Intro Political Analysis and Reseach

Intro to Political Analysis and Research |
Title: Introduction to Political Analysis and Research
Course Code: (PS 117)
Overview
This course presents an introduction to the research methods commonly used by

political scientists (and other disciplines), to answer their questions of interest. The aim of the
course is (1) to provide students with analytic tools with which they can critically evaluate
both social science research and also causal arguments found in everyday life and (2) to
improve students’ abilities to pose and answer research questions of their own. We will
examine a number of different topics that all political scientists must think about
Learning Objectives
By the end of the semester, students should be able to:
1. Evaluate readings in the social sciences i.e. recognize how the author(s) conceptualized
their work, created their measures, identify their research design and understand the pros and
cons of the various approaches taken by the author(s);
2. Study scholarly research in other areas too, as regards different political views in television
news, newspapers, and journals;
3. Get to know the different political or social issues in the Philippines, analyze and develop
it into research.
Discussion
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Part I. Introduction to Political Analysis
What is Political Analysis?

POLITICS involves making common decisions for a group of people.
It is the activity by which differing interests within a given unit of rule are conciliated
by giving them a share in power in proportion to their importance to the welfare and survival
of the whole community.
Politics according to different Philosophers

Politics According to Lasswell
“Politics is who gets what, when, how.” Harold Lasswell (American political
scientist). When staking a position is the “how” that helps you get something, it certainly
would count as politics by Lasswell's definition (which is arguably the most commonly
accepted one in the discipline).
This means that politics determines what policies and goals the political system will
pursue.
Whether you like it or not, politics is to a great extent about money. In the 1930s,
Harold Lasswell reputably defined politics as a competition about who gets what, when, and
how. The core of politics in developed democratic countries rivets around the money –
around the rate of taxation and utilization of collected money. Since the Second World
War, we have witnessed a steady rise in the volume of resources countries collect from their
citizens through the levied taxes. Nowadays, almost 40% of economic value created in
developed countries thus passes – one way or another - through taxes and state budgets.
Politics resolves how such resources will be used.
Who gets, when and how?

Politics arises because of the need to make decision, in the face of diversity and in the
context of complexity HAROLD LASSWEL-1930.
David Easton is renowned for his application of systems theory to political science,
and for his definition of politics as the "authoritative allocation of value" in A Framework for
Political Analysis and A Systems Analysis of Political Life, both published in 1965.
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Illustration No. 1
Activity No. 1.
What do you understand about the Illustration No. 1. Elaborate by using at one (1) example
Politics according to Aristotle

MAN is by nature a political animal.”
He meant that it is only within a political community that human beings can live the
good life thus, politics is not only prevalent in our lives, but inevitable. It is an ethical activity
concerned with creating a just society so, one must understand politics to meaningfully
participate in it.
Henry Miller described politics as “one has to be a lowbrow, a bit of a murderer, to
be a politician, ready and willing to see people sacrificed, slaughtered, for the sake of an idea,
whether a good or a bad one.”.
William Rogers on the other hand, describes politics as “the more you read and
observe about this so called political thing, you got to admit that each party is worse than the
other. The one that’s out always looks the best.”
Politics according to Arendt
This conception of politics as something positive and public activity was firmly
endorsed by Hannah Arendt.
She argued that politics is the most important form of human activity because it
involves human interaction amongst free and equal citizens.
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It thus gives meaning to life and affirms the u4niqueness of each individual.
Activity No. 2
Among the philosophers above-mentioned, whose ideology do you support the most and
why? Support your answer by applying your own personal analysis on the current Philippine
administration.
What is the purpose of politics?

The purpose of politics is to enable the members of a society to collectively achieve
important human goals they cannot otherwise achieve individually. Through negotiation,
debate, legislation and other political structures, politics procures safety, order and general
welfare within the state.
The Different Conceptions of Politics

 This is a state –centered view of politics.
 Politics is what governments or states do.
 It means that most people, most institutions and most social activities can be regarded
as being OUTSIDE politics.
 Business, schools, and other educational institutions, community groups, families and
so on are in this sense nonpolitical.
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Illustration No. 2
Illustration No. 3
Politics as Compromise and Consensus

The third conception of politics relates to the way in which decision are made.
Politics is seen as a particular means of resolving conflict that is, by compromise,
conciliation and negotiation.
It becomes the process of “conflict resolution.”
In this view, the key to politics is a wide dispersal of power.
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Politics as Power and Distribution of Resources

POLITICS AS POWER:
The fourth definition of politics is both the broadest and the most radical.
Rather than confining politics to a particular sphere, this view sees politics at work in
all social activities and in every corner of human existence.
In this sense, politics takes place at every level of social interaction.
Why is Politics Important to Life?

Politics is important because it determines what governance means. Far beyond the
role of government, at any level, politics determines how we manage our own world and the
world around us.
Politics is trying to make meaning out of the confusion of living.
What is the Essence of Politics?
The essence of politics is to empower the welfare of every individuals.
Many people wonder what is the true nature of politics but most don't really
understand that politics is everywhere from the class setting to, to family, and even the local
grocery store. Therefore, with politics impacting every component of our lives, this will
hopefully help others become more aware of the issues that are important to the political
arena and in turn start a chain reaction of more citizens becoming involved in the political
process on all levels.
Activity 3.
1. How important is politics in your own understanding
2. Politics as they say is everywhere? Give one concrete example.
OVERVIEW OF POLITICAL IDEOLOGY

What is Political Ideology
It is a coherent set of ideas on how people should live together.
Ideologies are the sets of basic beliefs about the political, economic, social and
cultural affairs held by the majority of people within a society.
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Illustration No. 4
Liberalism
Is a political philosophy or worldview founded on ideas of liberty and equality.
It supports ideas and programs such as freedom of speech, freedom of the press,
freedom of religion, free markets, civil rights, democratic societies, secular governments,
gender equality, and international cooperation.
The 17th-century philosopher John Locke is often credited with founding liberalism
as a distinct philosophical tradition. He argued that each man has a natural right to life, liberty
and property, while adding that governments must not violate these rights based on the social
contract. Liberals opposed traditional conservatism and sought to replace absolutism in
government with representative democracy and the rule of law.
Liberalism according to:
1. Voltaire (real name François-Marie Arouet) (1694 - 1778) was a French
philosopher and writer of the Age of Enlightenment.
He was an outspoken supporter of social reform (including the defense of civil
liberties, freedom of religion and free trade), despite the strict censorship laws and harsh
penalties of the period, and made use of his satirical works to criticize Catholic dogma and
the French institutions of his day.
Argued on intellectual grounds for the establishment of a constitutional monarchy in
France
2. David Hume (1711 - 1776) was a Scottish philosopher, economist and historian of
the Age of Enlightenment.
One of the three main figureheads of the influential British Empiricism movement.
(John Locke and Bishop George Berkeley)
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Fierce opponent of the Rationalism of Descartes, Leibniz and Spinoza, as well as an

atheist and a skeptic.
Most important contribution to Liberalism was his assertion that the fundamental
rules of human behavior would eventually overwhelm any attempts to restrict or regulate
them (which also influenced Immanuel Kant's formulation of his categorical imperative
theory)
3. Adam Smith (1723 - 1790) was a Scottish philosopher and political economist of
the Age of Enlightenment and a key figures in the Scottish Enlightenment.
The father of modern economics, and sometimes as the father of modern
Capitalism.
Expounded the theory that individuals could structure both moral and economic life
without direction from the state, and that nations would be strongest when their citizens were
free to follow their own initiative.
4. Immanuel Kant (1724 - 1804) was a German philosopher of the Age of
Enlightenment. He is regarded as one of the most important thinkers of modern Europe, and
his influence on Western thought is immeasurable. He was the starting point and inspiration
for the German Idealism movement in the late 18th and early 19th Centuries, and more
specifically for the Kantianism which grew up around him in his own lifetime.
Formulate categorical imperative theory (a way of evaluating motivations for action)
Activity 5
1. Based on the above-mentioned ideologies, cite at least three titles of studies that
you think you could come-up to, that is relevant to the adversities in the government.
2. On whose ideologies were you inspired in coming-up with those titles and why?
Conservatism
Is a political and social philosophy that promotes retaining traditional social
institutions in the context of culture and civilization.
It sought to preserve institutions including religion, monarchy, parliamentary
government, property rights and the social hierarchy, emphasizing stability and continuity,
while the more extreme elements called reactionaries oppose modernism and seek a return to
"the way things were “.
There is no single set of policies that are universally regarded as conservative,
because the meaning of conservatism depends on what is considered traditional in a given
place and time.
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As a General Ideology
Conservatism is opposed to the ideals of Liberalism and Socialism. Conservatism
generally refers to right-wing politics which advocate the preservation of personal wealth and
private ownership (Capitalism) and emphasize self-reliance and Individualism.
Conservative Politics
1. The inclination, especially in politics, to maintain the existing or traditional order.
2. A political philosophy or attitude that emphasizes respect for traditional institutions
and opposes the attempt to achieve social change though legislation or publicly funded
programs.
Conservative Society
A social conservative wants to preserve traditional morality and social mores, often
by opposing what they consider radical policies or social engineering. Social change is
generally regarded as suspect.
A second meaning of the term social conservatism developed in the Nordic countries
and continental Europe.
Activity 6.
Give an example each of conservative politics and conservative society
Conservatism According to:

1. Edmund Burke: “the principles of true politics are those of morality enlarged”
makes his politics a branch of ethics and thus separates him completely from Machiavelli and
the whole modern political tradition that makes power supreme. His basic political principles
are based on the ancient classical and Christian moral natural law, derived from God and
perceived by all uncorrupted men through “right reason.”
2. Quintin Hogg, the chairman of the British Conservative Party in 1959.
"Conservatism is not so much a philosophy as an attitude, a constant force,
performing a timeless function in the development of a free society, and corresponding to a
deep and permanent requirement of human nature itself"
3. CONFUCIUS (551-479 BC)-promoted social stability and family values along
with humility, honesty, modesty, studiousness and social duty.
The Golden Rule of “do unto others as you would have them do unto you” also
appears in his great work, “The Analects”.
Believed that a woman’s allegiance should pass from father to husband to son.
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4. Marcus Porcius Cato, foe of Julius Caesar and defender of the republican
principles of civic virtue, was renowned for his strong opposition to luxury, believing that
Hellenic (Greek) culture threatened Rome. Like his fellow Roman, the great orator Cicero,
Cato believed one should both know and restrain oneself.
5. Goethe. (1749–1832)--Germany’s supreme dramatist and poet, Johann Wolfgang
von Goethe reinvented himself, reigning in his youthful romantic, revolutionary spirit and
remoulding himself as a conservative and classicist. As he expressed it: “Everything that
liberates the spirit without a corresponding growth in self-mastery is pernicious, ” and “The
classical I call the healthy and the romantic the diseased.”
6. John Locke (1632–1704)—”People must knowingly agree to live and work
together.”
Liberals believe Locke is the Father of Liberalism because he laid the foundation for
liberal epistemology (how we know what we know).
To Locke, property is acquired by exercising one’s labor over it. His conception of
government is one of limits, with the rule of law dampening the impulse to tyranny.
However, though the individual in Locke’s worldview has rights, those rights are also bound
by social duties and responsibilities.
7. Alexander Hamilton (1757–1804) Among America’s Founding Fathers, Hamilton
was perhaps the most conservative and nationalistic. One of New York’s leading attorneys,
he wrote half of the Federalist Papers and put America on a sound financial footing with a
Treasury that assumed state debts as well as debts owed by the national government.
He set up the Bank of the United States to make liquidity in financial markets
possible, and founded the Federalist Party, to boot.
8. Irving Babbitt (1865–1933). A Harvard French literature scholar and eccentric
genius, Babbitt was heavily influenced by Edmund Burke. In the 1890s he and Paul Elmer
More formulated what became The New Humanism, opposing the emotional, intuitive tenets
of Naturalism and Romanticism.
For Babbitt, the world was not a series of accidents, but had a transcendental purpose.
Individuals are born with certain natural rights, which the government should protect,
particularly property rights. Morals are not relative but absolute in his world.
9. Whittaker Chambers (1901–1961). An American writer and editor who was a
confessed courier for Russian spies, Whittaker Chambers is seen here testifying before a
Senate Judiciary Internal Security Subcommittee, in New York, Aug. 16, 1951, about Red
infiltration in America.
His final book, "Cold Friday," was published posthumously in 1964. A strangely
prophetic work, it correctly predicted that the Soviet Union’s Eastern European satellite states
would revolt and eventually bring down the communist system.
8. Edmund Burke (1729–1797)-the Irish philosopher and statesman.
Considered the father of modern conservatism — saw limits to human reason.
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He was perfectly at ease with the idea of a monarchy and classed society. Moreover,
he felt that both Church and State draw their inspiration from the same divine source and are
in a sense inseparable. He hated injustice and any abuse of great power and rejected
military adventurism and argued for the phasing out of slavery.
9. Eric Hoffer (1902–1983). The jovial “longshoreman philosopher” and author,
delivered a memorable, scathing attack on the anti-individualist aspects of Socialism and
Liberalism in his first, most famous work, "First Things, Last Things" (1951). Hoffer
continued the diatribe in his "The Ordeal of Change" (1963).
He was fascinated by how people adopted political ideologies and came under the
spell of mass movements and fanaticism. He thought that a lack of personal self-esteem was
responsible and that an adherent of one strong ideology could easily switch to another, such
as Trotskyites becoming neo conservatists.
10. Milton Friedman (1912–2006). Dr. Milton Friedman, seen here shortly after
winning the 1976 Nobel Prize for economics, taught for 30 years at the University of Chicago
and had the ear of several U.S. presidents. Friedman revealed weak points in the previously
sacrosanct economic theories of John Maynard Keynes, popularized “supply-side
economics,” created the doctrine known as monetarism, and in general championed an
unfettered free market.
11. Ludwig von Mises (1881–1973. Uncompromising philosopher, founder of the
Classical Liberal movement (today called libertarianism) and central figure of the Austrian
School of Economics who mentored the Nobel Prize winner Friederich Hayek, Ludwig von
Mises was an implacable foe of authoritarian governments in all its forms: Nazism, Marxist
Socialism, and so forth. He also opposed overwhelming coercive regulation and antiquated
tax codes.
Mises influenced many economists, along with novelist Ayn Rand, who popularized
classical liberal economic ideas with her best-selling writings.
Activity 7.
Enumerate three philosophers whose philosophy you think, has the best impact in your
political ideology and why?
Socialism
Central to the meaning of socialism is common ownership. This means the resources
of the world being owned in common by the entire global population.
In practice, common ownership will mean everybody having the right to participate in
decisions on how global resources will be used. It means nobody being able to take personal
control of resources, beyond their own personal possessions.
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Illustration No. 5
1. Democratic Socialism
The factors of production are managed by a democratically-elected government.
Central planning distributes common goods, such as mass transit, housing, and energy, while
the free market is allowed to distribute consumer goods. (Source: Democratic Socialists of
America.)
Illustration No. 6
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Illustration No. 7
2. Revolutionary Socialism.
Socialism will emerge only after capitalism has been destroyed. "There is no peaceful
road to socialism." The factors of production are owned by the workers and managed by them
through central planning. (Source: Humanist Workers for Revolutionary Socialism.)
Is Communism a Form of Socialism?

