J. Perform. Constr. Facil. 1992.6:211-231

INVESTIGATION O F L ' A M B I A N C E PLAZA
BUILDING COLLAPSE
By Daniel A. Cuoco, 1 Fellow, ASCE, David B. Peraza, 2 Associate Member,
ASCE, and Thomas Z. Scarangello 3
ABSTRACT: The writers' firm, Thornton-Tomasetti Engineers (T-T), was retained

Downloaded from ascelibrary.org by New York University on 05/12/15. Copyright ASCE. For personal use only; all rights reserved.
by the city of Bridgeport within hours of the collapse of L'Ambiance Plaza to

investigate its cause. As the city's consultant, T-T had unrestricted access to project
documentation, to witness statements, to the collapse site, and to the collapse
debris. T-T personnel were present around the clock at the collapse site during the
rescue operation documenting and preserving perishable evidence. This paper is a
summary of a detailed report. The paper includes background information, field
observations, the results of laboratory tests and computational analyses, and find-
ings concerning the most probable cause of the collapse. Recommendations for
reducing the risk of a similar lift-slab failure in the future are also provided. New
physical evidence is presented that may affect the findings of previous investigations.
The most probable cause of the collapse was found to be instability of the steel
wedges at a particular column. This caused a loss of support to the slabs at that
column, which triggered the progressive collapse. This mechanism has not been
identified by previously published investigations.
INTRODUCTION
At approximately 1:30 p.m. on April 23, 1987, the structural frame and
slabs of what was to be a 16-story building in Bridgeport, Conn., collapsed
during construction. Despite the round-the-clock efforts of thousands of work-
ers who took part in the rescue operation during the next eight days, the
collapse of L'Ambiance Plaza claimed the lives of 28 construction workers.
On the day of the collapse, the city of Bridgeport retained Thornton-
Tomasetti Engineers (T-T) to investigate its cause. Representatives of T-T
arrived on the site on the same evening and were continuously present during
the entire rescue operation. During this period, T-T investigators docu-
mented the collapse debris and attempted to preserve as much perishable
evidence as possible. Fig. 1 shows the site several days after the collapse.
After completion of the rescue operation, T-T personnel continued their
documentation of the debris at the collapse site and at the city landfill,
where much of the debris had been taken. To assist in its investigation,
T-T retained the firm of Lucius Pitkin, Inc. (LPI), as its metallurgical con-
sultant, and the firm of Langan Engineering Associates, Inc., as its geo-
technical consultant.
As consultant to the city of Bridgeport, T-T had complete access to all
project documentation and transcripts of witness statements. In addition,
'Prin., Thornton-Tomasetti Engineers, 641 Avenue of the Americas, New York,

NY 10011.
2
Assoc., Thornton-Tomasetti Engineers, 641, Avenue of the Americas, New York,
NY.
3
Sr. A s s o c , Thornton-Tomasetti Engineers, 641 Avenue of the Americas, New
York, NY.
Note. Discussion open until April 1, 1993. To extend the closing date one month,
a written request must be filed with the A S C E Manager of Journals. The manuscript
for this paper was submitted for review and possible publication on March 24, 1992.
This paper is part of the Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities, Vol. 6, N o .
4, November, 1992. © A S C E , ISSN 0887-3828/92/0004-0211/$1.00 + $.15 per page.
Paper No. 3676.
211
J. Perform. Constr. Facil. 1992.6:211-231.

i'-ii niri'-j
FIG. 1. View of Site Shortly after Collapse
T-T personnel had unrestricted access to the collapse site and the landfill
site.
Because the collapse occurred during construction, the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA) conducted an investigation. OSHA
requested the participation of the National Bureau of Standards (NBS),
now known as the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
NBS issued its report in September of 1987, six months after the collapse
(Culver et al. 1987; Scribner and Culver 1988). Based on the technical
findings contained in this report, OSHA charged several contractors with
212

safety violations and levied fines. OSHA also instituted new safety measures
to be incorporated into future lift-slab projects.
By October of 1987, T-T had completed its field work and performed
sufficient computational analyses to have developed a strong hypothesis for
the cause of the collapse. T-T had also developed a testing program to
further investigate this hypothesis and other possible causes. However, due
to financial constraints, the city of Bridgeport was not able to authorize the
performance of these tests.

