TC -71_R

LAW COLLEGE DEHRADUN, FACULTY OF UTTARANCHAL UNIVERSITY

NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION - 2018

BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDICA

IN THE MATTER OF

W.P. No. ___/2018

FATIMA GHANSARI.....................................................................................PETITIONER
v.
UNION OF INDICA.......................................................................................RESPONDENT

CLUBBED WITH

W.P. No. ___/2017

Dr. R.M. SWAIN...............................................................................................PETITIONER
v.
STATE OF DEHRI.........................................................................................RESPONDENT

PETITION INVOKED UNDER ART. 32 OF

THE CONSTITUTION OF INDICA

___________________________________________________________________________
UPON SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND HIS LORDSHIP’S
COMPANION JUSTICES OF THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDICA

MEMORANDUM OF ARGUMENTS FOR THE PETITIONER

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

HEADINGS PAGE NO.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 3
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES 4-7
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 8
STATEMENT OF FACTS 9-10
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 11
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 12-13
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED 14-28
I. WHETHER LAW PROVIDING FOR 33% 14-18
RESERVATION TO WOMEN IN THE PARLIAMENT
AND THE AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE 19(2) ARE
ARBITRARY AND VIOLATIVE OF THE CONCEPT OF
EQUALITY?
II. WHETHER LEGISLATING THE LAW PROVIDING 33% 18-20
RESERVATION TO WOMEN IN THE PARLIAMENT
AND AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE 19(2) SMACKS OF
SOME ULTERIOR RELIGIOUS MOTIVES, AND IF SO,
DO THEY VIOLATE SECULAR PRINCIPLES AND CAN
THEY BE CHALLENGED ON THIS GROUND?
III. WHETHER THE LAW PROVIDING FOR 33% 20-22
RESERVATION FOR WOMEN IN THE PARLIAMENT
AND THE AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE 19(2) IS
SUPPRESSING THE RIGHTS OF MINORITY
COMMUNITY?
IV. WHETHER A LAW CAN BE STRUCK DOWN ON 22-25
GROUNDS THAT IT SERVES THE MOTIVE OF ANY
FOREIGN POWER OR HAS BECOME A TOOL OF
COMMUNAL POLITICS?
V. WHETHER THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT TO 25-27
ARTICLE 19(2) VIOLATES THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF
THE CONSTITUTION?

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VI. WHETHER THE PROTECTION OF THE WHISTLE 27-28

BLOWERS PROTECTION ACT, 2014 EXTENDS TO
MRS. FATIMA GHANSARI?
PRAYER 29

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

& And
¶ Paragraph
AIR All India Reporter
AP Andhra Pradesh
Art. Article
ER English Reports
Govt. Government
Hon’ble Honorable
Ltd. Limited
M.P. Madhya Pradesh
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
No. Number
Ors. Others
PIL Public Interest Litigation
Raj Rajasthan
SC Supreme Court
SCC Supreme Court Cases
SCR Supreme Court Reports
Supp Supplementary
U.P. Uttar Pradesh
UOI Union of India
v. Versus

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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Sr. No. Title Citation Page(s)

1. Air India Cabin Crew Association v. AIR 2004 SC 187, 201 24

Yeshaswinee Merchant

2. Ak Gupta v. State through CBI CRL. M.C. 1436 of 26

2009 (Delhi High
Court, 16/08/2010)

3. Ameerunnisa Begum v. Mehboob Begum AIR 1956 SC 91 19

AIR 1967 SC 1458
4. Andhra Pradesh v. Nalla Raja Reddy 16
AIR 1952 Cal. 823,830
5. Anjali Roy v. State of West Bengal 20
1997 (3) Bombay CR
6. Annand Pathwardhan v. Union of India 23
438
2014 (10) SCC 473
7. Anwar PK v. PK Basheer 19
AIR 1970 SC 1228
8. Arun Ghosh v. State of West Bengal 20
(2008) 6 SCC 1
9. Ashok Kumar Thakur v. Union of India 17
315 US 568 (1942)
10. Chaplilsky v. New Hampshire 25
AIR 1947 Nag 1
11. Charan Shukla v. Provincial Government 24

12. Chiranjit Lal Chaudhary v. Union of 21

AIR 1951 SC 41
India
AIR 1953 Bombay 311
13. Dattatreya Maitiram v. State of Bombay 26

14. Dr. Narayana Sharma v. Dr Pankaj 24

AIR 2000 SC 68, 72
Lehkar
(2005) 1 SCC 394
15. EV Chinnaiah v. State of AP 20

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AIR 1997 SC 3021

16. Gaurav Jain v. Union of India 24
AIR 1995 SC 1648
17. Govt of A.P v. PB Vijay Kumar 15
AIR 2007 SC 861
18. I.R Colheo v. State 16
AIR 2007 SC 869
19. I.R Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu 18

20. Indirect Tax Practitioners Association v. 27

(2010) 8 SCC 281
RK Jain
1962 (1) SCR 151
21. Jagannath Prasad v. State of UP 24
AIR 1973 SC 1461
22. Keshavanda Bharati v. State of Kerala 26
Writ No. 452 of 2016
23. Kirti Kumar Gupta v. State of MP 28
(Madhya Pradesh
High Court,
24/01/2017)
AIR 2007 SC 71
24. M. Nagraj v. Union of India 27
AIR 1996 SC 2178
25. Madhu Kishwar v. State of Bihar 27
AIR 1971 SC 2486
26. Madhu Limaye v. SDM Monghyr 24
SLP No. 9126 of 2010
27. Manoj Mishra v. Union of India 27
(Supreme Court,
09/04/2013)

