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Technical Evaluation – SANDVIK CH 4000 Drive Spindle Bearing Failures

Anomaly: Multiple premature failures of well-known bearing brands [including NTN]

type 23122 Brass Cage C3.

Bearing Location: Pinion End in a Drive Spindle

Bearing Application: SANDVIK CH 4000 Cone Crusher

Plant: Stevin Rock Q4, Kadra, Ras Al Khaima, UAE

Att: Mr. Barry John – Operations Director

Cc: Eng Reji – Maintenance Engineer

Dear Sirs

Following is a report of NTN’s technical inspection, findings, evaluation and conclusions as to the
most probable factors & causes that have contributed to the early failure of different international
brands [including NTN] of the type 23122 brass cage C3 as mounted on the pinion side of a SANDVIK
CH4000 Cone Crusher drive spindle.

The inspection, observations, findings and conclusions as per my colleague, Mr. Yoshikatsu Terada
and I, concerning the recurring bearing failures as experienced at this particular application point is
based on more than 60 years of collective experience in bearing failure analysis. Both Mr Terada and
I are confident that our conclusions and corrective action recommendations address and strike at
the very heart of the factors that have directly contributed to this particular recurring bearing
failure.

We would welcome an opportunity and request the same, to discuss our findings as well as our
corrective action recommendations with you in greater detail at your offices, respectfully requesting
that you please contact us at your earliest convenience to schedule a suitable time and date, should
you be agreeable.

Assuring you of our best attention at all times

Best regards

Technical Assessment by:

Y. Terada & A. R. du Preez
NTN Middle East FZE
Office 1414 JAFZA One
Jebel Ali, UAE
 2

Andre R. du Preez
Index

1. Preamble

2. Observations: NTN 23122EMD1C3 / NTN 22322EMW33 Bearings

Observations: FAG 23122-E1M-XL-M-C3 / FAG 223221-E1-XL-T41D Bearings

3. Discussion of Observations

4. Conclusions

5. Corrective Action Recommendations

Technical Assessment by:

Y. Terada & A. R. du Preez
NTN Middle East FZE
Office 1414 JAFZA One
Jebel Ali, UAE
 2

1. Preamble:

The appalling operational service life due to the recurring failure within weeks after commissioning
of the pinion side drive spindle bearing mounted in a SANDVIK CH 4000 Cone Crusher as operated by
Stevin Rock at their Q4 plant, gave rise to an opportunity for NTN Middle East FZE to work with the
Operations Director and Maintenance staff at Q4 plant to assess, identify and provide meaningful
bearing related solutions and technical support to Q4 staff with the objective to eliminate all root
causes preventing the said pinion side bearing from achieving an acceptable duration of operational
service life.

It should be noted that the early failure of two well-known and respected competitor brands [NSK
and FAG] preceded a Stevin/NTN controlled trial with NTN bearing types 23122EMD1C3 and
22322EMD1 in the same application.

Following the unexpected early failure of the NTN type 23122EMD1C3 pinion bearing in the said
controlled trial, a replacement spindle equipped with a respected competitor brand’s bearings –
[FAG] was installed.

This said replacement spindle set was discovered to [again] be in the process of failing, after only a
matter of weeks in service, when an uncharacteristic, larger than normal, pinion gear backlash was
detected during a routine check.

The decommissioning and dismounting of this failed FAG spindle drive bearing set prior to the
catastrophic “smash-up” of the pinion side bearing – [as has been the case previously] – enabled the
observation and gathering of valuable evidence as to the actual root causes of the recurring failures
plaguing this particular bearing application.

This Technical Report thus centres around the intelligence gathered from both the failed NTN
bearing and the subsequent developing failure of the FAG bearing. It must be stated that the early
discovery of the already in process FAG bearing failure sequence not only facilitated the
confirmation of some of our earlier suspicions as to why the NTN bearing failed so dramatically and
quickly, but redirected our focus so as to enabling us to clearly identify the actual sequence of events
– [with little doubt] – set off by the actual root causes in both the case of the NTN and FAG bearings.

