Chapter 3 Cracks in The Revolution Canvas

Gabriel & Espiritu Salaysay at Saysay Manuscript (Unedited)
Chapter 3
Cracks in the Revolution
A revolution is a people’s uprising against an established political system. But those
involved in the revolution are actually engaged in the business of killing, pillaging and
destroying in order to meet their political objective. In the process, the toughness of
personalities would surface since the business of killing needs the toughness of character and
the stomach to commit atrocities. But the toughness results in ego and pride to emerge as
well. This chapter will present how clashes in personalities among men who are tough and
imbued with ego contaminated the Revolution of 1896.
Preliminary Activity
Form groups from the class and have them discuss the following situation.
The Problems of the Katipunan

You belong to the Supreme Council of the Katipunan. You are tasked to approve the
application for membership of 10 new recruits, 5 of them, you have to admit into the
organization and the other 5 you have to execute for knowing who you are in the recruitment
process for they might squeal what the organization is about and point you as member of the
KKK. The following are the applicants:
1. A male in his twenties who can shoot well from a distance but a gay
2. A rich Chinese mestizo male but is suffering from high blood pressure
3. A Spanish mestizo captain of the Guardia Civil who can lead an attack
4. A former Spanish auditor who has access to the Governor’s vault
5. A good-looking male college graduate but is known to organize people for
his own
6. A businessman but has asthma
7. A physician but a known relative of the Spanish general
8. A woman who can cook for thousands but has 3 small children
9. A former gobernadorcillo but is known to be arrogant and has an ambition to
become the supreme leader or at least a general
10. An 80-year old man who knows how to make bombs
Process Questions
Return to classroom set-up and discuss the situation by mentioning each recruit and
asking each group about their choice.
 Why would you include the recruit, if he or she is your choice?

 Why execute him or her, if he or she is not your choice?
Your choice would illustrate the weakness of the KKK at the beginning of the
revolution.
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 What are these?
Either you choose to include (let them live) or exclude (exterminate them) the reason
of you doing so would illustrate the problems that the Katipunan faced. These would include
the lack of replenishable resources like ammunitions, food and fresh combatants to replace
those wounded or those who died. This would also include the lack of military skills of the
insurgents, the need for military leadership since civic or social leadership is different from
the discipline which the military needs. If this is sustained, still there would be the problem
of loyalty, the danger of betrayal and the emergence of ambitious tendencies that would
result in the lack of teamwork, the lack of cohesiveness, the persistence of division and the
ease to factionalize.
Historical Context of the Documents

Since its founding on July 7, 1892, the Katipunan or KKK (Kagalang-galang na
Katipunan nang manga Anak nang Bayan) remained an underground organization and had
remained a secret organization until its discovery on August 19, 1896, at a time when Spanish
officials and friars were already hearing rumors and were suspicious about the existence of a
rebellious group. The discovery, which was simply an accident for it happened only because
of the petty quarrel of Apolonio dela Cruz and Teodoro Patiño who worked at the printing
press of Diario de Manila and also members of the Katipunan. The bickering resulted in
Patiño confiding to his sister who lived in an orphanage in Mandaluyong and whose grief
made her mother superior to convince her to tell to the authorities what she knew about her
brother’s involvement in the secret organization. Patiño’s sister was not actually worried
about her brother’s quarrel but about his participation and membership in an underground
rebellious organization. His brother was then convinced to divulge the secret organization to
the suspicious Fr. Mariano Gil who brought with him Spanish guards to raid the printing press
and found evidences of the Katipunan in their lockers (Agoncillo and Guerrero 1977: 195).
This came as a surprise for the Katipuneros who had to hurry to meet up and organize
for crackdown and arrests of those suspected to be members of the Katipunan had already
begun. By the last week of August 1896, about 500 to 1,000 Katipuneros had already
assembled, though ill-equipped, untrained, and lacking in battle discipline was committed to
fight and carry out a plan they hatched as early August 24, 1896 to attack Manila on August
29, 1896. But the planned attack in Manila did not happen on August 29, instead, Bonifacio
shifted the offensive on an arsenal in San Juan del Monte. It was a strategic shift since the
attack, if successful, could yield into their possession guns and ammunitions which they
needed to beef up their weapons of mostly bolos and spears. But the first major offensive
turned out to be a blunder. This was the result of their lack of military experience. While they
were highly motivated to fight, they were not, however, battle hardened not even battle ready.
And while the Katipunan’s leadership structure was able to organize and motivate groups of
men, leading these men in a strategic and tactical manner in a battle is another matter. In the
battle of San Jose del Monte, the Katipuneros were met with heavy casualties and retreated as
far back as San Mateo, where they attacked the municipal building in Montalban but was
repulsed again at the Battle of Langka where they had to retreat to Balara (Agoncillo and
Guerrero 1977: 198).
But Bonifacio’s setbacks were not total failures for on August 30, 1896, just the next
day, eight provinces rose in revolt against Spain. Katipuneros in Manila, Cavite, Laguna,
Batangas, Bulacan, Pampanga, Tarlac, and Nueva Ecija captured their provincial and
municipal offices and churches and declared their territories under the command of the
revolutionaries. This forced Gov. Gen. Ramon Blanco to declare the eight provinces under the
state of war and martial law. From the eight provinces, the Spaniards had a special concern
for Cavite since, geographically and strategically, the province is located close to Manila, and
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houses a naval outpost at Sangley Point that could guard the mouth of Manila Bay from
enemies that could attack Manila. But the whole of Cavite except for the naval station fell in
the hands of the revolutionaries. The first order of battle was for the Spaniards was to re-take
the province.
The success of the revolutionary campaign in Cavite was not due to terrain but
mainly to the social class that led it. Pueblos upon pueblos fell in the hands of the Katipuneros
because those who joined and led the attack in the province were coming from the middle
class, mostly gobernadorcillos, cabezas de barangay and members of the principalia. The
Aguinaldo’s came from the landed family in Kawit. Other prominent leaders were also
owners of land, members of the middle class, teachers and lawyers. On the other hand, while
Bonifacio was fighting a war of attrition in the hills of Balara, San Mateo and Montalban
where he was the one attacking in a territory which is not his locality, the Caviteños were
fighting a war of defense where they were dug in trenches where food supplies would not be
much of a problem since they were fighting a war in their own backyard.
By September, the youngest gobernadorcillo of Kawit Capitan Miong (Emilio

Aguinaldo) had become a local hero for having decimated the forces of General Ernesto
Aguirre in the battle at Imus. But by November, the renewed offensive and reign of terror of
the Spaniards broke the defenses of the Katipuneros and the Spaniards began to retake the
pueblos they lost. Unfortunately, in 1895 even before revolution started, Cavite had two
Katipunan chapters. Mariano Alvarez, gobernadocillo of Noveleta first, organized in 1895 the
Sangguniang Bayan Magdiwang (Provincial Council of Noveleta). Mariano Alvarez was the
uncle of Bonifacio’s wife Gregoria de Jesus, whose chapter had Noveleta and later, San
Francisco de Malabon (now General Trias) as headquarters of the Magdiwang. But in the
same year, Baldomero Aguinaldo, Justice of the Peace of Cavite Viejo or Kawit also created
another chapter of the Katipunan, the Sangguniang Bayan Magdalo (Provincial Council of
Cavite Viejo) with its capital at Cavite Viejo where the Aguinaldo estate was located.
Baldomero was the older cousin of Emilio.
There are two differing claims as to when these two councils were founded. But
Agoncillo (1956:60) was clear in stating that the Gen. Mariano Alvares was first in the
formation of the Magdiwang council. Aguinaldo (1967: 25) indicated in his memoir that the
Magdalo council was formed in June 1895, as he joined the Katipunan in March 1895. This
chapter was formed through an election which he claimed was won by his older cousin,
Baldomero Aguinaldo at his utmost pleasure because he could not dispense of the job since he
was serving as gobernadorcillo of Kawit at that time. This election was conducted in the
presence of the Supremo, Pio Valenzuela, and Emilio Jacinto. If the Magdiwang was
organized prior to Magdiwang, it would then be deduced that the Magdiwang was formed not
later than June 1895. In the account of Santiago Alvarez (1977:16), he stated that the
Magdiwang was organized in April 1896 in an election that was won by the gobernadorcillo
of Noveleta, his father, Mariano Alvarez and witnessed by the Supremo, Pio Valenzuela, and
Emilio Jacinto. Two days later, Emilio Aguinaldo approached them in regard to the formation
of another council and in an election held that same day, the Magdalo council was formed
with the assumption of Emilio as chairman but which he gave up in favor of his cousin
Baldomero. With the differences in the dates claimed, only two things are definite, a)
Magdiwang was organized ahead of Magdalo, and b) the Supremo was present in both
elections.
Table 3.1 shows the pueblos controlled by the two camps (Ricarte 1963: 7, 14). While
Caviteños even took the existence of the two factions beneficial, for they were helping each
other, dissension came with major reverses that led to the Spaniards recapturing the rebel
pueblos. While they themselves commissioned themselves with military ranks, the two
factions could not later on agree with the design of the uniform that they would wear. And
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with these disagreements came the most divisive issue of which of the two chapters which
proclaimed themselves governments would be recognized as legitimate for the province.
Remember that the men which composed these two councils were gobernadorcillos and
members of the principalia at the time when these councils were organized. When the
revolution started, as they were accustomed to governing their localities, they would like to
ascend their councils into local governments as they were used to. But it is imperative that
neither side of the two councils would like to give up their territories to the other as neither
side would be under the jurisdiction of the other. It would be understandable that the
Magdiwang would hardly give up their territories for they occupied the most number of
pueblos extending as far as Batangas. It would also be understandable if the Magdalo would
not just give up their territories to the Magdiwang, since they were attacked by the Spaniards
in their first offensive salvo. They had gained initial victories in defense of the province and
they were the first ones to have suffered casualties.
If these councils were only Sangguniang Balangay or Municipal Councils, then

