G.R. No.
168081              October 17, 2008 I would like to guaranty my commitment towards a weight loss from 217 pounds to 200 pounds from today until 31
ARMANDO G. YRASUEGUI, petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., respondents.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
THIS case portrays the peculiar story of an international flight steward who was dismissed because of his failure to
adhere to the weight standards of the airline company.
He is now before this Court via a petition for review on certiorari claiming that he was illegally dismissed. To buttress
his stance, he argues that (1) his dismissal does not fall under 282(e) of the Labor Code; (2) continuing adherence to
the weight standards of the company is not a bona fide occupational qualification; and (3) he was discriminated
against because other overweight employees were promoted instead of being disciplined.
After a meticulous consideration of all arguments pro and con, We uphold the legality of dismissal. Separation pay,
however, should be awarded in favor of the employee as an act of social justice or based on equity. This is so because
his dismissal is not for serious misconduct. Neither is it reflective of his moral character.
The Facts
Petitioner Armando G. Yrasuegui was a former international flight steward of Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL). He
stands five feet and eight inches (5’8") with a large body frame. The proper weight for a man of his height and body
structure is from 147 to 166 pounds, the ideal weight being 166 pounds, as mandated by the Cabin and Crew
Administration Manual1 of PAL.
The weight problem of petitioner dates back to 1984. Back then, PAL advised him to go on an extended vacation leave
from December 29, 1984 to March 4, 1985 to address his weight concerns. Apparently, petitioner failed to meet the
company’s weight standards, prompting another leave without pay from March 5, 1985 to November 1985.
After meeting the required weight, petitioner was allowed to return to work. But petitioner’s weight problem recurred.
He again went on leave without pay from October 17, 1988 to February 1989.
On April 26, 1989, petitioner weighed 209 pounds, 43 pounds over his ideal weight. In line with company policy, he
was removed from flight duty effective May 6, 1989 to July 3, 1989. He was formally requested to trim down to his
ideal weight and report for weight checks on several dates. He was also told that he may avail of the services of the
company physician should he wish to do so. He was advised that his case will be evaluated on July 3, 1989.2
On February 25, 1989, petitioner underwent weight check. It was discovered that he gained, instead of losing, weight.
He was overweight at 215 pounds, which is 49 pounds beyond the limit. Consequently, his off-duty status was
retained.
On October 17, 1989, PAL Line Administrator Gloria Dizon personally visited petitioner at his residence to check on
the progress of his effort to lose weight. Petitioner weighed 217 pounds, gaining 2 pounds from his previous weight.
After the visit, petitioner made a commitment3 to reduce weight in a letter addressed to Cabin Crew Group Manager
Augusto Barrios. The letter, in full, reads:
Dear Sir:
Dec. 1989.
From thereon, I promise to continue reducing at a reasonable percentage until such time that my ideal weight is
achieved.
Likewise, I promise to personally report to your office at the designated time schedule you will set for my weight
check.
Respectfully Yours,
F/S Armando Yrasuegui4
Despite the lapse of a ninety-day period given him to reach his ideal weight, petitioner remained overweight. On
January 3, 1990, he was informed of the PAL decision for him to remain grounded until such time that he
satisfactorily complies with the weight standards. Again, he was directed to report every two weeks for weight checks.
Petitioner failed to report for weight checks. Despite that, he was given one more month to comply with the weight
requirement. As usual, he was asked to report for weight check on different dates. He was reminded that his grounding
would continue pending satisfactory compliance with the weight standards.5
Again, petitioner failed to report for weight checks, although he was seen submitting his passport for processing at the
PAL Staff Service Division.
On April 17, 1990, petitioner was formally warned that a repeated refusal to report for weight check would be dealt
with accordingly. He was given another set of weight check dates. 6 Again, petitioner ignored the directive and did not
report for weight checks. On June 26, 1990, petitioner was required to explain his refusal to undergo weight checks.7
When petitioner tipped the scale on July 30, 1990, he weighed at 212 pounds. Clearly, he was still way over his ideal
weight of 166 pounds.
From then on, nothing was heard from petitioner until he followed up his case requesting for leniency on the latter part
of 1992. He weighed at 219 pounds on August 20, 1992 and 205 pounds on November 5, 1992.
On November 13, 1992, PAL finally served petitioner a Notice of Administrative Charge for violation of company
standards on weight requirements. He was given ten (10) days from receipt of the charge within which to file his
answer and submit controverting evidence.8
On December 7, 1992, petitioner submitted his Answer.9 Notably, he did not deny being overweight. What he claimed,
instead, is that his violation, if any, had already been condoned by PAL since "no action has been taken by the
company" regarding his case "since 1988." He also claimed that PAL discriminated against him because "the company
has not been fair in treating the cabin crew members who are similarly situated."
On December 8, 1992, a clarificatory hearing was held where petitioner manifested that he was undergoing a weight
reduction program to lose at least two (2) pounds per week so as to attain his ideal weight.10
On June 15, 1993, petitioner was formally informed by PAL that due to his inability to attain his ideal weight, "and
considering the utmost leniency" extended to him "which spanned a period covering a total of almost five (5) years,"
his services were considered terminated "effective immediately."11
His motion for reconsideration having been denied,12 petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against PAL.
Labor Arbiter, NLRC and CA Dispositions
On November 18, 1998, Labor Arbiter Valentin C. Reyes ruled 13 that petitioner was illegally dismissed. The
dispositive part of the Arbiter ruling runs as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered, declaring the complainant’s dismissal illegal,
and ordering the respondent to reinstate him to his former position or substantially equivalent one, and to pay him:
a. Backwages of Php10,500.00 per month from his dismissal on June 15, 1993 until reinstated, which for purposes of
appeal is hereby set from June 15, 1993 up to August 15, 1998 at ₱651,000.00;
b. Attorney’s fees of five percent (5%) of the total award.
SO ORDERED.14
The Labor Arbiter held that the weight standards of PAL are reasonable in view of the nature of the job of
petitioner.15 However, the weight standards need not be complied with under pain of dismissal since his weight did not
hamper the performance of his duties. 16 Assuming that it did, petitioner could be transferred to other positions where
his weight would not be a negative factor.17 Notably, other overweight employees, i.e., Mr. Palacios, Mr. Cui, and Mr.
Barrios, were promoted instead of being disciplined.18
Both parties appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).19
On October 8, 1999, the Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution directing the reinstatement of petitioner without loss
of seniority rights and other benefits.20
On February 1, 2000, the Labor Arbiter denied21 the Motion to Quash Writ of Execution22 of PAL.
On March 6, 2000, PAL appealed the denial of its motion to quash to the NLRC.23
On June 23, 2000, the NLRC rendered judgment24 in the following tenor:
WHEREFORE, premises considered[,] the Decision of the Arbiter dated 18 November 1998 as modified by our
findings herein, is hereby AFFIRMED and that part of the dispositive portion of said decision concerning
complainant’s entitlement to backwages shall be deemed to refer to complainant’s entitlement to his full
backwages, inclusive of allowances and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent instead of simply
backwages, from date of dismissal until his actual reinstatement or finality hereof. Respondent is enjoined to manifests
(sic) its choice of the form of the reinstatement of complainant, whether physical or through payroll within ten (10)
days from notice failing which, the same shall be deemed as complainant’s reinstatement through payroll and
execution in case of non-payment shall accordingly be issued by the Arbiter. Both appeals of respondent thus,
are DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.25
According to the NLRC, "obesity, or the tendency to gain weight uncontrollably regardless of the amount of food
intake, is a disease in itself."26 As a consequence, there can be no intentional defiance or serious misconduct by
petitioner to the lawful order of PAL for him to lose weight.27
Like the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC found the weight standards of PAL to be reasonable. However, it found as
unnecessary the Labor Arbiter holding that petitioner was not remiss in the performance of his duties as flight steward
despite being overweight. According to the NLRC, the Labor Arbiter should have limited himself to the issue of
whether the failure of petitioner to attain his ideal weight constituted willful defiance of the weight standards of PAL.28
PAL moved for reconsideration to no avail. 29 Thus, PAL elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA) via a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.30
By Decision dated August 31, 2004, the CA reversed31 the NLRC:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby GRANT the petition. The assailed NLRC decision is declared NULL
and VOID and is hereby SET ASIDE. The private respondent’s complaint is hereby DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.32
The CA opined that there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC because it "looked at wrong and
irrelevant considerations"33 in evaluating the evidence of the parties. Contrary to the NLRC ruling, the weight
standards of PAL are meant to be a continuing qualification for an employee’s position.34 The failure to adhere to the
weight standards is an analogous cause for the dismissal of an employee under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code in
relation to Article 282(a). It is not willful disobedience as the NLRC seemed to suggest.35 Said the CA, "the element of
willfulness that the NLRC decision cites is an irrelevant consideration in arriving at a conclusion on whether the
dismissal is legally proper."36 In other words, "the relevant question to ask is not one of willfulness but one of
reasonableness of the standard and whether or not the employee qualifies or continues to qualify under this standard."37
Just like the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, the CA held that the weight standards of PAL are reasonable.38 Thus,
petitioner was legally dismissed because he repeatedly failed to meet the prescribed weight standards.39 It is obvious
that the issue of discrimination was only invoked by petitioner for purposes of escaping the result of his dismissal for
being overweight.40
On May 10, 2005, the CA denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.41 Elaborating on its earlier ruling, the CA
held that the weight standards of PAL are a bona fide occupational qualification which, in case of violation, "justifies
an employee’s separation from the service."42
Issues
In this Rule 45 petition for review, the following issues are posed for resolution:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER’S
OBESITY CAN BE A GROUND FOR DISMISSAL UNDER PARAGRAPH (e) OF ARTICLE 282 OF THE
LABOR CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES;
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER’S
DISMISSAL FOR OBESITY CAN BE PREDICATED ON THE "BONA FIDE OCCUPATIONAL
QUALIFICATION (BFOQ) DEFENSE";
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER WAS
NOT UNDULY DISCRIMINATED AGAINST WHEN HE WAS DISMISSED WHILE OTHER OVERWEIGHT
CABIN ATTENDANTS WERE EITHER GIVEN FLYING DUTIES OR PROMOTED;
IV.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT BRUSHED ASIDE
PETITIONER’S CLAIMS FOR REINSTATEMENT [AND] WAGES ALLEGEDLY FOR BEING MOOT AND
ACADEMIC.43 (Underscoring supplied)
Our Ruling
I. The obesity of petitioner is a ground for dismissal under Article 282(e) 44 of the Labor Code.
A reading of the weight standards of PAL would lead to no other conclusion than that they constitute a continuing
qualification of an employee in order to keep the job. Tersely put, an employee may be dismissed the moment he is
unable to comply with his ideal weight as prescribed by the weight standards. The dismissal of the employee would
thus fall under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code. As explained by the CA:
x x x [T]he standards violated in this case were not mere "orders" of the employer; they were the "prescribed weights"
that a cabin crew must maintain in order to qualify for and keep his or her position in the company . In other words,
they were standards that establish continuing qualifications for an employee’s position. In this sense, the failure to
maintain these standards does not fall under Article 282(a) whose express terms require the element of willfulness in
order to be a ground for dismissal. The failure to meet the employer’s qualifying standards is in fact a ground that
does not squarely fall under grounds (a) to (d) and is therefore one that falls under Article 282(e) – the "other causes
analogous to the foregoing."
By its nature, these "qualifying standards" are norms that apply prior to and after an employee is hired. They
apply prior to employment because these are the standards a job applicant must initially meet in order to be hired.
They apply after hiring because an employee must continue to meet these standards while on the job in order to keep
his job. Under this perspective, a violation is not one of the faults for which an employee can be dismissed pursuant to
pars. (a) to (d) of Article 282; the employee can be dismissed simply because he no longer "qualifies" for his job
irrespective of whether or not the failure to qualify was willful or intentional. x x x45
Petitioner, though, advances a very interesting argument. He claims that obesity is a "physical abnormality and/or
illness."46 Relying on Nadura v. Benguet Consolidated, Inc.,47 he says his dismissal is illegal:
Conscious of the fact that Nadura’s case cannot be made to fall squarely within the specific causes enumerated in
subparagraphs 1(a) to (e), Benguet invokes the provisions of subparagraph 1(f) and says that Nadura’s illness –
occasional attacks of asthma – is a cause analogous to them.
Even a cursory reading of the legal provision under consideration is sufficient to convince anyone that, as the trial
court said, "illness cannot be included as an analogous cause by any stretch of imagination."
It is clear that, except the just cause mentioned in sub-paragraph 1(a), all the others expressly enumerated in the law
are due to the voluntary and/or willful act of the employee. How Nadura’s illness could be considered as "analogous"
to any of them is beyond our understanding, there being no claim or pretense that the same was contracted through his
own voluntary act.48
The reliance on Nadura is off-tangent. The factual milieu in Nadura is substantially different from the case at
bar. First, Nadura was not decided under the Labor Code. The law applied in that case was Republic Act (RA) No.
1787. Second, the issue of flight safety is absent in Nadura, thus, the rationale there cannot apply here. Third,
in Nadura, the employee who was a miner, was laid off from work because of illness, i.e., asthma. Here, petitioner
was dismissed for his failure to meet the weight standards of PAL. He was not dismissed due to illness. Fourth, the
issue in Nadura is whether or not the dismissed employee is entitled to separation pay and damages. Here, the issue
centers on the propriety of the dismissal of petitioner for his failure to meet the weight standards of PAL. Fifth,
in Nadura, the employee was not accorded due process. Here, petitioner was accorded utmost leniency. He was given
more than four (4) years to comply with the weight standards of PAL.
In the case at bar, the evidence on record militates against petitioner’s claims that obesity is a disease. That he was
able to reduce his weight from 1984 to 1992 clearly shows that it is possible for him to lose weight given the proper
attitude, determination, and self-discipline. Indeed, during the clarificatory hearing on December 8, 1992, petitioner
himself claimed that "[t]he issue is could I bring my weight down to ideal weight which is 172, then the answer is yes.
I can do it now."49
True, petitioner claims that reducing weight is costing him "a lot of expenses."50 However, petitioner has only himself
to blame. He could have easily availed the assistance of the company physician, per the advice of PAL. 51 He chose to
ignore the suggestion. In fact, he repeatedly failed to report when required to undergo weight checks, without offering
a valid explanation. Thus, his fluctuating weight indicates absence of willpower rather than an illness.
Petitioner cites Bonnie Cook v. State of Rhode Island, Department of Mental Health, Retardation and
Hospitals,52 decided by the United States Court of Appeals (First Circuit). In that case, Cook worked from 1978 to
1980 and from 1981 to 1986 as an institutional attendant for the mentally retarded at the Ladd Center that was being
operated by respondent. She twice resigned voluntarily with an unblemished record. Even respondent admitted that her
performance met the Center’s legitimate expectations. In 1988, Cook re-applied for a similar position. At that time,
"she stood 5’2" tall and weighed over 320 pounds." Respondent claimed that the morbid obesity of plaintiff
compromised her ability to evacuate patients in case of emergency and it also put her at greater risk of serious
diseases.
Cook contended that the action of respondent amounted to discrimination on the basis of a handicap. This was in
direct violation of Section 504(a) of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,53 which incorporates the remedies contained in
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Respondent claimed, however, that morbid obesity could never constitute a
handicap within the purview of the Rehabilitation Act. Among others, obesity is a mutable condition, thus plaintiff
could simply lose weight and rid herself of concomitant disability.
The appellate Court disagreed and held that morbid obesity is a disability under the Rehabilitation Act and that
respondent discriminated against Cook based on "perceived" disability. The evidence included expert testimony that
morbid obesity is a physiological disorder. It involves a dysfunction of both the metabolic system and the neurological
appetite – suppressing signal system, which is capable of causing adverse effects within the musculoskeletal,
respiratory, and cardiovascular systems. Notably, the Court stated that "mutability is relevant only in determining the
substantiality of the limitation flowing from a given impairment," thus "mutability only precludes those conditions that
an individual can easily and quickly reverse by behavioral alteration."
Unlike Cook, however, petitioner is not morbidly obese. In the words of the District Court for the District of Rhode
Island, Cook was sometime before 1978 "at least one hundred pounds more than what is considered appropriate of her
height." According to the Circuit Judge, Cook weighed "over 320 pounds" in 1988. Clearly, that is not the case here.
At his heaviest, petitioner was only less than 50 pounds over his ideal weight.
