolescent Group 1996.
AFFECT
0
Contentment 1 Joy 2 Interest 3 Discontent 4 Distress 5 Boredom
Table % Table % Table % Table % Table % Table %
STRUCTURE 0 Whole Gp COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 0 Concord .1% 1.8% 11.1% 1.6% .1%
ORGANISn COHER. 1 Accord .4% 2.8% 1.6%
2 Discord .6% 1.9% .1%
3 Contracord .2% .1%
1 Systemic ACTION 0 Concord .1% 5.5% 19.4% .6% .1%
COHER. 1 Accord .7% 2.6% .5%
2 Discord .5% .9% .7% .1%
3 Contracord .2% .2% .1% .2%
2 Normative ACTION 0 Concord .2% 2.2%
COHER. 1 Accord .9% 4.5% .6% .6%
2 Discord .3% .4% 1.0%
3 Contracord .1% .1% .2% .1%
3 Unorganised ACTION 0 Concord .1% .1%
COHER. 1 Accord 1.2% 1.9% .3% .1% .4%
2 Discord 1.5% .5% 1.1% .1%
3 Contracord .1% .1% .2% .2%
1 Subgp COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 0 Concord .1%
ORGANISn COHER. 1 Accord .1% .1%
1 Systemic ACTION 0 Concord .1% .2%
COHER. 1 Accord .1% .2% .1%
2 Discord .1% .1%
3 Contracord .1%
2 Normative ACTION 1 Accord .1% .2%
COHER. 2 Discord .1%
3 Unorganised ACTION 1 Accord .1%
COHER. 2 Discord .1%
3 Contracord .1%
2 Sub+Ind COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 0 Concord .1% .9% .5%
ORGANISn COHER. 1 Accord .2% .6% 1.0%
2 Discord .2% .4%
3 Contracord .1%
1 Systemic ACTION 0 Concord .6% 5.3% .2% .1%
COHER. 1 Accord .6% 2.4% .1% .1%
2 Discord .1% .7% .4%
3 Contracord .1% .1% .1%
2 Normative ACTION 0 Concord .3%
COHER. 1 Accord .1% 2.0% .5% .1%
2 Discord .1% .3%
3 Contracord .1%
3 Unorganised ACTION 1 Accord .2% .9% .3% .1%
COHER. 2 Discord .2% .5% .2% .1%
3 Contracord .1%
3 Individuals COGNITIVE 2 Normative ACTION 1 Accord .5% .7% .2% .2%
ORGANISn COHER. 2 Discord .1% .2% .1%
3 Unorganised ACTION 1 Accord .9% .5% 1.1%
COHER. 2 Discord .3% .5% .3%
Table 17A.6. Percentages of all GFR Categories for Adolescent Group 1988.
458
AFFECT
0
Contentment 1 Joy 2 Interest 3 Discontent 4 Distress
Table % Table % Table % Table % Table %
STRUCTURE 0 Whole Gp COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 0 Concord .8%
ORGANISn COHER. 1 Accord .3% 2.1% .1%
2 Discord .1% .7% .1%
3 Contracord .1% .1%
1 Systemic ACTION 0 Concord .1% 1.0% 4.8%
COHER. 1 Accord .1% .3% 5.4% .1%
2 Discord .1% .8% .6% .1%
3 Contracord .1% .1%
2 Normative ACTION 0 Concord .1% .1%
COHER. 1 Accord .4% 4.3% .1%
2 Discord .4% 1.1% 1.3%
3 Contracord .2% .1% .3% .2%
3 Unorganised ACTION 1 Accord 1.5% 3.4%
COHER. 2 Discord 2.6% 2.1% 2.4% .3%
3 Contracord .4% .3% .8% .6%
1 Subgp COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 0 Concord .1%
ORGANISn COHER. 1 Accord .7% .1%
1 Systemic ACTION 0 Concord 3.8% .1% 3.2% .2%
COHER. 1 Accord .2% .1% 2.3% .1%
2 Discord .1%
3 Contracord .1%
2 Normative ACTION 0 Concord .1% .1%
COHER. 1 Accord .7% 2.8% .1%
2 Discord .7% .1%
3 Contracord .1% .1% .1%
3 Unorganised ACTION 1 Accord .2% .6%
COHER. 2 Discord .2% .2% .2% .1%
3 Contracord .1% .2% .1%
2 Sub+Ind COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 0 Concord .7%
ORGANISn COHER. 1 Accord .1% 1.0% .1%
2 Discord .1% .1%
3 Contracord .1% .1%
1 Systemic ACTION 0 Concord 2.1% .4% 9.3% .3%
COHER. 1 Accord 5.6%
2 Discord .1% 1.3% .7% .1%
3 Contracord .1%
2 Normative ACTION 1 Accord .1% 6.7% .1% .1%
COHER. 2 Discord .8% 1.0%
3 Contracord .4% .4%
3 Unorganised ACTION 1 Accord .2% 2.8% .1%
COHER. 2 Discord .5% 1.9% .7% .2%
3 Contracord .3% .1% 1.2% .1%
3 Individuals COGNITIVE 2 Normative ACTION 1 Accord .7% .1%
ORGANISn 3 Unorganised COHER.
ACTION 1 Accord .1%
COHER. 2 Discord .1% .1%
Table 17A.7. Percentages for all GFR Categories for Latency Group 1990.
459
AFFECT
1 Joy 2 Interest 3 Discontent 4 Distress 5 Boredom
Table % Table % Table % Table % Table %
STRUCTURE 0 Whole Gp COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 0 Concord .5% 2.1% .1% .1%
ORGANISn COHER. 1 Accord .9% 1.8% 1.0%
2 Discord .5% .5%
3 Contracord .1%
1 Systemic ACTION 0 Concord .2% .8% .1%
COHER. 1 Accord .3% 1.8% .1%
2 Discord .1% .2% .4% .1%
3 Contracord .1%
2 Normative ACTION 0 Concord 1.0% .1%
COHER. 1 Accord 4.2% 12.4% 1.0% .2% .3%
2 Discord .9% 1.8% 2.9% .5%
3 Contracord .1% .2% .1% .2%
3 Unorganised ACTION 1 Accord 1.4% 3.4% .2% .3%
COHER. 2 Discord 1.1% .7% 1.3%
3 Contracord .1% .1% .2% .4%
1 Subgp COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 1 Accord .1% .1%
ORGANISn 1 Systemic COHER.
