Republic of the Philippines

Bicol University
COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES & PHILOSOPHY
Philosophy Department
Daraga, Albay

ISO 9001:2015
TUV Rheinland ID 910863351

Mark M. Gatus, LPT

Marck Zaldy O. Camba, LPT

Prepared by:
Mark M. Gatus & Marck Zaldy O. Camba
Faculty Members, BU Philosophy Department
 Introduction

The actions that we judge to be either morally good or bad are those that involve moral persons
(whether human/non-human), both as the sources and recipients of these action (Evangelista &
Mabacquiao, 2020). It is important that as human beings we know how to assess actions whether
they are morally good or evil so that we can achieve our goals in life without or with less regret or
blame. In this lesson, you will learn different concepts on moral personhood and responsibility.
Moreover, this lesson will guide you on the importance of reason and impartiality in looking at
moral actions as good or evil.

Learning Objective

After completing the lesson, you will be able to:

1. Explain the notable aspects of a human person as a moral agent and the notion of
moral personhood and moral responsibility.

Activities

Let’s try this!

Direction: Answer the question below.

1. When would you say that your actions are morally accountable to you? Explain
and give an example.

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Prepared by:
Mark M. Gatus & Marck Zaldy O. Camba
Faculty Members, BU Philosophy Department
 LESSON 1:
MORAL PERSONHOOD AND MORAL ACCOUNTABILITY
Note: The main reference for the discussion of this lesson is taken from the book, “Ethics: Theories and Applications”
authored by Evangelista and Mabaquiao Jr. (2020)

Let’s Read!

Lesson one (1) is divided into two parts, the first part discusses about Moral
Personhood while the second part discusses about moral accountability. In the first part
of the lesson, you will learn about the following: a. the nature of moral personhood; b.
accounts for the significance of moral personhood in terms of possession of moral rights;
c. classification of moral persons into moral agents and moral patients; and, d. different
views on what constitutes the qualifying features of moral personhood. While on the
second part of the lesson, you will learn about the following: a. the nature of moral
accountability; and b. difference of moral accountability from related concepts, and
explicates the conditions for attributing moral accountability.

In lesson two (2), Reason and impartiality will be discussed. In this lesson you will
learn two things; a. moral judgments must be backed by good reasons, and b. morality
requires the impartial consideration of each individual’s interests.

A. MORAL PERSONHOOD

In judging whether an action is morally good or bad, or morally right or wrong,

we determine whether this action conforms to or violates our moral standards or
principles. For example, we judge an act of killing to be morally wrong because it violates
our moral principle which states that we ought not to kill or that we ought to respect a
person’s right to life. In doing so, we, however, already assume that the entities or beings
involved in the action (its source or receiver) have moral status or are moral persons.

For an action to be either morally good or bad, its source and recipient must be
both be moral persons. We generally regard humans as moral persons both in terms of
being sources and recipients of actions, while we do not generally regard animals as
moral persons at least but only in terms of being recipient of the actions of moral persons
(as when human kill or hurt them).

In making moral judgments, moral personhood plays a critical role. Moral

judgment applies only to acts involving moral persons. Therefore, we first need to
determine if the action under consideration is indeed morally evaluable before we can
apply our moral principles to test the morality of an action.

The concept of moral personhood is complex; and to help us get a better handle of
it, let us inquire into the following: first, what does being a moral person entail? Or what
are the consequences when an entity is regarded a moral person? Second, what are the
ways to be a moral person? Or are there different ways of being moral persons? Or are

Prepared by:
Mark M. Gatus & Marck Zaldy O. Camba
Faculty Members, BU Philosophy Department
 there different ways of being moral persons? Third, how does one qualify as a moral
person? The first question is about the significance of moral personhood; the second is
about its structure; and the third is about its basis. To address these questions, we shall
examine the minimum definition of moral personhood in terms of possession of moral
rights, the division of moral persons into moral agents and moral patients, and the claims
of the different theories of personhood.
a.1. Moral Persons and Rights

One standard way of defining personhood is in terms of possession of rights: to be

a person is to be a bearer of rights. For example, a legal person, in this sense, is one who
possess legal rights. A moral person is those who possess moral rights. Consequently, it
is their possession of moral rights that makes moral persons objects of moral concern.