On the pages that follow, we have recorded our observations, discussion of the observations,
conclusions and corrective action recommendations for your perusal, consideration and further
action.

While it is impossible to declare that our analysis and assessment is flawless and 100% accurate, Mr
Terada and I are very confident that our representation of the circumstances and events
contributing to the recurring, premature failure of now several pinion bearings, is difficult to fault.

Technical Assessment by:

Y. Terada & A. R. du Preez
NTN Middle East FZE
Office 1414 JAFZA One
Jebel Ali, UAE
 2

2. Observations

NTN 23122EMD1C3 – Pinion Side

Technical Assessment by:

Y. Terada & A. R. du Preez
NTN Middle East FZE
Office 1414 JAFZA One
Jebel Ali, UAE
 2

NTN 23122EMD1C3 – Pinion Side: Observations - The pictures on Page 4 above refer:

i. I was notified on 26th January 2022 that the trial spindle with NTN bearings –
[commissioned on the 14th January 2022] – had failed the previous evening.
ii. We arrived on site to find the trial spindle shaft dismembered and disassembled from the
housing. [This was contrary to my request that the spindle be kept intact until we/NTN could
disassemble the spindle together with Stevin personnel.]
iii. We recovered remnants of the failed NTN pinion bearing outer ring out of the scrap bin but
we were unable to recover all the pieces so as to reconstruct the outer ring for analysis.
iv. It must be stated that we noted a striking similarity in the anomalies evident on the
remnants of an FAG outer ring – [also recovered from the scrap bin] – when compared with
the remnants of the NTN outer ring.
v. We were unable to recover any NTN pinion bearing rolling elements from the scrap bin.
vi. We were unable to recover any cage remnants of the NTN pinion bearing from the scrap bin.
vii. The front cover plate could not be located for examination.
viii. The rear cover plate could not be located for examination.
ix. The pinion gear had been cut off the spindle shaft with a torch right next to the failed
bearing inner ring.
x. The inner ring was found on the shaft and displayed signs of blackening most associated with
substantial heat.
xi. The spindle housing at the pinion end had a blackened appearance in the bearing seat area
consistent with having been exposed to substantial heat.
xii. The housing seat of the pinion bearing outer ring showed signs of deep gouging and scoring
consistent with the rotation under duress of metal on metal debris jamming in a confined
space.
xiii. The inner ring was not removed for examination and the fit is assumed to have been
adequate.

Technical Assessment by:

Y. Terada & A. R. du Preez
NTN Middle East FZE
Office 1414 JAFZA One
Jebel Ali, UAE
 2

NTN 22322EMW33 – Pulley Side

Smearing in loaded zone

Abrasive Wear Evident

Technical Assessment by:

Y. Terada & A. R. du Preez
NTN Middle East FZE
Office 1414 JAFZA One
Jebel Ali, UAE
 2

Creep / Fretting evident

NTN 22322EMD1C3 – Pulley Side: Observations - The pictures on Page 6 above refer:

i. On our arrival on site, we found the pulley side bearing intact and still mounted on the
spindle shaft which had been disassembled from the housing before our arrival.
ii. The bearing appeared to be in very good condition, mostly due to the fact that it had been in
service for only 12 days.
iii. Some creeping / fretting was evident on the outer ring – [bearing slowly tic-tic turning in the
housing during operation]
iv. The bearing was dismounted from the shaft to facilitate a more thorough examination of the
individual components.
v. The raceway on the non-thrust side of the bearing displayed a dulled appearance.
vi. The outer ring also showed significant signs of wear [300+ micron] on the thrust side of the
bearing usually associated with bearings that have run for 3+ years.
vii. “Smearing”, a phenomenon exclusively associated with poor lubrication conditions in
bearings fitted with rollers, is evident on the thrust side raceway.
viii. The cage showed signs of wear leaving edges very sharp and facilitating abnormal roller
freedom for the short service time logged.
ix. Rolling elements on the non-thrust side of the bearing displayed a dull appearance while
rolling elements on the thrust side display a combination of dulling and wear pattern.
x. The initial sentiment to recover the bearing and re-mount it/use it in a next NTN drive
spindle trial was abandoned.
xi. The non-thrust side raceway on the inner ring displays a dulled appearance.
xii. The thrust side raceway on the inner ring displays a combination pattern of dulling and wear.
xiii. The fit of the inner ring on the shaft appears adequate with no evidence of turning on the
shaft.

