NATIONAL FORENSIC SCIENCES UNIVERSITY

SCHOOL OF ENGINEERING AND TECHNOLOGY

M TECH FORENSIC STRUCTURAL ENGINEERING

INVESTIGATION OF L’AMBIANCE PLAZA

BUILDING COLLAPSE IN BRIDGEPORT,
CONNECTICUT

Guided by Presented by
Prof. R J SHAH SREEBHA M S
ROLL NO:13
INTRODUCTION

❏ The L'Ambiance Plaza collapse was one of the worst disasters in

modern Connecticut history.
❏ L'Ambiance Plaza was a 16-story residential project under construction
in Bridgeport, Connecticut at the corner of Washington Avenue and
Coleman Street.
❏ Its partially erect frame completely collapsed on April 23, 1987, killing
28 construction workers.
❏ Failure was possibly due to high concrete stresses on the floor slabs by
the placement process resulting in cracking, ending in a type of punch-
through failure.
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❏ Several observers suggested the collapse was preventable and
highlighted the deficiencies of the lift slab construction technique.
❏ seven completed floors of the building’s structure toppled inward,
crumbling into a pile of debris and dust.
❏ This collapse prompted a major nationwide federal investigation
into lift slab construction as well as a temporary moratorium on
its use in Connecticut.
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❏ The east and west buildings, each of which measures
approximately 63 ft by 112 ft in plan, are separated by a distance
of about 4 ft.
❏ In the final construction, the two buildings would have been
joined by cast-in-place concrete pour strips across this space at
every floor level.
❏ The floors of the east and west buildings typically consist of post
tensioned concrete flat slabs supported on steel columns.

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View of Site Shortly after Collapse
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❏ L'Ambiance Plaza was to be a 13-story building with three levels
of a parking garage located under the building.
❏ At the time of the collapse, erection of the slabs was over half
complete; i.e., three levels of the parking garage and three to six
levels of the towers were in place.
❏ The collapse occurred while a group of three slabs was being
placed in temporary position.
❏ In the collapse, all the floor slabs fell, trapping the workmen
involved in the lifting operation and those on the lower floors
engaged in other phases of the construction.
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DESCRIPTION OF THE STRUCTURE
❏ The structural system consisted of steel columns (W and HP shapes)
and two-way unbonded post-tensioned concrete flat plates with
shearwalls at four perimeter and four interior locations.
❏ The building consisted of two offset rectangular towers, each 112 ft
(34 m) by 62 ft (19 m) in plan.
❏ The story heights were the same throughout the height of the
building except at level C and at ground level.
❏ Each tower of the building was erected independently.
❏ The slabs of the two towers were connected by cast-in-place
reinforced concrete pour strips in the center portion of the building.
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❏ The pour strips were cast after the corresponding lift slabs in the
two towers of the building were secured in their final position.
❏ The floor slabs were 7-in (178 mm) thick two-way unbonded post-
tensioned flat plates. Regular weight concrete was used
throughout.
❏ The tendons in the north-south direction were approximately
uniformly spaced over the length of the slab.
❏ In the east-west direction, the tendons were banded generally
following the column lines.
❏ Due to the presence of the elevator shaft, the tendons along
column line E in the west tower were splayed. 9
❏ It should be noted that the centroids of the banded tendons,
particularly those at the exterior column lines, do not coincide
with the column centerlines.
❏ A note on the tendon layout drawing indicated the stressing end
and dead end were reversed on some of the transverse tendons
(north-south direction).
❏ A nominal amount of -bonded reinforcement was used in the
vicinity of the columns and shearwalls.
❏ The building was supported by spread footings which, in
accordance with the plans, were to rest on the underlying
bedrock.
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CAUSES
❏ The building was being constructed using the lift-slab method;
collapse occurred during construction.
❏ The most probable cause of the collapse was determined to be loss
of support at a lifting jack in the west tower during placement of
an upper level package of three floor slabs.
❏ The loss of support was likely due to excessive deformation of the
lifting angle in a shear head followed by a lifting nut slipping off
the lifting angle of the shear head.

