SIGNIFICANT DOCTRINES IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

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JURISDICTION
 For jurisdiction to be acquired by a
court in a criminal case, the offense should
have been committed or any one of its
essential ingredients should have taken
place within the territorial jurisdiction of
the court. (Abalos vs. People, G.R. No.
136994, 09/17/2002)
 The rule therefore, in this
jurisdiction is that once a complaint or
information is filed in court, any disposition
of the case as its dismissal or the conviction
or acquittal of the accused rests in the
sound discretion of the court. Although the
fiscal retains the direction and control of
the prosecution or criminal cases even
while the case is already in court, he cannot
impose his opinion on the trial court. The
court is the best and sole judge on what to
do with the case before it. The
determination of the case is within its
exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A
motion to dismiss the case filed by the
fiscal should be addressed to the court
which has the option to grant or deny the
same. It does not matter if this is done
before or after the arraignment of the
accused or that motion was filed after an
investigation or upon instructions of the
Secretary of Justice who reviewed the
records of the investigation. (Santos vs.
Orda, Jr., G.R. No. 158236, 10/25/2004)
VENUE
 Venue in criminal cases is an
essential element of jurisdiction.
Experience has shown that under
the old rule, the offended party could
harass the accused in a libel case by laying
the venue of the criminal action in remote
or distant places.
The residence of a person is his
personal, actual or physical habitation or
actual residence or place of abode or his
actual residence or place of abode provided
he resides therein with continuity and
consistency. The term residence involves
the idea of something beyond a transient
stay in the place – one who transacts
business in a place and spends
considerable time thereat does not render
such a person a resident therein.
The absence of any allegations in
the information that the offended party was
actually residing where the crimes charged
were allegedly committed is a substantial
defect. (Agustin vs. Pamintuan, G.R. No.
164938, 8/22/20005)
INFORMATION
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 The real nature of the offense
charged is to be ascertained by the facts
alleged in the body of the information and
punishment provided by law, not by the
title or caption given by the prosecutor.
(Guinhawa vs. People, G.R. No. 162822,
8/25/2005)
 In Crespo vs. Mogul, the Court held
that once a criminal complaint or
information is filed in court, any disposition
of the case or dismissal or acquittal or
conviction of the accused rests with the
exclusive jurisdiction, competence and
discretion of the court. The trial court is
the best and sole judge on what to do with
the case before it. A motion to dismiss the
case filed by the public prosecutor should
be addressed to the court that has the
option to deny or grant the same. Contrary
to the contention of the petitioner, the rule
applies to a motion to withdraw the
information or to dismiss the case even
before or after arraignment of the accused.
The only qualification is that the action of
the court must not impair the substantial
rights of the accused or the right of the
people or the private complainant to
dismiss the case, or to quash the
information, or to withdraw the information
in compliance with the directive of the
Secretary of Justice, or to deny the said
motion. It does so not out of subservience
to or defiance of the directive of the
Secretary of Justice but in sound exercise
of its judicial prerogative. (Santos vs. Orda
Jr., G.R. No. 158236, 10/25/04)
 Where an information is already filed
in court, the remedies available to a private
complainant are within the courts, not
elsewhere. The information had been filed
and pending in the RTC. Therefore, the
discretion whether to dismiss the
information lay in the same court, as well
as the discretion to reverse its order of
dismissal. (Baltazar vs. Pantig, G.R. No.
149111, 8/9/2005)
 An order granting the withdrawal of
the information attains finality after 15
days from receipt thereof, without prejudice
to the re-filing of the information upon
reinvestigation. An order granting a motion
to dismiss becomes final 15 days after
receipt thereof, with prejudice to the re-
filing of the same case once such order
achieves finality. (Torres, Jr. vs. Aguinaldo,
G.R. No. 164268, 6/28/2005)
WAIVER OF OBJECTIONS TO THE
VALIDITY OF THE INFORMATION:
EXCEPTIONS
 It is basic that entering a plea waives
any objection the accused may have to the
validity of the information except on the
following grounds: (1) the information
charges no offense; (2) the trial court has
no jurisdiction over the offense charged; (3)
the penalty or the offense has been
extinguished, and; (4) double jeopardy has
attached.
The irregular procedure followed by
the dissent would encourage the pernicious
practice of ‘sandbagging’ where counsel
foregoes raising a pleading defect before
trial where it can be easily corrected only to
raise the defect later in the hope of
obtaining an arrest of judgment or new trial
from a sympathetic magistrate. (Miranda
vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 154098,
7/27/2005)
SUFFICIENCY OF INFORMATION
 The fundamental test in determining
the sufficiency of the material averments of
an information is whether or not the facts
alleged therein, which are hypothetically
admitted, would establish the essential
elements of the crime defined by law.
The court has ruled that evidence
aliunde or matters extrinsic of the
information are not to be considered. Sec.
3(a) of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court
authorizes the quashal of an information
when the facts therein do not amount to an
offense. The fundamental test in reflecting
on the viability of a motion to quash under
this particular ground is whether or not the
facts asserted, if hypothetically admitted,
would establish the essential elements of
the crime defined in the law. In this
examination, matters aliunde are not
considered. Anent the sufficiency of the
information, Sec. 6 of Rule 110 of the Rules
of Court requires, inter alia, that the
information must state the acts or
omissions so complained of as constitutive
of the element of the offense. (Cabrerra vs.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 162314-17,
10/25/2004)
 While it is necessary to allege the
essential elements of the crime in the
information, failure to do so is not an
irremediable vice. When the complaint or
the resolution by the public prosecutor,
which contains the missing averments, is
attached to the information, and forms part
of the records, the defect in the latter is
effectively cured, and the accused cannot
successfully invoke the defense that his
right to be informed is violated.
The character of the crime is not
determined by the caption or preamble of
the information nor from the specification
of the provision of law alleged to have been
violated but by the recital of the ultimate
facts and circumstances in the complaint or
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information. (Olivarez vs. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 163866, 7/29/2005)
 The acts or omissions complained of
must be alleged in such form as is
sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is
intended to be charged and enable the
court to know the proper judgment. The
information must allege clearly and
accurately the elements of the crime
charged. What facts and circumstances are
necessary to be included therein must be
determined by reference to the definition
and elements of the specific crimes. The
purpose of the requirement of alleging all
the elements of the crime in the information
is to inform an accused of the nature of the
accusations against him so as to enable
him to suitably prepare for his defense.
Another purpose is to enable the accused, if
found guilty, to plead his conviction in a
subsequent prosecution for the same
offense. The use of derivatives or
synonymous allegations of the basic facts
constituting the offense charged is
sufficient.
It is not necessary to allege in the
amended information a pattern of overt
criminal acts indicative of the overall
unlawful scheme or conspiracy because as
Sec. 3 of R.A. No. 7080 specifically provides
that the same is evidentiary and the general
rule is that matters of evidence need not be
alleged in the information. (Serapio vs.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148468,
01/28/2003; Laurel vs. Abrogar, 483 SCRA
243, March 27, 2006)
RIGHT TO BE INFORMED
 Where the date of the check and the
amount thereof as stated in the information
vary with the exhibits submitted by the
prosecution, which inconsistencies violate
the accused’s right to be informed, he
should be acquitted. Without a sufficient
identification of the dishonored check in the
information, the conviction of the accused
should be set aside for being violative of the
constitutional requirement of due process.
(Ongson vs. People, G.R. No. 156169,
8/12/2005)
ALLEGATION OF GENERIC
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
 A generic aggravating circumstance
must be alleged in the information if its
appreciation would result in raising the
penalty from reclusion perpetua to death.
(People vs. Herrera, G.R. No. 140557-58,
12/05/2001)
ALLEGATION OF QUALIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCES

 The fact that the qualifying
circumstances were recited in the second
paragraph and not in the first paragraph of
the information, as commonly done, is a
matter of form or style for which the
provincial prosecutor decided to write the
information differently, did not impair its
sufficiency. Nothing in the law prohibits the
prosecutor from adopting such a form or
style. As long as the requirements of the
law are observed, the information will pass
judicial scrutiny. (People vs. Lab-eo, G.R.
No. 133438, 01/16/2002)
DUPLICITY OF THE OFFENSE
 There is duplicity (or multiplicity) of
charges when a single Information carries
more than one offense. The Rules of
Criminal Procedure prohibit the filing of
such Information to avoid confusing the
accused in preparing his defense. (Loney
vs. People, 482 SCRA 194, February 10,
2006)
 As a general rule, the complaint or
information must charge only one offense.
The remedy of petitioner would have been
to move to quash at any time before
entering a plea on the ground that more
than one offense was charged in the
information. The failure of petitioner to
assert this ground in a motion to quash
before she pleaded to the information is
deemed a waiver. Consequently, she may be
validly convicted as many offenses as are
charged in the Information.
That the information was not so
worded in the terms defining the offense is
not fatal for the prosecution. It has long
been established that it is not necessary
that the acts and omissions complained of
as constituting the offense be stated in the
terms of the statute defining the offense.
(Herrera vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
140651, 02/19/2002)
FAILURE TO OBJECT ON THE
DUPLICITY OF THE OFFENSE IS
DEEMED A WAIVER
 The Rules of Court, particularly Sec.
13 of Rule 110, indeed frown upon multiple
offenses being charge in a single
information. However, petitioner failed to
raise the issues during arraignment. His
failure to do so amounts to a waiver and his
objections on this point can no longer be
raised on appeal. (Abalos vs. People, G.R.
No. 136884, 09/17/2002)
COMPLEX CRIME
 Where a complex crime is charged
and the evidence fails to support the charge
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as to one of the component offenses, the
accused can be convicted of the other. It is
fundamental that every element of the
offense must be alleged in the complaint or
information to comply with the
constitutional right of the accused to be
informed of the offense charged and to
enable him to set forth his defenses. The
accused is presumed to have no
independent knowledge of the facts that
constitute the offense.
It is also settled that an accused
cannot be convicted of an offense higher
than that with which he is charged in the
complaint of information or one which is
necessarily included in the offense charged.
The law accords him such benefit to
guarantee him his constitutional rights as
an accused. (People vs. Rama, G.R. No.
144386, 01/23/2002)
AVERMENT OF THE DATE OF
COMMISSION OF OFFENSE
 Sec. 11 of Rule 110 of the 2000
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure lays
down two rules with respect to the
averment of the date of commission of the
offense in the complaint or information: (1)
where time is not a material ingredient of
the offense, it is sufficient that the
information alleges that the act constitutive
of the offense was committed at the time as
near to the actual date when the same was
carried out, but; (2) where time is a
material ingredient of the offense, it must
be correctly alleged in the information.
(People vs. Dinglasan, G.R. No. 1333645,
09/17/2002)
INTERVENTION OF THE OFFENDED
PARTY IN CRIMINAL ACTION:
EXCEPTIONS
 An offended party may intervene in
the prosecution of a crime, except in the
following instances: (1) when from the
nature of the crime and the law defining
and punishing it, no civil liability arises in
favor of a private offended party, and; (2)
when from the nature of the offense, the
offended parties are entitled to civil
indemnity, but (a) they waive the right to
institute a civil action, (b) expressly reserve
the right to do so, or; (c) the suit has
already been instituted. In any of these
instances, the private complainant’s
interest in the case disappears and criminal
prosecution becomes the sole function of
the public prosecutor. (Rodriguez vs.
Ponferrada. G.R. No. 155531-34,
7/29/2005)
NATURE OF PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION
  Preliminary investigation is executive
in character and does not contemplate a
judicial function. Generally, preliminary
investigation falls under the authority of the
prosecutor. (Torres, Jr. vs. Aguinaldo, G.R.
No. 164268, 6/29/ 2005)
RIGHT TO PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION: ABSENCE OF
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
 It bears stressing that the
preliminary investigation is not a purpose except that of determining whether
constitutional right, but merely a right
conferred by statute. The absence of a
preliminary investigation does not impair
the validity of the information or otherwise
render the same defective. It does not affect
the jurisdiction of the court over the case or
constitute a ground for quashing the
information. It does not render the
information invalid nor affects the
jurisdiction of the court over the case. And
with more reason can it be said that the
denial of a motion for reinvestigation cannot
invalidate the information or oust the court
of its jurisdiction over the case, neither can
it be said that petitioner had been deprived
of due process.
The purpose of a preliminary
investigation is merely to determine
whether a crime has been committed and
whether there is probable cause to believe
that the person accused of the crime is
probably guilty thereof and should be held
for trial. As the court held in Webb vs. De
Leon, the finding of probable cause needs
only to rest on evidence showing that more
likely than not a crime has been committed
and that the suspect is probably guilty
thereof, and should be held for trial.
Probable cause does not need to be based
on clear and convincing evidence of guilt.
Absent any showing of arbitrariness
on the part of the prosecutor or any other
officer authorized to conduct preliminary
investigation, courts as a rule must defer to
said officer’s finding and determination of
probable cause, since the determination of
the existence of probable cause is the
function of the prosecutor.
The ruling in Rolito Go vs. Court of
Appeals that an accused shall not be
deemed to have waive his right to ask for a
preliminary investigation after he had been
arraigned over his objection and despite his
insistence on the conduct of the said
investigation prior to the trial on the merits
does not apply in the instant case because
petitioner merely prayed for a
reinvestigation on the ground of a newly-
discovered evidence. (Serapio vs.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148468,
01/28/2003)
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 Although the right to a preliminary
investigation is not a fundamental right
guaranteed by the Constitution but a mere
statutory right privilege, it is nonetheless
considered a component part of due process
in criminal justice. (Ong vs.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 126858,
9/16/2005)
 A preliminary investigation is not a
trial of the case on the merits and has no
a crime has been committed and whether
there is probable cause to believe that the
accused is guilty thereof and it does not
place the person against whom it is taken
in jeopardy. (De Ocampo vs. Secretary of
Justice, 479 SCRA 71, 2006; Romualdez vs.
Marcelo, G.R. No. 165510-33, 9/23/2005)
 While probable cause should be
determined in a summary procedure, there
is a need to examine evidence with care to
prevent damage to the potential accused’s
constitutional right to liberty and
guarantees of freedom and fair play.
(Preferred Home Specialties, Inc. vs. CA, 477
SCRA 387, 2006)
 Preliminary investigation is an
inquiry or proceeding to determine whether
there is sufficient ground to engender a
well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and that the respondent is
probably guilty thereof, and should be held
for trial.
Under the new rules of procedure,
preliminary investigation has only one
stage. Presidential Decree 911, upon which
the present rule is based, removed the
preliminary examination stage and
integrated it into the preliminary
investigation proper. Now, the proceedings
consist only one stage. (Almonte vs. Bien,
A.M. No. MTJ-04-1532, 6/27/2005)
 The 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure did away with the two-stage
preliminary investigation and, in its place,
provided a single and continuous
proceeding.
The investigation judge, if he does
not dismiss outright the complaint, must
issue a subpoena to the respondent
notifying him to submit his counter-
affidavit even after the investigating judge
had issued a warrant of arrest. (Gozun vs.
Gozum, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1324,
10/5/2005)
 It is basic that in the preliminary
investigation of a criminal offense, the
municipal trial judge has no legal authority
to determine the character of the crime – it
is the prosecutor who has the power to
determine the character of the crime or to
change the designation of the crime as may
be warranted by the facts. (Bitoon vs.
Toledo-Mupas, A.M. No. MTJ-05-1598,
8/9/2005)
 An investigating judge, after
conducting a preliminary investigation,
shall perform her ministerial duty which is
to transmit within ten days after the
conclusion thereof the resolution of the
case together with the entire records to the
provincial prosecutor, regardless of her
belief or opinion of the crime committed,
after conducting the preliminary
investigation which falls within the original
jurisdiction of her court. (Loss of Court
Exhibits at MTC-Dasmarińas, Cavite, Adm.
Matter No. MTJ-03-1491, 6/8/2005)
RIGHT TO PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION DOES NOT INCLUDE
RIGHT TO CROSS-EXAMINE
 Section 3(e) of Rule 112
provides that parties in a preliminary
investigation have no right to examine or
cross-examine.
The accused in a preliminary
investigation has no right to cross-examine
the witness which the complainant may
present. (Genil vs. Rivera, 479 SCRA 363,
2006)
DENIAL OF PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION
 To deny the accused’s claim to a
preliminary investigation would be to
deprive him of the full measure of his right
to due process.
A preliminary investigation has been
called a judicial inquiry. It is a judicial
proceeding when there is an opportunity to
be heard and for the production of and
weighing of evidence, and a decision is
rendered thereon.
The authority of a prosecutor or
investigating officer duly empowered to
preside or to conduct a preliminary
investigation is no less than a municipal
judge or even a regional trial court judge.
While the investigating officer, strictly
speaking, is not a “judge” by the nature of
his functions, he is and must be considered
to be quasi-judicial officer because a
preliminary investigation is considered a
judicial proceeding. A preliminary
investigation should therefore be conducted
so that the constitutional right to liberty of
a potential accused can be protected from
any material damage. (Sales vs.
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Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 143802,
11/16/2001)
CLARIFICATORY HEARING DURING
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IS
MERELY DISCRETIONARY
 A clarificatory hearing is not
indispensable during preliminary
investigation. Under Section 3(e) of Rule
112, it is within the discretion of the
investigating officer whether to set the case
for further hearings to clarify some matters.
(De Ocampo vs. Secretary of Justice, 479
SCRA 71, 2006)
WARRANTS OF ARREST
 Judges do not conduct a de
novo hearing to determine the existence of
probable cause - they just personally
review the initial determination of the
prosecutor finding a probable cause to see
if it is supported by substantial evidence.
(De Joya vs. Marquez, 481 SCRA 376,
January 31, 2006)
OBJECTION IN RELATION TO WARRANT
OF ARREST
 The rule is settled that any objection
involving a warrant of arrest or procedure
in the acquisition by the court of
jurisdiction over the person of an accused
must be made before he enters his plea,
otherwise the objection is deemed waived.
In other words, it is too late for accused-
appellant to raise an issue about his
warrantless arrest after he pleaded to a
valid information and after a judgment of
conviction was rendered against him after a
full-blown trial. (People vs. Whisenhunt,
G.R. No. 123819, 11/14/2001)
IRREGULARITY
 Any irregularity attendant to his
arrest, if any, was cured when he voluntary
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the
trial court by entering a plea of not guilty
and by participating in the trial. Moreover,
the illegal arrest of an accused is not
sufficient cause for setting aside a valid
judgment rendered upon a sufficient
complaint after trial free from error. (People
vs. Dela Cruz, G.R. Nos. 141162-63,
07/11/2002)
 We agree with the appellant that she
was not one of the accused named in the
search warrants. However, such fact did
not proscribe the policeman from arresting
her and charging her for violation of R.A.
No. 6425, as amended. There was probable
cause for her warrantless arrest
independent of that found by the judge
when he issued the search warrant against
Lao and Chan for search of the
condominium units at Atlantic drive and
Cityland.
Probable cause exists for the
warrantless detention and arrest of one at
the premises being searched when the facts
and the circumstances within their
knowledge and of which they had reliable
and trustworthy information are sufficient
to themselves to warrant a reasonable belief
of a cautious person that an offense has
been or is being committed. It has been
held that information from a reliable
informant, corroborated by the police
officer’s observations as to the accuracy of
the description of the accused, and of his
presence at a particular place, is sufficient
to establish probable cause. In this case,
the police officers received reliable
information and verified, after surveillance,
that appellant Lee and Lao were living
together as husband and wife in the
condominium unit and the appellant Lee
handled the accounting of the payment of
the illegal drug activities of Lao. Indeed,
the policemen found that the appellant
occupied the bedroom and slept in the
same bed used by Lao. The appellant took
her clothes from the same cabinet where
the subject shabu and paraphernalia were
found. The appellant had been living in the
same condominium unit with Lao since
October 1, 1996 until her arrest on October
25, 1996. Along with Lao, the appellant
thus had joint control and possession of the
bedroom, as well as of the articles,
paraphernalia, and the shabu found
therein. Such facts and circumstances are
sufficient on which to base a reasonable
belief that the appellant had joint
possession of the regulated drugs found in
the bedroom along with Lao, her live-in-
partner. For the purpose of prosecution for
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law,
possession can be constructive and need
not be exclusive, but may be joint. (People
vs. Huang Zhen Hua, G.R. No. 139301,
9/29/2004)
 Aside from the fact that the
respondent judge had sufficiently explained
why the warrant of arrest is dated earlier
that the complaint, the important thing is
that the warrant of arrest was not issued or
released for implementation before the filing
of the complaint. (Batic vs. Galapon, A.M.
No. MTJ-99-1239, 7/29/2005)
ASSAILING THE LEGALITY OF ARREST
 The rule is that an accused is
estopped from assailing the legality of his
arrest if he failed to move to quash the
information against him before his
arraignment. Any objection involving the
arrest of the procedure in the acquisition by
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the court of jurisdiction over the person of
an accused must be made before he enters
his plea, otherwise, the objection is deemed
waived. Even in the instances not allowed
by law, a warrantless arrest is not a
jurisdictional defect, and objection thereto
is waived where the person arrested
submits to arraignment without objection.
The subsequent filing of the charges and
the issuance of the corresponding warrant
of arrest against a person illegally detained
will cure the defect of that detention.
(People vs. Bongalon, G.R. No. 125025,
01/23/2002)
WARRANTLESS ARREST
 Under the Rules, peace officers may,
without a warrant, arrest a person under
any of these circumstances: (1) When, in
their presence, the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit, an offense; (2) When
an offense has just been committed, and
they have probable cause to believe, based
on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances, that the person to be
arrested has committed it, and; (3) When
the person to be arrested is a prisoner who
has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another, or from a penal
establishment where he or she is serving
final judgment or is temporarily confined
while the case is pending. (People vs.
Samus, G.R. No. 135957-58, 09/17/2002)
QUASHAL OF WARRANT OF ARREST
 Even if the petition for review
the resolution of the assistant prosecutor
was filed with the Secretary of Justice
before the issuance of the warrants of
arrest, the fact remains that the pendency
of a petition for the review of the
prosecutor’s resolution is not a ground to
quash the warrants of arrest. (Miranda vs.
Tuliao, 486 SCRA 377, March 31, 2006)
BASIS OF WARRANTLESS ARREST
 Personal knowledge of facts in
arrests without a warrant under Sec. 5(b) of
Rule 113 must be based upon probable
cause, which means an actual belief or
reasonable grounds of suspicion. The
grounds of suspicion are reasonable when,
in the absence of actual belief of the
arresting officers, the suspicion that the
person to be arrested is probably guilty of
committing the offense is based on actual
facts, supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to create
the probable cause of guilt of the person to
be arrested. A reasonable suspicion
therefore must be founded on probable
cause, coupled with good faith on the part
of the peace officer making the arrest.