Technical Assessment by:

Y. Terada & A. R. du Preez
NTN Middle East FZE
Office 1414 JAFZA One
Jebel Ali, UAE
 2

FAG 23122-E1A-XL-M-C3 – Pinion Side

Technical Assessment by:

Y. Terada & A. R. du Preez
NTN Middle East FZE
Office 1414 JAFZA One
Jebel Ali, UAE
 2

Technical Assessment by:

Y. Terada & A. R. du Preez
NTN Middle East FZE
Office 1414 JAFZA One
Jebel Ali, UAE
 2

FAG 23122-E1A-XL-M-C3 – Pinion Side: Observations - The pictures on Pages 8 & 9 above refer:

i. I became aware some days after the fact that the standby spindle commissioned
immediately after the failed NTN trial spindle, had itself also failed prematurely - again.
ii. Stevin confirmed the failure and confirmed that the failed spindle was available for
examination and that as per our earlier request, it had been kept intact as decommissioned.
iii. The pinion side cover plate had been removed exposing the pinion bearing.
iv. It must be stated that the bearing as mounted on the pinion side conforms to the type
specified by the OEM i.e. a 23122 brass cage C3 type.
v. Several rolling elements on the outboard roller set had turned through 90 degrees.
Technical Assessment by:
Y. Terada & A. R. du Preez
NTN Middle East FZE
Office 1414 JAFZA One
Jebel Ali, UAE
 2

vi. Also evident on the pinion side wear-ring are multiple indentation marks from a presumed
setting tool / punch that had been subjected to several [20 to 30] substantially heavy
impacts.
vii. The shaft was dismounted from the housing revealing that several rolling elements on the
inboard roller set had also turned through 90 degrees.
viii. Upon manipulation of the pinion bearing outer ring on the shaft, all the rolling elements
disgorged from the bearing together with 3 larger pieces of the cage [broken] accompanied
by fragments of the remainder.
ix. The cage – [all the pieces] – exhibits substantial wear when considering the time it has been
in service with all the pieces sporting very sharp edges all round – except for two fragments.
x. Two fragments of the cage are well blunted/rounded on all edges and have a surface sheen
similar to metals that have been tumbled in a deburring apparatus with ceramic abrasives.
xi. There is evidence that the outer ring turned in the housing for some seconds at some rpm.
xii. Some of the rolling elements showed a mix of wear marks and dulling and some showed
scuffing damage consistent with stationary scooting / sliding as opposed to rolling.
xiii. The raceways on the inner ring display definite signs of scuffing/scoring and there is
evidence of brass smearing/plastering on both raceways.
xiv. The fit of the inner ring on the shaft appears adequate with no evidence of turning on the
shaft.

FAG 22322-E1-XL-T41D – Pulley Side

Technical Assessment by:

Y. Terada & A. R. du Preez
NTN Middle East FZE
Office 1414 JAFZA One
Jebel Ali, UAE
 2

Abrasive wear evident

Smearing in load zone

FAG 22322-E1-XL-T41D – Pulley Side: Observations

Technical Assessment by:
Y. Terada & A. R. du Preez
NTN Middle East FZE
Office 1414 JAFZA One
Jebel Ali, UAE
 2