28. Marri Chandra Shekhar Rao v. Dean 26

1990(3) SCC 130
Seth G. S Medical College
AIR 2012 SC 3565,
29. Mohd. Ajmal Kasab v. State of 25
3662
Maharashtra
Case No. 315 of 2015
30. Mr Avinash Kumar v. GNCTD 28
(Central Information
Commission,

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06/08/2015)
52. L.Ed 551
31. Muller v. Oregun 22

32. Municipal committee Patiala v. Model 21

AIR 2007 SC 2844
town Resident Association
AIR 2012 SC 1310
33. NK Bajpai v. Union of India 27
AIR 1962 SC 812, 814
34. OK Ghosh v. EX Joseph 27
AIR 2008 Mad 264
35. R. Karruppan v. Government of India 24

36. Ram Krishen Dalmia v. Justice S.R. 25

1959 SCR 279
Tendolkar

37. Ramlila Maidan Incident v. Home 27

(2012) 5 SCC 1
Secretary, Union of India
AIR 1983 SC 1
38. S.P Mittal v. Union of India 20
AIR 2012 SC 3829,
39. Sahara India Real Estate Ltd. v. 23
3838
Securities & Exchange Board
AIR 1965 SC 845
40. Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan 19
(2013) 1 SCR 467
41. Saskatchewan v. Wahtecoott 25
(2013) 1 SCR 472
42. Shaskatchewhan v. Wahtecott 20
AIR 1951 SC 458
43. Shankari Prasad v. Union of India 19
AIR 2004 SC 2081
44. State of Kerala v. Praveen Bhai Thogadia 26
(1993) Supp. (4) SCC
45. Tongurau Sudhakar Reddy v. Govt. of 26
439
A.P
(2004) 4 SCC 666
46. Vijay Shekhar v. Union of India 19

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47. Western UP, Electric Power v. State of 21

1969 (1) SCC 817
UP

BOOKS

1. Jain MP, Constitutional Law, (8th Edition, 2017).

2. Basu DD, Shorter Constitution of India, Volume I-II, (4th Edition, 2012).
3. Tope TK, Indian Constitution, (2nd Edition, 2013).

STATUTES

1. Constitution of India 1950

2. The Whistle Blowers Protection Act, 2014.
3. Evidence Act, 1872

IMPORTANT DEFINITION

1. Petitioner for the purpose of this memorandum shall stand for MRS. FATIMA
GHANSARI AND ORS.
2. Respondent for the purpose of this memorandum shall stand for UNION OF
INDIA.

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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

I. W.P. No. ___/2018.

The Petitioner has approached this Hon’ble Court under Article 32 of the Constitution of
Indica.

II. W.P. No. ___/2017.

The Petitioner has approached the High Court of Dehri under Article 226 of the Constitution.
But the Hon’ble Supreme Court clubbed this petition under Article 139A of the Constitution
of Indica.

The Respondent has appeared in the Hon’ble Supreme Court in response to the petition filed
by the Petitioner.

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STATEMENT OF FACTS

BACKGROUND OF THE CASE

The Republic of Indica, got its independence from British Rule in 1947, is an independent
“Union of State”. The Constitutional and Legal framework of Indica is pari materia to the
Republic of India. As the Constitution of Indica provides Equality of Gender, concerns were
raised for Women Empowerment to have at least 33% seats reservation in both houses of
Parliament. In 2006, the law prescribing 33% reservation for women in the Parliament was
passed and received the assent of President on 1st July 2006.

CIRCUMSTANCES LEADING TO DISPUTE

I.
Year 2015 Women Representation in both the houses of Parliament have
increased and the Women Laden Parliament by a Constitutional
Amendment have inserted a new provision to Article 19(2).
27th December Dr. RN Swain filed a PIL in the High Court of the State of Dehri to
2017 declare 33% reservation as unconstitutional.

II.
26th December Mrs. Fatima Ghansari brought a motion in the house of Parliament
2017 for repealing the law of 33% reservation to women.
1st May 2018 Mrs. Fatima again tried to reintroduce the motion but the Speaker
of the house refused to entertain it, and on the same day, she
received anonymous phone calls and the caller threatened her of
due consequences if she continue to insist upon her stand to repeal
the law of 2006. However aggrieved by the incident, filed a petition
in the Supreme Court of Indica praying for declaring the
reservation law as Unconstitutional.

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III.
25th February Mrs. Garima Dhall, Mrs. Yamini Paul and Mrs. Mannat
2018 Raichandani were arrested by the Intelligence Agency of Indica on
the ground of spying for and producing vital state secrets to enemy
country.
10th May 2018 Members of Parliament of Wrongrace Party jointly introduced the
motion in the Lower House for repealing the law but the same was
rejected by the speaker.

MATTER BEFORE SUPREME COURT

Supreme Court of Indica has clubbed both the petitions filed before it and the petition before
the High Court of Dehri under Article 139A of the Constitution and has scheduled them for
the final hearing.

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STATEMENT OF ISSUES

I. WHETHER THE LAW PROVIDING FOR 33% RESERVATION TO THE

WOMEN IN THE PARLIAMENT AND AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE 19(2)
ARE ARBITRARY AND VIOLATIVE OF THE CONCEPT OF EQUALITY?

II. WHETHER LEGISLATING THE LAW PROVIDING 33% RESERVATION TO

WOMEN IN THE PARLIAMENT AND AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE 19(2)
SMACKS OF SOME ULTERIOR RELIGIOUS MOTIVES, AND IF SO, DO
THEY VIOLATE SECULAR PRINCIPLES AND CAN THEY BE
CHALLENGED ON THIS GROUND?

