Smart Home Robot: System Discovery
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ABSTRACT
The developments of the previous half-century have made the
dream of a supernatural robot serving and protecting humanity
accessible. Smart house robots have infiltrated our lives with the
rapid growth of science and technology. Smart house robot, a new
generation of robot in response to science and technology
progress, is one form of smart mobile robot. The intelligent house
robot can control itself and adapt to the home environment. The
robot can execute functions of information learning and
interaction since it is equipped with numerous sensing devices.
The Smart Home robot is an Internet of Things and artificial
intelligence combo whose tasks include house automation and
maintenance elements. This document offers information about
cyber assaults in connection with an analysis of the linked ideas of
smart house robotics.
Keywords
Technology, smart system, smart home, cloud attacks, DDoS,
robots, vulnerability
1. INTRODUCTION
Smart environments provide effective monitoring and health
evaluation methods. With the development of technology, home
automation is quite simple and economical. Direct or continuous
control with the house system can increase the important
improvement in the quality of life on a mobile device at any time.
In smart home systems, the sensors can help sensitive
environmental information. Sensitive environmental variables are
transmitted to a method based or account. The environmental
characteristics include the proportion of gases present in the
surrounding atmosphere, temperature, and the number of people
entering the house. The user might receive this alert information
regularly or at a specified interval of time. The alarm information
can be communicated as a mail or text message [1].
Figure 1: Smart Home
Not only does a Smart house help to understand environmental
conditions, but it also allows the user to monitor the home with
the support of various video sensors and feed, as showing in
figure 1. That is one of the smart home’s most significant
functions. Monitoring follows up on all home activities. The data
monitored contributes to decision-making. The user takes action
depending on the practical information [2]. For example, if a gas
leakage is detected, it will be monitored, and the information will
be transmitted to the customer for action. In recent times, the
smart home has become much more popular, as daily lives
become easier thanks to the rapid development of technology.
Nearly all are digitalized and automatic.
2. CYBER-ATTACKS ON SMART
HOME SYSTEM
The design and deployment of smart production systems are
assumed to be separated from outside the world and the rest of the
company network. It does not necessarily mean, on the one hand,
that remote attackers do not have to be taken into account: distant
attackers use alternate ways that may be indirect (for example,
tainted logic automated or software modifications). On the other
hand, maybe even more pertinently, the hypothesis that local
assailants have full capacity means: because of the lack of
isolation among parts of a smart manufacturing system (e.g., all
PLCs and computers on a single flat network), almost every
endpoint can trust, and any local attacker can do anything that
they want.
Attackers do not even sit back and hope to see a high-profile,
susceptible, smart web browser primed for attack by search
engines like Shodan. We feel it is more likely for a sophisticated
attacker profile than unusual attack paths such as those we cover
in this comprehensive paper. This option is helpful because smart
production systems live in an extensive interdependency while
manufactured with hardware. Only one minor portion of the issue
is hardware [2]. There are other elements: software, library,
developer, business connections, etc., such as software used to
produce other software, libraries offered by one company,
infrastructure providers working for various factories. There are
also more components of this system. The research explains how
this impacts the types of attacks feasible in smart production
processes, such as harmful industrial add-ons and custom IIoT
devices.
Once an attacker arrived in a smart production system, they have
different lateral travel opportunities that we believe were
previously undiscovered. In the robotic automation logic, we
uncovered security-critical design problems, which generate a
weakness (for which there are not yet automatic weakness
scanners) and low malevolent logic to be carried out [3].
It is not a smart production system in a vacuum [4]. There is a
complicated network of machinery, components, and people that
threat actors can use to launch both traditional and non-
conventional attacks [5]. We expect this research to enhance
awareness amongst the individuals who operate smart production
systems by drawing attention to the different attacks that must be
focused on, especially unusual.
