G.R. No.
131457 November 17, 1998 For their part, the grounds relied upon by the applicants for intervention are as follows:
HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH, PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR OF BUKIDNON, HON, REY B. BAULA,
MUNICIPAL MAYOR OF SUMILAO, BIKIDNON, NQSR MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATIONS, respondent,
vs.
HON. RENATO C. CORONA, DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. ERNESTO D. GARILAO,
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondent.
OPINION
MARTINEZ, J.:
This pertains to the two (2) separate motions for reconsideration filed by herin respondent and the applicants for
intervention, seeking a reversal of our April 24, 1998 Decision nullfying the so-called "win-win" Resolution dated
November 7, 1997, issued by the Office of the President in O.P. Case No. 96-C-6424, and denying the applicants
Motion For Leave To Intervene.
Respondent motion is based on the following grounds:
I.
THE SO-CALLED WIN-WIN RESOLUTION DATED NOVEMBER 7, 1997 IS NOT A VOID
RESOLUTION AS IT SEEKS TO CORRECT AN ERRONEOUS RULING. THE MARCH 9,
1996 DECISION OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT COULD NOT AS YET BECOME
FINAL AND EXECUTORY AS TO BE BEYOND MODIFICATION.
II.
THE PROPER REMEDY OF PETITIONERS IS A PETITION FOR REVIEW UNDER RULE
43 AND NOT A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF
COURT.
III.
THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS A CONDITION SINE QUA
NON BEFORE A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI MAY BE FILED BECAUSE THE
OUESTIONED RESOLUTION IS NOT A PATENTLY ILLEGAL.
IV.
PETITIONERS ARE GUILTY OF FORUM-SHOPPING BECAUSE ULTIMATELY
PETITIONERS SEEK THE SAME RELIEF, WHICH IS TO RESTRAIN THE
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM FROM PLACING THE SUBJECT 144-
HECTARE PROPERTY UNDER THE COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM LAW
(CARL).1
I.
THE INTERVENORS POSSESS A RIGHT TO INTERVENE IN THESE PROCEEDINGS.
II.
THE MODIFICATION BY THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT (OP) OF ITS 29 MARCH
1996 DECISION, THROUGH THE 7 NOVEMBER 1997 "WIN-WIN" RESOLUTION, WAS
NOT ERRONEOUS BUT WAS A VALID EXERCISE OF ITS POWERS AND
PROGATIVES.
III.
THE "WIN-WIN" RESOLUTION PROPERLY ADDRESSES THE SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES
RELATIVE TO THIS CASE.2
Both movants also ask that their respective motions be resolved by this Court en banc since the issues they raise are,
as described by the respondents, "novel"3 or, as characterized by the applicants for intervention, of
"transcendental significance."4 Most specifically, movants are presenting the issue of whether or not the
power of the local government units to reclassify lands is subject to the approval of the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR).
The instant motions are being opposed vehemently by herein petitioners.
The grounds raised here are were extensively covered and resolved in our challenged Decision. A minute
resolution denying the instant motions with finality would have been sufficient, considering that the same
follows as a matter of course if warranted under the circumstances as in other equally important cases.
However, in view of the wide publicity and media coverage that this case has generated, in addition to the
demonstrations staged at the perimeter of this Court, as well as the many letters coming from different
sectors of society (the religious and NGO's) and even letters from abroad we deem it necessary to write an
extended resolution to again reiterate the basis for our April 24, 1998 Decision, and hopefully write finis to
this controversy.
