1.6.5 Preliminary Hazard Analysis

HPCL Mittal Energy Limited (HMEL)
450 KMTA HDPE Plant Guru Gobind Singh Polymer Addition

Bathinda, Punjab, India
Page 1 of 22
1.6.5 Preliminary Hazard Analysis
HAZARD POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES ACTION REQUIRED
PERSONAL HAZARDS
1. Exposure to chrome catalyst dust. 1. Leakage during transfer of PF Injury or sickness if ingested, inhaled, or Personnel in area must wear dust
catalyst to PF catalyst slurry mix direct contact with eyes or skin. respirator, goggles, gloves, and
tank, and from catalyst knockout Activated catalyst is a known impervious clothing. Personnel should
tank to disposal tote bin. carcinogen. shower and change clothes when
leaving work area and/or other specific
plant procedures as outlined in
operating manual. Follow
recommended first aid procedures
listed in MSDS sheets. Follow
recommended cleanup procedure for
6+
Cr
2. Exposure to desiccant dust. 1. Exposure during loading or Injury or sickness if ingested, inhaled, or Personnel in area should wear dust
unloading of treater vessels. direct contact with eyes or skin. respirator, goggles and impervious
clothing. Follow recommended first
aid procedures in MSDS sheets.
3. Exposure to toxic fumes. 1. Hydrocarbon or chemical leaks.
A. Hexane & Hexene-1 A. Injury, sickness or death. May Follow recommended first aid
B. Cocatalyst (TEAL,TEB) and cause severe burns. techniques in MSDS sheets.
DEZ B. Contact may cause severe burns. Protective equipment to be worn while
C. Solid additive (Ultranox C. Hydrolysis with moisture releasing controlling leaks.
627a, 626a) phenol and phosphoric acid resulting Personnel should wear self-contained
D. Statsafe™ 3000 & 6000 in burns. breathing apparatus as shown in
D. Reactive with air and water forming MSDS sheets.
hydrogen chloride.
2. Fire involving: Products of combustion are: Fire-fighting equipment and techniques
should be reviewed by fire suppression
A. Ethylene A. Carbon oxides, hydrocarbons specialist.
B. Hexene-1 B. Carbon oxides, hydrocarbons
C. Isobutane C. Carbon oxides, hydrocarbons Equip critical areas with hydrocarbon
D. Hydrogen D. No toxic vapors produced detectors.
E. Antistat E. Carbon oxides, sulfur oxides,
hydrocarbons Fire watch with extinguisher and use of
F. Cocatalyst F. Carbon oxides, hydrocarbons metal a fire suit for high risk procedures such
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION: This information is proprietary and shall not be used, copied, disseminated, or disclosed for any purposes other than those permitted under written
agreement with Chevron Phillips Chemical Company LP.
EXPORT OF TECHNOLOGY: This technology is subject to U.S. Export Control Laws; Diversion Contrary to U.S. Law prohibited.
1.6.5 Preliminary Hazard Analysis Rev 0 / Issued for Final / 02-February -2018
Page 2 of 22
oxides as opening purge column clean out

G. PF catalyst G. Non-flammable screen.
H. Solid, liquid additives H. Carbon oxides, sulfur oxides,
I. Propylene hydrocarbons, nitrogen oxides,
J. Hot oil leaks on extruder phosphorous oxides, phosphine,
K. Purge column clean out hydrogen cyanide, ammonia, toxic
screen. fumes.
I. Carbon oxides, hydrocarbons
4. Exposure to fire. 1. Hydrocarbon spills Injury or death to personnel. Follow recommended fire-fighting
- operator error techniques MSDS sheets.
- equipment failure
2. Co-catalyst and DEZ spill Burns from contact or from possible fire, When working with co-catalyst and
DEZ, personnel should wear protective
gear (i.e., aluminized suit, full-face
shield, gloves, and boots).
5. Exposure to steam 1. Steam leaks in finishing area. 1. Injuries due to burns. Leak sources to be minimized.
Mechanical design to investigate fixed
and flexible connections to minimize
leaks and correct insulation materials.
Piping should be marked for easy
identification. Operating manuals to
address procedure for working with
this system.
Page 3 of 22
EQUIPMENT HAZARDS
TREATER AREA
1. VESSEL HIGH PRESSURE 1. Fire in area. Vessel overpressure resulting in Mechanical design to review
equipment failure and possible injury or overpressure protection as shown on
death to personnel. the P&ID and revise as necessary.
2. Operator error during treater Possible fire. Operating manual to address