merging may not be that tedious but these are Sangguniang Bayan or Provincial Councils
which will be converted into provincial governments. There cannot be two chapter-
governments in one province. Since they could not agree, for not one would even want to step
down, the best proposal would be to dissolve the mother organization itself, the Katipunan.
Dissolving the Katipunan in Cavite, however, would not be that easy. The Magdiwang
hierarchy having close affinity with Bonifacio due to blood ties, respected the Katipunan even
considering it as a government in itself. The Magdalo, on the other hand, having suffered so
much beating because of the initial Spanish attack, wanted the unity of the troops in order to
stand their ground amid their need for reinforcements as they wanted a new government
formed. The only way, then, to unite the two councils under one government was to have an
election. But an election outside of one initiated and sanctioned by the Katipunan under its
by-laws would be illegal. On the other hand, an election outside of the by-laws of the
organization would have a semblance of legitimacy if the Supremo would be there to
authorize it.
Table 3.1 Territories Controlled by the Two Councils of the Katipunan in Cavite
Magdiwang Magdalo
San Francisco de Malabon Cavite Viejo (Kawit)
Noveleta Perez Dasmariñas
Rosario Silang
Tanza Amadeo
Naic Mendez Nuñez
Ternate Bacoor
Maragondon Carmona
Magallanes Imus
Bailen
Alfonso
Indang
San Roque
(Source: Ricarte 1963:7,14)
As Cavite was losing ground, making the forces united would be the only option to
save the province from Spanish hands. The solution was to invite the Supremo Andres
Bonifacio who was waging his war campaign in the areas of Montalban and Balara in the
middle of December 1896 in order to resolve the conflict among them. The first meeting, in
Imus in December 31, 1896 failed to resolve the issue. It is then understandable that by
reading the accounts of this meeting, the Magdalo had been adamant to question what kind of
government did they have. The same question was hotly posed during the second meeting at
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Tejeros in March 1897, when the Magdalo delegates even questioned what kind of
government was the Katipunan. The invitation for the Supremo to resolve their differences
may not just be about a diplomatic solution. But since the Supremo was present in both
formation and election of leaders of both Magdiwang and Magdalo, his very presence creates
legitimacy in the electoral process. Thus his presence in the election, as he was invited to
resolve their differences, was also meant to create a sense of legitimacy to election and
eventually to the government that will be created. The election that followed would have
resolved their differences, but as it was an election in Cavite and by Caviteños only, they
would have created only a local government in the province of Cavite. But as it turned out, it
was an election, they proclaimed, to be the election for the Republic of the Philippines.
In the crossfire of the brave men, but ambitious as well, Bonifacio fell into the trap
that he eventually lost his position and eventually came the death of the organization he
founded for even Agoncillo reckoned that on March 22, 1896, in the election of president
during the convention at Tejeros, the Republic of the Philippines was born (Agoncillo and
Guerrero 1977: 202).
The account of an Gen. Santiago Alvarez, a.k.a. Gen. Apoy is an eyewitness source
of what happened during the successive meetings while the writing of Teodoro Agoncillo is a
secondary material with which he put together other records including his interview with the
then living Emilio Aguinaldo.
About the Authors

Santiago Alvarez (a.k.a. Gen. Apoy or Kidlat ng Apoy) was born on July 25, 1872 at
Noveleta, Cavite. He was the only child of Gen. Mariano Alvarez (a.k.a. Gen. Maninam)
leader of the Magdiwang faction and Nicolasa Virata. His parents’ ambition for him was to
become a teacher thus he studied under the tutelage of Antonio Dacon at Imus, later under
Ignacio Villocillo, and then transferred to Tondo under Macario Hernandez. He was 24 years
old when his education was interrupted at the outbreak of the revolution. He led the
revolutionaries in the Battle of Dalahican. He continued his education after the revolution
where he entered UST, transferred to San Juan de Letran to finish his Bachelor in Arts degree
and eventually earned his law degree at Liceo de Manila (Alvarez 1977: 2). He was already
having his law practice in the 1920s when a new air of vibrance was blowing in the hope that
the Americans would grant the Philippines its independence come 1921 with a new
administration in the US organized after the presidential election. The hope was drawn from
the promise of the Jones Law of 1916 which stated in the preamble that the US will grant
independence upon proof of the Philippine’s capability to govern itself. The eager anticipation
would usher in a new era that would place the heroic acts of the revolution of 1896 and the
living veterans of the revolution in oblivion. In the preface of his book, Memoirs of a
General, he implied his aim, to make known to the youth the fading struggle of the
revolutionaries and the story of the revolution.” Working from his notes, he reconstructed the
story of the revolution as a participant-eyewitness. His work was first serialized in Tagalog
weekly magazine Sampaguita in 36 parts beginning July 1927. In June 1973, Carolina Malay
translated the original Tagalog version into English which was completed sometime in 1977.
Teodoro Agoncillo, on the other hand, was born in 1912 at Lemery, Batangas. He
obtained his undergraduate and master’s degrees in Philosophy at the University of the
Philippines in 1934. He first taught at the Far Eastern University and at the Manuel Luis
Quezon University. After the publication of his seminal works, Revolt of the Masses and the
Crisis of the Malolos Republic, he was invited to teach at the University of the Philippines
where he became the chairman of the Department of History. Besides being a historian he
was also a literary writer. In writing the Revolt of the Masses, Agoncillo’s objective was to
write a biography of Andres Bonifacio, an obscure man whom he said even his sister could
56
not give a clear account of. But instead of just writing a biography of Bonifacio, he wrote
about the biography of the revolution itself. Agoncillo confessed that inconsistencies plagued
the accounts of Artemio Ricarte (a.k.a. Gen. Vibora), Pio del Pilar, Epifanio delos Santos, and
Teodoro Kalaw of Bonifacio and the revolution. But he admitted that in order to resolve the
inconsistencies, he consulted with the, then still alive, Emilio Aguinaldo (a.k.a.
Gen.Magdalo), who was by then already 88 years old when the Revolt of the Masses was
published in 1956.
========================================
Reading 3.1
The Katipunan and the Revolution:
Memoirs of a General1
By Santiago V. Alvarez
Preface
As the country moves toward change, the youth become more discerning and
discriminating regarding the competence of authors, especially those of historical writings.
They begin to question the credentials of anyone who dares to write a history of the people or
even of mere episodes. They look for motivations for such writings and inquire about their
sources.
Before we look into the period of Philippine history concerning the Katipunan and the
Revolution that I discuss in the following pages, I wish to say a few things about my humble
self. I shall be fifty-five years old on 25 July 1927; I was born in the year 1872 in Noveleta,
Cavite. In my early years, I studied under Macario Hernandez at his school located on Camba
Street in Manila. Subsequently, I attended San Juan de Letran College and the University of
Santo Tomas. After the tumultuous cry for national freedom (the Revolution), I resumed my
studies in 1902, at the law school of the Liceo de Manila, and later worked at the law offices
of Felipe Buencamino, Sr., and of R. del Rosario. While working in the latter’s law office, I
earned my law degree.
For five full years, from August 1896 to August 1901, I was one of those who guided
the Revolution. But even before the outbreak of the Revolution, I was already active in the
Katipunan as a member and as a delegate; as such, I was often in the company of the Supremo
Andres Bonifacio, Dr. Pio Valenzuela, and Mr. Emilio Jacinto. We organized chapters and
propagated the movement in general. In the process, I was able to keep some notes about our
experiences. As these were written in pencil on ordinary paper, they are now faded with age
and have become difficult to read, especially by people other than myself. The following
narrative, therefore, is not only of an eyewitness but also of active participant.
1
Lifted from his book by Santiago Alvarez, The Katipunan and the Revolution: Memoirs of a General,
Trans. By Paula Carolina S..Malay , Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila Press, 1977, pp. 3-4, 82-89.
(Source notes and footnotes were intentionally deleted from this reading.)
57
I am greatly indebted to my colleague and friend, Mr. Lope K. Santos, whose