A year and a half after the collapse, OSHA's proposed fines and all
L'Ambiance Plaza-related lawsuits were settled by a joint federal and state
judicial mediation panel (Felsen 1989). This unusually rapid settlement re-
sulted in virtually all investigations being brought to a halt.
This paper presents in summary form T-T's conclusion as to the most
probable cause of the collapse. This most probable cause has not been
identified or addressed by previous published investigations, and it deserves
further study. It is likely that further study will indicate the need to adopt
additional safety measures for the lift-slab industry that will further reduce
the risk of a similar catastrophic failure in the future. The complete details
of the T-T investigation are contained in a report available from T-T (Cuoco
et al. 1992).
PROJECT BACKGROUND
Description of Building
L'Ambiance Plaza was essentially a design/build project being built using
the lift-slab method of construction. The method consists of casting the
concrete slabs atop one another at ground level, and then lifting the slabs
into their final positions by means of hydraulic jacks mounted on top of the
columns. The Youtz-Slick method of lift-slab construction was patented in
1948, and to date over 45,000,000 sq ft have been constructed worldwide
using the technique. Typical lift-slab buildings are two to five stories in
height, although taller structures have been built. Lift-slab buildings his-
torically have had a good safety record.
As shown on the design drawings, L'Ambiance Plaza was to consist of
two residential towers and an abutting parking structure. The two towers,
which are referred to as the east and west buildings in this paper, contain
13 levels of apartments over three levels of parking. The uppermost floor
level is designated the 12 floor.
The east and west buildings, each of which measures approximately 63
ft by 112 ft in plan, are separated by a distance of about 4 ft. In the final
construction, the two buildings would have been joined by cast-in-place
concrete pour strips across this space at every floor level. The floors of the
east and west buildings typically consist of posttensioned concrete flat slabs
supported on steel columns.
The lifting subcontractor prepared shop drawings showing the lifting se-
quence, column sizes, weld block sizes and locations, wedge sizes, and the
shearhead details and locations.
Fig. 2(a) illustrates a typical shearhead used at L'Ambiance Plaza. Special
shearheads, such as in Fig. 2(b), were provided at the four central columns
of each building. Special shearheads differ from typical shearheads in various
respects, such as the lack of cutouts in the lifting angles and the addition
of header bars adjacent to the header channels. The shearheads are placed
around the columns and are cast into the slabs. They serve the dual purposes
213

•CUT OUT
-GUIDE BARS
—t- OF SHEARHEAD
ARM CHANNEL
COLUMN BAR
GUIDE BARS
t OF SHEARHEAD
ARM CHANNEL
FIG. 2. Plan Views: (a) Typical Shearhead; (b) Special Shearhead Used on Project
of providing an attachment for the lifting jacks and supporting the slabs on
the columns.
Fig. 3 shows a typical slab-to-column connection. Weld blocks are shop-
welded to the column flanges at floor levels and also at intermediate points.
Wedges are field-placed on the weld blocks to support the slabs in their
temporary and permanent positions. Permanent attachment of a floor slab
to a column is made by welding the shearhead and wedges to the column,
and then concreting the shearhead pockets.
The shop drawings include a schedule for the steel wedges used to attach
the slabs to the columns. The schedule indicates the width of the wedge to
be used at each location. The wedges are furnished in various heights.
Lifting Process
Prior to beginning the lifting operation, the stage I columns are attached
to the footings and all of the slabs are cast atop one another and postten-
sioned.
214

HEADER > •
CHANNEL ' . j
SLAB
WEDGE
WELD BLOCK
COLUMN
SEAL BLOCK
GUIDE BAR
WEDGE
WEDGE ON FAR FLANGE
WELD BLOCK
COLUMN FLANGE
FIG. 3. Typical Slab-to-Column Connection in Elevation: (a) Side View; (b) Front
view
Hydraulic jacks are then mounted on top of each column. Two lifting
rods hang from each jack. The lifting rods are fitted with round nuts at their
lower ends that slip under the shearhead's lifting angles. The operation of
the jacks is normally coordinated by a central console located on the roof
slab. The jacks can also be manually operated to adjust the elevation of the
slab at individual locations.
Slabs are typically lifted in packages of two or three to the highest available
weld block. A wedging crew then travels from column to column installing
wedges underneath the slab at each column. The wedging crew signals the
jack operator, who is on the roof, to slightly raise or lower the slab at that
location. Once the slab is at the proper elevation, wedges are selected and
inserted. The wedging crew then signals the jack operator to release the
jack load at that location, thereby transferring the slab load to the wedges.
The wedges are then tack welded into place. The tack welds are applied
215

after the load is transferred, so that the tack welds do not break when the
wedge "seats" itself. The function of the tack welds is to prevent the wedges
from falling out when the slab is lifted again.
Once a lifting stage has been completed, the next stage of columns is
welded on and the lifting process continues until all slabs have reached their
final elevations.
STATUS OF CONSTRUCTION AT TIME OF COLLAPSE
The general status of construction of the east and west buildings is shown
in Fig. 4. Following is a brief description of the status of key components
and relevant activities.
On the morning of the collapse, slab package 9/10/11 of the west building
was lifted to its temporary position at floor level 6. The 12/roof package
was already parked on wedges at the highest stage IV location. The 9/10/
11 package was immediately below the 12/roof package, separated by a
distance of about 8 in. Workmen, with the aid of a rolling scaffold, installed
wedges under the 9/10/11 package at certain columns before leaving for
lunch.
After lunch, workmen plumbed the west building using a hydraulic jack
rated at 12 tons. The jack was placed in the horizontal position between
the east building and the west building so as to exert a spreading force
between the tops of the two buildings.
After having plumbed the building, workers continued installing wedges
under the 9/10/11 slab package of the west building and making adjustments
to the slab elevation. This package was supported on lifting rods at certain
columns and on wedges at other locations.
Fig. 5 shows the path that had been taken by the wedging crew and their
location at the time of the collapse. The last column to have its wedges tack
welded was column 4.8E. Wedges had also been inserted, though not yet
tack welded, at column 3.8E. Adjustments to the slab elevation had been
made at column 3.8E moments before the collapse.
The location of the wedging crew under the 9/10/11 slab package at the
time of the collapse, as shown in Fig, 5, differs from that reported by others
(Culver et al. 1987). This discrepancy is due mainly to the locating by T-T
personnel of an additional column top segment with tack welds.
Concrete for the shear wall adjacent to the elevator in the west building
was being placed between ground level and level 1. Certain shear walls had
been placed earlier in the day between levels 1 and 2. Typical shear walls
were lagging behind the lifting by about five levels, contrary to the design
drawings, which permitted a maximum lag of three levels.
The only physical attachments between the east and west buildings at the
time of collapse were hardened pour strips on the lowest three levels and
the horizontal hydraulic jack, which was under load, at the top of the
buildings.
EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS
Numerous interviews of witnesses and other persons involved in the pro-