regeneration while pressuring regeneration procedures.
liquid from treater.
3. Blockage in treater outlet lines or Rupture of lines. Design pressure of equipment

filters resulting in blocked in head downstream of charge pumps should
from charge pumps. be at or above blocked in head.
REACTOR AREA
Vessel overpressure resulting in Mechanical design to review
1. Fire in area. equipment failure and possible injury or overpressure protection as shown on
death of personnel. the P&ID and revise as necessary.
2. Failure of pressure control system Vessel overpressure resulting in Mechanical design to review
on nitrogen to vessels including equipment failure and possible injury or overpressure protection as shown on
but not limited to the following death of personnel. the P&ID and revise as necessary.
- Reactor coolant surge

tank Equip critical areas with hydrocarbon
- Hexene surge tank detectors.
- Seal oil makeup tank
- Alkyl seal pot
Page 4 of 22
1. VESSEL HIGH PRESSURE 3. Excessive nitrogen pressure from Vessel overpressure resulting in Mechanical design to review
(CONT.) OSBL to reactor coolant surge tank equipment failure and possible injury or overpressure protection as shown on
death of personnel. the P&ID and revise as necessary.
4. Reactor overpressure caused by: Mechanical design to review

overpressure protection as shown on
Loss of coolant the P&ID and revise as necessary.
Loss of cooling water Provide adequate safety interlock
Excess catalyst system (SIS) to meet requirements.
Excess ethylene
Excess hydrogen Operating manual to address
Loss of circulation procedures for operating in and
Heating reactor on startup with exits recovering from a fouled reactor
closed condition.
Pressure transmitters blocked out
on startup Operating manual to address reactor
Catalyst not killed kill procedures, CTO (continuous take-
- empty kill pot off) operation, flashline heater
- loss of ethylene/HP N2 operation, and reactor dump
- Insufficient kill plugged Plugged flashlines. procedures.
flash lines
- Fluff melted in flashlines Fouled reactor. Implement “top-hat” rupture disk on
reactor below the PSV.
Plugged reactor.
5. CTO valve failure, Rupture and fire.

6. Loss of reaction
Page 5 of 22
1. VESSEL HIGH PRESSURE 7. Flash chamber and flash gas Fouled flash chamber, reactor plugging, Mechanical design to review
(CONT.) system overpressure: plugged flashlines. overpressure protection as shown on
P&ID and revise as necessary.
- plugged cyclone Equipment overpressure resulting in
- plugged filters failure and possible injury or death to
- excess rate from reactor CTO personnel.
valve
- excess rate of blowback gas to
filter
- plugged discharge valves on outlet
of flash chamber
- excess flow rate to flash chamber
- closed discharge valves on startup Mechanical design to review
overpressure protection as shown on
8. Start isobutane/N2 and hydrogen P&ID and revise as necessary.
compressor with discharge blocked.
DILUENT PURIFICATION AREA

1. Fire in area Mechanical design to review
2. Loss of cooling water overpressure protection as shown on
3. Loss of reflux the P&ID and revise as necessary.
4. Excess reboiler duty Vessel overpressure resulting in
5. Plugged vent line due to hydrate equipment failure and possible injury or Operating manual to address proper
formation death of personnel. procedures to prevent or minimize
6. Excess feed to deethanizer and icing of the lights column vent
dehexanizer columns. condenser.
7. Excess ethylene to recycle
isobutane surge tank from recycle Recycle olefin-free isobutane to
isobutane treaters during pressuring recycle isobutane tank.
liquids out of treater before
regeneration, or startup. Equip critical areas with hydrocarbon
8. Excess ethylene in recycle detectors.
isobutane storage tank.
9. Excess ethylene or hexene in Plugging of catalyst slurry system.
olefin-free isobutane storage tank.
10. Hydrate formation in vent column Equipment overpressure resulting in
Page 6 of 22
condenser. failure and possibly injury or death to Mechanical design to review