ACTION 0 Concord .2% .5%
COHER. 1 Accord .2% .4%
2 Discord .1%
2 Normative ACTION 0 Concord .1%
COHER. 1 Accord .3% 1.6% .1%
2 Discord .1% .1% .1%
3 Unorganised ACTION 1 Accord .6% .9%
COHER. 2 Discord .1% .1%
2 Sub+Ind COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 0 Concord .3% .7%
ORGANISn COHER. 1 Accord .3% 1.0% .8%
2 Discord .1% .1% .1%
1 Systemic ACTION 0 Concord .3% .7% .1%
COHER. 1 Accord .1% .9%
2 Discord .2% .2%
3 Contracord .1% .1%
2 Normative ACTION 0 Concord .1% 1.1%
COHER. 1 Accord 3.8% 13.3% 1.0% .6%
2 Discord .2% .8% 1.0% .1%
3 Contracord .1% .1%
3 Unorganised ACTION 1 Accord 1.4% 5.8% .4% .1% .2%
COHER. 2 Discord .6% .5% 2.2% .4% .1%
3 Contracord .3% .3%
3 Individuals COGNITIVE 2 Normative ACTION 1 Accord 2.9% .1% .6%
ORGANISn COHER. 2 Discord .4%
3 Unorganised ACTION 1 Accord 2.0% .1% .9%
COHER. 2 Discord .1%
Table 17A.8. Percentages for all Group Dimensions for Adolescent Group 1992.
460
AFFECT
0
Contentment 1 Joy 2 Interest 3 Discontent 4 Distress 5 Boredom
Table % Table % Table % Table % Table % Table %
STRUCTURE 0 Whole Gp COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 0 Concord 1.0% .1% 1.7%
ORGANISn COHER. 1 Accord 1.0% .6% 4.2% 1.2%
2 Discord .1% .6% .6%
3 Contracord .1% .2% .1%
1 Systemic ACTION 0 Concord 1.7%
COHER. 1 Accord .5% 1.7% .1%
2 Discord .1% .2% .1%
2 Normative ACTION 0 Concord .6% 2.3%
COHER. 1 Accord .4% 5.5% 11.6% 1.7% .6%
2 Discord 3.1% 1.7% 1.0% .1%
3 Contracord .1% .5%
3 Unorganised ACTION 0 Concord .2% .1%
COHER. 1 Accord 2.7% 5.4% 1.0% .2%
2 Discord 5.4% 2.5% 4.0% 1.0% .1%
3 Contracord 1.0% .2% .6% 1.2%
1 Subgp COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 1 Accord .2% .1%
ORGANISn 1 Systemic COHER.
ACTION 1 Accord .1%
2 Normative COHER. 1 Accord
ACTION .2%
COHER. 2 Discord .1%
3 Unorganised ACTION 2 Discord .1% .1%
COHER. 3 Contracord .2%
2 Sub+Ind COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 0 Concord .1% .4%
ORGANISn COHER. 1 Accord .1% .6% .1%
2 Discord .2%
1 Systemic ACTION 0 Concord 2.8% .1%
COHER. 1 Accord .8%
2 Normative ACTION 1 Accord 1.3% 6.2% .2% .1%
COHER. 2 Discord .1% .6% .4%
3 Unorganised ACTION 0 Concord .1% .1%
COHER. 1 Accord 1.3% 2.3% .1%
2 Discord 1.8% 1.3% 1.2% .1%
3 Contracord .2% .1% .1%
3 Individuals COGNITIVE 2 Normative ACTION 1 Accord 2.2% .2% .2%
ORGANISn 3 Unorganised COHER.
ACTION 1 Accord .6% 1.3%
COHER.
Table 17A.9. Percentages for all Group Dimensions for Adolescent Group 1993.
461
AFFECT
0
Contentment 1 Joy 2 Interest 3 Discontent 4 Distress 5 Boredom
Table % Table % Table % Table % Table % Table %
STRUCTURE 0 Whole Gp COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 0 Concord .1% 2.7% .1%
ORGANISn COHER. 1 Accord .2% 4.2%
2 Discord .5%
1 Systemic ACTION 0 Concord 2.0% 5.8% 27.6% 1.0%
COHER. 1 Accord 1.8% 10.8% .2%
2 Discord .9% 2.3% 1.7%
3 Contracord .1% .2% .2%
2 Normative ACTION 0 Concord .1% .5%
COHER. 1 Accord .4% 5.9% .7% .1% .5%
2 Discord .2% .7% .5%
3 Contracord .1%
3 Unorganised ACTION 0 Concord .1%
COHER. 1 Accord .6% 2.1% .2%
2 Discord .4% .4%
1 Subgp COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 1 Accord .2%
ORGANISn 1 Systemic COHER.
ACTION 0 Concord .9%
COHER. 1 Accord .2%
2 Normative ACTION 1 Accord .4%
COHER. 2 Discord .1%
3 Unorganised ACTION 1 Accord .1%
2 Sub+Ind COGNITIVE 0 Representational COHER.
ACTION 1 Accord 1.0% .9%
ORGANISn COHER. 2 Discord .1%
1 Systemic ACTION 0 Concord .7% .9% 3.8%
COHER. 1 Accord .4% .9% .1%
2 Discord .4%
2 Normative ACTION 0 Concord .2%
COHER. 1 Accord .2% .4% 3.1% .2% .1%
2 Discord .2% .6%
3 Unorganised ACTION 1 Accord .6% 1.3% .2% .1%
COHER. 2 Discord .1% .4% .2%
3 Individuals COGNITIVE 2 Normative ACTION 1 Accord 2.3% .4%
ORGANISn 3 Unorganised COHER.
ACTION 1 Accord 1.8% .1%
COHER.
Table 17A.10. Percentages for all GFR Categories for Adolescent Group 1996.
Frequency, percentage, rank and cumulative percentage for all 180 states is
given in Table 17A.11 below.