The accused waived his objections
on the alleged irregularity of their arrest,
considering that they pleaded not guilty to
the charges against them and participated
in the trial. Any defect in their arrest must
be deemed cured when they voluntarily
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court.
For the legality of an arrest affects only the
jurisdiction of the court over the person of
the accused. Consequently, if objections
based on this ground are waived, the fact
that the arrest was illegal is not a sufficient
cause for setting aside an otherwise valid
judgment rendered after a trial, free from
error. Technicality cannot render
subsequent proceedings void and deprive
the State of its right to convict the guilty
when all the facts on record point to the
culpability of the accused. (People vs.
Escordial, G.R. Nos. 138934-35,
01/16/2002)
KNOCK AND ANNOUNCE PRINCIPLE/NO
KNOCK RULE
 Sec. 7 of Rule 126 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: Right
to break door or window to effect search. –
The officer, if refused admittance to the
place of directed search after giving notice
of his purpose and authority, may break
open any outer or inner door or window of a
house or any part of a house or anything
therein to execute the warrant or liberate
himself or any person unlawfully detained
therein.
The police officers were obliged to
give the appellant notice, show her their
authority, and demand that they be allowed
entry. They may only break open any outer
window or door of a house to execute the
warrant if, after such notice and demand,
such officers are refused entry to the place
of directed search. This is known as the
knock and announce principle, which is
embodied in Anglo-American Law. The
method of entry of an officer into the
dwelling and the presence and absence of
such notice are as important considerations
in assessing whether subsequent entry to
search and/or arrest is constitutionally
reasonable.
Unannounced intrusion into the
premises is permissible when (1) a party
whose premises or is entitled to the
possession thereof refuses, upon demand to
open it; (2) when such person in the
premises already knew of the identity of the
officers and of their authority and persons;
(3) when the officers are justified in the
honest belief that there is an imminent peril
to life or limb, and; (4) when those in the
premises, aware of the presence of someone
outside are then engaged in activity which
7
justifies the officers to believe that an
escape or the destruction of the evidence is
being attempted.
However, the exceptions above are
not exclusive or conclusive. In order to
justify a “no knock” entry, the police must
have a reasonable suspicion that knocking
and announcing their presence, under the
particular circumstance, would be
dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit
the effective investigation of the crime by,
for example, allowing the destruction of
evidence. This standard, as opposed to a
probable cause requirement, strikes the
appropriate balance between the legitimate
law enforcement concerns at issue in the
execution of search warrants and the
individual privacy interest affected by “no
knock” entries. (People vs. Huang Zhen
Hua, G.R. No. 139301, 9/29/ 2004)
SEARCH INCIDENT TO LAWFUL ARREST;
BUY – BUST OPERATION
 Sec. 13 of Rule 126 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedures explicitly
states that, a person lawfully arrested
maybe searched for dangerous weapons or
anything which may have been used or
constituted proof in the commission of an
offense without a search warrant.
Undoubtedly, appellant was lawfully
arrested, caught as he was in flagrante
delicto as a result of a buy-bust operation
conducted by the police officers.
A buy-bust operation is vastly
different from an ordinary arrest. In lawful
arrests in the course of a buy-bust
operation, it becomes both the duty and the
right of the apprehending officers to
conduct a warrantless search not only on
the person of the accused but also in the
permissible area within his reach, that
point which is within the effective control of
the person arrested, or that which may
furnish him the means of committing
violence or escaping (People vs. Cuenco, 298
SCRA 621, 1998). In other words, a
warrantless search incident to a lawful
arrest may extend beyond the person of the
one arrested to include the premises or
surroundings under his immediate control.
(People vs. Uy, G.R. Nos. 144506-07,
04/11/2002)
PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE
 The plain view doctrine is not an
exception to the warrant – it merely serves
to supplement the prior justification,
whether it be a warrant for another object,
hot pursuit, search as an incident to a
lawful arrest or some other legitimate
reason for being present, unconnected with
a search directed against the accused.