11. Blocked vent and outlets on startup personnel. overpressure protection and revise as
necessary.
Operating manual to address

monitoring for possible hydrate
formation.
1. VESSEL HIGH PRESSURE REACTOR DUMP TANK
(CONT.)
1. Reactor dump rate exceeds Vessel overpressure resulting in Mechanical design to review
capacity of vapor line from the equipment failure and possible injury or overpressure protection as shown on
reactor dump tank. death to personnel. the P&ID and revise as necessary.
2. Plugged vapor line due to hydrates,

closed valve or polymer.
3. Excessive relief rate from the
reactor PSV’s
Mechanical design to review
FLUFF HANDLING AND STORAGE Vessel overpressure resulting in overpressure protection as shown on
equipment failure and possible injury or the P&ID and revise as necessary.
1. Plugged or closed nitrogen return death to personnel.
line. Fluff silos equipped with multiple level
2. Plugged vent filter. detection devices.
3. Excess nitrogen pressure to tank
or vent filter.
4. High suction pressure to blower
resulting in high discharge Mechanical design to review
pressure. overpressure protection as shown on
5. Excess blowback nitrogen to bag the P&ID and revise as necessary.
filters.
6. Over filling fluff silo
Vessel overpressure resulting in
ADDITIVE AREA equipment failure and possible injury or
death to personnel.
1. Excess nitrogen pressure to
additive or fluff feeders.
Page 7 of 22

2. Plugged vent filters. overpressure protection as shown on
the P&ID and revise as necessary.
Equipment overpressure resulting in

FINISHING equipment failure and possible injury or
death to personnel.
1. Extruder startup with frozen die
plate.
2. VESSEL LOW PRESSURE REACTOR AREA
1. Loss of nitrogen supply to: Vessel underpressure resulting in Mechanical design to review
- coolant surge tank equipment failure. requirements for underpressure
- sealant surge tank protection and instrumentation as
shown on the P&ID and revise as
necessary.
2. Start isobutane/nitrogen INRU Air leakage into compressor resulting in Mechanical design to review
compressor with no flow from the equipment failure or explosion. requirements for underpressure
purge column and with flow from protection including full vacuum design
the INRU primary membrane for the purge column and
separator spill back line blocked in. instrumentation as shown on the P&ID
and revise as necessary.
Operating manual to address

compressor startup procedures.
Page 8 of 22
2. VESSEL LOW PRESSURE DILUENT PURIFICATION AREA

(CONT.)
1. Start refrigeration compressor with Vessel underpressure resulting in Mechanical design to review
no flow from the process and with equipment failure. instrumentation as shown on the P&ID
the spill back line from refrigeration and revise as necessary.
flash drum blocked in.
2. Loss of pressure on the recycle

isobutane storage tank Loss of reactor and reactor pump flush Operating manual to address proper
because of insufficient head on feed procedures for loss of feeds.
pump discharge during cool weather. Check to see if the pressure control
valve has malfunction.
Loss of reactor feeds because of
insufficient head on feed pump
discharge during cool weather.
Vessel under vacuum resulting in

equipment failure.
REACTOR DUMP AREA

1. Fill reactor dump tank during requirements for underpressure
steam out then block in and allow protection including full vacuum
to cool. design of the reactor dump tank and
instrumentation as shown on the P&ID
and revise as necessary,
Operating manual should alert

personnel of this hazard and address
2. Start INRU compressor with no compressor startup procedures.
flow from the reactor dump tank
and with the compressor spill back
line blocked in.
Page 9 of 22
2. VESSEL LOW PRESSURE FLUFF HANDLING & STORAGE

(CONT.) AREA
1. Plugged nitrogen supply silos or Oxygen excursion into silos and transfer instrumentation as shown on the P&ID
transfer system. system. and revise as necessary.

2. Premature opening of blower Loss of nitrogen in system and oxygen instrumentation as shown on the P&ID
discharge PSV. excursion into silos and transfer system. and revise as necessary.
3. VESSEL HIGH TEMPERATURE TREATER AREA
1. Runaway reaction during Vessel overheats resulting in equipment Mechanical design to review
absorption of ethylene while failure and possible injury or death to instrumentation as shown on the P&ID
preloading treater: personnel. and revise as necessary.
- excess ethylene
- insufficient nitrogen flow Operating manual to document
- wrong treater catalyst correct treater regeneration and
operating procedures.
2. Heat generation due to addition of
pure hexene to the Olefin Free
treaters, prior to filling with
isobutane.
3. Heat generation in the ethylene

feed acetylene oxygen converter
due to excessive hydrogen
reaction.
REACTOR AREA
1. Reactor high temperature caused Vessel overpressure. Mechanical design to review
by: overpressure protection and
- Loss of coolant instrumentation as shown on the P&ID
Page 10 of 22
- Loss of cooling water and revise as necessary.