462
State State Frequency Percentage Rank Cumulative State State Frequency Percen Rank Cumulative
No Percentage No tage Percentage
1 0120 681 10.70 1.0 10.70 91 3252 8 .10 90.0 0.0
2 0221 467 7.40 2.0 18.10 92 3322 8 .10 90.0 0.0
3 2221 398 6.30 3.0 24.40 93 0223 7 .10 94.5 0.0
4 0020 286 4.50 4.0 28.90 94 1111 7 .10 94.5 0.0
5 2120 267 4.20 5.0 33.10 95 2010 7 .10 94.5 0.0
6 0121 249 3.90 6.0 37.00 96 2130 7 .10 94.5 0.0
7 0321 192 3.00 7.0 40.00 97 0113 6 .10 100.0 0.0
8 0021 177 2.80 8.0 42.80 98 1110 6 .10 100.0 0.0
9 2321 169 2.70 9.0 45.50 99 2012 6 .10 100.0 0.0
10 0110 166 2.60 10.0 48.10 100 2313 6 .10 100.0 0.0
11 2121 148 2.30 11.0 50.40 101 2343 6 .10 100.0 0.0
12 0211 131 2.10 12.0 52.20 102 2351 6 .10 100.0 0.0
13 0312 127 2.00 13.0 54.00 103 3352 6 .10 100.0 0.0
14 0332 105 1.70 14.0 55.70 104 0033 5 .10 107.0 0.0
15 3221 97 1.50 15.0 57.20 105 0213 5 .10 107.0 0.0
16 0232 90 1.40 16.5 58.60 106 1231 5 .10 107.0 0.0
17 0311 90 1.40 16.5 60.00 107 1232 5 .10 107.0 0.0
18 0220 82 1.30 18.0 61.30 108 1332 5 .10 107.0 0.0
19 2211 72 1.10 19.0 62.40 109 1333 5 .10 107.0 0.0
20 0322 71 1.10 20.0 63.50 110 2233 5 .10 107.0 0.0
21 0222 68 1.10 21.0 64.60 111 0023 4 .10 115.5 0.0
22 1221 67 1.10 22.5 65.70 112 0123 4 .10 115.5 0.0
23 3321 67 1.10 22.5 66.80 113 0241 4 .10 115.5 0.0
24 1120 61 1.00 24.0 67.80 114 0310 4 .10 115.5 0.0
25 2100 58 .90 25.5 68.70 115 1312 4 .10 115.5 0.0
26 2332 58 .90 25.5 69.60 116 1322 4 .10 115.5 0.0
27 2322 57 .90 27.0 70.50 117 2112 4 .10 115.5 0.0
28 0031 55 .90 28.5 71.40 118 2143 4 .10 115.5 0.0
29 0032 55 .90 28.5 72.30 119 2212 4 .10 115.5 0.0
30 0212 53 .80 30.0 73.10 120 3232 4 .10 115.5 0.0
31 0122 52 .80 31.0 73.90 121 0012 3 .00 127.0 0.0
32 1100 51 .80 32.5 74.70 122 0043 3 .00 127.0 0.0
33 2021 51 .80 32.5 79.50 123 0133 3 .00 127.0 0.0
34 0231 46 .70 34.5 76.20 124 0201 3 .00 127.0 0.0
35 3351 46 .70 34.5 76.90 125 1011 3 .00 127.0 0.0
36 0010 44 .70 36.5 77.60 126 1101 3 .00 127.0 0.0
37 2311 44 .70 36.5 78.30 127 1123 3 .00 127.0 0.0
38 0132 42 .70 38.5 79.00 128 1130 3 .00 127.0 0.0
39 1121 42 .70 38.5 79.70 129 1343 3 .00 127.0 0.0
40 0111 41 .60 40.5 80.30 130 2022 3 .00 127.0 0.0
41 2232 41 .60 40.5 80.90 131 2323 3 .00 127.0 0.0
42 2020 40 .60 42.0 81.50 132 2341 3 .00 127.0 0.0
43 2031 38 .60 43.0 82.10 133 3241 3 .00 127.0 0.0
44 2122 36 .60 44.5 82.70 134 0142 2 .00 140.5 0.0
45 2312 36 .60 44.5 0.0 135 1020 2 .00 140.5 0.0
46 0022 33 .50 46.5 0.0 136 1030 2 .00 140.5 0.0
47 0030 33 .50 46.5 0.0 137 1031 2 .00 140.5 0.0
48 0011 31 .50 48.5 0.0 138 1131 2 .00 140.5 0.0
49 2222 31 .50 48.5 0.0 139 1220 2 .00 140.5 0.0
50 2231 30 .50 50.0 0.0 140 1233 2 .00 140.5 0.0
51 2110 28 .40 51.0 0.0 141 1342 2 .00 140.5 0.0
52 0343 27 .40 52.0 0.0 142 2033 2 .00 140.5 0.0
53 0251 25 .40 53.0 0.0 143 2131 2 .00 140.5 0.0
463
Table 17A.11. Frequencies and percentages of Group States for all Groups (shown as
category values in the order Structure, Cognitive Organization, Affect, Action
Coherence).
Group Development.
Tables 18A.1 – 18A.5 show the percentages of stable and positive or negative
changes in categories in successive minutes. The calculations are made by computing
variables for each dimension that compare each minute in each session (except the first
minute) with the preceding one and assign it a value of –1 if there was a negative change
(to a lower rated category), 0 if there was no change and +1 if there was a positive change
(to a higher rated category). The graphs in Figures 18.1 – 18.5 were drawn using the
464
value of the 0 (no change) percentage as an indication of stability. Tables 18A.1 – 18A.5
show the percentages of stability and change for each dimension for each group.