In fine, We hold that the obesity of petitioner, when placed in the context of his work as flight attendant, becomes an
analogous cause under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code that justifies his dismissal from the service. His obesity may
not be unintended, but is nonetheless voluntary. As the CA correctly puts it, "[v]oluntariness basically means that the
just cause is solely attributable to the employee without any external force influencing or controlling his actions. This
element runs through all just causes under Article 282, whether they be in the nature of a wrongful action or omission.
Gross and habitual neglect, a recognized just cause, is considered voluntary although it lacks the element of intent
found in Article 282(a), (c), and (d)."54
II. The dismissal of petitioner can be predicated on the bona fide occupational qualification defense.
Employment in particular jobs may not be limited to persons of a particular sex, religion, or national origin unless the
employer can show that sex, religion, or national origin is an actual qualification for performing the job. The
qualification is called a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ). 55 In the United States, there are a few federal
and many state job discrimination laws that contain an exception allowing an employer to engage in an otherwise
unlawful form of prohibited discrimination when the action is based on a BFOQ necessary to the normal operation of a
business or enterprise.56
Petitioner contends that BFOQ is a statutory defense. It does not exist if there is no statute providing for it. 57 Further,
there is no existing BFOQ statute that could justify his dismissal.58
Both arguments must fail.
First, the Constitution,59 the Labor Code,60 and RA No. 727761 or the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons62 contain
provisions similar to BFOQ.
Second, in British Columbia Public Service Employee Commission (BSPSERC) v. The British Columbia Government
and Service Employee’s Union (BCGSEU), 63 the Supreme Court of Canada adopted the so-called "Meiorin Test" in
determining whether an employment policy is justified. Under this test, (1) the employer must show that it adopted the
standard for a purpose rationally connected to the performance of the job;64 (2) the employer must establish that the
standard is reasonably necessary65 to the accomplishment of that work-related purpose; and (3) the employer must
establish that the standard is reasonably necessary in order to accomplish the legitimate work-related purpose.
Similarly, in Star Paper Corporation v. Simbol,66 this Court held that in order to justify a BFOQ, the employer must
prove that (1) the employment qualification is reasonably related to the essential operation of the job involved; and (2)
that there is factual basis for believing that all or substantially all persons meeting the qualification would be unable to
properly perform the duties of the job.67
In short, the test of reasonableness of the company policy is used because it is parallel to BFOQ. 68 BFOQ is valid
"provided it reflects an inherent quality reasonably necessary for satisfactory job performance."69
In Duncan Association of Detailman-PTGWTO v. Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc.,70 the Court did not hesitate to
pass upon the validity of a company policy which prohibits its employees from marrying employees of a rival
company. It was held that the company policy is reasonable considering that its purpose is the protection of the
interests of the company against possible competitor infiltration on its trade secrets and procedures.
Verily, there is no merit to the argument that BFOQ cannot be applied if it has no supporting statute. Too, the Labor
Arbiter,71 NLRC,72 and CA73 are one in holding that the weight standards of PAL are reasonable. A common carrier,
from the nature of its business and for reasons of public policy, is bound to observe extraordinary diligence for the
safety of the passengers it transports.74 It is bound to carry its passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can
provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances.75
The law leaves no room for mistake or oversight on the part of a common carrier. Thus, it is only logical to hold that
the weight standards of PAL show its effort to comply with the exacting obligations imposed upon it by law by virtue
of being a common carrier.
The business of PAL is air transportation. As such, it has committed itself to safely transport its passengers. In order to
achieve this, it must necessarily rely on its employees, most particularly the cabin flight deck crew who are on board
the aircraft. The weight standards of PAL should be viewed as imposing strict norms of discipline upon its employees.
In other words, the primary objective of PAL in the imposition of the weight standards for cabin crew is flight safety.
It cannot be gainsaid that cabin attendants must maintain agility at all times in order to inspire passenger confidence on
their ability to care for the passengers when something goes wrong. It is not farfetched to say that airline companies,
just like all common carriers, thrive due to public confidence on their safety records. People, especially the riding
public, expect no less than that airline companies transport their passengers to their respective destinations safely and
soundly. A lesser performance is unacceptable.
The task of a cabin crew or flight attendant is not limited to serving meals or attending to the whims and caprices of
the passengers. The most important activity of the cabin crew is to care for the safety of passengers and the evacuation
of the aircraft when an emergency occurs. Passenger safety goes to the core of the job of a cabin attendant. Truly,
airlines need cabin attendants who have the necessary strength to open emergency doors, the agility to attend to
passengers in cramped working conditions, and the stamina to withstand grueling flight schedules.
On board an aircraft, the body weight and size of a cabin attendant are important factors to consider in case of
emergency. Aircrafts have constricted cabin space, and narrow aisles and exit doors. Thus, the arguments of
respondent that "[w]hether the airline’s flight attendants are overweight or not has no direct relation to its mission of
transporting passengers to their destination"; and that the weight standards "has nothing to do with airworthiness of
respondent’s airlines," must fail.
The rationale in Western Air Lines v. Criswell76 relied upon by petitioner cannot apply to his case. What was involved
there were two (2) airline pilots who were denied reassignment as flight engineers upon reaching the age of 60, and a
flight engineer who was forced to retire at age 60. They sued the airline company, alleging that the age-60 retirement
for flight engineers violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967. Age-based BFOQ and being
overweight are not the same. The case of overweight cabin attendants is another matter. Given the cramped cabin
space and narrow aisles and emergency exit doors of the airplane, any overweight cabin attendant would certainly
have difficulty navigating the cramped cabin area.
In short, there is no need to individually evaluate their ability to perform their task. That an obese cabin attendant
occupies more space than a slim one is an unquestionable fact which courts can judicially recognize without
introduction of evidence.77 It would also be absurd to require airline companies to reconfigure the aircraft in order to
widen the aisles and exit doors just to accommodate overweight cabin attendants like petitioner.
The biggest problem with an overweight cabin attendant is the possibility of impeding passengers from evacuating the
aircraft, should the occasion call for it. The job of a cabin attendant during emergencies is to speedily get the
passengers out of the aircraft safely. Being overweight necessarily impedes mobility. Indeed, in an emergency
situation, seconds are what cabin attendants are dealing with, not minutes. Three lost seconds can translate into three
lost lives. Evacuation might slow down just because a wide-bodied cabin attendant is blocking the narrow aisles.
These possibilities are not remote.
Petitioner is also in estoppel. He does not dispute that the weight standards of PAL were made known to him prior to
his employment. He is presumed to know the weight limit that he must maintain at all times. 78 In fact, never did he
question the authority of PAL when he was repeatedly asked to trim down his weight. Bona fides exigit ut quod
convenit fiat. Good faith demands that what is agreed upon shall be done. Kung ang tao ay tapat kanyang tutuparin
ang napagkasunduan.
Too, the weight standards of PAL provide for separate weight limitations based on height and body frame for both
male and female cabin attendants. A progressive discipline is imposed to allow non-compliant cabin attendants
sufficient opportunity to meet the weight standards. Thus, the clear-cut rules obviate any possibility for the
commission of abuse or arbitrary action on the part of PAL.
III. Petitioner failed to substantiate his claim that he was discriminated against by PAL.
Petitioner next claims that PAL is using passenger safety as a convenient excuse to discriminate against him.  We are
79
constrained, however, to hold otherwise. We agree with the CA that "[t]he element of discrimination came into play in
this case as a secondary position for the private respondent in order to escape the consequence of dismissal that being
overweight entailed. It is a confession-and-avoidance position that impliedly admitted the cause of dismissal,
including the reasonableness of the applicable standard and the private respondent’s failure to comply."80 It is a basic
rule in evidence that each party must prove his affirmative allegation.81
Since the burden of evidence lies with the party who asserts an affirmative allegation, petitioner has to prove his
allegation with particularity. There is nothing on the records which could support the finding of discriminatory
treatment. Petitioner cannot establish discrimination by simply naming the supposed cabin attendants who are
allegedly similarly situated with him. Substantial proof must be shown as to how and why they are similarly situated
and the differential treatment petitioner got from PAL despite the similarity of his situation with other employees.
Indeed, except for pointing out the names of the supposed overweight cabin attendants, petitioner miserably failed to
indicate their respective ideal weights; weights over their ideal weights; the periods they were allowed to fly despite
their being overweight; the particular flights assigned to them; the discriminating treatment they got from PAL; and
other relevant data that could have adequately established a case of discriminatory treatment by PAL. In the words of
the CA, "PAL really had no substantial case of discrimination to meet."82
We are not unmindful that findings of facts of administrative agencies, like the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, are
accorded respect, even finality.83 The reason is simple: administrative agencies are experts in matters within their
specific and specialized jurisdiction.84 But the principle is not a hard and fast rule. It only applies if the findings of
facts are duly supported by substantial evidence. If it can be shown that administrative bodies grossly misappreciated
evidence of such nature so as to compel a conclusion to the contrary, their findings of facts must necessarily be
reversed. Factual findings of administrative agencies do not have infallibility and must be set aside when they fail the
test of arbitrariness.85
Here, the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC inexplicably misappreciated evidence. We thus annul their findings.
To make his claim more believable, petitioner invokes the equal protection clause guaranty 86 of the Constitution.
However, in the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be
invoked.87 Put differently, the Bill of Rights is not meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals. 88 Indeed, the
United States Supreme Court, in interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment,89 which is the source of our equal protection
guarantee, is consistent in saying that the equal protection erects no shield against private conduct, however
discriminatory or wrongful.90 Private actions, no matter how egregious, cannot violate the equal protection guarantee.91
IV. The claims of petitioner for reinstatement and wages are moot.
As his last contention, petitioner avers that his claims for reinstatement and wages have not been mooted. He is
entitled to reinstatement and his full backwages, "from the time he was illegally dismissed" up to the time that the
NLRC was reversed by the CA.92
At this point, Article 223 of the Labor Code finds relevance:
In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, insofar as the
reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory, even pending appeal. The employee shall either be
admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the
option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the
execution for reinstatement provided herein.
The law is very clear. Although an award or order of reinstatement is self-executory and does not require a writ of
execution,93 the option to exercise actual reinstatement or payroll reinstatement belongs to the employer. It does not
belong to the employee, to the labor tribunals, or even to the courts.
Contrary to the allegation of petitioner that PAL "did everything under the sun" to frustrate his "immediate return to
his previous position,"94 there is evidence that PAL opted to physically reinstate him to a substantially equivalent
position in accordance with the order of the Labor Arbiter. 95 In fact, petitioner duly received the return to work notice
on February 23, 2001, as shown by his signature.96
Petitioner cannot take refuge in the pronouncements of the Court in a case97 that "[t]he unjustified refusal of the
employer to reinstate the dismissed employee entitles him to payment of his salaries effective from the time the
employer failed to reinstate him despite the issuance of a writ of execution" 98 and ""even if the order of reinstatement
of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the wages of
the employee during the period of appeal until reversal by the higher court." 99 He failed to prove that he complied with
the return to work order of PAL. Neither does it appear on record that he actually rendered services for PAL from the
moment he was dismissed, in order to insist on the payment of his full backwages.
In insisting that he be reinstated to his actual position despite being overweight, petitioner in effect wants to render the
issues in the present case moot. He asks PAL to comply with the impossible. Time and again, the Court ruled that the
law does not exact compliance with the impossible.100
V. Petitioner is entitled to separation pay.
Be that as it may, all is not lost for petitioner.
Normally, a legally dismissed employee is not entitled to separation pay. This may be deduced from the language of
Article 279 of the Labor Code that "[a]n employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances,
and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from
him up to the time of his actual reinstatement." Luckily for petitioner, this is not an ironclad rule.
Exceptionally, separation pay is granted to a legally dismissed employee as an act "social justice,"101 or based on
"equity."102 In both instances, it is required that the dismissal (1) was not for serious misconduct; and (2) does not
reflect on the moral character of the employee.103
Here, We grant petitioner separation pay equivalent to one-half (1/2) month’s pay for every year of service.104 It should
include regular allowances which he might have been receiving.105 We are not blind to the fact that he was not
dismissed for any serious misconduct or to any act which would reflect on his moral character. We also recognize that
his employment with PAL lasted for more or less a decade.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED but MODIFIED in that petitioner
Armando G. Yrasuegui is entitled to separation pay in an amount equivalent to one-half (1/2) month’s pay for every
year of service, which should include his regular allowances.

[ G.R. No. 211962, July 06, 2020 ]
JOSE ROMEO C. ESCANDOR, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
At the core of sexual harassment in the workplace, as penalized by Republic Act No. 7877, otherwise known as the
Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995, is abuse of power by a superior over a subordinate.1 Sexual harassment
engenders three-fold liability: criminal, to address the wrong committed against society itself; civil, to address the
private wrong against the offended party; and administrative, to protect the public service.2 Courts and administrative
bodies should not hesitate to penalize insidious acts of sexual harassment, especially when committed by high-ranking
public officers.
This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure filed by
petitioner Jose Romeo C. Escandor (Escandor). He prays for the reversal of the assailed October 17, 2013
Decision3 and February 28, 2014 Resolution4 of the Special Third Division of the Sandiganbayan. The assailed
Decision found Escandor guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of sexual harassment as penalized by the Anti-
Sexual Harassment Act. The assailed Resolution, denied Escandor's Motion for Reconsideration.
Escandor was the Regional Director of the National Economic and Development Authority Region 7, Cebu City from
August 16, 1992 to October 31, 2005. Private complainant Cindy Sheila C. Gamallo (Gamallo) was a contractual
employee of the National Economic and Development Authority Region 7 for the United Nations Children's Fund
assisted Fifth Country Program for Children from March 1995 to December 2003.5
In an Information6 dated March 21, 2007, Escandor was charged with violating Republic Act No. 7877 as follows:
That in (sic) or about the period from the month of July 1999 until November 2003, at Cebu City, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above- named accused JOSE ROMEO C. ESCANDOR, a public
officer, being the Regional Director of NEDA Regional Office No. 7, based in Sudlon, Lahug, Cebu City (SG-28), in
such capacity and committing the offense in relation to his official functions and taking advantage of his position, and
with grave abuse of authority, with deliberate intent, with evident bad faith, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and criminally perform or make a series of unwelcome sexual advances or verbal or physical behaviour of sexual
nature, and demand, solicit, and request sexual favors from Mrs. Cindy Sheila Cobarde- Gamallo, then a Contractual
Employee of the NEDA Regional Office No. 7 for the UNICEF-assisted Fifth Country Program for Children (CPC V),
and, thus, the accused's subordinate, thereby exercising authority, influence or moral ascendancy over said Mrs. Cindy
Sheila Cobarde-Gamallo in her working place, namely by: telling her that he has fallen in love with her and has been 
attracted to her for a long time already, maliciously  grabbing her hands, embracing her and planting a kiss on her
forehead; telling her that if it were possible, he would have prevented her marriage with her husband; asking her for a
date; groping her thigh; sending her winpop messages showing his amorous concern for her; on the office Christmas
party of 2002, by grabbing her on a stairway and kissing her on the lips; giving her gifts of chocolates, wine and a
bracelet on that same Christmas, and consistently throughout this time, sending her text messages suggestive of sex;
which acts of the accused resulted to an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment as these caused discomfort and
humiliation on his subordinate, Ms. Cindy Sheila Cobarde-Gamallo, adversely affecting her and her family, thus
constituting sexual harassment.7 (Emphasis supplied)
In her Complaint-Affidavit,8 Gamallo averred that the first incident of sexual harassment happened one afternoon in
July 1999, when Escandor called her in his office.9 There, Escandor apologized for his temper the previous day when
he got angry at Gamallo for the delay in the payment of her salary. Escandor, who was standing near his computer,
then asked Gamallo to approach him. When she did, he "grabbed her hand, embraced her, and kissed her on the
forehead."10
Gamallo further narrated the succeeding incidents of sexual harassment, as follows:
9.    One day sometime in 2000 RD Escandor called me to his office. . . . Then he said that I deserved to be happy, that
I am beautiful and smart and that many men admired me. . . . To my great horror, he told me he had been attracted to
me for a long time and if it was only possible, he would have prevented me from marrying Mark. ... He said he liked
the way I walked . . . He declared I was the kind of woman he wanted. . .