III. WHETHER THE LAW PROVIDING FOR 33% RESERVATION FOR

WOMEN IN THE PARLIAMENT AND THE AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE
19(2) IS SUPPRESSING THE RIGHTS OF MINORITY COMMUNITY?

IV. WHETHER A LAW CAN BE STRUCK DOWN ON THE GROUND THAT IT

SERVE THE MOTIVE OF ANY FOREIGN POWER OR HAS BECOME THE
TOOL OF COMMUNAL POLITICS?

V. WHETHER THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE 19(2)

VIOLATES THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE CONSTITUTION?

VI. WHETHER THE PROTECTION OF WHISTLE BLOWERS PROTECTION

ACT, 2014 EXTENDS TO MRS. FATIMA GHANSARI?

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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

I. WHETHER THE LAW PROVIDING FOR 33% RESERVATION TO THE

WOMEN IN THE PARLIAMENT AND AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE
19(2) ARE ARBITRARY AND VIOLATIVE OF THE CONCEPT OF
EQUALITY?

The Counsel on behalf of Respondents humbly submits before the Honourable Supreme
Court of Indica that the law providing for 33 % reservation and amendment to Article 19(2)
was not arbitrary and violative of the concept of equality. Before the passing of this said act,
there was no adequate representation of women in the social, economic and political life of
the country even after long years of independence. There has been a historical social
exclusion of women from polity due to various social and cultural reasons and patriarchal
tradition. The meaningful empowerment of women can be achieved only with adequate
participation by women in legislative and parliamentary machinery, as inadequate
representation of women is a primary factor behind the general backwardness of women at all
levels.

II. WHETHER LEGISLATING THE LAW PROVIDING 33%

RESERVATION TO WOMEN IN THE PARLIAMENT AND
AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE 19(2) SMACKS OF SOME ULTERIOR
RELIGIOUS MOTIVES, AND IF SO, DO THEY VIOLATE SECULAR
PRINCIPLES AND CAN THEY BE CHALLENGED ON THIS GROUND?

The Counsel on behalf of Respondents humbly submits before the Honourable Supreme
Court of Indica that legislating the law providing 33% reservation to women in the
Parliament and amendment to Article 19(2) does not smacks of any ulterior religious motives
and also not violate the secular principles. Moreover Article 368 of the Constitution of Indica
empowers the Parliament to amend any law in course to achieve the social welfare and to
complete the principles enshrined under the Preamble and Directive Principles of the State
Policy. Moreover the amendment was made to empower the women to express themselves
and their opinions freely with few limitations.

III. WHETHER THE LAW PROVIDING FOR 33% RESERVATION FOR

WOMEN IN THE PARLIAMENT AND THE AMENDMENT TO

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ARTICLE 19(2) IS SUPPRESSING THE RIGHTS OF MINORITY

COMMUNITY?

The Counsel on behalf of Respondents humbly submits before the Honourable Supreme
Court of Indica that the law providing for 33% reservation for women in the parliament and
the amendment to Article 19(2) is not at all suppressing the Rights of Minority Community.

IV. WHETHER A LAW CAN BE STRUCK DOWN ON GROUNDS THAT IT

SERVE THE MOTIVE OF ANY FOREIGN POWER OR HAS BECOME A
TOOL OF COMMUNAL POLITICS?

The Counsel on behalf of Respondents humbly submits before the Honourable Supreme
Court of Indica the law providing 33% reservation to the women in the Parliament was not
serving as a motive of foreign power nor that law has become the tool of communal politics.

V. WHETHER THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE 19(2)

VIOLATES THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE CONSTITUTION?

The Counsel on behalf of Respondents humbly submits before the Honourable Supreme
Court of Indica that the Constitutional Amendment made by the Parliament was not violative
of the basic structure of the Constitution. Article 368 of the Constitution empowers the
Parliament to amend any law in course to achieve the social welfare and to complete the
principles enshrined under the Preamble and Directive Principles of the State Policy.
Moreover the amendment was made to empower the women to express themselves and their
opinions freely with few limitations.

VI. WHETHER THE PROTECTION OF THE WHISTLE BLOWERS

PROTECTION ACT 2014 EXTENDS TO MRS. FATIMA GHANSARI?

The Counsel on behalf of Respondents humbly submits before the Honourable Supreme
Court of Indica that the protection of the Whistle Blowers Protection Act 2014 does not
extends to Mrs. Fatima Ghansari because she is not fulfilling the requirements of the Public
Interest Disclosure mentioned under Section 4 of the Act, 2014. According to the Section
4(4) of the Act, 2014-“Every disclosure shall be made in writing or by electronic mail….. in
accordance with the provision as may be prescribed….”