It is important to note that the possession of moral rights is merely the minimum
definition of moral personhood; for, as we shall later on elaborate, there are moral
persons who, in addition to having moral rights, also have moral duties or obligations.
The next discussions are about classifying what rights in general and the various kinds
of rights to see the unique features of moral rights.

RIGHTS are entitlements. They refer to interests one (i.e., the bearer of rights) is
allowed to pursue or actions one is allowed to do.

For example, when we say that humans have the right to live, we mean that
humans are entitled or allowed to do things that are necessary to continue with their
existence in this world. And when we say that we do not have the right to take another
person’s life, we basically mean that we are not entitled, allowed, or permitted to take
another person’s life.

RIGHTS correlate with duties; as such, they are better understood when
compared and contrasted with each other. Duties are actions that we ought to do or
perform. One main difference between rights and duties concerns whether one deserves
sanctions (penalties, punishments, or blame) for failing to satisfy them. On the other
hand, failure to exercise a right does not merit any sanction; that is, one does not deserve
to be punished or blamed for it.
Two general ways by which rights are classified
1. On the basis of the kind of duties imposed by rights, whether these rights
are only duties of non-interference or duties of provision as well.
✓ Negative rights: if one’s possession of a right imposes only the duty of non-
interference on other people.
✓ Positive rights: imposes the duty of provision (or positive performance), in
addition to the duty of non-interference.
2. In terms of how rights are acquired (or their mode of acquisition)
✓ Contractual Rights. The rights that we acquire when we enter into an
agreement or a contract with some other persons or institutions. This can
either be: formal, when the rights of the parties of the contract, along with
their correlative duties, are explicitly stated usually in some written
document; informal, if such rights and duties are merely implied.
✓ Legal Rights. The rights that we acquire when we become citizens of a
certain country or state.

Prepared by:
Mark M. Gatus & Marck Zaldy O. Camba
Faculty Members, BU Philosophy Department
 ✓ Moral Rights. Rights acquired when one becomes a moral person or a
member of the moral community. Having moral rights is entitled by being
a moral person. One becomes a moral person, and thus acquires moral
rights when one possesses the defining qualities of moral personhood,
which may include sentience (capacity to experience pleasure and pain)
and rationality (the capacity to know and choose freely). Human persons
are moral persons in virtue of possessing these qualities.

If being a person entails possession of rights, then being a moral person entails
possession of moral rights. What is at stake in the question of whether an entity—say a
human embryo, a human fetus, a brain-dead human, an animal, a corporation, or an
intelligent machine—is a moral person is whether this entity has moral rights and,
consequently, whether other moral persons have certain moral duties or obligations
towards this entity.

(In the movie Bicentennial Man [1999]), the robot wanted to be recognized as a person
by the government so he would be recognized as having rights, especially the right to
marry the person he so loved). But what are moral rights? Or more precisely, what kind
of rights are moral rights? Like legal and contractual rights, moral rights impose duties
of either non-interference or provision and thus, are either negative or positive. But
unlike legal and contractual rights, moral rights are acquired through possession of
the defining features of moral personhood. Furthermore, as they are used to justify the
acceptance or rejection of legal and contractual rights, moral rights are higher than these
two other kinds of rights.

a.2. Moral Agents and Patients

If humans are moral persons in virtue of their possession of certain qualities
(other than being human), moral persons, in principle, can either be human or non-
human. Non-human moral persons, in this regard, would refer to those possessing the
defining features of being a moral person but not of being a human being. They may
include animals, aliens, and artificial entities like corporations and intelligent machines.
Moral persons, regardless of whether they are human or non-human, are either
the ones performing such actions or those to whom such actions are being done. Moral
persons, in this consideration, are distinguished into moral agents and moral patients
(or moral recipients).

When moral persons act as the source of morally evaluable actions, in that they
are the doers of such actions, they are classified as moral agents. But when they act as the
receivers of such actions, in that such actions are done to them, they are classified as moral
patients. When a person, say Juan, helps another person in need, say Maria, Juan is the
moral agent while Maria is the moral patient.

The distinction and relation between moral patients and moral agents can also be
explained in terms of the possession of moral rights and duties.

In general, moral agents perform morally evaluable actions because it is their

moral duty to do so; while morally evaluable actions are done to moral patients because
it is moral right that such actions be done to them. For example, parents, as moral agents,

Prepared by:
Mark M. Gatus & Marck Zaldy O. Camba
Faculty Members, BU Philosophy Department
 take care of their young children for it is their moral obligations to do so; while these
children, as moral patients, are taken care of by their parents because it is their moral
right to receive such care from their parents.