10.    In the afternoon of the same day, ... he gently said he loved me and he could no longer hold back his attraction to
me. . . . Suddenly, I felt his hand on my thigh.11
After these incidents, Gamallo told her colleague, Lina Villamor, about what Escandor did to her.12
Escandor's alleged advances continued in the succeeding days, when Escandor would frequently ask Gamallo personal
questions such as her mood, what she did at home and during weekends, and details about her family, among
others.13 Because of the frequency of Escandor summoning Gamallo to his office, Gamallo related the incidents to
Rafael Tagalog (Tagalog), her immediate superior. Together with Villamor, Tagalog helped Gamallo avoid situations
where she would be alone with Escandor. Whenever Escandor would look for Gamallo, either Tagalog or Villamor
would accompany her to his office.14
However, Escandor's alleged advances did not stop. He incessantly sent Gamallo unsolicited messages through
Winpop, an intra-office messaging system, such as "Hello," "How are you today," "I miss you," "You look beautiful,"
"You look nice in your dress," and "I love you more every day."15 When Gamallo did not reply to these messages,
Escandor threatened her that she would be removed from the meeting list.16
During their Christmas party in 2000, Gamallo claimed she felt conscious as Escandor stared at her during her dance
performance with her officemates. After the party, she went to get her things from the third floor of the office and
when she reached the guard's station, Escandor was there. Upon reaching him, he grabbed her and was about to kiss
her on the lips. However, she moved away and the kiss landed on her left check. Gamallo then ran downstairs where
Villamor was waiting for her.17 In the same year's Christmas, Gamallo received chocolates, wine, an agenda book and
a bracelet from Escandor.18 A few days after, Gamallo told then Asst. Regional Director of the National Economic
Development Sandra Manuel (Manuel) about the incidents. Manuel advised her not to resign, but made arrangements
with Tagalog and Villamor to guard her.19
In February 2001, while in Cebu for a workshop, Escandor tracked Gamallo and Villamor to a folk house near their
hotel. He did not make any advances but insisted to pay for their drinks, which Gamallo and Villamor refused.20
Escandor's sexual advances allegedly continued, until Gamallo finally quit her job in November 2003.21
Three colleagues testified to corroborate Gamallo's account.22 Villamor testified that not only had Gamallo told her
about Escandor's sexual advances, but that she herself saw Escandor make such overtures, causing Gamallo great
distress to the point of reducing her to tears.23 She said that after those instances, she tried to prevent Gamallo from
being left alone with Escandor.24
Tagalog claimed that he, too, found out about the sexual harassment after he saw Escandor commit "some improper
acts and advances... to wards Gamallo."25 He said that "he counseled her to give Escandor the benefit of the doubt
[since] he might be undergoing a midlife crisis."26 Still, as Gamallo's immediate superior, he said he did his best to
"protect her from Escandor."27
Finally, Manuel averred that in 2000, she also learned of Escandor's indiscretions—first, when Villamor told her, and
second, when Gamallo herself confided in her.28 She said that while she "dissuaded Gamallo from resigning," she
"reported the matter to the [National Economic and Development Authority] Deputy Director General."29 This caused
the latter to confront Escandor.30 Escandor, learning about her action "accused her of disloyalty and told her to resign
from NEDA."31
In his defense,32 Escandor testified that he never engaged in the acts recounted by Gamallo. He claimed that the acts
allegedly committed by him are "pure fabrication."33 He explained that his office was always open and its inside was
visible from the outside, as their office was designed such that every room would have one door beside a large glass
window measuring around four by six feet, making the people inside visible.34 He also claimed that he could not have
harassed Gamallo as his wife, who was employed at the same office, could also see the things happening in his office,
just like the other employees.35
According to Escandor, the filing of the Complaint was part of an effort by a group of disgruntled employees to
remove him and his wife from office.36 He averred that the Complaint was also filed in retaliation to the filing of
administrative cases against Gamallo's husband, Atty. Russ Mark Gamallo (Atty. Gamallo), who was also a National
Economic and Development Authority employee. 37
To prove this scheme against him, Escandor presented as lone witness John Louis Savellon, a utility worker at the
National Economic and Development Authority, who testified that some of his officemates asked for his support to
oust Escandor.38 When he declined, Atty. Gamallo and a certain Mark Cabadsan harassed him. He also said that he
heard someone say in the library, "Tan awa nato asa kutob si Escandor kini kafile sa sexual harassment cases" (Let us
see how far Escandor can go when the sexual harassment cases are filed).39
Escandor also questioned Gamallo's credibility, averring that her acts when she was still with the National Economic
and Development Authority were inconsistent with her claims of sexual harassment. Escandor questioned Gamallo's
signature in a Memorandum Petition indorsed to the Director General of the National Economic and Development
Authority in October 2000 against the demand of Senator Osmena for Escandor's ouster.40 Escandor also questioned
Gamallo's March 2003 application to be his secretary.41
On October 17, 2013, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision42 finding Escandor guilty of sexual harassment. It
found that the prosecution was able to prove the elements of sexual harassment as defined and punished under
Republic Act No. 7877.43 It gave credence to Gamallo's testimony, noting that "there is nothing in the records that
would indicate that Gamallo is dishonest or untruthful."44
The Sandiganbayan also noted that Escandor presented only one corroborating witness, despite identifying several
individuals who were allegedly present during the incidents of sexual harassment:
Escandor's testimony identifies several people who were allegedly present during the incidents recounted by Gamallo -
Mrs. Escandor, his secretary, the other staff, the security guard, and so on. However, with the exception of Mrs.
Escandor whose testimony was excluded, it is unfortunate for the accused that only Savellon could corroborate part of
his defense that the NEDA employees allegedly schemed to oust Escandor from office. It is unbelievable, to say the
least, that Escandor, a person of high rank at the NEDA, could not find other witnesses to refute Gamallo's claims,
while the complainant was able to gather witnesses who testified on her behalf.45
The Sandiganbayan disposed of the case in the following manner:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the accused Jose Romeo C. Escandor is found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt and is sentenced to imprisonment for six (6) months and to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00),
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.46
Escandor filed a Motion for Reconsideration,47 where he stated that the Sandiganbayan erred in ignoring undisputed
evidence and established facts on record showing the belated filing of the Complaint. He averred that the Decision
"contravened the exacting test in assessing the credibility of a sexual harassment complaint."48 He also stated that the
Sandiganbayan erroneously disregarded the doctrinally settled rule in evaluating major self-contradictions and
irreconcilable inconsistencies.49 His motion was denied by the Sandiganbayan in its February 28, 2014 Resolution.50
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner insists that the evidence fails to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.51 He likewise assails his
conviction as having been made for an offense which was never charged in the Information since Gamallo testified to
events that supposedly transpired during the Christmas Party in 2000, whereas the Information alleged sexual
harassment for events that supposedly transpired during the Christmas party in 2002.52 He claims that this amounts to
a violation of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and the cause of accusation against him.53
He further assails his conviction based on a complaint that was filed after the lapse of the three (3) year prescriptive
period under Section 7 of Republic Act No. 7877.54
For resolution are the following issues:
First, whether or not Jose Romeo C. Escandor's guilt for sexual harassment under Republic Act No. 7877 has been
established beyond reasonable doubt.
Second, whether or not the discrepancy in the date of the Christmas party in which some complained act/s were
allegedly committed suffices to absolve Jose Romeo C. Escandor of liability.
Third, whether or not the Complaint against Jose Romeo C. Escandor was filed on time.
I (A)
Republic Act No. 7877, otherwise known as the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995, was the first criminal statute
enacted in the Philippines to penalize sexual harassment. It was adopted pursuant to the declared policy that "the State
shall value the dignity of every individual, enhance the development of its human resources, guarantee full respect for
human rights, and uphold the dignity of workers, employees, applicants for employment, students or those undergoing
training, instruction or education."55
It defines sexual harassment as follows:
SECTION 3. Work, Education or Training -Related, Sexual Harassment Defined. — Work, education or training-
related sexual harassment is committed by an employer, employee, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer,
teacher, instructor, pi-ofessor, coach, trainor, or any other person who, having authority, influence or moral
ascendancy over another in a work or training or education environment, demands, requests or otherwise requires any
sexual favor from the other, regardless of whether the demand, request or requirement for submission is accepted by
the object of said Act.
(a) In a work related or employment environment, sexual harassment is committed when:
(1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment, re-employment or
continued employment of said individual, or in granting said individual favorable compensation,
terms, conditions, promotions, or privileges; or the refusal to grant the sexual favor results in
limiting, segregating or classifying the employee which in any way would discriminate, deprive or
diminish employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect said employee;
(2)    The above acts would impair the employee's rights or privileges under existing labor laws; or
(3)    The above acts would result in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for the
employee.
(b) In an education or training environment, sexual harassment is committed:
(1)    Against one who is under the care, custody or supervision of the offender;
(2)    Against    one whose    education,    training, apprenticeship  or  tutorship   is   entrusted  to  quo; and second, hostile environment sexual harassment.70 Quid pro quo harassment conditions employment or job
the offender;
(3)    When the sexual favor is made a condition to the giving of a passing grade, or the granting of
honors   and   scholarships,   or  the  payment   of a stipend, allowance or other benefits, privileges,
or considerations; or
(4)    When   the   sexual    advances   result   in   an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment
for the student, trainee or apprentice.
Any person who directs or induces another to commit any act of sexual harassment as herein defined, or who
cooperates in the commission thereof by another without which it would not have been committed, shall also be held
liable under this Act.
Sexual harassment, as initially conceived, was the product of a consciousness that emerged among women, and
propelled various feminist movements. Its subsequent recognition in law is an offshoot of those campaigns.
The concept of sexual harassment began in the context of unwanted sexual relations imposed by superiors on
subordinates in the workplace.56  As early as 1887, the plight of women working in factories and the extortion vis-a-
vis sexual favors that they experience have been noted by several commentators.57 In 1840, women's moral reform
societies in the United States started petition drives for statutes penalizing seduction, in response to what were then
inadequate legal protection of women against sexual predation at work.58 In the decade before the American Civil
War, women's rights movement began pursuing discussions on women's socioeconomic conditions which make them
vulnerable to sexual coercion.59 Women's rights advocates publicized the case of domestic servant Hester Vaughn
who was held guilty of infanticide. After being fired by her employer who impregnated her, Vaughn gave birth alone
and impoverished, and left her infant dead60 Vaughn's case propelled efforts by women's groups to institute legal
reforms to protect women from sexual predation, and to enable other modes of collective self-help, such as organizing
labor unions for women.61
These developments made by the early feminist and labor movements were sustained in the 1970s by several lawyers
and activists representing women in courts. It was during this time that a concerted retaliation against sexual
harassment was pursued by advocates.62 The term "sexual harassment" was coined by Lin Farley during a
consciousness-raising session for a Cornell University course on women and work, where the women in the discussion
group repeatedly described being fired or quitting a job because they were harassed and intimidated by men.63 In her
works, Farley recognized the sexual coercion women experienced at work as a "social order that situates sexual
relations between men and women in relations of economic dependency."64 In April 1975, Farley testified before the
New York City Human Rights Commission Hearings on Women and Work, and defined sexual harassment as
"unsolicited nonreciprocal male behavior that asserts a woman's sex role over her function as a worker."65 Inspired by
the case of Carmita Dickerson Wood, an administrative assistant at Cornell University who quit her position due to
harassment by her supervisor, Farley and other women activists at Cornell formed the Working Women United, a
women's rights organization that sought to combat sexual harassment of women in the workplace.66
In 1979, Catharine MacKinnon published her book "Sexual Harassment of Working Women" which propelled the
adoption of laws on sexual harassment in the United States.67   Her central argument was that sexual harassment was
sex discrimination: "Sexual harassment is discrimination 'based on sex' within the social meaning of sex, as the
concept is socially incarnated in sex roles. Pervasive and 'accepted' as they are, these rigid roles have no place in the
allocation of social and economic resources."68 Through the works of Lin Farley and Catharine MacKinnon, the
discourse on sexual harassment translated into that of anti-discrimination.
In 1964, in the United States, the Civil Rights Act prohibited acts of discrimination on the basis of sex, among
others.69 American jurisprudence subsequently recognized two (2) categories of sexual harassment: first, quid pro
benefits on sexual favors;71 while hostile environment sexual harassment results from sexual advances which make
the working environment hostile or abusive to the employee.72
The two types of sexual harassment recognized in American jurisprudence are akin to sexual harassment as defined
under Republic Act No. 7877. Section 3(a)(l)73 similarly recognizes that sexual harassment is committed when a
sexual favor is made a condition for employment or for the grant of certain benefits. Likewise, Section 3(a)
(3)74 recognizes sexual harassment as committed when the offender's advances result in an intimidating, hostile, or
offensive environment for the employee.
In the Philippines, the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995 is a relatively new law. Although the Revised Penal Code,
enacted in 1930, already penalized offenses relating to violations of chastity, Congress saw it fit to enact a new law
specifically punishing sexual harassment committed in an "employment, education, or training environment."75
The original provisions of the Revised Penal Code on Rape (prior to its amendment in 1997) already punished a man
who has carnal knowledge of a woman under specified circumstances.76 That the crime is committed in an
employment, school, or training environment was not an element. This is also true for other crimes centering on a
perpetrator's lascivious, harassing or otherwise vexatious conduct, such as Acts of Lasciviousness,77 Seduction,78 and
Unjust vexation.79 These offenses pertain to acts which are not necessarily committed in an employment, training, or
school environment.
Under Republic Act No. 7877, an act of sexual harassment may result in three distinct liabilities: criminal, civil, and
administrative.80 An action for each can proceed independently of the others.81 In a criminal action, the accused is
prosecuted for a wrong committed against society itself or the State whose law he or she violated.82 In a civil action, a
defendant is sued by the plaintiff in an effort to correct a private wrong.83 The purpose of an administrative action, on
the other hand, is to protect the public service by imposing administrative sanctions to an erring public officer.84
Sexual harassment as defined and penalized under Republic Act No. 7877 requires three elements for an accused to be
convicted: (1) that the employer, employee, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher, instructor, professor,
coach, trainor, or any other person has authority, influence, or moral-ascendancy over another; (2) the authority,
influence, or moral ascendancy exists in a work-related, training-related, or education-related environment, and (3) the
employer, employee, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher, instructor, professor, coach, trainor, or any
other person who has authority, influence, or moral-ascendancy over another makes a demand, request, or requirement
of a sexual favor.85
The key elements which distinguish sexual harassment, as penalized by Republic Act 7877, from other chastity-related
and vexatious offenses are: first, its setting; and second, the person who may commit it. As to its setting, the offense
may only be committed in a work-related, training-related, or education-related environment. As to the perpetrator, it
may be committed by a person who exercises authority, influence, or moral ascendancy over another.86
Since Republic Act No. 7877 is a special criminal statute, the offense of sexual harassment is malum prohibitum.
Thus, in prosecuting an offender for sexual harassment, intent is immaterial. Mere commission is sufficient to warrant
a conviction.87 The Court explained in Narvasa v. Sanchez88 the reason why, even without intent, sexual harassment
is penalized:
Assuming arguendo that respondent never intended to violate [Republic Act No.] 7877, his attempt to kiss petitioner
was a flagrant disregard of a customary rule that had existed since time immemorial — that intimate physical contact
between individuals must be consensual. Respondent's defiance of custom and lack of respect for the opposite sex
were more appalling because he was a married man. Respondent's act showed a low regard for women and disrespect
for petitioner's honor and dignity.89 (Emphasis supplied)
This is in contrast with crimes mala in se, which are so serious in their effects on society as to call for almost
unanimous condemnation of its members.   In crimes mala in se, the intent governs; but in mala prohibita, the only
inquiiy is whether the law has been violated.90
Vedana v. Judge Valencia91 explained that the criminalization of sexual harassment was in keeping with "humanity's
march towards a more refined sense of civilization":
In the community of nations, there was a time when discrimination was institutionalized through the legalization of
now prohibited practices.1âшphi1 Indeed, even within this century, persons were discriminated against merely
because of gender, creed or the color of their skin, to the extent that the validity of human beings being treated as mere
chattel was judicially upheld in other jurisdictions. But in humanity's march towards a more refined sense of
civilization, the law has stepped in and seen it fit to condemn this type of conduct for, at bottom, history reveals that
the moving force of civilization has been to realize and secure a more humane existence. Ultimately, this is what
humanity as a whole seeks to attain as we strive for a better quality of life or higher standard of living. Thus, in our
nations very recent history, the people have spoken, through Congress, to deem conduct constitutive of sexual
harassment or hazing, acts previously considered harmless by custom, as criminal.92
Conviction under Republic Act No. 7877 subjects the offender to criminal penalties.93 Under Section 7, any person
who violates the law shall, upon conviction, be penalized by imprisonment of not less than one (1) month nor more
than six (6) months, or a fine of not less than P10,000.00 nor more than P20,000.00, or both such fine and
imprisonment at the discretion of the court. Since in a criminal action, the State prosecutes the accused for an act or
omission punishable by law,94 the action is commenced by filing the complaint with the regular courts or the office of
prosecutor.95 The criminal action arising from violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 7877 prescribes in
three (3) years.96
Criminal liability for sexual harassment notwithstanding, the offended party may pursue a separate civil action. As
stated in Section 6 of Republic Act No. 7877:
SECTION 6.  Independent Action for Damages. Nothing in this Act shall preclude the victim of work, education, or
training-related sexual harassment from instituting a separate and independent action for damages and other
affirmative relief.