Structure
Whole
Grp Subgroups Subgp+Ind Individuals
Year 1 Cognitive Representational Row % 65.3% 4.0% 30.7%
Quartiles Organisation Systemic Row % 55.3% 9.8% 35.0%
Normative Row % 41.1% 6.1% 47.3% 5.5%
Unorganised Row % 43.1% 6.2% 34.8% 16.0%
Affect Contentment Row % 73.3% 26.7%
Joy Row % 66.9% 6.5% 26.6%
Interest Row % 43.0% 8.1% 42.8% 6.1%
Discontent Row % 53.5% 7.1% 35.3% 4.1%
Distress Row % 64.3% 35.7%
Boredom Row % 8.3% 25.0% 66.7%
Action Concord Row % 60.6% 7.9% 31.6%
Coherence Accord Row % 34.7% 8.6% 47.0% 9.7%
Discord Row % 62.3% 3.7% 31.5% 2.6%
Contracord Row % 68.1% 6.4% 25.5%
2 Cognitive Representational Row % 69.9% 1.4% 28.8%
Organisation Systemic Row % 69.6% 4.3% 26.0%
Normative Row % 62.0% 6.0% 27.0% 5.0%
Unorganised Row % 56.5% 2.4% 36.6% 4.5%
Affect Contentment Row % 55.6% 44.4%
Joy Row % 75.1% 2.6% 22.3%
Interest Row % 65.0% 4.9% 28.0% 2.0%
Discontent Row % 53.7% 3.2% 38.9% 4.2%
Distress Row % 62.5% 8.3% 29.2%
Boredom Row % 33.3% 16.7% 50.0%
Action Concord Row % 74.3% 4.0% 21.7%
Coherence Accord Row % 57.9% 5.1% 32.6% 4.4%
Discord Row % 64.4% 2.0% 32.8% .8%
Contracord Row % 71.0% 6.5% 22.6%
3 Cognitive Representational Row % 85.5% 1.5% 13.1%
Organisation Systemic Row % 57.8% 18.6% 23.6%
Normative Row % 56.0% 8.9% 29.6% 5.5%
Unorganised Row % 51.4% 4.0% 32.2% 12.4%
Affect Contentment Row % 25.6% 60.5% 14.0%
Joy Row % 73.3% 6.7% 20.0%
Interest Row % 61.7% 5.6% 29.4% 3.3%
Discontent Row % 65.8% 1.5% 23.6% 9.0%
Distress Row % 56.7% 10.0% 33.3%
Boredom Row % 36.1% 63.9%
Action Concord Row % 68.5% 14.4% 17.1%
Coherence Accord Row % 53.7% 7.4% 30.7% 8.2%
Discord Row % 65.3% 3.5% 26.0% 5.1%
Contracord Row % 68.2% 2.3% 29.5%
4 Cognitive Representational Row % 80.0% 3.0% 17.1%
Organisation Systemic Row % 67.9% 6.4% 25.7%
Normative Row % 57.5% 2.5% 26.2% 13.8%
Unorganised Row % 58.2% 4.4% 27.9% 9.5%
Affect Contentment Row % 6.4% 6.4% 87.2%
Joy Row % 74.8% 4.4% 20.8%
Interest Row % 68.0% 4.2% 22.6% 5.2%
Discontent Row % 65.8% 3.6% 26.7% 3.9%
Distress Row % 76.2% 4.8% 11.9% 7.1%
Boredom Row % 30.1% 21.7% 48.2%
Action Concord Row % 78.2% 1.5% 20.3%
Coherence Accord Row % 59.2% 4.9% 25.6% 10.3%
Discord Row % 68.4% 3.5% 24.3% 3.8%
Contracord Row % 59.2% 9.2% 31.6%
Table 19A.2. Percentage of Condensed States for different absentees for all groups for
year quartiles.
Table 19A.2 indicates the dynamic observed for Whole only emerges toward the
middle of the year. In the early part of the year, Limited states show the trend most
471
clearly; Functional states decrease with loss of members and trends are generally
opposite to those found overall and by the end of the year. This suggests several
dynamics influence these figures. At the start of the year, the groups appear to function
better when all are present and loss of members is a threat, creating increased Limited
states but reducing whole group functioning and Unsociable states. This may be
because the groups have not yet achieved a secure collective identity and are still trying
to consolidate their existence. The effect of absentees in reducing conflict and allowing
groups to function better is greatest in the middle two quartiles, suggesting the dynamic
of removing problems by absentees is greatest then. However, by the end of the year,
groups again are most functional with everyone present. Some groups had lost
members and were smaller then, but their capacity for Functional activity is greater and
they were more active and better able to perform with all members present.
Affect
change +/-
Negative
Affect
change
Action Change 3 Negative change 23
mins Previous No change 228
Positive change 34
Action Change 2 Negative change 18
mins Previous No change 238
Positive change 29
Action Change 1 Negative change 29
min Previous No change 231
Positive change 25
Action Change Negative change 91
No change 184
Positive change 10
Action Change 1 Negative change 15
min Following No change 203
Positive change 67
Action Change 2 Negative change 33
mins Following No change 218
Positive change 34
Action Change 3 Negative change 34
mins Following No change 223
Positive change 28
Table 20A.6. Frequencies of Action change three minutes before to three minutes after
negative Affect change for all Adolescent Groups, controlling for overlapping minutes.
negative Action change in the minute preceding negative Affect change. This is
followed by a further increase of negative Action change in the minute of Affect change
and then reversed in the minute after the change. The Latency group provides some
support for the hypothesis of Action preceding Affect change. However it is only
limited since there is a further increase in the minute of change.
Affect
change +/-
Negative
Affect
change
Action Change 3 Negative change 7
mins Previous No change 44
Positive change 7
Action Change 2 Negative change 7
mins Previous No change 33
Positive change 18
Action Change 1 Negative change 15
min Previous No change 37
Positive change 6
Action Change Negative change 24
No change 32
Positive change 2
Action Change 1 Negative change 4
min Following No change 37
Positive change 17
Action Change 2 Negative change 9
mins Following No change 35
Positive change 14
Action Change 3 Negative change 6
mins Following No change 41
Positive change 11
Table 20A.7. Frequencies of Action change three minutes before to three minutes after
negative Affect change for the 1990 Latency Group, controlling for overlapping
minutes.
YEAR: 1988
0
-1
-3
-4
-5
-6
-7
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33
SESSION
Figure 20A.1. Mean of Condensed states for each session for 1988, crisis
sessions: 7, 8, 11, 13, 21, 27 and 31.
