AN ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT FOR THE DEVIL

After so many centuries of debate, much of it even quite recent,

as to the credibility of Anselm's and others' ontological arguments
for the existence of God, it seems only fair to the opposition that
some such argument be proposed for Satan's existence. It must be
noted, however, that in advocating the Devil's existence, we may be
no more than playing the Devil's advocate.
We intend to argue that if Anselm's first ontological argument suc-

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cessfully proves that God indeed exists, then, by parity of reasoning,
Satan, or the devil, exists as well. Or, to put it conversely, we shall
claim that if Satan does not exist, then neither can God, at least in
terms of what the Anselmian argument asserts. Finally, we shall
claim that if Satan does not exist, it will not be because of the
possible fact that the ontological argument establishes God's exis-
tence, but rather it will be because of something that the Anselmian
argument presupposes, which may not be provable in any argu-
ment.
Anselm's first argument, roughly, is as follows:
(1) I have a concept of something "than which nothing greater
can be conceived."
(2) If that "something" did not actually, or in fact, exist, it
would not be "that than which nothing greater can be
conceived," for somediing could always be conceived to be
greater, viz., something that actually exists.
(3) This "greatest something" is, by logical equivalence, or
definition, "God."
(.".) God exists.
An ontological argument for the devil, by analogue of reason,
goes as follows:
(1) I have a concept of something than which nothing worse can
be conceived.
(2) If that "something" did not actually, or in fact, exist, it
would not be "that than which nothing worse could be
conceived," because something could always be conceived to
be much worse, viz., something that actually exists.
 AN ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT FOR THE DEVIL 219

(3) This "greatest something" we shall call the Devil.

(.'.) The Devil exists.
This second ontological argument, by parity of reasoning with
the first, seems sound, if indeed, the first is. Is it not conceivable
that not only do we have an idea of something that is the worst
possible thing, but that it would have to exist if it truly were the
worst possible thing? Hence, the very possibility of the Devil im-
plies his actuality, just as the very possibility of God implies his
existence. The logic is the same, in both cases: a devil would not be
the Devil unless he existed and was therefore the most awful thing,
just as a god would not be God unless he existed and was therefore

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the greatest thing.
This ontological argument for Satan seems shocking enough, at
least at first reading, but something even more startling might be
suggested: the two arguments are not only analogous—they are
identical. Might it not be suggested that they both establish the
existence of the one thing—call it God or Satan—namely, a su-
preme Being who is the "greatest" and the "worst" possible being.
This suggestion, however, can be made good only if it can be
plausibly argued that the word 'greater' in the first argument does
not imply the word 'better*. For it is surely the case that if Anselm
means "better" when he uses the word 'greater', there would be an
overt contradiction between the two ontological arguments, viz., the
conflict between a "best being" and a "worst being." But does
Anselm, in fact, mean "better" by 'greater'? It has definitely been
claimed, subsequent to Anselm, that his argument assumes "exis-
tence to be a perfection," or that it is better to be than not to be,
and, with this supplementation, it certainly seems to be the case
that Anselm equated the two terms or at least implied the one by
the other.
But is this really explicit in Anselm's argument? Is he saying
that existence is a perfection? If he is, then his argument seems
question-begging, because the argument seems to assume what it
purports to prove, viz., that it is better for God to exist than not to
exist. Presumably, too, if existence is good, God must be good, but
one may not be able to assume that existence is good without, first,
proving that God exists and is good. Hence, one cannot, or must
not, reverse the order of argument such as Anselm seems to do—one
must not assume that existence is good or a perfection unless one
220 DAVID AND MARJORIE HAIGHT

has already proved God's existence. But, actually, the plausibility of

Anselm's proof, at least as it has been here paraphrased, is partly
contingent upon the word 'greater'. The "greatest" possible being
must be God. Or, it might be the Devil, for it does not follow from
Anselm's argument that God is good, only that he exists. And if the
word 'greater' does not involve "perfection," then both ontological
arguments establish the existence of one and only one being. It is
then a matter of faith as to whether one calls it God or Satan, a
benign daemon or a malicious demon. And this faith may, after all,
be simply cause of itself.

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DAVID AND MARJORIE HAIGHT
IOWA STATE UNIVERSITY