ject were conducted by state and local officials. Witnesses provided valuable
information a^bout the general construction process, the status of construc-
tion at the time of collapse, the collapse itself, and other items.
All witnesses agree that the collapse was extremely rapid. Estimates of
the elapsed time from beginning to end range from 2 sec to 10 sec.
216

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H SLABS SUPPORTED BY LIFTING RODS
\ / l T PATH OF WEDGING CREW
FIG. 5. Plan View of West Building
Most witnesses state that the first event that drew their attention was a
single loud bang. The noise was variously described as similar to a crack of
thunder, a loud crash, the sound of steel snapping under pressure, a leaf
spring on a truck snapping, and a rifle shot magnified.
This bang appeared to have come from the west building, and most
witnesses state that they saw or heard the slabs in the west building collapse
first. Most witnesses with good vantage points believe that the center of the
west building collapsed first.
An important account of what transpired immediately before the collapse
is provided by an ironworker who was in the process of installing wedges
in the west building. This surviving member of the wedging crew states that
at the time of the collapse he and his crew were somewhere near the center
of the west building. He and his partner, both of whom were on top of a
scaffold, had just inserted both wedges. He turned his head to shield his
eyes while his partner began to tack weld the wedges, at which point he
heard the initial bang. The sound appeared to come from immediately above
him or from within 25 ft west of him. He then heard a crumbling sound,
observed a lot of dust, and noticed that the ceiling directly over his head
was cracking like ice breaking. The slabs then came down around him,
driving him inside the cage of the rolling scaffold, which somewhat protected
him during the fall.
FIELD INVESTIGATION
T-T and its metallurgical consultant, LPI, performed extensive field work
to document the physical evidence of the collapse. During the first week,
particular attention was given to preserving perishable evidence at the col-
lapse site. This included protecting fracture surfaces; recording the postcol-
lapse configuration; and identifying and labeling column segments, slabs,
and other components. After this initial period, T-T undertook a systematic
218

program to document the debris, most of which had been taken to the city
landfill. A key feature of this program was the comprehensive effort to
identify the original location of every column segment.
Collapse Configuration
Both the east and west buildings collapsed entirely. For the most part,
each building collapsed within its own footprint, toward its center, as evi-
denced by the location of the debris and the inward bending of the columns.
Most of the columns were severely deformed or fractured in several loca-
tions. Stacks of shearheads, which had been stripped from the slabs, were
found at various heights along the columns.
The postcollapse locations of shearheads along the columns gives an in-
dication of which areas were the most likely to have collapsed first. Upon
first loss of support at a column, the shearheads and slabs at that location
would tend to slide down the column virtually unimpeded and with great
force, impacting the slabs below in a "snowballing" effect. Adjacent columns
would be drawn in toward the origin of the collapse, thereby impeding the
fall of their shearheads. In the west building, the shearheads on column 3E
slid down the furthest, indicating that they were probably the first to lose
support.
This is consistent with the postcollapse configuration of column 3E, which
was bent smoothly about its weak axis into a distinctive arch shape lying in
a vertical plane. The smooth shape of column 3E is an indication that it
was not subjected to significant lateral loads during the collapse.
Reconstruction of Column Segments

The urgency of the rescue operation required that debris from the collapse
be removed as quickly as possible. Columns had to be cut so that they could
be hoisted out of the rubble and, in many instances, had to be cut again
for transport to the landfill. This produced over 500 column segments scat-
tered over the landfill and collapse site.
During the rescue operation, T-T investigators at the collapse site made
a concerted effort to label all columns with as much information as was
known about them as they were removed from the rubble or cut into smaller
segments. This effort proved to be invaluable in later identifying key column
segments and the collapse mechanism.
Upon completion of the rescue operation, T-T investigators began a sys-
tematic effort to reconstruct on paper the original position of each column
segment within the building. This process involved: (1) Assigning a unique
serial number to each column segment; (2) documenting significant features
and markings on each column segment; and (3) determining the original
location of the column segments using the documented information.
The end result of this process was that, in terms of linear footage, 84%
of the column segments were positively identified and 4% were tentatively
identified. Fig. 6 is a column segment schedule for grid line E. Column
segment schedules for the remainder of the building are contained in the
T-T report (Cuoco et al. 1992).
Detailed Observations of Key Column Segments

A total of three column segments were identified by T-T's investigation
and by NBS's investigation (Culver et al. 1987) as possible initiation points
of the collapse: 3E, 3.8E, and 4.8E. The T-T investigation positively iden-
219

