Professional Documents
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0723
Learning Module
The Contemporary
World
This is a property of
Bataan Peninsula State Universi
Knowledge Area Code : SSCI NOT FOR SALE
Course Code : NGEC0723
Learning Module Code : LM02-NGEC0723
04 0723
Issues in Globalization
Course Packet 04
The Global Demography
And Migration
Knowledge Area Code
Course Code
:
:
SSCI
NGEC0723
Learning Module Code : LM2-NGEC0723
This is a property of
Bataan Peninsula State University
Course Packet Code : LM2-NGEC0723-04
NOT FOR SALE
This course packet will discuss the characteristics of global demography, the different phases of
demographic transition of the world, and the demography of the world and the impact to its
resources. In line to migration, this course packet will discuss how global migration happens and
its impact in our society. At the end of the course packet, activity and assessment will be given to
gauge the mastery of the student.
Objectives
At the end of the course packet you should be able to indicate the characteristics of global
demography, to compare and contrast the different phases of demographic transition of
the world to evaluate the demography of the world and its impact to resources. Likewise,
be able to understand how global migration happens and its impact, to demonstrate the
effects of global migration in our society, and to evaluate the impact of global migration
in our society.
Duration
Topic 03: The Global Demography and Migration = 3 hours
(2 hours self-directed learning with practical exercises and 1-hour assessment)
Delivery Mode
The course packet will be delivered online, both asynchronous and synchronous.
Assessment with Rubrics
No need of rubrics, assessment is point system.
Readings
The transition began around 1800 with declining mortality in Europe. It has now spread to all
parts of the world and is projected to be completed by 2100. This global demographic transition
has brought momentous changes, reshaping the economic and demographic life cycles of
individuals and restructuring populations. Since 1800, global population size has already
increased by a factor of six and by 2100 will have risen by a factor of ten. These trends raise many
questions and controversies.
Did population grow so slowly before 1800 because it was kept in equilibrium by
Malthusian forces?
Did fertility begin to fall because of improved contraceptive technology and
family planning programs, or were couples optimizing their fertility all along and
reduced it in response to changing economic incentives?
Are we approaching a biological limit to life expectancy, or can we expect to see
continuing or even accelerating longevity gains?
Will the societal costs of the elderly be catastrophic?
In the past, there has been great concern that rapid population growth in third-world countries
would prevent economic development, but most economists have down- played these fears.
Similarly, environmentalists fear that world population is already above the carrying capacity of
the biosphere, while most economists are complacent about the projected 50 percent increase in
population over this century.
According to a famous essay by Thomas Malthus, first published in 1798, slow population
growth was no accident. Population was held in equilibrium with the slowly growing economy.
Faster population growth would depress wages, causing mortality to rise due to famine,
war or disease—in short, misery. Malthus called this mortality response the “positive”
check. Depressed wages would also cause postponement of marriage, resulting in
prostitution and other vices, including contraception; this he called the “preventive”
check.
Since population could potentially grow more rapidly than the economy, it was always
held in check by misery and vice, which were therefore the inevitable human lot.
Economic progress could help only temporarily since population could soon grow to its
new equilibrium level, where misery and vice would again hold it in check.
In western Europe in the centuries before 1800, marriage required the resources to establish and
maintain a separate household, so age at first marriage for women was late, averaging around 25
years, and a substantial share of women never married.
Although fertility was high within marriage, the total fertility rate (TFR) was moderate
overall at four to five births per woman (Livi-Bacci, 2000, p. 136). Mortality was also
moderately high, with life expectancy at birth between 25 and 35 years but this was
heavily influenced by high mortality in infancy and childhood.
Outside of Europe and its offshoots, fertility and mortality were higher in the pre-transitional
period and change in fertility and mortality came later. Data on mortality or fertility are only
occasionally available for third-world countries before World War II (Preston, 1980).
In India in the late nineteenth century, life expectancy averaged in the low 20s and was
highly variable, while fertility was six or seven births per woman (Bhat, 1989).
In Taiwan, the picture was similar around 1900. Widespread data on fertility for the
decades after World War II confirm that total fertility rates in the third world were
typically six or higher.