Section 6 is consistent with Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, which states that, "Every man criminally liable is
also civilly liable." The rationale for this was explained in Rodriguez v. Ponferrada:97
Underlying this legal principle is the traditional theory that when a person commits a crime he offends two entities
namely (1) the society in which he lives in or the political entity called the State whose law he had violated; and
(2) the individual member of that society whose person, right, honor, chastity or property was actually or directly
injured or damaged by the same punishable act or omission.98(Emphasis supplied)
Civil liability arises from the damage or injury caused by the felonious act.99 Thus, in a civil action, the real party
plaintiff is the offended party, while in a criminal action, the plaintiff is the "People of the Philippines." Furthermore,
the quantum of evidence required in a civil action is mere "preponderance of evidence," in contrast to "proof beyond
reasonable doubt" which is required for conviction in a criminal action.100
Being independent from criminal action, the conviction or acquittal of the accused is not a bar to an independent suit
for damages in a civil action.101 Accordingly, in London v. Bagnio Country Club,102 this Court allowed an
independent action for damages against the accused despite the existence of an ongoing criminal case.
Aside from the actual perpetrator, the employer, or the head of office or institution may also be impleaded in an
independent action for damages.103 They would be solidarily liable for damages if they did not take immediate action
on a sexual harassment complaint.104
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7877 requires the employer or head of office to promulgate appropriate rules and
regulations to prevent the commission of acts of sexual harassment and to provide procedures for the resolution,
settlement or prosecution of acts of sexual harassment.105
In the government, the Civil Service Commission promulgated CSC Resolution No. 01-0940, otherwise known as the
Administrative Disciplinary Rules on Sexual Harassment Cases, which apply to all government officials and
employees.106 For the private sector, each organization's rules promulgated in accordance with Section 4 shall apply.
Section 4(b) of Republic Act No. 7877 further requires employers and heads of offices to create a "committee on
decorum and investigation of cases on sexual harassment." Pursuant to this, all national or local agencies of the
government, state colleges and universities, including government-owned or controlled corporations, were required to
create their own Committee on Decorum and Investigation.107
Unlike in criminal and civil actions which are brought before regular courts, an administrative action is commenced by
filing a complaint with the disciplining authority or agency, or with the Committee on Decorum and Investigation,
which shall receive and investigate sexual harassment complaints.108
CSC Resolution No. 01-0940, Section 3 defines sexual harassment as follows:
SECTION 3. For the purpose of these Rules, the administrative offense of sexual harassment is an act, or a series of
acts, involving any unwelcome sexual advance, request or demand for a sexual favor, or other verbal or physical
behavior of a sexual nature, committed by a government employee or official in a work-related, training or education
related environment of the person complained of.
(a) Work-related sexual harassment is committed under the following circumstances:
 (1)    submission to or rejection of the act or series of acts is used as a basis for any employment i.    Malicious Touching;
decision (including, but not limited to, matters related to hiring,   promotion,   raise   in   salary, 
job   security, benefits and any other personnel action) affecting    Jc the applicant/employee; or ii.   Overt sexual advances;

(2)    the act or series of acts have the purpose or  effect of interfering with the complainant's work iii. Gestures with lewd insinuation.
performance, or creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive work environment; or
b)    Verbal, such as but not limited to, requests or demands for sexual favors, and lurid remarks;
(3) the act or series of acts might reasonably be expected to cause discrimination, insecurity,
discomfort, offense or humiliation to a complainant who may be a co-employee, applicant,
customer, or ward of the person complained of. c)    Use of objects, pictures or graphics, letters or writing notes with sexual underpinnings;

(b) Education or training-related sexual harassment is committed against one who is under the actual or d)    Other forms analogous to the foregoing.
constructive care, custody or supervision of the offender, or against one whose education, training,
apprenticeship, internship or tutorship is directly or constructively entrusted to, or is provided by, the Casual gestures of friendship and camaraderie, done during festive or special occasions and with other people present,
offender, when: do not constitute sexual harassment.109 Accordingly, in Aquino v. Acosta,110 the Court agreed with the report of the
investigating Justice that the complainant failed to show by convincing evidence that the acts of Judge Acosta in
(1)    submission to or rejection of the act or series of acts   as   a  basis   for  any  decision  greeting her with a kiss on the cheek, in a 'beso-beso' fashion, were carried out with lustful and lascivious desires or
affecting  the complainant,   including,   but  not   limited  to,   the giving of a grade,  the  granting were motivated by malice or ill motive. The Court explained:
of honors  or a scholarship, the payment of a stipend or allowance, or   the   giving   of   any  
benefit,   privilege   or consideration. In all the incidents complained of, the respondent's pecks on the cheeks of the complainant should be understood in the
context of having been done on the occasion of some festivities, and not the assertion of the latter that she was singled
(2)    the act or series of acts have the purpose or effect   of  interfering   with   the   performance,   out by Judge Acosta in his kissing escapades. The busses on her cheeks were simply friendly and innocent, bereft of
or creating   an   intimidating,   hostile   or   offensive academic environment of the complainant; malice and lewd design.111
or
Unlike in a criminal action where the penalty is a fine, imprisonment, or both, the penalty in an administrative action
(3)    the   act   or   series   of acts   might  reasonably expected    to    cause    discrimination,    is, at most, dismissal, from the service.112 This is because an administrative action seeks to protect the public service
insecurity, discomfort, offense or humiliation to a complainant who may be a trainee, apprentice, by imposing administrative sanctions to the erring public officer.113 As has been explained:
intern, tutee or ward of the person complained of.
Public service requires the utmost integrity and strictest discipline; thus, a public servant must exhibit at all times the
CSC Resolution No. 01-0940, Section 4 further gives examples on where and how sexual harassment may take place: highest sense of honesty and integrity, and utmost devotion and dedication to duty, respect the rights of others and
shall refrain from doing acts contrary to law, and good.114
1. in the premises of the workplace or office or of the school or training institution;
In addition to Republic Act No. 7877, Congress has since enacted Republic Act No. 11313, otherwise known as the
Safe Spaces Act. Signed into law on July 15, 2019, it penalizes gender-based sexual harassment, and is founded on,
2. in any place where the parties were found as a result of work   or   education   or   training   among others, the recognition that "both men and women must have equality, security and safety not only in private,
responsibilities   or relations; but also on the streets, public spaces, online, workplaces and educational an training and training institutions."115 It
addresses four (4) categories of gender-based sexual harassment: gender-based streets and public spaces sexual
3.  at    work    or   education    or   training-related    social functions; harassment; gender-based online sexual harassment; gender-based sexual harassment in the workplace; and, gender-
based sexual harassment in educational and training institutions.
4. while on official business outside the office or school or training institution or during work or school or
training- related travel; In line with fundamental constitutional provisions regarding human dignity and human rights, the Safe Spaces Act
expands the concept of discrimination and protects persons of diverse sexual orientation, gender identity and/or
5. at   official   conferences,   fora,   symposia   or   training sessions; or expression. It thus recognizes gender-based sexual-harassment as including, among others, "misogynistic, transphobic,
homophobic and sexist slurs."
6. by telephone, cellular phone, fax machine or electronic mail.
The Safe Spaces Act does not undo or abandon the definition of sexual harassment under the Anti-Sexual Harassment
Law of 1995. The gravamen of the offenses punished under the Safe Spaces Act is the act of sexually harassing a
CSC Resolution No. 01-0940, Section 5 enumerates illustrative forms of sexual harassment: person on the basis of the his/her sexual orientation, gender identity and/or expression, while that of the offense
punished under the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995 is abuse of one's authority, influence or moral ascendancy so
a)    Physical as to enable the sexual harassment of a subordinate.
All the elements of sexual harassment, as penalized by Republic Act No. 7877, are present in this case.
Gamallo had earlier filed an administrative complaint with the National Economic Development Authority
Central.116 The present case, however, is exclusively concerned with Escandor's criminal liability and will be decided
exclusively of and without prejudice to his administrative liability.  On this, we find all the requisites for criminal
liability present, and sustain Escandor's conviction.
On the first requisite, it is clear that Escandor had authority over Gamallo. He was the Regional Director of the
National Economic and Development Authority Region 7, while Gamallo was a contractual employee in that
office.117 Escandor's authority also existed in a work-related environment; thereby satisfying the second requisite for
sexual harassment.
While the third requisite calls for a "demand, request, or requirement of a sexual favor," this Court has held
in Domingo v. Rayala118  that it is not necessary that these be articulated in a categorical oral or written statement. It
may be discerned from the acts of the offender.119 Thus, the Court found in that case that the accused's acts of
"holding and squeezing Domingo's shoulders, running his fingers across her neck and tickling her ear, having
inappropriate conversations with her, giving her money allegedly for school expenses with a promise of future
privileges, and making statements with unmistakable sexual overtones"120 satisfy the third requisite.
Here, Gamallo testified to several acts of sexual harassment committed by Escandor. Among these were grabbing her
hand,121 kissing,122 engaging in improper conversations,123 touching her thigh,124 giving her gifts,125 telling her
that "she was the kind of girl he really wants," asking her out on dates,126 and sending her text and Winpop messages
telling her that he missed her, that she looked beautiful, and that he loved her.127 All these acts undoubtedly amount
to a request for sexual favors.
At the core of sexual harassment in the workplace is power exercised by a superior over a subordinate. The power
emanates from how the superior can remove or disadvantage the subordinate should the latter refuse the superior's
sexual advances.128 Thus, sexual harassment is committed when the sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring
of the victim or the grant of benefits thereto; or when the sexual act results in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
environment for the employee.129
In this case, Gamallo stated that the acts of Escandor made her feel "disrespected,"130 "humiliated and
cheap,"131 "uneasy,"132 and "frightened."133 She could also not concentrate on work,134 could not sleep135 and
found herself "staring into empty space."136 When she disabled her Winpop messaging because of Escandor's
inappropriate messages, she was threatened that she will be deleted from the National Economic and Development
Authority meeting list. Villamor, Tagalog and Manuel, who all testified for Gamallo, tried to protect her from
Escandor. Villamor and Tagalog made sure that whenever Escandor called for Gamallo, either of them would go with
her.137 Manuel even had to relay the incidents to the National Economic and Development Authority Deputy Director
General. Undoubtedly, Escandor's acts resulted in an intimidating, hostile, and offensive environment for Gamallo.
I (C)
Escandor counters that, "[t]he evidence preferred ... is totally repugnant to human standard[s], common experience and
observation."138 He claims that the credibility of Gamallo is "zero not only because of unreasonable delay, but also
because of the inherent improbability of her story, her propensity to resort to falsehood and her strong motive to
falsely accuse and get back at the accused."139
Contrary to Escandor's assertions, the Sandiganbayan found Gamallo's testimony credible.140 We sustain this
conclusion.
Factual findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to great respect.
These findings will not be disturbed in the absence of any clear showing that the trial court overlooked,
misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances.141 This is because trial provides judges with the
"opportunity to detect, consciously or unconsciously, observable cues and micro expressions that could, more than the
words said and taken as a whole, suggest sincerity or betray lies and ill will."142
The matters raised by Escandor have been more than adequately addressed by the Sandiganbayan:
In the present case, there is nothing in the records that would indicate that Gamallo is dishonest or untruthful. She was
able to give her testimony in Court and answer the questions put to her on cross-examination. Her former supervisor,
Tagalog, attests that he had never heard of any act of immorality committed by Gamallo.143
The Sandiganbayan, being the court which conducted trial, "is in the best position to determine the truthfulness of
witnesses."144 Indeed, this court must "give the highest respect to [its] of the testimony of the witnesses, considering
its unique position in directly observing the demeanor of a witness on the stand."145
In Batistis v. People of the Philippines146 this Court held that only questions of law may be entertained in petitions for
review on certiorari filed with this court from decisions of the Sandiganbayan:
The factual findings of the [trial court], its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses, and its assessment of their
probative weight are given high respect, if not conclusive effect, unless cogent facts and circumstances of substance,
which if considered, would alter the outcome of the case, were ignored, misconstrued or misinterpreted.147
When the victim's testimony is straightforward, convincing, consistent with human nature, and unflawed by any
material or significant controversy, it passes the test of credibility and the accused may be convicted solely on the
basis thereof. 148
Escandor's claims fail to cast such degree of doubt on the Sandiganbayan's findings as to justify absolving him of
liability. On the other hand, Gamallo has adequately testified to the acts attributed to Escandor. Moreover, her account
is supported by the testimonies of three colleagues: Villamor, Tagalog and Manuel. As against these, Escandor only
had his own testimony and bare denials.
II (A)
Escandor further argues that his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation
against him was violated when the Sandiganbayan convicted him of sexual harassment committed during their 2000
Christmas party despite the Information pertaining to acts of sexual harassment committed on another date, i.e., their
2002 Christmas party.149
This contention fails to impress.
The Information detailed Escandor's acts of sexual harassment as follows:
. . .telling her that he has fallen in love with her and has been attracted to her for a long time already, maliciously
grabbing her hands, embracing her and planting a kiss on her forehead; telling her that if it were possible, he would
have prevented her marriage with her husband; asking her for a date; groping her thigh; sending her winpop messages
showing his amorous concern for her; on the office Christmas party of 2002, by grabbing her on a stairway and kissing
her on the lips; giving her gifts of chocolates, wine and a bracelet on that same Christmas, and consistently throughout
this time, sending her text messages suggestive ofsex[.]150
The recital lists several distinct acts (or sets of acts) of sexual harassment; the incident in the "Christmas party of
2002" being just one. That each act was distinct is manifested in how they were recited in the information: separated
by a semicolon for each act, or set of acts, making them distinct items in a list.151 Each of these acts or sets of acts, if
proven, is sufficient to convict Escandor. Thus, even if the Court does not appreciate the allegations relating to events
that transpired during the Christmas party— whether it was in 2002, as alleged in the Information, or in 2000, as
testified to by Gamallo—this does not absolve Escandor of liability.
II (B)
Escandor also argues that his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation against
him was violated when the Sandiganbayan convicted him of acts of sexual harassment based on the Information which
alleges an indefinite time when the offense charged was committed.152
It is now too late for Escandor to assail the validity of the information.
Rule 110, Section 11 of the Rules of Court requires that the time of the commission of the offense must be alleged as
near to the actual date as the information will permit; otherwise, the right of the accused to be informed would be
violated. The accused must raise the issue of defective information in a motion to quash or bill of particulars, which
may only be filed before arraignment.153
Petitioner failed to assail the Information within the permitted period. Thus, it is now too late for him to claim that the
information was defective. When the accused fails, before arraignment, to move for the quashal of such information
and goes to trial thereunder, he thereby waives the objection and may be found guilty of as many offenses as those
charged in the information and proved during trial.154
Assuming he is permitted to assail the Information, it is still not defective. Rule 110, Section 11 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure specifically provides that it is not necessary to state in the information the precise date that the
offense was committed except when it is a material ingredient of the offense. In this case, the time of the commission
of the offense is not an essential element under Republic Act No. 7877. Thus, the phrase "on or about" in the
information does not require the prosecution to prove any precise date.155
III (A)
Escandor assails his conviction citing "unreasonable delay and silence"156 as it was only initiated five years after the
alleged incidents. He argues that the belated filing of the Complaint renders Gamallo's actuations doubtful.157 He
notes that Gamallo is a college graduate, a National Economic and Development Authority Project Staff, and has a
lawyer for a husband158 Citing Digitel Communications v. Mariqirit,159 he argues that it was simply against the
natural order of events and against human nature that she would not complain about the sexual incidents
immediately.160
Escandor is mistaken. There is no time period within which a victim is expected to complain about sexual
harassment. 161 The time to do so may vary depending upon the needs, circumstances, and more importantly, the
emotional threshold  of the  employee.     Thus,  in Philippine Aelous  v. NLRC,162  this  Court  emphasized that  Q: Can you recall the tenor of that document?
filing  after  four years  does  not invalidate sexual harassment:
Private respondent admittedly allowed four (4) years to pass before finally coming out with her employer's sexual
impositions. Not many women, especially in this country, are made of the stuff that can endure the agony and trauma
of a public, even corporate, scandal. If petitioner corporation had not issued the third memorandum that terminated the
services of private respondent, we could only speculate how much longer she would keep her silence. Moreover, few
persons are privileged indeed to transfer from one employer to another. The dearth of quality employment has become
a daily "monster" roaming the streets that one may not be expected to give up one's employment easily but to hang on
to it, so to speak, by all tolerable means. Perhaps, to private respondent's mind, for as long as she could outwit her
employer's ploys she would continue on her job and consider them as mere occupational hazards. This uneasiness in
her place of work thrived in an atmosphere of tolerance for four (4) years, and one could only imagine the prevailing
anxiety and resentment, if not bitterness, that beset her all that time. But William Chua faced reality soon enough.