Socialism and communism are alike and that both are systems of production for use
based on public ownership of the means of production and centralized planning. Socialism
grows directly out of capitalism; it is the first form of the new society. Communism is a
further development or "higher stage" of socialism.
Utopian Socialism is a term used to define the first currents of modern socialist
thought as exemplified by the work of Henri de Saint-Simon, Charles Fourier, and Robert
Owen, which inspired Karl Marx and other early socialists. Often described as the
presentation of visions and outlines for imaginary or futuristic ideal societies, with positive
ideals being the main reason for moving society in such a direction.
Later socialists and critics of utopian socialism viewed "utopian socialism" as not
being grounded in actual material conditions of existing society, and in some cases, as
reactionary. These visions of ideal societies competed with Marxist-inspired revolutionary
social democratic movements. Charles Fourier, influential French early socialist
Marxist Communism refers to classless, stateless social organization based upon
common ownership of the means of production and to a variety of movements acting in the
name of this goal which are influenced by the thought of KARL MARX.
In general, the classless forms of social organization are not capitalized, while
movements associated with official Communist parties and Communist states usually are.
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A communist economy, in the classic Marxist definition (Pure communism), refers to

a system that has achieved a superabundance of goods and services due to an increase in
technological capability and advances in the productive forces and therefore has transcended
socialism. Karl Marx (1818–1883)
Leninism. VLADIMIR ILYICH ULYANOV, a Russian communist revolutionary,
politician, and political theorist, is the founder of Leninism.
Is the political theory for the organisation of a revolutionary vanguard party and the
achievement of a dictatorship of the proletariat, as political prelude to the establishment of
socialism.
Under his administration, Russia and then the wider Soviet Union became a one-party
communist state governed by the Russian Communist Party. Ideologically a Marxist, he
developed political theories known as Leninism. Chairman of the Council of People's
Commissars of the Soviet Union
3. Libertarian Socialism or “socialist libertarianism” is a group of anti-authoritarian political

philosophies inside the socialist movement that rejects socialism as centralized state
ownership and control of the economy, as well as the state itself.
It criticizes wage labour relationships within the workplace, instead emphasizing
workers' self-management of the workplace and decentralized structures of political
organization.
It asserts that a society based on freedom and justice can be achieved through
abolishing authoritarian institutions that control certain means of production and subordinate
the majority to an owning class or political and economic elite.
4. Is Anarchism Socialism?
The dominant form of anarchism is a form of socialism. It is a historical tendency in
socialism, the libertarian form of socialism.
Socialism is for replacing capitalism with social or collective ownership of the means
of production and democratic popular control over social production & social governance.
Market Socialism is an economic system in which the means of production are
owned either by the state or by the workers in each company (meaning in general that
"profits" in each company are distributed between them: profit sharing) and the production is
not centrally planned but mediated through the market
Activity 8.
Based on status quo, would you rather shift our democratic type of government to
communism? Support your answer with a specific example.
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Part II. Analysis of the Current Philippine Politics Under Duterte

Administration (Midterm Assessment
Overview:
Within weeks of his inauguration as president of the Philippines in June 2016,
Rodrigo R. Duterte became the most internationally known Filipino leader since Ferdinand
Marcos, the country’s infamous dictator, and Corazon Aquino, the iconic housewife-turned-
president who championed the restoration of democracy in 1986. A great deal of media
attention has been paid to Duterte’s murderous war on drugs as well as to his often crass and
controversial statements. His embrace of China and his visceral disdain for the United States
has garnered additional attention in foreign policy circles, and he frequently is included in
media reports and scholarly articles on the rise of populism globally.
Although the attention to Duterte and his brutal drug war is warranted, much less
attention has been paid to his administration’s broader policy agenda, its approach to politics
and governance, and its broader impact on democratic institutions and norms. As a candidate,
Duterte promised that he would produce real and rapid improvements in the lives of
Filipinos, particularly by aggressively addressing crime and corruption. Two and a half years
into his presidency, it is both warranted and possible to assess what has and has not changed
under Duterte. The picture is a mixed one, with elements of change, continuity, and
regression.
The Duterte government’s track record regarding human rights and democracy is
undoubtedly disturbing. It has run roughshod over human rights, its political opponents, and
the country’s democratic institutions. The combination of the Philippines’ powerful
presidency and the malleability of most of its political institutions is resulting in significant
democratic backsliding. But to focus only on Duterte fails to appreciate two other important
elements: the extent to which this degradation has happened through nominally legal means,
and the limited pushback to date by groups and institutions opposed to strongman rule. This
working paper takes an in-depth look at the complex dynamics contributing to democratic
backsliding in the Philippines.
The Duterte administration’s assault on human rights and democracy also raises the
question of what the U.S. government and America’s nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) can and should do to defend democracy in America’s former colony. The analysis
concludes with a discussion of America’s extremely limited support for human rights and
democracy in the Philippines since Duterte became president and offers suggestions for a
more robust response.
UNDERSTANDING THE KEY CONCERNS AND PRIORITIES

OF THE CURRENT GOVERNMENNT
The Duterte government’s top priorities include combating illegal drugs and crime,
promoting rapid infrastructure development, sustaining economic growth and making it more
inclusive, enhancing peace and development in Mindanao, and reorienting the Philippines’
foreign relations. To support these goals, the government has significantly increased spending
on infrastructure, raised the salaries of government employees, expanded existing social
development programs, revived the stalled peace process with the Moro National Liberation
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Front (MNLF) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), entered into
negotiations with the communist insurgents, and established a closer relationship with China.
Space constraints do not permit a full discussion of the government’s domestic and
foreign policies. Instead, the following sections discuss three policy areas that offer insights
into the Duterte administration—economic policymaking, peace and development in
Mindanao, and constitutional change—and discuss in greater detail the ongoing war on drugs.
Economic policies and performance. As a candidate, Duterte showed little interest in

economic policy issues. To reassure nervous domestic and foreign businesses, his campaign
developed a ten-point economic agenda that largely continued the Aquino government’s
economic policies. Since taking office, Duterte’s two principal economic priorities have been
to accelerate economic growth and make it more inclusive, and to significantly increase
spending on much-needed infrastructure. Key features of the government’s approach to the
economy include running a larger deficit, adopting a more statist approach to infrastructure
development, and continuing increases in social spending.
In 2017, GDP growth was 6.7 percent, and it is projected to be about 6.5 percent in
2018. The government, under its “Build Build Build” program, has significantly increased
spending on infrastructure and has ambitious plans to build new rail lines, a subway,
highways, and bridges in the coming years.12 To finance spending on infrastructure and social
services, the government has embarked on a multiphase tax reform program. The first
package of reforms was signed into law in December 2017; the second and more
controversial package is with Congress. Inflation has been increasing, averaging 4.8 percent
for January to August and reaching a nine-year high of 6.7 percent in September and
October.13 Higher oil and food prices, excise taxes associated with tax reform, and the weak
peso have all fueled inflation.
Duterte and Mindanao. Duterte is the first president from the southern island of Mindanao,
and his election was a significant political milestone for the Philippines. Home to about
25 percent of the nation’s population, Mindanao is a promising but vexing mix of economic
opportunity and underdevelopment, ethnic and religious diversity, and multiple forms of
armed conflict. Under Duterte, progress on the political and security front has been mixed.
This is in large measure due to the May 2017 occupation of Marawi City, in Lanao del Sur
province, by Islamist extremists affiliated with the self-proclaimed Islamic State. It took five
months of combat operations for the Philippine military to regain control over the extensively
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damaged city. In response to the Marawi crisis Duterte imposed island-wide martial law,
which remains in effect. The rehabilitation of the city is expected to cost more than $1 billion.
But before Marawi exploded, the Duterte government had done little either to revive the
stalled effort to pass legislation providing for greater Muslim autonomy or to adopt
federalism, an approach that many in Mindanao consider important for the island’s future.
The government had entered into a series of on-again, off-again talks with the communist
insurgency, which still has a significant armed presence in eastern Mindanao. Currently, the
process has stalled and appears unlikely to produce a breakthrough.
The most significant accomplishment pertaining to Mindanao was the passage of the
Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL) in July 2018. The BOL translates into law many of the
provisions included in the 2014 peace agreement between the Aquino government and the
MILF. Under the BOL, a new political entity, the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao, would replace the current Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The
BOL is an important step forward, but multiple challenges remain, including possible
objections to its constitutionality, a forthcoming plebiscite scheduled for late January and
early February 2019, and the actual establishment of the new autonomous entity.
The fading prospects for constitutional change. As a candidate, Duterte ran against the
widely perceived political and economic dominance of “imperial Manila” and promised to
change the Philippines into a federal state. This platform was not unprecedented: since 1992,
there have been recurring initiatives for charter change (or “Cha-Cha,” in the colloquial
expression), and all of them have failed. Duterte’s popularity and political dominance seemed
to enhance the prospects for success this time. But during most of his first two years in office,
he showed limited interest in this complex and contentious issue of federalism. He appointed
a twenty-two-member Constitutional Commission, and received its proposed draft
constitution in early July 2018. The commission suggested eighteen federated regions and
kept the directly elected presidency. Cha-Cha is now in the hands of the Congress. If both
houses agree to change the constitution, the revised charter will be subject to a national
plebiscite.
Over the past year, opposition to both the substance and process of Cha-Cha has
grown. Senators are elected in a nationwide constituency, so many of them see federalism as
a threat to their political influence and ambitions. Others criticize the process for being tightly
controlled and nonparticipatory. Several of Duterte’s own economic managers have raised
concerns about the economic costs and uncertainties that would accompany such a
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fundamental change. A recent Pulse Asia survey indicated that most Filipinos have little
knowledge of the 1987 constitution and 66 percent are against changing it. The same survey
also found that 69 percent have little or no knowledge of federalism and only 28 percent
favored changing to a federal system.14
As of December 2018 it appears unlikely that Cha-Cha will happen before the May
2019 midterm elections. The outcome of these elections—and particularly, the future
composition of the Senate—may determine whether Cha-Cha will be revived in the next
legislative term.
THE WAR ON DRUGS AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

