ERNESTO CALLADO vs.

INTERNATIONAL RICE RESEARCH INSTITUTE (IRRI)

G.R. No. 106483 May 22, 1995/ ROMERO, J.: Facts:Ernesto Callado, petitioner, was employed as a driver at the IRRI. One day while driving an IRRI vehicle on an official trip to the NAIA and back to the IRRI, petitioner figured in an accident. Petitioner was informed of the findings of a preliminary investigation conducted by the IRRI's Human Resource Development Department Manager. In view of the findings, he was charged with: (1) Driving an institute vehicle while on official duty under the influence of liquor; (2) Serious misconduct consisting of failure to report tosupervisors the failure of the vehicle to start because of a problem with the car battery, and (3) Gross and habitual neglect of duties. Petitioner submitted his answer and defenses to the charges against him.However, issued a Notice of Termination to petitioner. IRRI

Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal, illegal suspension and indemnity pay with moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees. IRRIwrote the Labor Arbiter to inform him that the Institute enjoys immunity from legal process by virtue of Article 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1620, 5 and that it invokes such diplomatic immunity and privileges as an international organization in the instant case filed by petitioner, not having waived the same. While admitting IRRI's defense of immunity, the Labor Arbiter, nonetheless, cited an Order issued by the Institute to the effect that "in all cases of termination, respondent IRRI waives its immunity," and, accordingly, considered the defense of immunity no longer a legal obstacle in resolving the case. The NLRC found merit in private respondent's appeal and, finding that IRRI did not waive its immunity, ordered the aforesaid decision of the Labor Arbiter set aside and the complaint dismissed. In this petition petitioner contends that the immunity of the IRRI as an international organization granted by Article 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1620 may not be invoked in the case at bench inasmuch as it waived the same by virtue of its Memorandum on "Guidelines on the handling of dismissed employees in relation to P.D. 1620." Issue:Did the (IRRI) waive its immunity from suit in this dispute which arose from an employer-employee relationship?

Held: No. P.D. No. 1620, Article 3 provides: Art. 3. Immunity from Legal Process. The Institute shall enjoy immunity from any penal, civil and administrative proceedings, except insofar as that immunity has been expressly waived by the Director-General of the Institute or his authorized representatives. The SC upholds the constitutionality of the aforequoted law. There is in this case "a categorical recognition by the Executive Branch of the Government that IRRI enjoys immunities accorded to international organizations, which determination has been held to be a political question conclusive upon the Courts in order not to embarass a political department of Government. It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of the government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the government or other officer acting under his direction. The raison d'etre for these immunities is the assurance of unimpeded performance of their functions by the agencies concerned. The grant of immunity to IRRI is clear and unequivocal and an express waiver by its Director-General is the only way by which it may relinquish or abandon this immunity. In cases involving dismissed employees, the Institute may waive its immunity, signifying that such waiver is discretionary on its part. G.R. No. 89572 December 21, 1989

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS (DECS) and DIRECTOR OF CENTER FOR EDUCATIONAL MEASUREMENT, petitioners, vs. ROBERTO REY C. SAN DIEGO and JUDGE TERESITA DIZONCAPULONG, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172, respondents.
Ramon M. Guevara for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:

The private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of Bachelor of Science in Zoology. The petitioner claims that he took the NMAT three times and flunked it as many times. 1 When he applied to take it again, the petitioner rejected his application on the basis of the aforesaid rule. He then went to the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, to compel his admission to the test. After hearing, the respondent judge rendered a decision on July 4, 1989, declaring the challenged order invalid and granting the petition. Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong held that the petitioner had been deprived of his right to pursue a medical education through an arbitrary exercise of the police power. RULING: There is no need to redefine here the police power of the State. Suffice it to repeat that the power is validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State, and (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. 5 In other words, the proper exercise of the police power requires the concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method. The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police power. It is the right and indeed the responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health. The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical schools and ultimately the medical profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors. While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a constitutional right to be a doctor. This is true of any other calling in which the public interest is involved; and the closer the link, the longer the bridge to one's ambition. The State has the responsibility to harness its human resources and to see to it that they are not dissipated or, no less worse, not used at all. These resources must be applied in a manner that will best promote the common good while also giving the individual a sense of satisfaction. A person cannot insist on being a physician if he will be a menace to his patients. The Court feels that it is not enough to simply invoke the right to quality education as a guarantee of the Constitution: one must show that he is entitled to it because of his preparation and promise. The private respondent has failed the NMAT five times. 7 While his persistence is noteworthy, to say the least, it is certainly misplaced, like a hopeless love.