The modern implementation of the fully integrated automation
approach (TIA) created by Siemens since 1996 can be viewed as
smart manufacturing systems. However, the diversity of smart
manufacturing systems makes it impossible, or even fruitless, to
define them in “crisp.” From the point of view of security
research, it is difficult to access a fully functional system suitably
generic and implemented under actual settings because the
concept of the smart manufacturing “generic” or “reference” does
not truly exist [5]. Therefore, any security analysis — evens the
one — should be regarded with the salt grain: Conclusions like
“All smart production systems are unsafe,” or, worse, attacks are
ready for use as “the way to secure smart systems” is easily
reached.
Figure 2: Attacks on Smart Home System
It is tough to defend a smart production system since the
environment itself is complicated. It is necessary to focus on
“keeping attackers out,” but this is the standard recommendation
for decades, no matter the system. Such a strategy is not future-
proof since, compared with conventional, static applications, there
is a tendency to expand connection and flexible set-up with
flexible plants [6]. It affects security rules so that each endpoint or
machine in a production plant is recognized, and the floor is open
to a more detailed approach. It affects security practices as
showing in figure 2. As we will illustrate, networking
communication from an industrial robot, for example, may not
come from the software which is trustworthy because it may be
misleading or misused. The difficulty is that there is currently no
straightforward verifying and signing of the information and
services transmitted to such complex systems.
Some smart devices do not have system hardening (provide
various protection techniques to secure them). Many may even
have defined passwords or passwords discovered in device
software without encryption.
For some connected device producers, security is not a top
concern, and all it takes is a vulnerable device for hackers to get
access to private or sensory data, leaving the whole local network
in danger.
These proposals are possible common risks that could threaten
smart grids effectively. Smart Grids could potentially take several
hazards, which might harm organizations and regular users [7].
Not only can these threats harm customers’ homes when they use
the Internet, while opponents might gather information from their
data. This may offer substantial concerns to the privacy of
individuals, such as sensitive client information, which may lead
to data being stolen or to the business end.
2.1 Phishing
Phishing could be the first step in jeopardizing the process for
customers and companies. Hackers would exploit customer
information to obtain important information about the firm, in this
case, information about the power supply, without appropriately
destroying the facts or payment receipts. With this data, the
hacker would use social engineering. On the other hand,
employees may face various hazards, such as fraudulent emails or
communications that appear like real emails. Employees may
provide personal information that may lead to a hack [8]. The
risks that arise undoubtedly concern a Smart Grid client, who may
harm clients mentally and financially by disclosing the
information on unknown sources and not knowing the
implications of such risks. However, it is an essential worry when
it comes to security precautions against phishing attempts.
2.2 Denial-of-Service
Denial-of-Service (DoS) is a strategic attack that is then a part of
the DoS attack. Concerning the Smart Grid, leading services are
provided for Smart Grids, which means that a Denial-of-Service
attack is available. The connectivity of the Smart Grid has to be
safe and reliable. The link connections must be dependable and
secure as the Smart Grid distributes the connecting to numerous
devices using decentralized architectural systems in a greater area.
When the Smart Grid is attacked (Dos), the loss is substantial. The
attack on Denial-of-Service affects the interference and is a
common means of attacking the OSI model’s application and
data-link layers [9]. Hackers may adjust the MAC address and
utilize a hacker tool like Tsunami Backdoor, allowing hackers to
flood the network with normal network connections. Hacker’s
MAC address may also be modified. In addition, the OSI-Model
provides a network- and transportation layer security protocol like
TCP, SSL, and IPv6; however, methods are vulnerable from the
network infrastructure of Smart Grid. However, the assault (DoS)
is carried out mostly in the OSI Model Application Layer since
the Application Lays allow the sending and reception of data. If
the attack (DoS) happens, the communication system may stop
reacting to different devices regarding the smart grid.
2.3 Malware spreading
Malware spreading, which is the main issue, can be the main risk
facing the Smart Grid. Infecting organizing servers and infected
devices can generate malware that may be spoken of by attackers.
The attacker can alter the functioning of devices and systems by
utilizing malware propagation, which will enable an attacker to
gain access to sensitive information collection.
2.4 Eavesdropping and traffic analysis
Spoofing assaults are types of eavesdropping and traffic analysis.
By monitoring the network, an attacker may get sensitive data.