i. The taper-lock pulley [which was still mounted on the shaft] was taken down and the pulley
side end cover was removed to facilitate dismounting the shaft out of the housing.
ii. It was noted that no gasket had been fitted with the pulley side end cover.
iii. It is important to state that the bearing mounted on the pulley side is a type associated
exclusively with shaker screen applications and is not the type recommended by the OEM
i.e. a 22322 type with a brass cage, a normal internal radial clearance and an outer ring with
an undisclosed reduced manufacturing tolerance.
iv. The outer ring seat appears adequate confirmed by the fact that there is no evidence that
the outer ring had turned in the housing.
v. The outer ring displays signs of “smearing” in the loaded zone, a phenomenon associated
with poor lubrication conditions in bearings fitted with rollers.
vi. The outer ring displays substantial wear [300+ micron] on the thrust side raceway normally
associated with a bearing that has run for 3+ years.
vii. The cage exhibited substantial wear to the point that rolling elements could very easily be
levered out of the bearing.
viii. The rolling elements displayed signs of wear and dulling.

Technical Assessment by:

Y. Terada & A. R. du Preez
NTN Middle East FZE
Office 1414 JAFZA One
Jebel Ali, UAE
 2

3. Discussion of Observations – [in no particular order]

i. The similarities in appearance and condition of the failed bearing components of the NTN
bearing vs the FAG bearing is noteworthy.
ii. Had the abnormal backlash on the FAG equipped drive spindle not been detected, a “smash
up” failure – [as in the case of the NTN pinion bearing and the FAG bearing before and the
NSK bearing before that] – would have resulted without a doubt.
iii. The rapid wear evident on both the NTN and FAG pulley side bearings after such a short
service life is key to unravelling the sequence of events that lead to the failures on the pinion
side so soon after commissioning.
iv. It cannot be said with any certainty that the heavy impacts applied while setting the wear
rings – [Refer: the setting tool indentations on the wear ring as per Picture 2 on Page 9] – did
or did not cause any damage to the bearing/cage prior to commissioning.
v. The contribution such heavy impacts to the failure sequence in both pinion bearing
premature failure cases covered in this report – [including all previous and subsequent such
similar failures] – cannot be quantified, cannot be ruled in for a fact but also cannot also be
ruled out as a fact.
vi. The advanced level of wear on the thrust side and non-thrust side raceways evident in the
bearings, the severe wear and depletion of the brass cages, the level of wear in the steel
cage of the FAG shaker screen bearing including the dulling of the raceways and rolling
elements of the bearings after such a short time in service, can only be attributed to a
significant level of abrasive particle contaminants in the lubrication.
vii. While the practice of not fitting gaskets with end covers might not have been a material
contributing factor in the failure sequence, it is none the less contrary to the
recommendation of the OEM.
viii. I have no knowledge as to whether a packing gasket set was or was not fitted to the spindle
housing flange at the time of mounting into the bottom shell, but it goes without saying that
the procedure as prescribed and set out in the OEM Operator Manual defining the
measuring and calculation of the thickness of packing gasket set required to achieve the
correct gear mesh contact point – [i.e. the correct footprint] – of the bevel/pinion gear set, is
of critical importance.
ix. Two fragments of the cage – [most probably cage fingers] – recovered from the pinion
bearing debris exhibit rounded and blunted edges while all the remaining pieces exhibit very
sharp edges which drives the thinking that they had been tumbling around with the two
rolling element sets in a harmless space and way for quite some time before final cage
fracture.
x. As the cage is a roller riding cage, the failing / fracturing cage would undoubtedly have
facilitated the turning of some rolling elements through 90 degrees resulting in even further
trauma to the cage.

Technical Assessment by:

Y. Terada & A. R. du Preez
NTN Middle East FZE
Office 1414 JAFZA One
Jebel Ali, UAE
 2

4. Final Comments
In all bearing failures, anomalies associated with the following eight categories are always evident to varying
levels of intensity and each must be individually examined and carefully assessed as to its contribution to or its
collateral consequence in the failure sequence. These eight categories in no particular order are:
i. Outer Ring
ii. Inner Ring
iii. Rolling Elements
iv. Cage
v. Housing Bearing Seat
vi. Shaft Bearing Seat
vii. Mounting
viii. Lubrication

The challenge to identifying the root causes responsible for the bearing failure rests heavily on the examining
party/ties’ ability to identify with confidence which anomaly manifested first, which followed, which was next
and so on until all the anomalies are arranged in the failure sequence to the complete corroboration of the
evidence.