- Excess catalyst
- Excess ethylene Operating manual to address
- CTO valve(s) closed or low Fouled reactor. procedures for operating in and
pressure trip recovering from a fouled reactor
- Loss of slurry circulation condition.
- Catalyst not killed due to empty kill Plugged reactor.
pot Operating manual to address reactor
- Loss of high pressure N2 resulting kill procedures and reactor dump
in insufficient kill procedures.
- Heating reactor on startup with
coolant coolers shut in or
controller on manual.
4. VESSEL LOW TEMPERATURE TREATER AREA
1. Rapid draining and depressuring Equipment failure if repressuring takes Mechanical design to review operating
of vessels and equipment, i.e., place before ambient temperatures are conditions and select proper
treaters, filters containing achieved, resulting in possible injury or metallurgy. Operating manual to
ethylene or propylene due to auto death to personnel. address procedures for control of
refrigeration depressurization.
REACTION AREA Mechanical design to review

1. Low temperature in flash chamber Vessel low temperature resulting in overpressure protection and
caused by: liquid hydrocarbon entering downstream instrumentation as shown on the P&ID
- Reactor startup to flash equipment with resultant vessel and revise as necessary.
chamber prior to polymer overpressure.
production without steam to the Operating manual to address control
flashline heaters. of low temperature conditions.
- Fouled flash lines
- Steam off of flashlines
5. VESSEL OVERFILL REACTOR AREA
1. Operator error when filling: Spills resulting in exposure of personnel Mechanical design to review
- Antistat purge pot to chemical vapors or liquids or instrumentation for filling control.
- Antistat mix tank carcinogenic catalyst
Page 11 of 22
- Antistat run tank Operating manual to address proper

- Kill pots filling procedures.
- DEZ charge tank
- PF and ZN catalyst charge tank
- PF and ZN catalyst mix tank
- PF and ZN catalyst run tanks
- Catalyst KO tank
- Thrust bearing lube oil reservoir
- Seal oil make-up tank
- Neat TEAL and TEB tanks
5. VESSEL OVERFILL (CONT.)

DILUENT PURIFICATION AREA
High level in suction drum will cause Mechanical design to review
1. Alarm failure on INRU compressor liquid or solid carryover to compressor instrumentation as shown on the P&ID
suction drum. resulting in equipment damage. and revise as necessary.
2. Sending heavies to INRU suction
drum. Solids carry over and filter Hydrocarbon loss to flare.
failure Operating manual to address normal
3. Instrument failure on: operating levels.
- Dehexanizer column Excess recycle isobutane must be
- Deethanizer column disposed of by flaring or pumping to off
- Vent column plot storage.
- Overhead accumulators Operating manual to address normal
operating procedures.
4. Free volume in recycle isobutane
storage tank insufficient to hold Excessive hydrocarbon and polymer
reactor isobutane contents at losses to flare.
shutdown.
REACTOR DUMP AREA

Loss of nitrogen circulation due to Operating manual to address
1. Reactor dump tank required and plugged fluff transfer lines and release of procedure for dumping reactor and
material from a previous reactor fluff and nitrogen to the atmosphere clearing the reactor dump tank
dump was not removed from the when clearing.
Page 12 of 22
reactor dump tank.
FLUFF STORAGE
1. Level indication failure. instrumentation as shown on the P&ID
2. Failure misalignment of fluff silo
rotary valve.
Pellets damage filter and spill to
3. Pellet silo over fill atmosphere
ADDITIVE AREA Mechanical design to review