Since he had no place in private respondent's heart, so must she have no place in his office. So, he provoked her,
harassed her, and finally dislodged her; and for finally venting her pent-up anger for years, he "found" the perfect
reason to terminate her.163
As aptly observed by the Sandiganbayan, Escandor is mistaken in his interpretation of Digitel.164 Digitel stemmed
from a Complaint for constructive dismissal due to professional and sexual harassment. In that case, this Court stated
that "there is, strictly speaking, no fixed period within which an alleged victim of sexual harassment may file a
complaint, [although] it does not mean that he or she is at liberty to file one anytime she or he wants to. Surely, any
delay in filing a complaint must be justifiable or reasonable as not not to cast doubt on its merits."165
Neither has prescription set in by the time Gamallo filed her Complaint Affidavit on September 4, 2004. Escandor's
acts of sexual harassment persisted until December 2003, the end of Gamallo's employment with the National
Economic and Development Authority Region 7. By the time she filed her Complaint-Affidavit, only about nine (9)
months had lapsed. This is well-within the three (3) years permitted by Section 7 of Republic Act No. 7877 within
which an action under the same statute may be pursued.
III (B)
Escandor further imputes ill-motive to Gamallo in filing the charges.
He submits that the charges were in retaliation to Escandor's administrative complaints against Gamallo's husband
who also worked at the National Economic and Development Authority. He also emphasized Gamallo's act of signing
the petition in support of his retention as Regional Director.
These   fail   to   discredit   Gamallo.    She   already   explained   the circumstances surrounding her participation in
the petition against Escandor:
ATTY. MARONILLA:
Q: Around the same date, Madam Witness, September 2000, do you not recall having signed a memorandum in
support of the accused against the effort of then Senator Osmena to remove him from NEDA Legislative?
PROS. RAFAEL:
The question, Your Honor, has no basis.
JUSTICE DE LA CRUZ:
Answer.
WITNESS:
A: I signed that document.
ATTY. MARONILLA:
Q: Madam Witness, the question is, do you recall?
A: Yes Sir.
A: It was depending (sic) NEDA as an institution. It did not depend (sic) the integrity of Director Escandor as a
person. It was on the NEDA extreme political pressure, and also Director Escandor was not guilty of the wrongdoing
that the Senator was accusing him of. We were really depending (sic) the integrity of NEDA, not the integrity of
Director Escandor.166
The memorandum sought to "uphold the image of NEDA as a government institution that has resisted undue political
pressures."167 Such image, according to the "[National Economic and Development Authority] Region 7 Staff," will
be tainted "should transfers or reshuffle of regional directors be made because of political pressure."168 The mere
happenstance of Gamallo's participation in an effort to protect the National Economic and Development Authority as
an institution is not itself a disavowal of and, in no way, precludes Escandor's harassment of Gamallo.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Sandiganbayan,
finding petitioner Jose Romeo Escandor guilty of the offense of sexual harassment as defined and punished under
Sections 3 and 7 of Republic Act No. 7877, and penalizing him with imprisonment of six (6) months and a fine of
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 217101, February 12, 2020 ]
LBC EXPRESS-VIS, INC., PETITIONER, VS. MONICA C. PALCO, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
An employee is considered constructively dismissed if he or she was sexually harassed by her superior and her
employer failed to act on his or her complaint with prompt and sensitivity.
This Court resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 and Resolution3 of the Court of
Appeals, which affirmed the National Labor Relations Commission's finding that the employer company, LBC
Express-Vis Inc., is liable for constructive dismissal.
On January 16, 2009, Monica C. Palco (Palco) started working for LBC Express-Vis Inc. (LBC) as a customer
associate in its Gaisano Danao Branch (LBC Danao). The Branch's Team Leader and Officer-in-Charge, Arturo A.
Batucan (Batucan), endorsed her application for the post and acted as her immediate superior.4
While employed at LBC, Palco had initially noticed that Batucan would often flirt with her, which made her
uncomfortable. Later, Batucan started sexually harassing her. Batucan's undisputed acts are detailed as follows:
1. As weeks passed, she noticed something in the way respondent- Arturo A. Batucan stared and smiled at
her. She also sensed some meaning in the way he talked to her, though she initially ignored these and just
tried to focus on her job.
2. At one time he offered to lend her money, which she refused, not wanting to be indebted to him.
3. There was likewise an instance when he secretly gave her chocolate, which she felt uncomfortable about,
there being no special occasion then.
4. Respondent-Arturo A. Batucan's actions grew bolder everyday[sic]. Whenever he approached her while
working, he found ways to hold her hand or put his hand on her lap, if not, on her shoulder.
5. Then, the time came when he started to kiss her on the cheek in a joking manner.
6. On certain occasions, he pulled the strap of her bra, which made her feel really uncomfortable. When she
tried to rebuke him on such, he would just tell her that it was a joke.
7. There was also a time when he joked about making a baby with her. He told her that if she will get
married someday, he wants to join with her husband in making the baby. She just laughed it off, but she
knew there was something wrong with the joke.5
The final straw happened at around 8:00 a.m. on May 1, 2010. That morning, Batucan sneaked in on Palco while she
was in a corner counting money. Palco was caught by surprise and exclaimed, "Kuyawa nako nimo sir, oy!" (You
scared me, sir!). Batucan then held her on her hips and attempted to kiss her lips. However, Palco was able to shield
herself.
Batucan then tried a second time and was able to kiss Palco's lips before she could react. Batucan told Palco that he
was just happy that day and then proceeded to wipe her lips. Palco, however, could not stop him. Thereafter, Batucan
asked her if it was okay for him to go to the LBC Camotes Branch on Monday, as though asking for her permission
and treating her like a girlfriend. She told him not to repeat what he had done and threatened to tell his wife about it.
Palco felt angry and afraid.6
On the evening of the following day, a Sunday, Batucan texted Palco asking her to report early for work the next day
to prepare for the arrival of a certain Ms. Ponce. Afraid of what Batucan might do next, Palco excused herself and
suggested that her co-employee take her place, explaining that she might not come in for work.7
The next day, despite being repulsed by Batucan, Palco still forced herself to go to work. She was relieved when
Batucan left with Ms. Ponce at 11:00 a.m. to visit the LBC Camotes Branch. However, on May 4, 2010, she did not
come in for work because she was sick, and was still bothered by the incident.8
On May 5, 2010, she reported the incident to the LBC Head Office in Lapu Lapu City. She had a resignation letter
prepared in case management would not act on her complaint. Acting on her complaint, management advised her to
request for a transfer to another team while they investigated the matter.9
On May 8, 2010, Palco returned to the LBC Head Office with her mother and submitted her formal complaint against
Batucan. Later, they proceeded to the police station to report the incident.10
On May 14, 2010, sensing that management did not immediately act on her complaint, Palco resigned. She asserted
that she was forced to quit since she no longer felt safe at work.11
On June 15, 2010, Batucan was served a copy of a Notice to Explain.12
On July 20, 2010, LBC held the administrative hearing for the incident.13 On the same day, Palco filed a Complaint
for Illegal Dismissal against the company.
On September 27, 2010, the area head of LBC Cebu sent a letter addressed to Batucan containing a suspension with The National Labor Relations Commission, in its May 31, 2012 Decision17 affirmed with modification the Labor
last warning: Arbiter's decision but reduced the amount of moral damages to P50,000.00.18

This administrative action is taken on the account of the complaint on immoral act with you [sic] teammate, Ms.
Monica Palco of which you were required to submit a valid explanation why sanction should not be imposed against
you. This aggravated the company by facing a case charged with illegal dismissal at NLRC Cebu.
After thorough consideration and evaluation of the case, the company finds it adequate cause to render you answerable
for the aforementioned conduct. This Office hereby sites you for the following infraction categorized under our Code
of Conduct as Major Offense to wit:
Against Persons:
a. Immoral act or any form of indecency within company premises or work assignment.
b. Any form of sexual harassment.
Accordingly, your attention is hereby called to this instance; you are directed to serve a SUSPENSION for a period of
sixty (60) days without pay with LAST WARNING effective immediately.
You are further admonished against a repetition of this omission.
For your information and strict compliance.
LEONARDO V. LIBRADILLA (signed)14
On October 18, 2010, Palco filed a Complaint for sexual harassment before the Danao City Prosecutor's Office.15
The Court of Appeals, in its March 13, 2014 Decision19 affirmed the National Labor Relations Commission. It denied
LBC's Motion for Reconsideration.20
LBC thus filed this Petition21 maintaining that: (1) "the findings are grounded entirely on speculation [;]" (2) "the
inference made is manifestly mistaken [;]" (3) "the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts [;]" and (4) "the
Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed but the parties, which... would justify a
different conclusion."22 Furthermore, it raised that "a period of four (4) months does not even constitute an
unreasonable period to resolve a case of such nature and gravity as one for sexual harassment."23
Subsequently, Palco filed a Comment,24 and LBC filed its Reply.25
Petitioner mainly argues that it should not be held liable for constructive dismissal. It insists that it did not commit any
act of discrimination, insensibility, or disdain towards respondent. Neither did it establish a harsh, hostile or
unfavorable work environment for her.26
Citing Verdadero v. Barney Autolines Group of Companies Transport, Inc.,27 petitioner argues that it cannot be held
liable for the hostile work environment that respondent experienced because it was Batucan, who committed the acts
subject of her complaint. It points out that Batucan was a mere team leader, a co-employee, who had no power to
dismiss, suspend, or discipline respondent.28 Petitioner did not know of, participate, or consent to Batucan's acts and
only learned of his acts after respondent reported it.29
Petitioner also insists that it acted with sensitivity and consideration for respondent's welfare and made efforts to
address her concerns while it was investigating the incident. It points out that when respondent expressed her intention
to resign, it suggested respondent's transfer to another team and did not require her to report back to the LBC Danao
where Batucan was stationed. When respondent accepted the offer, LBC granted her vacation leave requests while
awaiting her reassignment.30

The Labor Arbiter, in its Decision dated June 29, 2011, ruled in favor of Palco:
WHEREFORE, co-respondents LBC Express-VIS, Inc. and Arturo Batucan are hereby ORDERED solidarily to
immediately pay complainant Monica C. Palco the following:
Petitioner maintains that it immediately acted on the incident but still had to accord Batucan due process given the
seriousness of the charge. It argues that the delay in the investigation was caused by respondent's sudden resignation.
In any case, they proceeded with the investigation and suspended Batucan for 60 days with a final warning.31 It
asserts that four (4) months is not an unreasonable period to resolve a sexual harassment complaint.32

Backwages...............................
Separation pay.........................
Moral Damages........................ 200,000
Exemplary
Damages.................
Total.......................................
Attorney's fees (10%) .............
Grand Total.............................
SO ORDERED.16
Php 91,000.00 Petitioner contends that respondent's resignation was deliberate and voluntary, and was by way of reprisal for
petitioner's failure to heed her ultimatum that Batucan be immediately removed from his post.33
14,000
As such, petitioner contests the awards granted to respondent, arguing those who voluntarily resigned are not entitled
to backwages, and reinstatement or separation pay. It also argues that respondent is not entitled to damages since
50,000
petitioner acted in good faith in all its dealings and that respondent should bear the litigation expenses for filing an
unfounded and baseless case. It further asserts that there is no basis for the award of attorney's fees because there was
Php 355,000.00 no unlawful withholding of wages.34
35,000
In her Comment,35 respondent, maintains that she was constructively dismissed.36 She argues that Batucan's acts
390,500 towards her "created a hostile, intimidating and offensive environment, rendering her continued employment in the
company impossible, unreasonable or unlikely."37 She points out that Batucan's acts constitute sexual harassment
under Section 3(a)(3) of Republic Act No. 7877. The hostile work environment could be clearly seen from her intense
fear and anger and her subsequent acts after the incident: (1) she did not want to report to work; (2) she travelled four
(4) hours away from her home to personally file a letter-complaint to the LBC Head Office; and (3) she reported the
incident to the Danao City Police and filed a criminal case before the City Prosecutor's Office.38
Respondent further points out that in the administrative hearing, Batucan did not deny the kissing incident. She claims
that his version did not vary much from her allegations39 as he simply argued that his acts did not constitute sexual
harassment.40
Respondent maintains that petitioner failed to protect its employees from sexual harassment as required under
Republic Act No. 7877.41 It did not have the required rules and regulations to investigate sexual harassment reports,
any administrative sanctions for sexual harassment acts, or any committee on decorum and investigation for these
cases.42
She contends that petitioner was insensible and acted in bad faith in failing to immediately act on her
complaint.43 She points out the following: (1) the investigation only started 78 days after she reported the incident; (2)
it took 43 days for petitioner to serve Batucan a Notice to Explain; and (3) it took petitioner 78 days to call him for an
administrative hearing, and only after she had already been dismissed.44 It took management four (4) months and
three (3) weeks to resolve the matter, when a constructive dismissal case had already been filed.45
She likewise alleges that management pointed that there were no witnesses or any showing of bruises. It even
suggested that perhaps Batucan's kiss was merely a "beso."46
Respondent also posits that her resignation was not voluntary47 but was borne out of the hostile work environment
brought about by Batucan's sexual harassment, and the failure of management to accord her redress, protection, and
sensitivity.48 She thus insists she is entitled to backwages, separation pay, reinstatement, moral and exemplary
damages, and attorney's fees, with petitioner solidarity liable for damages with Batucan.49
The issue for this Court's resolution is whether or not LBC should be held liable for constructive dismissal.
This Court rules that LBC is liable for constructive dismissal.
Constructive dismissal occurs when an employer makes an employee's continued employment impossible,
unreasonable or unlikely, or has made an employee's working conditions or environment harsh, hostile and
unfavorable, such that the employee feels obliged to resign from his or her employment. Common examples are when
the employee is demoted, or when his or her pay or benefits are reduced. However, constructive dismissal is not
limited to these instances. The gauge to determine whether there is constructive dismissal, is whether a reasonable
person would feel constrained to resign from his or her employment because of the circumstances, conditions, and
environment created by the employer for the employee:50
[C]onstructive dismissal does not always involve forthright dismissal or diminution in rank, compensation, benefit and
privileges. There may be constructive dismissal if an act of clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an
employer becomes so unbearable on the part of the employee that it could foreclose any choice by him except to
forego his continued employment.51
In Saudi Arabian Airlines (Saudia) v. Rebesencio,52 this Court differentiated between voluntary resignation and
constructive dismissal:
In Bilbao v. Saudi Arabian Airlines, this court defined voluntary resignation as "the voluntary act of an employee who
is in a situation where one believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service,
and one has no other choice but to dissociate oneself from employment. It is a formal pronouncement or
relinquishment of an office, with the intention of relinquishing the office accompanied by the act of relinquishment."
Thus, essential to the act of resignation is voluntariness. It must be the result of an employee's exercise of his or her
own will.
In the same case of Bilbao, this court advanced a means for determining whether an employee resigned voluntarily:
As the intent to relinquish must concur with the overt act of relinquishment, the acts of the employee before and after
the alleged resignation must be considered in determining whether he or she, in fact, intended to sever his or her
employment. (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, constructive dismissal has been defined as "cessation of work because 'continued employment is
rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, as an offer involving a demotion in rank or a diminution in pay' and
other benefits."