nationalist sentiments encouraged me to undertake this project. He prodded me into writing
these memoirs by arguing that since I could shed more light on the different facets of the
Revolution, I would be doing a service to the youth, whom he saw as the direct beneficiaries
of this work. I myself would prefer that I reconstruct those events from my notes now instead
of somebody else doing it after my death. My notes would appear disjointed and unclear to
anyone else aside from myself, and any attempt to utilize them to write a historical account of
the period would prove of little value.
The events I have related in this account of the Katipunan and the Revolution
reverberate with shouts of “Long live our patriots!” and “Death to the enemy!” These were in
answer to the enemy’s assaults with mausers and cannon, the latter fired from both land and
sea.
The Magdiwang government honored me with an appointment as captain general, or

head of its army. Gen. Artemio Ricarte was lieutenant general.
I will now attempt to write down what I saw and what I know about the Katipunan
and the Revolution. First I shall narrate the events relating to the revolution beginning from
14 March 1896; then I shall deal with the organization and activities of the Society of the
Sons of the People (full name: Kamahalmahalan at Kataastaasang Katipunan ng mga Anak ng
Bayan [The Most Venerable Supreme Society of the Sons of the People]). The Katipunan
account is based on records which were entrusted to me by the original founders of the
Katipunan.
In the interest of honorable truth, I shall now attempt to write a history of the
Katipunan and the Revolution which I hope will be acceptable to all. However, I realize that it
is inevitable that, in the narration of actual happenings, I shall run the risk of hurting the
feelings of contemporaries and comrades-in-arms. I would like to make it clear that I shall try
to be as objective as possible and that it is far from my intention to depreciate anyone’s
patriotism and greatness.
I shall be honored if these memoirs become a worthy addition to what Gen. Artemio
Ricarte has already published in this weekly…
********
The Revolution was facing a grave crisis. The Katipunan forces in Cavite were
suffering defeat after defeat with great loss of life. Magdalo territories had passed to Spanish
hands after the Battles of Salitran, Zapote, and Dalahikan. Imus, the rebel capital was in a
state of imminent collapse. To strengthen defenses so that they could stop the Spanish
advance into the rest of the province that was still held by the Magdiwang and to forestall the
loss of more lives, the Supremo Bonifacio, with the approval of other revolutionary leaders,
called a meeting of the Magdalo and Magdiwang leaders. This meeting, scheduled for 24
March 1897, was postponed for the next day because of the death of Lt. Gen. Crispulo
Aguinaldo, Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo’s brother, on that day in the Battle of Salitran.
The Magdiwang leaders were waiting for their Magdalo counterparts at the Tejeros
friar estate house, the designated place, long after lunch on that day. They had designated
place, long after lunch on that day. They had to start in the afternoon to allow the usual enemy
raids, which came in the morning, to subside before they ventured out to Tejeros, a village in
the municipality of San Francisco de Malabon. When the Magdalo group finally came at
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about five in the afternoon, they brought with the sad news of the death of General Magdalo’s
own brother. Heading a small group, General Magdalo recounted the circumstances of the
heroic death of his patriot brother. Then he begged to be excused to attend to arrangements
for his beloved brother’s funeral. Thus, the meeting was put off for the next day at the same
place.
But before dispersing, Secretary of the Treasury Diego Mojica proposed a resolution
of condolence and prayers for patriots who had died heroically like Lt. Gen. Crispulo
Aguinaldo. The Supremo Bonifacio thought this was superfluous and objected to such a
resolution. “True love of country,” the Supremo argued, “and service to the cause of freedom
for the Motherland are the most noble attributes that would ensure one’s place in heaven. Lt.
Gen. Crispulo Aguinaldo and the comrades who died before him are all truly blessed and are
now in their respective places in the heavenly kingdom. Moreover, they will always occupy
an honored place in the history of our country.”
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The assembly at Tejeros was finally convened on 25 March 1897. The invitations to
the meeting were signed by Secretary Jacinto Lumbreras of the Magdiwang Council, and he
presided over the assembly. Seated with Lumbreras at the long presidential table were the
Supremo Andres Bonifacio, Messrs. Mariano Alvarez, Pascual Alvarez, Ariston Villanueva,
Mariano C. Trias, Diego Mojica, Emiliano R. de Dios, Santiago V. Alvarez, Artemio Ricarte,
Santos Nocon, Luciano San Miguel, Pablo Mojica, Severino de las Alas, and Santiago Rillo,
all of them of the Magdiwang. Among the Magdalo seated at the head table were Messrs.
Baldomero Aguinaldo, Daniel Tirona, and Cayetano Topacio.
It must be mentioned that, before the assembly was convened, Secretary of War
Ariston Villanueva of the Magdawang Council received the confidential information that Mr.
Daniel Tirona of the Magdalo faction was set to undermine the proceedings of the assembly
and that he had already succeeded in enjoining many among the Magdiwang leaders to ally
with him. Secretary Villanueva kept silent, but nevertheless alerted Captain General Apoy,
who had troops in readiness for any sudden eventuality.
The leaders were seated at the presidential table, as previously described, and all the
others were standing in groups on both sides of those seated. After Chairman Jacinto
Lumbreras had declared the assembly open, he announced the main topic of discussion, which
was how to bolster the defenses in the areas still under Magdiwang control. Presently, Mr.
Severino de las Alas rose to speak, and when he was recognized he said, “Before we discuss
minor details, let us first tackle the major issue such as what kind of government we should
have and how we should go about establishing it. Once we make a decision about these
questions, the problem of organization and strengthening of defenses will be resolved.”
“As initiator of the Revolution,” Chairman Lumbreras replied, “the Katipunan now
holds authority over the islands. It has a government of law and a definite program. It is
obeyed and respected by all because it stands for freedom, brotherly love, and a well-
organized and well-run government. The purpose of this meeting is to discuss the best
measures to take to strengthen the Magdiwang government vis-à-vis the enemy. We should
avoid surrendering the headquarters of the Katipunan army should the Magdalo eventually
lose out.”
The chair next recognized the Supremo. He concurred with what Chairman
Lumbreras had just said and explained that the “K” in the middle of the sun in the Katipunan
flag used in the Revolution stood for Kalayaan (freedom).
59
Mr. Severino de las Alas spoke again. He countered that the letter “K” and the sun on
the flag did not indicate whether the revolutionary government was democratic or not.
The Supremo replied that from the rank and file to the highest levels, the Katipunan
was united in its respect for universal brotherhood and equality of men. It was risking
bloodshed and life itself in its struggle against the king, in order to establish a sovereign and
free government. In short, it stood for people’s sovereignty, not a government led by only one
or two.
Mr. Antonio Montenegro spoke in defense of Mr. Severino de las Alas’s stand. He
argued that if they would not agree on the kind of revolutionary government they were to
have and that if they were to let the status quo prevail, then they who were in the Revolution
would be no better than a pack of bandits or of wild, mindless animals.
General Apoy was hurt by these words of Mr. Montenegro. He quickly stood up and
looked angrily at the previous speaker.
“We of the Katipunan,” he began, “are under the jurisdiction of our respected Highest
Council of the sons of the People. This Council is the defender of, and has authority over, the
Magdiwang and Magdalo governments of Cavite. We are true revolutionaries fighting for
freedom of the native land. We are not bandits who rob others of their property and wealth.
Nor should we be likened to beasts, for we know how to protect and defend others, especially
the political refugees who seek asylum with us. We are rational and we do not expose those
who talk big but do not accomplish anything. If you want to establish a different kind of
government that is to your liking, you must do as we have done. Go back to your localities
and snatch them from Spanish control! Then you can do what pleases you; but don’t you dare
seek refuge among cowards who might call you bandits and beasts. And for everybody’s
satisfaction, I am now ordering you arrested!”
Captain General Apoy stopped speaking and looked intently at the person he was
alluding to and ordered a detachment under Maj. Damaso Fojas to keep him under guard.
After a short while, Dr. Jose Rizal’s sister, Trining, and his widow, Josephine, pleaded with
General Apoy not to arrest Mr. Montenegro, but to let him stay at the estate house where they
themselves were staying. They volunteered to be held personally responsible for Mr.
Montenegro while in their custody. Captain General Apoy easily acceded to the request.
The strong and excited denunciation by Captain General Apoy of Mr. Montenegro
alerted the Magdiwang troops. The leaders eyed everyone suspiciously and were only
awaiting a signal from General Apoy for them to begin shooting. Disorder ensued and
disrupted the assembly.
When order was restored, some wanted the convention adjourned, but the Supremo
Bonifacio prevailed upon the others to continue. However, the presiding officer, Mr.
Lumbreras, refused to resume his role of chairman. He wanted to yield the chair to the
Supremo whom he thought to be the rightful chairman.
The Katipunan, as you know,” Mr. Lumbreras explained, “was responsible from the
beginning for the spread of the revolutionary movement throughout the Philippines. But
because of the disaffection of some, this assembly was called to establish a new overall
revolutionary council. If we are to pursue this ambitious and important undertaking, only the
Supremo has the right to preside at this assembly, for he is the Father of the Katipunan and
the Revolution.”
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Mr. Lumbreras’s speech was well received and his proposal was unanimously
accepted. The Supremo Bonifacio assumed the chairmanship accordingly and said, “Your aim
is to establish a new overall government of the Katipunan of the Sons of the People. This
would repudiate the decisions made at the meeting held at the friar estate house in Imus. In
my capacity as President-Supremo” of the Most Venerable Katipunan of the Sons of the
People, I agree and we should respect all decisions properly discussed and approved in all our
meetings. We should respect and abide by the wishes of the majority.”
Because of a repeated clamor for the approval of the establishment of a government

