Energy Research & Social Science 91 (2022) 102758

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Energy Research & Social Science

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Perspective

A historical turning point? Early evidence on how the Russia-Ukraine war

changes public support for clean energy policies
Bjarne Steffen a, b, *, Anthony Patt c
a
Department of Humanities, Social and Political Sciences, ETH Zurich, Switzerland
b
Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, United States
c
Department of Environmental Systems Science, ETH Zurich, Switzerland

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

Keywords: Given the importance of oil and gas from Russia for many European countries, the invasion of Ukraine by Russian
Climate policy forces in 2022 could be a turning point for energy policy in Europe. A framing in line with the clean-energy
Fossil fuel phase-out transition, however, is not a given. Here, we present early evidence on how the war has changed public pol­
Policy acceptance
icy support for policies aiming at the phase-out of fossil fuels, and for policies supporting the phase-in of clean
Public opinion
energy alternatives. Using a population survey in Switzerland, we evaluate the changing support for different
Renewable energy
Sustainable finance policy proposals with varying information treatments. Overall, we find strong support for clean energy policies
across much of the political spectrum. Nevertheless, an interpretation of the war's ramifications in line with
strengthened climate policy is by no means a given, and public support needs to be translated into policy action.

1. Introduction example, Kübler [8] examined the evolution of drug policy in

The transition to a net-zero energy system by or before 2050 has
become a goal of many countries [1,2]. It is clear that achieving such
transformative change will require sustained investment in low-carbon
energy sources, such as renewable energy technologies, over the inter­
vening decades, as well as the phase-out of fossil energy [3]. Yet public
policies to accelerate this change need to be enacted by policymakers.
Policymakers, in turn, pay attention to public support [4,5].
Political scientists have long noted that shocks and crises are
important drivers of political processes. One of the most applied theories
explaining when and why particular policies change is the “multiple
streams” theory, which suggests that policy change occurs when the
perceptions of problems, solutions, and politics align around particular
legislation [6]. A key element in this model of policy-making is the so-
called “focusing event,” some high-profile event taking place that
grabs people's attention, and causes them to focus on a particular facet of
a particular problem. If, at that moment, there are solutions that have
been analyzed and shown to solve a particular solution, and the politics
of these solutions are favorable, then it is likely that a policy change will
occur, solving the problem as it is perceived to be. Focusing events can
also influence politics: providing public support for one of the sides in a
political debate, allowing it to gain a majority of political votes [7]. For
Switzerland, with competing coalitions favoring punitive and support-
based approaches; the AIDS epidemic, which heightened the risks of
needle sharing, was found to add moral weight to the arguments for a
support-based approach, leading to policy change. If, on the other hand,
there is a poor fit between the problem and the solution, or the politics
are not favorable, then no change will take place, and over time, the
problem will fall from its position of importance. Hence, these shocks
can create a “window of opportunity” for policymakers to address a
problem that may have existed for some time, and yet was never quite
important enough to rise to the top of the policymakers' agenda. For
example, Yusuf et al. [9] found coastal flooding events to lead to the
issue of climate policy rising on the policy agenda of Atlantic coastal
state governments, and falling again with no action taken because of the
lack of confluence with the politics and solutions streams.
Critically, however, focusing events can often be interpreted in
different ways, which in turn influences whether the politics and solu­
tions streams can align around a particular problem. For example, the
September 11th, 2001 attack on the World Trade Center and Pentagon in
the United States could have formed the basis for policy-making to solve
a number of different problems: terrorism with roots in Afghanistan;
terrorism with roots in Saudi Arabia; or political turmoil in the Middle
East tightly coupled with fossil fuel exports. As Entman [10] documents,