While all moral persons are moral patients, only some are or can be moral agents.
For example, all human persons can be receivers of morally evaluable actions; but only
some of them can be sources of such actions. Normal human adults and infants, being
moral persons, are moral patients; but only normal human adult or humans already
capable of making informed decisions can be moral agent. Another way of saying this is
that all moral persons have moral rights, but not all have moral duties as well.

Given that all moral persons are moral patients, but not all are moral agents. There
are two classes of moral persons. One is the non-agentive moral persons, which consists of
moral persons who cannot be moral agents or they are moral persons who can only
function as moral patients. Second is the agentive moral persons, which consists of moral
persons who can be moral agents or they are moral persons who can also function as
moral agents. Between the two, only agentive moral persons can be morally accountable
for their actions. This also means that only agentive moral persons can deserve moral
blame or praise for their actions. As such, while moral agents can be morally accountable
for their actions, they are not always so because it will still depend on whether the other
conditions are satisfied.

One conceptual advantage of having of having the distinction between moral

agents and moral patients, and the more specific distinction between agentive and non-
agentive moral persons, is that it avoids confusion in assigning moral personhood to
certain entities. For example, say a human fetus, a comatose patient, or a patient in
persistent vegetative state, cannot be a moral person because of its incapacity to perform
actions that can be either morally good or bad.

MORAL ACCOUNTABILITY

A concept related to moral personhood is moral accountability. Moral Agents, as

discussed above, can be morally accountable for their actions towards moral patients. In
discussing the nature of moral accountability, we first clarify its meaning in terms of how
it relates to the various uses of the word “responsibility” and differs from the legal kind
of accountability.

According to Paul Glenn, to further understand the moral accountability of the

human person, let us consider the discussion below which centers the discussion on
human acts and acts of man, and hence, human acts is the concern of moral
accountability, not acts of man.

HUMAN ACTS ACTS OF MAN

Is an act which proceeds from the deliberate free
will of man.
In a wide sense, the term human act means any
sort of activity, internal or external, bodily or
spiritual, performed by human being.
Man’s animal acts of sensation (i.e., use of
senses) and appetition (i.e., bodily
tendencies)
Acts that man performs indeliberately or
without advertence and the exercise of free
choice.

Prepared by:
Mark M. Gatus & Marck Zaldy O. Camba
Faculty Members, BU Philosophy Department
 It is only the act that proceeds from the
knowing and freely willing human being that
has the full character of a human act.
Hence, acts that proceed from a deliberate (i.e.,
advertent, knowing) and freely willing human
being.
Such acts are affected in sleep, in delirium,
in the state of unconsciousness.
Acts done abstractedly or with complete
inadvertence, acts performed in infancy and
acts due to infirmity of mind or the weakness
of senility.

b.1. Accountability and Responsibility

We understand accountability as the deservingness of blame or praise for the
actions that we perform. Accountability is a natural product of our rationality, which
consists or our reason (or intelligence), and free will (or freedom).

In the practical context of performing actions, our reason enables us to distinguish

between right and wrong actions, while our free will enables us to choose which action
that we would like to perform. Consequently, we deserve blame for freely choosing to
perform an action we know to be wrong (or for freely choosing not to perform an action
we know to be right); while we deserve praise for freely choosing to perform an action,
we know to be right (or for freely choosing not to perform an action we know to be
wrong).
Two things worth emphasizing when it comes to accountability
1. Accountability involves both praise and blame (or reward or punishment), for
it is usual to associate accountability with blame or punishment only.
2. Deservingness is not negated by actualities. A person may deserve to receive
something and yet may not actually receive it. But the fact that he/she does not
receive it does not negate the fact that he/she deserves to receipt it.

Now, it uses customary to use the word “accountability” interchangeably with the
word “responsibility”. Aside from sharing a meaning with the word “accountability”, the
word “responsibility”, however, has other meanings with which accountability may be
confused.