No depreciation is intended or mad DECISION WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent court dated January 13, 1989, is REVERSED, with costs against the private respondent. It is so ordered.

Aglipay v. Ruiz
GR 45459, 13 March 1937 (64 Phil 201) Facts: In May 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the issuance of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, in the fulfillment of what he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, Esq., member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the President of the Philippines. In spite of the protest of the petitioners attorney, the Director of Posts publicly announced having sent to the United States the designs of the postage for printing. The said stamps were actually issued and sold though the greater part thereof remained unsold. The further sale of the stamps was sought to be prevented by the petitioner. Issue: Whether the issuance of the postage stamps was in violation of the Constitution. Held / Ruling: There has been no constitutional infraction in the case at bar, Act No. 4052 grants the Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, discretion to misuse postage stamps with new designs. Even if we were to assume that these officials made use of a poor judgment in issuing and selling the postage stamps in question still, the case of the petitioner would fail to take in weight. Between the exercise of a poor judgment and the unconstitutionality of the step taken, a gap exists which is yet to be filled to justify the court in setting aside the official act assailed as coming within a constitutional inhibition. The court resolved that petition for a writ of prohibition is hereby denied, without pronouncement as to costs.

Taada v. Angara (1997)

FACTS:  Petition for certiorari: State action to enter into WTO  April 15 1994 DTI Sec signed in Morocco the final act embodying the results of multilateral negotiations regarding the WTO o Aug 12 Senate receives letter from President submitting the Uruguay Final Act o Aug 13 president letter submitting the Agreement establishing the WTO, Ministerial Declarations, etc

Dec 9 PS 1083, immediate adoption of the Agreement Establishing the WTO o Dec 14 Senate Resolution No. 97, senate concurring in the ratification by the president of the agreement establishing the WTO o Dec 29 present petition was filed  Petitioner argues for the unconstitutionality of the WTO: o WTO requires the Philippines to place nationals and products of membercountries at par with each other o WTO limits, intrudes, impairs the constitutional powers of both Congress and the SC o WTO violates the constitutional mandate: to develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos, to give preference to qualified Filipinos and to promote preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods  Petitioner specifically seeks: o For the nullification of the concurrence of the Senate with the Presidents agreement to join the WTO o For the prohibition of the enforcement and implementation of the WTO o

ISSUE/s:  WON the petition presents a political question  WON the members of the Senate who participated in the deliberations and voting leading to the Senate Reso No. 97 are estopped from impugning the validity of the same, or the Agreement  WON the provisions of the Agreeement violate the provisions of Sec19, Art 2, and Secs 10 and 12, Art 12 of the 1987 Consti  WON the provisions of the Agreement unduly limit, restrict, and impair the sovereignty of the Phil Legislature  WON provisions of the Agreement impair the exercise of judicial power  WON Senate acted with a grave abuse of discretion in concurring only in the agreement establishing the WTO

SC RULING:  ISSUE # 1: MATTER OF JURISDICTION: political or justiciable o JUSTICIABLE because it seeks the nullity of a senate resolution on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution o An act of legislature is alleged to have infringed the Constitution: judicial review not just a matter of right but a duty (within the courts expanded jurisdiction) o Application of a constitutional provision o Judiciary as final arbiter on GADLEJ o Judicial review for GADLEJ, not review of the wisdom of a legislative or executive policy, not upon the merits nor propriety of govt policies, ONLY to determine WON there has been GADLEJ  WTO AGREEMENT AND ECONOMIC NATIONALISM o Economic nationalism: violated by the parity provisions and national treatment clauses in the WTO Agreement o Economic nationalism in Sec 19, Art 2, Secs 10 and 12, Art 12 of the Consti