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ARGUMENT ADVANCED

I. WHETHER THE LAW PROVIDING FOR 33% RESERVATION TO THE

WOMEN IN THE PARLIAMENT AND AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE
19(2) ARE ARBITRARY AND VIOLATIVE OF THE CONCEPT OF
EQUALITY?
It is most humbly pleaded before the Honourable Supreme Court of Indica that the
law providing for 33 % reservation and amendment to Article 19(2) was not
arbitrary and violative of the concept of equality.
1. THAT THE LAW PROVIDING FOR 33% RESERVATION TO THE
WOMEN IN THE PARLIAMENT WAS ENACTED TO IMPROVE
THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONDITIONS OF WOMEN IN INDICA.
In the last decade of the 20th century, the issue of political empowerment of
women gained momentum throughout in the world. In 1990’s the United
Nation the Economic and Social Council endorsed a target of 30% women in
decision making position in the world 1995. The father of the Nation Mahatma
Gandhiji believed that women have to play a much meaningful role in politics
making it more accountable, transparent and corruption free.1 The Constitution
of Indica, heralded a new era of equality for women of Indica. It guarantees
equal political rights including the right to vote to women. Also the provisions
contained in the United Nation Convention on the “Elimination of all forms of
Discrimination against women” are there in the Indica’s Constitution. Not
only does the constitution guarantees equal political status to women, but there
is a scope for “Positive Discrimination” in the favour as is evident in Article
15(3) of the Constitution of Indica. According to the released ranking of 193
members countries of the United Nations relating to the representation of
women in the Parliament in the year 2005 the representation of women in the
lower house was just 11.8% and where it was 11% in the upper house. So in
order to uplift the participation of women in the Parliament the law prescribing
33% reservation was passed from both the houses of Parliament.2

1
Mahatma Gandhi, HARIJAN, 2 (1st Edition, 1946).
2
Moot Proposition, ¶ 4.

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Before the passing of this said act, there was no adequate representation of
women in the social, economic and political life of the country even after long
years of independence. There has been a historical social exclusion of women
from polity due to various social and cultural reasons and patriarchal tradition.
The meaningful empowerment of women can be achieved only with adequate
participation by women in legislative and parliamentary machinery, as
inadequate representation of women is a primary factor behind the general
backwardness of women at all levels.
2. THAT THE LAW PROVIDING FOR 33% RESERVATION TO
WOMEN IN PARLIAMENT IS NOT VIOLATIVE OF THE CONCEPT
OF EQUALITY.
It is humbly pleaded before this Court that in the instant case there is no
violation of Equality clause under Article 14. Article 14 of the Constitution of
Indica talks about equality before law and equal protection of law. It is a well
settled principle that Art. 14 will be violated not only when the equals are
treated unequally but also when unequal are treated equally.3 Equal protection
of law does not mean that every law must have universal application. 4 Art. 14
does not operate against rational classification.5 In the instant case, where
there is presence of gender discrimination in the political realm of Indica as
sought by the women of the Indica itself, there must be reservation of woman
in the Parliament as well. The classification must be founded on intelligible
differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together
from others left out of the group and the differentia must have reasonable
nexus to the object sought by the state.6 Hence, the instant case falls within the
ambit of intelligible differentia and thus 33% women representation in the
Parliament is constitutionally valid. Article 15 (3) of the Constitution of Indica
states that “Nothing in this Article shall prevent the State from making any
special provision for women and children”. Thereby, when the Constitution
permits the State to make special provision for women, the wisdom of
legislature would ensure participation of women more effectively.

3
Andhra Pradesh v. Nalla Raja Reddy, AIR 1967 SC 1458.
4
Jagannath Prasad v. State of UP, 1962 (1) SCR 151.
5
Western UP, Electric Power v. State of UP, 1969 (1) SCC 817.
6
Ram Krishen Dalmia v. Justice S.R. Tendolkar, 1959 SCR 279.

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The Twin Article 15 and 16 prohibits a discriminatory treatment but not

preferential or special treatment of women, which is positive measure in their
favour as a class.7
The special provisions for women enshrined under Article 15(3) would not be
interpreted to authorize a discrimination against women because Article 15(3)
does not use the expression “Discrimination against” but uses a different
expression that is “special provision”. This gives a clear and coherent
interpretation to article 15(1) and 15(3) because the provision discriminating
in favour of women would necessarily discriminate against men and therefore
constitute an exception to the prohibition on the discrimination of ground of
sex under Article 15(1).8
Chief Justice Chagla held:9
“As a result of the joint operation of Article 15(1) and 15(3), the state could
discriminate in favour of women against men, but it could not discriminate in
favour of men against women”.
There is a prohibition against discrimination under Article 15(1) but not
against preferential treatment. Constitution of Indica specially permits the
State to make special provision under Article 15(3). The reason is that women
physical structure and performance of maternal function place her at a
disadvantage in the struggle for subsistence and her physical well being
becomes an object of public interest and care in order to preserve the strength
and figure of the race.10
It was argued in the case that in absence of specific provision, reservation for
women would constitute the violation of Article 14. The Supreme Court
rejected the contention and in this case held that “Both preference and
reservation can be given under Article 15(3) and it would not violate equality
clause under Article 14.”11
In another case, the Government of Andhra Pradesh amended the AP Society
Act 1964 in 1991 to provide for two women member being nominated by the

7
Air India Cabin Crew Association v. Yeshaswinee Merchant, AIR 2004 SC 187, 201.
8
Anjali Roy v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1952 Cal. 823,830.
9
Dattatreya Maitiram v. State of Bombay, AIR 1953 Bombay 311.
10
Muller v. Oregun, 52. L.Ed 551.
11
Govt of A.P v. PB Vijay Kumar, AIR 1995 SC 1648.