However, recent work suggests that the demographic situation in China may have been
closer to the European experience than previously thought (Lee and Feng, 1999).
The classic demographic transition starts with mortality decline, followed after a time by reduced
fertility, leading to an interval of first increased and then decreased population growth and,
finally, population aging.
Mortality Declines
The beginning of the world’s demographic transition occurred in northwest Europe, where
mortality began a secular decline around 1800. In many low-income countries of the world, the
decline in mortality began in the early twentieth century and then accelerated dramatically after
World War II.
The first stage of mortality decline is due to reductions in contagious and infectious diseases that
are spread by air or water.
Starting with the development of the smallpox vaccine in the late eighteenth century,
preventive medicine played a role in mortality decline in Europe.
However, public health measures played an important role from the late nineteenth century, and
Although pretransition fertility was typically high in third-world countries, its levels were far
below the hypothetical biological upper limit for a population (as opposed to an individual),
which is around 15 to 17 births per woman (Bongaarts, 1978).
The contraceptive effects of prolonged breastfeeding, often combined with taboos on
sex while breastfeeding, led to long birth intervals and reduced fertility.
Abortion was also important, and sometimes the practice of coitus interruptus had an
important effect.
Fertility Transition
Most economic theories of fertility start with the idea that couples wish to have a certain number
of surviving children, rather than births per se. If this assumption holds, then once potential
parents recognize an exogenous increase in child survival, fertility should decline. However,
mortality and fertility interact in complicated ways. For example, increased survival raises the
return on post birth investments in children (Meltzer, 1992).
Bearing and rearing children is time intensive. Technological progress and increasing
physical and human capital make labor more productive, raising the value of time in all
activities, which makes children increasingly costly relative to consumption goods.
Fertility transitions in east Asia have been particularly early and rapid, while those in
south Asia and Latin America have been much slower (Casterline, 2001).
Currently, 60 countries with 43 percent of the world’s population have fertility at or below
the replacement level of 2.1 children per woman. Of these, 43 are More Developed Countries,
but 17 are Less Developed Countries, two-thirds of childbearing occurs between ages 20 and
35 in the Least Developed Countries, whereas 80 percent occurs in this age range in the More
Developed Countries.
The disparity in population growth between developed and developing countries reflects the
existence of considerable heterogeneity in birth, death and migration processes, both over time
and
across national populations, races and ethnic groups. The disparity has coincided with changes in
the age-group composition of populations.
An overview of these factors illuminates the mechanisms of global population growth and
change.
Baby booms have altered the demographic landscape in many countries. As the experiences of
several regions during the past century show, an initial fall in mortality rates creates a boom
generation because high survival rates lead to more people at young ages than in earlier
Migration also alters population patterns. Globally, 191 million people live in countries
In both developed and developing countries, there has been a huge movement from rural
to urban areas since 1950. Less-developed regions, in aggregate, have seen their
population shift from 18 per cent urban in 1950 to 44 per cent in 2006, while the
corresponding figures for developed countries are 52 per cent to 75 per cent.
The patterns of change in fertility, mortality and growth rates over the demo- graphic transition
are widely known and understood. Less well understood are the systematic changes in age
distribution that are an integral part of the demographic transition and that continue long after
the other rates have stabilized.
In India, the pretransition total fertility rate is about six births per woman (Panel A), and life
expectancy is about 25 years (Panel B). India’s mortality decline leads its fertility decline by 50
years. The fertility transition here is slow relative to East Asia’s, but similar to Latin America’s.
In the first phase of the transition, when mortality begins to decline while fertility
remains high, mortality declines most at the youngest ages, causing an increase in the
proportion of children in the population and raising child dependency.
Next, as fertility declines, child dependency ratios decline and soon fall below their
pretransition levels. The working-age population grows faster than the population as a
whole, so the total dependency ratio declines. This second phase may last 40 or 50 years.
In a third phase, increasing longevity leads to a rapid increase in the elderly population
while low fertility slows the growth of the working-age population. The old-age
dependency ratio rises rapidly, as does the total dependency ratio. In India, this phase
occurs roughly between 2015 and 2060 —and it would last longer if mortality decline
were not assumed to cease in the simulation.