of the Philippine Republic, the chair proceeded to prepare for an election to the following
positions: president, minister of finance, minister of welfare, minister of justice, and captain
general.
The Supremo spoke again before the election began. He said that the candidate who
would get the most number of votes for each position should be the winner, no matter what
his station in life or his educational attainment. What should matter was that the candidate had
never been a traitor to the cause of the Motherland. Everyone agreed and there were shouts of
approval such as, “That is how it should be – equality for everyone! Nobody should be higher
nor lower than the other. May love of country prevail!”
The Supremo Bonifacio appointed Gen. Artemio Ricarte as secretary. Then, with the
help of Mr. Daniel Tirona, he distributed pieces of paper to serve as ballots. When the ballots
had been collected and the votes were ready to be canvassed, Mr. Diego Mojica, the
Magdiwang secretary of the treasury, warned the Supremo that many ballots distributed were
already filled out and that the voters had not done this themselves. The Supremo ignored this
remark. He proceeded with the business at hand as if nothing unusual had happened.
When the votes for president were counted, Mr. Emilio Aguinaldo won over Mr.
Andres Bonifacio, the Supremo. The winner was acclaimed by applause and shouts of
“Mabuhay!” (Long live!).
Mr. Severino de las Alas spoke again to say that since the Supremo Bonifacio had
received the second highest number of votes for the presidency, he should be proclaimed
vice-president of the government of the Philippine Republic. When nobody signified approval
or disapproval of the proposal, the presiding officer, the Supremo Bonifacio ruled that the
election be continued. For vice-president, Mr. Mariano Trias won over Mr. Mariano Alvarez
and the Supremo Bonifacio. General Vibora was elected captain over General Apoy. General
Vibora demurred, saying that he had neither the ability nor the right to assume the new
position. But General Apoy cut short his objections by saying that he personally vouched for
General Vibora’s competence and right to occupy the position to which he was elected.
General Apoy’s endorsement was greeted with shouts of “Long live the newly elected captain
general!”
Mr. Baldomero Aguinaldo wanted the elections to be finished before it got too dark.
To facilitate the counting of votes, he suggested that for all other positions to be voted upon,
voters should stand on one side of the hall if in favor and on the other side if against. The
suggestion was adopted for the rest of the election. For the position of secretary of war, Mr.
Emiliano R. de Dios was elected overwhelmingly over Messrs. Santiago V. Alvarez, Ariston
Villanueva, and Daniel Tirona. After the voters had given the proper honors to the new
secretary of war, they proceeded to elect the secretary of the interior. Mr. Andres Bonifacio,
the Supremo, won over Mr. Mariano Alvarez. The crowd broke into shouts of “Mabuhay!”
Mr. Daniel Tirona requested for a restoration of order and then spoke aloud.
61
“My brethren, the office of secretary of the interior is of so great a scope and of such
sensitivity that we should not entrust it to one who is not a lawyer. One among us is a lawyer.
He is Mr. Jose del Rosario. Let us reconsider the choice for the last position, for, he has no
credentials to show attesting to any educational attainment.
Then in as loud a voice as he could muster, Tirona shouted, “Let us elect Mr. Jose del
Rosario, the lawyer!”
Greatly embarrassed, the Supremo Bonifacio quickly stood up and said, “We agreed
to abide by the majority vote and accept its choice no matter what the station in life of the
person elected. And because of this, I demand from you, Mr. Daniel Tirona, an apology. You
must restore to the voters and the one they elected the honor you have only now besmirched.”
Then he pulled out his revolver and took aim.
Instead of replying, Mr. Tirona ignored the Supremo’s remarks and, perhaps because
of fear, he slid away and got lost in the crowd. Disorder ensued as the convention secretary
tried to disarm the Supremo, who was intent on shooting Mr. Tirona. The people began to
disperse and the Supremo adjourned the meeting with these words:
“In my capacity as chairman of this convention and as President-Supremo of the Most

Venerable Katipunan of the Sons of the People which association is known and
acknowledged by all, I hereby declare null and void all matters approved in this meeting.”
Then he left quickly and was followed by his aides and some others present.
Mr. Baldomero Aguinaldo, the Magdalo president, did not leave San Francisco de
Malabon that night, in order to convince the Magdiwang leaders to reconvene the disrupted
meeting the following day. They agreed to his proposal. That same night rumor had it that
Messrs. Mariano Trias, Daniel Tirona, Emiliano R. de Dios, Santiago Rillo, and others were
in the parish house of the Catholic church at Tanza (Santa Cruz de Malabon), and that they
were conferring with the priest, Fr. Cenon Villafranca. Many attested to seeing them, but no
one knew what they talked about.
On the request of Magdalo Pres. Baldomero Aguinaldo, a meeting was called at the
same friar estate house in Tejeros. Called on the day after the tumultuous convention, its
purpose was to continue and revalidate the proceedings of the election meeting, to revive their
former alliances, and to restore cordiality and fraternal love in their relations. Aside from the
Supremo Andres Bonifacio, among the Magdiwang who attended were Messrs. Mariano
Alvarez, Diego Mojica, Ariston Villanueva, Pascual Alvarez, Jacinto Lumbreras, Santiago
Alvarez, Artemio Ricarte, Nicolas Portilla, Santos Nocon, and Fr. Manuel Trias, the parish
priest of San Francisco de Malabon. They waited until five that afternoon, but none of the
Magdalo members came, not even their president who had initiated what would have been a
reconciliation meeting.
That same night it was rumored that the Magdalo leaders were currently holding their
own meeting at the parish house in Tanza. Though it had reason to be apprehensive because
the Magdalo were meeting in territory under its jurisdiction, the Magdiwang leadership
looked the other way because the Magdalo were hard-pressed for meeting places since its
territories had all been taken by the Spanish enemy.
The next morning, 27 M arch 2897, eyewitnesses who had spied on the proceedings
revealed that, indeed, a meeting had taken place at the Tanza parish house and that the
62
Supremo’s decisions regarding the election at the friar estate house were not respected. These
revelations surfaced despite denials from many sectors.
At the gathering in the “Tanza parish house, those elected at the Tejeros convention
knelt before a crucifix and in the name of the Holy Father, the highest pontiff of the Roman
Catholic church, invoked the martyred saints and solemnly took their office. F. Cenon
Villafranca officiated. With Messrs. Severino de las Alas and Daniel Tiona as witnesses, the
following took their oaths of office: Messrs. Emilio Aguinaldo, Mariano C. Trias, and
Artemio Ricarte. Conspicuously absent was the Supremo Andres Bonifacio, who was not
invited although he was one of those elected to office. It will be recalled that as chairman of
the Tejeros convention, he declared null and void all matters approved by the assembly
because of a grave violation of a principle agreed upon before the election.
It should be noted here that, unknown to the Matdiwang Council, the Magdalo posted
troops to guard the Tanza parish house for their oath-taking ceremonies. The troops were
under strict orders not to admit any of unwanted Magdiwang partisans. If the news about the
secret ceremony had leaked out earlier, and the underdogs in the power struggle had
attempted to break into it, they would have been annihilated then and there.
33
The Spaniards captured and occupied the town of Imus in the afternoon of 25 March
1897. They left three days afterwards and marched into the San Francisco de Malabon
territory up to the village of Bakaw. When they reached Bakaw, they were intercepted by
Mardiwang troops led by Supremo Bonifacio and General Apoy. A pitched battle ensued. But
the Magdiwang initiative was foiled by the arrival of a great number of enemy reinforcements
at the height of the encounter. In the face of such an unfavorable situation, the Supremo
decided on a tactical retreat to their fortifications. General Apoy for his part, ordered Major
Baluyot to rally all other armed units of the Magdiwang army and assign them to the Tarike
fortifications in San Francisco de Malabon.
After the battle, the Spaniards encamped and rested in Bakaw, but throughout the
night they were harassed with potshots from small Katipunan bands.
Anticipating that the enemy encamped at Bakaw would try to penetrate the strong
Dalahikan fortifications in Noveleta from the rear, General Apoy ordered General San Miguel
to pull out all troops from Dalahikan and transfer them to some other fort.
On 3 April, the Supremo made a bid to recapture Noveleta. General Vibora and Gen.
Santos Nocon accompanied him in the offensive, which lasted the whole day. But despite a
fierce determination on their part and heavy enemy losses, they were unable to dislodge the
Spaniards.
A few days after the Supremo’s unsuccessful attempt to retake Noveleta, fresh
Spanish reinforcements began arriving in great numbers in the open fields to the west of
Bakaw and along the seashores of Noveleta and Salinas. At nine that morning, artillery fire
from mountain cannons began battering the San Francisco de Malabon fortifications,
extending from Tejeros to Tarike. A two-hour shelling was followed by ground attack by
cavalry and infantry troops.
63
After preliminary skirmishes, man-to-man combat broke out at the Tarike fort. It
became a fierce battleground as the rebels made a valiant defense. Every head that emerged
from either side was quickly bashed in or severed at the neck. All that could be heard was the
rattle of gleaming blades, the burst of gunfire, and the thud of bodies as they fell against the
earth. Wielding a variety of arms such as spears, machetes, daggers, revolvers, and rifles, the
combatants locked in struggle and fell together. In one instance, the tip of a bayonet piercing
somebody’s middle came out straight through the back of another who himself had a pointed
machete sticking in his chest. In another instance, one who was mortally wounded by a sharp
dagger inflicted killed by the other’s gun. Another pair who fell together each had bayonet
thrusts, one through the navel and the other above the chest. Some had severed heads, others,
severed hands or feet.
General Apoy and the Supremo Bonifacio lost many gallant troops in this bloody and
miserable battle. Among those who died were the valiant Maj. Pio Baluyot and head soldiers
Francisco Arnaldo, Juan Brosas, Lucio Poblete, and Nicomedes Esguerra. The enemy rode
roughshod over their bodies as they rushed into town to raise their flag of victory and to burn
houses.
Very early that morning before the battle, Captain General Apoy had visited the
Tarike fort to boost the morale of the Magdiwang and Balara troops. Then at past seven
o’clock, they saw the Spaniards massing a great number of their troops. The commanders of
the Magdiwang and the Balara contingents thought it was the better part of discretion if the
captain general was not with them inside the fort when the expected attack took place. Thus,
Major Baluyot and Captain Olaes escorted him across the river to the west of the town of San
Francisco de Malabon.
Gen. Pio del Pilar and his troops, along with a small detachment from Imus, came to
help the defense of San Francisco de Malabon, but for some unknown reason he withdrew
even before the enemy could attack. He made his withdrawal without notifying those inside
the fort.
Coming from Imus and Kawit, the enemy took Noveleta without resistance. They
captured the fortifications and collected Katipunan arms and ammunition. Coming in and
spreading out into the open fields around Imus, Kawit, Noveleta, and San Francisco de
Malabon, they overwhelmed the People’s troops with their sheer number.
******
Reading 3.2
Revolt of the Masses2