In Penaflor v. Outdoor Clothing Manufacturing Corporation, constructive dismissal has been described as tantamount
to "involuntarily [sic] resignation due to the harsh, hostile, and unfavorable conditions set by the employer." In the
same case, it was noted that "[t]he gauge for constructive dismissal is whether a reasonable person in the employee's
position would feel compelled to give up his employment under the prevailing circumstances."53
One of the ways by which a hostile or offensive work environment is created is through the sexual harassment of an
employee.
Workplace sexual harassment occurs when a supervisor, or agent of an employer, or any other person who has
authority over another in a work environment, imposes sexual favors on another, which creates in an intimidating,
hostile, or offensive environment for the latter. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 7877, otherwise known as the Anti-
Sexual Harassment Act, states:
SECTION 3. Work, Education or Training-related Sexual Harassment Defined. — Work, education or training-related
sexual harassment is committed by an employer, employee, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher,
instructor, professor, coach, trainor, or any other person who, having authority, influence or moral ascendancy over
another in a work or training or education environment, demands, requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor from
the other, regardless of whether the demand, request or requirement for submission is accepted by the object of said
act.
(a) In a work-related or employment environment, sexual harassment is committed when:
(1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment, re-employment or
continued employment of said individual, or in granting said individual favorable compensation,
terms, conditions, promotions, or privileges; or the refusal to grant the sexual favor results in
limiting, segregating or classifying the employee which in any way would discriminate, deprive or
diminish employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect said employee;
(2) The above acts would impair the employee's rights or privileges under existing labor laws; or
(3) The above acts would result in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for the
employee. (Emphasis supplied)
This Court has held that "[t]he gravamen of the offense in sexual harassment is not the violation of the employee's
sexuality but the abuse of power by the employer."54
In this case, Batucan's acts are undisputed. He filed no pleading in the labor tribunals to deny respondent's
allegations.55 During the administrative hearing, he simply explained that his acts were misinterpreted and did not
constitute sexual harassment.56
However, it is clear that Batucan's acts were sexually suggestive. He held respondent's hand, put his hand on her lap
and shoulder, pulled her bra strap, joked about making a baby with her, attempted to kiss her, and eventually scored
one.57 These acts are not only inappropriate, but are offensive and invasive enough to result in an unsafe work
environment for respondent.
Petitioner emphasizes that it was not the company, but Batucan, that created the hostile work environment. It argues
that Batucan is a mere co-employee, not part of its management who may dismiss other employees.58
This argument, however, fails to persuade. Batucan cannot be deemed a mere co-employee of respondent. The
determination of whether an employee is part of the managerial staff depends on the employee's duties and
responsibilities:59
Managerial employees are defined as those vested with the powers or prerogatives to lay down management policies
and to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees or effectively recommend such
managerial actions. They refer to those whose primary duty consists of the management of the establishment in which
they are employed or of a department or a subdivision thereof, and to other officers or members of the managerial
staff. Officers and members of the managerial staff perform work directly related to management policies of their
employer and customarily and regularly exercise discretion and independent judgment.60
At the very least, Batucan held a supervisory position, which made him part of the managerial staff. Batucan was
petitioner's team leader and officer-in-charge in LBC Danao.61 He was tasked to: (1) "manage and oversee the day to
day operation[s] of the branch[;]" (2) keep in custody LBC Danao's daily cash sales; and (3) to deposit it in the
company account.62 Furthermore, respondent was hired under Batucan's endorsement of.63 He acted as her
immediate superior.64 Respondent had also referred to him as "Sir."65 There is also no showing that Batucan
answered to anyone in LBC Danao. Respondent had to travel to the LBC Head Office to submit her complaint as she
had no other superior within LBC Danao to whom she could report Batucan's acts. Thus, Batucan cannot be deemed to
be respondent's mere co-employee.
Nonetheless, although Batucan holds a supervisory position, he cannot be deemed to have acted on petitioner's behalf
in committing the acts of sexual harassment. It cannot be assumed that all the illegal acts of managerial staff are
authorized or sanctioned by the company, especially when it is committed in the manager's personal capacity.
In Verdadero v. Barney Autolines Group of Companies Transport, Inc.,66 this Court ruled that constructive dismissal
cannot be assumed if an officer of the company wronged an employee, but the employer did not authorize the act:
It is to be emphasized that the abovementioned acts should have been committed by the employer against the
employee.1âшphi1 Unlawful acts committed by a co-employee will not bring the matter within the ambit of
constructive dismissal.
Assuming arguendo that, Gimenez did commit the alleged unlawful acts, still, this fact will not suffice to conclude that
constructive dismissal was proper. Contrary to the arguments of Verdadero, Gimenez is not the employer. He may be
the "disciplinary officer," but his functions as such, as can be gleaned from the BALGCO Rules and Regulations, do
not involve the power or authority to dismiss or even suspend an employee. Such power is exclusively lodged in the
BALGCO management. Gimenez remains to be a mere employee of BALGCO and, thus, cannot cause the dismissal
or even the constructive dismissal of Verdadero. The employers are BALGCO and its owners, Barney and Rosela. As
correctly put by the CA:
Petitioner BALGCO, however, cannot be blamed for the existing hostile conditions that beset private respondent. The
repulsive behavior of the disciplinary officer against another employee cannot be imputed upon petitioner BALGCO
in the absence of any evidence that it promotes such ill-treatment of its lowly employees or has itself committed an
overt act of illegality. . . If private respondent had felt that his continued employment with petitioner BALGCO had
been rendered "impossible, unreasonable or unlikely" this could only have resulted from the hostile treatment by the
disciplinary officer and not by any action attributable to petitioner BALGCO nor to its owners Barney Chito and
Rosela Chito.67 (Citations omitted, emphasis supplied)
This is consistent with the established rule in labor law that the complainant must first establish the employer-
employee relationship to be able to claim that he or she was illegally dismissed.68
The distinction between the employer and an erring managerial officer is likewise present in sexual harassment cases.
Under Section 5 of the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act, the employer is only solidarity liable for damages with the
perpetrator in case an act of sexual harassment was reported and it did not take immediate action on the matter:
SECTION 5. Liability of the Employer, Head of Office, Educational or Training Institution. — The employer or head
of office, educational or training institution shall be solidarily liable for damages arising from the acts of sexual
harassment committed in the employment, education or training environment if the employer or head of office,
educational or training institution is informed of such acts by the offended party and no immediate action is taken
thereon. (Emphasis supplied)
This provision thus illustrates that the employer must first be informed of the acts of the erring managerial officer
before it can be held liable for the latter's acts. Conversely, if the employer has been informed of the acts of its
managerial staff, and does not contest or question it, it is deemed to have authorized or be complicit to the acts of its
erring employee.
In this case, Batucan cannot be considered to have been acting on petitioner's behalf when he sexually harassed
respondent. Thus, respondent cannot base her illegal dismissal complaint against petitioner solely on Batucan's acts.
However, even if petitioner had no participation in the sexual harassment, it had been informed of the incident.
Despite this, it failed to take immediate action on respondent's complaint. Its lack of prompt action reinforced the
hostile work environment created by Batucan.
The delay on petitioner's part is clear. The following are the undisputed sequence of events:
(1) On May 1, 2010, the kissing incident occurred.69
(2) On May 5, 2010, respondent reported the incident to management in the LBC Head
Office.70 Management suggested that instead of resigning, perhaps she could transfer to another branch.
Respondent conceded.
(3) On May 8, 2010, she went back to the LBC Head Office with her mother, Araceli Palco, to submit her
formal complaint. She also reported the incident to the police.71
(4) While respondent was waiting to be transferred to another branch, Araceli Palco noted that Batucan
resumed his duties as usual.72
(5) On May 14, 2010, Palco tendered her resignation after sensing that management did not act on her
complaint.73 In her resignation letter, she stated that she wanted to look for a more secure workplace.74 In
her exit interview, she ranked the following factors as having caused a strong influence for her to leave: (1)
relations with co-workers; (2) job security; (3) how her supervisor relates to her; and (4) her overall
perception of the company's ability to deal fairly with its associates.75
(6) On June 18, 2010,76 Batucan received a Notice to Explain—41 days after respondent reported the
incident, and one (1) month after she felt constrained to leave her employment.
 (7) On June 19, 2010, Batucan submitted his written explanation.77 It took another month before the
administrative hearing for the complaint was conducted.78 They heard Batucan only on July 20, 2010, the
same date respondent filed her illegal dismissal complaint.79
(8) On September 27, 2010, Batucan was suspended for 60 days with last warning—two (2) months after his
administrative hearing, and over four (4) months from the time the complaint was filed.80 During the span
of the investigation, there was no showing that Batucan was preventively suspended.
Clearly, there was unreasonable delay on petitioner's part in acting on respondent's complaint. Despite its allegations,
there is no showing that petitioner acted on respondent's report before they issued Batucan a Notice to Explain. Thus,
the formal investigation is deemed to have commenced only 41 days after the incident was reported. Petitioner
likewise offered no explanation as to why it took another month before it held an administrative hearing for the case.
Worse, it took petitioner another two (2) months to resolve the matter, even if Batucan's answers in his administrative
hearing did not substantially differ from respondent's allegations. In his administrative hearing, Batucan had reasoned
that he was simply trying to give respondent a "beso[,]" yet he likewise admitted that he does not usually do that with
his team or in the office:
Q: Sabi mo sa inyong written explanation noong June 19, 2010, na kayo po ay masaya lamang kaya mo
siya hinawakan ang kanyang pisngi [sic] at sabay halik, tama po ba ito?
A: Tama po, kasi sa unang pagkakataon nakapunta ako ng opisina ng maaga.
Q: Bakit mo naman hinawakan ang kanyang pisngi at halikan mo sana [sic] iyon noong May 01, 2010?
A: Gusto ko lang sana batiin si Ms. Monica sa pamamagitan ng biso biso.
Q: Kagawian na ba sa team ninyo or sa office na mag biso biso?
A: Hindi, pero sa bahay namin, kaming mag asawa at mga anak ko kahit malaki na sila, mag biso biso pa rin sa pag-
alis at pag dating.
Q: Ibig sabihin nito hindi rin kagawian ninyo ni Ms. Monica Palco na magbiso biso?
A: Hindi talaga, pero malambing ako sa kanila, sa lahat ng mga associates.
Q: Ganun ka ba talaga pag masaya ka, hahalikan mo ang inyong mga kasamahan sa trabaho kahit walang pahintulot sa
kanila, lalo na ang mga babae?
A: Hindi naman, isa lang akong masayahing tao at malambing.
Q: Hindi mo ba naisip na ang inyong ginawa ay isang uri ng sexual harassment?
A: Hindi kasi wala akong intention na halikan ang kanyang labi, at alam ko naman na hindi kami magkasintahan at
may tao din. (Emphasis supplied)81
Given these circumstances, the delay in acting on respondent's case showed petitioner's insensibility, indifference, and
disregard for its employees' security and welfare. In failing to act on respondent's complaint with prompt and in
choosing to let the resolution of the complaint hang in the air for a long period of time, it had shown that it did not
accord her claims the necessary degree of importance, and at best considered it a minor infraction that could wait.
Petitioner, it appears, belittled her allegations.
Furthermore, during the investigation, Batucan resumed his duties as usual. In the meantime, respondent consumed her
vacation leaves just trying to avoid him while waiting for her transfer to another branch. Petitioner's acts showed that it
was respondent who had to change and adjust, and even transfer from her place of work, instead of Batucan. Petitioner
thus cannot claim that it did not create a hostile, unfavorable, unreasonable work atmosphere for respondent.
This Court also notes respondent's assertion that petitioner had stated how difficult her allegations were to prove
because there were no witnesses or evidence of bruises. Respondent's mother, Araceli, stated in her August 5, 2010
Affidavit:82
12. So again, I accompanied her to the main office to submit her resignation letter. At first I told the HR and the legal
staff that we arrived to this decision because we have not found any development in our complaint against Mr.
Batucan. I told them why I said so, because after the scheduled day of investigation of Mr. Batucan, still he reported
for work. "Isnt it that if somebody is under investigation, he or she will no longer report for work?" That if there is a
complaint on that employee, there should be preventive suspension? I said to the legal staff and he nod his head, which
means yes. And I added, "Did you know how much money we spend for our transportation every time we come here?
We will spend P400.00 for two persons and if only one will come, P300.00." At least the HR and the legal staff know
the reasons why Monica file a resignation;
13. Then I proceeded to the office of the Area Head and listen to his opinion about the resignation of Monica. At first,
I told him the things I said to the HR and Legal staff. He said to me that it's not easy to decide about the case of
Monica and Mr. Batucan because there is no evidence such as bruises. So I answered, "Ngano man diay, kon gakson
ka ug hagkan, manlagom diay ka? Ngano man gikulata diay ka? (Translation: "Why would that matter, if you are
kissed, would you have bruises?") No answer from him and he proceeded to another statement, "We have no witness
so it[']s hard to prove the case." Again I answered him, "kon magbuhat ka ug binastos sa usa ka babaye,
nagkinahanglan diay nga naay magtan-aw? Kanang mga buhata himoon na nimo sa tumang ka pribado nga kanarang
kamong duha. Unya mangita ka ug witness? ["] (Translation: "If you are doing lascivious acts to a woman, would you
need somebody to see you do it? If you are going to do those acts, you will do it where it is secluded as possible,
where there are only two of you. And now, you are looking for a witness?" [)] He will not answer me. He said that
even though Monica resigned, he will pursue the case but it will take time. He will investigate the co-workers of
Monica if it is true that they have beso-beso. I told him "Unsay beso-beso? (Translation: 'What [sic] beso-beso')
between man and woman while they are alone? Beso-beso is only acceptable when there is an occasion, for example
birthdays, Christmas and New Year, not when no one is around and not in the lips."83
While petitioner did not admit to making these statements, in its Reply filed with the Labor Arbiter, it stated:
Complainant alleged that according to Mrs. Palco, individual respondent Libradilla told Mrs. Palco that he cannot
immediately act on the case because there was no evidence such as bruises and no witnesses. Based on Mrs. Palco's
affidavit however, individual respondent Libradilla never said he cannot immediately act on the case. Without
admitting the truth hereof, what individual respondent Libradilla was quoted as saying was that it was not easy to
decide the case because there is no evidence such as bruises and furthermore, even with the resignation of
complainant, he will pursue the case, but it will take time. . .
Moreover, complainant accused individual respondent Libradilla as dismissing respondent's act of kissing complainant
on the lips as a mere beso-beso. Based on the abovequoted statement of Mrs. Palco, and without admitting the truth
thereof, individual respondent Libradilla assured Mrs. Palco of an investigation. He was never quoted as concluding
that respondent Batucan's acts were mere beso-beso.84
Petitioner was explicit enough in denying the statement that it would not immediately act on the case. Yet it did not
expressly deny stating that the case was difficult to decide because there are no bruises or witnesses.
This Court emphasizes that statements suggesting that a case is weak because there are no witnesses or bruises are
highly insensitive to victims of sexual harassment. In stating that a sexual harassment case is hard to prove without
witnesses or physical manifestations of force, employers discourage their employees from coming forward with sexual
harassment incidents. They foster an environment in which employees feel that their word cannot be taken against the
word of the perpetrator. In making these statements, the employer lends more credence to the perpetrator, even
without the latter having been questioned or having submitted a written explanation. It allows the employee to feel that
the sexual harassment complaint's resolution had already been pre-determined against him or her.
Indifference to complaints of sexual harassment victims may no longer be tolerated. Recent social movements have
raised awareness on the continued prevalence of sexual harassment, especially in the workplace, and has revealed that
one of the causes of its pervasiveness is the lack of concern, empathy, and responsiveness to the situation. Many times,
victims are blamed, hushed, and compelled to accept that it is just the way things are, and that they should either just
leave or move on.