WTO: places nationals and foreign products on the same footing as Filipino and domestic products in contravention of the FILIPINO FIRST POLICY  Render meaningless effectively controlled by Filipinos  WTO: ensures conformity of national economic laws, regulations, and administrative procedures with its annexed agreements and imposed obligations o Negate the preferential treatment accorded to Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods  RESPONDENTS: o Constitutional provisions are not self-executing, merely policies o Such nationalistic provisions must be read in relation to: Art 12, Sec 1 and 13. o Read properly, the cited WTO provisions do not violate the Consti o WTO agreement contains sufficient safeguards for developing countries y Declaration of Principles NOT SELF-EXECUTING o Article 2 is a mere declaration of principles and state policies basic political creed of the nation o Not intended to be self-executing o Used as aids by the judiciary in adjudication, or legislature in lawmaking o Not self-executing provisions, a disregard of which cannot give rise to a cause of action in the courts o Kilosbayan, Inc v. Morato: Do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation o Basco v. Pagcor: broad constitutional principles need legislative enactments to implement them y WHY? Because of basic considerations of due process and the lack of judicial authority to wade into the unchartered ocean of social and economic policy making y ISSUE # 2: ECONOMIC NATIONALISM SHOULD NOT BE READ WITH OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATES TO ATTAIN BALANCED DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMY o Sec 10 and 12 of Article 12 should be read with relation to Sec 1 and 13 of the same Article: ideals of economic nationalism does not espouse an isolationist economy but a self-reliant and competent economy, able to compete in foreign markets, and trade policies that uphold equality and reciprocity, protection of Filipino enterprises from unfair trade practices and overbearing foreign competitions o AND FURTHER, there are enough balancing provisions in the Constitution that allow the Senate to ratify the concurrence with the WTO agreement y Need fore business exchange on the bases of equality and reciprocity y Protectionist policy only against unfair trade practices y Does not encourage entry of foreign goods services, but does not prohibit them either  WTO RECOGNIZES NEED TO PROTECT WEAK ECONOMIES o WTO has some built-in advantages to protect weak and developing countries o Each vote by a member is equal to one, equal to any others vote, unlike in the Security Council where major states have permanent seats and veto powers o Poor countries can protect their economies through one-on-one negotiations with developed countries o Not mere practical alliances, but real negotiations rooted in law o

 SPECIFIC PROVISOS TO PROTECT DEVELOPING COUNTRIES o Amount of tariff reduction, period within which the reduction is to be spread out (page 61) o Export subsidy for agricultural production (GATT) o Anti-dumping measures, countervailing measures and safeguards against import surges  CONSTITUTION DOES NOT RULE OUT FOREIGN COMPETITION o Policy of self-reliance does not necessarily mean no foreign exchange allowed o Not economic seclusion nor mendicancy in the international community o Independence refers to freedom from undue foreign control of the national economy o WTO rules on most favored nation, national treatment, and trade without discrimination rules of equality and reciprocity applying to all members  CONSITUTION FAVORS CONSUMERS NOT INDUSTRIES OR ENTERPRISES o WON the WTO/GATT will favor consumers is a political question; wisdom of legislative policy  CONSITUTION DESIGNED TO MEET FUTURE EVENTS AND CONTINGENCIES  ISSUE # 3: WTO AGREEMENT AND LEGISLATIVE POWER o Petitioners: because each member-country is required to conform to the laws and regulations of the WTO, the lawmaking body of Congress is limited to this conformity o Especially as WTO infringes on the taxation power of Congress: when WTO fixes tariff rates  SOVEREIGNTY LIMITED BY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATISES o All government authority is inherently limited by the fact that it is a member of a family of nations o Doctrine of incorporation: the country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered to be automatically part of the countrys laws o Authority limited by principles of international law and treaty stipulations  UN CHARTER AND OTHER TREATIES LIMIT SOVEREIGNTY  ISSUE # 4: WTO AND JUDICIAL POWER: o In question: WTO TRIPS Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights intrudes on the power of the SC to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedures o Burden of proof on proving the authenticity of a patent similar to something else by another country o SC upholds said TRIPS, similar to RA 165, Patent Law  ISSUE#5: CONCURRENCE ONLY IN THE WTO AGREEMENT AND NOT IN OTHER DOCUMENTS CONTAINED IN THE FINAL ACT o Assailed Senate Resolution expressed concurrence in what the Final Act required, concurrence of the Senate in the WTO agreement o Ministerial Declarations were deemed accepted without being ratified, by virtue of Article 25: Sec 1 of GATT

JUDGMENT: The validity of the assailed resolution is upheld.