Mr Terada and I can state with confidence that for the bearings covered in this failure analysis, the sequence of
events leading up to bearing failure is assessed as follows:
1. The quality/cleanliness of the lubricating oil deteriorated due to abrasive particle contamination.
There is no doubt that dust & fines from the process came into contact with and immersed into the
oil.

2. The contamination in the lubricating oil then eroded the brass cage relatively quickly to a point where
the free space between rolling elements and cage were so enlarged that the
guidance/control/centering of the rolling elements by the roller riding cage was lost.

3. The brass smearing/plastering on the pinion bearing raceways suggests that a cage fragment/broken
finger at some point in the melee became jammed between rolling element and raceway resulting in
a rolling element turning through 90 degrees and then jamming crossways to be scooted/forced to
slide around on the raceway with the roller set subjecting the cage to further trauma i.e. breaking off
further fragments/fingers causing a second, third, fourth rolling element etc. to also turn through 90
degrees.

4. Equally possible, the growing free space around the rolling elements may have facilitated the onset of
barrelling by the rolling elements – [rolling wobble] - with the inevitable turning of random rolling
elements through 90 degrees and then jamming crossways to slide/scoot along the raceway surface
along with the roller set subjecting the cage to further trauma, breaking off more fragments/fingers
which jammed between rolling elements and raceway resulting in the brass smearing/plastering
evident on the raceway.
[It cannot be stated with absolute confidence which of the above two scenarios is the more likely.]

5. Heat build-up due to friction would rapidly have ensued resulting in elevated temperatures on the
sliding surfaces in a matter of minutes. Expansion due to the rapidly rising heat would have physically
reduced the clearances in the bearing components creating more metal to metal contact and hence
more heat. Simultaneously, the already poor condition of the lubricating oil was further deteriorated
by the excessive frictional heat resulting in more metal to metal contact, more friction, more heat,

Technical Assessment by:

Y. Terada & A. R. du Preez
NTN Middle East FZE
Office 1414 JAFZA One
Jebel Ali, UAE
 2

more expansion, less clearance, more heat, more friction, more heat etc. until the untenable point
was reached where the bearing jammed solid and a catastrophic “smash up” failure occurred.
5. Conclusions

1. The bearings cannot be faulted.

2. The inner and outer ring seats cannot be faulted.

3. The use of an induction heater to open the bores of the bearings to facilitate mounting on
the shaft seats is recommended.

4. The method of setting the wear rings on the shaft with a heavy hammer and setting tool /
punch is not recommended and although not ideal, cannot be considered a bona fide root
cause of failure in this case.

6. Fitting the end covers to the spindle housing without gaskets is not recommended and
although not ideal, cannot be considered as a bona fide root cause of failure in this case.

7. While I did not witness/observe the setting of the drive spindle into the bottom shell of the
crusher and cannot offer any thoughts on this part of the application, I will say the following
with confidence: The setting of the spindle into the bottom shell, with or without the
calculated packing gasket set, whether as per the sequence as recommended by the OEM or
not, whether ideal or not ideal, cannot be considered as a bona fide root cause of failure in
this case.

8. The use of a shaker screen bearing at the pulley end of a drive spindle contrary to the OEM
specified 22322 brass cage normal clearance type is perplexing, is not recommended and
although not ideal, cannot be considered as a bona fide root cause of failure in this case.

9. The recurring failure of the pinion bearing in this particular application can be wholly
attributed to abrasive particle contamination of the lubrication oil. There are only a few
possibilities that would explain how the lubricating oil can become contaminated to such a
level as to erode the cages of the bearings in such a short service time frame and the
obvious ones are as follows:

a. The integrity of the oil return line to the oil tank or the oil tank itself is compromised.

b. The Over-pressure dust seal air-blower responsible for venting the dust out of the
crusher away from the oil side is not functioning to standard.

c. The dust seal is no longer sealing/not functioning to standard.

d. The dust scraper might not be functioning to standard.