Another meaning of responsibility is causation. Here, being responsible for

something, simply means being the cause of that something. The entities that can be
responsible in this sense involve both inanimate entities, like the storms and stones, and
animate ones, like animals and humans. Thus, we sometimes say, that the storm was
responsible for the floods that devastated the city; and the lion was responsible for the
death of the deer. In saying these, we simply mean that the storm caused the floods and
the lion caused the death of the deer. We surely do not mean, in addition, that the storm
and the lion were accountable for these events.
When the cause of something is a person, say a human person, the person is
usually referred to, in philosophy, as an agent (or personal agent). Being an agent is
one necessary condition for accountability, in that the person accountable for an action
must be the action’s agent. But there are other necessary conditions for accountability.
Consequently, just by being an agent of an action does not immediately make someone
accountable for this action.
Still, another meaning of the word responsibility is duty or obligation, or
having certain duties or obligations towards other people (see Zimmerman, 2010, 607-

Prepared by:
Mark M. Gatus & Marck Zaldy O. Camba
Faculty Members, BU Philosophy Department
 08). Zimmerman (2010, 608), refers to the responsibility understood as the possession of
duties as prospective responsibility, the kind of responsibility directed towards what
will happen. In contrast, he refers to the responsibility understood as accountability as
retrospective responsibility, the kind of responsibility directed towards what happened
already. Thus, the parents’ responsibility toward their children consists of actions that
they have to do towards their children as a matter of duty; but their retrospective
responsibility towards the same consists of actions that they have already done to their
children for which they deserve blame or praise.

In light of the uses of the word “responsibility”, when we ask, “Who is responsible
for this action?”, we may be asking either of the following:

1. Who causes this action?

2. Whose duty is this action?
3. Who should be blamed or praised for this action?

These questions are related in certain ways, but it is important not to confuse them.
For the person who causes the action may or may not be the one tasked, or has the
obligation, to perform the action, and, consequently, may or may not deserve blame or
praise for this action.
b.2. Moral and Legal Accountability
What makes moral responsibility different from the legal accountability?

1. One difference is the kind of standards or principles used in ascertaining the

quality of an act, for which one may deserve blame or praise.
2. Legal accountability uses legal standards (laws/statutes) whereas moral
accountability uses moral standards (moral rules or principles). As statutes do
not always embody moral rules (like laws that are discriminatory), legal
accountability likewise, does not always reflect moral accountability.
3. The person who does not deserve moral blame may deserve legal punishment;
and the person who does not deserve moral blame may be legally punished.
4. Another difference is the kind of sanctions or penalties for wrongdoers. Legal
sanctions for criminal offenses—especially in penal systems following the
classical theory in criminal justice—are said to be external in that they come in
the form of physical punishments. Moral sanctions (moral blame or fault), on
the other hand, are said to be internal in that they come in the form of mental
sufferings such as guilt or remorse, shame, self-hatred, low self-esteem, and the
like.

b.3. Conditions of Moral Accountability

Two general set for the conditions of Moral Accountability

1. Attribution Conditions (assignment conditions)

• They determine whether moral accountability can be attributed or
assigned to a person for an action that he/she has done. Under this set
are the incriminating conditions, which would make one morally
accountable for the action under consideration; and the excusing
conditions, which would spare one from moral accountability for the
action under consideration.

Prepared by:
Mark M. Gatus & Marck Zaldy O. Camba
Faculty Members, BU Philosophy Department
 •According to the agency condition, a person is only accountable for
actions in which he/she is the cause. This condition, however, is not
sufficient for there are two other necessary conditions: The Knowledge
Condition, referring to the condition in which a person knows or has
the capacity to know the moral quality of his/her action; and the
intentionality condition, referring to the condition in which a person
intends or freely chooses to perform an action he/she is doing.
• Taken together, these three conditions constitute the incriminating
condition. A person is accountable for an action if and only if he/she:
o Is the agent of the action;
o knows or has the capacity to know that the action is good or bad;
o Intentionality performs an action.
o (if at least one of them does not occur, then the person is excused
from the moral accountability).
• We may refer to the absence or non-occurrence of each of the
incriminating conditions as follows:
o Non-agency for the agency condition
o Ignorance for the knowledge condition
o Involuntariness for the intentionality condition
• A person is not morally accountable for an action if he/she failed to have
at least one of the following:
o Volition to perform the act;
o Knowledge whether the act is either good or bad (or have the
capacity to know such);
o Intention to perform the act. It might be that this person:
▪ Did the action and knew the action to be good or bad, but
it was not his/her intention to do so.
▪ Did the action and intentionally did so, but he/she did not
know it to be either good or bad.
▪ Simply did not do the action or was not the one who did
the action.
2. Degree Conditions
• They determine the degree of one’s moral accountability. Under this set
are the mitigating conditions, (lessens the degree of moral accountability),
and aggravating conditions (increases accountability).
• The conditions are regarded as mitigating when they lessen the degree
of one’s moral accountability; while they are regarded as aggravating
when they increase it.
• Analysis of the degree conditions assumes that the person whose action
is under consideration is held morally accountable for the action in
question; what is being determined is simply the degree of his/her
accountability.