At the end of the full transitional process for India, the total dependency ratio is back
near its level before the transition began, but now child dependency is low and old-age
dependency is high. Presumably, mortality will continue to decline in the twenty-first
century, so that the process of individual and population aging will continue.
Original statements
Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa coined the term ‘second transition’ in 1986; the phrase appeared in
the title of the introductory chapter of a special volume (published in Dutch) on the demographic
situation in low fertility countries (Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa 1986).
Examining demographic change in 30 European countries, van de Kaa (1987, pp.5)
argued that “the principal demographic feature of this second transition is the decline in
fertility from somewhat above the ‘replacement’ level of 2.1 births per woman…to a level
well below replacement.”
The second demographic transition began in Europe after World War II. He argued that
the war led to an increase in premarital intercourse and the age at first sexual intercourse
declined in the postwar period.
Proposed that early marriages loosened the temporal link between marriage and
childbearing, as young married couples waited to have children until they were
financially ready. Advances in contraceptive technology, with the introduction of the pill
and IUD, further weakened the link between the two.
Theoretical motivations
1. Shift from king-child to king-couple. Van de Kaa and Lesthaeghe were heavily
influenced by Aries’ claim that motivational shifts lead to fertility decline in the West
over the twentieth century (Aries 1980).
Aries pointed out that “society has always controlled nature and domesticated
sexuality” Malthus (1888) captured this view by claiming that the “passion between
the sexes” was too great for married couples to practice fertility control via
abstinence (and Malthus viewed other means as immoral).
Aries argued that this “planned parenthood” occurred before the availability of
modern contraceptive technology, it relied on behavioral and sex-proximal methods
(especially withdrawal and abstinence) and was in part successful because of a
culture of self-control or non-coital, premarital eroticism.
It reflected the end of the “child-king” days, the child was no longer essential in
couples’ plans; instead a child was just one of the components that might allow
adults to blossom as individuals.
2. The Maslowian drift and rise of individualism. This value shift embodies the
“Maslowian drift”- a shift toward higher-order needs of self-actualization and individual
autonomy to motivate behavior once more basic needs like survival and safety have been
DEFINITION OF TERMS
Global demography - the number of births and deaths per 1,000 people. On a worldwide basis,
the difference between these rates is the rate of population growth. Within regions or
countries, population growth is also affected by emigration and immigration.
Fertility - the quality of being able to produce children. As a measure, the fertility rate is the
average number of children that a woman has in her lifetime and is quantified demographically.
GLOBAL MIGRATION
Global migration a situation in which people go to live in foreign countries, especially in order to
find work. Most global migration is from developing countries to developed ones.
Differentiating Sedimented from Modular Transnationalism: The View from East Asia
The dominant literature on transnationalism regards it as an alternative way of framing
immigration, but the a priori exclusion of labor migrants from the scope of migrant
transnationalism is untenable. Evidence from East Asia suggests that labor migrants, who are
compelled by the prevailing policy regime in the region to become sojourners, engage in what
can be called modular transnationalism by the state and cultural politics.
Migrant Transnationalism
It is now accepted that not all migrants engage in transnationalism, whether in the sociocultural,
economic, or political sense.
Portes (2001:183) proposes that “It is more useful to conceptualize transnationalism as
The extremely uneven development within East Asia has witnessed the acceleration and
intensification of large numbers of population movements and cross-border flows, both regular
and unauthorized, occurring along- side other forms of regional integration.
Although individuals with varied levels of skill migrate for economic reasons, highly-
skilled migrants, usually professionals, have a career to speak of which lends their
migration a creditable level of security, flexibility, and high status (Wang, 2008).
The perception of migrants as temporary workers who will not settle is still very much
the conventional wisdom for Asia Pacific elites. Immigrant settlement is not officially
permitted anywhere (with some exceptions for people with high levels of financial or
human capital) according to Castles (2003:20).