1. Instrument failure on loss-in- Possible release of polymer or additives instrumentation as shown on the P&ID
weight feeders. to the environment. and revise as necessary.
COMPOUNDING AREA Release of hot water from the pellet Locate overflow of the pellet water
1. Instrument failure on pellet water water surge tank resulting in possible surge tank to a safe location.
surge tank. injury to personnel.
Page 13 of 22
EQUIPMENT HAZARDS
1. High pressure flash Polymer sitting too long without Plugged flash tank, reactor kill and dump Verify design has adequate
- polymerization in vessel adequate shortstop to kill reaction. instrumentation to assure shortstop
flow.
2. INRU unit operability Oil in process getting to separation unit. INRU shutdown, flaring of purge gas to Operating manual and training to
- Oil in process INRU, downtime to replace adsorbent or address operation of oil recovery
- Membrane failure membranes system
- New material in PSA
(proprietary type of
adsorbent) Obtain MSDS from vendor on
proprietary INRU unit material
3. Purge column high HC in fluff High leakage from flash tank to purge Hydrocarbon in fluff from purge column, Verify instrumentation / analyzers in
column resulting in flash fire in Finishing fluff transfer loop
Building.
4. Dense phase air high Poor vendor design of internal coolers Melted polymer, plugged lines, water in Consider external cooler downstream
temperature hopper cars of compressors in detailed design
Page 14 of 22
MATERIAL HAZARDS
1. LOSS OF FEEDS: 1. Power failure. Loss of ethylene feed may result in Mechanical design to review
- Ethylene plugged reactor. instrumentation as shown on the P&ID
- Hexene 2. Instrument air failure. and revise as necessary.
- Isobutane Loss of hexene or hydrogen will affect
- Hydrogen 3. Loss of ethylene / backup polymer quality. Operating manual to address proper
nitrogen. procedure for loss of feeds.
Chemicals: Loss of olefin-free isobutane could result
- PF and ZN catalyst 4. Operator error. in plugged catalyst feed lines.
- Solid and liquid additives
- Polymer fluff to extruder 5. Failure of solids feeding systems. Loss of recycle isobutane could result in
high reactor solids and a plugged
6. Catalyst particles settle out. reactor.
Loss of catalyst would result in loss of

reaction.
Loss of additives would affect polymer

quality.
Loss of fluff to extruder could result in

extrusion of pure additives, with
overheating and possible charring or fire.
2. EXCESSIVE FEEDS: 1. Instrument failure. Excess ethylene feed would result in Mechanical design to review catalyst
- Ethylene high saturation pressure, which could system design to minimize
- Hexene 2. Operator error. result in loss of circulation or high opportunities for settling out.
- Isobutane reactor pressure.
- Hydrogen 3. Failure of feeding system controls.
Excess hexene would lower polymer Mechanical design to review
4. Open ended system downstream. density resulting in a fouled reactor. instrumentation as shown on the P&ID
5. Control valve by-pass opened Excess olefin-free or recycle isobutane
would result in low reactor solids, low Operating procedures to address
catalyst productivity, and upset safety shutdown systems.
conditions.
Page 15 of 22
Excess H2 could result in high reactor

pressure and would affect product
quality.
2. EXCESSIVE FEEDS (CONT.)
CHEMICALS: Excessive antistat would result in loss of Operating manual to address proper
- Antistat reaction, which would cause excess procedures for excessive feeds or
- PF and ZN catalyst ethylene in the reactor. open-ended system downstream.
- Solid and liquid additives
- Polymer fluff to extruder Excess catalyst would result in a run-
away reaction until ethylene in the
reactor was consumed.
Excess of additives would affect polymer

quality.
Excess fluff to extruder would affect

polymer quality or cause mechanical
overload.
1. Instrument failure. Loss of steam will upset the dehexanizer Mechanical design to review
3. LOSS OF UTILITIES: and deethanizer columns. This may instrumentation as shown on the P&ID
- Steam 2. Operator error result in insufficient degassing of the and revise as necessary.
- Electricity fresh isobutane and hexene. Further,
- Nitrogen 3. Operating problems at the source. olefins may not be adequately removed
- Cooling water from the olefin-free isobutane causing Operating manual to address proper
- Instrument air catalyst feeding problems. procedures for loss of utilities.
Loss of electricity will result in an

emergency shutdown.
Loss of nitrogen, cooling water, or

instrument air will require a plant
shutdown.
Page 16 of 22
4. Utilities supply conditions deviate 1. Ambient conditions. Low cooling water temperature may Operating manual to address proper
from normal or design conditions: upset reactor temperature control. High procedures for operation under these
2. Operating problems at source. temperature will effect heat removal from conditions.
cooling water temperature, the reactor resulting in a fouled reactor.
steam pressure.
High cooling water temperature will
result in vessel overpressure in recycle /
purification area.
Low or high steam pressure may result