By Teodoro A. Agoncillo
22
Lifted from his book by Teodoro A. Agoncillo,The Revolt of the Masses. Quezon City: University of
the Philippines Press, 1956, pp. vii-xii, 200-217. (Source notes and footnotes were intentionally deleted
from this reading.)
64
Foreword
It was with great difficulty and trepidation that I was finally able to persuade myself
to sit down to attempt a biography of Andres Bonifacio. For no one who has gone through the
available sources on the first epoch of the Philippine Revolution, which includes, necessarily,
the history of the Katipunan and its plebian founder, can fail to note with dismay and with a
sense of loss, that it is practically impossible for any one man to write a fairly complete story
of Bonifacio’s life. For the Plebian Hero, the first truly Filipino democrat, suffered from two
disadvantages.
On the one hand was his lowly and obscure origin, and on the other was the plethora
of supposedly reliable documents on his trial and death. Because of his obscure origin, none
of his contemporaries, not even his sister, could give clear and accurate data on his life.
Indeed, because he was a mere bodeguero, they did not suspect that he would become a
national figure and so do not remember much about him. I tried hard to pump dry his living
contemporaries to obtain necessary and important information – to no avail! None of them
could characterize him either as a man or as a leader of the Katipunan which he made into a
vibrant force that challenged Spanish might and prestige.
On the other hand, the numerous documents on the trial and death of Bonifacio make
it sufficiently taxing for a student of the period to pick out which are reliable and which are
not. Some of the accounts were obviously manufactured by certain dramatis personae to
make themselves appear in good light; others contain accounts of incidents that never
happened. There was, too, the play of personal prejudices, and out of this welter of confusing
opinions and narratives, one who is not direful enough in one’s researches comes out of the
labyrinth like a dazed man blinking in the glare of the sun after long hours spent in a dark
room.
In dealing with Andres Bonifacio and the Katipunan, I have laid more emphasis on
the latter than on its founder and organizer, firstly, because of the dearth of materials on his
life, and secondly, because it is my belief that Bonifacio can best be seen and appreciated
against the backdrop of the revolutionary society. He could not have been greater than the
Katipunan. Nor could he have risen above it. To understand him, one must understand the
Katipunan. He looms great because of the society. He must, therefore, be seen in and through
the Katipunan, and this method of unraveling the thin and scattered threads of his life is valid
only because of the lack of materials.
In examining my sources of information, I have adopted the attitude of friendly

