MODULEIII

THEACTS
Lesson1 EthicsandFaith
Lesson2 FreedomandResponsibility
DeontologicalTheories
Lesson3 MoralStandards
Lesson4
 2

MODULEIII

INTRODUCTION
TheActsDoctrineisthedoctrinethatitmakesanethicaldifference whetherana
gentactivelyintervenestobringaboutaresult,oromitstoactincircumstancesinwhichitisforeseenthatasa
resultoftheomissionthesame
resultoccurs.

OBJECTIVES

Afterstudyingthemodule,youshouldbeableto:
1. identifytherelationshipbetweenethicsandfaith;
2. distinguishbetweenfreedomandresponsibility;and
3. determinethedifferentdeontologicaltheories.

DIRECTIONS/yODULEORGANIZER

There are three lessons in the module. Read each lesson carefully then answer
theexercises/activities to find out how much you have benefited from it.Work
onthese exercises carefully and submit your output to your tutor or to the
DOUSoffice.
In case you encounterdifficulty,discussthis withyourtutorduringtheface-to-
facemeeting.Ifnotcontactyourtutoratthe DOUSoffice.

Goodluckandhappyreading!!

-ModuleIIII-

Lesson1
 ETHICSANDFAITH

• Howdowereasonwhattodoin thelightofourfaith?
Source:RichardM.Gula,ReasonInformedby Faith FAITH
• FaithisacommitmenttoGod.
• ChristianfaithisfollowingChrist,tobeHisdisciple.
• TofollowJesusistobeinformedandanimatedbylovingGod,neighbor,ands
elf.
• Christianmorallivingsummarizedinthecommandment:LoveGodandlove
yourneighborasyoulovesyourself.

CHRISTIANMORALITY
• ChristianmoralityisgroundedinGod’sself-givingloveinJesus.
• OurresponseoffaithtoGod’sself-givinglovemustshowitselfin
love.
• Butwhatlovedemandsmustbe specifiedIeachareaofourlife.
• Theworkofconscienceistodiscover thecallofGodineach
situation,whatGodisaskingofusinthehereandnow

CONSCIENCE
• Conscienceisnotthesuper-ego.
• Super-egocommandswithshould’sorhave-
to’sforthesakeofgainingapprovaloroutoffearoflosinglove.
• Conscience responds to invitation to love, wants to respond to
valueirregardlessofwhetherauthorityrecognizeitornot.
• St. Paul: conscience is our fundamental awareness of the
differencebetween good and evil, as guide to loving decisions, and as
judge ofactionsunbecomingofaChristian.
• Rooted in the biblical notion of heart as the center of feeling
andreason,decisionandaction,intentionandconsciousness.
• VoiceofconscienceisthevoiceofGOd.

THREEDIMENSIONOFCONSCIENCE
1. Acapacity:abilitytodiscerngoodandevil.
 4

2. A process of discovering what makes for being a good person,

andwhatparticularactionismorallyrightorwrong.
3. A judgmentthatisresultof#2:

• “Conscienceisthewholeperson’scommitmenttovalueandthejudgment
one makes in the light of what commitment of who
oneoughttobeandwhatto do ornotto do”.(R.Gula,p.18)
• 2’d dimension of conscience is process of discernment, a process
ofcontinual conversion to what is true and good, the search for who
weoughttobe,andwhatweoughttodofaithfulresponsetoGod’scall.
• Shaped by society, and aims at forming character,a person with
amatureconscience,

Matureconsciencerequiressomedegreeof:
1. Knowledge, evaluateknowledgeinvolving high degree of self-
knowledge.
2. Freedom:fundamentaloption&freedomofchoice.
3. Affective capacityto care for others andto commitoneselfto
moralvalues.

MORALDISCERNMENT
• Practicalreasoningofmoraldiscernmentismorethanalinearsequenceofl
ogicalprocedures,butaprocessofback-and-forth,around-and-
aroundmovementoffaith,reason,emotion,andintuition.
• Faith gives us perspective for interpreting what is going on &
settingpriorities.
• Reason assesses scope of moral experience & relationship of
multiplefactors.
• Emotion and intuition gives first evaluation of what is going on and
anideaofobligationsandresponsibilitieswehavetowardsthesituation.

In the process of harmonizing faith, reason, emotion,and intuition, we

needtoappealtothreeofinquiry:
1. Socialcontext
2. Situationalcontext
3. Personalcontext

SOCIALCONTEXT
• Religioussources:Bible,Jesus,Church
• Non-religious sources: communities of influence, friends, role
models,expertauthority,laws,andprinciples.

-/\toduleIIII-
 • Principlesneedtobeinterpreted.

SITUATIONALCONTEXT
Throughinvestigationofsituationbyasking:
What?
Why?AndHow?
Who?
When?AndWhere?
Whatif?
Whatelse?

PERSONALCONTEXT
• Everydaymoralityislargelyamatterofcharacter.
• “Character“refersto uniqueset of traits that characterize the
kindofpersononeisandtheactiononedoes.
• Christiancharacterdevelopstoextentthatwecommitourselves to
Christandareinformedbystories,traditionsthatwitnesstohiswayoflife.
‘batchouryourthoughts;theybecomeyourwords.
Watch your words;they become actions.Watch
your actions;they become
habits.Watchyourhabits;they becomecharacter.
Watchyourcharacter;itbecémesyourdestiny.”-Anonymous

• Virtues:habitsoftheheart.
• Virtuesenableustofulfiltherichestpotentialofhumannature.
• Tounderstandourmoralchoices,weneedtoattendtoaspectsofour
character.
• Emotions and intuitionsare aspects closestto our
decisions.Theygiveusimmediate,initialinterpretiveresponsetooursitua
tionbeforethecriticalreflectionofit.
• Closelyalignedwithemotionsandintuitionsaresomaticreactions:
e.g.racingheart,lightness,aches,etc.
• Beliefsareourstableconvictions,thetruthsweliveby,e.g.beliefin
thevalueof persons,beliefinGod.
• Imaginationisgreatinstrumentofmoralgood.

-ModuleIIII-
 MANASLIBERTY(FREEDOM)
OUTLINE:
l. Twoextremepositions:
a. B.F. Skinner:Manisabsolutelydetermined.(1.1-1.4)
b. JeanPaulSartre:Manisabsolutelyfree.(2.0-2.4.1)
II. MiddlePosition:PhenomenologyoffreedomofMaurice
Merleau-Ponty(3.0-4.3)

III. FreedomandthePerson:GabrielMarcel(5.0-6.3.3)
IV. TwoTypesofFreedom:FreedomofChoiceandFundamentalOption
(PietFransen&JoseA.Cruz,S.J.)(7.0-7.3)
V. FreedomandResponsibility(RobertJohann)(8.0-8.4)
VI. FreedomandJustice(9.0-9.9)

1.0 Webeginourphenomenologicaldescriptionoffreedombyusingepoche,
bracketing two positions on freedom: absolute
determinismandabsolutefreedom.

1.1 ThebehavioristpsychologistB.F.Skinnerholdsthatmanisabsolutelydeter
mined

1.1.1 Man’sbehaviorisshapedanddetermined(caused)byexternal
forcesandstimuli:
a. Genetic,biologicalandphysicalstructures
b. Environmental structures: culture, national
andecclesiastical(church)
c. Externalforcesanddemands
1.1.2 Ourbehavior,beingconditionedbythesefactors,ismanipulated:man
can be programmedlike a
machine.E.g.governmental,educational.Andpropagandistictechni
ques.