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registrar of the society in the management of the society. But it was contended
that due to this the preference of women in the management would increase
above 50% and this is violation of Article 14. The Supreme Court denied the
contention and observed that the purpose of this provision is to encourage
women to participate in the management more effectively. Thus this is not
unconstitutional under the light of Article 14.12
In E.V Chinnaiah v. State of AP13, it was held that legislation may not be
amenable to challenge on the ground of violation of Article 14 if its intention
is to give effect to Article 15 and Article 16 or when the differentiation is not
unreasonable.
The Supreme Court held that Article 14 recognizes women as a class. The
legislature has a power to classify persons and declared that women as a class
are different from men as a class.14
Equality secured by Article 14 does not mean absolute equality which is a
human impossibility. It is held to be a comparative concept.15 It does not mean
that all laws must be universal in application or general in character. It does
not mean that the same laws should apply to all persons. Article 14 not makes
it incumbent on the legislature, always to make laws applicable to all persons
generally.
All persons are not equal by their nature, attainment or circumstances. The
varying needs of different classes of persons often require separate
treatment.16 From the very nature of the society there should be different laws,
applying differently in different places. Application of the same laws
uniformly to all under different circumstances may result in violation of the
principle of equality.17 The legislature is required to deal with diverse
problems resulting from an infinite variety of human relations. It must
therefore have the power to make laws dealing with particular problems. As a
consequence the legislature must have power to make laws distinguishing
selecting and classifying person and things upon which their laws are to

12
Tongurau Sudhakar Reddy v. Govt. of A.P, (1993) Supp. (4) SCC 439.
13
EV Chinnaiah v. State of AP, (2005) 1 SCC 394.
14
Ameerunnisa Begum v. Mehboob Begum, AIR 1956 SC 91.
15
I.R Colheo v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2007 SC 861.
16
Chiranjit Lal Chaudhary v. Union of India, AIR 1951 SC 41.
17
Municipal committee Patiala v. Model town Resident Association, AIR 2007 SC 2844.

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operate.18. In the view of inherent complexities involved in modern society, it

is held that some free play must be given o the executive also in this
connection of equality.
3. THAT THE AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE 19(2) WAS NOT
ARBITRARY AND VIOLATIVE OF CONCEPT OF EQUALITY.
It is most humbly pleaded before this court that amendment to Article 19(2)
was not arbitrary as Article 368 of the Constitution empowers the Parliament
to amend any law in course to achieve the social welfare and to complete the
principles enshrined under the Preamble and Directive Principles of the State
Policy. Moreover the amendment was made to empower the women to express
themselves and their opinions freely with few limitations.19
In referring to Article 368 of the Indica Constitution the Supreme Court
expressed its full concurrence with the decision in Shankari Prasad v. Union of
India20 and laid down that Article 13(2) did not affect the amendments of the
constitution made under Article 368. The court held that constituent power
under Article 368 on the parliament includes even power to take away the
fundamental Rights under Part III of the Constitution.
21
In Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan Supreme Court held that an
amendment was a legislative process and an amendment of the constitution
was made only by legislative process with ordinary majority or special
majority as the case may be and that amendment could not nothing but law.

II. WHETHER LEGISLATING THE LAW PROVIDING 33%

RESERVATION TO WOMEN IN THE PARLIAMENT AND
AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE 19(2) SMACKS OF SOME ULTERIOR
RELIGIOUS MOTIVES, AND IF SO, DO THEY VIOLATE SECULAR
PRINCIPLES AND CAN THEY BE CHALLENGED ON THIS GROUND?
It is most humbly pleaded before the Honourable Supreme Court of Indica that
legislating the law providing 33% reservation to women in the Parliament and

18
R. Karruppan v. Government of India, AIR 2008 Mad 264.
19
Moot Proposition, ¶ 11.
20
Shankari Prasad v. Union of India, AIR 1951 SC 458.
21
Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1965 SC 845.

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amendment to Article 19(2) does not smacks of any ulterior religious motives and
also not violate the secular principles.
1. THAT THE LAW PROVIDING 33% RESERVATION TO WOMEN
AND AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE 19(2) DOES NOT SMACKS ANY
ULTERIOR RELIGIOUS MOTIVES.
The father of the Nation Mahatma Gandhiji believed that women have to play
a much meaningful role in politics making it more accountable, transparent
and corruption free. Also the provisions contained in the United Nation
Convention on the “Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against
women” are there in the Indica’s Constitution. Not only does the constitution
guarantees equal political status to women, but there is a scope for “Positive
Discrimination” in the favour as is evident in Article 15(3) of the Constitution
of Indica.
Though the Constitution provides for equality of gender but historically has
been a male dominated society and patriarchy is an old practice among Hindus
as well as Muslims.22
Moreover Article 368 of the Constitution of Indica empowers the Parliament
to amend any law in course to achieve the social welfare and to complete the
principles enshrined under the Preamble and Directive Principles of the State
Policy. Moreover the amendment was made to empower the women to express
themselves and their opinions freely with few limitations.23
International law reaffirms that the right to freedom of expression and freedom
of religion. Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)
as well as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
guarantees the right to hold opinions without interference, guarantees
everyone the right to freedom of expression and right to receive and impart
information. Article 18 of ICCPR also guarantees the freedom of thought
conscience and religion.
The freedom of expression demands that it cannot be suppressed unless the
situations created by allowing the freedom are pressing and the community
interest is endangered. The anticipated danger should not be remote,

22
Moot Proposition, ¶ 3.
23
Moot Proposition, ¶ 11.

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conjectural or farfetched.24 It should have proximate and direct nexus with the
expression. The expression should be intrinsically dangerous to the public
interest. In other words the expression should be inseparably locked up with
the action contemplated like the equivalent of a spark in a powder keg.25
In order to qualify hate speech, the speech must be offensive and project the
extreme form of emotion.26 Every offensive statement does not amount to hate
speech. The expression advocacy and discussion of sensitive and unpopular
issue have been termed as low value speech unqualified for constitutional
protection.27
In the instant case, a sting operation by Zebra Post revealed that the members
of the ruling party in collusion with large media houses are running Hindu
agenda which is rigging the state towards religious extremism. But in the case
of Anwar P.K v. P.K Basheer, it was held that the admissibility of the
electronic records under Section 63 and 64 and 65 B of the Evidence Act must
have a Prime facie authentication and without the authentication these records
are not admissible in the court.28 Moreover in Vijay Shekhar V. Union of
India 29 the Supreme Court upheld that offending any person in pursuance of a
sting operation to expose them in any court is illegal as it is prominently
considered that these proofs can be Fictitious in nature.