In recognizing the need to address these concerns, the State's policy against sexual harassment has been strengthened
through Republic Act No. 11313, otherwise known as the Safe Spaces Act. This law has expanded the definition of
gender-based sexual harassment in the workplace85 and has added to the duties of an employer as to its prevention,
deterrence, and punishment. It explicitly requires that complaints be investigated and resolved within 10 days or
less upon its reporting.86 It likewise expressly provides for the liability of employers87 and duties of co-workers as to
sexual harassment.88 The law likewise specifies the confidentiality of proceedings,89 and the issuance of a restraining
order for the offended person.90 Moreover, it allows local government units to impose heavier penalties on
perpetrators.91
While this law does not apply to this case as it was enacted after the commission of Batucan's acts, its principles
emphasize the need to accord more importance to complaints of sexual harassment and recognize the severity of the
offense.92
In any case, this Court will not hesitate in granting the affirmative relief that is due respondent under the law. Under
the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act, she may file a separate action for any affirmative relief for sexual harassment:
SECTION 6. Independent Action for Damages. — Nothing in this Act shall preclude the victim of work, education or
training-related sexual harassment from instituting a separate and independent action for damages and other
affirmative relief.
Petitioner's insensibility to respondent's sexual harassment case is a ground for constructive dismissal. In this instance,
it cannot be denied that respondent was compelled to leave her employment because of the hostile and offensive work
environment created and reinforced by Batucan and petitioner. She was thus clearly constructively dismissed.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is DENIED. This the Court of Appeals May 13, 2014 Decision
and February 10, 2015 Resolution are AFFIRMED. Respondent Monica C. Palco is found to have been constructively
dismissed. LBC Express-Vis, Inc., is hereby adjudged liable to Monica C. Palco for separation pay, backwages, moral
damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees, as awarded by the National Labor Relations Commission in its
Decision dated May 31, 2012. It is likewise held solidarily liable with Arturo A. Batucan for any other damages the
latter is held liable for on account of his acts of sexual harassment against respondent.
G.R. No. 233413
CELIAR. ATIENZA, Petitioner
vs.
NOEL SACRAMENTO SALUTA, Respondent
DECISION
REYES, J. JR., J.:
The Facts and the Case
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the April 21, 2017
Decision1 and the August 9, 2017 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 147356. The
questioned CA Decision affirmed with modification the April 27, 2016 Decision 3 and the June 21, 2016 Resolution4 of
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC LAC No. 01-000121-16 which reversed and set aside the
October 29, 2015 Decision5 of the Labor Arbiter in NLRC NCR Case No. 04-04089-15, while the questioned CA
Resolution denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The instant case stemmed from the complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment of wages, overtime pay, holiday pay,
premium pay for work on holidays and rest day, illegal deduction, and issuance of a certificate of employment filed by
Noel Sacramento Saluta (respondent) against Celia R. Atienza (petitioner) and CRV Corporation before the NLRC.
Respondent alleged that he was hired as a company driver by CRV Corporation in May 2012. He was assigned to
drive for the petitioner, one of the company's top officials and received ₱9,000.00 monthly salary.
On December 11, 2014, while driving along North Luzon Expressway, respondent hit the rear portion of the vehicle in
front of him. Thus, he was made to pay the amount of ₱15,000.00 to answer for the damages caused to the said
vehicle. The amount was first advanced by the company, but will be deducted from his monthly salary. On the said
occasion, the authorities confiscated his driver's license and issued him a Temporary Operator's Permit (TOP).
On December 23, 2014, respondent told the petitioner that he needed to absent himself from work because he had to
claim his driver's license since his TOP had already expired. According to him, petitioner refused to excuse him from
work because she had appointments lined up that day. As it was illegal for him to drive without a license, he was
constrained to get his license the following day, December 24, 2014; thus, he failed to report for work. However,
before going on leave, he first requested another company driver to drive for the petitioner. When petitioner learned
that he was not around, she immediately called him up saying, "kung hindi ka makakapag-drive ngayon, mabuti pa
maghiwalay na tayo." Upon hearing such words, respondent concluded that he had been verbally terminated.
When respondent went to CRV Corporation at around 3:00 p.m. on the same day, Rodolfo Reyes (Reyes), the General
Manager of the company, confirmed that he was already terminated from work. As it was Christmas Eve, he requested
that he be given his last salary, but this was refused on the ground that he has yet to reimburse the company the
₱15,000.00 it had advanced.6
Thus on April 7, 2015, respondent filed a complaint against CRV Corporation and the petitioner for illegal dismissal,
non-payment of wages, overtime pay, holiday pay, premium pay for work on holidays and rest day, illegal deduction,
and issuance of a certificate of employment.
For her part, petitioner contended that respondent was not dismissed from work, rather he abandoned his job when he
refused to report for work and took a leave of absence without permission. Petitioner claimed that respondent was not
an employee of CRV Corporation, but was hired by the petitioner as her personal/family driver with a monthly salary
of ₱9,000.00 and free board and lodging. His duty was simply to drive for her and her family to anywhere they wish to
go. His monthly salary was coursed through Reyes.
Sometime in December 2014, while driving her brother-in-law's car, respondent was involved in a vehicular accident.
Since respondent readily admitted his fault, she agreed to lend him P15,000.00 so that he could immediately pay for
the damages he caused.
On the night of December 22, 2014, respondent asked for permission if he could go to Pampanga as he needed to sign
some papers. She agreed on the condition that respondent would report for work the following day. On December 23,
2014, respondent did not report for work as instructed. Instead, he simply called petitioner to inform her that he will be
absent because he had to renew his expired driver's license. That was the last time she had heard from the respondent.
She subsequently learned that on December 27, 2014, respondent asked Reyes for his remaining salary of ₱2,100.00
for the period covering December 16 to 22, 2014. Because respondent had not yet paid his ₱15,000.00 loan, he was
told that his salary could not be released. Nevertheless, Reyes extended to him a personal loan in the amount of
₱4,000.00 which respondent promised to pay. Respondent communicated with Reyes for the last time on January 7,
2015 when the former told the latter that he will no longer return to work. Thus, petitioner was surprised to learn that
on April 7, 2015, or more than three months from the time he failed to report for work, respondent filed a complaint
for illegal dismissal.7
In a Decision8 dated October 29, 2015, the Labor Arbiter dismissed respondent's complaint except insofar as his claim
for illegal deduction and request for the issuance of a certificate of employment are concerned.
The Labor Arbiter held that respondent failed to prove by substantial evidence that he was an employee of CRV
Corporation. Given the admission of the petitioner that respondent was her personal driver and considering that the
employer-employee relationship between CRV Corporation and the respondent had not been established, respondent
was deemed an employee of the petitioner. Being a personal driver, his compensation for work and indemnity for
dismissal were governed by Articles 1689, 1697 and 1699 of the Civil Code. The monthly salary of ₱9,000.00 being
received by the respondent was reasonable and in accordance with Article 1689 of the Civil Code. His claims for
overtime pay, holiday pay and premium for work done on holidays, as well as premium for work done on rest day
cannot be granted as the Labor Code exempts from coverage househelpers and persons in the personal service of
another from such benefits. The Labor Arbiter further held that the amount of ₱15,000.00 cannot be charged against
the respondent as it had not been proved that he was the one responsible for the vehicular accident that transpired in
December 2014. As for respondent's request to be issued an employment certificate, the same must be granted as he
was entitled thereto pursuant to Article 1699 of the Civil Code. The Labor Arbiter also dismissed the complaint for
illegal dismissal for lack of showing that respondent was illegally terminated from the service, or that he was
prevented from returning to work. On the contrary, the Labor Arbiter found the respondent to have left his
employment without justifiable reason. For such reason, he was deemed to have forfeited the salary due him and
unpaid pursuant to Article 1697 of the Civil Code.
On appeal, the NLRC reversed and set aside the decision of the Labor Arbiter in a Decision[9] dated April 27, 2016.
The NLRC held that while it may be true that the respondent failed to present substantial evidence to prove that he was
under the employ of CRV Corporation as one of its drivers, it is also true that petitioner did not dispute that respondent
was driving for her. By alleging that the respondent was her personal driver, it becomes incumbent upon her to prove
their employer-employee relationship which she failed to do. The respective allegations of the parties show that
respondent was an employee of CRV Corporation. Furthermore, the allegation put forward by petitioner that
respondent customarily reported for work to Reyes, the General Manager, and the act of the latter of extending a
personal loan to the former proved that respondent was indeed under the employ of the company.
On whether respondent was illegally dismissed from work or had abandoned his job, the NLRC held that both parties
failed to adduce evidence to support their respective contentions. Apart from his uncorroborated statement that he was
verbally terminated from work, no other evidence was presented by the respondent. On the other hand, petitioner
relied on the information relayed to him by Reyes that respondent will no longer be reporting back for work. Be that as
it may, considering that petitioner failed to disprove that she verbally terminated respondent, coupled by the fact that
when respondent was asking for his December 2014 salary, the same was not released to him, it could reasonably be
inferred that respondent was indeed dismissed from work. The NLRC rejected the defense of abandonment raised by
the petitioner for lack of proof indicating respondent's clear intention to sever his employer-employee relationship with
the company. For failure of the petitioner to discharge the burden of proof that respondent's dismissal was justified,
there can be no other conclusion, but that the same was illegal. Thus, it ordered CRV Corporation and the petitioner to
pay respondent full backwages from December 2014, separation pay equivalent to one month salary for every year of
service, wage differentials, holiday pay, 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay from May 2012. His claims
for overtime pay, night shift differentials and premium pay for holidays and rest day were denied for lack of evidence
that the same had been incurred and unpaid. Anent the complaint for illegal deduction, the NLRC agreed with the
Labor Arbiter that the sum of ₱15,000.00 cannot be deducted from respondent's salary absent any showing that he was
responsible for the damage caused during the said vehicular accident.
Petitioner filed a Partial Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied in a Resolution10 dated June 21, 2016.
Alleging grave abuse of discretion, petitioner elevated the case before the CA by way of petition for certiorari. In a
Decision11 dated April 21, 2017, the CA, like the NLRC, ruled that respondent failed to prove by substantial evidence
that he was a company driver of CRV Corporation. However, in order to level the playing field in which the employer
was pitted against the employee, the CA deemed it necessary to reexamine the evidence presented by the petitioner in
support of her claim that she was the real employer of the respondent. The CA was not convinced that petitioner hired
respondent in her personal capacity for the former's failure to present respondent's employment contract duly signed
by the petitioner and showing the date the respondent was hired, his work description, salary and manner of its
payment. The CA added that as a top official of CRV Corporation, petitioner could have easily negated respondent's
allegation that he was employed by the company by presenting the payrolls, complete list of personnel, salary
vouchers and SSS registration of the company, but she did not do so. Petitioner also failed to explain why respondent
was customarily reporting to and receiving his salary through Reyes if he truly was her personal driver. Petitioner also
did not refute that respondent's salaries were paid through Automated Teller Machines (ATM) just like the rest of the
employees of the company. That respondent was an employee of CRV Corporation was further showed by the fact that
the company wields the power of dismissal. If respondent was indeed the employee of the petitioner, there would be
no reason for him to go to CRV Corporation's office to confirm whether he was terminated or not after he was verbally
dismissed by the petitioner and ask for the release of his salary from the company.
The CA also held that petitioner failed to adduce evidence showing that the respondent was not terminated for just or
authorized cause and after the observance of due process. On the contrary, the appellate court found the failure of the
respondent to report for work on December 24, 2014 in order for him to be able to claim his driver's license as his
TOP had already expired to be reasonable; thus, not enough reason for his dismissal. The CA was likewise not
convinced that the respondent abandoned his job as no evidence was presented indicating respondent's clear intention
to sever his employment with the company. Thus, the appellate court affirmed the Decision of the NLRC with
modification in that it imposed a 6% interest per annum on all the monetary awards granted to the respondent from the
finality of judgment until fully paid.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied it in a Resolution12 dated August 9, 2017.
Undaunted, petitioner is now before this Court via the present Petition for Review on Certiorari contending that the
appellate court erred in holding that the respondent was not her personal driver, but a company driver under the
employ of CRV Corporation; and that respondent was entitled to full backwages, separation pay, wage differentials,
holiday pay, 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay for having been illegally dismissed.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner claimed that the CA erred in ruling that respondent was employed as CRV Corporation's company driver
and not her personal driver despite respondent's failure to prove by substantial evidence the existence of an employer-
employee relationship between him and the company. She asseverated that following the pronouncement of the High
Court in Lopez v. Bodega City,13 it is the employee in illegal dismissal cases, the respondent in this case, who bears the
burden of proving the existence of an employer-employee relationship by substantial evidence, not her. Be that as it
may, petitioner insisted that the following circumstances show that respondent was hired by her in her personal
capacity, viz.: (a) respondent was not able to present any employment contract or document showing that he was
indeed a company driver of CRV Corporation; (b) respondent received his salaries from the petitioner. The Bank of
the Philippine Islands Statements of Cash Deposits and Withdrawals that respondent presented did not at all prove that
CRV Corporation was the one paying his salaries; and (c) respondent failed to present any evidence to show how CRV
Corporation exercised control over the means and methods by which he performed his work. On the other hand,
petitioner had shown that she exercised the power of control over the petitioner as she had the sole authority to give
instructions to respondent as to where and when he would drive for her and her family.
Furthermore, petitioner averred that it was error for the CA to have ruled that respondent had been unlawfully
terminated from work considering that the fact of his dismissal had not even been established by the respondent by
substantial evidence. In this case, petitioner pointed out that respondent never disputed that after he left his work on
December 23, 2014, he did not make any attempt to return to work. His refusal to return to work without any
justifiable reason amounted to abandonment of work. That respondent intended to put an end to his employment was
clearly demonstrated when he informed Reyes that he will no longer report for work. Since it was respondent who
decided to end his employment without her prior knowledge, she should not be faulted and be held liable for illegal
dismissal.
Petitioner also asseverated that respondent was not entitled to full backwages and separation pay. Since he worked as a
family driver who left his work without justifiable reason, pursuant to Article 149 of the Labor Code, he was deemed
to have forfeited the unpaid salary due him. He was also not entitled to separation pay because one who abandons and
resigns from his work is not qualified to receive the same. Furthermore, petitioner contended that the CA erred in
granting respondent's claim for wage differentials, holiday pay, 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay
because the Labor Code is clear that family drivers are not entitled to the same.14
For his part, respondent insisted that he was one of the company drivers and regular employees of CRV Corporation
since May 2012. As one of the company drivers, his work was absolutely necessary and desirable to the usual business
of the company. He argued that the petitioner only claimed that he was her personal driver so that she could
circumvent the requirement of having to pay company drivers the mandated minimum wage. He added that like the
other regular employees of the company, he received his salaries through the ATM.
Furthermore, respondent claimed that he did not resign nor abandon his job, but was illegally dismissed therefrom. His
vigorous pursuit of the present illegal dismissal case is a manifestation that he had no intention of relinquishing his
employment. At any rate, he asseverated that it is the employer who had the burden of proving that the dismissal was
justified. If the petitioner insisted that he resigned from his work, it is incumbent upon her to prove that he did so
willingly. Unfortunately, petitioner failed to discharge her burden of proof. Since respondent was not afforded due
process as he was not given any notice to explain or a notice of termination, there can be no other conclusion but that
he was indeed illegally terminated from work. Having been illegally dismissed from work, the CA rightfully granted
him his money claims. On top of full backwages, separation pay, wage differentials, holiday pay, 13th month pay and
service incentive leave pay, he must also be awarded damages and attorney's fees even if the same were not included
in his complaint as the same had been seasonably raised in his position paper.15
The Court's Ruling
Respondent is the personal/family
driver of the petitioner
Settled is the tenet that allegations in the complaint must be duly proven by competent evidence and the burden of
proof is on the party making the allegation. 16 In an illegal dismissal case, the onus probandi rests on the employer to
prove that its dismissal of an employee was for a valid cause. However, before a case for illegal dismissal can prosper,
an employer-employee relationship must first be established. Thus, in filing a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for
illegal dismissal, based on the premise that he was an employee of CRV Corporation, it is incumbent upon the
respondent to prove the employer-employee relationship by substantial evidence.17 Stated otherwise, the burden of
proof rests upon the party who asserts the affirmative of an issue. Since it is the respondent who is claiming to be an
employee of CRV Corporation, it is, thus, incumbent upon him to proffer evidence to prove the existence of employer-
employee relationship between them. He needs to show by substantial evidence that he was indeed an employee of the
company against which he claims illegal dismissal. Corollary, the burden to prove the elements of an employer-
employee relationship, viz.: (1) the selection and engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the
power of dismissal; and (4) the power of control, lies upon the respondent.18
It must be pointed out that the issue of whether or not an employer-employee relationship exists in a given case is
essentially a question of fact. As a rule, this Court is not a trier of facts and this applies with greater force in labor
cases. Only errors of law are generally reviewed by this Court. However, this rule is not absolute and admits of
exceptions like in labor cases where the Court may look into factual issues when the factual findings of the Labor
Arbiter, the NLRC, and the CA are conflicting. 19 In this case, the findings of the Labor Arbiter differed from those of
the NLRC and the CA necessitating this Court to review and to reevaluate the factual issues and to look into the
records of the case and reexamine the questioned findings.20
To ascertain the existence of an employer-employee relationship, jurisprudence has invariably adhered to the four-fold
test, to wit: (1) the selection and engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal;
and (4) the power to control the employee's conduct, or the so-called "control test." 21 Although no particular form of
evidence is required to prove the existence of an employer-employee relationship, and any competent and relevant
evidence to prove the relationship may be admitted, a finding that the relationship exists must nonetheless rest on
substantial evidence, or such amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify
a conclusion.22 In this case, a scrutiny of the records will bear out that the respondent failed to substantiate his claim
that he was a company driver of CRV Corporation.