1.2 Against Skinner, we hold that there are other levels of

experiencewhich cannot be explained by or reduced to external
factors andstimuli,suchas
a. I can make myself

awareofmybiologicalandphysicallimitations
b. Icanquestionmyownenvironmentalstructure,revoltorvalidatethe
m.
c. Icanachievedistancefromexternaldemandsandforces:hesitate,r
eflect,deliberateandchallengethem.
1.3 Therearedifficultieswithabsolutedeterminism:
1.3.1 Explainingawayself-questioningandself-reflectionisdoingself-
questioningandself-reflection.
GECClO4a-Ethics -Yodu(e!fl!-
 1.3.2 Not all causal motives are necessitating causes because
thegoods that we face and the motives we use are
limited,conditioned,andmixed.
1.3.3 If the feeling of freedom is rejected, then no basic
experienceis trustworthy,which would lead to total
skepticism andinaction.
1.3.4 Ifthestatement“manisabsolutelydetermined”istrue,then
the statement is also determined, and the opposite “man
isabsolutely free” would also be determined,and so there
wouldbenotruthvalueanymoretothestatement.
1.4 Ifhumanbeingsaremanipulatedlikemachines,therewouldbe no
probleminmakingasocietyjust.

SARTRE:ABSOLUTEFREEDOM

2.0 Jean Paul Sartre, in his early stage, hold that man is
absolutelyfree.
2.1 Inhisessay“ExistentialismisaHumanism”Sartrediscusseshis
position by stating that with man, “existence precedes
essence.”(He develops absolute freedom in metaphysical terms in
his book“BeingandNothingness”.)
2.1.1 Manfirstexistsandthencreateshisown essence.
2.1.2 There is no pre-existing essence that man has to
conformwhenheexists.
2.1.3 There is no God, because if there is a God, He would be
acreator, and essence would exist first before
existence;thusman wouldbedetermined.
2.1.4 “Man is what he is not (yet), and he is not what he
is”becausehecanbewhathewantstobe.
2.2 Man cannot be free in some things on[y and not free in others; he
isabsolutely free or not at all. There is no middle position: man
isabsolutelyfree.
2.2.1 Objection 1 to Sartre: How can you say I am absolutely
freewhen I am not free to be born in such and such a place,
ofparentsso&so,onsuch&suchaday?

AnswerofSartre:Youcanalwaysliveasifyouwerenotborninsuch&such
aplace,ofparentsso&so,onsuch&sucha
day.
2.2.2 Objection2 toSartre:HowcanyousayIamabsolutelyfree
whenIcannotclimbabigrockorpassthroughit?SoIamlimited.
 8

AnswerofSartre:Therockisanobstacletoyourfreedomonlybecauseyoufr
eelywanttoclimborpassthroughit.

2.3 ForSartre,freedomisanegation,anegatingpowerofconsciousness.
2.4 Ininterpersonalrelationship,thismeansreducingtheotherperson
toanobject,describedastheSartreanstare.
2.4.1 The other person, because he is also free,also reduces me
toanobject.SoforSartre,“Hellisotherpeople”(fromtheplay“NoExi
t”)

MERLEAU-POHTY:SITUATEDFREEDOM

3.0 Maurice Merleau-Pontyin his last chapterofthe

PhenomenologyofPerceptioncriticizesSartreabsolutefreedomandhol
dsthemiddlepositionofstructurefreedom.
3.1 ForMerleau-Ponty,criticizingSartre,iffreedomisabsolutely,
alwaysandeverywherepresent,thenfreedomisimpossible and
nowhere.
3.1.1 Therewouldbenodistinctionbetweenfreedomandunfreedom.e.
g.breakshischains.Wearefreewhenwecontroloursituationaswell
aswhenwearepowerless.
3.2 SuchfreedomasSartre’scannotembodyitselfinanyformofexistence,
because once freedom has realized something, we
havetosayatoncethatitliesoutsideitsso-calledembodiments.
3.3 In such kind of freedom, it is difficu\t to speak of choice,
becausechoiceimpliesvalue,andseeingvaluesisimpossiblefromthesta
ndpointofafreedomwhichtranscendsallsituations.
4.0 ForMerleau-Ponty,ourfreedomissituatedfreedom.
4.1 Freedomis interwovenwith a field of existence.Our choices
arenotmadefromabsolutezero,butfromthisfieldofmeaning.
4.1.1 Outsidemyself,thereisnolimittomyfreedom,butin
myself,therearelimits.
4.1.2 We haveto make
adistinctionbetweenexplicitintention:Iplantocli
mbthemountain
generalintention:WhetherIplanto climbthemountainor
not,itappearshightome.
4.1.3 Whichdoesnotgiveuphisearthysituationandfromwhichis
basedmyplans.
4.1.4 Insofar as I have hands, feet, body, I bear intentions which
donotdependonmyfreedombutwhichIfindmyselfin.
 4.1.5 Ifindmyselfalreadyina worldofmeaning.e.g.Icannotstructure
data of perception in arbitrary fashion. e.g.
habits,tiredness.e.g.historicalsituation.
4.1.6 ItistrueIcanchangehabitsorItranscendfacticity,butI
canonlydoasfromthesestandpoints.
4.1.7 Agoodexampleofsituatedfreedomisrevolution:itis
neitherpurelydeterminednorcompletelyfree.
4.1.8 IncontrasttoSartre’ssubjectwhoisdistancefromthe
world.
Merleau-Ponty’ssubjectisdialoguewiththeworld

MARCEL:FREEDOMANDTHEPERSON

5.0 GabrielMarcelunderstandsfreedominrelationtotheperson.
5.1 Thepersonischaracterized bydisponsibilite,availability

incontrasttothee_g_owhichisclosed.
5.2 We start out in existenceas an ego havingfreedomand
growtobeginaperson.
5.3 Marcel’sphilosophycanbesystematizedintermsofhavingand
being(aswhatRogerTroisfontaine,S.J.didinhisbookDel’existence
aI’etre).HavingandBeing aretworealmsiflife.
5.4 Having pertains to thins, external to me, and therefore
autonomous(independentof me).
5.4.1 Things do not commune with me are not
capableofparticipation,closedandopaque,quantifiable,an
dexhaustible.
5.4.2 Thelife
ofhavingthereforeisalifeofinstrumentalrelationship.
5.4.3 Having isthe realmofthe problem.Aproblemissomething
tobesolvedbutapartfromme,thesubject.
5.4.4 Having is also applicable not only to things but also
toideas, fellowman, and faith. I can have my ideas,
possessother people, and have my religion. Here I treat my
ideas,other people; religion is my possession, not open for
sharingwithothers.
5.5 Beingontheotherhand,pertainstopersons,opentoothers,able
toparticipate,creative,non-conceptualizable,aplenitude.
5.5.1 The[ifeofbeingisthelifeofcommunion.
5.5.2 The realm of being is the realm of mystery. A mystery is
aproblem that encroaches on the subject, that is part of
me,thesubject.
 10

5.5.3 Beingis also applicable not onlyto personsbut alsoto things

(art), ideas, faith. I am painting; I am my ideas; I
ammyfaith.Heremyart,ideas,
religionarepartofmewhichIcansharetoothers.
8.OFreedomfor Marcel belongs to the realm of being,
becausefreedom is not distinct from us, not a possession.
Freedom is amystery,notaproblem.
6.1 A thing possessed may be used or neglected by the owner
withoutlosing its character, but with freedom, when I deny or
abuse it,betrayit(itlosesitscharacterasfreedom)
6.2 Manis gifted withfreedom(freedomasafact),andthatiswhyhe
experiencesalack,butwhichisreallyanexigencyofBeing
6.2.1 InanswertothisappealofBeing,maneitherfulfillsor
betrayshisfreedom.
6.2.2 To fulfill freedom is to affirm, to be in communion
withothers,withBeing.
6.2.3 Therefore,freedomasafactpointasvalue._Iamfreein
ordertobecomefree(freedomasachievement),tobecomefull
yaperson.