FOR POLITICS AND GOVERNANCE
Duterte’s principal priority has been a highly punitive approach to illegal drug use,
which he sees as an existential threat to the country’s social fabric. His nationwide war on
drugs has applied the approach that he used in Davao City, giving the police free rein to deal
with suspected drug users and pushers with little concern for legal niceties. It also has
involved a lesser-noticed campaign against government officials allegedly complicit in the
drug trade. This approach has resulted in the deaths of thousands of suspected drug users and
pushers—mostly young males living in poor urban neighborhoods—at the hands of the police
or unidentified assailants. The police claim that many of these deaths were the result of the
suspects resisting arrest, but evidence from journalists and human rights groups shows that
many were premeditated extra-judicial killings (EJKs).The number of EJKs is difficult to
determine and disputed—in part because the government and Philippine National Police
(PNP) intentionally obfuscate the data—but estimates range from 6,000 to 12,000 deaths.
This loss of life is the most horrific and immediate consequence of the drug war. But the drug
war itself is a sign that the Philippine government has abdicated its responsibility to protect
human rights and respect the rule of law. EJKs violate both the Philippine Constitution and
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (to which the Philippines is a
signatory), particularly the provisions concerning the presumption of innocence and
adherence to due process. Given the attention that human rights organizations and the media
have paid to the drug war, it is worth looking more closely at the reasons for it and some of
its broader consequences.
Why is Duterte singularly focused on drugs and crime? It is not surprising that crime
is a major problem in the Philippines, given its high level of poverty, underresourced and
corruption-prone law enforcement agencies, and glacially slow judiciary. Criminal activities,
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in the form of smuggling, illegal gambling, drugs, trafficking in persons, and money
laundering, are significant features of the Philippine political economy. Studies by
International Alert suggest that the illicit economy in Mindanao plays an important role in
sustaining the multiple conflicts across the island.
Crime has been a political issue intermittently since the 1960s. Marcos pointed to
criminality and lawlessness as a justification for martial law in 1972, and Joseph Estrada’s
image as a crime fighter was an important aspect of his political appeal in the late
1990s. Crime also corrupts politics and undermines institutions. Politicians and the police
have long participated in, protected, or otherwise benefited from criminal activity. The
proceeds from these illegal activities have been an important source of financing for some
politicians as well as for terrorist groups. At the community level, drug use and drug-related
crimes have long been recognized as serious social problems. By the late 1990s, the
importation (primarily from China), local production, and use of methamphetamine
hydrochloride (known as shabu in the Philippines) was a major issue for law enforcement and
the courts. In public opinion surveys prior to 2016, crime usually came just behind
unemployment and food prices in the list of people’s main concerns. Survey data also showed
a complex trend during the Aquino administration: fewer people were victims of crime, but
more were worried about encountering drug addicts. Under Duterte, the official estimates of
drug use have increased significantly—suggesting that they were either understated before or
are being overstated now.
Since the early 2000s, there has been a growing awareness of the problem of narco-
politics, mostly involving mayors and other local officials thought to be complicit in the drug
trade. However, it would be an exaggeration to assert that the Philippines is becoming a
narco-state, where state institutions have been penetrated by the power and wealth of drug
lords and the economy depends heavily on the production or distribution of illegal drugs.
Nevertheless, Duterte sees it differently. Although he was not the first presidential candidate
to run against drugs and crime, he was the first to frame drugs as an existential threat and to
be explicit about the brutal approach he would use to solve the problem.
Why has Duterte made illegal drugs his signature issue? In addition to viewing drugs
as a cancer on society, there is an ugly political logic. Combating drugs and crime was central
to his reputation as an effective mayor of Davao City. Moreover, public acceptance of the
Davao Death Squad, a shadowy group that specifically targeted suspected drug dealers, petty
criminals, and homeless youth, showed the low cost and high returns of mounting an extra-
legal war on drugs and crime. As president, Duterte’s nationwide war on drugs continues to
19
play well across most socioeconomic segments of society, particularly as long as the principal
victims are the urban poor.
The drug war also offers a potent and useful political narrative in which Duterte alone
possesses the moral authority to rescue the country from the dangers posed by drug pushers
and other criminals. As Peter Kreuzer, a German researcher, has observed:
Duterte not only successfully established crime as the most pressing problem, but also
made the unconditional fight against this threat into a hallmark of a comprehensive “we”
group. Given the assumed absoluteness of the evil to be combated, any criticism of the
president has been silenced. Detractors are suspected of being supporters of the criminal
threat to society, and any reference to due process can be ignored.
This narrative of drugs as an existential threat has been used to justify imprisoning
opposition Senator Leila de Lima (a prominent critic of Duterte’s drug war), to exercise
control over local officials, and to frame the motivation of the Islamic extremists who took
over Marawi City.
Public attitudes about the war on drugs. Most Filipinos believe that Duterte’s war on
alleged drug users and pushers is a draconian but necessary response to a serious social
problem. Survey data have shown strong but softening support for it: in December 2016,
85 percent of those surveyed voiced satisfaction, though by June 2018, only 78 percent were
satisfied.27 At the same time, almost three out of four Filipinos (73 percent) believe that EJKs
happen, almost as many are concerned that they might be a victim of an EJK, and a large
majority think that it is important for the police to capture suspects alive.
Activity 9.
Why do you think is the reason why there is a strong public support for the drug war?
Elaborate your answer
The drug war’s impact on the Philippine National Police. The PNP is the government
institution most deeply involved in implementing the drug war—known locally as Oplan
Double Barrel or Oplan Tokhang and therefore most directly affected by it. The involvement
of PNP elements in EJKs is well documented and beyond dispute. 31 Some broader
consequences of the PNP’s involvement are worth examining in greater detail.
20
Although largely overlooked by most analyses, the PNP, and its predecessor the
Philippine Constabulary, have long been at the nexus of politics, crime, and the rule of law.
As historian Alfred McCoy has shown, Philippine presidents and local officials have used the
police as an essential tool to assert their authority, bolster their legitimacy, selectively fight
crime, and control dissent. As the principal law enforcement agency, the PNP has a long
history of being vulnerable to corruption, particularly in the highly lucrative areas of illegal
gambling, drugs, and smuggling. Some of this corruption stems from individual greed, but it
also is the product of low salaries, the complicity of politicians, and the multifaceted
shortcomings of the justice system.
As mayor of a city that at times was wracked by political and criminal violence,
Duterte considered the police to be a central pillar of his government. He established close
relationships with many in the police and gained an intimate understanding of how the police
operate. Thus, it is not surprising that Duterte and the PNP have a symbiotic relationship.
In the context of Duterte’s drug war, individual police officers face difficult choices.
Journalist Sheila Coronel describes the complex considerations that influence police behavior
today:
Policemen weigh the continually shifting balance of incentives and risks as they seek
to deter crime, advance their careers, please their political patrons, and make money, while
also evading exposure and prosecution. Yet in the end, these policemen often also believe
they are upholding order and helping keep the peace. They are specialists in violence
practitioners in the skills of lethal force who improvise often morally and legally questionable
workarounds to the constraints of a broken justice system.
The longer-term consequences for law enforcement from the war on drugs may be
highly damaging. The Brookings Institution’s Vanda Felbab-Brown has warned about its
potentially corrupting influence:
Inducing police to engage in de facto shoot-to-kill policies is enormously corrosive of

law enforcement, not to mention the rule of law. There is a high chance that the policy will
more than ever institutionalize top-level corruption, as only powerful drug traffickers will be
able to bribe their way into upper-levels of the Philippine law enforcement system. Moreover,
corrupt top-level cops and government officials tasked with such witch-hunts will have the
21
perfect opportunity to direct law enforcement against their drug business rivals as well as
political enemies, and themselves become the top drug capos.
Moreover, assuming that eventually there will be a president who no longer sanctions EJKs
by the police, the seeds have been planted for a potentially divisive and dangerous debate
over how to handle human rights abuses that the PNP carried out during the Duterte era.
Other collateral damage. Duterte’s war on drugs has had less dramatic but significant
consequences for other aspects of governance in the Philippines, including the justice system,
public health, and local governance.
Impact on the justice system. The war on drugs has further stressed the Philippines’
overburdened justice system. The volume of cases to be investigated, prosecuted, and tried,
as well as the number of alleged offenders awaiting trial in detention facilities, has increased
dramatically. A comprehensive picture of the impact on the justice system is beyond the
scope of this working paper, but some of the available data point to these burdens. In 2016,
there were 28,000 drug arrests—a 44 percent increase over 2015—and more than 47,300
drug-related cases were filed. During the first 10 months of 2017, the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency conducted 34,744 drug enforcement operations, with 66,672 arrests. In
2017, about 70,700 drug-related cases were filed in court, and about 21,400 were reviewed.
According to the Supreme Court, as of 2017 more than 289,000 drug cases had been filed in
the country’s lower courts.
As a result, drug suspects and convicts are crammed into the Philippines’ already
packed jails and prisons. According to the Department of Justice’s Bureau of Corrections, in
2017 the national prison system held 41,500 inmates, more than double its capacity. Data
from the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology, which oversees provincial and municipal
jails, show an even more disturbing situation. As of May 2018, there were over 141,000
detainees—of which about 70 percent were drug-related cases—held in jails that were
582 percent overcapacity.
Ultimately, the legal dimensions of the war on drugs will test not only the capacity of
the justice system, but also the jurisprudence, values, and autonomy of the Philippine
judiciary. In November 2018, a Regional Trial Court issued the first legal judgment against
the PNP, finding three policemen guilty of murdering Kian Delos Santos, a seventeen-year-
old the policemen claimed was a drug runner who resisted arrest. Currently, there is one case
before the Supreme Court challenging the constitutionality of the PNP’s official plan for
eradicating illegal drugs.
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Impact on public health. The government’s punitive approach to reducing drug use

also has important consequences for public health. It has overwhelmed the country’s paltry
rehabilitation capacity and is having a negative effect on drug-linked diseases. As of mid-
2017, the Philippines had only forty-eight drug rehabilitation facilities and only about fifty
medical personnel trained in addiction medicine. According to the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency, close to 990,000 “drug personalities” voluntarily surrendered in 2016,
and by May 2017 that number had grown to 1.2 million people.
The war on drugs has had predictable negative effects on drug-related public health
problems. According to Vanda Felbab-Brown:
A crucial goal of drug policy should be to enhance public health and limit the spread
of diseases linked to drug use. The worst possible policy is to push addicts into the shadows,
ostracize them, and increase the chance of overdoses as well as a rapid spread of HIV/AIDS,
drug-resistant tuberculosis, and hepatitis. In prisons, users will not get adequate treatment for
either their addiction or their communicable disease. Even prior to the Duterte’s brutal war on
drugs, the rate of HIV infections in the Philippines has been soaring due to inadequate
awareness and failure to support safe sex practices. Duterte’s war on drugs will only intensify
these worrisome trends among drug users.
Impact on local politics and government. Duterte’s almost singular focus on the drug
war has far-reaching consequences for the country’s local politics and governance. In many
respects, subnational government in the Philippines is highly decentralized, but most local
government units (LGUs) are dependent upon central government funding and grapple with
the challenge of unfunded mandates. LGUs are key actors in the drug war, and local officials
need to juggle multiple and sometimes conflicting priorities, including protecting their
citizens, cooperating with local law enforcement, and demonstrating results to central
authorities. And as reported by Rappler, a respected Philippine news website, the drug war
has caused a major shift in LGU priorities:
At the local level, the drug war has changed the way barangays [the smallest LGUs]
spend their funds. Traditional social services such as medical clinics or feeding programs for
malnourished children are no longer budget priorities. Through a number of policy incentives
as well as strict supervision by the DILG, the priority at the barangay level has now become
the monitoring and surveillance of drug suspects and the rehabilitation of drug users who
have surrendered.
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There also is a darker dimension to the drug war at the local level. Peter Kreuzer notes
the pressure and intimidation experienced by local officials:
It has become highly problematic for local political elites to evade the president’s
injunction to participate in the anti-crime killing spree that is engulfing the Philippines.
The various reshuffles are placing more hard-line police officers in command positions.
Furthermore, these officers are well aware that results measured in dead bodies are
expected of them. In addition, police officers and politicians alike have been publicly
denounced as supporting and profiting from drug crimes and thus threatened not only
with being indicted, but also with becoming victims of extrajudicial executions
themselves. Most officials then choose to fall in line with the president.
DUTERTE’S SUBVERSION OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND NORMS

The Duterte government’s approach to eradicating illegal drugs, besides being
inhumane and misguided, has negative consequences for the rule of law, governance, and
politics. But that is not the full extent of the damage being done to the Philippine polity. This
section provides an assessment of the Duterte government’s impact on democratic institutions
and norms.
JUST HARDBALL POLITICS AS USUAL?
Some observers of Philippine politics might argue that Duterte is only the most recent
example of presidents who exercise fully the levers of executive power to advance their
political and policy agendas. In this light, he is perpetuating and perhaps perfecting the
hardball politics that every president has practiced since 1986. To be sure, Duterte’s
predecessors all used a mix of persuasion and inducements to advance their agenda, and no
president has been above using intimidation and subterfuge to get their way at times.
Therefore, the “politics as usual” view has some superficial validity. But a deeper assessment
shows that the Duterte presidency is qualitatively different from its post-Marcos predecessors
because of its willingness to intimidate the opposition, weaken institutional checks, and
discard democratic norms.
The Duterte presidency is fundamentally different from post-1986 administrations in

its unrelenting use of intimidation to weaken any challenges to its authority. Duterte’s brutal
drug war sends a powerful message regarding his willingness to use extra-legal means,
including EJKs, to achieve his goals. Unlike previous administrations, Duterte and his
24
supporters routinely use lawsuits, incarceration, and social media trolling to intimidate
opponents and critics. As sociologist Randy David has observed:
Compared to Ferdinand Marcos, Mr. Duterte has performed the art of intimidation
with consummate skill. Without warning, he calls out the name of his prey, denouncing
him or her in the strongest possible terms, and publicly announces that he or she, or
they, are in his line of fire. . . . The public has learned to take these instances of public
vilification of targeted figures as part of the Duterte style of rule. People know these are
not empty threats. Indeed, the public takes them as synonymous with the President’s
exercise of political will.44
In some cases, Duterte’s threats may simply reflect his impetuous personality and
desire to dominate media coverage. However, his statements and actions also send the
message that no one is safe from his attacks and that opposing him is a high-risk venture.
DISABLING DEMOCRATIC CHECKS AND BALANCES
As a former mayor, Duterte is used to governing by decree and by dint of his