There are four conditions (see Velasquez, 2014, 60-61)

1. Degree of knowledge of the moral wrongfulness of the action along

with the relevant facts related to the action.
a. The more the knowledgeable the person is, the greater is his/her
moral accountability. The less knowledgeable a person is, the
lesser is his/her moral accountability.

Prepared by:
Mark M. Gatus & Marck Zaldy O. Camba
Faculty Members, BU Philosophy Department
 2. Degree of pressure or difficulty in life that forces to perform a
wrongdoing.
a. The greater the pressure, the lesser the moral responsibility. The
lesser the pressure, the greater the moral accountability.
3. Degree of intensity (or seriousness) of the injury caused by the
wrongdoing.
a. The greater the intensity of the injury, the greater the moral
accountability. The lesser the intensity of the injury, the lesser the
moral accountability.
4. Degree of involvement (or participation) in a group or collective act or
moral wrongdoing.
a. The greater the involvement, the greater the moral
accountability. The lesser the involvement, the lesser the moral
accountability.

Let’s Think about this

Direction: Answer carefully the questions below.

1. Are all human beings moral persons? Explain your answer

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2. Are all moral persons human beings? Explain your answer.
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3. When a person does not appear to feel shame or guilt or show remorse for a
wrong doing that he/she has freely and knowingly done, would it still matter to
say that he/she is morally accountable for his/her wrongdoing? Explain.

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Prepared by:
Mark M. Gatus & Marck Zaldy O. Camba
Faculty Members, BU Philosophy Department
 LESSON 2:
REASON AND IMPARTIALITY
Note: The main reference for the discussion of this lesson is taken from the book, The Elements of Moral Philosophy.
7th Edition. Authored by James Rachels (2013).

Let’s Read!

What can we learn from all this about the nature of morality? As a start, we may
note two main points: first, moral judgments must be backed by good reasons; and
second, morality requires the impartial consideration of each individual’s interests.
MORAL REASONING

Feelings are often a sign of moral seriousness and may be admired. But they can
also get in the way of discovering the truth: When we feel strongly about an issue, it is
tempting to assume that we just know what the truth is, without even having to consider
arguments on the other side. Unfortunately, however, we cannot rely on our feelings, no
matter how powerful they may be.
Our feelings may be irrational; they may be nothing but the products of
prejudice, selfishness, or cultural conditioning. One time, for example, people’s feelings
told them that members of other races were inferior and that slavery was God’s plan.

If we want to discover the truth, we must let our feelings be guided as much as
possible by reason. This is the essence of morality. The morally right thing to do is always
the thing best supported by the arguments.

This is not a narrow point about a small range of moral views; it is a general
requirement of logic that must be accepted by everyone, regardless of their position on
any particular issue.

In this way, moral judgments are different from expressions of personal taste. If
someone says, “I like coffee,” she does not need to have a reason—she is merely stating
a fact about her preferences, and nothing more. On the other hand, if someone says that
something is morally wrong, he does need reasons, and if his reasons are legitimate, then
other people must acknowledge their force.

Of course, not every reason that may be advanced is a good reason. There are bad
arguments as well as good ones, and much of the skill of moral thinking consists in
discerning the difference. But how do we tell the difference? How do we go about
assessing arguments? The examples we have considered point to some answers.

The first thing is to get one’s facts straight. Often this is not as easy as it sounds.
Sometimes key facts are unknown. Other times, matters are so complex that even the
experts disagree. Yet another problem is human prejudice. Often we want to believe
something because it supports our preconceptions. For example, people who do not want
to give to charity often say that charities are inefficient and corrupt, even when they have

Prepared by:
Mark M. Gatus & Marck Zaldy O. Camba
Faculty Members, BU Philosophy Department
 no good evidence for this; and people who dislike homosexuals may say that gay men
are all pedophiles, even though very few are. But the facts exist independently of our
wishes, and responsible moral thinking begins when we try to see things as they are.