TWOKINDSOFFREEDOM

7.0 There are therefore two types of freedom: freedom of

choice(horizontalfreedom)fundamentaloption(verticalfreedom)
7.1 Ourfirst commonlyunderstoodexperienceoffreedomis theability
to choose goods. e.g. I choose to study instead of
playingmahjong; I choose to buy cheap pair of shoes instead of
anexpensivepairofshoesbecauseIamsupportingmysibling’seducati
on.
7.2 But we reflect deeper,our choice implies a prior or may lead to
apreference of values. When I choose to study instead of
playingmahjong, I value learning more than pleasure. When I
choose
thecheappairofshoesIvaluehelpingmysister/brotherroorethan
ITILCOITI/Ot.
7.2.1 This freedom is called fundamental option because it is
ourgeneraldirectionororientationinlife.
7.2.2 Itiscalledverticalfreedombecausevaluesforma
hierarchy;somevaluesarehigherthanothers.
7.2.3 For the German phenomenologist Max Scheler,
preferringand realizinghighervalues is love and
preferringandrealizinglowervaluesishatredoregoism.
 11

7.2.4
Intheultimateanalysis,thereareonlytwofundamentaloption
s:love andegoism.
7.2.5 Itislovewhichmakesmeaperson;whichmakesme truly
free.
7.3 Freedom of choice and fundamental option are interrelated:
ourchoices shape our fundamental option, and fundamental option
isexercisedandconcretizedinourparticularchoices.

LEARHINGACTIVITY

1. Distinguishbetweenethicsandfaith.
2. Whatare thetwokindsoffreedom?Distinguisheach.
 12

Lesson2

FREEDOMANDRESPONSIBILITY

8.0 Responsibilityistheothersid
eoffreedom.
8.1 Just as thereare two kinds
offreedom,there are also
two
meaningofresponsibility.
8.2 Thefirstmeaningofrespons
ibilitycorrespondstothefirsttypeof

freedom,freechoice,namelyaccountability.
8.2.1 Iamaccountablefor
anactionthatisfree;
whosesourceis
the “I”:I acted on
my own,Idecided
on my own.Iam
freefromexternal
constraints.
8.2.2 Apersonismorallyr
esponsibleforaninj
uryorawrongif:
i.

Thepersoncaus
edorhelpedcaus
eit,orfailedtopr
eventinwhenhe
orshecouldhave
shouldhave;and
ii. The
persondidsokno
wingwhathe
orshewasdoing;a
nd
iii. Thepersondids
oofhisorherow
nfreewill.
(M.Velasquez)
8.3 Being
responsible,accountable,f
or my
action,however,does
 13

notnecessari ofthesituation.
lymake me a 8.3.2 Aresponsethatm
responsiblep eetstheobjective
erson.Here demandsofthesit
we uationisarespons
encounteras ethatmeetsthede
econd mandofUstice.
meaning of 8.3.3 Aresponsibleactio
responsibilit nthenfromarespo
y nse-
correspondi ablepersonrequir
ngto the
esputtingtheothe
second
rintheforefrontin
typeoffreedo
placeofmyself: I
m-response-
am free from
abilitv
internal
8.3.1 Res
constraints, like
pon
egoism
se -
andwhims.
abili
8.gGreater freedom then is not
ty
mea just being able to do what
ns I want to
the dobutbeingabletodoandw
abili antingtodowhatthesituati
ty to onobjectively(versussubje
give ctively)obligedmetodo.
an
acco FREEDO
unt, MANDJU
thea STICE
bilit
ytoj 9.OTherelationshipbetweenfre
ustif edomandjustice
ymy canbeseenwhenwetakein
acti toconsiderationthenetwo
onas rkofrelationshipwithfello
truly w
resp
onsi
veto humanbeingandthegoodsintendedbyfreedom.
theo 9.1
bjec
tive Justiceisgivingtotheotherwhatis
dem due.
ands

-modulelili-
 14

9.2When we choose goods (things, money, political power,etc.),

wemustconsiderthat theyarefinite and exhaustible,and
thattheotheralsoneedsthem.
9.2.1Absolutelove forfinitegoods leads to
corruption,intheobjectandinthesubject.
9.3 If the human being is to keep his freedom, he must assess his
realneeds with respectto what is availablearound his world and
theequallyrealneedsofhisfellowman.
9.4 Thisrequires an objective order of values, like abalancing
measurement,alibro.
9.5 What is dueto the other is all that he needsto
preserveandenhancehisdignityasahumanbeing.
9.5.1 We are obligated to give to the other what the other
needstoenhancehisdignity.
9.5.2 Hisdignityincludeshisbeingandbecomingfree.
9.6 Butweareobligatedtogiveonlywhatwecangivewithinthe
llm1tedmatrixofpossibilities.
9.7 Freedomthenconditionsjustice,andjusticeisaconditionof
freedom.
9.7.1 Freedom conditions justice, because giving what is due to
theothermeansallowinghimtousehistalentstofulfillhishumanit
y, giving him freedom. So, to violate the freedom oftheotheris
todenyhimjustice.
9.7.2 Justice is condition of freedom, because I can only use
myfreedom for the promotion of justice, of what is due to
thehuman being. In the exercise of my freedom, I must
observejustice so that the resources of fellow human beings
and theworld of nature are not exhausted and totally lost;
otherwisetherewillbenomoregoodstochoosefrom.
9.8 Thisrelationshipoffreedomandjusticeisapplicab\etosociety.
9.8.1 Ina society,theremustbeabalanceoffreedomandjustice.
9.8.2 This means that there must be structural order in
societysuchthathighervaluesarenotsubordinatetolowervalues.
9.8.3 The social structure must be such that exchange of
economicgoods and distribution of political power is geared
towardsenhancementofthehumanbeing.
9.8.4 Thepracticalnormtofollowforthatidealis“toeachaccording to
his needs (Acts 2:45)....from each according tohis
means(Acts11:29)"
9.9 Incasesofconflictbetweenfreedomandjustice,theuseofviolence must
be avoided; instead, structures for deliberationareneeded. People
must be able to participate in dialogueto settletheirdifferences.

C•EC¢lo4a-Ethics -Modulellll-
 15

EthicS(ormoralPhilosophy)isconcernedwithquestionsofhowpeople ought
to act, and the search for a definition ofright
conduct(identifiedastheonecausingthegreatestgood)andthegoodlife(inthese
nseofalifeworthlivingoralifethatissatisfyingorhappy).