Apart from his staunch insistence that he was a company driver of CRV Corporation, respondent did not proffer any
competent evidence, documentary or otherwise, as would prove his claimed employment with the company. In the
case at bench, the respondent did not present his employment contract, company identification card, company pay slip
or such other document showing his inclusion in the company payroll that would show that his services had been
engaged by CRV Corporation. His contention that he received his salaries through the ATM like the other employees
of the company, even if true, does not sufficiently show that his salaries were paid by the company as its employee.
Respondent also failed to present any proof showing how the company wielded the power of dismissal and control
over him. Evidence is wanting that the company monitored the respondent in his work. It had not been shown that
respondent was required by the company to clock in to enable it to check his work hours and keep track of his
absences. On the other hand, the records showed that petitioner had a say on how he performed his work. It is the
petitioner who decides when she needed the services of the respondent. As a matter of fact, the respondent had to
secure permission from the petitioner before he can take a leave of absence from work. That petitioner also enjoyed
the power of dismissal is beyond question given that respondent himself believed that the petitioner verbally
terminated him.23 Because the respondent failed to establish his employment with CRV Corporation, the Court must
necessarily agree with the Labor Arbiter that respondent was the personal/family driver of the petitioner.
Both the NLRC and the CA made it the petitioner's obligation to prove that respondent was under her employ and not
a company driver of CRV Corporation. The Court does not agree. It must be emphasized that the rule of thumb
remains: the onus probandi falls on the respondent to establish or substantiate his claim by the requisite quantum of
evidence given that it is axiomatic that whoever claims entitlement to the benefits provided by law should establish his
or her right thereto.24 Unfortunately, respondent failed to hurdle the required burden of proof as would give ground for
this Court to agree with him.
Respondent was not dismissed
from employment
It is axiomatic that in illegal dismissal cases, the employer bears the burden of proving that the termination was for a
valid or authorized cause. However, there are cases wherein the facts and the evidence do not establish prima
facie that the employee was dismissed from employment. Before the employer is obliged to prove that the dismissal
was legal, the employee must first establish by substantial evidence the fact of his dismissal from service. If there is no
dismissal, then there can be no question as to the legality or illegality thereof.25
Here, respondent alleged that when he failed to report for work on December 24, 2014, he was verbally terminated by
the petitioner. Respondent claimed that Reyes confirmed his termination. On the other hand, petitioner contended that
the respondent just stopped reporting for work after he left his work on December 23, 2014.
Respondent's bare claim of having been dismissed from employment by the petitioner, unsubstantiated by impartial
and independent evidence, is insufficient to establish such fact of dismissal. Bare and unsubstantiated allegations do
not constitute substantial evidence and have no probative value. 26 It must be emphasized that aside from the allegation
that he was verbally terminated from his work, respondent failed to present any competent evidence showing that he
was prevented from returning to his work. Reyes did not issue any statement to corroborate the claimed termination of
the respondent. That he was refused to be given his salary covering the period from December 15, 2014 to December
22, 2014 did not at all prove the fact of his termination. It must be taken into account that salaries of employees may
not be released for myriad of reasons. Termination may only be one of them. The Court reiterates the basic rule of
evidence that each party must prove his affirmative allegation, that mere allegation is not evidence. The Court must
also stress that the evidence presented to show the employee's termination from employment must be clear, positive,
and convincing. Absent any showing of an overt or positive act proving that petitioner had dismissed the respondent,
the latter's claim of illegal dismissal cannot be sustained — as the same would be self-serving, conjectural, and of no
probative value.27
Respondent did not abandon
his work
Abandonment is a matter of intention and cannot lightly be inferred or legally presumed from certain equivocal
acts.28 In Protective Maximum Security Agency, Inc. v. Fuentes,29 this Court held:
Abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to resume his employment. It is a form of
neglect of duty, hence, a just cause for termination of employment by the employer. For a valid finding of
abandonment, these two factors should be present: (1) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or
justifiable reason; and (2) a clear intention to sever employer-employee relationship, with the second as the more
determinative factor which is manifested by overt acts from which it may be deduced that the [employee] has no more
intention to work. The intent to discontinue the employment must be shown by clear proof that it was deliberate and
unjustified.
The burden of proving abandonment is upon the employer who, whether pleading the same as a ground for dismissing
an employee or as a mere defense, additionally has the legal duty to observe due process.30
The Court finds that there is no abandonment in this case. Aside from his absence from work, petitioner failed to
present any proof of respondent's overt conduct which clearly manifested his desire to end his employment. Settled is
the rule that mere absence or failure to report for work is not tantamount to abandonment of work. 31 This is especially
so in light of his having filed a case for illegal dismissal which is inconsistent with abandonment of employment. An
employee who takes steps to protest his dismissal cannot logically be said to have abandoned his work. The filing of
such complaint is proof enough of his desire to return to work, thus, negating any suggestion of abandonment.32
The Civil Code shall govern the
rights of family drivers
Article 141, Chapter III, Book III on Employment of Househelpers of the Labor Code provides that family drivers are
covered in the term domestic or household service. It states:
ART. 141. Coverage. — This Chapter shall apply to all persons rendering services in household for compensation.
"Domestic or household service" shall mean service in the employer's home which is usually necessary or desirable for
the maintenance and enjoyment thereof and includes ministering to the personal comfort and convenience of the
members of the employer's household, including services of family drivers. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Thus, under the Labor Code, the rules for indemnity in case a family driver is terminated from the service shall be
governed by Article 149 thereof which provides:
ART. 149. Indemnity for unjust termination of services. — If the period of household service is fixed, neither the
employer nor the househelper may terminate the contract before the expiration of the term, except for a just cause. If
the househelper is unjustly dismissed, he or she shall be paid the compensation already earned plus that for fifteen (15)
days by way of indemnity.
If the househelper leaves without justifiable reason, he or she shall forfeit any unpaid salary due him or her not
exceeding fifteen (15) days.
However, Section 44 of Republic Act No. 10361, otherwise known as the "Domestic Workers Act" or "Batas
Kasambahay" (Kasambahay Law), expressly repealed Chapter III (Employment of Househelpers) of the Labor Code,
which includes Articles 141 and 149 mentioned above.
The Kasambahay Law, on the other hand, made no mention of family drivers in the enumeration of those workers who
are covered by the law.1âшphi1 This is unlike Article 141 of the Labor Code. Section 4(d) of the Kasambahay Law
states:
SEC. 4. Definition of Terms - As used in this Act, the term:
xxxx
(d) Domestic worker or "Kasambahay" refers to any person engaged in domestic work within an employment
relationship such as, but not limited to, the following: general househelp, nursemaid or "yaya", cook, gardener, or
laundry person, but shall exclude any person who performs domestic work only occasionally or sporadically and not
on an occupational basis.
The term shall not include children who are under foster family arrangement, and are provided access to education and
given an allowance incidental to education, i.e.[,] "baon", transportation, school projects and school activities.
Thus, Section 4(d) of the Kasambahay Law pertaining to who are included in the enumeration of domestic or
household help cannot also be interpreted to include family drivers because the latter category of worker is clearly not
included. It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, or consequence
implies the exclusion of all others — this is expressed in the familiar maxim, expressio unius est exclusio
alterius33 Moreover, Section 2 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Kasambahay Law provides:
SEC. 2. Coverage. - This x x x [IRR] shall apply to all parties to an employment contract for the services of the
following Kasambahay, whether on a live-in or live-out arrangement, such as but not limited to:
(a) General househelp;
(b) Yaya;
(c) Cook;
(d) Gardener;
(e) Laundry person; or
(f) Any person who regularly performs domestic work in one household on an occupational basis.
The following are not covered:
(a) Service providers;
(b) Family drivers;
(c) Children under foster family arrangement; and
(d) Any other person who performs work occasionally or sporadically and not on an occupational basis. (Emphasis
supplied)
The aforecited administrative rule clarified the status of family drivers as among those not covered by the definition of
domestic or household help as contemplated in Section 4(d) of the Kasambahay Law. Such provision should be
respected by the courts, as the interpretation of an administrative government agency, which is tasked to implement
the statute, is accorded great respect and ordinarily controls the construction of the courts. 34 Moreover, the statutory
validity of the same administrative rule was never challenged. This Court has ruled time and again that the
constitutionality or validity of laws, orders, or such other rules with the force of law cannot be attacked collaterally.
There is a legal presumption of validity of these laws and rules. Unless a law or rule is annulled in a direct proceeding,
the legal presumption of its validity stands.35 And while it is true that constitutional provisions on social justice
demand that doubts be resolved in favor of labor, it is only applicable when there is doubt. Social justice principles
cannot be used to expand the coverage of the law to subjects not intended by the Congress to be included.
Due to the express repeal of the Labor Code provisions pertaining to househelpers, which includes family drivers, by
the Kasambahay Law; and the non-applicability of the Kasambahay Law to family drivers, there is a need to revert
back to the Civil Code provisions, particularly Articles 1689, 1697 and 1699, Section 1, Chapter 3, Title VIII, Book IV
thereof. The Articles provide:
did not repeal the said Civil Code provisions since they are not inconsistent with the Labor Code. Besides, repeals by
implication are not favored as laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation and full knowledge of all laws existing
on the subject, the congruent application of which the courts must generally presume.36
Since what were expressly repealed by the Kasambahay Law were only Articles 141 to 152, Chapter III of the Labor
Code on Employment of Househelpers; and the Labor Code did not repeal the Civil Code provisions concerning
household service which impliedly includes family drivers as they minister to the needs of a household, the said Civil
Code provisions stand. To rule otherwise would leave family drivers without even a modicum of protection. Certainly,
that could not have been the intent of the lawmakers.
Pursuant to Article 1697 of the Civil Code, respondent shall be paid the compensation he had already earned plus that
for 15 days by way of indemnity if he was unjustly dismissed. However, if respondent left his employment without
justifiable reason, he shall forfeit any salary due him and unpaid for not exceeding 15 days. Given that there is neither
dismissal nor abandonment in this case, none of the party is entitled to claim any indemnity from the other. Verily, in a
case where the employee's failure to work was occasioned neither by his abandonment nor by a termination, the
burden of economic loss is not rightfully shifted to the employer; each party must bear his own loss.37 Otherwise
stated, the respondent's act of not reporting to work after a verbal miscommunication cannot justify the payment of any
form of remuneration.

SEC. 1 — Household Service. Petitioner is not liable for wage differentials,

holiday pay, 13th month pay and service
ART. 1689. Household service shall always be reasonably compensated. Any stipulation that household service is incentive leave pay
without compensation shall be void. Such compensation shall be in addition to the [househelper's] lodging, food, and
medical attendance. As found by the Labor Arbiter, the ₱9,000.00 salary respondent receives a month is reasonable and in accordance with
Article 1689 of the Civil Code. Hence, petitioner may not be made to pay the respondent wage differentials.
xxxx
Petitioner is not also liable to the respondent for the payment of holiday pay, 13th month pay and service incentive
ART. 1697. If the period for household service is fixed neither the head of the family nor the [househelper] may leave pay because persons in the personal service of another, such as family drivers, are exempted from the coverage
terminate the contract before the expiration of the term, except for a just cause. If the [househelper] is unjustly of such benefits pursuant to Articles 82,38 9439 and 9540 of the Labor Code, and Section 3(d)41 of the implementing
dismissed, he shall be paid the compensation already earned plus that for fifteen days by way of indemnity. If the rules of Presidential Decree No. 851.
[househelper] leaves without justifiable reason, he shall forfeit any salary due him and unpaid, for not exceeding
fifteen days. The reversal of the judgment rendered by the
appellate court will not inure to the benefit
xxxx of CR V Corporation

ART. 1699. Upon the extinguishment of the service relation, the [househelper] may demand from the head of the
family a written statement on the nature and duration of the service and the efficiency and conduct of the
[househelper].
The reason for reverting back to the Civil Code provisions on household service is because, as discussed earlier,
Section 44 of the Kasambahay Law expressly repealed Articles 141 to 152 of the Labor Code which deals with the
rights of family drivers. Obviously, an expressly repealed statute is not anymore binding for it has no more force and
effect.
On the other hand, Article 302 of the Labor Code, its repealing clause, which provides:
ART. 302. Repealing clause. - All labor laws not adopted as part of this Code either directly or by reference are
hereby repealed. All provisions of existing laws, orders, decrees, rules and regulations inconsistent herewith are
likewise repealed.
It is not lost on this Court that only the petitioner appealed the CA Decision which found the respondent to have been
illegally dismissed and ordered both the CRV Corporation and the petitioner liable to the respondent for the payment
of backwages, separation pay, wage differentials, holiday pay, 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay.
Considering that CRV Corporation did not appeal the decision of the appellate court, the same stands insofar as the
corporation is concerned.
At this juncture, this Court takes this opportune time to emphasize that a reversal of a judgment on appeal is binding
on the parties to the suit, but shall not benefit the parties against whom the judgment was rendered in the court a quo,
but who did not join in the appeal, unless their rights and liabilities and those of the parties appealing are so
interwoven and dependent as to be inseparable, in which case a reversal as to one operates as a reversal as to all.42
It is basic that under the general doctrine of separate juridical personality, stockholders of a corporation enjoy the
principle of limited liability: the corporate debt is not the debt of the stockholder.43 This is because a corporation has a
separate and distinct personality from those who represent it.44
Here, it was not disputed that CRV Corporation had been impleaded, duly notified of the suit, and properly served
with legal processes, but it never participated in the case by sending an authorized representative or filing a single
pleading. The Securities and Exchange Commission i-Report45 dated May 14, 2015 which showed that the company
status of CRV Corporation as revoked can hardly mean that the NLRC did not acquire jurisdiction over it inasmuch as
the i-Report did not indicate when the CRV Corporation ceased to exist. Besides, the complaint had already been filed
on April 7, 2015. Moreover, under Section 122 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 68 or "The Corporation Code of the
Philippines," a corporation whose registration had been revoked has three years from dissolution to continue to be a
body corporate for purposes of winding up its affairs which includes prosecuting and defending suits by or against it.

Although a reversal of the judgment as to one would operate as a reversal as to all where the rights and liabilities of
those who did not appeal and those of the party appealing are so interwoven and dependent on each other as to be
inseparable,46 CRV Corporation and petitioner have no commonality of interest because each bears the injury of an
adverse judgment. CRV Corporation will not be harmed had petitioner been held liable to pay the respondent his
unpaid wages. Conversely, petitioner did not suffer any monetary injury when CRV Corporation was made liable to
pay the respondent his unpaid wages.

Even if petitioner is allegedly one of CRV Corporation's top officials, such hypothetical fact does not translate, or even
imply that she will be financially injured by an adverse money-claim judgment against the latter. Much like
stockholders, corporate officers and employees only have an inchoate right (only to the extent of their valid
collectibles in the form of salaries and benefits) to the assets of the corporation which, in turn, is the real owner of the
assets by virtue of its separate juridical personality.47

Moreover, no evidence was offered by both parties that petitioner was equipped with a board resolution (even if
belatedly submitted)48 or, at least, authorized by corporate by-laws49 to represent CRV Corporation in the instant suit.
Therefore, petitioner's appeal cannot benefit CRV Corporation.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The April 21, 2017 Decision and the August 9,
2017 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 147356 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the
October 29, 2015 Decision of the Labor Arbiter in NLRC NCR Case No. 04-04089-15 is AFFIRMED only insofar as
petitioner Celia R. Atienza is concerned.

SO ORDERED.