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❏ The postulated failure mechanism was duplicated in laboratory
experiments.
❏ The local failure propagated as loads were redistributed.
❏ The remaining jack rods along column line E supporting the
package of floor slabs slipped off the lifting angles and the slabs
failed in flexure and shear.
❏ These slabs fell causing the lower level slabs to fail.

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LIFT SLAB METHOD
❏ L' Ambiance Plaza was being constructed using the lift-slab
method.
❏ In flat slab construction, floor and roof slabs are cast one on top
of the other at ground level.
❏ The floors are usually tvo-way post-tensioned flat plates of either
regular or lightweight concrete.
❏ After post-tensioning, the slabs are lifted to their final portions by
hydraulic jacks and are connected to the columns.
❏ By casting the slabs at ground level, lift-slab construction can
eliminate 90 percent of the formwork required for cast-in-place
construction and reduces labor requirements.
❏ Cost savings and speed of construction are two primary
advantages claimed for lift-slab construction 17
Lifting Process
❏ Prior to beginning the lifting operation, the columns are attached
to the footings and all of the slabs are cast atop one another and
posttensioned.
❏ Hydraulic jacks are then mounted on top of each column.
❏ Two lifting rods hang from each jack. The lifting rods are fitted
with round nuts at their lower ends that slip under the
shearhead's lifting angles.
❏ The operation of the jacks is normally coordinated by a central
console located on the roof slab.
❏ The jacks can also be manually operated to adjust the elevation of
the slab at individual locations. 18
❏ Slabs are typically lifted in packages of two or three to the highest
available weld block.
❏ A wedging crew then travels from column to column installing
wedges underneath the slab at each column.
❏ The wedging crew signals the jack operator, who is on the roof, to
slightly raise or lower the slab at that location.
❏ Once the slab is at the proper elevation, wedges are selected and
inserted.
❏ The wedging crew then signals the jack operator to release the
jack load at that location, thereby transferring the slab load to the
wedges.
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❏ The wedges are then tack welded into place.
❏ The tack welds are applied after the load is transferred, so that
the tack welds do not break when the wedge "seats" itself.
❏ The function of the tack welds is to prevent the wedges from
falling out when the slab is lifted again.
❏ Once a lifting stage has been completed, the next stage of columns
is welded on and the lifting process continues until all slabs have
reached their final elevations.

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MECHANISMS WHICH MAY HAVE INITIATED THE COLLAPSE

● Lateral instability. ● Foundation failure.

● Individual column ● Failure due to lateral soil
instability. pressure.
● Floor slab failure. ● Loss of support of floor
● Weld failure. slab.

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❏ Several construction operations were in progress on the day of the
collapse. Some of these activities involved portions of the project
unrelated to the two building towers which actually collapsed.
❏ Level A of the parking garage south of the east tower was being cast
and finished. A retaining wall was being backfilled at the northeast
corner of the east tower.
❏ Several structural operations were in progress in both the east and
west towers. Concrete was being placed in shear wall forms between
ground level and level 1 at the south side of both the east and west
towers.
❏ Concrete was also being placed in the shear wall at the elevator shaft
between level C and the ground level. 22
❏ Critical construction procedures being conducted on the 23rd of
April included lifting of the floor slabs and securing these slabs
with wedges in both the east and west towers.
❏ The lifting operation in the east tower had progressed to the end
of stage IV while in the west tower stage IV was about half
complete.
❏ On 23rd of April, the level 5 floor slab of the east tower was raised
to its final position and wedges were installed. These wedges,
having been tack-welded in position as they were placed initially,
were being welded permanently to the columns and shear heads
when the collapse occurred.
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❏ Erection operations were being conducted in the west tower at the
time of the collapse.
❏ The roof and level 12 floor slabs had been lifted to their
temporary positions at the top of the stage IV column sections on
the 21st of April.
❏ The slabs for floor levels 9/10/11 had been raised to their
temporary position in the fourth stage of lifting by April 23rd.
❏ A 12-ton (107 kN) capacity hydraulic jack had been placed
between the slabs at level 11 of the east and west towers
approximately 4 ft (1.2 m) from column line C to adjust laterally
the position of the floors that were being lifted. 24
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❏ Shearwalls on the north side of the east and west towers had been cast
prior to the day of the collapse and had developed same portion of
their design strength.
❏ Shearwalls on the south side of the east and west towers had been cast
between the ground level and level 1 on the day of the collapse and had
not developed significant strength at the time of the collapse.
❏ The undamaged columns in the foreground are for the parking garage
which had not been erected at the time of the collapse.
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Slab to Column Connection
❏ Once the slabs had been placed approximately at the desired
elevation for parking (mechanical attachment to the columns), the
jacks could be valved for local control so that the shearhead and
floor slab ,at each column location could be raised or lowered to
exactly the desired elevation.
❏ The floor slabs were then mechanically attached, either
permanently or temporarily, to the columns.