The word"ethics" isderivedfromtheGreek"ethos"(meaning"custom" or

"habit"). Ethics differs from morals and morality in that ethicsdenotesthe
theory ofrightactionandthegreatergood,whilemoralsindicatetheir
practice.Ethics is not limited to specificacts and definedmoral codes, but
encompassesthe whole of moral ideals and
behaviours,aperson’sphilosophyoflife(orWeltanschauung).

It asksquestionslike "How should people act?"(Normative or

PrescriptiveEthics),'Whatdopeoplethinkisright?"(Descriptive Ethics), "How
do we take moral knowledge and put it intopractice?" (Applied Ethics), and
'What does 'right' even mean?" (Meta-Ethics).Seebelowformore
discussionofthese categories.

AncientGreekEthics

Socrates, as recorded in Plato's dialogues, is customarily regarded

asthe father of Western ethics.He asserted that people will naturallydo
whatis good providedthat they know what is right,and that evil or bad
actionsare purely the result of ignorance: 'There is only one good, knowledge,
andoneevil,ignorance”.Heequatedknowledgeandwisdomwithself-
awareness(meaningto beawareofveryfactrelevanttoa person’sexistence)
According to Aristotle, "Nature does nothing in vain", so it is onlywhena
personacts in accordancewiththeir nature andtherebyrealizestheir full
potentialthattheywill do good and thereforebe content in life. Heheldthat
self-realization (theawarenessofone’snatureandthedevelopment of one's
talents) is the surest path to happiness, which is the ultimate goal, all other
things (such as civic life or wealth) being merely means to an end. He
encouraged moderation in all things, the extremesbeing degraded and
immoral, (e.g. courage is the moderate virtue betweenthe extremes of
cowardice and recklessness), and held that Man should not simply live, but live
well with conductgoverned by moderatevirtue.Virtue, for Aristotle,denotes
doing the rightthing to the right person at the righttime to the proper extent
in the correctfashion and for the right reason -somethingofatallorder.
Cynicism
isanancientdoctrinebestexemplifiedbytheGreekphilosopher Diogenes of
Sinope, who lived in a tub on the streets of Athens.Hetaughtthat a life lived
accordingto Nature was betterthan onethatconformed toconvention,
and that asimple lifeis essential

C•ECC104a -Ethics -Module IIII-

 16

to virtue and
happiness.Asamoralteacher,Diogenesemphasizes detachmentfrommanyofth
oseconventionallyconsidered“good”.

Hedonismposits that the principal ethic is maximizingpleasure

and minimizingpain. This may range from those advocating self-gratification
regardlessofthepainandexpensetoothersandwithnothought for the future
(Cyrenaic Hedonism), to those who believe that themost ethical pursuit
maximizes pleasure and happiness for the most
people.Somewhereinthemidd[e of this continuum, Epicureanism
observedthat indiscriminate indulgence sometimes results in negative
consequences,suchas painandfear,whicharetobeavoided.

The Stoic philosopher Epictetus positedthatthegreatest goodwas

contentment, serenity and peaceofmind,whichcanbeachievedby self-
mastery over one’s desires and emotions, and freedom from
materialattachments. In particular, sex and sexual desire are to be avoided
as thegreatestthreatto the integrityand equilibriumof a man's mind.
Accordingto Epictetus,difficult problems in life should not be avoided,but
ratherembracedasspiritualexercisesneededforthehealthof thespirit.

Pyrrho, the founding figure of Pyrrhonian Skepticism,taught that

onecannot rationally decidebetweenwhatisgoodand whatisbad
although,generally speaking, self-interest is the primary motive of human
behaviour,andhewasdisinclined to rely upon sincerity, virtue or Altruism
asmotivations.

Humanism,withitsemphasisonthe dignityandworth of allpeople

andtheirabilityto determinerightand wrongpurelybyappealto
universalhumanqualities (especially rationality),canbetracedbackto Thales,
XenophanesofColophon (570-480 B.C.), Anaxagoras,
Pericles(c.495429B.C.),ProtagorasDemocritusandthehistorianThucydides(c.
460
-375 B.C.).These earlyGreekthinkerswereall instrumentalinthemove
awayfrom a spiritual moralitybased on the supernatural,and
thedevelopmentofa morehumanistic freethought
(theviewthatbeliefsshould be formed on the basis of science and logic,and
not be influencedbyemotion,authority,traditionor dogma).

NormativeEthics

NormativeEthics (or PrescriptiveEthics)isthebranchofethicsconcerned

with establishing how things shouldorought tobe, howtovaluethem,
which things aregoodorbad, and which actions

ifiECCl04a-Ethics -Modulellll-
17
 18

are
rightorwrong.Itattemptstodevelopasetofrulesgoverninghumanconduct,oraset
ofnormsforaction.

Normative ethical theories are usually split into three

maincategories:Consequentialism,DeontologyandVirtueEthics:

• Consequentialism(or Teleological Ethics) argues that the morality ofan

action is contingent on the action’s outcome or result. Thus,a
morally right action is one that produces a good
outcomeorconsequence. Consequentialist
theories mustconsider questions
like'Whatsortofconsequencescountasgoodconsequences?", ’Who isthe
primary beneficiary of moral action?","How arethe
consequencesjudged and
whojudgesthem?"Someconsequentialisttheoriesinclude:

o Utilitarianism, which holdsthat an action is right if it

leadstothe most happiness forthe greatestnumber
ofpeople("happiness"hereisdefinedasthe
maximizationofpleasure andthe
minimizationofpain).TheoriginsofUtilitarianism
canbetraced backasfarastheGreekphilosopher
Epicurus,but its fu[l formulationis usuallycreditedto
Jeremy Betham,with John Stuart Mill as
itsforemostproponent.

o Hedonism, which is the philosophy that pleasure is the

mostimportant pursuit of mankind, and that individuals
shouldstrive to maximize their own total pleasure (net of
any painor suffering). Epicureanism is a more
moderateapproach(which still seeks to maximize
happiness, but which
defineshappinessmoreasastateoftranquillitythanpleasure).

o Egoism, which holds that an action is right if it

maximizesgood for the self. Thus, Egoism may license
actions whichare good for the individual, but detrimental
to the generalwelfare. Individual Egoism holds that all
people should dowhateverbenefits himorherself.
PersonalEgoism holdsthat each person should actin his
own self-interest, butmakes no claims about what
anyone elseought todo. Universal Egoism holds that
everyone should act in waysthatare intheirowninterest.

o Asceticism, which is, in some ways, the

 19

oppositeofEgoisminthatitdescribesalifecharacterized

GECCl04a-Ethics
 20

by abstinencefrom egoisticpleasures especiallyto

achieveaspiritualgoal.

O Altruism,which prescribesthat an individualtake

actionsthathavethe bestconsequences foreveryone
exceptforhimself,accordingto
AugusteComte’sdictum,"Liveforothers".Thus, individuals
have a moral obligation to help,serve or benefit others, if
necessary at the sacrifice of self-interest.

ORule Consequentialism, which is a theory (sometimes

seenasanattempttoreconcileConsequentialismandDeontol
ogy), that mora\ behaviour invo\vesfollowing
certainrules,butthatthoserulesshouldbechosenbasedonthe
consequences thatthe selection ofthoseruleshave.