The immediate requirement means
that the executing officer can, at the time of
discovery of the object or the facts therein
available to him, determine probable cause
of the object’s incriminating evidence – to
be immediate, probable cause must be the
direct result of the officer’s instantaneous
sensory perception of the object.
The requirement of inadvertence
means that the officer must not have
known in advance of the location of the
evidence and intend to seize it.
The immediately apparent test does
not require an unduly high degree of
certainty as to the incriminating character
of evidence – incriminating means the
furnishing of evidence as proof of
circumstances tending to prove the guilt of
a person
Probable cause is a flexible, common
sense standard, merely requiring that the
facts available to the officer would warrant
a man of reasonable caution and belief that
certain items may be contrabanded or
stolen property or useful as evidence of a
crime – a practical, non-traditional
probability that incriminating evidence is
involved is all that is required.
The immediately apparent aspect is
central to the plain view exception. It is not
enough to prove that the sealed boxes were
in the plain view of the NBI agents –
evidence should be adduced to prove the
existence of all the essential requirements
for the application of the doctrine during
the hearing of the motion to quash. (United
Laboratories, Inc. vs. Isip, G.R. No. 163858,
6/28/2005)
SEARCH WARRANTS
 Still, no provision of law exists which
requires that a warrant, partially defective
in specifying some items sought to be seized
yet particular with respect to the other
items, should be nullified as a whole. A
partially defective warrant remains valid as
to the items not sufficiently described in the
warrant. A search warrant is severable, the
items not sufficiently described may be cut
off without destroying the whole warrant.
The exclusionary rule found in Sec. 3(2) of
Article III of the Constitution renders
inadmissible in any proceeding all evidence
obtained through unreasonable searches
and seizure.
A search warrant proceeding is, in
no sense, a criminal action or the
commencement of a prosecution – it is a
special and peculiar remedy, drastic in
nature, and made necessary because of
8
public necessity, resembling in some
respect with what is commonly known as
John Doe proceedings.
A search warrant is a legal process
which has been likened to a writ of
discovery employed by the State to procure
relevant evidence of crime – it is in the
nature of a criminal process, restricted to
cases of public prosecutions and not a
process for adjudicating civil rights or
maintaining mere private rights. A private
individual or a private corporation
complaining to the NBI or to a government
agency charged with the enforcement of
special penal laws, such as the BFAD, may
appear, participate and file pleadings in the
search warrant proceedings to maintain,
inter alia, to validity of the search warrant
issued by the court and the admissibility of
the properties.
A search warrant is not a sweeping
authority empowering a raiding party
undertake a fishing expedition to seize and
confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or
articles relating to a crime. (United
Laboratories, Inc. vs. Isip, G.R. No. 163858,
6/28/2005)
 Upon the filing of the application for
search warrant, the RTC was duty-bound to
determine whether probable cause existed.
In the determination of probable
cause, the court must necessarily resolve
whether or not an offense exists to justify
the issuance of a search warrant or the
quashal of one already issued by the court
The absence or probable cause will
cause the outright nullification f the search
warrant. (Ching vs. Salinas, G.R. No.
161295, 6/29/2005)
 The “probable cause” for a
valid search warrant has been defined as
such facts and circumstances which would
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man
to believe that an offense has been
committed, and that objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place
sought to be searched. In determining the
existence of probable cause, the examining
magistrate must make a probing and
exhaustive, not merely a routine or pro
forma examination of the applicant and the
witness. (Betoy, Sr. vs. Califlores, 484 SCRA
435)
DOCTRINE OF ELECTION OF REMEDIES
 In its broad sense, election of
remedies refers to the choice by a party to
an action of one of two or more coexisting
remedial rights, where several such rights
arise out of the same facts, but the term
has been generally limited to a choice by a
party between inconsistent remedial rights,
the assertion of one being necessarily
repugnant to, or a repudiation of the other.
While some American authorities
hold that the mere initiation of proceeding
constitutes a binding choice of remedies
that precludes pursuit of alternative
courses, the better rule is that no binding
election occurs before a decision on the
merits is had or a detriment to the other
party supervenes.
Nothing in the Rules signifies that
the necessary inclusion of a civil action in a
criminal case for violation of the Bouncing
Checks Law precludes the institution in an
estafa case of the corresponding civil action,
even if both offenses relate to the issuance
of the same check.
What Sec. 1(b) of Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court prohibits is the reservation
to file the corresponding civil action. The
fact that the Rules do not allow the
reservation of civil actions in BP 22 cases
cannot deprive the private complainant of
the right to protect her interests in the
criminal actions for estafa – in
promulgating the Rules, the Supreme Court
did not intend to leave the offended parties
without any remedy to protect their
interests in estafa.
A recovery by the offended party
under one remedy necessarily bars that
under the other – obviously stemming from
the fundamental rule against unjust
enrichment, this is in essence the rationale
for the proscription in our law against
double recovery for the same act or
omission. (Rodriguez vs. Ponferrada. G.R.
No. 155531-34, 7/29/2005)
BAIL
 A bail application does not only
involve the right of the accused to
temporary liberty, but likewise the right of
the State to protect the people and the
peace of the community from dangerous
elements. To appreciate the strength or
weakness of the evidence of guilt, the
prosecution must be consulted or heard. It
is equally entitled as the accused to due
process. The prosecution must be given
ample opportunity to show that the
evidence of guilt is strong. (People vs.
Antona, G.R. No. 137681, 01/31/2002)
 Without bail, an accused under
detention cannot be released
It is a dictum that a person applying
for bail should be in the custody of the law
or otherwise deprived of liberty. (Inoturan
9
vs. Limsiaco, Jr., A.M. No. MTJ-01-1362,En
Banc, 5/6/2005)
APPLICATION FOR BAIL IS NOT A
WAIVER TO ASSAIL IRREGULARITY
 Application for bail or the admission
to bail is no longer considered as a waiver
of the accused’s right to assail the warrant
issued for his arrest as regards its
attendant illegalities or irregularities.
(Almonte vs. Bien, A.M. No. MTJ-04-1532,
6/27/2005)
HEARING IN APPLICATION FOR BAIL
 Under the present rules, a hearing
on an application for bail is mandatory –
whether bail is a matter of right or of
discretion, the prosecutor should be given
reasonable notice of hearing, or at least his
recommendation on the matter must be
sought. Regardless of quantity, the sale,
trade, administration, dispensation,
delivery, distribution and transportation of
shabu is punishable by life imprisonment
to death. To grant an application for bail
and fix the amount thereof without a
hearing duly called for the purpose of
determination whether the evidence of guilt
is strong constitutes gross ignorance or
incompetence whose grossness cannot be
excused by a claim of good faith or
excusable negligence.
The prosecutor has the right to
control the quantum of evidence and the
order of presentation of the witnesses, in
support of the denial of bail, it is beyond a
judge’s authority to compel the public
prosecutor to exercise its discretion in a
way the judge deems fit, so long as such
exercise of discretion will not defeat the
purpose for which the hearing was held,
i.e., to determine whether strong evidence of
guilt exists such that the accused may not
be entitled to bail. (Mabutas vs. Parello,
A.M. No. RTJ-03-1817,RTJ-04-1820,
6/8/2005)
 Respondent judge should not have
granted bail simply on the failure of the
prosecution to prove that the evidence of
guilt of the accused was strong but should
have endeavored to determine the existence
of such evidence. Under the present rules, a
hearing is required in granting bail whether
it is a matter of right or discretion. A motion
to reduce the amount of bail likewise
requires a hearing before it is granted in
order to afford the prosecution the chance
to oppose it. In this jurisdiction, whether
bail is a matter of right or discretion,
reasonable notice of hearing is required to
be given to the prosecutor of fiscal, or at
least he must be asked for his
recommendation. If the prosecution refuses
to adduce evidence or fails to interpose an
objection, it is still mandatory for the court
to conduct a hearing or ask searching and
clarificatory questions. In fact, even in
cases where there is no petition for bail, a
hearing should still be held. (Te vs. Perea,
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1286, 01/21/2002)
BAIL, WHERE FILED
 Section 17 of Rule 114 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure now provides
that bail in the amount fixed may be filed
with the court where the case is pending, or
in the absence or unavailability of the judge
thereof, with another branch of the same
court within the province or city. (Catiis vs.
CA, 482 SCRA 71, February 9, 2006)
 If the accused is arrested in a
province, city or municipality, other than
where the case is pending, bail may be filed
with any Regional Trial Court of said place,
or if no judge thereof is available, with any
metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial
judge, or municipal circuit trial judge
therein – a judge in any other place has no
authority to act thereon. (Inoturan vs.
Limsiaco, Jr., A.M. No. MTJ-01-1362, En
Banc, 5/6/2005)
BAIL, WHEN DISCRETIONARY
 If the accused is charged with an
offense punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, the judge
should not grant bail for his provisional
release regardless of whether or not the
prosecutor recommends bail for the
provisional release of the accused.
However, if the accused has been brought
under custody of the court, he may file a
petition for bail for his provisional liberty.
If after the requisite hearing, the court finds
that the evidence of the accused is strong,
the petition shall be denied. Consequently,
the accused will remain under the custody
of the court. However, if the evidence of
guilt of the accused is not strong, the
petition shall be granted and the accused
discharged upon approval of the bail bond,
in such amount fixed by the court, taking
into consideration the guidelines set forth
in Sec. 9 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, in tandem with DOJ
Department Circular No. 74 as well as the
recommendation of the public prosecutor.
(People vs. Hu Ruey Chun, G.R. No. 158064,
6/30/2005)
 Every judge should know by heart
that in indictments for capital offenses like
syndicated estafa, bail should not be
granted when the evidence of guilt is
strong. (Bitoon vs. Toledo-Mupas, A.M. No.
MTJ-05-1598, 8/9/2005)
10
 A person charged with a capital
offense is not absolutely denied the
opportunity to obtain provisional liberty on
bail pending the judgment of his case.
However, as to such person, bail is not a
matter of right but is discretionary upon
the court. Had the rule been otherwise, the
Rules would not have provided for an
application for bail by a person charged
with a capital offense under Rule 114.
Under the foregoing, there must be a
showing that the evidence of guilt against a
person charged with a capital offense is not
strong for the court to grant him bail. Thus,
upon an application for bail by the person
charged with a capital offense, a hearing
thereon must be conducted, where the
prosecution must be accorded an
opportunity to discharge its burden of
proving that the evidence of guilt against an
accused is strong. The prosecution shall be
accorded the opportunity to present all the
evidence it may deem necessary for this
purpose. When it is satisfactorily
demonstrated that the evidence of guilt is
strong, it is the court’s duty to deny the
application for bail. However, when the
evidence of guilt is not enough, bail
becomes a matter of right. (Serapio vs.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148468,
01/28/2003)
APPLICATION FOR BAIL AND FILING A
MOTION TO QUASH SIMULTANEOUSLY