[XXX] SEGMENT SERIAL NUMBER ISI TU1 REMAINED ATTACHED TO FOUNDATION
AT COLLAPSE SITE
fxxjij TENTATIVE SEGMENT LOCATION
I UBS X| SEGMENT REMOVED BY NBS
! ! SEGMENT I SI NOT FOUND
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STAGE LEVEL 1-E 2-E 3-E 3.8-E 4.8-E 6-E.5
FIG. 6. Column Segment Schedule along E Line
tified and reconstructed on paper all column segments belonging to these

key columns.
The top segment of column 3E has several notable features. The upper-
most weld blocks, at which the 12/roof package was parked, exhibited ec-
centric tack welds and pronounced deformation of the top edge of the west
weld block. The web of column 3E has indentations on both sides from the
impact of lifting nuts, indicating that both lifting nuts slipped out from the
lifting angle and struck the column. However, the depth of the nut impres-
sions on the underside of the level 9 shearhead indicate that the nuts were
not highly loaded when they slid out.
The top edge of the upper weld blocks of the top of column 4.8E are not
damaged, indicating that the wedges supporting the 12/roof package did not
220

roll out under load. This column had tack welds at the 9/10/11 package,
indicating that the wedge installation at this column had been completed
prior to the collapse. This column did not have nut indentations on either
side of the web, which indicates that the lifting nuts did not strike the column.
Others (Culver et al. 1987) have reported the opposite with regard to the
presence of tack welds and nut indentations. This discrepancy is due to
different identifications of the top segment of column 4.8E.
The top edges of upper weld blocks of the top of column 3.8E are not
damaged. The nut indentations on both sides of the web and the deep
impressions on the underside of the level 9 shearhead indicate that the lifting
nuts were heavily loaded when they slid out from under the lifting angles.
As-Installed Wedge Widths

At the 21 locations, T-T measured the widths of the wedges that had
been installed and that remained attached to the column. Comparison of
the as-installed widths against the wedge widths called for on the lifting
shop drawings indicates that it was not uncommon for the wedging crews
to install wedges whose width deviated from the drawings. In fact, in many
instances, different size wedges were used on either side of the same shear-
head. It appears that wedging crews have the latitude to select the width
of each wedge on a case-by-case basis. For example, if a wedge installer
sees that a shearhead is shifted relative to the column, he or she may install
a wider wedge on one side in a misguided attempt to improve the bearing
condition on that side. It is misguided because although a wider wedge
appears to improve the bearing of the shearhead on the wedge, in reality
it does not improve the stability of the wedge. This is further discussed in
the section headed "Wedge Stability."
LABORATORY TESTS
T-T's full testing program could not be carried out due to financial con-
straints. However, a limited amount of concrete testing was performed.
Petrographic and air content analyses were performed on four concrete
samples by Twin City Testing Corporation, of St. Paul, Minn. For these
samples, the general overall concrete quality was found to be good. The
paste hardness was medium to hard and the paste-aggregate bond was con-
sidered good. The samples exhibited a negligible depth of carbonation,
indicating low porosity. No evidence of ice crystals was found in any of the
samples.
In addition to the described analyses, 34 concrete cores were tested in
compression by LPI. The concrete strength was found to be good in all
cases.
COMPUTATIONAL ANALYSES
Introduction
Various computational analyses of the buildings were performed to assist
in determining the most probable cause of the collapse. These included: (1)
Planar buckling analyses of column groups; (2) a three-dimensional analysis
of the buildings when subjected to lateral forces acting at the time of the
collapse; (3) computation of shearhead gaps; (4) a parametric study of the
factors that affect wedge stability; and (5) an analysis of the stresses in the
slab and in the shearhead at column 3E when supported on a single wedge.
Of particular interest are the results obtained from items 3, 4, and 5.
221

Shearhead Gaps
To allow clearance between the shearhead and the weld blocks during
the lifting operation, it is necessary that the distance between the shearhead
headers be larger than the out-to-out distance between the weld blocks. For
this discussion, the term "gap" is defined as the distance from the outside
face of the weld block to the inside face of the header, or header bar, as
illustrated in Fig. 3.
The larger this gap, the more difficult it is for the wedge to remain stable
and to transfer loads from the shearhead to the column. Also, the larger
this gap, the smaller the amount of bearing area provided to the shearhead.
The size of the gap at any given location is a function of four factors: (1)
The depth of the column; (2) the thickness of the weld block; (3) the clear
distance between the shearhead's headers; and (4) the eccentricity of the
shearhead relative to the column. The magnitude of the gap anticipated by
the lifting subcontractor, as indicated by a detail on the shop drawings, is
Viin. ± .
Based on the lifting-shop drawings, T-T calculated the actual shearhead
gaps at all erected columns in the east and west buildings for the case in
which the shearhead is perfectly centered on the column. Fig. 7 is a histogram
showing the frequency of gap sizes for this condition. Most of the columns
have gaps ranging from 0.233 in. to 0.327 in. The exceptions are columns
3E and 3.8E, which have gaps of 0.628 in. For this condition, only the
header bars and the guidebars bear on the wedge—the header channels do
not. Further assuming that the wedges are installed so as to be perfectly
centered over the weld blocks, the bearing area on each side of the shearhead
is about 4.4 sq in. This represents the most favorable condition possible at
the upper levels of columns 3E and 3.8E.
This already abnormal condition is further aggravated by the fact that
the shearheads used on columns 3E and 3.8E do not have a feature that
limits their eccentricity with respect to the columns, as do typical shearheads.
Referring to Fig. 2(a), typical shearheads had cutouts in the lifting angles
FREQUENCY
100
80
60
COLUMNS 3E AND 3.8E
STAGE I
40
_ COLUMNS 3E AND 3.8E