ONegativeConsequentialism,whichfocuseson
minimizingbadconsequences ratherthan
promotinggoodconsequences. This may actually
requireactive
intervention(topreventharmfrombeingdone),ormay
onlyrequirepassiveavoidanceofbadoutcomes.

LEARNINGACTIVITY

1. Whatisnormativeethics?

2. Whatistheroleofethicsintermsofidentifyingthefollowing:

a. responsibility;

b. accountability;and

c. liability.

-ModuleIIII-
 21

Lesson3

DEONTOLOGICALTHEORIES

• Deontologyis an
approach to ethics
that focuses onthe
rightness or wrongness of
actionsthemselves,asoppos
edtotherightness or
wrongnessofthe
consequences ofthose
actions.
Itarguesthatdecisionsshoul
dbemadeconsideringthefa
ctorsofone’s

dutiesandother'srights(theGreek’deon’means’obliga
tion'or’duty').
• Somedeontologicaltheoriesin
clude:
o Divine Command Theory:
a form of
deontologicaltheory
which statesthat an
action isright ifGod has
decreedthatitisright,and
thatanact is obligatory
ifand only if (and
because) it is
commanded by
God.Thus,moral
obligationsarisefrom
God's commands,andthe
rightnessofanyactiondep
endsuponthatactionbein
gperformedbecauseitisa
duty,notbecauseofany
goodconsequences
arisingfromthataction.Wi
lliamofOckham,ReneDes
cartesandthe18th
 22

is the motives of the

CenturyCalvinistsa[lacceptedversionsofthis person who carries out
moraltheory. the action that
O NaturalRightsTheo makethem right or
ry(suchasthates wrong, not the
pousedby consequences of the
ThomasHobbesa actions. Simplystated,
ndJohn the Categorical
Locke), which Imperative states that
holds that one should only act
humanshave insuch a way that one
absolute, could want the maxim
naturalrights (or motivating
(inthesenseof principle)of one's action
universal to become a universal
rightsthatare law, and that one should
inherent alwaystreatpeopleasan
inthenatureofet endaswellasameansto
hics,and anend.
notcontingent
onhuman actions O PluralisticDeontology is
or a descriptionofthe
beliefs).Thiseven deontologicalethicspro
tuallydevelopedi poundedby W.D.Ross
ntowhatwetoday (1877-
callhumanrights. 1971).Hearguesthatthe
reare seven prima
OEmmanuelKant's facie dutieswhich
CategoricalImper need to be
ative,whichroots takenintoconsideration
moralityinhuma whendeciding
nity's whichduty
shouldbeacted
rationalcapacity
andassertscertai GECC104a- Ethics
ninviolablemoral
(aws. Kant's
formulation is
deontological in
that he argues
that to actin the
morally right
way, people
must act
according to
duty, and thatit
 23

upon: beneficence (to help other people to increase their

pleasure,improvetheircharacter,etc); non-maleficence
(toavoidharmingother people); justice (to ensure people get what they
deserve); self-improvement (toimproveourselves); reparation
(torecompensesomeoneifyouhaveactedwronglytowardsthem);
gratitude (tobenefitpeoplewhohavebenefitedus); promise-keeping
(toactaccordingtoexplicitandimplicitpromises,includingtheimplicitprom
ise to tellthe truth). Insome circumstances, there maybe
clashes or conflicts between these duties and a decision must bemade
whereby one duty may "trump" another, although there are
nohardandfastrulesandnofixedorderofsignificance.

OContractarian Ethics (or the Moral Theory of Contractarianism)

claimsthat moral norms derive their normative force from the
ideaof contract or mutual agreement. It holds that moral acts are
thosethat we would all agree to if we were unbiased, and that moral
rulesthemselves are a sort of a contract, and therefore only people
whounderstandand agree to theterms ofthe contract are bound by
it.Thetheorystemsinitiallyfrompolitical
Contractarianismandtheprincipleof socialcontract developedby Thomas
Hobbes, Jean-JacquesRousseauand JohnLocke,whichessential\y holds
thatpeople give up some rights to a government and/or other authority
inorder to receive, or jointly preserve, social order. Contractualism is
avariation on Contractarianism, although based more
onthe Kantianideasthat ethics is an essentially
interpersonalmatter,and that right and wrong are a matter of whether
we can justify theactiontootherpeople.

• Virtue Ethicsfocuses on the inherent character of a person rather

thanon the nature or consequences of specific actions performed. The
systemidentifies virtues (those habits and behaviours that will allow a
person toachieve"eudaimonia",or well-being ora goodlife),counsels
practicalWiSdom to resolveanyconflictsbetweenvirtues,and
claimsthatalifetimeof practising
thesevirtuesleadsto,orineffectconstituteshappinessandthegoodlife.

OEudaimonismis a philosophy originated by Aristotlethat defines

rightaction as that which leads to "well-being", and which can be
achievedbyalifetimeofpractisingthe virtues
inone’severydayactivities,subjecttothe exerciseof practical wisdom.It
wasfirstadvocatedby Platoand is particUlarly associated with Aristotle,
and became theprevailing approach to
ethical thinking in
 24

GECCl04a-Ethics -ModuleIIII-
 25

theAncientandMedievalperiods.ItfelloutoffavourintheEarlyModernperi
od,buthasrecentlyundergoneamodernresurgence.

o Agent-Based Theoriesgive an account of virtue based onour

common-sense intuitions about which character traitsare
admirable (e.g. benevolence, kindness, compassion,etc),
whichwecanidentifybylookingatthepeopleweadmire,ourmoral
exemplars.

o EthicsofCarewasdeve\opedmainlybyFeministwriters,andcalls fora
change in how we view morality and the virtues, shifting
towardsthemoremarginalized virtuesexemplifiedbywomen,suchas
taking
careofothers,patience,theabilitytonurture,self-sacrifice,etc.

Meta-Ethics
Meta-Ethics isconcernedprimarilywiththe meaning
ofethicaljudgements,and seeksto understandthe natureofethical
properties,statements, attitudes, and judgements and how they may be
supported ordefended.A meta-ethicaltheory,unlike a normative ethical
theory(seebelow),doesnotattemptto evaluatespecificchoicesas
beingbetter,worse, good, bad or evil; rather it tries to define the essential
meaning andnature of the problem being discussed. It concerns itself with
second
orderquestions,specificallythesemantics,epistemologyandontologyofethics.
The major meta-ethical views are commonly divided into two camps:
MoralRealismandMoralAnti-Realism:

• Moral Realism:MoralRealism(or MoralObjectivism)holdsthatthereare

objectivemoralvalues,sothatevaluativestatementsareessentially
factual claims, which are either true or false, and thattheir truth or
falsity are independent of our beliefs, feelings or
otherattitudestowardsthethingsbeingevaluated.It is a coqnitivistviewin
that it holdsthat ethical sentences express valid propositions
andarethereforetruth-apt.