 The Court finds that no such
inconsistency exists between an application
of an accused for bail and his filing of a
motion to quash. Bail is the security given
for the release of a person in the custody of
the law, furnished by him or a bondsman,
to guarantee his appearance before any
court as required under the conditions set
forth under the Rules of Court. Its purpose
is to obtain the provisional liberty of a
person charged with an offense until his
conviction while at the same time securing
his appearance at the trial. As stated
earlier, a person may apply for bail from the
moment that he is deprived of his liberty by
virtue of his arrest.
On the other hand, a motion to
quash an information is the mode by which
an accused assails the validity of a criminal
complaint or information filed against him
for insufficiency, or for defects, which are
apparent in the facts of the information. An
accused may file a motion to quash the
information as a general rule, before
arraignment.
The right of an accused to see
provisional liberty does not preclude his
right to assail the validity of the information
charging him with such offense. (Serapio
vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148468,
01/28/2003)
WHEN THE EVIDENCE OF GUILT IS
STRONG
 The constitutional mandate makes
the grant or denial of bail in capital offenses
hinge on the issue of whether or not the
evidence of guilt of the accused is strong.
This requires that the trial court conduct
bail hearings wherein both the prosecution
and the defense are afforded sufficient
opportunity to present their respective
evidence. The burden of proof lies with the
prosecution to show strong evidence of
guilt.
The Court is not in a position to
grant bail to the petitioner as the matter
requires evidentiary hearing that should be
conducted by the Sandiganbayan. (Estrada
vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148965,
02/26/2002)
DUTY OF THE JUDGE IN GRANTING BAIL
APPLICATION
 The absence of objection from the
prosecution in such cases is never a basis
for the grant of bail in such cases for the
judge has no right to presume that the
prosecutor knows what he is doing on
account of the familiarity with the case.
Judicial discretion is the domain of
the judge before whom the petition for
provisional liberty will be decided. The
mandated duty to exercise discretion has
never been reposed upon the prosecutor.
We reiterate the following duties of
judges in case an application for bail is
filed: (1) in all cases, whether bail is a
matter of right or discretion, notify the
prosecutor of the hearing of the application
for bail or require him to submit his
recommendation; (2) where bail is a matter
of discretion, conduct a hearing of the
application for bail regardless of whether or
not the prosecution refuses to present
evidence to show that the guilt of the
accused is strong for the purpose of
enabling the court to exercise its sound
discretion, and; (3) Decide whether the guilt
of the accused is strong based on the
summary of evidence of the prosecution;
and if the guilt of the accused is not strong,
discharge the accused upon the approval of
the bail bond. Otherwise the bail should be
denied. (Te vs. Perea, A.M. No. MTJ-00-
1286, 01/21/2002)
ORDER GRANTING BAIL
 While an accused charged with a
capital offense is not entitled to bail at any
time during trial when the evidence of guilt
11
is strong, it does not mean, however, that a
grant thereof can be questioned any time
and without regard to the period of filing
provided by the Rules of Court.
An order granting bail is an
interlocutory order. The word interlocutory
refers to something intervening between the
commencement and the end of a suit which
decides some point or matter but is not a
final decision of the whole controversy. The
60-day period within which to file a special
civil action for certiorari was specifically set
to avoid any unreasonable delay that would
violate the constitutional rights of parties to
a speedy disposition of their cases. (Pobre
vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141805,
7/8/2005)
 Bail may be granted to a
possible extraditee only upon a clear and
convincing proof (1) that he will not be a
flight risk or a danger to the community,
and (2) that there exists special,
humanitarian and compelling
circumstances. (Rodriguez vs. Presiding
Judge, RTC, Manila, Br. 17, 483 SCRA 290,
March 27, 2006)
CANCELLATION OF BAIL BOND
 Petitioner submits that by
surrendering the accused who is now in
jail, her application for cancellation of bail
in the four criminal cases is allowed under
Sec. 19, now Sec. 22 of Rule 114 of the
revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as
amended, which provides: “Sec. 22.
Cancellation of bail — Upon application of
the bondsmen, with due notice to the
prosecutor, the bail may be cancelled upon
surrender of the accused or proof of his
death.”
The bail shall be deemed
automatically cancelled upon acquittal of
the accused, dismissal of the case, or
execution of the judgment of conviction. In
all instances, the cancellation shall be
without prejudice to any liability on the
bail.
Petitioner’s submission is
misplaced. The first paragraph of Sec. 22
contemplates of a situation, where, among
others, the surety or bondsman surrenders
the accused to the court that ordered the
latter’s arrest. Thereafter, the court, upon
application by the surety or bondsman,
cancels the bail bond. We hold that the
cash bail bond cannot be cancelled.
Petitioner did not surrender the accused,
charged in the four criminal cases, to the
trial court. The accused was arrested and
detained because he was charged in a
subsequent criminal case. Moreover, the
bail bond posted for the accused was in the
form of cash deposit, which as mandated by
Sec. 14 of Rule 114, shall be applied to the
payment of fine and costs, and the excess if
any, shall be returned to the accused or to
any person who made the deposit. (Esteban
vs. Alhambra, G.R. No. 135012, 9/7/2004)
FORFEITURE OF BAIL BOND
 There are two occasions upon which
the trial court judge may rule adversely
against the bondsmen in cases when the
accused fails to appear in court, first
summary forfeiture of the bond and,
second, judgment against the amount of
the bond.
Judgment against the bondsmen on
the bond may be construed as a final order
hence subject to appeal. (Reliance Surety &
Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Amante, Jr., G.R. No.
150994, 6/ 30/ 2005)
 The cancellation of
petitioner’s bail, without prior notice and
hearing, could be considered a violation of
co-petitioner’s right to due process
tantamount to grave abuse of discretion.
(Rodriguez vs. Presiding Judge, RTC,
Manila, Br. 17, 483 SCRA 290, March 27,
2006)
ARRAIGNMENT BEFORE BAIL
 In Lavides vs. Court of Appeals, this
Court ruled on the issue of whether an
accused must first be arraigned before he
may be granted bail. In cases whether it is
authorized, bail should be granted before
arraignment, otherwise the accused may be
precluded from filing a motion to quash.
However, the foregoing
pronouncement should not be taken to
mean that the hearing on a petition for bail
should at all times precede arraignment,
because the rule is that a person deprived
of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or
voluntary surrender may apply for bail as
soon as he is deprived of his liberty, even
before a complaint or information is filed
against him.
It is therefore not necessary that an
accused be first arraigned before the
conduct of hearings on his applications for
bail. For when bail is a matter of right, an
accused may apply for and be granted bail
even prior to arraignment. The ruling in
Lavides also implies that an application for
bail in a case involving an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death
may also be heard even before an accused
is arraigned. Further, if the court finds in
such case that the accused is entitled to
bail because the evidence against him is not
strong, he may be granted provisional
liberty even prior to arraignment; for in
12
such a situation, bail would be authorized
under the circumstances. (Serapio vs.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148468,
01/28/2003)
ARRAIGNMENT, HOW MADE
 Sec. 1(a) of Rule 116 of the Rules of
Court mandates that an accused be
arraigned in open court and tasked to enter
a plea of guilty or not guilty of the crime
charged. The purpose of arraignment is,
thus, to inform the accused of the possible
loss of freedom, even of his life, depending
on the nature of the crime imputed to him,
or at the very least to inform him of why the
prosecuting arm of the State is mobilized
against him. Consequently, when accused-
appellant entered a negative plea during his
arraignment, the same was not binding on
the court as an indication of his innocence.
Rather, it is a general denial of the charges
impugned against him and an exercise of
his right to be heard of his plea. (People vs.
Montero, G.R. No. 130709, 03/06/2002)
SEARCHING INQUIRY
 Under established principles, a
searching inquiry must not only comply
with the requirements of Sec. 1, par (a) of
Rule 116 but must also expound on the
events that actually took place during the
arraignment, the words spoken and the
warnings given, with special attention to
the age of the accused, his educational
attainment and socio-economic status as
well as the manner of his arrest and
detention, the provision of counsel in his
behalf during the custodial and preliminary
investigations, and the opportunity of his
defense counsel to confer with him. These
matters are relevant since they serve as
trustworthy indicia of his capacity to give a
free and informed plea of guilt. Lastly, the
trial court must explain the essential
elements of the five crimes he was charged
with and their respective penalties and civil
liabilities and also direct a series of
questions to defense counsel to determine
whether he was conferred with the accused
and has completely explained to him the
meaning of a plea of guilt. This formula is
mandatory and absent any showing that it
was followed, a searching inquiry cannot be
said to have not been undertaken. (People
vs. Molina, G.R. No. 141129-33,
12/14/2001)
INVALID ARRAIGNMENT
 Verily a judgment of conviction
cannot stand upon an invalid arraignment.
Since the vice of nullity affects not only the
criminal cases for incestuous rape under
automatic review but also the criminal case
for attempted rape notwithstanding the
absence of a notice of appeal in the latter.
(People vs. Molina, G.R. Nos. 141129-33,
12/14/2001)
WAIVER OF RIGHT TO A SUSPENSION
OF ARRAIGNMENT
 The arraignment was made on
October 22, 1997. At the time, what was
applicable was Sec. 12(q) of Rule 116 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Nowhere in that section was it
required that a motion by the accused be
filed for the suspension of arraignment.
Hence, the absence of such motion could
not be considered a waiver of the right to a
suspension of arraignment. True, Sec. 11(a)
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
which was invoked by the OSG, requires a
motion by the proper party.
This new requirement of “motion by
the proper party” could not be applied to
these cases because the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which prescribes such
requirement, took effect only on 1
December 2000. (People vs. Alcalde, G.R.
Nos. 139225-28, 05/29/2002)
ARRAIGNMENT IN THE ABSENCE OF
DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL DE PARTE
 The appointment of a the prosecution of the defense during trial.
counsel de oficio in the absence of the
defendant’s counsel de parte is not
prohibited, not even by the Constitution,
especially when the accused himself
requests that appointment. (Lumanlaw vs.
Peralta, Jr., 482 SCRA 396, February 13,
2006)
SUSPENSION DUE TO INSANITY/
IMBECILITY OF THE ACCUSED
 Settled is the rule that when a judge
is informed or discovered that an accused is
apparently in a present condition of
insanity or imbecility, it is within his
discretion to investigate the matter. If it was
found that by reason of such affliction the
accused could not, with the aid of counsel,
make a proper defense, it is the duty of the
court to suspend the proceedings and
commit the accused to a proper place of
detention until his faculties are recovered.
Moreover, the aforementioned Sec. 12(a) of
Rule 116 mandates the suspension of the
arraignment and the mental examination of
the accused should it appear that he is of
unsound mind. (People vs. Alcalde, G.R.
Nos. 139225-28, 05/29/2002)
WHEN PUNISHMENT IS DEATH
 Where the punishment to be inflicted
is death, it is not enough that the
13
information be read to the accused or even
translated into the dialect they speak. This
is because the implementation of such
penalty is irrevocable, and experience has
shown that innocent persons have at times
pleaded guilty. The trial court must avoid
improvident pleas of guilt, since the