YEAR: 1990
-1
-2
-3
Mean 9 Condensed States
-4
-5
-6
-7
1 5 7 9 11 16 18 21 23 25 27 29 31
2 6 8 10 12 17 19 22 24 26 28 30
SESSION
Figure 20A.2. Mean of Condensed states for each session for 1990, crisis
sessions: 5, 11, 19, 21, 28, 29 and 30.
476
YEAR: 1992
-1
-2
-4
-5
-6
3 6 8 12 14 16 18 22 25 29 31 34 36 38
4 7 11 13 15 17 19 24 26 30 33 35 37
SESSION
Figure 20A.3. Mean of Condensed states for each session for 1992, crisis
sessions: 7, 11, 12, 14, 19, 22, 30, 31, 35 and 37.
YEAR: 1993
-1
-2
-3
Mean 9 Condensed States
-4
-5
-6
1 3 5 7 8 11 12 17 18 21 22 23 24 25 26 28 29 30
SESSION
Figure 20A.4. Mean of Condensed states for each session for 1993, crisis
sessions: 5, 7, 8, 11, 17, 25, 29 and 30.
477
YEAR: 1988
100
90
80
%in(0,0) Stability of Constate
70
60
50
40
30
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32
SESSION
Figure 20A.5. Percentage of stable Condensed states for each session for 1988,
crisis sessions: 7, 8, 11, 13, 21, 27 and 31.
YEAR: 1990
90
80
70
%in(0,0) Stability of Constate
60
50
40
30
20
1 5 7 9 11 16 18 21 23 25 27 29 31
2 6 8 10 12 17 19 22 24 26 28 30
SESSION
Figure 20A.6. Percentage of stable Condensed states for each session for 1990,
crisis sessions: 5, 11, 19, 21, 28, 29 and 30.
478
YEAR: 1992
90
80
70
%in(0,0) Stability of Constate
60
50
40
30
20
3 6 8 12 14 16 18 22 25 29 31 34 36 38
4 7 11 13 15 17 19 24 26 30 33 35 37
SESSION
Figure 20A.7. Percentage of stable Condensed states for each session for 1992,
crisis sessions: 7, 11, 12, 14, 19, 22, 30, 31, 35 and 37.
YEAR: 1993
90
80
70
%in(0,0) Stability of Constate
60
50
40
30
20
1 3 5 7 8 11 12 17 18 21 22 23 24 25 26 28 29 30
SESSION
Figure 20A.8. Percentage of stable Condensed states for each session for 1993,
crisis sessions: 5, 7, 8, 11, 17, 25, 29 and 30.
In 1988, although session 7 has a low stability, sessions 8 and 21 have high
scores. Only sessions 11, 13 and 31 have significantly low scores. In 1990, only
sessions 19, 21 and 30 are low, but several others are on troughs: 11 and 19. In 1992,
sessions 7, 12, 14, 19 and 35 are low. In 1993, only session 7 is particularly low, but
sessions 17 and 30 are troughs.
479
YEAR: 1990
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
%i Stability
20
10 % Constructive
0 States
1 5 7 9 11 16 18 21 23 25 27 29 31
2 6 8 10 12 17 19 22 24 26 28 30
SESSION
Adopting the <45% criterion for the 1990 group shown in Figure 20A.9, crisis
sessions for stability occur at session 6, 19, 21, 22, 25 and 30. Other significant troughs
of stability occur in sessions 2, 11 and 16. For quality of state, the crises occur only at
sessions 21, 23, 28, 31 according to the strict criterion, but significant troughs also occur
at sessions 6, and 7. The synchrony between these two dimensions seems to be in phase
for most of the year except for a few points at sessions 2, 23, 29 and 31.
480
YEAR: 1992
100
90
80
70
60
50
% Stability
40
% Constructive
30 States
3 6 8 12 14 16 18 22 25 29 31 34 36 38
4 7 11 13 15 17 19 24 26 30 33 35 37
SESSION
YEAR: 1993
100
90
80
70
60
50
40 % Stability
30 % Constructive
20 States
1 5 8 12 18 22 24 26 29
3 7 11 17 21 23 25 28 30
SESSION
In Figure 20A.10, the stability and quality for 1992 shows that according to the
strict criterion there are stability crises at session 7, 8, 13, 15, 30, 31 and 35. Another
481
trough occurs at session 19. For quality, strict criterion crises occur at sessions 14, 29,
and 35. Other troughs are at sessions 8, 12, 19 and 33. The synchrony is consistent
except for two points at session 13 and sessions 30 and 31.
The stability and quality of sessions for 1993 shown in Figure 20A.11 indicates
that there are strict criterion crises for stability in sessions 1, 7, 21, 22 and 28. Other
troughs are at 17 and 24. For quality, there are strict criterion crises at sessions 5, 7, 21,
28, 29 and 30. Another trough is at session 25. The synchrony is consistent except for
three points at sessions 17, 24 and 30.
Limits by set
Therapists for
All Groups.
No Limit
Limit set
LAGS(STRUCTUR,1) Whole Grp Subtable % 60.1% 60.8%
Subgroups Subtable % 5.9% 5.9%
Subgp+Ind Subtable % 28.7% 31.3%
Individuals Subtable % 5.2% 2.0%
Structure Whole Grp Subtable % 60.3% 60.1%
Subgroups Subtable % 5.8% 6.6%
Subgp+Ind Subtable % 28.7% 31.2%
Individuals Subtable % 5.2% 2.1%
LEADS(STRUCTUR,1) Whole Grp Subtable % 60.1% 61.3%
Subgroups Subtable % 5.9% 5.7%
Subgp+Ind Subtable % 28.8% 31.0%
Individuals Subtable % 5.2% 2.0%
LEADS(STRUCTUR,2) Whole Grp Subtable % 60.2% 60.8%
Subgroups Subtable % 6.1% 5.0%
Subgp+Ind Subtable % 28.7% 31.5%
Individuals Subtable % 5.1% 2.7%
LEADS(STRUCTUR,3) Whole Grp Subtable % 60.2% 60.7%
Subgroups Subtable % 6.0% 5.4%
Subgp+Ind Subtable % 28.8% 31.0%
Individuals Subtable % 5.0% 2.9%
Table 21A.1. Percentage of Structure categories associated with Limits and No Limits
for all Groups for the minute in which the Limit is applied, the preceding minute,
“LAGS(STRUCTUR,1)” and the succeeding three minutes, “LEADS(STRUCTUR,1-3).”