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❏ Slabs were attached to the columns through the shearheads by blocks
welded to the external faces of the column flanges and by steel wedges
placed between these blocks and the lower face of the shearheads.
❏ The seal block was present only at those locations where the slab was to
be attached permanently to the column.
❏ The parking of a slab at a desired elevation was done by three workers
who moved as a team from column to column and fixed the slab at the
desired elevation.
❏ At each column, one worker observed the elevation of the lower surface
of the slab from beneath the slab.

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❏ A second worker, located at the lifting jack, responded to signals from the
first worker, and raised or lowered the jack until the floor was in the
desired position.
❏ At that time, the first worker and a helper would place a wedge between
the weld block and the bottom face of the shearhead on each side of the
column.
❏ After the load was transferred to the wedges, a welder fixed each wedge in
place temporarily with two tack welds, one between the wedge and the
column at each end of the wedge.
❏ When a pair of wedges at a column had been inserted and tack welded, the
jack rods were lowered for attachment to another package of slabs and the
jacking process was repeated.
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Typical Slab-to-Column Connection in Elevation: (a) Side View; (b) Front view31
Collapse Configuration
❏ Both the east and west buildings collapsed entirely. For the most
part, each building collapsed within its own footprint, toward its
center, as evidenced by the location of the debris and the inward
bending of the columns.
❏ Most of the columns were severely deformed or fractured in
several locations. Stacks of shearheads, which had been stripped
from the slabs, were found at various heights along the columns.
❏ The postcollapse locations of shearheads along the columns gives
an indication of which areas were the most likely to have
collapsed first.
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❏ Upon first loss of support at a column, the shearheads and slabs
at that location would tend to slide down the column virtually
unimpeded and with great force, impacting the slabs below in a
"snowballing" effect.
❏ Adjacent columns would be drawn in toward the origin of the
collapse, thereby impeding the fall of their shearheads.
❏ In the west building, the shearheads on column 3E slid down the
furthest, indicating that they were probably the first to lose
support.

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❏ This is consistent with the postcollapse configuration of column
3E, which was bent smoothly about its weak axis into a distinctive
arch shape lying in a vertical plane.
❏ The smooth shape of column 3E is an indication that it was not
subjected to significant lateral loads during the collapse.

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Plan View of West Building
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❏ One of the wedges supporting the 12/roof package at column 3E
rolled out due to instability.
❏ This left the shearhead supported on a single wedge, which
severely overstressed the shearhead.
❏ Application of the lateral load from the horizontal hydraulic jack
shortly before the collapse caused the remaining highly loaded
wedge to roll slightly, causing a pronounced rounding of the top
edge of the west weld block and bending outward of the west
header member of the shearhead.

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❏ Local jockeying of the slab elevation may have triggered this
remaining wedge to roll out completely.
❏ With both wedges out, the 12/roof package dropped 8 in. to the
top of the 9/10/11 slab package, which held it momentarily.
❏ The lifting nuts supporting the 9/10/11 package, and now also the
12/roof package, slipped out and impacted the web of column 3E,
causing the loud initial bang reported by most of the witnesses.
❏ As the upper slabs and shearheads started sliding down column
3E, the roof-level shearhead caught on a weld block.

