Professional Documents
Culture Documents
REFERENCES
Linked references are available on JSTOR for this article:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/41688671?seq=1&cid=pdf-
reference#references_tab_contents
You may need to log in to JSTOR to access the linked references.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms
is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Annals of the
Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute
Ashok Aklujkar
1. 1
The present paper is a study of ancient Indian semantic1
comparative point of view, the comparison being with the s
that has developed in relatively recent times in the West.8 Wit
rison in mind, one could study Indian semantics in two ways
could compare its history, as far as it is known, with that of
semantics, and ( ii ) one could select certain problems of semantic
either in the Indian tradition or in the western tradition and examine
whether those problems have been raised in the other tradition and, if
raised, how they have been raised and discussed. The first way would
take the research to a study of some facts of literary history and of
ideas about semantics while the second would take him to a study of
ideas in the semantics. In the present paper I plan to follow the first
way ; I shall here compare the histories of Indian and Western
semantics.
1. S
The present study is thus very ambitious in its scope and cannot
help being sketchy rather than thorough. However, since it tries to
* Paper read in the South Asia ( linguistica and philology ) section of the
Twenty-seventh International Congress of Orientalists. The author is grateful to
Dr. Ronald E. Asher ( University of Edinburgh ) for suggesting stylistic improvement!
in the first draft of this paper.
1 I use the word c semantics ' in the sense 6 study-science-general theory of
meaning ' I do not include in semantics the study-science-general theory of
reference-referent-denotatum. The problem of the relation between reference and
meaning which is a border-line problem and which is perhaps as important in the
study of meaning as it is in the study of reference, is not excluded from semantics by
the restriction of the term Semantics ' in the above manner. There is no reason why
we should treat any related branches of human knowledge as water-tight compart-
ments. For the history of the word ' semantics 'f see Read ( 1948 ). N oreen uses the
term c semology ' ( Malmberg 1964 : 124 ) which is again taken up recently by Joos
( 1958 ). German linguists usually prefer the term ( semasiology ' ; cp. Kronasser
( 1952 ). For a distinction between semasiology and onomasiology, see Malmberg
( 1964 : 124 ).
2 For the sake of brevity, I drop the adjectives ( ancient ' and c modern-
relatively recent ' from the phrases ' ancient Indian' and < modern-relatively recent
western ' in the following pages. I am aware of the fact that the West also has sn old
tradition of semantic thought.
cover a large number of facts and aspects it may help in having a correct
perspective of Indian semantics. It may, perhaps too broadly, indicate
the peculiarities of the Indian semantic tradition, the amount of credit
or discredit that the Indian tradition should historically receive and thi
degree of the relevance the Indian tradition has to modern western
semantics. This paper is thus an introduction to Indian semantics1 and
a contribution to the history of linguistics.
1. S
One could begin the comparison either from the point of view of
the Indian tradition or of the western tradition ; that is, one could start
with the facts known about either tradition and try to see whether any-
thing corresponds to those facts in the other tradition and, if something«
corresponding is found, to what extent the correspondence goes. I have
preferred to start the comparison from the point of view of the western
tradition. My preference has been governed by some practical consi- v
darations. In the first place, more is known about the western tradition
than is about the Indian tradition ; it facilitates understanding and :
1.4
In many places I speak of the Indian semantic tradition in general.
My main reliance, however, is on Bhartrhari's Vâkya-padïya 2 which is
the earliest available ( fourth century A. D. ) and extensive work of
Indian semantics. Though it is not primarily devoted to semantics and ,
though it makes no claim of originality of views, it is perhaps the most -
important work in what survives of the Indian semantic tradition ; it
has influenced the ideas of all later Indian semanticists and deals with
the semantic problems quite extensively though semantics is but one
part of its scope. Most of the evidence for what I want to point out .
comes from this work. As I am concerned here with broad
comparisons between two traditions and not with the
of individual ideas back in time in any one tradition, I do no
necessary either to be exhaustive in my references when I make
point or to find out the earliest evidence in support of what
sufficient for my present purposes to produce some textual evid
a particular point made in connection with either tradition.