Next, we can bring moral principles into play. A number of principles were
involved: that we should not “use” people; that we should not kill one person to save
another; that we should do what will benefit the people affected by our actions; that every
life is sacred; and that it is wrong to discriminate against the handicapped. Most moral
arguments consist of principles being applied to particular cases, and so we must ask
whether the principles are justified and whether they are being applied correctly.

It would be nice if there were a simple recipe for constructing good arguments and
avoiding bad ones. Unfortunately, there is not. Arguments can go wrong in many ways,
and we must always be alert to the possibility of new complications and new kinds of
error. But that is not surprising. The rote application of routine methods is never a
satisfactory substitute for critical thinking, in any area. Morality is no exception.

THE REQUIREMENT OF IMPARTIALITY

Almost every important moral theory includes the idea of impartiality. This is the
idea that each individual’s interests are equally important; no one should get special
treatment. At the same time, impartiality requires that we not treat the members of
particular groups as inferior, and thus it condemns forms of discrimination like sexism
and racism.

Impartiality is closely connected with the idea that moral judgments must be
backed by good reasons. Consider the racist who thinks that white people deserve all the
good jobs. He would like all the doctors, lawyers, business executives, and soon, to be
white. Now we can ask for reasons; we can ask why this is thought to be right. Is there
something about white people that makes them better fitted for the highest-paying and
most prestigious positions? Are they inherently brighter or more industrious? Do they
care more about themselves and their families? Would they benefit more from such
employment? In each case, the answer is no; and if there is no good reason for treating
people differently, then discrimination is unacceptably arbitrary.

The requirement of impartiality, then, is at bottom nothing more than a rule

against treating people arbitrarily. It forbids treating one person worse than another
when there is no good reason to do so. But if this explains what is wrong with racism, it
also explains why, in some cases, it is not racist to treat people differently. Suppose a
movie director were making a film about Fred Shuttlesworth (1922–2011), the heroic
African-American civil rights leader. This director would have a good reason not to cast
Christian Bale in the starring role. Such “discrimination” would not be arbitrary or
objectionable.

Prepared by:
Mark M. Gatus & Marck Zaldy O. Camba
Faculty Members, BU Philosophy Department
 Let’s Think about this

Some people are fond of telling stories, or shall I say “tsismis” that sometimes
over-tell something to someone. This behavior causes misunderstanding that sometimes
lead to fighting. Have you become a victim of “tsismis” in your place? What can you say
about its moral consequence? Relate your answer to the concepts of Reason and
Impartiality.

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Prepared by:
Mark M. Gatus & Marck Zaldy O. Camba
Faculty Members, BU Philosophy Department
 Learning Output no. 3

INSTRUCTIONS

1. After reading the module, discuss significant ideas you have learned among the
member of the group.
2. Reflect and compose an essay paper to case written below;

Late one night you are driving home from your office. You are tired and stressed
because of overtime work. Then, a drunk man suddenly appears in front of your
car and you try to stop, but because of his sudden appearance you lost control
and hit him. The guy looks and smells as if he is homeless. You go out of your
car to see how badly the drunk man is hurt, yet, upon going out the man shouts
at you and blames you for reckless driving and wants you to lend him money
for the damages you caused him. In this particular situation, analyze and
determine the moral patient and the moral agent and explain the moral
accountability of the driver of the car and the drunk man. Between the two
persons, who has the moral accountability.

3. Collaborate and brainstorm among your group members the questions and
compose a 400 to 1000 words essay. If you have conflicting opinions and
disagreements, make sure that you will discuss them and decide who has a sound
or better opinion before writing the essay paper.
4. In writing, use Tahoma, Arial, or Times New Roman font style and use font size
12. Write your reflection paper on a short bond paper with a margin of 1 inch on
each side, single spacing.
5. Do not forget to write the members of the group. Write the name of the members
in alphabetical order. Take note that members of the group whose name is not
written will not earn any points from the score of the group.
6. After, turn-in your essay paper in our google classroom on or before the set
deadline of submission.

References

Evangelista, F. J. & Mabacquiao, N., Jr. (2020). Ethics: Theories and Applications.
Mandaluyong City: Anvil Publishing, Inc.

Rachels, James. (2013). The Elements of Moral Philosophy. 7th Edition. New York:
McGraw Hill.

Prepared by:
Mark M. Gatus & Marck Zaldy O. Camba
Faculty Members, BU Philosophy Department