To support their request that their motions be referred to the Court en banc, the movants cited the Resolution
of this Court dated February 9, 1993, in Bar Matter No. 209, which enumerates the cases that may be
resolved en banc, among which are the following:
x x x           x x x          x x x
3. Cases raising novel questions of law;
x x x           x x x          x x x
8. Casesa assigned to a division which in the opinion of at least three (3) members thereof
merit the attention of the Court en banc and are acceptable to a majority of the actual
membership of the Court en banc; and
 x x x           x x x          x x x
Regrettably, the issues presented before us by the movants are matters of no extraordinary import to merit
the attention of the Court en banc. Specifically, the issue of whether or not the power of the local government
units to reclassify lands is subject to the approval of the DAR is no longer novel, this having been decided by
this Court in the case of Province of Camarines Sur, et al. vs. Court of Appeals5 wherein we held that local
government units need not obtain the approval of the DAR to convert or reclassify lands from agricultural to
non-agricuultural use. The dispositive portion of the Decision in the aforecited case states:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned decision of the Court of
Appeals is set aside insofar as it (a) nullifies the trial court's order allowing the Province of
Camarines Sur to take possession of private respondents' property; (b) orders the trial
court to suspend the expropriation proceedings; and (c) requires the Province of
Camarines Sur to obtain the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert or
reclassify private respondents' property from agricultural to non-agricultural use.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, the Decision sought to be reconsidered was arrived at by a unaninous vote of all five (5) members
of the Second Division is of the opinion that the matters raised by movants are nothing new and do not
deserve the consideration of the Court en banc. Thus, the participation of the full Court in the resolution of
movants' motions for reconsideration would be inappropriate.
We shall now resolve the respondents' motion for reconsiderations.
In our Decision in question, we struck down as void the act of the Office of the President (OP) in reopening
the case in O.P. Case No. 96-C-6424 through the issuance of the November 7, 1997 "win-win" Resolution
which substantially modified its March 29, 1996 Decision that had long become final and executory, being in
gross disregard of the rules and basic legal precept that accord finality to administrative determinations. It
will be recalled that the March 29, 1996 OP Decision was declared by the same office as final and executory in
its Order dated June 23, 1997 after the respondent DAR's motion for reconsideration of the said decision was
denied in the same order for having been filed beyond the 15-day period.
In their instant motion, the respondent contend that the "win-win" Resolution of November 7, 1997 "is not a
void resolution as it seeks to correct an erroneous ruling," hence, "(t)he March 29, 1996 decision of the Offce
of the President could not as yet become final and executory as to beyond modification. 6
The respondent explained that the DAR's failure to file on time the motion for reconsideration of the March
29, 1996 OP Decision was "excusable"
The manner of service of the copy of the March 29, 1996 decisoin also made it imposible
for DAR to file its motion for reconsideration on time. The copy was received by the
Records Section of the DAR, then referred to the Office of the Secretary and then to the
Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance. By the time it was forwarded to the litigation office
of the DAR, the period to file the motion for reconsideration had already lapsed. Instead of
resolving the motion for reconsideration on the merits in the interest of substantial justice,
the Office of the President denied the same for having been filed late." 7 (Emphasis
supplied)
We cannot agree with the respondents' contention that the June 23, 1997 OP Order which denied the DAR's
motion for reconsideration of the March 29, 1996 OP Decision for having been filed late was "an erroneous
ruling" which had to be corrected by the November 7, 1997 "win-win" Resolution. The said denial of the
DAR's motion for reconsideration was in accordance with Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18, dated
February 12, 1987, which, mandates that "decision/resolutions/order of the Office of the President shall,
except as otherwise provided for by special laws, become final after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from receipt
of a copy thereof . . ., unless a motion for reconsideration thereof is filed within such period. 18
Contrary to the respondents' submission, the late filing by the DAR of its motion for reconsideration of the
March 29, 1996 OP Decision is not excusable. The respondents' explanation that the DAR's office procedure
after receiving the copy of the March 29, 1996 OP Decision "made it impossible for DAR to file its motion for
reconsideration on time" since the said decision had to be referred to the different departments of the DAR,
cannot be considered a valid justification. There is nothing wrong with referring the decision to the
departments concerned for the preparation of the motion for reconsideration, but in doing so, the DAR must
not disregard the reglementary period fixed by law, the rule or regulation. In other words, the DAR must
develop a system of procedure that would enable it to comply with the reglementary period for filing the said
motion. For, the rules relating to reglementary period should not be made subservient to the internal office
procedure of an administrative body. Otherwise, the noble purpose of the rules prescribing a definite period
for filing a motion for reconsideration of a decision can easily be circumvented by the mere expediency of
claiming a long and ardous process of preparing the said motion involving several departments of the
administrative agency.