accused might be admitting their guilt and
thus forfeiting their lives and liberties
without having fully understood the
meaning, significance or consequences of
their pleas. (People vs. Galvez, G.R. No.
135053, 03/06/2002)
PLEA OF SELF – DEFENSE
 It has been held that the plea of self-
defense cannot be justifiably entertained
when it is not only uncorroborated by any
separate competent evidence but is also
extremely doubtful in itself. (People vs.
Herrera, G.R. No. 140557, 12/05/2001)
IMPROVIDENT PLEA OF GUILTY
 Our jurisdiction does not subscribe
to a per se rule that once a plea of guilty is
deemed improvidently made that the
accused-appellant is at once entitled to a
remand. To warrant a remand of the
criminal case, it must also be proved that
as a result of such irregularity there was
inadequate representation of facts by either
In People vs. Abapo we found that undue
reliance upon an invalid plea of guilty
prevented the prosecution from fully
presenting its evidence, and thus remanded
the criminal case for further proceedings.
Where the facts are however
adequately represented in the criminal case
and no procedural unfairness or irregularity
has prejudiced either the prosecution of the
defense as a result of the improvident plea
of guilty, the settled rule is that a decision
based on an irregular plea may
nevertheless be upheld where the judgment
is supported beyond reasonable doubt by
other evidence on record since it would be a
useless ritual to return the case to the trial
court for another arraignment and further
proceedings. (People vs. Molina, G.R. Nos.
141129-33, 12/14/2001)
MOTION TO DISMISS AND MOTION TO
WITHDRAW INFORMATION,
DISTINGUISHED
 A motion to withdraw information
differs from a motion to dismiss. While
both put an end to an action filed in court,
their legal effect varies. An order granting
the withdrawal of the information attains
finality after 15 days from receipt thereof,
without prejudice to the re-filing of the
information upon reinvestigation. An order
granting a motion to dismiss becomes final
15 days after receipt thereof, with prejudice
to the re-filing of the same case once such
order achieves finality.
Unlike a motion to dismiss, a
motion to withdraw information is not time-
barred and does not fall within the ambit of
Sec. 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure which provides that the
law on provisional dismissal becomes
operative once the judge dismisses, with the
express consent of the accused and with
notice to the offended party. (Torres, Jr. vs.
Aguinaldo, G.R. No. 164268, 6/29/2005)
PROVISIONAL DISMISSAL
 There is provisional dismissal when a
motion filed expressly for that purpose
complies with the following requisites, (1) it
must be with the express consent of the
accused, and; (2) there must be notice to
the offended party. Sec. 8 of Rule 117
contemplates the filing of a motion to
dismiss, and not a motion to withdraw
information. (Torres, Jr. vs. Aguinaldo, G.R.
No. 164268, 6/29/2005)
MOTION TO QUASH
 The court may not quash an
information for lack of probable cause.
Under Section 3, Rule 117, of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure, a motion to quash an
information may be filed only for the
following grounds, to wit:
a) that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense;
b) that the court trying the case has no
jurisdiction over the offense
charged;
c) that the court trying the case has no
jurisdiction over the person of the
accused;
d) that the officer who filed the
information had no authority to do
so;
e) that it does not conform
substantially to the prescribed form;
f) that more than one offense is
charged except when a single
punishment for various offenses is
prescribed by law;
g) that the criminal action or liability
has been extinguished;
h) that it contain averments which, if
true, would constitute a legal excuse
or justification, and;
i) that the accused has been
previously convicted or acquitted of
the offese charged, or the case
against him was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his
express consent.
14
To quash means to annul, vacate or
overthrow. The absence of probable cause
for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is not
a ground for the quashal of an information
but is a ground for the dismissal of the
case.
It bears stressing that, even before
the effectivity of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedures, The RTC issues a
warrant for the arrest of the accused only
upon finding of probable cause based on
the resolution of the Investigating
Prosecutor. The affidavits and other
evidence appended to the information,
whatever evidence the prosecutor may
adduce upon order of the court. If the
court finds that there is no probable cause
for the issuance of the warrant of arrest, it
may dismiss the case. The dismissal of the
case is without prejudice to the refiling
thereof, unless barred by prescription. The
trial court is mandated to immediately
dismiss the case upon finding no probable
cause exists to issue a warrant of arrest,
and after having evaluated the resolution of
the prosecutor and the supporting
evidence.
The absence or presence of probable
cause is to be determined from the material
averments of the information and the
appendages thereof, as enumerated in Sec.
8 of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
By quashing the information on the
premise of lack of probable cause instead of
merely dismissing the case, the
Sandiganbayan acted in violation of the
case law and, thus, acted with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction. (People of the Philippines vs.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 144159,
9/29/2004)
 The order denying a motion to quash
is interlocutory and therefore not
appealable, nor can it be subject of
apetition for certiorari unless there is a
grave abuse of discretion. (Principio vs.
Barrientos, 478 SCRA 639, 2006)
 A special civil action for certiorari is
not the proper remedy to assail the denial
of a motion to quash an information. The
proper procedure in such a case is for the
accused to enter a plea, go to trial without
prejudice on his part to present the special
defenses he had invoked in his motion to
quash and, if after trial on the merits, an
adverse decision is rendered, to appeal
therefrom in the manner authorized by law.
(Sasot vs. People, G.R. No. 143193,
6/29/2005; Soriano vs. Casanova, 486
SCRA 431, March 31, 2006)
  A special civil action for certiorari
and prohibition is not the proper remedy to
assail the denial of a motion to quash an
information. The established rule is that
when such an adverse interlocutory order is
rendered, the remedy is not to resort
forthwith to certiorari or prohibition, but to
continue with the case in due course and,
when an unfavorable verdict is handed
down to take an appeal in the manner
authorized by law. Only when the court
issued such order without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion and when the assailed
interlocutory order is patently erroneous
and the remedy of appeal would not afford
adequate and expeditious relief will
certiorari be considered an appropriate
remedy to assail an interlocutory order. No
such special circumstances are present in
the case at bar. (Madarang vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 143044, 7/14/2005)
QUASHAL OF INFORMATION ON THE
GROUND THAT IT CHARGES NO
OFFENSE
 Fundamental is the rule that a
criminal complaint or information must
state every single fact necessary to
constitute the offense charged; otherwise,
the information or complaint may be
quashed on the ground that it charges no
offense. If an accused files a motion to
quash an information on this ground, he
thereby hypothetically admits the truth of
the averments therein. The test in the
resolving a motion to quash on the ground
that the information charges no offense is
whether the material facts alleged in the
complaint or information will establish the
essential elements of the offense charges as
defined in the law. The trial court may not
consider a situation contrary to that set
forth in the criminal complaint or
information. (Torres vs. Garchitorena, G.R.
No. 153666, 12/27/2003)
 As a general prerequisite, a motion to
quash on the ground that the Information
does not constitute the offense charged, or
any offense for that matter, should be
resolved on the basis of said allegations
whose truth and veracity are hypothetically
committed, and on additional facts
admitted or not denied by the prosecution.
(Laurel vs. Abrogar, 483 SCRA 243)
EFFECT OF FILING OF INFORMATION
CHARGING AN INCUMBENT OFFICER OF
A CRIME
 Suspension from office is
mandatory whenever a valid Information
charges an incumbent public officer with (1)
violation of RA 3019; (2) violation of Title 7,
Book II of the RPC; (3) any offense involving
15
fraud upon government; or (4) any offense
involving fraud upon public funds or
property. (Bustillo vs. Sandiganbayan, 486
SCRA 545)
DISCHARGE OF WITNESS
 Granting ex gratia argumenti that
not all the requisites of a valid discharge
are present, the improper discharge of an
accused will not render inadmissible his
testimony nor detract from his competency
as a witness. Any witting or unwitting error
of the prosecution in asking for the
discharge, and of the court in granting the
petition, no question of jurisdiction being
involved, cannot deprive the discharged
accused of the acquittal provided by the
rules, and of the constitutional guarantee
against double jeopardy. (People vs.
Verceles, G.R. No. 130650, 09/10/2002)
 Trial court is given the
power to discharge an accused as a witness
only because it has already acquired the
prosecution from utilizing said person as a
witness. (Pontejos vs. Office of the
Ombudsman, 483 SCRA 83)
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
 After trial on the merits, an acquittal
is immediately final and cannot be appealed
on the ground of double jeopardy. The only
exception where double jeopardy cannot be
invoked is where there is a finding of
mistrial resulting in a denial of due process.
(People vs. Tria-Tirona, G.R. No. 130106,
7/15/2005)
 A judgment of acquittal cannot be
reopened, absent a grave abuse of
discretion or a denial of due process to the
State. (People vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
152532, 8/16/2005)
 There is no double jeopardy when the
accused are being prosecuted for an act or
incident punished by four national statutes
and not by an ordinance and a national
statute. (Loney vs. People, 482 SCRA 194,
February 10, 2006)
 Double jeopardy cannot be invoked
where the accused has not been arraigned
and it was upon his express motion that
the case was dismissed. (Miranda vs.
Tuliao, 486 SCRA 377, March 31, 2006)
STATE WITNESS
 The prosecutorial powers include the
discretion of granting immunity to an
accused in exchange for testimony against
another. (Pontejos vs. Office of the
Ombudsman, 483 SCRA 83)
  The requirements for the discharge at any investigation conducted under the
and utilization of an accused as a state laws of the Philippines, or for the taking of
witness are enumerated in Sec. 17 of Rule his deposition. A subpoena duces tecum is
119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal used to compel the production of books,
Procedures: records, things or documents therein
specified.
1. absolute
necessity for the testimony of the Well-settled is the rule that before a
accused whose discharge is subpoena duces tecum may issue, the
requested; court must first be satisfied that the
2. no other direct following requisites are present: (1) the
evidence available for the proper books, documents or other things requested
prosecution of the offense must appear prima facie relevant to the
committed except the testimony of issue subject of the controversy (test of
the accused; relevancy), and; (2) such books must be
3. testimony of reasonably described by the parties to be
said accused can be substantially readily identified (test of definiteness). (Roco
corroborated in its material points; vs. Contreras, G.R. No. 158275, 6/28/2005)
4. said accused
does not appear to be the most TRIAL IN ABSENTIA
guilty, and;
5. said accused  By the mere fact that the petitioner
has not at any time been convicted jumped bail and could no longer be found,
of any offense involving moral the petitioner is considered to have waived
turpitude. (People vs. Verceles, G.R. her right to be present at the trial.
No. 130650, 09/10/2002)
Once the accused escapes from
 Fact that an individual prison or jumps bail or flees to a foreign
had not been previously charged or country, he loses his standing in court and
included in an information does not prevent unless he surrenders or submits to the
the prosecution from utilizing said person jurisdiction of the court, he is deemed to
as a witness. (Pontejos vs. Office of the have waived any right to seek relief from the
Ombudsman, 483 SCRA 83) court.