* Corresponding author at: Department of Humanities, Social and Political Sciences, ETH Zurich, Switzerland.
E-mail address: bjarne.steffen@gess.ethz.ch (B. Steffen).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2022.102758
Received 6 June 2022; Received in revised form 13 July 2022; Accepted 21 July 2022
Available online 27 July 2022
2214-6296/© 2022 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
B. Steffen and A. Patt
there were political actors attempting to frame the attacks in each of
these ways, but ultimately, the Afghanistan terrorism frame prevailed,
supporting policy-making in the form of a United States intervention to
topple the Taliban government.
On February 24th, 2022, after months of preparation and specula­
tion, Russian forces invaded the country of Ukraine. The war soon
caused thousands of deaths and wounded, and let millions of people flee
their home. The Russian attack was widely condemned in the West,
including by nearly every European government, and met with military,
humanitarian, and financial support for the Ukrainian government, as
well as economic and social sanctions against Russia and many of its
elites. Within days of the attack, the German government announced
that it was suspending the final permitting process for the Northstream 2
natural gas pipeline due to begin shipping natural gas from Russia to
Germany under the Baltic, circumventing an existing pipeline passing
through Ukraine. More generally, policymakers in Europe began to focus
on three related problems. First, it was seen as a problem that many
countries' energy systems depended on fossil fuel imports from Russia
for their day-to-day functioning. Russia could, at any time, block the
flow of energy in order to retaliate to the economic and social sanctions.
Indeed, Russia did, weeks later, cease deliveries of natural gas to Poland
and Finland. Second, the payments for these fossil fuel imports were
seen as a problem in their own right, since they accounted for the largest
single revenue stream flowing to the Russian government, and hence an
enabler of the Russian military. This fact prompted calls for European
countries to further hurt Russia, ending these imports and the associated
payments themselves. Third, the price of fossil fuels rose dramatically
after the onset of the war, exacerbating the issue of inflation already
evident. Each of these three problems, in turn, could be framed in a
number of ways: reliance on fossil fuels; reliance on energy imports;
reliance on energy imports from a single country; reliance on imports
from non-democratic countries; and cost-ineffective energy systems.
Solutions began to appear in the media for each of these perceived
problems, including renewable energy development within Europe,
constructing liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals to access natural gas
from Qatar or the United States, measures to reduce reliance across the
economy on imports from non-democratic countries, including China,
and tax reductions for fossil fuels.
There is reason to believe, then, that the war in Ukraine has led to a
window of opportunity for new climate and energy policies in Europe
centering on the accelerated deployment of renewable energy technol­
ogies, and on the accelerated phase-out of fossil energy use. These
changes would most clearly respond to the perceived vulnerability to
energy imports from Russia. However, one potential reason to believe
that support for these policies could fall is if they were perceived as
leading to higher energy prices, exacerbating this perceived problem.
That the war could have led to rising support for several other sets of
policies related to energy is somewhat less obvious. One such issue,
relevant for a number of European countries, is the regulation of the
financial sector, and whether global investments originating in a given
country ought to be oriented towards sustainability. A second issue is the
support for the use of new natural gas-fired peak power stations. In the
authors' home country of Switzerland, the construction of several of
these had recently been proposed as a means to provide flexibility to the
power system, and thus to accelerate the phase-out of fossil fuels. Similar
proposals have been made in neighboring Germany. While the war likely
highlighted the need to accelerate the phase-out of fossil fuels, it is
unclear whether a solution involving natural gas use would be viewed
favorably. Finally, a third issue is support for greater European energy
sector integration, or rather for enhanced national autonomy or even
autarchy. In Switzerland, many experts have suggested that enhanced
European power-market integration would facilitate the transition to
renewable energy by allowing the country to seasonally balance its large
hydropower generating fleet, as well as its planned additions of solar
photovoltaic (PV), with winter imports of wind energy. At the same
time, however, there have been calls for Switzerland to enhance its
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Energy Research & Social Science 91 (2022) 102758
energy security by ending all reliance on imported energy. One could
imagine the war in Ukraine supporting both sets of arguments.
In sum, it is hence unclear whether European clean energy policy
could change significantly in light of the war, and witness a historical
turning point that is comparable to shifts in other areas such as defense
or foreign policy. The multiple streams theory suggests that the war as a
focusing event could lead to major policy change, but it depends on the
interpretation of the event. It is unclear whether a narrative framing it in
light of the clean energy transition will prevail. This ambiguity is
problematic for energy policymakers that need to decide on potentially
sweeping policy changes within short notice. A better understanding of
the war's importance for clean energy is also highly relevant for re­
searchers concerned with the energy transition. Scholarly transition
frameworks like the multi-level perspective [3] describe pressure from
the socio-technical landscape as a starting point for innovative tech­
nologies gaining momentum in existing systems, and the interpretation
of the war will determine its significance in that regard.
To provide early evidence on this question, here we present the re­
sults of a survey administered in April 2022 to a sample of 1000 Swiss
voters in the French- and German-speaking regions of the country. We
asked respondents for their level of support for 10 possible climate and
energy policy measures, as well as their self-assessment of whether their
support had risen or fallen as a result of the war in Ukraine. We also
asked respondents a number of questions related to socio-economic
factors, and their preferred political party. Based on the results, we
discuss implications for energy policymaking and energy transition
research more generally.
Switzerland makes a good case study, offering findings that can be
generalized to other European democracies, for several reasons. First, it
is fairly typical of European countries in terms of being dependent on
Russian imports for the energy sector, and having witnessed an increase
in energy prices. Second, it is a country with a large financial sector
(including for fossil fuel trade) that has hardly been addressed by green
financial policies to date [11], and hence a good country to investigate
whether attitudes towards greening the financial sector may have
changed. Third, Switzerland is a country where issues of energy trade
are of high political salience, given that Switzerland is not a member of
the European Union (EU), and is facing a potential energy shortfall due
to future EU policies that would restrict transmission capacity to
Switzerland. In this respect it is somewhat of an outlier politically; at the
same time, the issue of energy autarchy, which is discussed intensively
in Switzerland because of its non-EU status, is one that forms an un­
dercurrent of policy debates in other countries. Finally, Switzerland is a