Technical Assessment by:

Y. Terada & A. R. du Preez
NTN Middle East FZE
Office 1414 JAFZA One
Jebel Ali, UAE
 2

It must be stated that the lubrication oil delivered to the spindle bearings is bled off from the main
oil system and passes through its own filter arrangement before delivery to the bearings. Most
concerning is, if the abrasive particle contamination level in the spindle oil after double filtration is
still that concentrated as to erode the bearing cage so significantly in such a short time, then some
important questions arise which need attention right away, namely:

i. What is the level of contamination in the main oil system?

ii. How worn are the bushes – [eccentric bush, bottom shell bush, thrust bearing] – and oil whetted /
sliding surfaces in the crusher?
iii. Are the filters in both systems working to standard?
iv. How worn is the pump impeller?
v. Is the pump still able to deliver the rated volume at the pump rated pressure?
vi. How long has the oil been in service?
[There is now a myriad of oil related questions to be considered and acted on as necessary.]

6. Corrective Action Recommendations

The following corrective action recommendations are made solely from an objective point of view
and for the completeness of the purpose of this report. They are purely for your perusal,
consideration and further action should you so decide. No inferences are intended or suggested.

i. We recommend that adequately qualified SANVIK Engineers/Trainers present their

current Preventative Maintenance Training Course for SANDVIK Crushers as
operated by Stevin Rock to all relevant maintenance and operator staff.

ii. We recommend that the guidelines concerning routine inspection and care
protocols as defined by the OEM for daily, weekly, monthly, half yearly [ 6 monthly]
and yearly [12 months] intervals be followed diligently and the results recorded and
filed by the relevant staff member.

iii. We recommend that all maintenance and repair related procedures for SANDVIK
Crushers as operated by Stevin Rock and as laid down and defined in the OEM
manuals be followed diligently at all times.

iv. We recommend that the relevant Stevin Rock maintenance staff members
participate in an NTN technical training program comprising aspects of Bearing
Application Technology that is consequent on the Quarrying/Crushing MRO segment
and that such a course be delivered to Stevin Rock/Rack Rock personnel at no cost
by adequately qualified Engineers from the NTN Middle East FZE Office at a time and
place of Stevin’s convenience.

v. It is recommended that such said technical training modules be presented by NTN

Middle East FZE at times on days that best suit Stevin personnel so as to facilitate
Technical Assessment by:
Y. Terada & A. R. du Preez
NTN Middle East FZE
Office 1414 JAFZA One
Jebel Ali, UAE
 2

the least disruption to staff commitments and production responsibilities. Everybody

is welcome to attend.
In closing, it is our absolute intention to continue with Stevin Rock on the path we have agreed with
the objective of achieving the most favourable cost of ownership statistics by virtue of achieving the
best rated service life performance our NTN products can attain.

Achieving the aforesaid is heavily influenced by the following three fundamental facts, namely:

1. The right bearing for the job

2. The right mounting conditions for the bearing and
3. The right lubrication for the application.

The above fundamentals will never change and is exactly where NTN Middle East FZE can lend
traction to adding the cost saving value that result in the quality results that Stevin is expecting from
the Stevin/NTN initiative.

For the purpose of setting the stepping stones in place marking our way forward from here, we
respectfully request that Stevin schedule a suitable date and time for the purpose of meeting with us
in order to discuss the content of this report as well as several related matters which at the present
time have not yet been fully clarified.

We are available to assist you where we can request that you do not hesitate to contact us
immediately should the need arise.

We assure you of our best attention at all times

Yours sincerely

Engineering Department
NTN Middle East FZE

Technical Assessment by:

Y. Terada & A. R. du Preez
NTN Middle East FZE
Office 1414 JAFZA One
Jebel Ali, UAE