DEMURER TO EVIDENCE Due process is satisfied when the

parties are afforded a fair and reasonable
 Under Sec. 23 of Rule 119 of the opportunity to explain their respective sides
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as of the controversy.
amended, the trial court may dismiss the
action on the ground of insufficiency of Promulgation of judgment in
evidence upon a demurer to evidence filed absentia is valid provided that the essential
by the accused with or without leave of elements are present: (a) that the judgment
court. Thus, in resolving the accused’s be recorded in the criminal docket, and; (b)
demurer to evidence to sustain the that a copy be served upon the accused or
indictment or support or verdict of guilt. counsel.
The grant or denial of a demurer to
evidence is left to the sound discretion of Recording the decision in the
the trial court, and its ruling on the matter criminal docket of the court satisfies the
shall not be disturbed in the absence of a requirement of notifying the accused of the
grave abuse of discretion. Significantly, decision wherever he may be. (Estrada vs.
once the court grants the demurer, such People, G.R. No. 162371, 8/25/2005)
order amounts to the acquittal and any
further prosecution of the accused would CROSS-EXAMINATION
violate the constitutional prescription on
double jeopardy. This constitutes an  Procedural due process
exception to the rule that the dismissal of a demands that a lawyer should be given the
criminal case made with the express opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses
consent of the accused or upon his motion against him. (Uytengsu III vs. Baduel, 477
bars plea of double jeopardy. (People vs. SCRA 621, 2006)
Sandiganbayan, et. al., G.R. No. 140633,
02/04/2002)  The act of a judge in allowing
the presentation of the defense witness in
SUBPOENA the absence of the complainant public
prosecutor or a private prosecutor
 A subpoena is a process directed to a designated for the purpose is a clear
person requiring him to attend and to transgression of the Rules which could not
testify at the hearing or trial of an action or be rectified by subsequently giving the