personality, popularity, and unrivaled authority. In Davao City, he had no strong political
opposition, significant institutional checks, or close media scrutiny. Peter Kreuzer, writing in
2009 (when Duterte was mayor), presciently observed:
Duterte makes abundantly clear that there can be security, but only he himself can
provide it. Security is provided according to his personal ideas of justice and adequateness. In
his political symbolism, Duterte clearly is above the law. It is him, who indicts, passes
judgment and orders the executioners to do their job. It is a personalized fight between those
who do not follow the rules and the rightful vigilante whose rules reign supreme.45
As president, Duterte has repeatedly expressed his disdain for those who oppose his
policies, and has taken numerous steps to silence his critics and weaken institutional checks:
 Led by Solicitor General Jose Calida, the government has weaponized the legal
system to attack political opponents. This began in early 2017 when opposition
Senator Leila de Lima was imprisoned on nonbailable drug-related charges.46 Groups
allied with Duterte, as well as some leftist organizations, have filed multiple lawsuits
against former president Aquino and former budget secretary Florencio “Butch” Abad,
a longtime leader of the Liberal Party. Most recently, in September 2018 the
government arrested Senator Antonio Trillanes IV, a vocal critic of Duterte. The
25
government claimed that a presidential pardon granted to Trillanes by Benigno Aquino

in 2011 was invalid, therefore making Trillanes ineligible to serve as senator.
 Duterte has repeatedly disparaged or threatened the leaders of key accountability
institutions like the chairman of the Commission on Human Rights, the chief justice of
the Supreme Court, and the chairwoman of the Office of the Ombudsman. Followers of
Duterte threatened to seek the impeachment of Ombudsman Conchita Carpio-Morales,
but her term ended in July 2018. Most disturbingly, in March 2018 Solicitor General
Calida filed a quo warranto petition against then chief justice Maria Lourdes Sereno,
and in May 2018, the Supreme Court—which currently is dominated by Macapagal
Arroyo appointees and in time will be dominated by Duterte appointees—took the
unprecedented and arguably unconstitutional step of removing its own chief justice.48
 The government has threatened the mainstream media with lawsuits and nonrenewal
of franchises.49 These threats have been directed at media owners like the Rufino-Prieto
family, which owns the Philippine Daily Inquirer, and the Lopez family, which owns
ABS-CBN, the country’s largest TV network. In January 2018, the Securities and
Exchange Commission revoked the operating license of the highly respected news website
Rappler, alleging that it has foreign owners and therefore is in violation of the
constitution. In November, the Department of Justice said that it had grounds to indict
both Rappler and its founder Maria Ressa for tax evasion and failure to file tax
returns.50 Meanwhile, on social media, critics of the government are routinely harassed
and threatened.
 Finally, Duterte has periodically raised the specter of declaring martial law
nationwide or forming a revolutionary government that would no longer be bound by the
constitution. Declaring martial law would be constitutional, at least initially, but would be
extremely polarizing politically. However, declaring a revolutionary government would
be an extra-constitutional act. It seems likely that these statements are intended as trial
balloons to gauge public and elite reactions.
 THE PROSPECTS FOR PUSHBACK: POLITICAL ANDINSTITUTIONAL

CHECKS ON DUTERTE
President Duterte’s continued popularity is not surprising. His base of support is

rooted in his persona, his tough approach to fighting drugs and crime, his proto-populist
policies, and the Philippines’ continuing economic growth. Moreover, Duterte and his
supporters have demonstrated an impressive ability to put their opponents on the defensive.
26
They portray individuals and groups associated with the Aquino administration as
incompetent or corrupt elitists. They accuse defenders of human rights of protecting drug
peddlers and criminals. They charge the mainstream media with being partisan and
disseminating “fake news.” What then, are the existing and potential checks on Duterte?
COUNTERVAILING INSTITUTIONS AND ACTORS
A brief scan of the political landscape suggests that most institutions and actors that
can serve as checks on Duterte are weak, divided, or under attack.
 Provisions in the 1987 Constitution place checks on the duration of martial law and
the powers than can be exercised under it. Today, the powers granted to the president and
the military during martial law are limited in ways that did not exist when Ferdinand
Marcos used martial law as the foundation for his dictatorship. However, it is still possible
that the constitution will be rewritten, which could include expanding the scope for
declaring martial law and increasing the powers exercised under it.
 Since 1986 the jurisprudence of the fifteen-member Supreme Court has been
eclectic, defying simple characterization. Based on its decisions over the past two years, it
is clear that the court does not see itself as a bulwark against Duterte’s exercise of
presidential power. Moreover, the court’s autonomy and integrity have been seriously
compromised by the unprecedented removal of Sereno from chief justice at the behest of
Duterte’s solicitor general.
 The Commission on Human Rights has limited authority and a small staff and
budget. Without the cooperation of the PNP and government prosecutors, its impact has
been further diminished. The dramatic increase in EJKs has highlighted the relative
powerlessness of the commission, as well as the divisions and weaknesses that
characterize human rights NGOs in the Philippines.
 The mainstream political opposition is weak and on the defensive. This is the
predictable consequence of the power of the presidency, Duterte’s popularity, and the
chronic weakness of political parties. The Liberal Party has been decimated by defections,
and its leadership (and other members of the Aquino coalition) have struggled to craft a
counternarrative and strategy. Aquino has been largely silent, and until recently the
putative leader of the opposition, Vice President Leonor “Leni” Robredo, has kept an
intentionally low profile.
 The national democratic left has been divided by Duterte’s policies. Since 1986, the
“Natdem” left—the legal political parties and mass organizations associated with the
27
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP)—has enjoyed a relatively small but well-
organized following. But it also suffers from factionalism and antiquated leadership and
doctrine. Its unity has been weakened by the contradictions inherent in Duterte’s policies.
To woo over this section of the opposition, Duterte invited members of the left into his
cabinet, entered into peace talks with the CPP and its armed wing, New People’s Army
(NPA), and has been vociferously anti-American. At the same time, other policies of his
are anathema to the left: the human rights abuses associated with the drug war, his
empowering of the PNP and the armed forces, his threats to declare martial law, and his
decision to break off peace talks. As a result, the left has been slow to unify in opposition
to Duterte.
 The Catholic Church is an influential voice in Philippine society and politics, but it is
not monolithic and its views do not always prevail. Initially, Catholic bishops were
divided over Duterte and how to engage him, especially because of his popularity and the
public’s support for the drug war. But over time, their cautious response to EJKs has
become more critical.51 Duterte has openly disparaged the church, calling it corrupt and
hypocritical, and at one point ranted about God being “stupid.”
 Civil society organizations (CSOs) and coalitions in the Philippines can play an
important political role through their policy advocacy, efforts to make government more
transparent and accountable, and ability to mobilize protests. However, the political
impact of civil society is reduced by partisan and ideological differences, the narrow focus
of most CSOs, and inadequate financial and human resources. Many of the CSOs that
worked closely with the Aquino government are now suspect and on the defensive. Yet
major universities, especially those in Manila, remain important centers for critical
analysis and debate.
 Philippine and foreign businesses were reassured by the Duterte government’s ten-
point economic plan, which promised considerable continuity, as well as the appointment
of Davao-based businessman Carlos “Sonny” Dominguez as finance secretary. Most
businesses support the increased government spending on infrastructure, but reactions to
Duterte’s tax reforms have been more mixed. Businesses also have differing views on
China’s growing economic role and the desirability of federalism. Given the power of the
presidency, the business community tends to be reluctant to criticize a sitting president.
However, this could change if businesses feel that they are being hurt by poor
macroeconomic management or excessive cronyism or corruption.
28
It is important to note that there is a typical arc of presidencies, which begins with
high approval ratings, strong congressional support, and minimal opposition. Following the
midterm elections, the power of the president often begins to diminish as political and
business elites position themselves for the next presidential election.
THE POTENTIALLY PIVOTAL ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES
The senior leadership of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) has a tradition of
generally respecting civilian primacy, but the AFP nonetheless influences politics and
policymaking in a variety of important ways. First, if there is a leadership crisis, like there
was in January 2001, following the aborted impeachment trial of then president Joseph
Estrada, and the AFP chooses to withdraw its support from the sitting president, it virtually
guarantees the end of that presidency. Second, the AFP’s longtime efforts to combat domestic
armed insurgencies make it an influential actor in Mindanao and other conflict-affected areas.
Under Duterte, the role of the AFP in Mindanao has been elevated further with the imposition
of island-wide martial law. Third, the AFP has a strong say in determining national security
policy. Over the past decade, the focus of the AFP’s mission has shifted from internal
security to a growing concern with external threats, particularly from China. Finally, because
of the AFP’s long-standing ties to the U.S. military, the AFP is an important stakeholder in
the Philippines’ bilateral relationship with the United States.
In recent years, the AFP appears to have become more professional and less political,
but all presidents still cultivate the support of the AFP leadership. Duterte has appointed
numerous former officers to senior civilian positions in his government. He knows a number
of them from when he was mayor, and he appears to believe that military officers will be
more effective administrators and less prone to corruption than civilians. He also wants to
bolster support within the military for his national security policies, including negotiating
with the communists and embracing China. He has courted rank-and-file soldiers and police,
visiting many military bases and raising salaries.
To date, Secretary of Defense Delfin Lorenzana and the AFP leadership have shown
they understand the constitutionally mandated role of the military and are committed to
military professionalism. The AFP has avoided being drawn into the antidrug campaign, and
to date the army appears to have administered martial law in Mindanao with competence and
restraint. However, given mandatory retirement ages, the senior leadership of the AFP
29
changes fairly rapidly. Therefore, routine leadership changes could bring to the fore senior
officers who are more political.
A final potentially important issue is the uncertain extent to which members of the
AFP agree with the Duterte administration’s approach to addressing the country’s national
security challenges. Some members of the military may likely object to his pivot to China, his
willingness to negotiate with communist insurgents, and his fixation on the drug war. Other
military officials may also feel that the AFP’s domestic role has become unacceptably
overextended by the Marawi crisis in 2017, the administration of martial law across
Mindanao, and the continuing threat of Islamist extremism.
THE IMPORTANCE OF PUBLIC OPINION
Public opinion in the Philippines is frequently measured by credible survey firms and
closely monitored by all politicians. As a result, public support for the president is an
important factor in perceptions of presidential power. Duterte has remained popular because
he entered office with an energized base of support and because elements of his persona and
policies appeal across socioeconomic classes. What might cause public support for Duterte to
soften?
 Duterte promised real change within a matter of months. Although most Filipinos

probably knew that his timeframe was unrealistic, he is now well into the third year of his
administration and there has been little or no change on many fronts. The economy
continues to grow, but the benefits of growth have not been quickly or widely shared.
Likewise, it will be years before the benefits of the government’s infrastructure program
will be widely experienced.52 Meanwhile, the push for federalism has been erratic and
appears to have stalled. Scholar Nicole Curato suggests that support for Duterte is
“conditional not fanatical.” According to her, “He may be able to get away with murders,
but not with broken promises.”53
 Deteriorating economic conditions. The Philippine economy is likely to continue to
grow at around 6.5 percent for the foreseeable future. But as has been the case in the past,
strong GDP growth does not necessarily result in rapid improvements in the incomes of
poor Filipinos. Instead, inflation—which currently is at a nine-year high—has an
immediate and tangible impact on consumers, especially the poor and retirees. In addition
to the spike in inflation, the depreciation of the peso and the uncertainties associated with
a change to a federal system pose risks to the economy’s performance.
30
 Corruption begins to undermine Duterte’s moral authority. Every presidency is

tainted by corruption to a greater or lesser degree. There is little evidence that Duterte
enriched himself while he was mayor of Davao City, and as president he has dismissed—
though not necessarily punished—members of his administration suspected of corruption.
But his push to rapidly increase spending on infrastructure, combined with the weakening
of accountability mechanisms, almost guarantees more corruption and malfeasance in
government. As Joel Rocamora has observed: “People turned against Erap [Joseph
Estrada] not because of his performance as president, but because they changed their
judgment of the man. Judgment shifted from the rational to the moral sphere.”54
 Unease with becoming “another province of China.” The rapidity, degree and tone of
Duterte’s embrace of China—and commensurate distancing from the United States—are
not without political risks. Many Filipinos have some Chinese blood, so there is not the
same level of sensitivity about ethnic Chinese domination of the economy as is found in
Indonesia and Malaysia. However, some Filipinos have less-than-positive views of
Chinese nationals residing in the Philippines because they are seen as being associated
with the drug trade, gambling, and illegal mining. 55 Surveys indicate that Filipinos have a
high level of trust in the United States and a low level of trust in China, and four of five
Filipinos believe that it is “not right” to accede to China in the South China Sea.56
 The emergence of an appealing alternative. To date, the opposition to Duterte lacks a
leader (or group of leaders) who offers a compelling alternative to the president and his
policies. The government’s targeted assault on opposition leaders, including the arrests of
Senators de Lima and Trillanes, is partly to blame, but the opposition’s weakness also
stems from its limited pool of potential leaders. After maintaining a low profile for most
of the past two years, Vice President Leni Robredo has become more vocal in her
criticisms. Besides Vice President Robredo, other potential challengers include those
whom Duterte has attacked: Senators de Lima and Trillanes and former chief justice
Sereno. Moreover, former president Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, who was elevated to
speaker of the house in July 2018, also may be positioning herself as a possible successor
to Duterte.
IS DUTERTE A POPULIST? AND DOES IT MATTER?
In recent years, “populist” has become a convenient adjective to describe a growing