1. 6
So far I have used the expressions ' Indian semantics ' and i Indian
semantic tradition ' without raising the question whether there is any
referent for these expressions. We know for sure that the West has a
branch of study named ' semantics ' which has been distinguished from
some other branches of study at least from Bréal's time;1 but such a
fact has not been as yet established in the case of the Indian linguistic,
logical or philosophical tradition.2 I therefore have to answer the follow-
ing four questions before I proceed with the use of the expressions
1 Indian semantics ' and 'Indian semantic tradition'; ( i ) Is there any
body of Sanskrit literature that is exclusively concerned with the study
of meaning ? ( ii ) If such a body of literature exists, does it have any
specific name ? ( iii ) Are all the topics that are topics of semantics in
the West discussed in this literature ? That is, how much justified is
the transfer of the word 'semantics' to the Indian scene ? ( iv ) Is the
qualification ' Indian ' necessary ? What is distinctively Indian about
this semantics ? Or, is it Indian only because it developed in India ?
What follows the present introductory section in this paper and
many more papers on which I am working at present, are an indirect
answer to the last two questions. By studying the information that I
supply there and by judging the logic that I use there, the reader can
decide for himself how far the transfer of the word ' semantics ' is justi-
fied and how far the Indian semantics is ť Indian ' As for myself, I
answer both the questions in the affirmative ; I think that there is
enough similarity between the western semantics and the Indian studies
of meaning to justify the latter's being referred to by the term
1 semantics ' ; I also think that there are certain historical, methodologi-
cal and expressional peculiarities of the semantics that developed in
India3 to justify its being qualified by the adjective 'Indian '
Before I touch upon the first question, it would be worth point-
ing out that we need not have a body of literature that is exclusively
devoted to the study of meaning to be justified in saying that a language
1 Bréal introduced the terna ť sémantique 1 in an article in 1883 for the first time
( Malmberg 1964 : 123 ). His ' Eassai de sémantique . science des significations 9 was
first published in 1897. Ullmann ( 1966 : 217 ) informs us that in 1820's Reisig had
thought of ' semasiology
2 Staal ( 1966 : 304-311 ) points out that if the Indian ideas are presented in a
careful manner the existence and the relevance of Indian semantic thought would be
acknowledged. As will be noticed below, my approach is different in that I assume
the existence of semantic ideas in the Indian tradition and try to prove the
existence of a body of literature devoted to what we refer to as semantic problems
or topics.
3 This point should be added to the points in section 2.
t. 1
Two attitudes are noticeable in some of the western studies of the
problem of meaning. Bloomfield and some of the linguists influenced by
him seem to consider any satisfactory solution of the problem of mean-
ing almost an improbability.1 Philosophers like Quine ( 1953 : 47-64 )
show the direction in which one should approach the problem of mean-
ing but do not actually tackle the problem ; instead, they try to keep
philosophical analysis clear off it if they can.2 There is nothing
wrong with one's being aware of the difficult nature of the problem one
is trying to solve. Similarly, there should not be any objection if an
investigator feels that a particular area of knowledge is a mess and
should be avoided. I would even concede that if one accepts Bloomfield's
concept of meaning, it is indeed impossible to solve the problem of mean-
ing in a way that would satisfy a scientific mind. One fact, however,
emerges clearly. A sort of defeatist attitude is implicit in the remarks
especially of Bloomfield - and it has had its effect on the western
linguistic tradition, especially in the United States ; the study of mean-
ing was neglected for some time.
This defeatist attitude does not seem to be a result of the various
notions of meaning that were then current. Nor does it seem to be a
result of the various meanings of the word 4 meaning' which are still
current. It seems to be a result of the wrong approach to the problem,
of the confusion of meaning with reference3 and of the behavioristic
trend.4 The approach was wrong in the following way. Bloomfield
3 [ Annals, B. O. R. I. ]
assumed that every word in language must have a definite meaning and
that there could be no truly scientific theory of meaning as long as we
are not able to define the meaning of each word (Kunjunni Raja 1963:4);
but as Frege ( transi. 1952 : 42 ) says, ' One cannot require that every-
thing shall be defined, any more than one can require that a chemist shall
decompose every substance or as Russell ( 1940 : 29 ) says, • It is no
more necessary to be able to say what a word means than it is for a
cricketer to know the mathematical theory of impact and projectiles '
Further, Bloomfield misses the point that semantic systems are man-
made and autonomous, that circumlocution is not a make-shift device
for stating meanings but the most effective royal road ( Weinreich
1966 : 192 ).