16
prosecution a chance to cross-examine the
witness. (Pinote vs. Ayco, 477 SCRA 409,
2006)
PREJUDICIAL QUESTION
 Prejudicial question is defined as
that which arises in a case the resolution of
which is a logical antecedent to the issue,
involved in said case and the cognizance of
which pertains to another tribunal. (People
vs. Sandiganbayan, 485 SCRA 473, March
28, 2006)
 Prejudicial question generally comes
into play in a situation where a civil action
and a criminal action are both pending and
there exists in the former an issue that
must be preemptively resolved before the
criminal action may proceed, because
howsoever the issue raised in the civil
action is resolved would be determinative
juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of
the accused in the criminal case. (Yu vs.
Philippine Commercial International Bank,
485 SCRA 56, March 17, 2006)
CIVIL LIABILITY IN CRIMINAL CASES
 Under Art. 29 of the Civil Code, when
the accused in a criminal prosecution is
acquitted on the ground that his guilt has
not been proven beyond reasonable doubt,
a civil action for damages for the same act
or omission may be instituted. The
judgment of acquittal extinguishes the
liability of the accused for damages only
when it includes a declaration of the fact
from which the liability might arise did not
exist.
An accused who is acquitted of
estafa may nevertheless be held civilly liable
where the facts established by the evidence
so warrant. Petitioner is clearly liable to
the private respondent for the amount
borrowed. The CA found that the former
did not employ trickery or deceit in
obtaining money from the private
complainants, instead, it concluded that
the money obtained was undoubtedly loans
for which petitioner as payment for the
principal loan, constitute evidence of her
liability which was deemed instituted with
the criminal action. (Eusebio-Calderon vs.
People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 158495,
10/21/ 2004)
 While a reading of the aforequoted
provisions shows that the offended party is
required to make a reservation of his right
to institute a separate civil action,
jurisprudence instructs that such
reservation may not necessary be expressed
but may be implied which may be inferred
not only from the acts of the offended party
but also from the acts other than those of
17
the latter. (Sarmiento, Jr. vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 122502, 12/27/2002)
 Under the present revised Rules, the
criminal action for violation of BP 22 shall
be deemed to include the corresponding
civil action.
The inclusion of the civil action in
the criminal case is expected to significantly
lower the number of cases filed before the
courts for collection based on dishonored
checks.
The pendency of the civil action
before the court trying the criminal case
bars the filing of another civil action in
another court on the ground of litis
pendentia.
The court will certainly not allow the
complainant to recover a sum of money
twice based on the same set of checks, nor
will it allow it to proceed with two actions
based on the same set of checks to increase
its chances of obtaining a favorable ruling -
such runs counter to the court’s policy
against forum shopping. (Hyatt Industrial
Manufacturing Corp. vs. Asia Dynamic
Electric Corp., G.R. No. 163597, 7/29/2005)
JUDGMENT FOR TWO OR MORE
OFFENSES
 Under Sec. 3 of Rule 120 of the Rules
of Court, when two or more offenses are
charged in a single complaint or
information and the accused fails to object
to it before trial, the court may convict the
accused of as many offenses as are charged
and proved and impose on him the penalty
for each of them. Furthermore, Sec. 1 of
Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, states that
the accused may move to quash the
information at any time before entering his
plea.
Accused-appellants did not, within
the prescribed period, file such motion on
the ground of duplicity. They are deemed to
have waived the defect in the information.
Through accused-appellant’s failure to
object to the duplicitous charges, they
effectively waived their right against
multiple offenses in a single information.
(People vs. Pacificador, G.R. No. 126515,
02/06/2002)
JUDGE WHO TRIED THE CASE IS NOT
THE JUDGE WHO PENNED THE
DECISION
 The fact that the judge who tried the
case was different from the judge who
penned the decision does not in any way
taint the same. Indeed, the efficacy of a
decision is not necessarily impaired by the
fact that its writer only took over from a
colleague who had earlier presided at the
trial, unless there is showing of grave abuse
of discretion in the factual findings reached
by him. Moreover, a judge who was not
present during the trial can rely on the
transcript of stenographic notes taken
during the trail as basis of his decision.
Such reliance does not violate substantive
and procedural due process of law. (People
vs. Sansaet, G.R. No. 139330, 02/06/2002)
 Sec. 14(1) of Article VII of the 1987
Constitution provides that the judgment
must clearly and distinctly state the facts
and the law on which it is base. One of the
purposes of the constitutional requirement
is to assure the parties that the judge
arrived at his decision through the
processes of legal and factual reasoning.
(People vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
140633, 02/04/2002)
PERIOD FOR DECIDING THE CASE
 It is well settled that non-observance
of the period for deciding cases or their
incidents does not render such judgments
ineffective or void. (Kho vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 115758, 03/19/2002)
ACQUITTAL OF AN ACCUSED IS NOT A
BASIS FOR ACQUITTAL OF ANOTHER
FOR THE SAME CRIME
 A decision acquitting the
accused of a crime cannot be the basis of
the dismissal of criminal case against
different accused for the same crime.
(Miranda vs. Tuliao, 486 SCRA 377, March
31, 2006)
APPEALS IN CRIMINAL CASES
 In a criminal case, an appeal throws
the whole case wide open for review. Issues
whether raised or not by the parties may be
resolved by the appellate court. (Jan-Dec
Construction Corporation vs. CA, 481 SCRA
556, February 6, 2006)
 When petitioner appealed her
conviction, the dismissal of the interest
checks by the lower court did not preclude
the Court of Appeals from reviewing such
decision and modifying her civil liability.
The appeal conferred upon the appellate
court full jurisdiction and rendered it
competent to examine the records, revise
the judgment appealed from, increase the
penalty and cite the proper provision of the
penal law. (Eusebio-Calderon vs. People of
the Philippines, G.R. No. 158495,
10/21/2004)
 Under BP 22, as amended, the CA
has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over
18
decisions of the RTC in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction. Under Sec. 2 of Rule
41 of the Rules of Court, as amended, the
aggrieved party may appeal from the said
decision by filing a notice of appeal and
paying the requisite docket fees therefore
within fifteen days from notice of said
decision. However, the CA has no
jurisdiction over appeals from the decision
of the RTC rendered in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction in cases where the
issues raised are purely legal. In such a
case, the remedy of the aggrieved party is to
appeal the decision via a petition for review
on certiorari in this Court under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. (Traverse Development
Corporation vs. DBP, G.R. No. 150888,
9/24/2004)
 Except in criminal cases where the
penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or
death, all appeals to the Supreme Court are
not a matter of right but of sound
discretion. Appeal in criminal cases where
the penalty of reclusion perpetua or death is
imposed is a matter of right. (People vs.
Flores, 481 SCRA 451, January 31, 2006)
 The Supreme Court has sole
authority to review the Ombudsman’s
resolutions in criminal cases, on pure
questions of law, while appeals from
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman
in administrative disciplinary cases should
be taken to the Court of Appeals under the
provisions of Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure. (Lanting vs. Ombudsman,
G.R. No. 141426, 5/6/2005)
 The sister of the deceased has legal
standing to file a petition for certiorari in a
criminal case for parricide as she is a party-
litigant who is akin to the ‘offended party’
she being a close relative of the decease.
A petition for review under Rule 45,
not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65,
is the proper remedy in assailing final
dispositions of a case before the Court of
Appeals. In any case, the Court may
disregard petitioner’s lapse and treat the
present petition as one for review under
Rule 45. This is in accordance with the
liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court
and in the interest of substantial justice,
especially: (1) if the petition was filed within
the reglementary period for filing a petition
for review; (2) errors of judgment are
averred, and; (3) there is sufficient reason
to justify the relaxation of the rules. The
petition in this case actually asserts errors
of judgment committed by the CA, which
are proper in a petition for review, and it is
settled that it is the allegations in the
complaint or petition and the character of
the relief sought that determine the nature
of an action. (Pobre vs. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 141805, 7/8/2005)
 The fact that the petitions was given
due course does not necessarily mean the
Court will have to look into the sufficiency
of the evidence since the issue to be
resolved is the appealability of an acquittal.
(People vs. Tria-Tirona, G.R. No. 130106,
7/15/2005)
EFFECT OF DECLARATION OF NULLITY
OF PROCEEDINGS
 The declaration of nullity of
proceedings should be deemed to carry with
it the reinstatement of the orders set aside
by the nullified proceedings. (Miranda vs.
Tuliao, 486 SCRA 377, March 31, 2006)
CERTIORARI
 All criminal actions are prosecuted
under the direction and control of the
public prosecutor, and it behooves
petitioners to implead the People of the
Philippines as respondent in petitions for
certiorari to enable the public prosecutor or
Solicitor General, as the case may be, to
comment on the petitions. (Madarang vs.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143044,
7/14/2005)
PROBATION
 An accused shall not be allowed bail
after the judgment has become final, unless
he has applied for probation before
commencing to serve sentence, the penalty
and the offense being within the purview of
the Probation Law. (Vicente vs. Majaducon,
461 SCRA 12, A.M. No. RTJ-02-1698,
6/30/2005)
 A conviction becomes final when the
accused applies for probation. The guard of
probation does not remove a court
employee from the purview of the applicable
provisions of the Administrative Code and
the Rules Implementing Book V of
Executive Oder No. 292 and Other
Pertinent Civil Service Laws. (Re:Conviction
of Imelda Furtos, Clerk III, RTC, Br. 40,
Calapan City for the Crime of Violation of
B.P. 22, A.M. No. P-04-1808, 6/27/2005)
 The Supreme Court has sole
authority to review the Ombudsman’s
resolutions in criminal cases, on pure
questions of law, while appeals from
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman
in administrative disciplinary cases should
be taken to the Court of Appeals under the
provisions of Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure. (Lanting vs. Ombudsman,
G.R. No. 141426, 5/6/2005)
19
CASES BEFORE THE SANDIGANBAYAN
 Administrative Circular No. 10-94
directs all trials judges to make a physical
inventory of the cases on their dockets.
Given the rationale behind the
Administrative Circular, we hold that it is
applicable to the Sandiganbayan with
respect to cases within its original and
appellate jurisdiction.
According to the memorandum
submitted by the OCA, there is a practice
in the first and third divisions of the
Sandiganbayan of unloading cases to other
divisions despite the facts that these cases
have been submitted for decision before
them.
We suggest a review of the practice
of unloading cases that greatly contribute
to the backlog of undecided cases.
The Sandiganbayan is a special
court created in an effort to maintain
honesty and efficiency in the bureaucracy,
weed out misfits and undesirables in the
government and eventually stamp out graft
and corruption. We held consistently that a
delay of three years in deciding a single
case is inexcusably long. We can not accept
the excuses of Presiding Justice
Sandiganbayan Francis E. Garchitorena
that the court was reorganized in 1997,
that the new Sandiganbayan relocated tom
its present premises which required the
packing and carting of records and that
some boxes were still unopened.
We likewise find unacceptable
Presiding Justice Garchitorena’s excuse
that one case alone comprises more than
50% of the First Division’s Backlog and that
the same has been set for promulgation on
December 8, 2000. As we said, a delay in a
single case cannot be tolerated, “para
muestra, bastaun boton” (For an example,
one button suffices).
Presiding Justice Garchitorena
failed to devise an efficient recording and
filing system to enable him to monitor the
flow of cases and to manage their speedy
and timely disposition. This is duty on
which he failed. (RE: Problem of Delays in
Cases before the Sandiganbayan, A.M. No.
00-8-05-SC, 11/28/2001)
 It is the Court’s policy to sustain the
factual findings of the Sandiganbayan since
as a trial court it is in a better position to
assess the evidence before it. (Mendoza vs.
People, G.R. No. 146234, 6/29/2005)
 Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
a petition for review on certiorari to this
court (from Sandiganbayan decision) is
proper only where, as provided for in Sec.
1(a), Rule X of the Revised Internal Rules of
the Sandiganbayan, the penalty imposed is
less than death, life imprisonment or
relusion perpetua.

Since Sec. 1(b), Rule X of the

Revised Internal Rules of the
Sandiganbayan does not provide for a
period to appeal, Sec. 6 of Rule 122 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure shall
apply. (Pondevida vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R.
No. 160929-31, 8/16/2005)

 For an offense to fall under the

exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, the following requisites
must concur: (1) the offense committed is a
violation of (a) R.A. 3019, as amended (the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), (b)
R.A. 1379 (the law on ill-gotten wealth), (c)
Chapter II, Sec. 2, Title VII, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code (the law on bribery), (d)
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A,
issued in 1986 (sequestration cases), or; (e)
other offenses or felonies whether simple or
complexed with other crimes; (2) the
offender committing the offenses in items
(a). (b). (c) and (e) is a public official or
employee holding any of the positions
enumerated in paragraph A of Sec. 4, and;
(3) the offense committed is in relation to
the office.

As long as the offender’s public

office is intimately connected with the
offense charged or is used to facilitate the
commission of the said offense and the
same is properly alleged in the information,
the Sandiganbayan acquires jurisdiction.
(Adaza vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
154886, 7/28/2005)

HOLD-DEPARTURE ORDERS
CASES BEFORE THE SANDIGANBAYAN

 Circular No. 39-97 provides that

hold-departure orders shall be issued only
in criminal cases within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Regional Courts. Clearly
then, Municipal Trial Courts do not have
jurisdiction to issue hold-departure orders
and it was an error on the part of MTC
Judge Sardido to have issued one in the
instant case. (Re: Hold-departure Orders
Issued by Judge Sardido, MTC, Koronadal,
South Cotabato in Criminal Case No. 19418,
AM. No. 01-9-245-MTC, 12/05/2001)

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