Because of the huge network that it comprises, the Smart Grid has
numerous network nodes, and the network devices to the bigger
network cannot be maintained without this risk. The Smart Grid
poses the greatest chance that data will be stolen and is the main
concern for the data security of the entire world. During a civil
war on 25 December 2015, a cyber-attack breakout took place. A
power plant in Ivano-Frankivsk, Ukraine, focused cyber-attacks
which had an important influence in the dark on 80,000 of those
who were exposed to risk, compared to one million, 400,000 (1,4
million) of them.
The cyber-attack was carried out with a spear-phishing email and
software from the Trojan horse, called Black Energy. This mighty
malware was able to delete data, damaged hard drives, and control
affected systems. The cyberattack intensified when the attacker
launched the corporation’s organized Denial-of-Service (DoS)
attack, paralyzing the power plant management phone line. As a
result, users could not contact the disruption (DoS attack). The
cyberattack not only stole the information but also disrupted a
nation’s essential infrastructure, which evolved immensely and
decisively. The circumstance is undoubtedly the most disastrous
incidence since many people have had hard cold weather without
electricity.
3. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
Figure 1 shows the architecture of the system. There are major
blocks concerned: the sensors, the system of WSN, the camera,
and the robot. Sensors: S1- sensor of temperature, S2- sensor
LPG, S3- sensor of smoke.
Figure 2: Architecture of Smart Home
The WSN System offers information storage, sensor monitoring
in an intelligent home, tasks sent by the user, and task monitoring
by the robot.
3.1 Autonomous Mode
Each room under surveillance employs several installed sensors,
which gather and transmit an alarm daily in an emergency. The
home server analyses the website data and gives users the facts to
make decisions. The robots take the proper measures when an
accident happens [4]. To view the smart house, a camera is
employed. A camera could cover a part of the room. Excessive
power consumption reduces the shutdown of cameras in typical
settings. The camera networks focused on the accident position
and sent photographs to the safety cabin when the mishap or
accident. In emergency cases, GSM MODEM is utilized to deliver
the SMS to the owner.
3.2 User Control Mode
Users can operate the robot through a PC and conduct user-
specified operations. RFID reader serves the door opening system
service in user mode.
3.3 Hardware
The system of hardware has six pieces. ATMEGA328
Microcontrollers are available, such as a sensor, smoke sensor,
gas sensor, robot, GSM Modem, ZigBee, and camera. There are
also sensors available. For controlling and monitoring activities,
the ATMEGA 328 microprocessor is used. It is used to read the
sensor’s measuring value, enter a step-motor and LED module
control input, analog-digital converters, and data transmissions for
the sensor value flow. The microprocessor transmits the sensor’s
analog electrical signal to digital. After the microprocessor
receives a digital signal, the value is sent by the wireless network
from the sensors to the robot.
4. RELATED WORKS AND SUMMARY
For the smart home system, robotics is an intriguing technology.
The robot’s components are a camera, the GSM modem, the
ZigBee Module. Researchers started to employ interior
environment robots with cameras. The security cameras on robots
can be relocated to other locations for new viewpoints of
photography—a camera used in an emergency to communicate
images to the user. We have introduced a smart home system with
Robotics and WSN, development and implementation. The
architecture and realization using WSN and the smart home robot
where our robot and our surroundings are intelligent collaborators.
The system has effectively addressed several inconveniences of
conventional systems by lowering the complexity of the circuit,
electricity usage, and management but ensuring flexible and
accurate environmental maintenance. Engineering has always
sought to build smart home systems tools and methodologies.
Meanwhile, researchers are continually seeking very popular and
efficient techniques for the intelligent home system. In recent
years, robotics and WSN in the intelligent home system are
becoming popular generally. Smart home systems Wireless
Sensor Networks (WSNs) can collect data after an incident such
as gas explosion or smoke detectors or any user order. The
technical challenges of employing a network such as installation,
operation of the system and information collection using a
wireless communication include ensuring that power is supplied at
the sensor network, minimizing costs. Robotics robots are often
used for household purposes in the realm of rapid development.
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