The respondent then faulted the Office of the President when they further stressed that it should have
resolved "the (DAR's) motion for reconsideration on the merits in the interest of substantial justice," instead
of simply denying the same for having been filed late,9 adding that "technicalities and procedural lapses"
should be "subordinated to the established merits of the case.10 Respondents thus plead for a relaxation in the
application of the rules by overlooking procedural lapses committed by the DAR.
We are not persuaded.
Procedural rules, we must stress, should be treated with utmost respect and due regard since they are
designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases to remedy the worsening problem of delay in the resolution of
rival claims and in the administration of justice. The requirement is in pursuance to the bill of rights
inscribed in the Constitution which guarantees that "all persons shall have a right to the speedy disposition of
their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative bodies." 11 The adjudicatory bodies and the
parties to a case are thus enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. 12 While it is true that a litigation is not a game
of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed
procedure to ensure an orderly and speedy administration of justice. 13 There have been some instances
wherein this Court allowed a relaxation in the application of the rules, but this flexibility was "never intended
to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. 14 A liberal interpretation and
application of the rules of procedure can be resorted to only in proper cases and under justifiable causes and
circumstances.
In the instant case, we cannot grant respondents the relief prayed for since they have not shown a justifiable
reason for a relaxation of the rules. As we have discussed eralier, the DAR's late filing of its motion for
reconsideration of the March 29, 1996 OP Decision was not justified. Hence, the final and executory character
of the said OP Decision can no longer be disturbed, much less substantially modified. Res judicata has set in
and the adjudicated thing or affair should forever be put to rest. It is in this case sense that we, in our
decision under reconsideration, declared as void and of no binding effect the "win-win" Resolution of
November 7, 1997 which substantially modified the March 29, 1996 Decision, the said resolution having been
issued in excess of jurisdiction and in arrant violation of the fundamental and time-honored principle of
finality to administrative determinations.
The movants, however, complain that the case was decided by us on the basis of a "technicality," and, this has
been the rallying cry of some newspaper columnists who insists that we resolve this case not on mere
"technical" grounds.
We do not think so.
It must be emphasized that a decision/resolution/order of an administrative body, court or tribunal which is
declared void on the ground that the same was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion, is by no means a mere technicality of law or procedure. It is elementary that jurisdiction
of a body, court or tribunal is an essential and mandatory requirement before it can act on a case or
controversy. And even if said body, court or tribunal has jurisdiction over a case, but has acted in excess of its
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, such act is still invalid. The decision nullfying the questioned
act is an adjudication on the merits.
In the instant case, several fatal violation of the law were committed, namely: (1) the DAR filed its motion for
reconsideration of the March 29, 1996 OP Decision way beyond the reglemenatary period; (2) after the said
motion for reconsideration was denied for having been filed late, the March 29, 1996 Decision was declared
final and executory, but the DAR still filed a second motion for reconsideration which is prohibited by the
rules;15 (3) despite this, the second motion for reconsideration was entertained by herein respondent, then
Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona, and on the basis thereof; issued the "win-win" Resolution
dated November 7, 1997, substantially modifying the March 29, 1996 Decision which had long become final
and executory; (4) the reopening of the same case through the issuance of the November 7, 1997 "win-win"
Resolution was in flagrant infringement of the doctrine of res judicata. These grave breaches of the law, rules
and settled jurisprudence are clearly substantial, not of technical nature.