country where large policy issues are often resolved through popular
referenda. Indeed, the government's most recent climate policy package
was rejected by 51 % of voters in a June 2021 referendum. Again, this
makes Switzerland a good country to study because its citizens, having
to vote on these referenda, are used to having to express their opinions
on policy issues on which they ultimately will directly vote (though
there might still be a gap between expressed opinions and voting de­
cisions of course). In sum, we believe that the empirical evidence from
Switzerland allows for a discussion whether and to which extent the
Russia-Ukraine war constitutes a historical turning point for European
energy policy at large. Accordingly, this Perspective aims to inform
energy policymakers and clean energy transition scholars alike.
2. Climate and energy policy in Switzerland
Swiss climate and energy policies have generated a great deal of
coverage in the media, in part because they have come up frequently in
referenda in recent years. In the Swiss political system, the two houses of
parliament need to pass a unified new law, but these do not enter into
effect immediately. With >50,000 signatories gathered within several
months of any law's passage, any group (including political parties) can
bring the law to a popular vote, which typically occurs within one year.
Swiss climate and energy law has been divided into two policy-
B. Steffen and A. Patt
making streams, one focused primarily on energy, and electricity gen­
eration and use in particular, while the other focuses on climate change
and emissions more generally.1 In part, this follows from the fact that the
Swiss power sector is already largely decarbonized, with roughly 65 %
of power generated through hydroelectric dams, and roughly 30 % from
a fleet of nuclear power plants. The 2011 nuclear accident in Fukushima,
Japan, triggered a reevaluation of the national energy system with calls
to decommission the nuclear power fleet. In 2016, the parliament passed
a national energy policy package, with a mix of instruments designed to
gradually phase out the country's nuclear power fleet as individual
plants reached the end of operational life, and to replace these with
support for wind and solar power, as well as energy efficiency measures.
The right-wing populist party (Swiss People's Party) challenged the law,
bringing it to a referendum in 2017; the challenge failed, as 58.2 % of
voters approved the law.
On the climate side, a policy package had been put in place in 2000
to achieve the First Commitment Period targets (2008–12) in the Kyoto
Protocol, which was then revised in 2013 in order to achieve the Second
Commitment Period targets (2020). In 2020, the Swiss parliament
passed a revised version of the law intended to achieve the emissions
reduction targets promised for 2030 in the country's Nationally Deter­
mined Contribution under the Paris Agreement. The revised law con­
tained a mix of instruments, including technology support, carbon
prices, and regulatory measures. Again, the Swiss People's Party chal­
lenged the law, and in June 2021 prevailed in their challenge, with 51.6
% of voters rejecting the law.
Following this defeat, the government developed a new proposal for
the revised climate law, omitting any additional use of carbon prices,
which had been viewed as largely leading to the law's rejection by
voters. A parliamentary debate on the new proposal is scheduled for the
summer of 2022. The Swiss People's Party has already announced that
they are likely to challenge the law if it closely resembles the proposal
set forth by the government.
Meanwhile, there have also been extensive discussions focusing on
Swiss climate targets for 2050. In 2019, a coalition of climate policy
advocates launched a signature drive for a national vote on setting a net
zero emissions target and a ban on the use of fossil fuels for 2050,
eventually collecting the needed 100,000 signatures. This triggered a set
of counter-proposals from the government, which, if passed, would avert
the popular vote. The most recent of these quite closely mirrors the text
of the popular initiative, in terms of setting a net zero target for 2050,
and a near complete phase-out of fossil energy. It is also scheduled for
parliamentary debate in the summer of 2022.
3. Survey method
To explore the possible effects of the war in Ukraine on support for
Swiss climate and energy law, we developed a survey that was admin­
istered in late April 2022, i.e. two months into the war. We sampled 600
respondents in the German-speaking part of the country, and 400 re­
spondents in the French-speaking part, making use of the database of an
established marketing survey company. Previous studies have found
such opt-in samples to be of high reliability, compared to comparatively
more expensive representative population samples [30].
Five of the questions focused directly on issues associated with fossil
fuel use and reflect the current policy debates: (1) economy-wide phase-
out of fossil fuels by 2050; (2) the use of natural gas as a means to ensure
adequate winter power supply; (3) a prohibition on future installations
of fossil heating systems; (4) a prohibition on sales of cars with internal
combustion engines to take effect in 2030; and (5) regulations on the
financial industry aimed at reducing new investments in the fossil en­
ergy industry. Five further questions focused on issues associated with
renewable energy support: (6) government support for solar and wind
1
For more details, see e.g. [28,29].
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Energy Research & Social Science 91 (2022) 102758
power to enable the economy-wide phaseout of fossil fuels; (7) coordi­
nation of the Swiss and European power markets, in order to enable
improved integration of imbalanced solar, wind, and hydropower re­
sources in Switzerland; (8) policy changes to enable ground-mounted
solar photovoltaics installations, currently prohibited in most cases
under Swiss law; (9) streamlining of the permitting processes for wind
turbine installations; and (10) government support for novel deep-
decarbonization technologies, such as carbon-neutral synthetic avia­
tion fuels.
For each of these ten questions, we asked two questions: level of
support using a five-point Likert scale; and, the respondent's own
assessment about whether their support had risen, fallen, or remain
unchanged as a result of the war in Ukraine. We explored the degree to
which attitudes towards each of these issues would be sensitive to
background scientific information. For this, we distributed multiple
versions of the survey, such that for each question, there was a control
group receiving no additional scientific information, and an equally
numbered treatment group receiving a paragraph of information,
derived from the scientific literature, on each issue. The underlying
purpose of the information treatment was to test whether people's atti­
tudes were contingent on a great science-based understanding of this
policy issue in question. We developed individual information treatment
paragraphs for each question, formulated in plain language and mainly
based on the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change [12], Switzerland-specific energy pathway studies like
summarized in [13], and comparisons with other European countries.
The extent that we observe little difference between the treatment and
control groups, we can infer attitudes that are more stable.
Finally, we asked a number of questions related to demographic
factors (age, income, and educational attainment), as well as potential
covariates. The latter included whether respondents: lived in the city,
suburbs, or countryside; owned or rented their primary residence;
heated the residence with fossil fuel; owned or leased a car with an in­
ternal combustion engine; and political preferences. For the latter, the
options were the six main political parties in Switzerland. As they are
frequently aligned from left to right, these are the Greens, the Social