• Therearetwomainvariants:
oEthical Naturalism This doctrine holds that there are
objectivemoral properties of which we have empirical
knowledge, butthatthesepropertiesare reducib\e toentirely
non-ethicalproperties.Itassumes cognitivism
(theviewthatethicalsentencesexpress propositions
andcanthereforebe
 26

trueorfalse),andthatthemeaningsoftheseethicalsentencescanbe

CECCl04a-Ethics -ModuleIIII-
 27

expressedas naturalproperties withouttheuseofethicalterms.

oEthicalNon-NaturalismThisdoctrine(whosemajorapologistisG. E.
Moore) holds that ethical statementsexpress
propositions (inthatsenseitisalso cognitivist)that cannot
bereducedto non-ethicalstatements (e.g."goodness"is
indefinable inthatitcannotbedefinedinanyotherterms).
Mooreclaimedthata naturalisticfallacy iscommitted by any
attempt to prove a claim about ethics byappealingtoa
definition intermsofoneormore naturalproperties
(e.g."good"cannotbedefinedintermsof"pleasant", "mo
re evolved", "desired",
etc).Ethicallntuitionism
isavariantofEthicalNon-Naturalismwhich claims that we
sometimes have intuitive awareness ofmoralpropertiesor
ofmoraltruths.

• MoralAnti-Realism:
Moral Anti-Realism holds that there are no objective moral
values,andcomesinoneof
threeforms,dependingonwhetherethicalstatementsarebelievedtobesu
bjectiveclaims(EthicalSubjectivism),notgenuineclaimsatall(Non-
Cognitivism)ormistakenobjectiveclaims(MoralNihilismorMoralSkepticis
m):
o Ethical Subjectivism,whichholdsthatthereare no objectivemoral
properties and that moral statements are made true orfalse
by the attitudes and/or conventions of the observers, orthat
any ethical sentence merely implies an
attitude, opinion, personalpreference or feeling heldby someone.

Thereareseveraldifferentvariants:
Simple Subjectivism:the view that ethical
statementsreflect sentiments,
personalpreferencesandfeelingsratherthanobjectivefac
ts.

• Individualistsubjectivism:theview(originallyputforward
by Protagoras) that there are as many distinctscales of
good and evil as there are individuals in
theworld(effectivelyaformofEgoism).

• Moral Relativism(or Ethical Relativism):the view thatfor

a thing to be morally right is for it to be approved
ofbysociety,leadingtotheconclusionthatdifferent
 28

CECCI04a-Ethics -Modulellll-
 29

thingsarerightforpeopleindifferentsocietiesanddifferentper
iods inhistory.

• Ideal ObserverTheory:the view that what is right

isdetermined by the attitudesthat a hypothetical
idealobserver (a being who is perfectly rational,
imaginativeandinformed)wouldhave.

o Non-Cognitivism,whichholdsthat ethical sentences

areneithertruenorfalsebecausethey
donotexpressgenuinepropositions, thus implying that moral
knowledge is impossible.Againtherearedifferentversions:

• Emotivism: the view, defended by A.J. Ayerand C.

L.Stevenson (1908- 1979) amongothers,that
ethicalsentences serve merely to express emotions, and
ethicaljudgementsareprimarily expressions
ofone'sownattitude, although to some extent they
arealso imperatives
meanttochangetheattitudesandactionsofotherlisteners.

• Prescriptivism (or
UniversalPrescriptivism):theview,propoundedby
R.M.Hare (1919-2002),thatmoralstatements
function as imperatives
whichare universalizable (i.e. applicable to everyone
insimilarcircumstances)e.g."Killingis wrong"
reallymeans"Donotkill!"

• Expressivism:theviewthatthe primaryfunctions ofmoral

sentences is not to assert any matter of fact,
butratherto expressanevaluativeattitude
towardanobject of evaluation. Therefore, because the
function ofmoral language is non-descriptive, moral
sentences donothaveanytruthconditions.

• Quasi-Realism: the view, developed from

Expressivismand defended by Simon Blackburn (1944 - ),
that ethicalstatements behave linguistical\y like factual
c\aims, andcan be appropriately called "true" or "false"
even thoughthere are no ethical facts for them to
correspond to.Blackburn argues that ethics cannot be
entirely
realist,forthiswouldnotallowforphenomenasuchas
 30

CECC104a-Ethics -ModuleIllI-
 31

thegradualdevelopmentofethicalpositionsovertimeorindiff
eringculturaltraditions.

• Projectivism:theviewthatqualitiescanbe attributedto
(or"projected"on)anobjectasifthosequalitiesactuallybelong
to it.ProjectivisminEthics(originallyproposed by David
Hume and more recently championedby Simon
Blackburn)is associated by many with
MoralRelativism,and is considered controversial, even
thoughitwas philosophical orthodoxy throughout much of
the20thCentury.

• MoralFictionalism:theviewthatmoralstatementsshouldnot
betakento be literally true,butmerely auseful fiction. This
has led to charges ofindividuals claiming
toholdattitudesthattheydo
notreallyhave,andthereforeareinsomewayinsincere.

OMoralNihilism,whichholdsthatethicalclaimsaregenerallyfalse.Ith
oldsthattherearenoobjective
values (that nothing is morally good, bad, wrong, right,
etc.)because there are no moral truths (e.g. a moral nihilist
wouldsaythatmurder is not wrong, but neither is it
right).Error Theory is a form of Moral
Nihitismwhichcombines Cognitivism (the beliefthat moral
languageconsistsoftruth-apt statements)with MoralNihilism
(thebeliefthattherearenomoralfacts).

OMoralSkepticism,whichholdsthat noone hasanymoralknowledge

(or the stronger claim that no one can have
anymoralknowledge).Itisparticularlyopposedto MoralRealism
(seeaboye)andperhapsitsmostfamousproponentisFriedrichNiet
zsche.

Analternativedivisionofmeta-ethicalviewsisbetween:
• MoralAbsolutism:Theethicalbe\iefthat there are absolutestandards
againstwhichmoralquestionscanbe judged,andthatcertainactionsare
right or wrong,regardless of the context of the act.

• Moral Universalism: The meta-ethical position that there

isauniversalethicwhichappliestoallpeople,regardlessofculture,

YECC104a-Ethics
 32

race, sex, religion, nationality, sexuality orother distinguishing

feature,andallthetime.

• Moral Relativism:The positionthat moral or ethical propositionsdonot

objective and/or universal moral truths, but instead make
claimsrelativetosocial,cultural,historicalorpersonalcircumstances.

DescriptiveEthics

Descriptive Ethics is a value-free approachto ethics which

examinesethics from the perspective of observations of actual choices made
by moralagents in practice. It is the study of people's beliefs about
morality,and implies the existence of,rather than explicitly
prescribing,theories ofvalueorofconduct.Itis not designedtoprovide guidance
topeople inmaking moral decisions, nor is it designed to evaluate the
reasonableness ofmoralnorms.

Itismorelikelytobe investigatedbythoseworkingin thefieldsof

evolutionarybiology, psychology, sociology, history
oranthropology,althoughinformationthatcomesfromdescriptiveethicsisalso
usedin
philosophicalarguments.

Descriptive Ethics is sometimes referred to as ComparativeEthics

becausesomuchactivitycaninvolve comparing ethicalsystems:comparing the
ethics of the past to the present; comparing the ethics of onesociety to
another;andcomparingtheethics which people claim
tofollowwiththeactualrulesofconductwhichdodescribetheiractions.