number of political leaders, including Duterte. But as a term intended to categorize a
particular approach to politics and governing, populism is frustratingly expansive. Cas
31
Mudde and Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser describe populism as a “thin-centered ideology that
considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonist camps,
‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite. To this can be added Jan-Werner Muller’s
observation that, “In addition to being anti-elitist, populists are always anti-pluralist. When
running for office, populists portray their political competitors as part of the immoral, corrupt
elite; when ruling, they refuse to recognize any opposition as legitimate.” Muller also notes
that populists in power tend to frame their rule as a response to a crisis or an existential
threat. Finally, Steven Levitsky and James Loxton point to two additional traits of populist
leaders: they claim to be political outsiders and they establish a personalistic linkage to
voters.
Using these criteria, Duterte certainly has some populist traits. His Mindanaowan
roots, crass language, and brusque behavior set him apart from most of the national political
elite. In his campaign, he ran as a Manila outsider, and portrayed the members of the elite
associated with the Aquino government as incompetent and corrupt. As president, he has
framed the problems of drugs and crime as an existential national crisis and portrayed drug
users as a dehumanized “other.” His efforts to intimidate political opponents and critics
clearly are anti-pluralist.
However, other aspects of Duterte’s politics do not comport with populism. Although
he portrays himself as a political outsider, he is from a prominent political family and served
as mayor of a major city for twenty-two years. Even as he criticizes some members of the
political and business elite, in practice he has allied himself with powerful members of the
political establishment—most notably Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and the Marcos, Estrada,
and Villar families. And while Duterte is more antagonistic toward powerful taipans and
conglomerates than Benigno Aquino was, he appears more interested in ensuring that they
support him than in reducing the concentration of economic power.
Duterte has increased spending for social programs and some of the government’s
policies, such as higher salaries for government employees, free irrigation, and tertiary public
education, can be viewed as populist. But to date his core fiscal and macroeconomic policies
are more neoliberal than populist. However, if Duterte’s popularity declines, there is a risk
that his government will adopt economic policies that are more statist and populist.
Finally, to date Duterte has not created a mass movement or highly personalistic
political party typically associated with populist leaders. According to Joel Rocamora,
32
“Digong Duterte may bring the popular medjo bastos (rudeness) into political discourse, but
he does not bring citizens into formal processes of political participation. In contrast to
populists who mobilize people, Digong like Estrada is a demobilising populist. Reflecting
this perspective, as well as the more general challenge of building political organizations in
the Philippines, efforts to create a pro-Duterte grassroots movement, Kilusang Pagbabago
(Movement for Change), appear to have faltered. In its stead, Duterte’s daughter, Sara
Duterte-Carpio, has established Hugpong ng Pagbabago (Faction for Change), a Mindanao-
based political party widely viewed as her vehicle for entering national politics. The putative
failure of the former and the creation of the latter demonstrate the continued dominance of
traditional dynastic politics.
In sum, describing Duterte as a populist provides a convenient but not entirely
accurate label to characterize a complex, somewhat contradictory politician with a disparate
policy agenda. Still, the growing literature on populist leaders generally depicts them as being
toxic to liberal democracy, so the Duterte-as-populist narrative provides a valid but limited
frame for viewing his impact on democracy.
DEMOCRATIC BACKSLIDING: HOW FAR, HOW FAST?
With the challenges currently facing liberal democracy in the United States and
elsewhere, the concept of democratic backsliding has taken on new saliency. According to
Nancy Bermeo, backsliding, in its broadest sense, is “state-led debilitation or elimination of
any of the political institutions that sustain existing democracy” (emphasis added). 61 A 2015
study on democratic backsliding, written by Ellen Lust and David Waldner for the U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID), suggests that backsliding is best conceived
as a change in a combination of competitive electoral procedures, civil and political liberties,
and accountability, and that backsliding occurs through a series of discrete changes in the
rules and informal procedures that shape those elections, rights and accountability. These
discrete changes take place over time, separated by months or even years, and the end result
is not predetermined: backsliding may result in democratic breakdown, or it may not, and can
occur within both democratic and authoritarian regimes.
The term “backsliding” is particularly appropriate for low-quality democracies like
the Philippines, where concerted and sustained efforts are required to improve the quality of
democracy. Absent that, backsliding is inevitable. How serious is the problem of democratic
backsliding in the Philippines, and is the country on the way to democratic breakdown? In
33
answering these questions, it is important to start by recognizing the sources of democratic

resiliency in the Philippines.
Democratic resiliencies. Elite democracy was practiced before martial law was
declared in 1972 and after the restoration of democracy in 1986. It often was not pretty, and it
failed in a number of important ways. But many Filipinos take pride in people power, and
norms of constitutionalism, political competition, free speech and media, and autonomous
civil society have fairly deep roots. A variety of influential institutions, including the Catholic
Church, many schools and universities, and most of the media, embrace and promote
democratic norms. Moreover, the alternative to democracy—authoritarianism—is not an
abstraction, at least to older Filipinos who experienced the Marcos dictatorship.
Broad support for democracy among Filipinos has been consistently borne out in
surveys. A 2018 Social Weather Stations (SWS) survey showed that 78 percent were satisfied
with how democracy works and 60 percent always preferred democracy.63 Surveys also
consistently show a high degree of satisfaction with the country’s democratic institutions,
including the Senate, House of Representatives, and Supreme Court. So while Filipinos tend
to be fairly cynical about the motivations and integrity of politicians and government
officials, they are used to enjoying political freedoms, lively political debates, and
competitive elections.
Vulnerabilities. At the same time, multiple conditions in the Philippines make it vulnerable to
democratic backsliding.
 Socioeconomic conditions. Inequality, the uneven distribution of benefits from
economic growth, and an apparent sense of middle-class insecurity and vulnerability may
make the poor and middle class receptive to promises of simplistic quick fixes.
 Presidentialism and weak institutions. The combination of a powerful presidency and
generally weak and malleable political institutions gives the president wide latitude. If a
president does not respect democratic institutions and norms, many other political actors
will follow suit.
 The weakness of collective action. This applies particularly to political parties and
civil society organizations. In How Democracies Die, Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt
underscore the important role that political parties historically have played in containing
extremist demagogues. But in the Philippines, parties are abysmally weak, and to date
have been unable to provide compelling alternative leaders or narratives. Although the
34
Philippines boasts a robust civil society, as of yet it has not been an effective counterforce
to Duterte.
 Generational change. Most Filipinos under the age of forty-five did not directly
experience either the abuses of the Marcos era or the nonviolent People Power Revolution
that forced him from office in 1986. Moreover, because school curricula have glossed
over the period and the younger members of the Marcos family (particularly his children)
have been able to revamp his image, public understanding of the severe damage done by
the Marcos dictatorship has been diminished.64 As a result, younger Filipinos know only
the freedoms and disappointments of thirty years of elite democracy. This may make them
less protective of the democratic freedoms that were lost during the Marcos era.
Death by a thousand cuts? In How Democracies Die, Levitsky and Ziblatt describe the
incremental demise of democracy:
Many government efforts to subvert democracy are “legal,” in the sense that they are
approved by the legislature or accepted by the courts. Because there is no single moment—no
coup, declaration of martial law, or suspension of the constitution—in which the regime
obviously “crosses the line” into dictatorship, nothing may set off society’s alarm bells.
Those who denounce government abuse may be dismissed as exaggerating or crying wolf.
Democracy’s erosion is, for many, almost imperceptible.
This observation is highly relevant for the Philippines under Duterte. Two and a half
years into his presidency—with the very important exception of EJKs—his government still
operates largely within the bounds of the constitution. He has not muzzled the media,
outlawed the political opposition, or canceled elections. Despite his threats, he has not
declared nationwide martial law or created a revolutionary government. Nevertheless, the
extent to which he has used the powers of the presidency to run roughshod over human rights
and weaken democratic checks and balances is unprecedented.
Levitsky and Ziblatt also observe that “without robust norms, constitutional checks
and balances do not serve as the bulwarks of democracy we imagine them to be.” In
particular, they point to the importance of two norms: (1) mutual toleration, the
understanding that competing parties accept one another as legitimate rivals, and (2)
forbearance, the idea that politicians should exercise restraint in deploying their institutional
prerogatives.66 Duterte’s actions clearly violate both of these norms. To be sure, they have
been frequently disregarded in the past, but under Duterte any pretense of honoring them has
35
disappeared. As Lisandro Claudio and Patricio Abinales have noted, “Duterte is the first
Philippine president to not render even the minimum obeisance to liberal democratic politics.
Bermeo points to the challenge of responding to gradual or incremental backsliding:
“Slow slides toward authoritarianism often lack both the bright spark that ignites an effective
call to action and the opposition and movement leaders who can voice that clarion.” To date,
Duterte hasn’t triggered “the bright spark,” and the opposition to him has yet to generate
compelling new leaders or political movements.
“But even where there is backsliding, there may be grounds for optimism that it can
be reversed. As Bermeo notes:
Incremental and ambiguous change preserves mixed landscapes wherein one set of
institutions or ideas can correct others. As long as some electoral competition takes
place, power can be clawed back. When civil society is allowed some space,
countermobilization can occur. Because backsliding reflects incentive structures,
changed incentives can reverse negative trends.68
The election-driven overthrow of Ferdinand Marcos in 1986, as well as the electoral
defeats of then president Mahinda Rajapaksa in Sri Lanka in January 2015 and then prime
minister Najib Razak in Malaysia in June 2018, give at least some credence to Bormeo’s
cautious hopefulness.
SUMMING UP: A MIXED RECORD DELIVERING CHANGE AND AN

UNCERTAIN FUTURE
Thus far, how much real change has Duterte’s presidency produced? And what does
this suggest for the future? To date, there has been real change in several areas. The first is
the drug war and the damage it has inflicted on the rule of law, the professionalism of the
PNP, and other aspects of governance. Second is the weakening of democratic institutions
and norms. Third is a portion of the government’s economic policies, particularly the increase
in spending on infrastructure and a few populist social programs. Fourth is the reorientation
of the Philippines’ foreign relations to move closer to China and pullback from the United
States, the United Nations, and the liberal norms espoused by the international community.
Finally, the possibility of constitutional changes, up to and including federalism, would be
highly significant for the Philippines.
Alongside these changes, there are important elements of continuity. So far, there is
considerable continuity in most macroeconomic policies and public financial management.
36
The government also has continued to expand (with some tweaks or rebranding) most
preexisting social development programs. Finally, the passage of the Bangsamoro Organic
Law was the culmination of a decades-long process.
Under Duterte, there also are worrying signs of regression back to some of the worst
aspects of traditional Philippine politics. First is the emphasis on highly personalistic
leadership: Duterte’s presidency is all about him and not about institutions. Second, little
effort has been made to reduce the entrenched power of political dynasties and oligarchs—
except those that might challenge Duterte. Instead, Duterte has been willing to ally with
traditional political leaders who have shown little interest in reforming politics and
governance. Third, his administration has adopted a somewhat more statist approach to
economic development. Finally, Duterte’s selective pandering to 1960s-style anti-U.S.
nationalism, which exaggerates the influence of the United States and sometimes is used to
deflect public attention away from the shortcomings of far more important domestic actors, is
an unwelcome development.
Looking ahead, it seems likely that there will be a continuing struggle between elites
and other groups who desire a strongman and those who believe in the desirability of
democracy, even the flawed version that has been practiced in the Philippines. The best-case
scenario is a gradual reassertion of checks and balances brought about by a softening of
public support for Duterte, a growing recognition of the damage being done to Philippine
democracy, and more unified and effective pushback against his antidemocratic actions. But
it is also possible that the country’s contentious politics could move in dangerous directions.
This might be the case if Duterte declares nationwide martial law or manages to ram through
major changes to the 1987 constitution. Alternatively, if Duterte, who is in poor health, were
to resign or be incapacitated before the end of his term, members of his coalition might try to
block Vice President Robredo from succeeding him. Under any of these scenarios, there is a
risk of mass mobilization (both for and against Duterte) that could lead to extraconstitutional
and potentially violent forms of people power. This popular uprising, in turn, could tempt or
compel the PNP and AFP to take sides. The Philippines would then be in perilous, uncharted
territory.
AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND

DEMOCRACY IN THE PHILIPPINES
American diplomats often boast of the strong people-to-people connections that exist
between the United States and the Philippines, principally because of the large Filipino-
37
American community in the United States. But America’s institutional engagement with the
Philippines is surprisingly thin, even though the country is a former colony, a major treaty
ally, and a fellow democracy. There are two reasons for this state of affairs. First, historically
the bilateral relationship has been dominated by military/security ties, key elements of which
include the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, the presence of two massive U.S. military bases in
the Philippines until the early 1990s, the post-9/11 Global War on Terror, and most recently
the U.S. response to China’s assertion of sovereignty in the South China Sea. Second, the
Philippines’ moderately sized economy has been less open to foreign investment and less
export-oriented than many other East Asian economies. As a result, though U.S.-Philippines
economic ties are not insignificant, they are small compared to the United States’ relations
with larger and more open economies in the region.
U.S.-PHILIPPINES RELATIONS: LESS THAN MEETS THE EYE
During the Obama and Aquino presidencies, the bilateral relationship was the most
cordial it had been since the Fidel Ramos administration (1992–1998). During the six-month
period following the election of Duterte and before the election of Donald Trump, the
bilateral relationship went into a downward spiral. The nadir came in early September 2016,
prior to the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit in Laos, when it was
reported that President Obama would raise human rights issues in his one-on-one meeting
with Duterte. In a news conference before the summit, Duterte angrily rejected being lectured
by Obama and famously said, “Son of a whore, I will curse you in that forum.” In response,
Obama canceled the meeting with Duterte. In September 2016, $4.5 million in U.S. State
Department funding intended to assist Philippine law enforcement was shifted to maritime
security. In November of the same year, the State Department suspended the sale of 26,000
military assault rifles to the PNP. The arrival of a new U.S. ambassador, Sung Kim, in early
December, a month after Trump’s election, provided an opportunity to reset the bilateral
relationship.
Today, U.S. foreign policy is shaped by a president who expresses admiration for
authoritarian rulers and has shown little interest in defending human rights and democracy.
The Duterte administration is pro-China, much more transactional in its relationship with the
United States, and intolerant of any foreign criticism of human rights abuses associated with
his drug war. Washington now finds itself with limited influence with regard to the Duterte
government. Unlike China and Japan, the U.S. government cannot compel American
corporations to fund large infrastructure investments.70 Moreover, the Philippines is not
38
dependent on foreign aid, so it can take or leave US development assistance. This is exactly
what it did in December 2017, when Manila withdrew from being considered for a second
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) compact worth over $400 million. The
Philippines no longer met the MCC’s minimum requirements in the areas of rule of law and
controlling corruption, so it withdrew in order to avoid the embarrassment of being turned
down by the MCC Board of Directors.
The nongovernmental foundations of U.S.-Philippine relations are also surprisingly
weak. University-to-university ties are limited, and only a few American universities offer
Philippine studies. The involvement of American foundations—even those that traditionally
have had an interest in Southeast Asia such as the Ford, Henry Luce, and Open Society
Foundations—is minimal. And in the realm of public diplomacy, the passage of time has
diminished the ranks and influence of champions of close U.S.-Philippines relations such as
former senators John McCain and Richard Lugar, former representative Stephen Solarz,
former secretary of state George Shultz, and former ambassadors Stephen Bosworth and
Nicholas Platt, all of whom have died or retired.
THE TIMID AMERICAN RESPONSE TO THE DUTERTE GOVERNMENT’S

SUBVERSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY
Since Donald Trump became president, the U.S. government has avoided saying or
doing anything that might alienate Duterte. During the first half of 2017, the scale and
brutality of Duterte’s drug war became irrefutably clear in major reports by Human Rights
Watch and Amnesty International, as well as by powerful photojournalism by the Philippine
Daily Inquirer, Reuters, and the New York Times. Despite this, in late April 2017, in a phone
conversation with Duterte, Trump told him: “I just wanted to congratulate you because I am
hearing of the unbelievable job on the drug problem. Many countries have the problem, we
have a problem, but what a great job you are doing and I just wanted to call and tell you
that.” He also invited Duterte to the White House—an invitation Duterte later declined.
When the State Department was headed by Rex Tillerson and was itself in turmoil,
the U.S. government was largely silent regarding the drug war and human rights abuses. In
August 2017, when Tillerson met with Duterte at the ASEAN summit in Manila, their
discussion focused on the Marawi crisis and terrorism and did not include the human rights
violations associated with the drug war. The State Department’s 2017 human rights report on
the Philippines acknowledged that “extrajudicial killings have been the chief human rights
concern in the country for many years and, after a sharp rise with the onset of the antidrug
39
campaign in 2016, they continued in 2017. Concerns about police impunity increased

significantly following the sharp increase in police killings.” However, it seemed to suggest
that the drug-related EJKs were not all that different from other human rights abuses in the
Philippines.72
In June 2018, the United States joined thirty-seven other members (out of forty-seven total)
of the United Nations Human Rights Council to sign a statement on human rights in the
Philippines issued by the government of Iceland:
We urge the government of the Philippines to take all necessary measures to bring
killings associated with the campaign against illegal drugs to an end and cooperate with the
international community to investigate all related deaths and hold perpetrators
accountable. While acknowledging that drug use in the Philippines is a serious problem,
actions to tackle drug abuse must be carried out in full respect of the rule of law and
compliance with international human rights obligations.
This statement appears to be the strongest public statement with which the U.S.
government has been associated, but it received little attention in the media. On the same day
this statement was issued, the United States pulled out of the Human Rights Council.
The U.S. Congress expressed some initial concern over the situation in the
Philippines, but has not taken any meaningful action. In May 2017, senators Ben Cardin and
Marco Rubio introduced a bill, the Philippines Human Rights Accountability and Counter
Narcotics Act of 2017 (S 1055), which would restrict arms sales to the PNP and provide up to
$25 million in fiscal years 2017 and 2018 to support human rights groups and assist the
Philippines in dealing with its drug problem. The bill was referred to the Foreign Relations
Committee and has languished there since. In the House of Representatives, in July 2017 the
Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission held a hearing on “The Human Rights
Consequences of the War on Drugs in the Philippines” that was highly critical of Duterte’s
war on drugs. But there has been no subsequent action.
Although the U.S. embassy in Manila might be engaged in quiet diplomacy regarding
human rights, conversations with Filipino human rights leaders suggest that little has taken
place. USAID’s Democracy, Human Rights and Governance (DRG) portfolio in the
Philippines funds conventional rule-of-law, civil society, and local governance programs, but
stays well clear of anything that addresses democratic backsliding. Because of their
dependency on USAID and State Department funding, democracy promotion organizations
40
like Freedom House, the National Democratic Institute, and the International Republican
Institute have not responded in a major way. The Asia Foundation in the Philippines, which
relies more on Australian than U.S. funding, does some work on the rule of law, but also
shies away from anything that might antagonize the Duterte government. Only the National
Endowment for Democracy has significantly increased its funding in support of democracy in
the Philippines, from under $500,000 in 2015 to over $1 million in 2017.
THE CASE FOR A MORE ROBUST AMERICAN RESPONSE
Nancy Bermeo has observed, “When backsliding yields situations that are fluid and
ill-defined, taking action to defend democracy becomes particularly difficult.” 74 This is true
for “small d” democrats both inside the Philippines and abroad. Given the long-standing
dominance of U.S. military and security interests and the Trump administration’s lack of
interest in defending democracy, it is especially difficult for the U.S. government to
formulate a suitable response.
Still, the United States has a unique historical relationship with the Philippines, one that
needs to be considered alongside purely strategic considerations. The Philippines’ political
system is modeled after America’s, and for more than a century the Philippine elite’s
attitudes and behavior have been shaped by America’s influence on the country’s educational
system, economy, and politics. The U.S. government has long and influential relations with
the AFP and, to a lesser extent, the Philippine police. And when Philippine leaders have
shown a commitment to democratic politics and governance, the U.S. government has been
quick to proclaim solidarity. Therefore, at a time when human rights and democracy are
under attack in the Philippines, the U.S. government and American NGOs ought to support
Filipino-led efforts to defend human rights and democracy. Doing so would have the added
benefit of showing Filipinos that the U.S.-Philippine relationship is not only about advancing
U.S. security and economic interests.
Moreover, the Philippines is not China, Vietnam, or Cambodia, where the prospects
for democracy are negligible in the short to medium term. The situation in the Philippines is
dynamic, and investments in human rights and democracy have the potential to make a
difference. Despite Duterte’s efforts to weaken checks on his power, there are civil society,
media, religious, and educational organizations—and even some members of the business
elite— that are committed to defending democracy. Like Trump in the United States, Duterte
has become a catalyst for a struggle between vastly different visions of what kind of country
the Philippines can and should be. This is a contest Filipino democrats need to win; but in
41
doing so, they will need to offer something better than just a return to the pre-Duterte status
quo.
Naturally, there are no quick or easy fixes. The goal of more robust American support
for democracy in the Philippines should be twofold: first and most immediately, to promote
greater solidarity among “small-d” democrats in the Philippines, the United States, and
around the world, and second, to improve and expand the sharing of ideas and strategies for
how to defend and strengthen democratic institutions and norms. Illustratively, in the near
term, the United States could support Filipino efforts on the following fronts:
 improve understanding in the Philippines of effective approaches to countering illegal

drugs;
 develop effective responses to the Duterte government’s anti–human rights narrative

and broaden the community of human rights supporters and activists; and
 promote solidarity and sharing lessons for defending human rights and democracy by
supporting visits to the Philippines of human rights advocates, democratic political leaders,
and scholars on democracy.
Longer term, Americans and Filipinos should work together to address common challenges to
preserving and improving democracy. This could include joint efforts to:
 improve the role of media/social media in democracy;
 reform political finance and strengthen political parties;
 strengthen school-based and civic education on human rights and democracy; and
 build university-to-university ties, including scholarly collaboration on key aspects of

Philippine politics and society (such as poverty and inequality, criminality and the illicit
economy, Supreme Court decisionmaking, and the political role of the middle class).
Finally, a U.S. House of Representatives controlled by the Democrats holds out the
possibility of greater congressional attention to the situation in the Philippines. Members of
Congress should consider pushing the Trump administration to apply Magnitsky Global Act
sanctions to current and former PNP leaders responsible for EJKs.
42
A more robust American response will prompt some Filipinos to accuse the United
States of meddling in the Philippines’ domestic affairs. Duterte’s supporters will almost
certainly portray it as effort to destabilize his government. Therefore, support must be
transparent and nonpartisan, and those providing it will need to be prepared to take some
heat. Ideally, this should not be a solely American project—it should involve democratic
groups elsewhere, including in Australia, Canada, Europe, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.
As long as strategic and security interests dominate U.S. policy toward the
Philippines, and with the U.S. Congress largely consumed with domestic politics, it is
unlikely that the U.S. government will take meaningful steps to support human rights and
democracy in the Philippines. Therefore, American NGOs, foundations, and universities will
need to step up and take the lead. But ultimately, it will be the actions of Filipino democrats
that matter most.
Activity 10
Make a reaction paper on the current administration of President Duterte.
NB
1. This is not to ignore the considerable influence that the United States has had on
Philippine politics and policymaking post-independence, but U.S. influence has
declined significantly over the past quarter century.
2. Although the Philippine political elite is frequently referred to as an oligarchy, the
true oligarchs are the twenty or thirty richest tycoons and their families, most of
whom have created the large business conglomerates that dominate the Philippine
economy. Political families (such as the Marcoses and Cojuangcos) are wealthy by
almost any standard, but the business families (such as the Sys, Gokongweis, Ayalas,
and Aboitizes) control vast business empires and have personal net worths in the
billions of dollars. Little scholarly attention has been paid to how these families
influence politics and policymaking.
References:
43
1. Timberman, D (2019) Philippine Politics Under Duterte: A Midterm Assessment. Retrived

on October 10, 2020, from https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/01/10/philippine-politics-
under-duterte-midterm-assessment-pub-78091
2. David E. Sanger and Maggie Haberman, “Trump Praises Duterte for Philippine Drug
Crackdown in Call Transcript,” New York Times, May 23,
2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/23/us/politics/trump-duterte-phone-transcript-
philippine-drug-crackdown.html.
3. Philippines 2017 Human Rights Report,” U.S. Department of State, 2017, pp. 1–
2, https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/277355.pdf.
4. “Philippines’ Duterte Insults Obama Ahead of Scheduled Talks,” Deutsche Welle, May 9,
2016, https://www.dw.com/en/philippines-duterte-insults-obama-ahead-of-scheduled-talks/a-
19527837.
Part III. Commonly Used Research Methods Used by Political Scientists
Overview
For decades, there has been a raging debate among scholars regarding the differences
between and advantages of qualitative and quantitative methods. In fact, this has probably
been one of the largest and longest methodological debates in all of social science research.
Perhaps it can be briefly summarized by the following two famous and opposing quotations:
Donald Campbell says, “All research ultimately has a qualitative grounding”; and Fred
Kerlinger says, “There’s no such thing as qualitative data. Everything is either 1 or 0” (in
Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 40). Although it is not necessarily critical to determine which—
if either—of these approaches can be described as the better one, it is imperative to have a
thorough understanding of these methods in order to be able to conduct sound political
science research. After all, for a study to be of value to scholars and other individuals
interested in the topic, it is necessary for one to choose the correct research approach, ask
suitable questions, use appropriate research methods and statistical analyses, correctly deduce
or induce inferences, and have suitable general goals driving the research.
The questions under consideration and the answers obtained by any particular study
will depend on whether the study uses quantitative or qualitative approaches. The purpose of
this article is to differentiate between these two types of research. First, the literature
available on this topic is briefly summarized, focusing specifically on how qualitative and
quantitative research is defined, as well as the different assumptions on which these types of
research are based. Next, a summary of the similarities and differences in each stage of the
research process is provided. Then, the different methods that these two types of approaches
44
use are discussed. Next, since this is a book examining political science in the 21st century,
current and future research directions are examined. In particular, the use of what are called
mixed methods approaches is discussed. The article ends with a brief summary and
conclusion of the information that has been presented. Finally, suggested books and articles
for further reading are provided, including some material for individuals interested in
conducting advanced statistical studies, which are beyond the scope of this article.
Outline
1. Quantitative and Qualitative Research