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❏ The other shearheads and slabs on column 3E traveled straight
down the column, impacting on the levels below, and ripping
shearheads and slabs from the column.
❏ The surrounding columns were pulled inward by the catenary
action of the posttensioning strands.
❏ Lifting nuts on adjacent columns slipped out and tackwelded
wedges on adjacent columns became dislodged.
❏ Collapse of the east building could have been triggered by forces
transmitted through the pour strips or through the horizontal
jack, or by the impact of debris from the collapsing west building.

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Elevations Showing Wedge Roll-Out Mechanism 39
CONCLUSION
❏ The most probable cause of the collapse is loss of support to the
12/roof slab package at column 3E due to instability of the wedges
at that location.
❏ The principal factors that permitted instability of the wedges
were improper dimensional sizing of the shearhead and lack of a
feature to restrict lateral movement of the shearhead.
❏ The postcollapse locations of the shearheads in the west building,
and other physical evidence, indicate that the collapse originated
in the vicinity of column 3E.

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❏ The unique post collapse configuration of column 3E, which was
referred to as the "rainbow column" in the media, is consistent
with the collapse initiating at this column.
❏ Each tower collapsed toward its center; there was no indication of
any consistent translation or rotation in which the structure
deformed as a unit.
❏ The wedges supporting the slabs in the upper levels of the west
tower were dislodged and the post-tensioning in the slabs was lost
early in the collapse.

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❏ Many of the shearheads in the upper levels of the structure were
undamaged; shearheads in the lower levels were significantly
deformed.
❏ The absence of a feature on the shearheads of column 3E to
restrict lateral movement of the shearhead relative to the column
made it possible for this shearhead to shift to one side an abnormal
amount, further increasing the shearhead gaps.
❏ This results in minimum bearing on one of the wedges and it also
further increases the eccentricity of the load applied to the wedge.
❏ The lagging of shearwall construction behind the lifting operation
made it likely for columns to be significantly out-of-plumb, thus
causing the shearheads to be eccentric to the columns. 42
❏ The presence of hydraulic fluid on the wedges or shear heads
would contribute to instability of the wedges.
❏ The presence of a large opening in the slab immediately adjacent
to column 3E introduces higher stresses in the slab and the shear
head than would otherwise be present.
❏ The application of a horizontal load to the top of the building
about an hour before the collapse would tend to disturb the
marginal stability of a wedge at column 3E.

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Recommendations
❏ Lift-slab buildings have historically had a good safety record in comparison
with other methods of building construction.
❏ However, as a result of the collapse of L'Ambiance Plaza, many design
professionals, contractors, building officials, and the public have lost confidence
in the method.
❏ A task committee should be formed to develop standards for lift-slab
construction.
❏ A testing program should be conducted to evaluate the conditions under which
unwelded wedges can safely support the intended loads.
❏ The tests should address the effect of shearhead gaps, wedge sizes, slab stiffness,
wedge eccentricity, the application of lateral loads, and friction coefficients of
the contact surfaces.
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❏ Based on the results of the testing program, criteria should be
established with regard to shearhead gaps, wedge sizes, and
wedge positioning.
❏ These criteria should address the possibility that shearheads are
shifted to the most unfavorable position allowed by the geometry
and the possibility that the contact surfaces are lubricated.
❏ The lifting drawings should clearly demonstrate that the
foregoing criteria are satisfied at all stages of the lifting.
❏ Inspection of wedge installations should be conducted by an
independent party after every lift to ensure that the wedges are
properly installed. 45
REFERENCES

❏ Investigation of L'Ambiance Plaza Building collapse in Bridgeport, Connecticut

C. Culver, C. Scribner, R. Marshall, F. Y. Yokel, J. Gross, C. Yancey, E. M.
Hendrickson
❏ INVESTIGATION OF L'AMBIANCE PLAZA BUILDING COLLAPSE By
Daniel A. Cuoco, Fellow, ASCE, David B. Peraza, Associate Member, ASCE, and
Thomas Z. Scarangello

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THANK YOU

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