AppliedEthics

Applied Ethics is a disciplineof philosophythat attemptsto

applyethicaltheoryto real-lifesituations.Strict,principle-
basedethicalapproachesoftenresultinsolutionstospecificproblemsthatare
notuniversally acceptable or impossible to implement. Applied Ethics is
muchmorereadytoincludetheinsightsof psychology, sociology
andotherrelevantareasofknowledgeinitsdeliberations.Itisusedindetermining
publicpolicy.

Thefollowingwould be questions ofAppliedEthics:"Isgettinganabortion

immoral?", "Is euthanasia immoral?", "Is affirmative action right orwrong?",
"What are human rights, and how do we determine them?" and
"Doanimalshaverightsaswell?"

YECC l04o-Ethics -ModuleIIII-

 33

Sometopicsfallingwithinthed1sCiplineinclude:

• Medical Ethics:thestudyof moral valuesandjudgementsas theyapplyto

medicine.Historically,Westernmedicalethicsmaybetracedto
guidelineson the duty ofphysiciansin antiquity,suchasthe
HippocraticOath (at itssimplest,"topracticeand prescribetothe best of
my ability for the good of my patients, and to try to avoidharming
them"),and early rabbinic, Muslim and Christian teachings. Six of the
values that commonly apply to medical ethics discussions are:
Beneficence (a practitioner should act in the best interest of
thepatient), Non-maleficence ("first,donoharm"),Autonomy
(thepatient has the right to refuse or choose their treatment),
Justice (concerningthedistributionofscarcehealthresources, and the
decision of who gets what treatment), Dignity (both the patient
and the practitioner have theright to dignity), Honesty
(truthfulnessand respectfor the conceptofinformedconsent).

• Bioethics:concernstheethicalcontroversiesbroughtaboutbyadvancesin
biology and
medicine.Publicattentionwasdrawntothesequestionsbyabusesofhuma
nsubjectsin
biomedicalexperiments,especiallyduringtheSecondWorldWar,butwithr
ecentadvancesin bio-techno\ogy,bioethicshasbecomeafast-
growingacademicandprofessionalareaofinquiry. Issues
includeconsiderationofcloning,stemcellresearch,transplanttrade,geneti
callymodifiedfood,humangeneticengineering,genomics, infertilitytreat
ment,etc,

• LegalEthics:an ethicalcode
governingtheconductofpeopleengagedinthe practiceof law.Model
rules usually addressthe client-
lawyerrelationship,dutiesofalawyeras advocate
inadversaryproceedings,dealingswith
personsotherthanclients,lawfirmsandassociations,public
service,advertisingandmaintainingthe
integrityoftheprofession.Respectof clientconfidences, candour
towardthetribunal, truthfulness in statementsto others, and
professional independence are some of the
definingfeaturesoflegalethics.

• BusinessEthics:examinesethical principlesand moral

orethicalproblemsthatcanariseina business environment.
Thisincludes Corporate Social Responsibility, a
conceptwhereby organizations considertheinterestsof society
bytakingresponsibilitfortheimpactoftheiractivitiesoncustomers,
 34

CECC104a-Ethics - Module IIII-

 35

employees,shareholders,communitiesandtheenvironmentina\\aspectsof
their operations, over and above the statutory
obligationtocomplywithlegislation.

• EnvironmentalEthics:considerstheethicalrelationshipbetween
; humanbeingsandthenaturalenvironment.Itaddressesquestions
like "Should we continueto clear cut forests for the sake of
humanconsumption?","Shouldwecontinuetomakegasolinepowered vehi
cles, depleting fossil fuel resources while the technology exists to create
zero-emissionvehicles?",’What environmental obligations do we need
to keep for future generations?", "Is it right for humans toknowingly
cause the extinction of a species for the (perceived or
real)convenienceofhumanity?"

• Information Ethics: investigates the ethical issues arising from

thedevelopmentandapplicationof computers
andinformationtechnologies.Itisconcernedwithissueslikethe
privacyofinformation,whether artificialagents maybemoral,how
oneshould behave
intheinfosphere,andownershipandcopyrightproblemsarisingfromthecre
ation,collection,recording,distribution,processing,etc,ofinformation.

• MediaEthics: dealswiththespecificethicalprinciplesandstandardsof
media in general, including the ethical issues
relatingtojournalism,advertisingandmarketing,andentertainmentmedia.

LEARNINGACTIVITY

1. Whatistheroleofdeontologyindeterminingmoralactions?
2. Whatarethedifferentbranchesofethics?Discusseach.

CECC104a-Ethics
 36

Lesson4

MORALSTANDARDS

Whatdistinguishesmoralstan
dardsfromamoralstandards?
1. Moral Standards
deal with
mattersthat can
seriouslyinjure
orbenefitshumanb
eing.e.g.theft,rape
,fraud,slander,
murder

2. The validity of
moral standards
rests on the
adequacy of reason
tosupportandjustif
ythem,notondecisi
onsofmajorityoraut
horitative bodies.
e.g. that one ought
to tell the truth
does notdepend on
how many people
will vote on it nor
on the
legislative.One
indication
ofjustificationis the
consensusof
participantsincom
munication.
(Habermas)

3. Mora[ standards
are to be preferred
to other va\ues,
including self-
interest.e.g.honesty
istobepreferredtha
ncheating,although
cheatingcanmakem
egraduate.
 37

o
4. Moral standards
are based on The challenge of
impartial moral standards isthat in
considerations. vio(atingthem,effect
Anotherwayof isnotalwaysimmediateand
expressingthis is visible
“universalizable”
ortakingthe
pointofview

ofan‘idealobserv
er.’Still,thisimpar GECCf0#o-Ethics
tiallymustbebala
ncedwithpartialit
ytowardsthose
we have aspecial
relationship(fami
lyandfriends)and
thepoorandthedi
sable.

5. Moral standards
are associated
with special
emotions such
as
‘guilt,’‘shame,’‘r
emorse,’‘praise,
’‘indignation’.

Whatiscommontoall
fivecharacteristics?
Noneotherthansocietyt
akeninitsbroadestsense,
orinphilosophicalterms,
the‘other.’
Inotherwords,individual
responsibilitycannotbet
akeninisolationformsoci
alresponsibility.

Non-
compliancewithmoralst
andardsseriouslyinjureu
sahumanbeings.
Nababawasanandpagkata
 38

MoralityandEthics(Velasquez)
Morality:pertainstostandardofrightandwrong,usuallyinheritedfroma comm
unity

BUT

Ethics:studiestostandardsofrightandwrong,theactofmakingadecision,thena
ture oftheagentwhomakesthedecision.

WHAT,HOW,WHO
Moral,Ethics,
Procedural(Habermas)Questionsconcerningrig
htandwrong:

Procedural=standardisoptimality/efficiency
Ethical=standardisethos,pertainingtothegoodlife
Moral=standardisjustice,howothersareaffectedbyactions

TheStudyofEthics
1. Ethicsentailsareflectivedistancetocriticallyexaminestandards
• Itlooks valuebeneaththesemoralstandards(WHATofWHY)
e.g.Wetakeforgrantedthatweshouldmarryinchurch.
But have we asked why? If we do,this will affect our attitudeto
divorce,etc.
Value:lifelongcommitment?