482
Limits by set
Therapists for
All Groups.
No Limit
Limit set
LAGS(COGNORG,1) Representational Subtable % 16.6% 7.9%
Systemic Subtable % 37.7% 13.5%
Normative Subtable % 29.9% 31.3%
Unorganised Subtable % 15.8% 47.2%
Cognitive Organisation Representational Subtable % 17.1% 5.9%
Systemic Subtable % 38.1% 11.4%
Normative Subtable % 30.5% 28.7%
Unorganised Subtable % 14.3% 54.1%
LEADS(COGNORG,1) Representational Subtable % 16.5% 8.6%
Systemic Subtable % 38.2% 10.9%
Normative Subtable % 29.8% 31.6%
Unorganised Subtable % 15.5% 48.8%
LEADS(COGNORG,2) Representational Subtable % 16.4% 8.8%
Systemic Subtable % 37.9% 12.3%
Normative Subtable % 30.0% 30.8%
Unorganised Subtable % 15.6% 48.1%
LEADS(COGNORG,3) Representational Subtable % 16.5% 8.7%
Systemic Subtable % 37.9% 12.3%
Normative Subtable % 29.5% 33.3%
Unorganised Subtable % 16.1% 45.7%
Limits by set
Therapists for
All Groups.
No Limit
Limit set
LAGS(AFFECT,1) Contentment Subtable % 2.9% .6%
Joy Subtable % 13.6% 28.5%
Interest Subtable % 66.9% 47.6%
Discontent Subtable % 12.8% 17.8%
Distress Subtable % 1.2% 5.1%
Boredom Subtable % 2.5% .4%
Affect Contentment Subtable % 2.9% .4%
Joy Subtable % 13.8% 27.9%
Interest Subtable % 67.6% 44.5%
Discontent Subtable % 12.2% 20.6%
Distress Subtable % 1.0% 6.4%
Boredom Subtable % 2.6% .4%
LEADS(AFFECT,1) Contentment Subtable % 3.0% .3%
Joy Subtable % 14.1% 26.5%
Interest Subtable % 67.1% 46.6%
Discontent Subtable % 12.1% 21.0%
Distress Subtable % 1.3% 5.2%
Boredom Subtable % 2.5% .4%
LEADS(AFFECT,2) Contentment Subtable % 2.9% .4%
Joy Subtable % 14.4% 25.0%
Interest Subtable % 66.7% 48.6%
Discontent Subtable % 12.3% 20.1%
Distress Subtable % 1.3% 5.0%
Boredom Subtable % 2.4% .9%
LEADS(AFFECT,3) Contentment Subtable % 2.9% .4%
Joy Subtable % 14.7% 23.6%
Interest Subtable % 66.2% 50.8%
Discontent Subtable % 12.4% 19.4%
Distress Subtable % 1.3% 4.8%
Boredom Subtable % 2.4% 1.0%
Table 21A.3. Percentage of Affect associated with Limits and No Limits for all Groups
for the minute in which the Limit is applied, the preceding minute, “LAGS(AFFECT,1)”
and the succeeding three minutes, “LEADS(AFFECT,1-3).”
484
Limits by set
Therapists for
All Groups.
No Limit
Limit set
LAGS(ACTION,1) Concord Subtable % 35.1% 9.5%
Accord Subtable % 48.2% 46.7%
Discord Subtable % 14.5% 34.8%
Contracord Subtable % 2.2% 9.0%
Action Coherence Concord Subtable % 35.8% 6.2%
Accord Subtable % 49.0% 43.0%
Discord Subtable % 13.4% 39.8%
Contracord Subtable % 1.8% 11.0%
LEADS(ACTION,1) Concord Subtable % 35.6% 6.9%
Accord Subtable % 48.1% 46.8%
Discord Subtable % 14.0% 36.9%
Contracord Subtable % 2.2% 9.4%
LEADS(ACTION,2) Concord Subtable % 35.5% 7.5%
Accord Subtable % 47.2% 51.1%
Discord Subtable % 14.9% 32.9%
Contracord Subtable % 2.4% 8.5%
LEADS(ACTION,3) Concord Subtable % 35.3% 8.7%
Accord Subtable % 47.4% 50.1%
Discord Subtable % 14.8% 33.5%
Contracord Subtable % 2.6% 7.7%
Table 21A.4. Percentage of Action Coherence associated with Limits and No Limits for
all Groups for the minute in which the Limit is applied, the preceding minute,
“LAGS(ACTION,1)” and the succeeding three minutes, “LEADS(ACTION,1-3).”
485
Locomotion by Therapists
for All Groups.
No
Locomotion Locomotion
LAGS(STRUCTUR,1) Whole Grp Subtable % 60.9% 58.0%
Subgroups Subtable % 5.5% 7.6%
Subgp+Ind Subtable % 28.2% 33.1%
Individuals Subtable % 5.5% 1.4%
Structure Whole Grp Subtable % 61.0% 57.6%
Subgroups Subtable % 5.3% 8.0%
Subgp+Ind Subtable % 28.3% 32.5%
Individuals Subtable % 5.4% 1.9%
LEADS(STRUCTUR,1) Whole Grp Subtable % 60.9% 58.1%
Subgroups Subtable % 5.4% 7.9%
Subgp+Ind Subtable % 28.4% 32.0%
Individuals Subtable % 5.3% 2.0%
LEADS(STRUCTUR,2) Whole Grp Subtable % 60.7% 58.9%
Subgroups Subtable % 5.7% 6.6%
Subgp+Ind Subtable % 28.3% 32.6%
Individuals Subtable % 5.3% 2.0%
LEADS(STRUCTUR,3) Whole Grp Subtable % 60.9% 57.9%
Subgroups Subtable % 5.5% 7.4%
Subgp+Ind Subtable % 28.3% 32.5%
Individuals Subtable % 5.3% 2.2%
Locomotion by Therapists
for All Groups.