Democrats, the Green Liberals (which are seen as more market oriented
than the Greens), the Centrists (a recent fusion of Christian Democrat
and Conservative parties), the Liberal Democrats, and the right-wing
Populist party.
Clearly, the survey method has some limitations. Particularly, by
simply asking whether support changed as a result of the war, we cannot
exactly measure how large the change in support has been, and re­
spondents could overestimate the change. An alternative way to mea­
sure changes would be a panel analysis (e.g., in the context of the Swiss
Environmental Panel [14]), though panel analyses cannot deliver the
early insights that could inform the rapidly evolving debate concerning
fast changes to energy policies. Further, past research emphasized that
public acceptance of policies typically does not consider individual
policy instruments in isolation but is formed in relation to a broader
climate and energy policy mix [15]. We decided to nevertheless survey
policies one by one, as our study aims at evaluating the changing support
for policies that are seemingly more or less directly linked to the Russia-
Ukraine war, and measuring support individually provides a richer
picture on how consistent a change in attitudes may be. However, we
largely refrain from specifying specific policy instruments (with the
exemption of prohibiting some technologies), but rather refer to policy
goals that could be achieved by various specific instruments or combi­
nations thereof (e.g. accelerating the deployment of renewables), and/or
roughly outline a policy mix (e.g. a gas heating ban combined with
support for low-income groups).
4. Empirical results
For each of the 10 main questions, we display a set of graphs showing
overall levels of support, the effects of the information treatment, and
B. Steffen and A. Patt
support levels contingent on political preferences. We also show self-
reported changes in levels of support, and these net changes contin­
gent on political preferences.
4.1. Support for fossil fuel–related policies
Fig. 1 shows support for the economy-wide phase-out of fossil fuels.
There is strong support for this in all parties except for the populist
party; even among the latter, the opposition is <50 %. Generally, people
were more likely to say that their support had risen (almost a third of
respondents), rather than fallen, as a result of the war. In this case, there
was a significant difference (p < 0.05) between French and German
survey respondents, the latter showing a greater tendency towards
increasing support following the beginning of the war in Ukraine. No
other significant correlations or effects were observed.
Fig. 2 shows support for building new natural gas-fired power plants.
Feelings are mixed on this issue, with little differentiation across party
lines; among the supporters of no party do either support or opposition
exceed 50 %. Changes in support levels since the war are generally less
than for the other policies investigated, and indeed, among Greens and
Green Liberals, completely absent.
Fig. 3 shows support for the prohibition of new fossil heating sys­
tems. There is generally high support for this measure, strongest in the
left parties, and weakest in the Populist party. Somewhat surprisingly,
neither home ownership nor current use of a fossil heating system had a
statistically significant influence on support levels. Also, no other sig­
nificant demographic effects were observed. Support levels rose the
most in the social democratic party, perhaps reflecting lower levels of
support prior to the war, and hence a greater opportunity for movement.
Fig. 4 shows support for a prohibition on the sale of new internal
combustion engine cars. Support is highly contingent on party identifi­
cation. The data also showed significantly lower levels of support (p <
0.05) for rural residents compared to either urban or suburban residents,
as well as higher levels of support among those who did not own an
internal combustion engine car. Changes in support levels as a result of
the war are modest compared to changes on other policies.
Fig. 5 shows support for a policy aimed at reducing fossil energy
finance. There is very high support for this in the left parties, and more
mixed support in the right parties. No other significant effects were
observed. Support has risen as a result of the war fairly consistently
across parties, with the exception of the Populist party.
4.2. Support for clean-energy-related policies
Fig. 6, showing support for policies aimed at expanding solar and
wind energy production, highlights that such policies enjoy the highest
levels of support, consistent across all political parties, of any of the
Fig. 1. Support for a policy to completely end the use of fossil fuels (oil and natural gas) in Switzerland by 2050.
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Energy Research & Social Science 91 (2022) 102758
policies. No other significant effects were observed. It also showed the
greatest tendencies towards increased levels of support since the war,
with a bit less than a third of respondents increasing their support.
Fig. 7 shows support for the integration of the Swiss power system
with the European one. Support levels are high in all parties, and also
show a free-market effect, in terms of the Green Liberals showing higher
support than the Greens, and the Liberal Democrats showing higher
levels of support than the centrists. Only the Populist party, which is also
anti-EU, shows less than majority support. Support has risen very
consistently among all parties, with the exception of the Populist party.
Fig. 8 shows the support for ground-mounted solar installations to be
high. Switzerland is one of the few countries where freestanding solar
photovoltaics are rare (also due to a moratorium for such projects), and
yet it appears that the war has increased the political appetite for these,
relatively consistently across all political parties.
Fig. 9 shows support for streamlining the permitting processes for
wind also to be high. In Switzerland, as of now, a set of permitting legal
processes run in sequence, leading to administrative planning phases
that take up to a decade [16]. One current proposal is to have them run
in parallel, meaning that the same arguments would be heard, but the
entire process would take less time, likely improving the financial
prospects for wind park developers.
Fig. 10, finally, shows support for a policy to develop technical op­
tions in hard-to-decarbonize sectors. Support levels are high, only falling
narrowly below 50 % in the Populist party. Support has also risen,
relatively consistently, across the political spectrum.
Comparing the proposed policy changes relating to fossil fuel use
(Figs. 1–5) and those concerning clean energy support (Figs. 6–10), we
do not see a clear pattern, with one of the groups seeing a generally
higher change in support following the Russian invasion. For instance,
both policy proposals to completely end the use of fossil fuels by 2050,
and policy proposals accelerating the deployment of solar and wind
power became substantially more popular. While in the context of the
war, the dependency on oil & gas is arguably more salient, respondents
seem to be aware that the need to phase out fossil fuels, and the need to
phase in renewables are closely linked.
5. Discussion and conclusion
Across all the policies we examined, we found levels of support that
would justify policy action taking place, with the exception of installing
new gas-fired power stations. According to the respondents, the support
for policies to reduce fossil fuels strongly increased due to the war in
Ukraine – now, 62 % support (strongly or weakly) the phase-out of fossil
fuels by 2050, with a clear majority in all party groups except for the
Populist party. There seems to be a particular high support for banning
fossil fuel heating systems (with some qualifications) already by 2025,
B. Steffen and A. Patt Energy Research & Social Science 91 (2022) 102758