STAGE II THROUGH IV
20
0 1 2 3 4 S 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
GAP (Sixteenths of an Inch)
FIG. 7. Histogram of Shearhead Gaps
222

that restricted the shearhead from shifting relative to the column. The special
shearheads used on columns 3E and 3.8E, as shown in Fig. 2(b), did not
have this feature.
When one of these shearheads is shifted all the way to one side, the gap
increases to about 1V2 in. and the bearing area reduces to less than 0.5 sq
in. on one side. This is assuming that the wedges are perfectly centered. In
this condition, one side of the shearhead bears only on the guidebars—
bearing on the header member proper has been lost.

At column 3E, this condition is even further aggravated by the fact that
the wedges supporting the 12/roof package were installed eccentrically, as
evidenced by the location of the tack welds. Fig. 8 shows the shearhead in
the shifted position, with the wedges in their actual locations. Note that one
side of the shearhead is supported only on a small portion of a single
UIDE BAR
10 BEARING
WEDGE
BEARING AREA
TACK WELD
ROOF SLAB
LEVEL 12
SLAB
WEDGE
WELD BLOCK
FIG. 8. Shearhead in Shifted Position, Column 3E at 12/Roof Slab Package: (a)

View A-A; (b) Section
223

guidebar. Likewise, the wedge is loaded on only one corner, resulting in a
highly unstable condition.
The question arises, are the magnitudes of these shearhead gaps abnormal
in comparison with previous lift-slab buildings? The writers had the oppor-
tunity to examine drawings for several other lift-slab buildings. For the
centered condition, gaps of lA in. to % in. are by far the most frequent,
although larger gaps do occur. However, for the shifted condition, the gaps
present on columns 3E and 3. 8E of L'Ambiance Plaza are significantly larger

than the gaps on these other buildings.
Wedge Stability
Until the point in time during the construction process that a wedge
becomes fully welded into place, the wedge is held in place solely by the
horizontal frictional force that can be developed at the interface of the
shearhead and the wedge. During this period there is no mechanical con-
nection between the slab(s) and the supporting column. Fig. 9 illustrates
the basic principles of equilibrium for a wedge.
Several parametric three-dimensional computer analyses were performed
to study the effect on the required frictional forces caused by: (1) The wedge
height; (2) the eccentricity of the applied downward loading; and (3) the
longitudinal eccentricity of the wedge relative to the supporting weld block.
It was found that for conditions similar to that experienced by a typical
wedge, the required friction coefficient was attainable, assuming dry surface
conditions. However, for conditions similar to that experienced by a wedge
at column 3E or 3.8E, the required friction coefficient increased dramati-
cally, to the point that the wedges would probably begin to roll. This effect
is due to the large shearhead gaps at these locations, which results in a
highly eccentric loading. Also, as expected, the height of the wedge signif-
icantly affected the wedge's initial stability. Obviously, the presence of
hydraulic fluid on a wedge, which was widely reported, further decreases
the initial stability of the wedge.
No attempt was made to model equilibrium conditions after the initial
rolling of a wedge. It is apparent from the geometry that even if a wedge
is initially unstable, after rotating slightly the wedge may jam and be pre-
vented from rolling any farther. This "seating" of the wedge is a complex
nonlinear mechanism that is best approached by a testing program. How-
ever, several simple observations can be made.
Assuming that the shearhead does not translate horizontally relative to
the column, a wedge could roll out completely if its top edge cleared the
underside of the shearhead. Assuming that no deformations occur, this
condition is nearly satisfied at columns 3E and 3.8E when the shearhead is
in the shifted position. Deformation of the wedge, the shearhead, or the
top edge of a weld block could provide sufficient clearance to allow a wedge
to roll out completely.
If the shearhead did translate relative to the column in a direction per-
pendicular to the plane of the column flange, then the shearhead could have
"dragged" a wedge along, causing it to rotate and fall out. In this case,
since the wedge rolls with the shearhead, it does not have the opportunity
to jam. Such translation could be caused by an external lateral force applied
to either the column or the shearhead.
The stability of a wedge can also be affected by adjustments in the slab
elevation at neighboring columns.
224

FOR EQUILIBRIUM:
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COEFFICIENT OF
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, LOAD FROM SLAB
WEDGE
FRICTION FOiRCE
HEIGHT
OF
WEDGE PIVOT POINT
WELD BLOCK
FIG. 9. General Wedge Equilibrium Free-Body Diagram
It is of interest to note that the width of the wedge has no effect on either
the initial stability of the wedge or on its ability to jam against the shearhead.
Support on Single Wedge