1. Definition of Quantitative Research
2. Assumptions of Quantitative Research
3. Definition of Qualitative Research
4. Assumptions of Qualitative Research
2. Comparing and Contrasting Quantitative and Qualitative Research Methods
1. The Research Question
2. Theorizing
3. Research Design
4. Sampling
5. Data Collection
6. Data Analysis
7. Reporting of Results
8. Summary
3. Quantitative Methods in Political Science
1. Limitations of Quantitative Methods
4. Qualitative Methods
1. Limitations of Qualitative Methods
5. Future Directions
6. Conclusion
Quantitative and Qualitative Research
The following section introduces the definitions and assumptions of quantitative and
qualitative research. First, however, it is worth briefly discussing two types of political
analysis in order to understand the origins of quantitative and qualitative methods. Political
scientists distinguish between empirical analysis—obtaining and dealing with knowledge and
information—and normative analysis— determining how to use that knowledge. Normative
analysis relies on the development of subjective goals and values to apply what has been
learned to reality. Empirical analysis, however, focuses on using common terms to explain
and describe political reality and can be either quantitative or qualitative in nature. If
something is empirical, it is verifiable through observations or experiments. Empirical
analysis is the focus of this article.
Definition of Quantitative Research
As a first step, it is necessary to define these two methods of research and examine
their goals. Quantitative research can be defined as a process of inquiry examining an
identified problem that is based on testing a theory measured by numbers and analyzed with
statistical techniques. Thus, quantitative research involves the analysis of numerical data. A
45
more technical definition is provided by Brady and Collier (2004), who define mainstream
quantitative methods as “an approach to methodology strongly oriented toward regression
analysis, econometric refinements on regression, and the search for statistical alternatives to
regression models in contexts where specific regression assumptions are not met” (p. 294).
The econometric refinements and statistical alternatives referred to by the authors are beyond
the scope of this article but include logit and probit models, time-series analysis, and a variety
of techniques to circumvent problems that can occur in regression analysis, such as
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. Essentially, quantitative methods have played a major
role in improving on commonly used research tools within the structure of regression models
that are frequently used in the field of political science.
Assumptions of Quantitative Research
The goal of quantitative research is to examine particular instances or aspects of

phenomena to determine if predictive generalizations of a theory hold true or to test causal
hypotheses. As a result, there are several key assumptions underlying quantitative research
methods, which are briefly outlined here. These include the following:
 Reality can be studied objectively.

 Research must remain independent of the researcher through the use of experiments,
questionnaires, machines, or inventories.
 Research is value free, and the researcher does not become a part of or interfere with
the research.
 Theories and hypotheses are tested in a cause effect order with research based
primarily on deductive forms of logic identified a priori by the researcher.
 The purpose of research is to develop generalizations that contribute to theory and
allow the researcher to predict, explain, and understand a particular phenomenon.
Definition of Qualitative Research
Qualitative research can be defined as a process of inquiry that builds a complex and
holistic picture of a particular phenomenon of interest by using a natural setting. Thus,
qualitative research involves the analysis of words, pictures, videos, or objects in the context
in which they occur.
Assumptions of Qualitative Research
The goal of qualitative research is to understand social issues from multiple

perspectives to have a comprehensive understanding of a particular event, person, or group.
As with quantitative research, there are several key assumptions underlying qualitative
research methods:
 Reality is socially constructed, and there are multiple realities.

 The researcher interacts and often works closely with the individuals or groups under
study and serves as the primary instrument for data collection and analysis.
 The research is value laden, and the researchers become a part of the research,
attempting to understand the lives and experiences of the people they study.
46
 Research is context bound and based on inductive forms of logic that emerge as a
study progresses.
 The purpose of research is to find theories that help explain a particular phenomenon.
Comparing and Contrasting Quantitative and Qualitative Research Methods
The following section examines how quantitative and qualitative methods are similar
to and different from each other throughout the research process, beginning with the creation
of a research question and up to the reporting of the results. Although examining quantitative
and qualitative methods as two separate categories is necessary for the sake of clarification
throughout this section, it is important to realize that these two methods are not mutually
exclusive, a topic that will be discussed in more detail shortly. As Manheim, Rich, Willnat,
and Brians (2007) note, when examining the differences between quantitative and qualitative
methods, “The distinctions discussed are generally more matters of degree than absolutes.
The two types of methods often require only different forms of work, but are working toward
similar objectives” (p. 323). This is important to keep in mind while reading this article.
The Research Question
The first step in conducting sound political science research is selecting a research
question. An appropriate research question should fulfill either a scientific need or a societal
need by helping to provide an answer to an important problem. Both quantitative and
qualitative forms of research begin by creating a research question that is intended to produce
knowledge of the empirical world. In terms of the research questions, the main difference
between quantitative and qualitative methods typically exists in the type of questions that are
being posed.
Theorizing
A theory is a potential explanation for events and is composed of a set of logically

related propositions and assumptions. Theorizing is the actual process of stating these
conceptual explanations for events that take place in the real world by proclaiming
relationships among the concepts. Theories are created to help people understand phenomena.
There are several characteristics that make a theory particularly useful in explaining
observations. Theories should be (a) testable, (b) logically sound, (c) communicable, (d)
general, and (e) parsimonious.
Theorizing is a critical phase of the research process for quantitative and qualitative
researchers. However, quantitative researchers are more likely than qualitative researchers to
focus on testing performed theories. Quantitative researchers base their studies on a theory
that relates to their subject in an attempt to develop generalizations that contribute to theory.
Thus, in quantitative research, theorizing occurs prior to the collection of data. Qualitative
researchers, on the other hand, are more likely than quantitative researchers to elaborate on
theories while making observations of a particular phenomenon. Many qualitative researchers
argue that, as a result of this, their theories are far more grounded in reality than are those of
quantitative researchers. However, quantitative researchers argue that the formulation of
theory during the observation-making process can easily lead to the creation of a theory
designed around those specific observations. As a result, these theories would be polluted and
47
not testable. Furthermore, if a theory is based on observation of one particular group, the
usefulness of the theory is quite limited.
Research Design
Simply defined, a research design is the plan of a study. It organizes observations in a

manner that establishes a logical basis for causal inference. Essentially, the research design
can be viewed as the blueprint for a study. There are three main types of research designs in
political science: exploratory, descriptive, and explanatory. Exploratory research attempts to
discover which factors should be included when theorizing about and researching a particular
subject. Descriptive research attempts to measure some aspect of reality for its own sake and
not for the purpose of developing or testing some theory. Explanatory research uses
observations of reality to test hypotheses and help develop an understanding of patterns of
behavior in the context of a specific theory.
Regardless of the purpose of a study, every research design should have the same
basic elements, which are outlined by Manheim et al. (2007): (a) a statement outlining the
purpose of the research; (b) a review of the theory and any hypotheses that are going to be
tested, if applicable; (c) a statement explaining the variables that will be used; (d) an
explanation of the operationalization and measurement of the variables; (e) a statement of
how observations will be organized, as well as conducted; and (f) a discussion of how the
data that are collected will be analyzed.
Although both quantitative and qualitative researchers produce research designs for
their studies, quantitative researchers are much more likely than their counterparts to base
their designs on the logic of experiments. For instance, quantitative researchers often
emphasize control groups, pretests, and other elements that provide them with the opportunity
to hold some factor(s) constant in their attempt to make causal inferences. Qualitative
research designs, on the other hand, typically focus more on who or what is being observed,
where the observation will take place, how observations will be conducted, and how the data
will be recorded. For qualitative researchers, more emphasis is placed on viewing people and
events as they naturally occur, while for quantitative researchers there is a greater focus on
establishing cause-and-effect relationships.
Sampling
A sample is a small group of cases drawn from and used to represent a larger
population under consideration. A representative sample is a sample in which each major
attribute of the larger population occurs in approximately the same proportion or frequency as
in the larger population. “In other words, a truly representative sample is a microcosm—a
smaller, but accurate model—of the larger population from which it is taken” (Manheim et
al., 2007, p. 119). When a sample is representative, the conclusions drawn from it are
generalizable to the entire population.
In quantitative studies, sampling is based on the logic of probability to produce

statistical representativeness. Additionally, in quantitative research, sampling is done before
the data are collected. Qualitative researchers, on the other hand, usually create their sample
once their study is already in progress. After observing, learning about, and gaining
48
understanding from an initial case, qualitative researchers are then able to determine what
they will observe next. Additionally, whereas generalizability is a chief concern for
quantitative researchers, this is not the case for qualitative researchers, who are far more
concerned with finding the specific information that they are looking for from their sample.
Since this method is very time-consuming, qualitative findings are often based on fewer cases
than quantitative findings.
Data Collection
Data are observations or information about reality that represent attributes of variables
and result from the research process. Although data collection is an integral part of both types
of research methods, data are composed of words in qualitative research and numbers in
quantitative research, which results in a data collection process that differs significantly for
quantitative and qualitative research. Furthermore, the data collection process is different:
Although quantitative researchers have the ability to administer a previously prepared
questionnaire or watch an experiment unfold behind blind glass, qualitative researchers are
engaged—sometimes for long periods of time—with the people or groups under study.
Data Analysis
As can likely be seen by now, quantitative researchers frequently have a detailed plan
of action that is thought out prior to the beginning of a study’s taking place. Qualitative
researchers, on the other hand, tend to take a more fluid approach to their studies. This holds
true for the analysis of data, as well. Whereas in quantitative studies, the data analysis
methods are planned out in advance and then occur after the data are collected, data analysis
typically takes place at the same time as data collection in qualitative studies. To make
appropriate future observations, analyses must often begin after studying one to several initial
cases. As a result, quantitative researchers are not usually afforded the opportunity to modify
their methods of data collection during a project, while qualitative researchers can do so at
any point in a project after conducting the initial data analysis.
Additionally, although qualitative data are more subjective and sometimes difficult to
interpret, quantitative data are easily coded into numerical formats. As a result, it is much
easier to enter quantitative data into computer programs, such as Excel and SPSS, than it is to
enter qualitative data. Furthermore, there are a number of programs that analyze the statistical
data, such as SPSS and Stata. Although programs do exist for the interpretation of qualitative
data, they are not used nearly as extensively as those used for quantitative data analysis.
Finally, whereas quantitative researchers have a variety of means to test the statistical
significance and validity of the data that they are analyzing, this is not the case for qualitative
researchers. Instead, qualitative researchers must do their best to present a clear, accurate, and
convincing analysis of their data. As a result, a topic of much debate between quantitative
and qualitative researchers is the validity and reliability of findings produced in studies.
Validity is the extent to which measures correspond to the concepts they are intended to
reflect. Reliability is the consistency with which a measuring instrument allows assignment
of values to cases when repeated over time. Although a measure can be reliable without being
valid, it cannot be valid without being reliable.
49
Additionally, since one of the main points of conducting quantitative research is to

study causal relationships, part of the process involves manipulating various factors that
could potentially influence a phenomenon of interest while at the same time controlling for
other variables that could affect the outcome. For instance, if a researcher were examining
if gender played a role in whether a person received a job, it would be important to control
for other variables, such as education or previous work experience, since these factors may
also determine why an individual would receive an employment offer. In quantitative
analysis, empirical relationships and associations are typically examined by using general
linear models, nonlinear models, or factor analysis to understand important information about
the relationship between variables, such as the direction of a relationship. However, despite
the results that may be produced by these models, it is important to note that a major tenet of
quantitative research is that correlation does not imply causation. In other words, a spurious
relationship is always a possible result of the data analysis.
Reporting of Results
When presenting the results of a study, qualitative researchers often have an arduous
task in front of them. Since their reports typically rely on the interpretation of observations, it
is necessary for them to be very careful in the selection of what stories, quotations, pictures,
and so on, they will share in order to avoid bias. The reports produced by quantitative
researchers tend to be more straightforward since they rely mostly on the interpretation of
statistics. But here, too, it is important to make sure that bias was avoided in the sample and
that appropriate data analysis methods were used in order to avoid bias in quantitative
analysis.
Summary
To sum up, there are a lot of similarities among quantitative and qualitative research
methods. Irrespective of which method is used, it is still necessary to create an appropriate
research question, understand the theory behind what will be observed, create a research
design, collect and analyze data, and create a report of the results. However, there are several
key differences between quantitative and qualitative research methods. These methods differ
in (a) the types of questions that they pose, (b) their analytical objectives, (c) the amount of
flexibility allowed in the research design, (d) the data collection instruments that are used,
and (e) the type of data that are ultimately produced. According to Mack, Woodsong,
MacQueen, Guest, and Namey (2005), the fifth difference is the biggest. The authors argue
that quantitative methods are generally inflexible since categories are typically closed-ended
or fixed, while qualitative methods are more flexible, with a large amount of spontaneity and
adaptation occurring during interaction with other people, especially in the form of open-
ended questions.
To decide which research approach should be used, several things should be taken
into account, including the problem of interest, the resources available, the skills and training
of the researcher(s), and the audience for the research. Since there are considerable
differences in the assumptions that underlie these two research approaches, as well as the
collection and analysis of data, these considerations are important. The following sections
provide a more detailed examination of the various types of quantitative and qualitative
research methods, as well as the limitations of these methods in general.
50
Quantitative Methods in Political Science
Quantitative methods are essentially a variety of research techniques that are used to
gather quantitative data. There are a variety of different types of quantitative methods, which
are briefly outlined in this section: experiments, quasi experiments, content analysis, and
surveys. First, in experiments, participants are randomly assigned to experimental conditions,
as well as experimental controls. The individuals who are assigned to experimental controls
are testing the independent variable. The difference between experiments and quasi
experiments is the way that subjects are selected. In quasi experiments, participants are
assigned to experimental conditions in a nonrandom fashion.
Next, content analysis is a systematic means of counting and assessing information in