III. WHETHER THE LAW PROVIDING FOR 33% RESERVATION FOR

WOMEN IN THE PARLIAMENT AND THE AMENDMENT TO
ARTICLE 19(2) IS SUPPRESSING THE RIGHTS OF MINORITY
COMMUNITY?
It is most humbly pleaded before the Honourable Supreme Court that the law
providing for 33% reservation for women in the parliament and the amendment to
Article 19(2) is not at all suppressing the Rights of Minority Community.

24
Arun Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1970 SC 1228.
25
Annand Pathwardhan v. Union of India, 1997 (3) Bombay CR 438.
26
Saskatchewan v. Wahtecoott, (2013) 1 SCR 467.
27
Chaplilsky v. New Hampshire, 315 US 568 (1942).
28
Anwar PK v. PK Basheer, 2014 (10) SCC 473.
29
Vijay Shekhar v. Union of India, (2004) 4 SCC 666.

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1. THAT A LAW WHICH OPPOSES ANY BELIEF OF MINORITY

COMMUNITY, WHICH IS AGAINST THE EQUALITY CLAUSE,
CANNOT BE CONSIDERED AS VIOLATION OF THEIR RIGHTS.
It is most humbly pleaded before this Court that a law providing for 33%
reservation to women in the Parliament cannot be considered as violation of
minority rights as the belief of the minority community was against the
equality clause under Article 14.
The law of 33% reservation to women was strongly opposed by the members
of the minority community because according to them men and women cannot
be equal but Article 14 of the Constitution of Indica guarantees equality before
law.30
Explaining the concept of equality, the Supreme Court in Marri Chandra
Shekhar Rao v. Dean Seth G. S Medical College 31 observed that
“Equality must become a living reality for the large masses of the people.
Those who are unequal in fact cannot be treated by identical standards; that
may be equality in law but it would certainly not be real equality. Existence of
equality of opportunity depends not merely on the absence of disabilities, but
on the presence of abilities. It is not simply a matter of legal equality. De jure
equality must ultimately find its raison in de facto equality.”
2. THAT THE AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE 19(2) DOES NOT
SUPPRESS THE RIGHTS OF MINORITY COMMUNITY.
It is most humbly pleaded before the court that an amendment to Article 19(2)
does not suppress the rights of minority and this amendment was done so as to
empower the women to express themselves and their opinions freely.
In order to qualify hate speech, the speech must be offensive and project the
extreme form of emotion.32 Every offensive statement does not amount to hate
speech. The speeches delivered by the women members of the Parliament33
were not against the minority community but it was done to promote the
Hindu Religion.34

30
Moot Proposition, ¶ 7.
31
Marri Chandra Shekhar Rao v. Dean Seth G. S Medical College, 1990(3) SCC 130.
32
Saskatchewan v. Wahtecoott, (2013) 1 SCR 467.
33
Moot Proposition, ¶ 12.
34
Moot Proposition, ¶ 14

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The Supreme Court observed that the Speech or fair criticism is that which
while criticizing any act does not impute any ulterior motive to it. 35
The Supreme Court while discussing the challenge against the validity of
Auroville Emergency Provision Act 1980 observed that the government on
receiving of several complaints about the mismanagement of the affairs of the
society enacted the impugned legislation for taking over the management of
the society and held that the act was violative of the rights of any section of
citizens under Article 29 as it is not against their right to conserve their
language script and culture.36
The Supreme Court while discussing the constitutional validity of Section 3 of
Central Educational Institutions Act 2006, observed that the Act provides for
Reservations in the institute but do not violate the basic structure as Parliament
has the power to pass or amend any law for the Reservation or upliftment
purposes. It was held that the Constitutional amendment to the aforesaid act
was not violative of the basic structure of the constitution and the
constitutionality of the Act was also upheld.37

IV. WHETHER A LAW CAN BE STRUCK DOWN ON GROUNDS THAT IT

SERVE THE MOTIVE OF ANY FOREIGN POWER OR HAS BECOME A
TOOL OF COMMUNAL POLITICS?
It is most humbly pleaded before the Honourable Supreme Court of Indica that the
law providing 33% reservation to the women in the Parliament was not serving as
a motive of foreign power nor that law has become the tool of communal politics.
1. THAT THE LAW PROVIDING 33% RESERVATION WAS NOT A
TOOL FOR COMMUNAL POLITICS.
The state of Indica has given equal status to women under its constitution
under Article 14 which provides that “State shall not deny to any person
equality before law or the equal protection of laws within the territory of
Indica”. This provision clearly shows that women in Indica enjoy right to
equality and any discrimination against them shall be violation of equality of

35
Dr. Narayana Sharma v. Dr Pankaj Lehkar, AIR 2000 SC 68, 72.
36
S.P Mittal v. Union of India, AIR 1983 SC 1.
37
Ashok Kumar Thakur v. Union of India, (2008) 6 SCC 1.