Computer analyses were performed to determine the stresses on the slab
and on the shearhead due to the loss of a wedge. The computer model is
composed of over 15,000 finite elements, representing the slab, and addi-
tional beam elements representing the shearhead.
The computer model represents the slab and shearhead surrounding col-
umn 3E at the 12/roof slab package. The boundaries of the model correspond
approximately to the midspan center lines of the surrounding bays. The slab
penetration immediately adjacent to column 3E was included in the model.
Applied loads included the weight of two slabs, a construction live load,
and prestressing loads due to the curvature of the tendons.
225

Three support cases at the shearheads were studied: (1) Support at four
points, which represents the shearhead being supported on both wedges;
(2) support at two points, which represents support on only one wedge; and
(3) support at one point, which represents support on one wedge by a single
guide bar.
Table 1 summarizes the results, which indicate that under normal support
conditions the shearhead components of the level 12 slab at column 3E were
not overstressed. However, when supported on one wedge, large over-

stresses in bending and shear develop, particularly for the arm channel.
When supported on a single point, the bending stresses reach the yield
point. The transverse shear stresses in the slab were small for all conditions.
COMMENT ON OTHER COLLAPSE SCENARIOS
Many possible collapse mechanisms were evaluated by T-T, including

excessive foundation settlement, lateral earth pressure on the basement
walls, buckling instability of a column group, flexural column failure due
to lateral loads, posttensioning failure, and loss of support at a column.
Loss of support at a column includes, more specifically, failure of a lifting
rod, weld block failure, punching shear, slipping out of a lifting nut, and
rolling out of a wedge.
Certain mechanisms are not likely since they do not agree with the key
observations of reliable eyewitnesses, others can be eliminated based on
structural analysis, and others are improbable because they do not explain
key features of the debris or collapse configuration. Several key scenarios
are briefly discussed in this section.
Posttensioning Failure
Others (Poston et al. 1991) have shown that there were serious deficiencies
in the posttensioning for the west building. One example is the reverse
drape of the strands in the area adjacent to the elevator. There is no doubt
that these deficiencies would allow the collapse to progress more rapidly
than it would have otherwise. However, due to the nature of these defi-
ciencies, it is unlikely that they could have initiated such a spontaneous and
TABLE 1. Shearhead Stresses

Bending Shear
Number of
Support case supports Stress (ksi) Factor3 Stress (ksi) Factor3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(a) Arm Channel (C5 x 6.7)
1 Four 12.3 0.51 10.6 0.76
2 Two 30.4 1.27 26.7 1.91
3 One 36.0 1.50 29.3 2.09
(b) Header Member (C5 x 9 Plus 1/2 in. x 5 in. Bar)
1 Four 11.7 0.49 2.42 0.17
2 Two 21.5 0.90 5.8 0.41
3 One 32.0 1.33 7.2 0.51
"Ratio of actual stress over allowable stress. Allowable stresses for bending and shear
were taken as 24 ksi and 14 ksi, respectively. A value larger than unity indicates an
overstress.
226

total collapse without prior warning. There is no reliable eyewitness testi-
mony that these deficiencies, which had been present since the time the
slabs were cast, had manifested themselves earlier in the project, as would
be expected.
Failure of Lifting Rod

In order for a lifting rod to fail and thereby initiate the collapse, the lifting
rod would have to be loaded. Once the wedges are inserted at a column, the
normal procedure is to immediately transfer the load from the lifting rods to
the wedges at that column. Assuming that this normal procedure was followed,
this eliminates all columns where wedges had been installed, as shown in Fig.
5, as possible locations for the failure of a lifting rod.
In addition, if a lifting rod were to fail, it could not laterally impact the
web of the column. Therefore, any column with nut impact indentations on
both sides of the web can also be eliminated from consideration as a possible
location of lifting rod failure.
The remaining possible columns are all perimeter columns and, as a result,
are subjected to relatively small loads. Unless a rod at one of these lightly
loaded columns contained a gross defect that had managed to survive the
previous lifting operations, it is highly unlikely that a lifting rod failure
triggered the collapse.
Slipping Out of Lifting Nut

The possibility of a lifting nut slipping out due to rotation of a lifting
angle has been identified as the most probable cause of the collapse by
others (Culver et al. 1987). Improper installation of the lifting nuts plays
an important role in this scenario.
In this scenario, the collapse probably initiated at column 4.8E. However,
contrary to the NBS report (Culver et al. 1987), the upper portion of column
4.8E does not have any nut indentations in the web. This indicates that the
lifting nuts did not strike the column web at this location, or at least did
not strike it with any significant amount of force.
At the alternative column proposed for the origin of the collapse, column
3.8E, the 9/10/11 package was already supported on wedges. This is based
on the discovery of an additional column top segment by T-T personnel and
on the testimony of the surviving ironworker who was installing the wedges.
Since the wedges were in place at column 3.8E, and were most probably
supporting the weight of the slab, the lifting nuts were not loaded and
therefore could not have initiated the collapse.
This scenario does not address why similar failures did not occur earlier
in the project or on other lift-slab projects. Presumably, the improper in-
stallation of lifting nuts was not uncommon, and shearheads with the same
lifting angle design have been used many times in the past.
COLLAPSE SCENARIO
The collapse scenario for wedges rolling out is illustrated in Fig. 10. One
of the wedges supporting the 12/roof package at column 3E rolled out due
to instability. This left the shearhead supported on a single wedge, which
severely overstressed the shearhead. Application of the lateral load from
the horizontal hydraulic jack shortly before the collapse caused the re-
maining highly loaded wedge to roll slightly, causing a pronounced rounding
of the top edge of the west weld block and bending outward of the west
227