in an upset condition in the purification
area.
5. Cold temperature to flare or 1. PSV relieves liquid low boiling point Relief system temperature may drop Mechanical design to review PSV
downstream of control valves. hydrocarbons. below minimum design temperature of discharge temperature shown on the
carbon steel resulting in brittle fracture of P&ID and select proper metallurgy.
2. Higher than expected pressure drop flare header.
through the valve.
6. Exposure of equipment to 1. Phosphoric acid in the extruder feed Corrosion to vessels and piping. Operating manual to address
corrosive chemicals hopper. procedures to prevent use of steam
2. Water corrosion under insulation. when using additives which
3. External corrosion due to Hydrolyze, i.e. Ultranox 626.
condensation of moisture on piping
and equipment containing Mechanical review cold insulation
propylene or other refrigerant. specifications and revise as necessary
to minimize moisture penetration.
Page 17 of 22
OPERATIONAL HAZARDS
Procedures for startup must be
1. Startup developed. Special procedures
include purging to remove oxygen and
water and pressure testing.
2. Shutdown scheduled. Procedures for scheduled and
unscheduled (emergency) shutdown
must be developed.
Mechanical design to study overall

plant equipment for remote shutdown
system. This includes isolation of all
hydrocarbon sources, shutdown of all
pumps and other rotating equipment.
3. Pressurizing and depressurizing 1. Rapid pressuring of ethylene Possible detonation of ethylene resulting Operating manual to address the
treaters, ethylene feed lines and in equipment failure and possible injury special procedures required for
ethylene feed acetylene oxygen or death to personnel. depressuring, preloading or pressuring
converter feedstock treaters. Ethylene block
valves to be equipped with ¾” bleeder
bypass to allow slow pressure up.
4. Special procedures
Special procedures and design

consideration are required to prevent
hazards during the following events:
A. Treater regeneration 1 Operator error. Equipment damage and possible injury Procedures for treater regeneration
1. Mol sieve and alumina 2. Instrument failure. or death to personnel. must be developed. DCS graphics
degradation due to improper need to be developed. Choice of
depressuring, preloading. adsorbents in order to eliminate
preload requirements.
2. Mol sieve bed overheating 1. Operator error. Equipment damage and possible injury Mechanical design review
and resultant vessel damage due 2. Instrument failure. or death to personnel. instrumentation as shown on the P&ID
to improper preloading. and revise as necessary.
Page 18 of 22
3. Incomplete regeneration. 1. Loss of utilities. Catalyst poison breaks through resulting Mechanical design to verify heat loss
in loss of reaction. from regeneration gas piping, and duty
of regeneration gas heaters. Location
on plot plan for treaters and
regeneration gas heaters may be
B. Reactor dump Reactor dump may be required due to effected.
loss of utilities, feeds, catalyst, a seal Several days lost production. Mechanical design to review dump
failure, broken hydrocarbon line or a piping design to give improved dump
reaction runaway. Reactor logging time. Operating procedures must be
could be the result of incomplete kill or developed to decrease the possibility
failure to dump the reactor soon of logging the reactor.
enough.
C. Reassembly, flow line up, and Infrequent but necessary part of Detailed training and following of
startup of reactor operating a HDPE plant Potential for leaks or over pressure procedures
C. Missing chemicals or catalyst
1. High concentration antistat 1. Instrument failure The result of high concentration is the Operating procedures must be
same as excessive feed rate. developed to prevent hazards
2. Operator error. associated with mixing.
3. Vessel depressured and diluent

allowed to boil off.
2. Low concentration antistat. The result of low concentration in the
same as loss of feed rate.
3. Incorrect amounts of Incorrect additives concentration would Special procedures for maintenance
additives from loss-in-weight affect polymer quality but create no requiring vessel opening or entry to
feeders. safety hazard. be developed.
Asphyxiation by nitrogen is possible. Consider use of oxygen alarms in

Flash fires could result from improper such locations.
purging of hydrocarbon and inadequate
Page 19 of 22
neutralization of residual alkyl by water

addition.
D. Cleaning of bag filters and guard Polymer entering blowers or Cleaning procedures to be
filters in the storage areas. compressors will damage equipment. documented.
Possible dust fire or explosion.
E. Cleaning of flash gas guard Release of hydrocarbon vapor while Cleaning procedures to be
filters. cleaning creates fire hazard. Flash fires documented,
are likely.
F. Cleaning screen below purge Plugged purge column exit. Release of hydrocarbon vapor while Operating procedures to address
column cleaning creates fire hazard. Plugged safe cleaning of screens.
line can discharge plug without warning.
Personnel injury.
G. Transfer of polymer from reactor Unit upset by loss of utilities or change