hostility. It has been my experience that most of the errors in the difficult task of
interpretation – which, after all, is the most important in any book – spring from the scholar’s
uncritical attitude. He takes for granted that the fame of an author is sufficient guaranty of
reliability and competence. Such mental outlook smacks of hypocrisy and cowardice. I have,
therefore, dismissed this line of reasoning as inadequate. In his book, I have subjected my
sources to a severe scrutiny, looked for loopholes, inconsistencies, and inaccuracies in order
to arrive at a balanced conclusion. Ricarte, for instance, hitherto regarded as incontrovertible,
is, after a careful examination, not always accurate and reliable. So are certain documents on
the trial and death of Bonifacio. And so are some of the opinions expressed by the great
scholars Epifanio de los Santos and Teodoro M. Kalaw. I shall probably hear loud protests
and whispered innuendoes, but I invite the potential objectors to my method to read my Notes
carefully, for in them I have embodied the reasons for repudiating some of the claims of
famous scholars, for dismissing this authority and for accepting that document.
No controversial points are discussed in the main body of the book. Only my own
conclusions are there set forth, whereas the arguments to support them are sufficiently
65
clarified, I hope, in the Notes. This method, I believe, makes for easy reading and saves the
readers from being rudely interrupted in their reading. To include the discussions of doubtful
points and the footnotes in the main text would be to make the book a dull and protracted law
brief. It is as if in the midst of a lively conversation between two friends, a maid suddenly
appeared to tell the host that a salesman was at the door. In the second place, I refuse to argue
the positions I have taken in the main narrative, believing, likewise, that it is improper of me
to dispute things with my visitor – in this case, the reader – in the sala. I have thought it best
to argue in the backroom – in the Notes at the end of the book.
With the help of General Emilio Aguinaldo, who was very cooperative with me, I
was able to throw light on hitherto obscure and highly controversial episodes, thereby
correcting serious mistakes and misconceptions about some phases of the Revolution. I trust
that with the data I have included in this book, and which I have interpreted, other students of
the Revolution will be inspired to carry on where I left off. If this leads to the writing of a
better book in the near or distant future, I shall consider my efforts not wasted and my work
not written in vain.
THE AUTHOR
Manila, 12 April 1948
********
Twelve:
Seeds of Discontent
In the first flush of rebel victory climaxing the simultaneous attacks upon the Spanish
garrisons and convents, followed by the dismal failure of Governor-General Blanco to smash
the insurgent power, the Katipunan of Cavite divided into two factions, the Magdiwang and
the Magdalo, immediately proceeded to reorganize the province along partisan lines. Each
faction exercised sovereign power over a number of towns including those in Batangas
bordering Cavite. Thus Talisay, a town in Batangas, was under the Magdalo government,
while Nasubgu, Tuwi and Look, in the same province, belonged to the Magdiwang. As
independent entities, the leaders of the town provincial councils never got together to elect
one supreme council that would hold sway over the entire province. The Magdiwang,
proceeding with its election independently of the Magdalo, chose the following men to
administer its government: Mariano Alvarez, President; Pascual Alvarez, Executive
Secretary; Emiliano Riego de Dios, Minister of the Interior (Pagpapaunlad); Mariano Trias,
Minister of Grace and Justice; Ariston Villanueva, Minister of War; Santiago Alvarez,
Commander-in-Chief; Diego Moxica, Minister of Finance; Artemio Ricarte and Mariano
Riego de Dios, Military commanders with the rank of Brigadier-General. On the other hand,
the Magdalo elected the following to take the reins of its government; Baldomero Aguinaldo,
President; Candido Tirona, Minister of War; Cayetano Topacio, Minister of Finance; Emilio
Aguinaldo, Commander-in-Chief; Edilberto Evangelista, Lieutenant-General; Vito Belarmino
and Crispulo Aguinaldo, Military Commanders with the rank of Brigadier-General. Since the
organization of the Magdiwang, its capital had been Noveleta, but in the early part of
November, when General Blanco began his offensive, the capital was moved to San Francisco
66
de Malabon and later to Naik. The Magdalo, for its part, had its capital in Kawit and when it
fell , Imus, San Francisco de Malabon, Naik and Maragondon successively became its seat.
An attempt was made by both factions to make their respective armies wear the same
uniform. It was agreed to adopt the following insignia: for the President’s cap, a sun with
golden rays on a white background, a K (Katipunan), and the letters A.N.B. (Anak ng Bayan),
in the middle. The same insignia was used for the sleeves. The Minister had the same insignia
as the President’s except that the letters A.N.B. were not included. The bands on the sleeves of
a Minister, including the K, were of different colors according to the Ministry to which each
belonged. The Minister of War had a red K on a white background, a sun on the cap, a sun on
the left breast but none on the sleeves. The plan, however, did not go beyond the paper stage,
as the rebels did not have the means to buy the uniform.
When Cavite, led by its rival factions, successfully rose in revolt, the leaders fell into
disputes arising from the desire of one group to lord it over the other. Since both groups were
responsible for the rebel victories, neither would bow to the other or allow itself to be placed
under its rival’s command. There was no serious open breach, but the silent conflict, more
ominous that it appeared on the surface, threatened to wreck the unity that in the beginning
had done much to prevent the foe from overrunning the whole province and annihilating the
revolution at its very inception. It was this conflict, more than anything else, that led to the
rebel’s defeat at the hands of Polavieja. The Magdiwang faction, believing that as the initiator
of the revolution in Cavite it had the priority right to rule over the insurgents of the province,
looked with disdain at the way the Magdalo men refused to cooperate with it. The Magdalo
followers, believing that most of the victories in the whole territory were won by their leaders,
wanted to appear the stronger and, therefore, the better fitted to rule.
The situation, though not so serious on the surface, led the Magdiwang men to invite
Andres Bonifacio to visit Cavite and see for himself all that had been accomplished by the
revolutionists in that area and to intervene in the conflict. A delegate was sent to look for the
Supremo in the mountains of Montalban and Mariquina to apprise him of the urgent necessity
of mediating on the widening rift between the two popular councils. Bonifacio, informed of
the situation, refused to heed the request of the Magdiwang leaders on the ground that in order
to succeed in the revolution against Spain the leaders must not be concentrated in a single
place. This preliminary contact with the Supremo resulted in the periodic exchanges of
communications between him and the Magdiwang chieftains. On the third invitation, written
by Artemio Ricarte upon the instruction of Mariano Alvarez, Bonifacio acceded to the
request. With his wife and two brothers, Ciriaco and Procopio, Bonifacio left for Cavite about
the middle of December 1896. Emilio Aguinaldo, Candido Tirona and Edilberto Evangelista
were on hand to meet the Supremo and his entourage at Zapote. It was at this preliminary
meeting that a misunderstanding arose between the Magdalo leaders and Bonifacio, for the
former, rightly or wrongly, saw from Bonifacio’s gestures and behavior that he regarded
himself superior and “acted as if he were a king.” Even so, the hard feelings that Bonifacio’s
unconscious and unintentional actions engendered remained submerged and flared up only in
the Imus Assembly.
Bonifacio was brought by the rebel leaders to the house of Juan Castañeda in Imus,
where he was visited by Baldomero Aguinaldo, Daniel Tirona, Vicente Fernandez and others.
The Supremo, upon seeing Fernandez, ordered his arrest. For Bonifacio, remembering that
Fernandez was the same man, who had promised, before the battle of San Juan, to attack the
Spaniards in Laguna and Morong simultaneously with Bonifacio’s offensive in San Juan del
Monte but whose promise was never carried out, now saw his chance to punish the offender.
Bonifacio blamed him for the defeat in San Juan and was determined that he should not go
unpunished. As Supreme Head of the Katipunan, Bonifacio took it for granted that he would
be obeyed by all. To his surprise and dismay, the Magdalo chieftains, to whom Fernandez had
67
run for shelter refused to give up their man. The Supremo by then had realized that he had
very little, if any, influence in the Magdalo area. With doubts crisscrossing his mind and
misgivings assailing his heart, Bonifacio, on January 2, 1897, wrote from San Francisco de
Malabon to his uncle-in-law, Mariano Alvarez:
President Mainam: Don’t fail to come this very moment for I want to talk to you
privately about what happened to me in Magdalo and so that you might explain their
organization to me.
Meanwhile, Esteban San Juan invited Bonifacio to attend the demonstration of the
Magdiwang rebels in Noveleta. Accompanied by San Juan himself, Baldomero Aguinaldo
and Candido Tirona, Bonifacio arrived at Noveleta amidst the enthusiastic acclamation of the
people. At three in the afternoon, a parade took place in which Bonifacio, riding in a carriage
and flanked on both sides by the Magdiwang soldiers in red uniform, was the object of the
demonstration. As the parade wound its way toward San Francisco de Malabon, the people
shouted, “Long live the ruler of the Philippines!” to which Bonifacio answered: “Long live
Philippine Liberty!” Upon arriving at Malabon, he was quartered in the house of Santos
Nocon and, later, in the house of Mrs. Estafania Potente, where he stayed until the Spaniards
captured the town in April 1897.
THE MISUNDERSTANDING THAT existed between the followers of the Magdiwang and
the Magdalo, so destructive of the Katipunan plans, deepened into mutual suspicion and
jealousies that resulted in military reverses in several sectors. Polavieja’s counter-offensives
led to the fall of several towns hitherto held by the rebels, and the attitude of non-cooperation
exhibited by one faction when the other was harassed by the enemy led, as it must, to disaster
in the field. The situation, both camps believed, could only be remedied by coming together
and threshing out differences of opinion and solving, ultimately, the question of leadership in
the province. For this purpose, the leaders of the Magdiwang and the Magdalo decided to call
a convention or assembly at Imus.
In the assembly hall, the two factions met (on December 31, 1896) and exchanged the
usual greetings. Bonifacio entered, proceeded to the head of the table and unceremoniously
occupied the chair. He beckoned to the Magdiwang Ministers to sit at his right side. This
obvious partiality to the Magdiwang was resented by the Magdalo, for as Supreme Head of
the Katipunan who was called upon the mediate between the two factions, Bonifacio was
expected to show impartiality. But his actions in the case were motivated by his regard for his
wife’s uncle, Mariano Alvarez, the President of the Magdiwang – a fact that aggravated their
situation. Even so, the Magdalo men did not show their resentment but kept silent in order to
prevent further misunderstanding between the followers of both camps. Seeing that
Bonifacio had called his Ministers, Baldomero Aguinaldo, President of the Magdalo, without
being invited, sat to the left of Bonifacio. General Emilio Aguinaldo, seeing his position as a
purely military one, was content to be a mere observer. He had, however, a plan of his own.
Since it was the intention of his faction to propose the establishment of a revolutionary
government, he had decided beforehand that in the coming election for the presidency he
would nominate and support Edilberto Evangelista, since among them all “Evangelista was
the best educated.” Bonifacio knew of Aguinaldo’s active electioneering in favor of
Evangelista and was deeply hurt, for as founder and Supreme Head of the Katipunan he felt
that the presidency should be given to him as a reward.
The assembly opened with Bonifacio as Chairman. It was evident, when Baldomero
Aguinaldo made the proposal to establish a revolutionary government, that the two factions
would never come to an understanding. The Magdalo men contended that the continuance of
the Katipunan government was no longer necessary, for since the start of the Revolution the
Society had ceased to remain a secret society and must therefore be supplanted by one that
68
would be better fit the situation. The Magdalo people further contended that being small,
Cavite must not be divided between the two factions. On the other hand, the Magdiwang
followers argued that the Katipunan already had a constitution and by-laws duly approved and
enforced in the Islands and that, by virtue of this, provincial and municipal governments in
and around Manila had already been established. There was, therefore, no necessity of
establishing a new government. Even so, the Magdiwang Minister of War, Ariston
Villanueva, stood up and said that if a new government was to be established, Andres
Bonifacio, who had organized and planned the entire revolutionary movement, must of right
occupy the presidency without election. Further, he pointed out that as Chairman and
Supremo, Bonifacio should be given blanket authority to appoint the Ministers. The Magdalo
group strenuously objected and insisted on the election. The discussion became heated and
did not accomplish any tangible result. The assembly was adjourned and each faction left
without any definite understanding.
Suspicions and jealousies continued to plague the ranks of the rebels and even among
the members of the same faction petty quarrels continued to come up. The Magdalo followers
suspected the Magdiwang of courting the favor of the Spaniards, while the same suspicion
was aroused in the Magdiwang as regards the Magdalo. In a situation where the Magdalo
needed the help of the Magdiwang, the latter, to which Bonifacio belonged, refused to come
to the aid of the former. Moreover, the Magdiwang followers were themselves occupied, now
and then, with petty jealousies and quarrels that tended to demoralize the soldiers. Thus, when