< • < •
c
<• • >
r*
WEDGE
UNSTABLE
WELD BLOCK- WEDGE
ROLL-OUT
COLUMN
f«)
LATERAL
FORCE
< •
e ^
SEVERELY <> <>

OVERSTRESSED^
SHEARHEAD
WEDGE J&
m
FIG. 10. Elevations Showing Wedge Roll-Out Mechanism
header member of the shearhead. Local jockeying of the slab elevation may
have triggered this remaining wedge to roll out completely. With both wedges
out, the 12/roof package dropped 8 in. to the top of the 9/10/11 slab package,
which held it momentarily. The lifting nuts supporting the 9/10/11 package,
and now also the 12/roof package, slipped out and impacted the web of
column 3E, causing the loud initial bang reported by most of the witnesses.
As the upper slabs and shearheads started sliding down column 3E, the
roof-level shearhead caught on a weld block. The other shearheads and
slabs on column 3E traveled straight down the column, impacting on the
228

levels below, and ripping shearheads and slabs from the column. The sur-
rounding columns were pulled inward by the catenary action of the post-
tensioning strands. Lifting nuts on adjacent columns slipped out and tack-
welded wedges on adjacent columns became dislodged. Collapse of the east
building could have been triggered by forces transmitted through the pour
strips or through the horizontal jack, or by the impact of debris from the
collapsing west building.
Column 3E, which was now freestanding, then fell of its own weight over
the debris into an arch shape.
CONCLUSIONS
The most probable cause of the collapse is loss of support to the 12/roof
slab package at column 3E due to instability of the wedges at that location.
The principal factors that permitted instability of the wedges were improper
dimensional sizing of the shearhead and lack of a feature to restrict lateral
movement of the shearhead. This is supported by the following.
Witnesses generally state that the collapse initiated in the upper levels of
the west building. More specifically, the surviving ironworker, who was at
column 3.8E, says that the initial loud bang came from either directly above
him or 25 feet to the west, which corresponds to column 3E. The initial
loud bang was probably due to a lifting nut impacting the web of column
3E after the collapse had already initiated.
The postcollapse locations of the shearheads in the west building, and
other physical evidence, indicate that the collapse originated in the vicinity
of column 3E. The unique postcollapse configuration of column 3E, which
was referred to as the "rainbow column" in the media, is consistent with
the collapse initiating at this column.
Computational analyses indicate that even if the shearheads at column
3E were perfectly centered, the shearhead gaps at this location were ab-
normally large compared to other columns on the project. This increased
the eccentricity of the loads on the wedges, tending to make them unstable.
The absence of a feature on the shearheads of column 3E to restrict
lateral movement of the shearhead relative to the column made it possible
for this shearhead to shift to one side an abnormal amount, further increasing
the shearhead gaps. This results in minimum bearing on one of the wedges
and it also further increases the eccentricity of the load applied to the wedge.
The lagging of shearwall construction behind the lifting operation made
it likely for columns to be significantly out-of-plumb, thus causing the shear-
heads to be eccentric to the columns.
The wedges for the 12/roof slab package at column 3E were installed
eccentrically. In combination with the shifted shearhead condition, the sup-
port provided to the shearhead would have been minimal on one side and
could have resulted in a wedge being loaded on only one corner.
The presence of hydraulic fluid on the wedges or shearheads would con-
tribute to instability of the wedges.
The presence of a large opening in the slab immediately adjacent to
column 3E introduces higher stresses in the slab and the shearhead than
would otherwise be present.
The application of a horizontal load to the top of the building about an
hour before the collapse would tend to disturb the marginal stability of a
wedge at column 3E.
The jockeying of the slab elevations in the vicinity of column 3E at the
229

moment of the collapse would further tend to disturb the stability of a wedge,
possibly triggering the collapse.
Lift-slab buildings have historically had a good safety record in compar-
ison with other methods of building construction. However, as a result of
the collapse of L'Ambiance Plaza, many design professionals, contractors,
building officials, and the public have lost confidence in the method. To
reduce the risk of a similar failure in the future we recommend the following.
A task committee should be formed to develop standards for lift-slab

construction. The committee should be composed of members representing
a broad cross section of the engineering community.
A testing program should be conducted to evaluate the conditions under
which unwelded wedges can safely support the intended loads. The tests
should address the effect of shearhead gaps, wedge sizes, slab stiffness,
wedge eccentricity, the application of lateral loads, and friction coefficients
of the contact surfaces.
Based on the results of the testing program, criteria should be established
with regard to shearhead gaps, wedge sizes, and wedge positioning. These
criteria should address the possibility that shearheads are shifted to the most
unfavorable position allowed by the geometry and the possibility that the
contact surfaces are lubricated.
The lifting drawings should clearly demonstrate that the foregoing criteria
are satisfied at all stages of the lifting.
Inspection of wedge installations should be conducted by an independent
party after every lift to ensure that the wedges are properly installed.
Plumbing of lift-slab buildings is a sensitive operation that should be
carefully planned and executed. The plan should define the means and
methods to be used, as well as maximum displacements and forces to be
imposed. The process should be monitored by an independent party.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Thornton-Tomasetti would like to gratefully acknowledge the cooperation

and assistance provided by former mayor Thomas W. Bucci of the city of
Bridgeport, the Office of the City Attorney, the Bridgeport Police De-
partment, the Connecticut State Police, and the firms of Paul C. Higgins,
Inc., and Robinson & Cole.
APPENDIX I. CONVERSION TO SI UNITS
To convert To Multiply by
lbm kg 0.4536
lbf N 4.448
ft m 0.3048
kips kN 4.448
ksi kPa 6,895
APPENDIX II. REFERENCES