No
Locomotion Locomotion
LAGS(COGNORG,1) Representational Subtable % 17.4% 6.3%
Systemic Subtable % 37.5% 17.8%
Normative Subtable % 30.1% 30.4%
Unorganised Subtable % 15.0% 45.6%
Cognitive Organisation Representational Subtable % 17.8% 4.9%
Systemic Subtable % 37.7% 16.9%
Normative Subtable % 30.7% 27.8%
Unorganised Subtable % 13.8% 50.3%
LEADS(COGNORG,1) Representational Subtable % 17.4% 6.4%
Systemic Subtable % 37.5% 17.5%
Normative Subtable % 30.3% 29.7%
Unorganised Subtable % 14.8% 46.4%
LEADS(COGNORG,2) Representational Subtable % 16.9% 8.2%
Systemic Subtable % 37.4% 18.1%
Normative Subtable % 29.9% 31.1%
Unorganised Subtable % 15.8% 42.7%
LEADS(COGNORG,3) Representational Subtable % 17.0% 7.9%
Systemic Subtable % 37.3% 18.6%
Normative Subtable % 29.5% 32.6%
Unorganised Subtable % 16.3% 40.8%
Locomotion by Therapists
for All Groups.
No
Locomotion Locomotion
LAGS(AFFECT,1) Contentment Subtable % 2.8% 1.4%
Joy Subtable % 14.2% 24.1%
Interest Subtable % 66.5% 52.2%
Discontent Subtable % 12.8% 16.9%
Distress Subtable % 1.2% 4.8%
Boredom Subtable % 2.6% .5%
Affect Contentment Subtable % 2.8% 1.4%
Joy Subtable % 14.3% 23.8%
Interest Subtable % 66.6% 51.7%
Discontent Subtable % 12.6% 17.5%
Distress Subtable % 1.1% 5.3%
Boredom Subtable % 2.7% .3%
LEADS(AFFECT,1) Contentment Subtable % 2.8% 1.3%
Joy Subtable % 14.7% 22.4%
Interest Subtable % 66.0% 53.8%
Discontent Subtable % 12.6% 17.5%
Distress Subtable % 1.3% 4.6%
Boredom Subtable % 2.6% .4%
LEADS(AFFECT,2) Contentment Subtable % 2.7% 1.7%
Joy Subtable % 15.0% 21.0%
Interest Subtable % 65.7% 55.1%
Discontent Subtable % 12.7% 17.2%
Distress Subtable % 1.3% 4.5%
Boredom Subtable % 2.6% .4%
LEADS(AFFECT,3) Contentment Subtable % 2.6% 1.9%
Joy Subtable % 15.0% 21.0%
Interest Subtable % 65.5% 55.5%
Discontent Subtable % 12.7% 17.3%
Distress Subtable % 1.4% 4.0%
Boredom Subtable % 2.7% .2%
Locomotion by Therapists
for All Groups.
No
Locomotion Locomotion
LAGS(ACTION,1) Concord Subtable % 35.5% 11.8%
Accord Subtable % 48.4% 46.2%
Discord Subtable % 14.1% 33.4%
Contracord Subtable % 2.1% 8.6%
Action Coherence Concord Subtable % 35.7% 10.9%
Accord Subtable % 48.8% 44.6%
Discord Subtable % 13.6% 35.0%
Contracord Subtable % 1.9% 9.5%
LEADS(ACTION,1) Concord Subtable % 35.6% 11.3%
Accord Subtable % 47.9% 48.0%
Discord Subtable % 14.4% 32.1%
Contracord Subtable % 2.1% 8.5%
LEADS(ACTION,2) Concord Subtable % 35.6% 11.6%
Accord Subtable % 47.3% 50.2%
Discord Subtable % 14.9% 30.1%
Contracord Subtable % 2.3% 8.1%
LEADS(ACTION,3) Concord Subtable % 35.3% 12.6%
Accord Subtable % 47.1% 50.8%
Discord Subtable % 15.3% 28.7%
Contracord Subtable % 2.3% 7.9%
with a reduction in Sociable states and an increase in both Functional and Unsociable
states. Then in the minute after the intervention, there is a decrease in Happy Conflict
and Dysfunctional and an increase in Constructive states. In the second minute
following, this trend is reversed with a move towards Unsociable states and then in the
third minute, this in turn is reversed again with a move back to increased Constructive
states. This seems to introduce yet another instance of oscillation or rhythm in the
group’s functioning. Finally, for No Intervention from minute before the intervention
there is a trend from Unsociable states towards Constructive states, but in the following
three minutes there is a drift towards increased Happy Conflict and Dysfunctional.
1990: For the 1990 group, in the transition from the minute before the
intervention to the minute of the intervention, there are changes for Group Intervention
indicating increase in Functional, Limited Functional and Dysfunctional. In the
following three minutes, after the intervention, there is at first a reversal of this with a
reduction in Functional and Dysfunctional and an increase in Sociable. Then in the
second minute, there is a reduction in Happy Conflict, while in the third minute Happy
Conflict again increases showing the rhythmic oscillation. For Member Interventions,
there is a slight increase in Sociable and Dysfunctional from the penultimate minute.
Then in the first minute after the intervention, there is a movement from Sociable to
Limited Functional, followed in the next minute by a reduction in Dysfunctional and
increase in Happy Conflict with a further increase in this state in the third minute. As
time passes, Member Interventions are associated with a drift towards increased
conflict. For Group and Member Interventions, there is an increase in conflictual states
and Functional and a decrease in Sociable states, leading in the next minute to a
reduction in Happy Conflict and increase in constructive and Dysfunctional states. This
then oscillates between conflictual and Sociable in the next two minutes. No
Intervention is associated with a drift towards increased Happy Conflict in the following
minutes.
491
Th e ra p is t In te rve n tio n s fo r 1 9 9 2 .