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right and respect for human dignity. Women in Indica have right to enjoy right
to equality. However, in order to improve their status, constitution provides
under Article 15(3) that State may make special provision for women.
Consequently a number of legal provisions aimed at securing equal status for
and removing discrimination against women have been made. For instance the
Constitution was amended in the year 1992 to reserve 33% of the seats in their
favour in panchayats.38 The amendment is regarded as a major step for socio-
economic empowerment of the women in India. The constitution has also cast
the duty on every citizen to renounce the practices derogatory to the dignity of
women.39 It being a part of Directive Principle of State Policy is not
enforceable in a court of law but if the state makes any law to prohibit any act
or conduct in violation of this duty the court would uphold the law as a
reasonable restriction of the fundamental rights.
Indica has ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women. Ratification obliges to honour the obligations
imposed by the convention. The Supreme Court40 held that the convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women is an integral
scheme of the Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles.41
Article 2(e) of CEDAW enjoins the State parties to breathe life into the dry
bones of the Constitution, International Convention and the Protection of
Human Rights Act to prevent gender based discrimination and to effectuate
right to life including empowerment of economic, social and cultural rights.
Article 2(f) read with Articles 3, 14 and 15 of CEDAW embodies concomitant
right to development as an integral scheme of the Indica Constitution and the
Human rights Act. It is therefore desirable that the enabling legislature is
enacted to give legal effect to the convention so that the discrimination against
women which exist due to legal, social and cultural traditions is eliminated.
Rights provided therein will remain meaningless to a large number of women
due to their poverty, ignorance and illiteracy. The convention made
declarations as well as for the provision for reservation.

38
Art. 243D, the Constitution of Indica, Inserted by the Constitution (Seventy Third Amendment) Act, 1992.
39
Art. 51-a(e), the Constitution of Indica, Inserted by the Constitution (Seventy Third Amendment) Act 1992
40
Madhu Kishwar v. State of Bihar, AIR 1996 SC 2178.
41
Gaurav Jain v. Union of India, AIR 1997 SC 3021.

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In the case of Bhagwati Charan Shukla v. Provincial Government 42 “that the

effect of the words must be judged from the standard of reasonable strong
minded firm and the courageous men, and not those of weak and vacillating
minds, nor of those who scent danger in every hostile point of view. It is the
standard of the ordinary man or as they say in English Law, “The man on the
top of a Clampham omnibus”.
In the case of Keshavanda Bharati v. State of Kerala43, Chief Justice Sikri
observed that “ it seems to me that in view of Article 51 of the Directive
Principles of State Policy, this court must interpret language of the
constitution, if not intractable which is after all a municipal law, in the light of
the United Nations Charter and the solemn declaration subscribed to by India.”
From the above Judgment it can be deduced that where the language of the
municipal law is ambiguous or rather intractable the court must rely upon the
present international authority of municipal law as Article 253 of our Indian
Constitution confers exclusive power upon Parliament to make law for giving
effect to any treaty, agreement or convention with any other country or
countries or any decision mad at any international conference.
It may be noted that equality of status has been guaranteed to women by the
constitution, it is myth to millions of women as they are the victims of various
kinds of violence within the house, at work places and in the educational
system. They are still the subject of suppression.
2. THAT THE LAW PROVIDING FOR 33% RESERVATION WAS NOT
SERVING ANY MOTIVE OF FOREIGN POWER.
It is most humbly pleaded before this court that the law which was enacted to
provide 33% reservation to the women was not serving any motive of foreign
power.
Mrs. Garima Dhall, Mrs. Yamini Paul and Mrs. Mannat Raichandani who
were the institutional force behind the passing of the law providing 33 %
reservation to women in the Parliament got arrested by the Intelligence

42
Charan Shukla v. Provincial Government, AIR 1947 Nag 1.
43
Keshavanda Bharati v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461.

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Agency of Indica on the ground of spying for and providing vital State secrets
to enemy country.44
But the claims of the Intelligence Agency lie on the evidences which they
sought as credible proof in the court of law. The Delhi High Court 45 observed
that the Report or evidences filed by the agency cannot be accepted because it
can be flimsy, not convincing and vague. It was found that the Intelligence
Agency had not investigated the case properly and unnecessarily doubted the
credibility of the accused.
As in the instant case, the Intelligence Bureau claims that they have credible
evidences but without admissibility of such through the court they cannot
conclude that the law providing for 33% reservation was serving as a motive
for foreign power.

V. WHETHER THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE 19(2)

VIOLATES THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE CONSTITUTION?
It is most humbly pleaded before the Honourable Supreme Court of Indica that the
Constitutional Amendment made by the Parliament was not violative of the basic
structure of the Constitution.
1. THAT THE PARLIAMENT HAS POWER TO AMEND THE LAWS BY
VIRTUE OF ARTICLE 368.
Article 368 of the Constitution empowers the Parliament to amend any law in
course to achieve the social welfare and to complete the principles enshrined
under the Preamble and Directive Principles of the State Policy. Moreover the
amendment was made to empower the women to express themselves and their
opinions freely with few limitations.46
In referring to Article 368 of the Indica Constitution the Supreme Court
expressed its full concurrence with the decision in Shankari Prasad v. Union of
India47 and laid down that Article 13(2) did not affect the amendments of the
constitution made under Article 368. The court held that constituent power

44
Moot Proposition, ¶ 19.
45
A.K Gupta v. State through CBI, CRL. M.C. 1436 of 2009 (Delhi High Court, 16/08/2010).
46
Moot Proposition, ¶ 11.
47
Supra 20.