Fig. 2. Support for a policy to build a set of natural gas power plants in Switzerland to cover potential power shortfalls in winter months.

Fig. 3. Support for Swiss-wide policy prohibiting the installation of new oil and natural gas heating systems for buildings, in combination with government support
to ensure that the switch to alternative heating systems – such as heat pumps – would be affordable to low-income families, taking effect by 2025.

Support by party idenficaon

Strongly against Weakly against Neutral Weakly for Strongly for
(weak and strong support)

Overall 26% 16% 18% 21% 19% Green 74%

Social Dem. 53%
Green Liberal 57%
Informaon with Centrist 42%
Liberal Dem. 34%
treatment without Populist) 23%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 0% 25% 50% 75% 100%

Change of support as a result of the ongoing war in the Ukraine

Diminished support No change Increased support Change of support by party idenficaon

(% increased support minus % diminished support)
Overall 5% 81% 14% Green 16%
Social Dem. 7%
Green Liberal 13%
Informaon with Centrist 16%
Liberal Dem. 9%
treatment without Populist 4%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% -20% 0% 20% 40% 60%

Fig. 4. Support for a policy prohibiting the purchase of new cars that burn gasoline or diesel in combination with government support for the installation of electric-
vehicle charging stations, taking effect by or before 2030.

also among homeowners. Such a policy could heavily contribute to the
decarbonization of the Swiss economy, given that the building sector
was responsible for 24 % of CO2 emissions in 2020 [17]. Overall, the
increased public support for these policies is in line with an interpre­
tation of the Ukraine war-related energy problems as being related to the
reliance on imported fossil fuels in general, such that a solution needs to
address the use of fossil fuels in general (as compared to, for instance,
simply diversifying the countries from which oil and gas are being
imported).
Compared to fossil fuel phase-out policies, the support for policies
that aim at accelerating the role-out of renewables, such as solar and
wind, is even higher (79 % strong or weak support), including among
supporters of the populist party (69 %), due to about a third of the re­
spondents who report an increased level of support since the war. The

5
B. Steffen and A. Patt Energy Research & Social Science 91 (2022) 102758

Fig. 5. Support for financial policies that encourages Swiss banks, asset managers, and financial traders to reduce investment in fossil fuels.

Support by party idenficaon

Strongly against Weakly against Neutral Weakly for Strongly for
(weak and strong support)

Overall 5% 12% 27% 52% Green 91%

Social Dem. 83%
4% Green Liberal 95%
Informaon with Centrist 77%
Liberal Dem. 82%
treatment without Populist) 69%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 0% 25% 50% 75% 100%

Change of support as a result of the ongoing war in the Ukraine

Diminished support No change Increased support Change of support by party idenficaon

(% increased support minus % diminished support)
Overall 3% 68% 29% Green 26%
Social Dem. 27%
Green Liberal 27%
Informaon with Centrist 39%
Liberal Dem. 29%
treatment without Populist 22%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% -20% 0% 20% 40% 60%

Fig. 6. Support for policies to accelerate the deployment of solar and wind power in Switzerland to the extent needed to replace oil and natural gas.