order to interpret it. For instance, scholars may count the number of times that personal
characteristics, such as dress or hairstyle, are mentioned in newspaper articles to determine
whether media coverage of male and female candidates differs. Finally, surveys are used to
estimate the characteristics of a population based on responses to questionnaires and
interviews from a sample of the population. Surveys provide five types of information: (1)
facts, (2) opinions, (3) perceptions, (4) attitudes, and (5) behavioral reports. Essentially,
questionnaires and surveys can serve as a means for helping scholars understand why people
feel or act the way that they do, as well as measure their attitudes and assess their behaviors.
Limitations of Quantitative Methods
There are three key criticisms of quantitative research that are discussed here. First,
since quantitative research methods were adopted from the physical sciences, critics argue
that all cases are treated as though they are alike. Complex concepts are turned into numbers,
and their unique elements are dissipated as a result. Furthermore, people can easily attribute
different meanings to something even when they are experiencing the same phenomena.
Second, and related to the first criticism, some people argue that quantitative methods are
inherently biased. Since they are adopted from the physical sciences, critics argue that
quantitative methods fail to take into account the unique cultural roots and other critical
aspects of marginalized groups of people. Thus, according to critics, when it comes to
populations that have been politically excluded, the usage of quantitative methods may not be
appropriate, according to critics. Third, critics argue that quantitative research methods result
in taking individuals out of their natural settings to examine very limited aspects of what a
person thinks or believes. To these critics, context is very important, and by taking actions
out of context, it is impossible to understand the true meaning of events or responses.
Qualitative Methods in Political Science
Just as quantitative research methods have a variety of research techniques that are
used to gather data, there are also a variety of qualitative methods. This section focuses on
several of these: ethnographic studies, phenomenological studies, case studies, focus groups,
and intense interviews. First, in ethnographic studies, researchers examine cultural groups in
their natural setting. Examples of cultural groups can include students in a dormitory, women
in a crisis center, or people from a village in Asia. This type of study can provide rich,
detailed information about the individuals in various groups, since it involves first-hand
observation.
51
Second, in phenomenological studies, a small group of people is studied intensively

over a long period to understand the life experience of the individuals being studied.
Phenomenological studies can involve direct or indirect observation. Additionally, depending
on the study, the individuals being observed may or may not know the purpose of the study or
what exactly is being observed. Sometimes the researcher relies on building a trusting
relationship with the subjects so the subjects act as naturally as possible even though they are
being observed. As a result of this closeness, the researcher can often tell when a person is
modifying his or her behavior. However, it is not always possible to establish this kind of
relationship. As a result, some researchers conceal the purpose of their studies from those
being observed to avoid the modifying of behavior by the subject. This process of behavior
modification by the respondent is called reactivity and can greatly affect the results of a
study.
Third, in a case study, a case is studied by a researcher, and detailed information

about the entity or phenomenon is recorded. Sometimes information that is found in a case
study can lend itself to the content analytical techniques discussed in the previous
quantitative research section. Other times, newspapers, books, interviews, or other sources
may be used. In content analysis, researchers are looking for specific words, phrases, or
general ideas that are relevant to their study. The researchers will then count the instances of
these items to learn more about a particular subject. For instance, some political scientists are
interested in learning about gender bias in the media. By examining how often a female
versus a male candidate is mentioned in an article or the type of coverage the candidate
receives, these scholars are able to draw conclusions about gender bias in the media.
Finally, there are two other ways to collect and analyze qualitative data that are of
relevance in this section—focus groups and intense interviewing. Focus groups are in-depth
studies composed of small groups of people who have guided discussions. For instance, a
focus group may be shown a political advertisement that a political campaign hopes to air on
television. After watching the advertisement, members of the group are asked questions, and
a discussion is prompted in which they can discuss their feelings about the ad, such as what
they liked and did not like, as well as whether they were swayed by the ad and found it to be
credible. These responses allow the advertisement’s producers to make changes that make the
ad more effective.
Intense interviews are similar to survey questionnaires in that the interviewer

generally has some thoughts in mind about what the respondent will be asked. However,
although survey questions are planned out in their entirety in advance, this is often not the
case in intense interviews where the interviewee has the ability to ask follow-up questions or
a variety of other questions related to an answer provided by the respondent. Additionally,
whereas survey questionnaire responses tend to be closed-ended (a particular response can be
chosen from those available), intense interview responses are typically open-ended (no
response categories) and can be very detailed. Thus, researchers have more flexibility when
conducting an intense interview than they would if they were administering a questionnaire;
however, their results are typically not quantifiable.
Limitations of Qualitative Methods
Just as quantitative methods have their detractors, so too do qualitative methods.

Some of the biggest criticisms of qualitative methods are outlined in this section. First, some
52
critics argue that qualitative methods focus too much on particular individuals, sometimes at
the expense of seeing the bigger picture, and they fail to make their results generalizable to a
larger population. Second, critics note that the quality of the results and analysis that are
produced are highly dependent on the skill of the researcher. It is necessary for the researcher
to have remained unbiased and provide a clear assessment of the subjects under study, or the
results are essentially meaningless. Third, it is very time-consuming to conduct qualitative
research studies. The amount of time spent conducting interviews and making observations is
just the beginning. After these take place, the researchers still have to figure out a way to
analyze the vast amounts of information that they have collected to produce results.
Future Directions
As can be seen from the information provided throughout this article, there has been a
raging decades-long debate as to whether qualitative or quantitative research is better. Many
scholars focus on qualitative versus quantitative techniques, automatically framing these
methods and approaches in opposition to each other. Although it may appear that qualitative
and quantitative data exist in opposition to each other, this is not necessarily the case. As
King, Keohane, and Verba (1994) argue, “The two traditions appear quite different; indeed
they sometimes seem to be at war. Our view is that these differences are mainly ones of style
and specific technique. The same underlying logic provides the framework for each research
approach” (p. 3). As a result, research does not typically fit into one particular category or
another.
Additionally, King et al. (1994) note that we live in a world that changes rapidly, and
to fully understand the changes that occur around us, it is necessary to be able to take into
account information that can be quantified, as well as information that cannot. Furthermore,
since social science requires comparison, it is important to examine both quantitative
differences (such as which phenomena are more or less alike in degree) and qualitative
differences (such as which phenomena are more or less alike in kind).
In recent years, scholars have been focusing a lot more on triangulation. Triangulation
is essentially the idea that more than one research technique can be used to examine a
research question to further verify the findings. Triangulation can help improve confidence
about the results produced from a study. Quantitative and qualitative research can frequently
be integrated, creating mixed-methods research that can depict a clearer picture of a social
science phenomenon than one single method on its own.
Another way that quantitative and qualitative methods can exist together is by coding
qualitative data into quantitative data. Just about any type of qualitative data can be assigned
meaningful numerical values that can be manipulated to help condense the information and
gain a different and more generalizable understanding of the data. One frequently used
example is open-ended questions. Although more detailed insight is gained from an open-
ended question than a categorical question, open-ended questions can typically be broken
down into simple numerical categories allowing for a quantitative analysis of the data.
The Research Network on Gender Politics and the State (RNGS) serves as another
good example. The researchers in RNGS had been conducting a cross-national, longitudinal,
qualitative research project that explored changes in public policy processes dating back to
53
the 1960s. Starting in 2000, however, the researchers began to code their vast qualitative data
into a large quantitative data file. By using quantitative coding, additional useful information
may be garnered, and a new form of data analysis is possible. As can be seen here, sometimes
the line between quantitative and qualitative analysis may not be so clear after all.
On the other hand, quantitative data is inherently based on qualitative judgment

because it is impossible to interpret numbers without understanding the assumptions
underlying the numbers. When a person provides a numerical response to a survey question,
for instance, many assumptions and judgments are present. For instance, if a person, when
asked, “How satisfied are you with your life?” responds, “Very satisfied” (denoted by a value
of 1), a variety of other questions could be asked. What does satisfaction mean to this
respondent? Was he or she thinking only of the economic climate? Job? Family?
Relationships? How does he or she define satisfaction, and how does this differ from how the
next person defines satisfaction? Did the respondent even pay attention to or think about the
question, or was he or she just offering quick responses? When and in what context was this
question presented? The list goes on. As can be seen from this brief example, what appeared
to be a simple numerical piece of information actually involved numerous judgments about
the meaning of each response.
Conclusion
Quantitative and qualitative analysis are two general approaches to the analysis of
data. Both seek to explain trends but have different means of doing this. Additionally,
quantitative and qualitative research methods are each based on a basic set of assumptions.
Both forms of research carefully follow each step in the research process, from formulating a
research question to reporting the results of the data analysis. However, the order and ways in
which this process is completed differ between quantitative and qualitative methods because
of the different goals that researchers using these methods have for their studies. Essentially,
though, at some level, quantitative and qualitative data are inseparable and do not exist in
complete opposition to each other. Thus, it is almost self-defeating to claim that one method
is better than the other. There are times when one is more appropriate to use in a given
situation than another, but often, they can both be used together, whether at the same time or
in different stages. As research progresses through the 21st century, it is highly probable that
more scholars will use mixed-methods approaches.
Activity 11
Formulate a research study on any of the issues in the Philippine Government. Accomplish
chapters 1 and 2 by following the format of the college for chapters II and II only.
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56

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Intro to Political Analysis and Research |

Title: Introduction to Political Analysis and Research

Course Code: (PS 117)

This course presents an introduction to the research methods commonly used by

Part I. Introduction to Political Analysis

What is Political Analysis?

Politics according to different Philosophers

Who gets, when and how?

Politics according to Aristotle

What is the purpose of politics?

The Different Conceptions of Politics

Politics as Compromise and Consensus

Politics as Power and Distribution of Resources

Why is Politics Important to Life?

OVERVIEW OF POLITICAL IDEOLOGY

Fierce opponent of the Rationalism of Descartes, Leibniz and Spinoza, as well as an

Conservatism According to:

Is Communism a Form of Socialism?

A communist economy, in the classic Marxist definition (Pure communism), refers to

3. Libertarian Socialism or “socialist libertarianism” is a group of anti-authoritarian political

Part II. Analysis of the Current Philippine Politics Under Duterte

UNDERSTANDING THE KEY CONCERNS AND PRIORITIES

Economic policies and performance. As a candidate, Duterte showed little interest in

THE WAR ON DRUGS AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

Inducing police to engage in de facto shoot-to-kill policies is enormously corrosive of

Impact on public health. The government’s punitive approach to reducing drug use

DUTERTE’S SUBVERSION OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND NORMS

JUST HARDBALL POLITICS AS USUAL?

The Duterte presidency is fundamentally different from post-1986 administrations in

DISABLING DEMOCRATIC CHECKS AND BALANCES

As a former mayor, Duterte is used to governing by decree and by dint of his

government claimed that a presidential pardon granted to Trillanes by Benigno Aquino

 THE PROSPECTS FOR PUSHBACK: POLITICAL ANDINSTITUTIONAL

President Duterte’s continued popularity is not surprising. His base of support is

COUNTERVAILING INSTITUTIONS AND ACTORS

THE POTENTIALLY PIVOTAL ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES

THE IMPORTANCE OF PUBLIC OPINION

 Duterte promised real change within a matter of months. Although most Filipinos

 Corruption begins to undermine Duterte’s moral authority. Every presidency is

IS DUTERTE A POPULIST? AND DOES IT MATTER?

In recent years, “populist” has become a convenient adjective to describe a growing

DEMOCRATIC BACKSLIDING: HOW FAR, HOW FAST?

answering these questions, it is important to start by recognizing the sources of democratic

SUMMING UP: A MIXED RECORD DELIVERING CHANGE AND AN

AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND

U.S.-PHILIPPINES RELATIONS: LESS THAN MEETS THE EYE

THE TIMID AMERICAN RESPONSE TO THE DUTERTE GOVERNMENT’S

campaign in 2016, they continued in 2017. Concerns about police impunity increased

THE CASE FOR A MORE ROBUST AMERICAN RESPONSE

 improve understanding in the Philippines of effective approaches to countering illegal

 develop effective responses to the Duterte government’s anti–human rights narrative

 improve the role of media/social media in democracy;

 reform political finance and strengthen political parties;

 build university-to-university ties, including scholarly collaboration on key aspects of

1. Timberman, D (2019) Philippine Politics Under Duterte: A Midterm Assessment. Retrived

Part III. Commonly Used Research Methods Used by Political Scientists

1. Quantitative and Qualitative Research

Quantitative and Qualitative Research

Definition of Quantitative Research

Assumptions of Quantitative Research

The goal of quantitative research is to examine particular instances or aspects of

 Reality can be studied objectively.

Definition of Qualitative Research

Assumptions of Qualitative Research