Tanada vs Angara, 272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997

Facts : This is a petition seeking to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement. Petitioners question the concurrence of herein respondents acting in their capacities as Senators via signing the said agreement. The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products. Thus, provides new opportunities for the service sector cost and uncertainty associated with exporting and more investment in the country. These are the predicted benefits as reflected in the agreement and as viewed by the signatory Senators, a free market espoused by WTO. Petitioners on the other hand viewed the WTO agreement as one that limits, restricts and impair Philippine economic sovereignty and legislative power. That the Filipino First policy of the Constitution was taken for granted as it gives foreign trading intervention. Issue : Whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Senate in giving its concurrence of the said WTO agreement. Held: In its Declaration of Principles and state policies, the Constitution adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity , with all nations. By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered automatically part of our own laws. Pacta sunt servanda international agreements must be performed in good faith. A treaty is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties. Through WTO the sovereignty of the state cannot in fact and reality be considered as absolute because it is a regulation of commercial relations among nations. Such as when Philippines joined the United Nations (UN) it consented to restrict its sovereignty right under the concept of sovereignty as autolimitation. What Senate did was a valid exercise of authority. As to determine whether such exercise is wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. The act of signing the said agreement is not a legislative restriction as WTO allows withdrawal of membership should this be the political desire of a member. Also, it should not be viewed as a limitation of economic sovereignty. WTO remains as the only viable structure for multilateral trading and the veritable forum for the development of international trade law. Its alternative is isolation, stagnation if not economic self-destruction. Thus, the people be allowed, through their duly elected officers, make their free choice. Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Tanada vs Angara 272 SCRA 18

Facts On April 15, 1994, the Philippine Government represented by its Secretary of the Department of Trade and Industry signed the Final Act binding the Philippine Government to submit to its respective competent authorities the WTO (World Trade Organization) Agreements to seek approval for such. On December 14, 1994, Resolution No. 97 was adopted by the Philippine Senate to ratify the WTO Agreement. This is a petition assailing the constitutionality of the WTO agreement as it violates Sec 19,

Article II, providing for the development of a self reliant and independent national economy, and Sections 10 and 12, Article XII, providing for the Filipino first policy. Issue Whether or not the Resolution No. 97 ratifying the WTO Agreement is unconstitutional Ruling The Supreme Court ruled the Resolution No. 97 is not unconstitutional. While the constitution mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino interests only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationalist policy. Furthermore, the constitutional policy of a selfreliant and independent national economy does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates neither economic seclusion nor mendicancy in the international community. The Senate, after deliberation and voting, gave its consent to the WTO Agreement thereby making it a part of the law of the land. The Supreme Court gave due respect to an equal department in government. It presumes its actions as regular and done in good faith unless there is convincing proof and persuasive agreements to the contrary. As a result, the ratification of the WTO Agreement limits or restricts the absoluteness of sovereignty. A treaty engagement is not a mere obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties. A state which has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make its legislations such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken.

Calalang vs. Williams

[GR 47800, 2 December 1940] First Division, Laurel (J): 4 concur Facts: The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of 17 July 1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarias Street, from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street, from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m., from a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic. The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission, on 18 July 1940, recommended to the Director of Public Works the adoption of the measure proposed in the resolution, in pursuance of the provisions of Commonwealth Act 548, which authorizes said Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads. On 2 August 1940, the Director of Public Works, in his first indorsement to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, recommended to the latter the approval of the recommendation made by the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission, with the modification that the closing of Rizal Avenue to traffic to animal-drawn vehicles be limited to the portion thereof extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Azcarraga

Street. On 10 August 1940, the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, in his second indorsement addressed to the Director of Public Works, approved the recommendation of the latter that Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue be closed to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles, between the points and during the hours as indicated, for a period of 1 year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and regulations thus adopted. Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as a taxpayer of Manila, brought before the Supreme court the petition for a writ of prohibition against A. D. Williams, as Chairman of the National Traffic Commission; Vicente Fragante, as Director of Public Works; Sergio Bayan, as Acting Secretary of Public Works and Communications; Eulogio Rodriguez, as Mayor of the City of Manila; and Juan Dominguez, as Acting Chief of Police of Manila. Issue: Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the Director of Public Works infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people. Held: The promotion of social justice is to be achieved not through a mistaken sympathy towards any given group. Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extraconstitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex. Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest number."