In East Asia, the labor migration regimes have been described as gendered and racialized
—and ostensibly copied, according to Asis (2005:17)
Contract labor systems in the Gulf and in East Asia are based on “differential exclusion”
that accept migrants “only within strict functional and temporal limits: they are welcome
as workers, but not as settlers; as individuals, but not as families or communities; as
temporary sojourners, but not as long-term residents” (Castles, 2003:11).
Evidence from East Asia suggests that labor migrants, who are compelled by the prevailing
policy regime in the region to become sojourners, engage in what can be called modular
transnationalism.
Entertainers go to Japan on a three-month visa, renewable for a similar period, for a total
stay of six months.
Domestic workers in Taiwan, who are legally allowed to work there for at most three
three-year contracts (for a maximum stay of nine years), with compulsory return to the
homeland at the end of each contract.
The immigrant who practices sedimented transnationalism is the active agent who draws
voluntarily but strategically from a repertoire of ways of being and ways of belonging that are
Migration regimes in East Asia generally do not welcome labor migrants as immigrants and
permanent settlers. State parameters make migrants into sojourners, constraining them into a way
of life that makes labor migrants the prototypical exponents of transnationalism in this part of the
world.
Brief Lesson
Questions:
1. What is demography and its significance to the contemporary world?
2. Which question and controversies about demographic transition would you like to share
your views with? Why?
3. Why do people migrate?
4. What is the difference between sedimented and modular transnationalism?
Generalization
The problem of global demography originates from the current situation which emphasizes the
uncontrollable growth of population resulting in exhaustion of resources. There are as much
number of countries with decreasing population as those with falling populations. These extreme
situations challenge the role of policy makers in the methods to address these issues. There is a
need to address global demographic problems in the context of each state due to different
Application
After completing the course packet, please post your questions or concerns at our learning system
for further discussion.
References
Lee, Ronald. 2003. “The Demographic Transition: Three Centuries of Fundamental Change.” Journal of
Economic Perspectives 17(4): 167-190.
•Lesthaeghe, Ron. 2010. “The Unfolding Story of the Second Demographic Transition.” Population and
Development Review 36(2): 211-251.
Castles, Stephen. 2000. “International Migration at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century:
Global Trends and Issues.” International Social Science Journal 52(165): 269-281.
Aguilar, Filomeno V. 2012. “Differentiating Sedimented from Modular Transnationalism: The View
from East Asia.” Asian and Pacific Migration Journal 21(2): 149-171.
David E Bloom and David Canning (2006), Conference in Global Demography: Fact, Force and
https://www.rba.gov.au/publications/confs/2006/bloom-canning.html
Future.
Transnational Migration Theory https://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007%2F978-1-
4614-5583-7_676#:~:text=Transnational%20migration%20is%20then%20defined,60).
04 0723
Activity Sheet
eedback FormLearner’s
Activity 01: Read and answer the following statements below.
1. Write your own view about the significance of the short article below.
Feedback Form
In the Philippines, a pervasive culture of migration has led millions to seek opportunities abroad,
particularly since an economic downturn in the 1970s. The government has long embraced
exporting labor as official economic policy, but over time, the focus has shifted: first to protecting
workers overseas and much more recently to linking migration and development. This article
explores the evolution of Filipino migration policy and trends.
2. Find an article about what we can and cannot learn from the history of world population.
Submit and below it, write brief impression.
04 0723
Assessment
eedback FormLearner’s
Assessment 01: Identify what is being referred to in each statement. Write your answer on the
blank provided before each number.
Feedback Form
______ 1. It is the branch of social sciences concerned with the study of human
populations, their structure and change (through births, deaths, and migration), and their
relationship with the natural environment and with social and economic change.
______ 3. They are not immediately granted permanent residency upon marriage to a
Japanese national.
______ 8. He argued that this “planned parenthood” occurred before the availability of
modern contraceptive technology.
______ 9. It is the active agent who draws voluntarily but strategically from a repertoire
of ways of being and ways of belonging that are mobilized simultaneously in relation to both
origin and destination.
______ 10. They are welcome as workers, but not as settlers; as individuals, but not as
families or communities; as temporary residents, but not as long-term ones”
04 0723
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eedback FormLearner’s
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