G ro u p
&
G ro u p M em ber M em ber No
In te rve n tio n In te rve n tn In t In te rve n tio n
9 Condensed F u n c tio n a l S u b ta b le % 7 .3 % 6 .3 % 2 .9 % 3 .3 %
S ta te s # 3 L im ite d F u n c tio n a l S u b ta b le % 5 .7 % 3 .8 % 2 .9 % 2 .6 %
S o c ia b le S u b ta b le % 2 6 .8 % 2 5 .1 % 2 1 .5 % 2 9 .0 %
L im ite d S o c ia b le S u b ta b le % 2 4 .4 % 2 9 .9 % 2 6 .8 % 4 0 .9 %
U n h a p p y C o o p e ra tio n S u b ta b le % 5 .7 % 7 .7 % 7 .8 % 4 .1 %
H a p p y C o n flic t S u b ta b le % 9 .8 % 8 .7 % 1 4 .1 % 7 .1 %
P ro d u c tive Tu rm o il S u b ta b le % .9 % 3 .4 % .4 %
D ys fu n c tio n a l S u b ta b le % 1 5 .4 % 1 0 .4 % 1 3 .7 % 4 .5 %
N o m in a l S u b ta b le % 4 .9 % 7 .1 % 6 .8 % 8 .2 %
L E A D S (C O N D 9 ,1 ) -1 S u b ta b le % .8 %
F u n c tio n a l S u b ta b le % 8 .9 % 5 .4 % 4 .4 % 4 .5 %
L im ite d F u n c tio n a l S u b ta b le % 4 .1 % 4 .7 % 2 .9 % .7 %
S o c ia b le S u b ta b le % 2 2 .8 % 2 5 .6 % 2 3 .9 % 2 7 .1 %
L im ite d S o c ia b le S u b ta b le % 3 0 .9 % 2 8 .8 % 2 7 .3 % 4 1 .3 %
U n h a p p y C o o p e ra tio n S u b ta b le % 7 .3 % 7 .1 % 8 .8 % 4 .8 %
H a p p y C o n flic t S u b ta b le % 1 0 .6 % 8 .6 % 1 2 .7 % 8 .2 %
P ro d u c tive Tu rm o il S u b ta b le % .8 % .7 % 2 .9 % 1 .1 %
D ys fu n c tio n a l S u b ta b le % 9 .8 % 1 1 .4 % 1 0 .2 % 6 .3 %
N o m in a l S u b ta b le % 4 .1 % 7 .8 % 6 .8 % 5 .9 %
L E A D S (C O N D 9 ,2 ) -1 S u b ta b le % .5 %
F u n c tio n a l S u b ta b le % 4 .9 % 6 .4 % 4 .9 % 3 .0 %
L im ite d F u n c tio n a l S u b ta b le % 4 .1 % 4 .0 % 4 .9 % 1 .5 %
S o c ia b le S u b ta b le % 2 3 .6 % 2 5 .3 % 2 5 .4 % 2 6 .4 %
L im ite d S o c ia b le S u b ta b le % 2 8 .5 % 2 9 .9 % 2 5 .9 % 3 9 .4 %
U n h a p p y C o o p e ra tio n S u b ta b le % 1 2 .2 % 6 .9 % 7 .3 % 4 .5 %
H a p p y C o n flic t S u b ta b le % 7 .3 % 8 .5 % 1 1 .2 % 1 1 .2 %
P ro d u c tive Tu rm o il S u b ta b le % 1 .6 % .9 % 1 .5 % 1 .1 %
D ys fu n c tio n a l S u b ta b le % 1 3 .0 % 1 0 .5 % 1 1 .2 % 7 .1 %
N o m in a l S u b ta b le % 4 .9 % 7 .7 % 7 .3 % 5 .9 %
L E A D S (C O N D 9 ,3 ) -1 S u b ta b le % .8 %
F u n c tio n a l S u b ta b le % 7 .3 % 5 .9 % 5 .9 % 3 .0 %
L im ite d F u n c tio n a l S u b ta b le % 4 .9 % 4 .2 % 2 .4 % 2 .2 %
S o c ia b le S u b ta b le % 2 2 .0 % 2 5 .4 % 2 6 .3 % 2 5 .3 %
L im ite d S o c ia b le S u b ta b le % 3 2 .5 % 2 9 .6 % 2 9 .3 % 3 6 .4 %
U n h a p p y C o o p e ra tio n S u b ta b le % 8 .1 % 6 .5 % 7 .3 % 7 .4 %
H a p p y C o n flic t S u b ta b le % 9 .8 % 8 .7 % 7 .8 % 1 1 .9 %
P ro d u c tive Tu rm o il S u b ta b le % 1 .6 % 1 .3 % .5 % .7 %
D ys fu n c tio n a l S u b ta b le % 8 .1 % 1 0 .8 % 1 3 .2 % 6 .7 %
N o m in a l S u b ta b le % 4 .9 % 7 .6 % 7 .3 % 6 .3 %
In 1993, in the minute of intervention, all constructive states reduce and there is
an increase in all Unsociable states. In the 1st minute after, there are changes from
Sociable to Functional and to most Unsociable states and this tendency increases in the
2nd minute. However, it reverses in the 3rd with a reduction in Dysfunctional and
Nominal and an increase in Sociable states. In this year, it seems that Group
Interventions initially increase unsociable functioning and then lead to stabilization after
2 minutes. For Member Interventions, there is a reduction in Sociable in the minute of
intervention and the in the 1st minute after, this is reversed with Sociable continuing to
increase for the next two minutes and then reversing in favour of Functional in the 3rd
minute. Dysfunctional tends to oscillate between decreasing in the 1st minute then
increasing in the 2nd. For Group and Member Interventions, in the minute of
intervention there is little change but in the 1st after, there is a move from Unsociable to
Constructive states which continues as a drift in the 2nd minute and then stabilizes in the
3rd. These interventions are clearly effective in producing constructive change in the
group that is maintained for the three minutes. No Intervention shows a steady drift
towards Dysfunctional from the minute of consideration onwards.
495
Author/s:
Gordon, Peter Rob
Title:
A study of group psychotherapy: an empirical study of the whole group
Date:
2001
Citation:
Gordon, P. R. (2001). A study of group psychotherapy: an empirical study of the whole
group. PhD thesis, Department of Psychology, The University of Melbourne.
Publication Status:
Unpublished
Persistent Link:
http://hdl.handle.net/11343/39542
File Description:
A study of group psychotherapy: an empirical study of the whole group