2. Itlooksattheagentwhomakesthemoraldecision:Mature?
Levelofmoraldevelopment;WHO

3. ItisaboutthemoraldecisionmakingprocessH0{ }W

Ethicsisnotabouttheoreticalknowledge,transformingittoactionin
everydaylife.
Dilemmas
Signaledbybeing“bothered”-nababaqabaq

Whatisdilemma?
Dilemmas are experiences where an agent is confused about the
rightdecisiontomakebecausethereareseveralcompetingvaluesthatareseemin
glyequallyimportantandurgent.

FeelingsandDilemmas

Strongfeelingssignalpresenceofadilemma.

GECCY0#a-Ethics
 39

BUTmanypeopledonot always“catch”thedilemma behindthefeeling.

One can be conditionedto be indifferentsothatwhat usedto

beNAKAKABAGABAGisnolongeradilemma.

Dilemmasarenotaboutcompetingsolutions

• We normally handle the “pagkabagabag” by

immediatelyofferingsolutions instead of articulating the competing
values or issues e.g.shouldIcheatornotcheat.

Consider:
Ramon,aGrade5 honorstudentat an all boys’Grade5honorstudent at
an all boys’ Grade School allows Jose, a large, burly boy
seatednexttohim,topeekathismathquarterlyexam.Unfortunately, Teacher
sees this and immediately gives both boys a failing mark for the quarterexam. Ramon feels
that a great injustice has been committed; that Joseshouldhavebeen
punishedmoreseverelythanhim.

WhydoesRamonfeelthiswayaboutTeacher’spunishment?
WhydidRamonallowJoseto copy?
Howshouldwehandleamoraldilemma?
Certainlynotthroughfeelings
Upsurgeof Feelingscannotbeprevented

Whatwedowiththemseparatesthematurefromtheimmaturemoralagent

Usingreasonandimpartiality
ReasonDefined

• Afaculty
• Awayofdealingwithissues
• Moraljudgementarenotamatterofpersonalpreferencesortastes

“...the morallyrightthingto do, in any circumstance,is determinedby

whattherearethebestreasonsfordoing.”Rachel’s“WhatisMorality”

ImpartiallyDefined

• Eyerystakeholder’sinterestisequallyimportant
• There are no special interests or people, thus in making every
moraldecision,eachstakeholder’sinterestshouldbeconsidered.

-ModuleIIII-
 40

• Onemustnotbearbitrary.
• Everypersonshould betreatedthe same
wayunlessthereisgoodreasonnottodoso.

WhyReason?WharrIg›tartially

Becausedilemmasarecomplexexperiences;hardtomakeagooddecision

An agent is confused about the right decision to make because there

areseveralcompetingvaluesthatdifferentstakeholdersprotect

TheCaseofBabyJaneDoe
Inlate1983therewasagreatpubliccontroversyoveraninfantknown to the
public only as Baby Jane Doe. This unfortunate baby, born
inNewYorkState,sufferedfrommultipledefectsincludingspinabifida(abroken
and protruding spine), hydrocephafy (excess fluid on the brain), andperhaps
worst of all, microcephaly(an abnormally small head), suggestingthat part of
the brain was missing. Surgery was needed for the spina bifida;however, the
doctors who examined the baby disagreed about whether
theoperationshouldbeperformed.

Dr. George Newman believed that surgery would be pointless

becausebaby cou\d never have a meaningful human life.
Anotherphysician,Dr.Arjen Keuskamp, did not think the baby’s condition
was hopeless andadvocatesimmediatesurgery.
(Bothewerepediatricnuerologists).Theparentsdecidedto acceptDr.
Newman’srecommendation, and
refusedpermissionforsurgery.Dr.Keuskampthenwithdrewfromthecase.

Because such cases have become common, the plight of Baby

JaneDoe would not have received much attention had it not been for
theinterventionofthird parties.Shortlyafter
parentsmadetheirdecision,Lawrence Washburn, a lawyer associated with
some conservative right-to-life groups, petitioned the courts to set aside the
parents’ wished and orderthat surgery be performed. The New York State
Supreme Court granted thatrequest,but a higher court quickly overturnedthe
order, calling Washburn’ssuit“offensive”.

The court was impressed by Dr. Newman’s testimony; he told

thecourt, “the decision made by the parents is thatit would
beunkindto havethe surgery performedon this child... on the
basisof the combination tf›ot are present in this child, she is not
likelyto ever achieve any interpersona/relationship, the very
qualitieswhichweconsiderhuman.”

-ñtodufellll-
 41

AfterMr.Washburn’ssuitwasdismissed,thefederalgovernmentgotin the act.

The Department of Justice filed suit demanding access
tothehospital’srecordsinordertodeterminewhethera“handicappedperson”-
the infant - was being discriminated against. Thus suit was also
dismissed,with the judge declaring that the parents’ decision “was a
reasonable onebased on due considerationofthemedical
opinionsavailableand onagenuineconcernforthebestinterestsofthechild.”

The parents did eventuallyagreetothe use

ofshunttoremovetheexcessfluidfromthechild’sbrain.Butthemajor
surgery,forthespina
befina,wasnotperformed.

Wastheparent’sdecisioncorrect?
WhatarethefactsoftheBabyJaneDoecase
Ifyouweretheparents(themoralagents),whatwasyourdilemma
Whoarethetwootherstakeholderscontestingtheparents’decision?
Whatwasthevalue/behindtheirposition?

Whyarewetheonlymoralagents?
BecauseonlyhumanbeingsorefreeSummary:T
obeEthicalRequires

Pause
1. Togetholdofemotionsbeforetheydod
amageand
2. Distancefromwhateveryoneelseiss
aying

CriticalThinking
1. Toanalysethesituation,consider
stakeholdersinterestmakethe rightchoices
2. To see the biggerpicture and alignthe
choicewithwhatthevalueimportanttome

Courage
' 1. ToACTDELIBERATELYANDWITHCONVICTIONonwhatreasonsaysistherightt
hingtodo.
 42
-/hoduIe/f/f-
 43

LEARNINGACTIVITY
1. Istheresuchthingasmoralnorms?ormoralstandards?
2. Distinguishreasonfrom impartiality.

SUMMATIVETEST

CaseAnalysis

Michael had several friends including Roger and Daniel. Roger has
recentlymet and started dating a wonderfultady named Phyllis. He is
convinced thisis a long term relationship. Unknown to Roger, Michael
observed them at arestaurantseveral daysago and realizedPhyllisisthewife of
his otherfriendDaniel.
Michael is deciding whetherto tell Rogerthat Phyllis is married when
hereceives a call from Daniel. Daniel suspects his wife is having an affair
andsince they and Michael share many friends and contacts, he asks if
Michaelhasheardanythingregardingan affair.
To whom does Michael owe greater friendship to in this situation? No matterwho he tells, he is
going to end up hurting one, ifnot both friends.Does
heremainsilentandhopehisknowledgeisneverdiscovered?

MODULESUMMARY

ChristianmoralityisgroundedinGod’sself-givingloveinJesus.

Conscienceisnotthesuper-ego.

Super-egocommandswithshould’sorhave-
to’sforthesakeofgainingapprovaloroutoffearoflosinglove.

Deontologyis an approach to ethics that focuses onthe

rightness or wrongness of actions themselves,as opposedto
therightnessorwrongnessoftheconsequencesofthoseactions

ifiECC!04a-Ethics -ModuleIIII-