Culver, C. G., Schribner, C. F., Marshall, R. D., Yokel, F. Y., Gross, J. L.,
Yancey, C. W., andHendrickson, E. M. (1987). "Investigation of the L'Ambiance
Plaza building collapse in Bridgeport, Connecticut." NBSIR 87-3640, National
Bureau of Standards (NBS), Washington, D.C.
Cuoco, D. A., Scarangello, T. Z., and Peraza, D. B. (1992). "Investigation of the
collapse of L'Ambiance Plaza." Thornton-Tomasetti Engineers, New York, N.Y.
230

Felsen, M. D. (1989). "Mediation that worked: Role of OSHA in L'Ambiance Plaza
settlement." / . Perf, Constr. Fac, ASCE, 3(4), 212-217.
Poston, R. W., Feldmann, G. C., and Suarez, M. G. (1991). "Evaluation of L'Ambi-
ance Plaza posttensioned floor slabs." J. Perf. Constr. Fac, ASCE, 5(2), 75-91.
Scribner, C. F., and Culver, C. G. (1988). "Investigation of the collapse of L'Ambi-
ance Plaza." J. Perf. Constr. Fac, ASCE, 2(2), 58-79.
Wonder, D. R. (1988). "What happened at "L'Ambiance Plaza?" Civ. Engrg.,
ASCE, 58(10), 68-71.
231

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INVESTIGATION O F L ' A M B I A N C E PLAZA

ABSTRACT: The writers' firm, Thornton-Tomasetti Engineers (T-T), was retained

by the city of Bridgeport within hours of the collapse of L'Ambiance Plaza to

'Prin., Thornton-Tomasetti Engineers, 641 Avenue of the Americas, New York,

J. Perform. Constr. Facil. 1992.6:211-231.

FIG. 1. View of Site Shortly after Collapse

J. Perform. Constr. Facil. 1992.6:211-231.

performance of these tests.

J. Perform. Constr. Facil. 1992.6:211-231.

J. Perform. Constr. Facil. 1992.6:211-231.

J. Perform. Constr. Facil. 1992.6:211-231.

STATUS OF CONSTRUCTION AT TIME OF COLLAPSE

Numerous interviews of witnesses and other persons involved in the pro-

J. Perform. Constr. Facil. 1992.6:211-231.

a SLABS SUPPORTED ON WEDGES

FIG. 5. Plan View of West Building

J. Perform. Constr. Facil. 1992.6:211-231.

Reconstruction of Column Segments

Detailed Observations of Key Column Segments

J. Perform. Constr. Facil. 1992.6:211-231.

STAGE LEVEL 1-E 2-E 3-E 3.8-E 4.8-E 6-E.5

FIG. 6. Column Segment Schedule along E Line

tified and reconstructed on paper all column segments belonging to these

J. Perform. Constr. Facil. 1992.6:211-231.

As-Installed Wedge Widths

J. Perform. Constr. Facil. 1992.6:211-231.

_ COLUMNS 3E AND 3.8E

J. Perform. Constr. Facil. 1992.6:211-231.

bearing on the header member proper has been lost.

FIG. 8. Shearhead in Shifted Position, Column 3E at 12/Roof Slab Package: (a)

J. Perform. Constr. Facil. 1992.6:211-231.

present on columns 3E and 3. 8E of L'Ambiance Plaza are significantly larger

J. Perform. Constr. Facil. 1992.6:211-231.

WHERE yU, IS THE SUB

, LOAD FROM SLAB

FIG. 9. General Wedge Equilibrium Free-Body Diagram

Support on Single Wedge

J. Perform. Constr. Facil. 1992.6:211-231.

not overstressed. However, when supported on one wedge, large over-

COMMENT ON OTHER COLLAPSE SCENARIOS

Many possible collapse mechanisms were evaluated by T-T, including

TABLE 1. Shearhead Stresses

J. Perform. Constr. Facil. 1992.6:211-231.

Failure of Lifting Rod

Slipping Out of Lifting Nut

J. Perform. Constr. Facil. 1992.6:211-231.

SEVERELY <> <>

J. Perform. Constr. Facil. 1992.6:211-231.

J. Perform. Constr. Facil. 1992.6:211-231.

A task committee should be formed to develop standards for lift-slab

Thornton-Tomasetti would like to gratefully acknowledge the cooperation

APPENDIX I. CONVERSION TO SI UNITS

APPENDIX II. REFERENCES

J. Perform. Constr. Facil. 1992.6:211-231.

J. Perform. Constr. Facil. 1992.6:211-231.

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