Association of Small Landowners vs SeC

Equal Protection These are 3 cases consolidated questioning the constitutionality of the Agrarian Reform Act. Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights includes a call for the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform program. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. RA 3844, Agricultural Land Reform Code, had already been enacted by Congress on August 8, 1963. This was substantially superseded almost a decade later by PD 27, which was promulgated on Oct 21, 1972, along with martial law, to provide for the compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum retention limits for landowners. On July 17, 1987, Cory issued EO 228, declaring full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of PD 27 and providing for the

valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of their payment. This was followed on July 22, 1987 by PP 131, instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP), and EO 229, providing the mechanics for its implementation. Afterwhich is the enactment of RA 6657, Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, which Cory signed on June 10. This law, while considerably changing the earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its provisions. In considering the rentals as advance payment on the land, the executive order also deprives the petitioners of their property rights as protected by due process. The equal protection clause is also violated because the order places the burden of solving the agrarian problems on the owners only of agricultural lands. No similar obligation is imposed on the owners of other properties. The petitioners maintain that in declaring the beneficiaries under PD 27 to be the owners of the lands occupied by them, EO 228 ignored judicial prerogatives and so violated due process. Worse, the measure would not solve the agrarian problem because even the small farmers are deprived of their lands and the retention rights guaranteed by the Constitution. In his comment the Sol-Gen asserted that the alleged violation of the equal protection clause, the sugar planters have failed to show that they belong to a different class and should be differently treated. The Comment also suggests the possibility of Congress first distributing public agricultural lands and scheduling the expropriation of private agricultural lands later. From this viewpoint, the petition for prohibition would be premature. ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause. HELD: The SC ruled affirming the Sol-Gen. The argument of the small farmers that they have been denied equal protection because of the absence of retention limits has also become academic under Sec 6 of RA 6657. Significantly, they too have not questioned the area of such limits. There is also the complaint that they should not be made to share the burden of agrarian reform, an objection also made by the sugar planters on the ground that they belong to a particular class with particular interests of their own. However, no evidence has been submitted to the Court that the requisites of a valid classification have been violated. Classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from each other in these same particulars. To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements: (1) it must be based on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class. The Court finds that all these requisites have been met by the measures here challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory.

Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. The petitioners have not shown that they belong to a different class and entitled to a different treatment. The argument that not only landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to share the burden of implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see. There is no need to elaborate on this matter. In any event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice except only where its discretion is abused to the detriment of the Bill of Rights.

Pamatong vs. Comelec

Prefatory Statement: Last December 1 was the deadline for the filing of Certificate of Candidacies (COCs) for the 2010 Elections. In the end, a total of 99 filed their COCs for President. Among the lesser known presidentiables include someone called Manok (because apparently he can mimic a cocks crow), a six-star general, and a future emperor of the world. Considering that we would be having automated elections next year and the list of all candidates are to be written in the ballots while voters are supposed to shade the circles corresponding to their choices, would all 99 candidates be included? No. Aside from disqualification petitions filed against the aspirants, the Comelec can also motu propio deny due course to the COCs. Aside from the qualifications set forth under the Constitution, a candidate should also have the capacity and resources to launch a national campaign. Under the Constitution (Article II, Section 26), the State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service xxx. Would the Comelecs act of disqualifying the so-called nuisance candidates violate this constitutional provision?

Rev. Ely Velez Pamatong Vs. Commission on Elections

G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004 FACTS: Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President. Respondent COMELEC declared petitioner and 35 others as nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not supported by a registered political party with a national constituency.

Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court claiming that the COMELEC violated his right to equal access to opportunities for public service under Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified

candidates only to those who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political parties. The COMELEC supposedly erred in disqualifying him since he is the most qualified among all the presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of the president, he is capable of waging a national campaign since he has numerous national organizations under his leadership, he also has the capacity to wage an international campaign since he has practiced law in other countries, and he has a platform of government.

ISSUE: Is there a constitutional right to run for or hold public office?

RULING: No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. It neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort.

The equal access provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled Declaration of Principles and State Policies. The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-executing, and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the equal access provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts.

Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that would accommodate as many people as possible into public office. Moreover, the provision as written leaves much to be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of positive rights. It is difficult to interpret the clause as operative in the absence of legislation since its effective means and reach are not properly defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims that can be subsumed under this rubric appear to be entirely open-ended. Words and phrases such as equal access, opportunities, and public service are susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the intention of the framers to inflict on the people an operative but amorphous foundation from which innately unenforceable rights may be sourced.

The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations. Some valid limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on Nuisance Candidates. As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations are meant to be borne by any one who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing that any person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they create.

The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of candidates who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into account the practical considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates, the greater the opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time and resources in preparation for the election. The organization of an election with bona fide candidates standing is onerous enough. To add into the mix candidates with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable campaign would actually impair the electoral process. This is not to mention the candidacies which are palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note joke. The poll body would be bogged by irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the electoral process, most probably posed at the instance of these nuisance candidates. It would be a senseless sacrifice on the part of the State.

The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and factual. The basis of the factual determination is not before this Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the reception of further evidence is in order. The SC remanded to the COMELEC for the reception of further evidence, to determine the question on whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance candidate as contemplated in Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Obiter Dictum: One of Pamatongs contentions was that he was an international lawyer and is thus more qualified compared to the likes of Erap, who was only a high school dropout. Under the Constitution (Article VII, Section 2), the only requirements are the following: (1) natural-born citizen of the Philippines; (2) registered voter; (3) able to read and write; (4) at least forty years of age on the day of the election; and (5) resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election.

At any rate, Pamatong was eventually declared a nuisance candidate and was disqualified.

ROE VS WADE
ROE ET AL. v. WADE, DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF DALLAS COUNTY APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS No. 70-18. Argued December 13, 1971 Reargued October 11, 1972 Decided January 22, 1973 To summarize and to repeat: 1. A state criminal abortion statute of the current Texas type, that excepts from criminality only a life-saving procedure on behalf of the mother, without regard to pregnancy stage and without recognition of the other interests involved, is violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (a) For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first trimester, the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's attending physician. (b) For the stage subsequent to approximately the end of the first trimester, the State, in promoting its interest in the health of the mother, may, if it chooses, regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably related to maternal health. (c) For the stage subsequent to viability, the State in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life [410 U.S. 113, 165] may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother. 2. The State may define the term "physician," as it has been employed in the preceding paragraphs of this Part XI of this opinion, to mean only a physician currently licensed by the State, and may proscribe any abortion by a person who is not a physician as so defined. In Doe v. Bolton, post, p. 179, procedural requirements contained in one of the modern abortion statutes are considered. That opinion and this one, of course, are to be read together. 67 This holding, we feel, is consistent with the relative weights of the respective interests involved, with the lessons and examples of medical and legal history, with the lenity of the common law, and with the demands of the profound problems of the present day. The decision leaves the State free to place increasing restrictions on abortion as the period of pregnancy lengthens, so long as those restrictions are tailored to the recognized state interests. The decision vindicates the right of the physician to administer medical treatment

according to his professional judgment up to the points where important [410 U.S. 113, 166] state interests provide compelling justifications for intervention. Up to those points, the abortion decision in all its aspects is inherently, and primarily, a medical decision, and basic responsibility for it must rest with the physician. If an individual practitioner abuses the privilege of exercising proper medical judgment, the usual remedies, judicial and intraprofessional, are available. XII Our conclusion that Art. 1196 is unconstitutional means, of course, that the Texas abortion statutes, as a unit, must fall. The exception of Art. 1196 cannot be struck down separately, for then the State would be left with a statute proscribing all abortion procedures no matter how medically urgent the case. Although the District Court granted appellant Roe declaratory relief, it stopped short of issuing an injunction against enforcement of the Texas statutes. The Court has recognized that different considerations enter into a federal court's decision as to declaratory relief, on the one hand, and injunctive relief, on the other. Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 252-255 (1967); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965). We are not dealing with a statute that, on its face, appears to abridge free expression, an area of particular concern under Dombrowski and refined in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S., at 50. We find it unnecessary to decide whether the District Court erred in withholding injunctive relief, for we assume the Texas prosecutorial authorities will give full credence to this decision that the present criminal abortion statutes of that State are unconstitutional. The judgment of the District Court as to intervenor Hallford is reversed, and Dr. Hallford's complaint in intervention is dismissed. In all other respects, the judgment [410 U.S. 113, 167] of the District Court is affirmed. Costs are allowed to the appellee. It is so ordered.