Support by party idenficaon

Strongly against Weakly against Neutral Weakly for Strongly for
(weak and strong support)

Overall 7% 7% 23% 30% 33% Green 80%

Social Dem. 78%
Green Liberal 90%
Informaon with Centrist 64%
Liberal Dem. 70%
treatment without Populist) 41%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 0% 25% 50% 75% 100%

Change of support as a result of the ongoing war in the Ukraine

Diminished support No change Increased support Change of support by party idenficaon

(% increased support minus % diminished support)
Overall 4% 72% 23% Green 23%
Social Dem. 24%
Green Liberal 25%
Informaon with Centrist 26%
Liberal Dem. 25%
treatment without Populist 8%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% -20% 0% 20% 40% 60%

Fig. 7. Support for close integration of Switzerland into EU electricity regulation in order to allow electricity trading between Switzerland and the rest of Europe and
a pooling of hydro-power, solar PV, and wind power resources across countries.

level of support remains high also in questions concerning more specific
measures to accelerate renewables roll-out, such as allowing for ground-
mounted solar PV and streamlining the permitting process for wind
turbines – two topics that have been quite controversial in Switzerland
so far [18,19]. The increased support for renewable energy policies
further supports an interpretation of the war where the main problem is
fossil fuel dependence, which can be solved by expanding solar and wind
power as a replacement.
Besides policies that directly address the energy sector, we also
measured the support for financial policies that encourage financial
actors to reduce fossil fuel investments, and thereby address the energy
sector indirectly. There is a (slim) majority for such interventions among
the respondents, 20 % of whom reported that their support had grown
since the war. Given the potentially large effect of comparably modest
changes to financial regulation [20], such policies could have an effect
well beyond national borders, given the international importance of the

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B. Steffen and A. Patt Energy Research & Social Science 91 (2022) 102758

Fig. 8. Support for a policy to allow for the installation of some ground-mounted PV in Switzerland, contingent on an environmental impact analysis.

Support by party idenficaon

Strongly against Weakly against Neutral Weakly for Strongly for
(weak and strong support)

Overall 7% 7% 26% 29% 32% Green 75%

Social Dem. 71%
Green Liberal 86%
Informaon with Centrist 60%
Liberal Dem. 52%
treatment without Populist) 49%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 0% 25% 50% 75% 100%

Change of support as a result of the ongoing war in the Ukraine

Diminished support No change Increased support Change of support by party idenficaon

(% increased support minus % diminished support)
Overall 2% 79% 19% Green 16%
Social Dem. 19%
Green Liberal 21%
Informaon with Centrist 20%
Liberal Dem. 22%
treatment without Populist 12%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% -20% 0% 20% 40% 60%

Fig. 9. Support for a policy to streamline the permitting process for wind-turbines, contingent on maintaining the rights of local communities to object to wind-
power based on legitimate environmental concerns.

Fig. 10. Support for increasing the financial support (e.g., via a significant climate fund) for the development and market introduction of novel technologies that are
required to replace fossil fuels in sectors like aviation or high-temperature processes in the industry.

Zurich and Geneva financial centers.
Across all the policy questions, we observed only minor differences
between the information treatment and control groups; in most cases
these were not statistically significant, and in all cases these differences
were smaller than those attributable to underlying political party pref­
erences. This suggests relatively robust opinions as to the underlying
issues. This could be due to the fact that people have firm political
opinions that are not be changed through additional information (which
we consider less likely as actually quite a large share of respondents
report to have increased or decreased support since the war), or because
people are already well informed given the multiple recent energy policy
debates (which we consider more likely). Furthermore, as there is no
reason to believe that Switzerland is an outlier with respect to the effects
of the war on public opinion, we suggest that the results seen here would
be likely to be similar in other western European countries.
From a climate policy point of view, our results are encouraging. It

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B. Steffen and A. Patt Energy Research & Social Science 91 (2022) 102758