the town fiesta of San Francisco de Malabon was held in January 1897, the rebels, then
enjoying the afternoon games, were disturbed by a series of rifle shots that sent them
scampering away to places of safety. Thinking that the enemy was approaching, Ariston
Villanueva and Santiago Alvarez gathered their men and prepared to meet an attack. They
later found out that the rifle shots came from the men of Captain Mariano San Gabriel, also a
Magdiwang man, who trigger-happy, had fired several shots in the air. Alvarez’s men tried to
disarm the offending soldiers, but instead were themselves disarmed. Alvarez was furious and
demanded that San Gabriel disarm his men. The latter refused and left for Noveleta. It was
only through Ricarte’s intervention that the two men, Alvarez and San Gabriel, were brought
together again as comrades.
The situation had not eased up a bit when the leaders of the Magdiwang planned to
hold another convention, this time in the estate-house of Tejeros, a Madiwang territory
situated about two kilometers from San Francisco de Malabon and about half a kilometer
under the Magdalo, comprising the towns of Kawit, Bakood and Imus, was at the time
seriously threatened by the Spanish army which occupied the estate-house of Salitran and
which had dug in as a preparatory step to the battle that was about to commence. General
Emilio Aguinaldo, leading the Magdalo soldiers, faced the Spaniards in Salitran, a barrio
between the towns of Imus and Dasmariñas. It was March 22, 1897, Aguinaldo’s birthday,
when simultaneously the battle raged and the assembly convened at Tejeros.
The delegates, mostly belonging to the Magdiwang, lazily trooped that sultry
afternoon to the spacious estate-house of Tejeros. Some of the men were barefoot; others
wore buri hats or were dressed in barong Tagalog. They came from all directions from Kawit,
Noveleta and Imus to the north; from Tanza to the west, and from San Francisco de Malabon
to the northeast. The estate-house, surrounded by stone walls and built in the middle of the
six-hectare farm owned by the friars and now in rebel hands, had 60-meter frontage. The
entrance was through an arched gate connected to the rear arched gate by a long and wide
corridor. To the right, a few meters from the front gate, were the stairs. Directly opposite the
stairs was a storage room, and next to it, to the rear, was the chapel. Directly opposite this and
next to the stairs was another storage room. Up the stairs was the big hall, with the doors of
thirty-four rooms opening to it. In the rear of a room to the right were the dining room and the
azotea that commanded a beautiful view of the fields around and the murky Ilog Kawayan on
69
whose banks thick clumps of bamboo protected the house from the glare of the sun. The
estate-house stood alone in that wide expanse of riceland. Directly opposite the house and
across the road was more riceland (tubigan). The long road that commenced from the town of
Salinas led directly to San Francisco de Malabon, and half a kilometer from the estate house it
branched off to the right, where a bridge connected the latter town to the town of Tanza or
Santa Cruz de Malabon.
It was this place, the former summer resort of the friars, that witnessed the first
important election held under the auspices of the Katipunan government. An invitation was
sent by the Magdiwang chieftains to the Magdalo followers to attend the meeting, but because
of the battle then raging around the locality not all the Magdalo leaders were able to attend.
The Magdiwang was represented by Andres Bonifacio, Mariano Alvarez, Pascual Alvarez,
Santiago Alvarez, Luciano San Miguel, Mariano Trias, Severino de las Alas, Santos Nocon
and others, while Magdalo was represented by Baldomero Aguinaldo, Daniel Tirona,
Cayetano Topacio, Antonio Montenegro and others. The estate-house buzzed with life as
more rebels, some of them uninvited, came to the convention. It was past two in the afternoon
when the meeting was formally opened.
Jacinto Lumbreras, acting president of the Magdiwang, took the chair and opened the
convention with introductory remarks summing up the purpose of the meeting. To his right
sat Teodoro Gonzales, also a Magdiwang, who acted as secretary. Severino de las Alas, a
Magdiwang, immediately took the floor and explained that before discussing ways and means
of defending such a small area as Cavite, the convention assembled should first of all agree
upon the kind of government that should be set up to administer the whole country under the
prevailing circumstances. “From this government,” he said, “any thing that is necessary in the
defense of the country can emanate.” The presiding officer, however, reminded the speaker
that a government had already been established upon the founding of the Katipunan, its
Supreme Council, its Provisional Councils and its Popular Councils, and that the meeting was
called to adopt defensive measures. At this juncture, Bonifacio spoke and supplemented
Lumbreras’ explanation, calling the attention of those assembled to the Katipunan with a K in
the middle, which embodied the ideal of the revolutionists, namely, liberty. De las Alas, not
contented with the Supremo’s explanation, countered that the K in the flag of the Katipunan
did not in any way identify the kind of government that they had, whether such government
was monarchical or republican. Bonifacio remarked that all the Katipuneros, from the
Supreme Head to the lowest member, recognized the principle of Unity, Fraternity and
Equality. “It can be seen” he said, “that the Government of the Association of the Sons of the
People is republican in form.”
The discussion was going nowhere and tempers ran high as the men insisted on their
own points of view. So far, the discussion was between the men of the same faction. In an
unfortunate moment, a Magdalo man, Antonio Montenegro, stood up and, shouting at the top
of his voice, took issue with Bonifacio. “If we do not act upon the suggestion of Mr. de las
Alas,” he said, “we, the rebels will be likened unto a mere pack of highway robbers, or worse,
like animals without reason.” The words, uttered in good faith and in the belief that something
must be done to have a new government organized, touched off a sensitive spot in the hearts
of the Magdiwang listeners. Santiago Alvarez, a Magdiwang, pricked to anger, took the floor
and, throwing a malicious side-glance at Montenegro, retorted: “We, the rebels of Cavite,
especially those under the Magdiwang, recognize the Government organized by the
Association of the Sons of the People. And if you want to set up another form of government,
you can go back your province and wrest the authority from the Spaniards, as we have already
done. As such, you can do whatever you want to and nobody would interfere with you. We of
Cavite,” he added with a meaning full of bitterness, “we of Cavite do not need and will never
need any adviser of your own standing only.”
70
Pandemonium reigned as the voice of Santiago Alvarez boomed inside the spacious
sala. His bodyguards, planted near the stairs, moved ominously – all set to fire at those inside
the hall. Lumbreras, sensing the explosive situation, tactfully called a recess to give sufficient
time for the angry men to cool off. At the end of an hour, the meeting was resumed. Jacinto
Lumbreras, seeing that it would be useless for him to continue to preside in such an
atmosphere, refused to take the chair, saying. “As the question under discussion is completely
outside of what is mentioned in the agenda of the meeting and is concerned instead with the
establishment of an over-all government of the revolution, I should not continue to preside
over this session.” Then he took his seat among the members, and Andres Bonifacio, who was
acclaimed by all to succeed him, took the chair as the presiding officer by virtue of his being
the President of the Supreme Council of the Katipunan. He then called the meeting to order an
said: “As you desire to set up a supreme government to direct the revolution, abolishing what
was organized by the Katipunan and repudiating the resolution approved in the Assembly of
Imus, as President of the Supreme Council of the Katipunan, I accede to your just petition, but
first of all I want to ask you to recognize a principle as a basis of agreement in this or in other
meetings, which is: that we respect and obey the will of the majority.” Those present saw the
justice and wisdom of his proposition and assented unanimously.
The Republic of the Philippines was then and there proclaimed amidst enthusiastic
hurrahs. With a new form of government determined to take the place of the Katipunan, the
election of officers was then prepared. Nine officers were to be elected by popular vote,
namely, President, Vice-President, Captain-General, Director of War, Director of Interior,
Director of State, Director of Finance, Director of Fomento and Director of Justice. Before
proceeding with the election, Bonifacio, probably assailed by all the electors representing the
different regions of the Philippines to the principle that whoever would be elected should be
recognized and respected regardless of his social condition and education. The proposal,
made in the form of a mere statement and reminder, was approved, for in that convention very
few, if any, were men of high intellectual attainments. The ballots were prepared and
distributed. The balloting was made successively, that is, the office of the President was first
voted upon, after which the other offices were filled in singly. After an hour, the ballots were
cast for the presidency, and Emilio Aguinaldo won in absentia over Andres Bonifacio and
Mariano Trias. The President-elect was proclaimed with loud shouts and applause.
Before the ballots were cast for the Vice-Presidency, Severino de las Alas stood up
and suggested that in as much as Bonifacio had received the second largest number of votes
he should automatically be allowed to occupy the Vice-Presidency. The men assembled
appeared lukewarm to the suggestion, there being no one who approved or disapproved it.
Consequently, Bonifacio decided to continue with the election of the Vice-President. Mariano
Trias was elected to the position over Andres Bonifacio, Severino de las Alas and Mariano
Alvarez. The election of the Captain-General came next and Ricarte, the acting Secretary of
the convention, came out over Santiago Alvarez. With a modesty that sprang from the
realization of the responsibility attached to the position, Ricarte stood up and declared: “None
better than I know my own limitations and fitness: the position with which this assembly
honors me is beyond my scant ability and strength; to me it is a very honorable position but
its horizon is too wide for me: so I request the assembly not to resent my refusal to accept it.
Ricarte’s modesty, genuine or assumed, proved effective. Cries of disapproval followed his
request to be relieved, and the disturbance created by the enthusiastic followers of the General
forced Bonifacio to call the meeting to order. Then “It is getting dark,” he said, “so we have
to proceed to the election to other positions.” Somebody suggested that in order to expedite
the election to the remaining positions, the electors should step to one side when their
candidates were called, a proposal that was immediately approved. In this manner, the
following were elected: Director of War, Emiliano Riego de Dios, who won over Ariston
Villanueva, Daniel Tirona and Santiago Alvarez, Director of Interior, Andres Bonifacio, who
won over Mariano Alvarez and Pascual Alvarez.
71
The election of Bonifacio gave rise to an incident that nearly ended in a bloody affair.
Amidst the acclamations that followed the announcement of his election, Daniel Tirona, a
Magdalo man, stood up and said: “The position of Director of the Interior is an exalted one
and it is not meet that a person without a lawyer’s diploma should occupy it. We have in our
province a lawyer, Jose del Rosario; therefore, we should protest against the elected and
acclaimed.” And, shouting at the top of his voice, he added: “Let us vote for Jose del
Rosario!” No one, however, took up the suggestion which was shouted four times.
Nevertheless, Bonifacio felt insulted and he turned crimson with anger. Controlling himself,
he demanded that Daniel Tirona retract what he had said. “Did we not agree,” he added,”that
we have to abide by the decision of the majority whatever may be the social standing of the
elected?” He insisted that Tirona give satisfaction to the assembly for his defamatory words.
But Tirona ignored Bonifacio and tried to lose himself in the crowd. In the flush of his anger,
Bonifacio whipped out his pistol to fire at Tirona but Ricarte grabbed his hand and thus
prevented what might have been a tragic affair. The people then began to leave the hall, and
Bonifacio, frustrated and deeply wounded in feeling, cried aloud: “I, as chairman of this
assembly, and as President of the Supreme Council of the Katipunan, as all of you do not
deny, declare this assembly dissolved.” With this parting statement, he left the hall, followed
by his men.
THE SEED OF DISCONTENT, resulting from his failure to get the presidency, and which
was by the unfortunate attitude of Danel Tirona, who, by another sad coincidence, belonged
to the opposite faction, found fertile ground in Bonifacio’s heart and mind. Aside from the
fact that as founder of the Katipunan and the initiator of the Revolution he believed he should
have been given the presidency, he contended that irregularities were committed by the
Magdalo men and that he would have been elected had it not been for the premeditated frauds
of the rival faction. Writing to his uncle-in-law, Mariano Alvarez, he said:
MY DEAR GENERAL MAINAM:
Our recently ended election at Mapagtiis [San Francisco de Malabon] has left a large
poisonous thorn in my heart. I reiterate to you my nullification of all that had been
agreed upon there. Ay, General, I never expected that my complacency and
faithfulness would be rewarded with avarice and insult upon my person by your
fellow townsmen who are false patriots. I shall make them realize when I set foot on
Morong soil that it was not I whom they insulted but the whole country.
Send me food at once and faithful soldiers of the Mother Country here at Limbon as
fulfillment of your promised help when I left in disquietitude. Your supremo, And.
Bonifacio, Maypagasa.
Giving vent to his resentment over the procedure and results of the elections,
Bonifacio, in a letter to his friend, Emilio Jacinto, then in Laguna explained his side and gave
the background of the event:
The majority of those in the convention determined to organize a