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under Article 368 on the parliament includes even power to take away the
fundamental Rights under Part III of the Constitution.
2. THAT THE AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE 19(2) IS NOT VIOLATIVE
OF BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE CONSTITUTION.
It is most humbly pleaded before the Honourable Supreme Court of Indica that
the Constitutional Amendment made by the Parliament was not violative of
the basic structure of the Constitution and the main object was to empower the
women so that they can express their opinion freely.
In the seminal Keshavananda Bharati case,48 Sikri, C.J., mentioned the
following as the basic foundation and structure of the constitution i.e.
Supremacy of the Constitution; Separation of Powers; Equality before law;
Secular Character of Constitution49; Federal character of the Constitution.
While it is necessary to maintain and preserve Freedom of Speech and
Expression in a democracy, so also it is necessary to place some curbs on this
freedom for the maintenance of social order.50 No freedom can be absolute or
completely unrestricted.51 The state may make laws imposing reasonable
restriction on the exercise of such freedom.52 Exercise of legislative power in
this respect by the state can be subjected to judicial review, within a limited
ambit.53
The Supreme Court held that in Clause (2) of Article 19, public order is
virtually synonymous with public peace, safety and tranquility.54
Any act which disturbs only the serenity of others may not fall within the term
public order as used in clause (2) of Article 19.55
In M Nagraj v. Union of India56 and I.R Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu57 the
petitioner challenge the Constitutional Validity of 77th and 1st Constitutional
Amendment and also 82nd Amendment Act of 2000 but the Supreme Court

48
Keshavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461.
49
State of Kerala v. Praveen Bhai Thogadia, AIR 2004 SC 2081.
50
Ramlila Maidan Incident v. Home Secretary, Union of India, (2012) 5 SCC 1.
51
Sahara India Real Estate Ltd. v. Securities & Exchange Board, AIR 2012 SC 3829, 3838.
52
Mohd. Ajmal Kasab v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2012 SC 3565, 3662.
53
NK Bajpai v. Union of India, AIR 2012 SC 1310.
54
OK Ghosh v. EX Joseph, AIR 1962 SC 812, 814.
55
Madhu Limaye v. SDM Monghyr, AIR 1971 SC 2486.
56
M. Nagraj v. Union of India, AIR 2007 SC 71.
57
I.R Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2007 SC 861.

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held that if these amendments do not violate basic feature of the Constitution
and reservation policy of the state then it cannot be justified that they are
altering the structure of the constitution therefore they are not beyond the
amending power of the constitution.

VI. WHETHER THE PROTECTION OF THE WHISTLE BLOWERS

PROTECTION ACT 2014 EXTENDS TO MRS. FATIMA GHANSARI?
It is most humbly pleaded before the Honourable Supreme Court of Indica that the
protection of the Whistle Blowers Protection Act 2014 does not extends to Mrs.
Fatima Ghansari because she is not fulfilling the requirements of the Public
Interest Disclosure mentioned under Section 4 of the Act, 2014. According to the
Section 4(4) of the Act, 2014-
“Every disclosure shall be made in writing or by electronic mail….. in accordance
with the provision as may be prescribed….”
In the instant case, Mrs. Fatima Ghansari has not followed any procedure
prescribed under Section 4(4) of the Act, 2014 but informed the speaker about the
same who the competent authority is according Section 3(b) (ii) of the Act.
The Supreme Court explained who Whistle Blower is: A Whistle Blower is a
person who raises a concern about the wrongdoing occurring in an organization or
body of people. Usually this person would be from that same organization the
Whistle Blower may make their allegations internally (to other persons in the
same accused organization) or externally (to regulators, law enforcement
agencies, to media or to group concerned with the issue).58
The Supreme Court further explained that one of the basic requirement of a person
being accepted as a Whistle Blower is that his primary motive for the activity
should be in furtherance of public good. In other words, the activity should be and
has to be undertaken in public interest, exposing illegal activities of a public
organization or authority.59
It was observed that if the conduct of the person does not fall within the high
moral and ethical standards that are required of bonafide whistle blower, then, he

58
Indirect Tax Practitioners Association v. RK Jain, (2010) 8 SCC 281.
59
Manoj Mishra v. Union of India, SLP No. 9126 of 2010 (Supreme Court, 09/04/2013).

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can’t be considered as whistle blower and no protection will be granted under

Section 11 of the said act.60
The Madhya Pradesh High Court held that if the action taken by the person is not
under the said act, and not in public good but with lack of bonafide belief, the
person will not be entitled to seek protection under Section 11 of the act and not to
be called as whistle blower.61

60
Mr Avinash Kumar v. GNCTD, Case No. 315 of 2015 (Central Information Commission, 06/08/2015).
61
Kirti Kumar Gupta v. State of MP, Writ No. 452 of 2016 (Madhya Pradesh High Court, 24/01/2017).

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PRAYER

Wherefore, in the light of legal precedents, principles cited, provisions of the Constitution
and argument advanced, it is most humbly prayed and implored before the Honorable
Supreme Court, that it may graciously be pleased to adjudge and declare-

❖ THE LAW PROVIDING FOR 33% RESERVATION TO THE WOMEN IN THE

PARLIAMENT AND THE AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE 19(2) SHOULD BE
HELD CONSTITUTIONAL.
❖ THE PROTECTION OF WHISTLE BLOWERS PROTECTIONS ACT, 2014
SHOULD NOT EXTEND TO MRS. FATIMA GHANSARI.

And pass any other order(s) as it deems fit in the interest of equity, justice and good
conscience.

ALL OF WHICH IS MOST HUMBLE AND RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.

For this act of kindness, the Respondent faction shall be duty bound forever.

SD/-

(COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENTS)

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