should be stressed, however, that there is no guarantee that a “fossil fuel
dependency” interpretation of energy concerns will automatically
translate into more ambitious clean energy policies. As has been the case
with other focusing events in the past, there are alternative in­
terpretations leading to different solutions (e.g., increase the import
capacity for LNG, or reduce the burden of high energy prices through
subsidies), and affected industries are strongly engaged to frame the
problem in a way that leads to their preferred solutions. Past research
has highlighted the importance of agency in shaping socio-political
dynamics in climate change mitigation [21], and stakeholders that
aim to increase the stringency of climate policies need to actively engage
in framing the debate [22]. Policymakers should be encouraged by the
high level of support for new policies, and use the window of opportu­
nity for ambitious policy change.
Moreover, there is no guarantee that attitudes expressed in the
context of a survey will translate into actual support for real policies. If
ideas and considerations are only partially consistent before the survey,
the responses provided could depend on the context given and the
wording of the question [23,24]. The little effect of information treat­
ment in our study would be in line with consistent attitudes, though the
study design does not explicitly test for it. More importantly, opinion
research like ours in general raises the question how predictive opinions
are for actual decisions in elections or votes. In the Swiss context this
may be more likely, as residents are used to having to vote directly on
policy issues, with a high correspondence between their expressed
preferences in public opinion polls and later political referenda,
particularly in cases here background knowledge is high or issues are
viewed as being important [25]. Nevertheless, our results should be
interpreted against the background of a potential gap between opinions
in survey results and actual policy support.
While this Perspective provides early evidence on shifting policy
support, it also remains to be seen how durable the observed patterns
will be. Future studies, particularly ones using panel analyses, can
provide insights in that regard. In addition, future research should
evaluate public opinion in other countries that are reliant on energy
imports from Russia. While many general sentiments in Switzerland are
arguably comparable to those in some other European countries, some
contextual factors, such as trust in government, might differ [26].
Looking beyond the climate and energy sphere, as of May 2022, it
appears increasingly likely that from a future point of view, the Russian
invasion of Ukraine indeed could be seen as a historical turning point.
Following the dreadful human suffering and massive economic damage
in Ukraine, it is hard to imagine that the political, and economic re­
lations between Russia and the West will recover in the foreseeable
future. An economic recession in Western European countries cannot be
ruled out, which would trigger economic policy interventions. During
past crises, stimuli packages unfortunately had mixed outcomes with
respect to climate policy goals, as they partly fostered high-carbon
intensive infrastructure [27]. Depending on the interpretation of the
current focusing events, such outcomes could happen again, as the
current discussions about increasing hard coal use and building new
natural gas infrastructure show. There is a key difference to the COVID-
19 crisis and the Global Financial Crisis, though: Given the hitherto
existing dependency on Russian oil & gas, fundamental changes to their
energy policy need to be at the heart of Western European's reaction to
the current events, not just a potential collateral to policies addressing
primarily different objectives (like financial stability, or containing a
virus). Hence, the window of opportunity for a step change in policy
ambition towards net-zero energy systems is there. History will tell
whether the opportunity is taken – the level of public support for clean
energy policies should strongly encourage climate policy advocates to
work in that direction.
Declaration of competing interest
The authors declare that they have no known competing financial
interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence
the work reported in this paper.
Data availability
Data will be made available on request.
Acknowledgements
BS acknowledges funding by the SWiss Energy research for the En­
ergy Transition (SWEET) project “Enabling Decentralized renewable
Generation in the Swiss cities, midlands, and the Alps (EDGE)”. The
authors bear full responsibility for the presented conclusions and
findings.

Appendix A
Table A.1
Overview on information treatments.

Question Introductory text (simple) Introductory text (with information treatment)

1. Support for a policy to completely end the use of fossil
fuels (oil and natural gas) in Switzerland by 2050
2. Support for a policy to build a set of natural gas power
plants in Switzerland to cover potential power shortfalls
in winter months
Swiss policy-makers are currently considering a policy
to completely phase-out the use of fossil energy –
primarily oil and natural gas – by 2050.
The Swiss Bundesrat has proposed building several
natural-gas fired power plants, to cover potential power
shortfalls in winter months.
Swiss policy-makers are currently considering a policy to
completely phase-out the use of fossil energy – primarily oil
and natural gas – by 2050. The Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change has concluded that such a phase-out of
fossil energy is technically feasible, and is likely to result in
little to no additional costs for most energy consumers. It
would, however, require large and sustained investments
over the next 20 years into alternative energy sources, such
as solar and wind power, as well as a shift from cars and
heating systems that currently use fossil fuels towards
electric or biomass-fuelled alternatives.
The Swiss Bundesrat has proposed building several natural-
gas fired power plants, to cover potential power shortfalls in
winter months. Due to their limited periods of operation, the
natural gas needed for these could be stored within the
country. Energy models show that these would be cost
effective in the event of reduced electricity trade with other
European countries; in the event of current or expanded
levels of electricity trade, such plants would neither be
needed nor a cost-effective part of the Swiss energy system.
(continued on next page)