dump tank to dumpster. in feedstock or product.
H. Plug in slurry transfer line. Packed or sticky solids.
i. Excess air to the flare header

during oxidation step of Failure of nitrogen and air flow controls. Flammable mixture in flare header Implement SIS system.
catalyst regeneration in the resulting in equipment failure and
ethylene feed acetylene possible injury
oxygen converter.
5. Unstable operation. Unit upset by loss of utilities or change Change in product quality or loss of Operating procedures must be
in feedstock or product qualities. production. developed to recover from upset
conditions.
6. Low or high throughout. Changes in inlet or outlet flows. 1. High rates on the high head pumps Mechanical design to review safety
could send pump into unstable feature as indicated on the P&ID and
operation. those provided by vendor.
2. High rates through the treaters could
Page 20 of 22
send poisons to the reactor.
3. High rates through purification area

could cause vessel overpressure and
column flooding.
4. Low rates through purification could

result in instability and poor fractionation.
7. High solids reactor operation. Unstable conditions indicated by Fouled or plugged reactor with resultant Operating procedures to recognize
reactor pump kw wide banding. cleaning. abnormal operating conditions.
Page 21 of 22
GENERAL CONDITIONS
Locate reactor dump tank for safe
1. Plant layout access by truck or polymer dumpster.
Orient catalyst activator up wind of

reactor and hydrocarbon storage
areas.
2. Fire-fighting equipment. Provide hydrocarbon detectors, fire

monitors, and deluge systems as
required by applicable codes or
company practices. Consider special
fogging nozzle above circulating pump
seal. Catalyst activator to be equipped
with perimeter hydrocarbon detectors,
as well as at the combustion air inlet;
3. Emergency shutdown. designed to stop burner and purge
with nitrogen, in order to prevent hot
surfaces becoming an ignition source.
Design engineering and operations

supervision conduct joint review of
emergency shutdown system.
Examine multiple emergency isolation
valve actuations from a single trip
switch.
4. Static electricity build-up. Free movement of non-conductors High voltage arc capable of igniting a Mechanical design to review
such as polyethylene, liquid flammable mixture. equipment design to provide liquid dip
hydrocarbons and many additives. legs and equipment grounding.
Loss of static grounding connection
during additive unloading of powders. Dust explosion Operating procedures to address
purging to avoid flammable mixtures,
and use of static grounding. Continuity
check for static grounding strap.
Page 22 of 22
5. Radiation. Failure of source shielding. Improper Radiation exposure (injury) to personnel. Operating manuals to clearly
maintenance of sources. document location of all radiation
sources. Staff is to be trained in
proper maintenance procedures for
each type of device.
6. Hydrocarbon vapor cloud. Uncontrollable escape of large amount Explosion. Destruction of facilities. Mechanical design to examine:
(> 2.5 ton) of hydrocarbon from vessel Injury and death of personnel. - plant layout criteria
rupture, process line failure or faulty re- - gas detection system
assembly of equipment. - reliability of fire protection
- activation of emergency isolation
Loss of reactor circulation pump seal. valves
- minimizing hydrocarbon
Rupture or breakage of main feed inventories
supply line rail car or truck - Hydrocarbon detectors
-Water deluge system and firefighting
Opening reactor or dump tank with plug monitors.
isolating large pocket of hydrocarbon
7. Corrosion or erosion of reactor Plant staff to conduct ongoing metal
wall. thickness measurements of this code
vessel.
8. Polymerization in olefin treaters. A. Metal contaminants in desiccant Polymerization in bed. Possible Only desiccant in full compliance with
support or desiccant. structural damage to treater by high specifications is to be purchased.
temperature. Certificates of material analysis.
B. Overheating desiccant.
Operating manual to reflect this
potential hazard into the treating and
regeneration procedures.
9 Release of dust and hydrocarbon. A. Pump seal failure Injury to personnel. Mechanical design to examine use of
B. Valve leaks instrumentation to detect failures
C. Filter bag rupture Violation of environmental requirements. mechanical design to examine
D. Failure to abide by good equipment alternatives to minimize
housekeeping, allowing fines to possibilities and mitigate excursions.
accumulate in finishing building.
E. Rupture or drop of catalyst tote bin.

1.6.5 Preliminary Hazard Analysis - Rev0

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HPCL Mittal Energy Limited (HMEL)

450 KMTA HDPE Plant Guru Gobind Singh Polymer Addition

HAZARD POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES ACTION REQUIRED