government; but I gave them to understand that this could not be done on account of
the absence of the representatives of other districts, aside from an agreement having
already been made at the convention at Imus; that all this annulled the majority,
because in view of the present critical situation of those pueblos there was no time to
wait for the representatives from other places, and the Imus Convention lacked
validity on account of the alleged absence of the minutes. Nevertheless, I assured
those present there that in case the manifest will of the people governed in the
election of officers, I would respect it.
***
72
Moreover, before the election began, I discovered the underhand work of

some of the Imus crowd who had quietly spread the statement that it was not
advisable that they be governed by men from other pueblos, and that they should for
this reason strive to elect Captain Emilio as President. As soon as I heard of this, I
said that this meeting was dirty work, because this was what they were after and they
were deceiving the people, adding that if they wished me to point out, one by one,
those who were conducting themselves in this matter, I would do so. The majority
said that this was no longer necessary. I also said that if the manifest will of the
people was not complied with, I would not recognize the chiefs elected, and if I did
not recognize them they would not be recognized by our people there, either. Don
Artemio Ricarte, the General elect, also said at the meeting that this election was due
to bad practices.
========================================
Reinforcement Activity
 Contrasting and comparing primary and secondary sources
Complete the matrix below.
Primary Source Secondary Source

Categories Memoirs of a General by
Revolt of the Masses by Teodoro
Santiago Alvarez a.k.a Gen.
Agoncillo
Apoy
Author’s Background
Objective of the
author
Date written or
published
Mention of dates
Mention of places
Key Personalities
Sequencing of events
Differences between
the two accounts
73
Probable reason why

the differences
Thematic motivation
of authors (Why the
Tejeros meeting
failed?)
a) What are common with the two documents?

b) What are the differences?
c) Based on the two documents what characteristics do primary sources have?
d) What characteristics do secondary sources have?
In instances where there are differences in facts and claims that documents under examination
would have, historians could resort to the still living eyewitnesses. This is what Agoncillo did
since his book The Revolt of the Masses was published in 1956, written prior to that year
when Emilio Aguinaldo was still alive. He died in 1964. Agoncillo resolved the differences
by conferring to him. But in cases where claims on facts or observations conflict, historians
could just write in a footnote the differences with their explanation and their sources. If these
differences are a matter of dates, then historians would simply indicate not the exact date but
the period from a possible date when the event begins up to a possible date when the event
ends.
 Identifying the weakness of the Revolution of 1896 based on the documents under
examination
What were the weaknesses that revolution faced in terms of the character of the
personalities involved?
 Judging upon these weaknesses to reflect on our values as a people
What wrong character traits or values do these weaknesses reflect on us as a people?
Challenge
From your answer on the last bullet, how do you change these character traits in order
to practice the right values?
References
74
Agoncillo, Teodoro (1956) The Revolt of the Masses. Quezon City: University of the
Philippines Press.
Agoncillo, Teodoro A. and Guerrero, Milagros C. (1977) History of the Filipino People.
Quezon City: R.P. Garcia Publishing Co.
Aguinaldo, Emilio F. (1967) My Memoirs, Vol. 1, Manila: Cynthia Aguinaldo Suntay.
Alvarez, Santiago V. (1977) The Katipunan and the Revolution: Memoirs of a General,
Translated By Paula Carolina S. Malay, Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila Press.
Ricarte, Artemio G. (1963) Memoirs of General Artemio Ricarte, Manila: National Heroes
Commission.
75

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Gabriel & Espiritu Salaysay at Saysay Manuscript (Unedited)

The Problems of the Katipunan

 Why would you include the recruit, if he or she is your choice?

 What are these?

Historical Context of the Documents

By September, the youngest gobernadorcillo of Kawit Capitan Miong (Emilio

If these councils were only Sangguniang Balangay or Municipal Councils, then

About the Authors

The Katipunan and the Revolution:

I am greatly indebted to my colleague and friend, Mr. Lope K. Santos, whose

The Magdiwang government honored me with an appointment as captain general, or

Because of a repeated clamor for the approval of the establishment of a government

Then he pulled out his revolver and took aim.

“In my capacity as chairman of this convention and as President-Supremo of the Most

Revolt of the Masses2

In examining my sources of information, I have adopted the attitude of friendly

Manila, 12 April 1948

MY DEAR GENERAL MAINAM:

The majority of those in the convention determined to organize a

Moreover, before the election began, I discovered the underhand work of

 Contrasting and comparing primary and secondary sources

Complete the matrix below.

Primary Source Secondary Source

Probable reason why

a) What are common with the two documents?

 Judging upon these weaknesses to reflect on our values as a people

What wrong character traits or values do these weaknesses reflect on us as a people?

Aguinaldo, Emilio F. (1967) My Memoirs, Vol. 1, Manila: Cynthia Aguinaldo Suntay.

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