In the Indian tradition we find various notions of meaning
( Kunjunni Raja 1963 : 69-74, Bhartrhari 2. 119-137 BSS pp. 132-139 ).
The Sanskrit term that corresponds to English ' meaniug ', namely
' artha ', does not have exactly the same number of meanings, but defi^
nitely has enough to cause confusion.1 Occasionally, though not as
commonly as in the western tradition, we find meaning understood as
reference.2 Still there is no expression of a defeatist attitude, no trace
of having given up the problem of meaning in despair. There is a con-
founding variety of views on almost all important theoretical problems
in semantics3 and quite a few instances of both genuine and deliberate
misunderstandings and misrepresentations;4 but the pursuit of mean-
1 See the dictionaries of Sanskrit by Roth-and-Böhtlingk, Monier Williams,
Apte etc. For the meanings of c meaning', see Ogden and Richards ( 1953), Abraham
( 1963 ), Fries ( 1954 : 62-63 ) and Read ( 1955 ).
2 For example, Sabara ( 1. 1. 5 ) : ' syãc ced arthena sambandhah krura-
modaka- àabdoGGãrane mukhasya pätana-pürane syãtãm . ' ť If there were any natural
relationship between a word and its meaning, the word ' razor 1 would cut the mouth
and the word ' sweet cake ' would fill it '. This statement is a part of the argument
to which Sabara does not subscribe. It is based on a wrong under*
standing of the Mtmãmsã position on the part of Sahara's philosophical advers
When the Mimãmsakas say 1 aulpattikas tu šabdasyarthena sambandhah ' they just
wish to point out that it cannot be told when exactly the relation between word
and meaning came to be established. The Mimãmsã doctrine of autpattika éabdã-
řtha-sambandha and the Vyãkarana doctrine of nitya or anãdi-siddha éabdõrtha -
sambandha are essentially the same ( see Bhartrharťs vrt ti on 1. 23, p. 59 ).
3 Even a perusal of the books by Kunjunni Raja and Bhattacharya would
convince one of this point.
4 For example, Kumarila's arguments against the grammarian's view of
indivisible sentence meaning. They seem to be a result of confusion of meaning
with reference -at least as far as Bhattacharya's ( 1962: 33-37 ) exposition
of them goes. It is not uncommon to find in Indian philosophical texts that that
interpretation of a philosophical adversary's theory is chosen which can be best
attacked. Interest in polemics and tendency of treating philosophical discussions as
a game for sharpening one's wits cannot be said to be entirely absent in the Indian
tradition, Bee note 2 above.
S. 6
4 [ Annals, B, O. R. I. ]
This fact is rather surprising. From very old times the Indians
were aware of the change that had taken place in the Sanskrit language.
Efforts to determine the meanings and etymologies of Vedic words had
begun even before Yãska. The prãtiéãkhyas had noted the changes in
pronunciation with great zeal. The grammarians had brought to atten-
tion the changes in forms. The writers of Prakrit grammars had
essentially used the technique of postulating a common form when they
treated Sanskrit forms as prakrti ' the original ' and Prãkrta forms as
vikrti 1 the derivative ' of Sanskrit forms. The phenomenon of nirüdha-
laksanã had been noticed. Homonyms and homophones had attracted
the attention of all thinkers interested in language (Kunjunni Raja
1963 : 34-48 ). Still, nothing that would resemble the western histori-
cal semantics developed in India.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abraham, Leo. 1936. " What is the theory of meaning about ?"
The Monist , 46. 228-256.
Alston, William P. 1964. Philosophy of language . Prentic
Foundations of Philosophy Series. Englewood Cliffs,
Jersy.
Arjunwadkar, Krishna Shrinivas and Arvind Mangrulkar. ( eds. and
transi. ) 1962. Mammata-bhatta-vir acita Kãvya-prakãia.
Poona. ( Marathï ).
Bar-Hillel, Y. 1954. " Logical syntax and semantics Language , 30.
230-237.
35. 101-106.
Peirce, Charles Sanders. Collected Papers Yol. II. (eds. ) Charles Hart-
shorne and Paul Weiss. Harvard University Press. Cambridge,
Mass. 1960.
Quine, Willard van Orman. 1953. From a logical point of view. Harvard
University Press. Cambridge, Mass.
Mass.