8
B. Steffen and A. Patt
Table A.1 (continued )
Question
3. Support for Swiss-wide policy prohibiting the
installation of new oil and natural gas heating systems
for buildings, in combination with government support
to ensure that the switch to alternative heating systems –
such as heat pumps – would be affordable to low-income
families, taking effect by 2025.
4. Support for a policy prohibiting the purchase of new
cars that burn gasoline or diesel in combination with
government support for the installation of electric-
vehicle charging stations, taking effect by or before 2030
5. Support for financial policies that encourages Swiss
banks, asset managers, and financial traders to reduce
investment in fossil fuels
6. Support for policies to accelerate the deployment of
solar and wind power in Switzerland to the extent
needed to replace oil and natural gas
7. Support for close integration of Switzerland into EU
electricity regulation in order to allow electricity trading
between Switzerland and the rest of Europe and a
pooling of hydro-power, solar PV, and wind power
resources across countries
8. Support for a policy to allow for the installation of some
ground-mounted PV in Switzerland, contingent on an
environmental impact analysis
Introductory text (simple)
One of the main uses for fossil energy in Switzerland is
for oil and natural gas heating systems.
The other main use for fossil energy in Switzerland is
passenger vehicles with internal combustion engines
(ICEVs).
With its large financial sector, Switzerland is an
important center for energy investment and
international trade of fossil fuels.
Demand for electricity will rise by at least 50 % if the
use of oil and natural gas is eliminated.
Electricity trade with other European countries is a
topic currently being discussed in Switzerland and the
EU.
One of the potential reasons why Switzerland has been
slow to install solar power is that the country limits
solar installations to rooftops and building surfaces.
9
Energy Research & Social Science 91 (2022) 102758
Introductory text (with information treatment)
One of the main uses for fossil energy in Switzerland is for
oil and natural gas heating systems. Alternatives exist that
usually cost less to operate over the lifetime of the
investment. These include heat pumps and biomass-based
district heating systems. The installation of these
alternatives are increasing, but there are still a significant
number of new fossil fuel heating systems being installed.
Numerous European countries, and several Swiss cantons,
already have laws that prohibit the installation of new fossil
heating systems, and instead require alternatives like heat
pumps.
The other main use for fossil energy in Switzerland is
passenger vehicles with internal combustion engines
(ICEVs). Electric vehicles (EVs) now offer lifetime
ownership costs that are often below those of ICEVs.
Multiple scientific studies, including the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change, conclude that the overall
environmental impact of EVs are much lower than that of
ICEVs. The number of new EVs sold has been rising quickly
in Switzerland, and is currently at about 20 % of all new cars
sold. The EU is considering legislation that would prohibit
the sale of new ICEVs by 2035. Other countries have faster
timelines: the UK will prohibit the sale of new ICEVs starting
in 2030, while Norway will do so starting in 2025. In
Norway, EVs already account for >85 % of new cars sold.
With its large financial sector, Switzerland is an important
center for energy investment and international trade of
fossil fuels. Scientific studies, including the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, conclude that
the financial sector could play an important role in re-
directing capital flows away from fossil fuels and towards
renewable energy sources. While the EU and some European
countries are introducing dedicated policies that encourage
financial institutions to divest from fossil fuels (e.g. the
requirement to disclose climate effects of the portfolio, and
fossil fuel divestments of public pension funds), Switzerland
so far relies mostly on voluntary initiatives.
Demand for electricity will rise by at least 50 % if the use of
oil and natural gas is eliminated. The current least-cost
options to expand electricity supply and solar PV and wind
power. Switzerland currently receives <5 % of its electricity
from solar and wind power. Most other European countries
now receive >10 % of their electricity supply from solar and
wind power, while in some countries this exceeds 30 %. In
these countries, government policies have played a critical
role in stimulating investment.
Electricity trade with other European countries is a topic
currently being discussed in Switzerland and the EU. The
reason for these discussions is that solar panels, like
hydropower, produce more energy in summer, while wind
turbines produce more energy in winter. Because
Switzerland's geography lends itself to solar and
hydropower, but not to wind power, the country faces a
potential power shortfall in winter. Other countries, such as
the UK and Denmark, face the reverse situation, with more
renewable energy available in winter than in summer. One
solution would be for Switzerland to export power in
summer to these other countries, and import power from
them in winter. Multiple scientific studies show that this
would allow Switzerland to eliminate the use of fossil
energy while maintaining current electricity prices. Such
electricity trade would likely require a close integration
with EU electricity regulation. The energy system models
show that without this trade, Switzerland would need to
store large amounts of electricity from the summer to the
winter, which entails losing up to 40 % of electricity
originally generated. This would increase prices
significantly, and also require much more installation of
wind, solar, and hydropower within Switzerland.
One of the potential reasons why Switzerland has been slow
to install solar power is that the country limits solar
installations to rooftops and building surfaces. Ground-
based solar systems are generally not an option in
Switzerland, although they are generally lower cost, and
often attractive to larger investors. In most other European
(continued on next page)
B. Steffen and A. Patt Energy Research & Social Science 91 (2022) 102758

Table A.1 (continued )

Question Introductory text (simple) Introductory text (with information treatment)

countries, more solar PV is currently being installed on the

9. Support for a policy to streamline the permitting process
for wind-turbines, contingent on maintaining the rights
of local communities to object to wind-power based on
legitimate environmental concerns
10. Support for increasing the financial support (e.g., via a
significant climate fund) for the development and
market introduction of novel technologies that are
required to replace fossil fuels in sectors like aviation or
high-temperature processes in the industry
One of the reasons why Switzerland has been slow to
install wind power is that the legal processes for
obtaining needed permits take many years, in some
cases more than a decade.
While mature renewable energy technologies for
electricity generation are readily available and often
cost competitive, some other sectors – e.g. international
aviation, and some high-temperature processes in
industry – still lack the possibility to phase out fossil
fuels at a reasonable cost.
ground than on rooftops.
One of the reasons why Switzerland has been slow to install
wind power is that the legal processes for obtaining needed
permits take many years, in some cases more than a decade.
One main reason for this is that there are separate legal
processes during which people can oppose new wind-
turbines, each of which can take a year or more. In
Switzerland, these processes run in sequence – one after
another – rather than simultaneously. Other European
countries have streamlined their permitting processes by
making the processes happen simultaneously. This means
that the same potential objections to proposed wind-
turbines can be heard and considered, but they will all be
heard at the same time, and the timeline for wind turbine
development becomes faster.
While mature renewable energy technologies for electricity
generation are readily available and often cost competitive,
some other sectors – e.g. international aviation, and some
high-temperature processes in industry – still lack the
possibility to phase out fossil fuels at a reasonable cost.
Technology assessment studies from the International
Energy Agency and many others show that numerous novel
technologies exist at a pilot and demonstration state, but
would require significant financial support to become
market-ready. Increasing such support (e.g. via a climate
fund) could also contribute in developing related industries
and jobs in Switzerland.

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