It should be stressed that when the March 29, 1996 OP Decision was declared final and executory, vested
rights were acquired by the herein petitioners, namely, the province of Bukidnon, the municipality of
Sumilao, Bukidnon, and the NQSR Management and Development Corporations, and all others who should
be benefited by the said decision. Thus, we repeat, the issue here is not a question of technicality but that of
substance and merit. In the words of the learned Justice Artemio V. Panganiban in the case of Videogram
Regulatory Board vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,16 "(j)ust as a losing party has the right to file an appeal within the
prescribed period, the winning party also has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of
his/her case.
Another matter which the movants bring to our attention is that when the DAR's Order denying petitioners'
application for conversion was first brought by petitioner Carlos O. Fortich to the Office of the President, the
appropriate administrative rules were not complied with. We wish to point out that, apparently, movants had
the opportunity to question this alleged lapse in procedure but chose not to avail of the same. For the "win-
win" Resolution itself never mentioned this supposed procedural lapse as an issue. Here, the issue which has
been brought to the fore is the validity of the "win-win" Resolution of November 7, 1997, not that of any
other previous proceedings. The movants cannot now question the supposed procedural lapse for the first
time before us. It should have been raised and resolved at the first opportunity, that is, at the administrative
level.
The other grounds raised by respondents in their instant motion for reconsideration concerning the propriety
of petitioners' remedy, the absence of a motion for reconsideration of the "win-win" Resolution before
resorting to the present petition for certiorari, and forum shopping have already been extensively dealt with in
our challenged decision. We need not further elaborate on these grounds except to state that the same lacks
merit.
With respect to the motion for reconsideration filed by the applicants for intervention, we likewise find the
same unmeritorious. The issue of the applicants' right to intervene in this proceedings should be laid to rest.
The rule in this jurisdiction is that a party who wishes to intervene must have a "certain right" or "legal
interest" in the subject matter of the litigation. 17 Such interest must be "actual, substantial, material, direct
and immediate, and not simply contingent and expectant."18
Here, the applicants for intervention categorically admitted that they were not tenants of petitioner NQSR
Management and Development Corporation, but were merely seasonal farmworkers in a pineapple
plantation on the subject land which was under lease for ten (10) years to the Philippine Packing
Corporation. 19 Respondent, then DAR Secretary Ernesto Garilao, also admitted in this Order of June 7, 1995
that "the subject land is neither tenanted nor validly covered for compulsory acquisition . . . 20
Under Section 4, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution, the rights to own directly or collectively the land they
till belongs to the farmers and regular farmworkers who are landless, and in the case of other farmworkers,
the latter are entitled "to receive a just share of the fruits" of the land. The pertinent portion of the aforecited
constitutional provision mandates:
Sec. 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the
right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively
the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits
thereof. . . . (Emphasis supplied)
Commenting on the above-quoted provision, the eminent constitutionalist, Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., one of
the framers of the 1987 Constitution, declares that under the agrarian reform program the equitable
distribution of the land is a right given to landless farmers and regular farmworkers to own the land they till,
while the other or seasonal farmworkers are only entitled to a just share of the fruits of the land. 21 Being
merely seasonal farmworkers without a right to own, the applicants' motion for intervention must necessarily
fail as they have no legal or actual and substantial interest over the subject land.
It is noteworthy that even "win-win Resolution of November 7, 1997 which the herein respondents and the
applicants for intervention seek to uphold, did not recognize the latter as proper parties to intervene in the
case simply because the qualified farmer-beneficiaries have yet to be meticulously determined as ordered in
the said resolution. The dispositive portion of the "win-win" Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Office of the President, through
Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, dated March 29, 1996, is hereby MODIFIED as
follows:
x x x           x x x          x x x
 (3) The Department of Agrarian Reform is hereby directed to carefully and meticulously
determine who among the claimants are qualified beneficiaries.
x x x           x x x          x x x
We take note of the Memorandum in Intervention filed by 113 farmers on October 10,
1997 without ruling on the propriety or merits thereof since it is unnecessary to pass upon
it at this time.
SO ORDERED.22 (Emphasis supplied)
These are all that are necessary to dispose of the instant separate motions for reconsideration considering that
the crucial issue in the present petition for certiorari is simply the validity of the "win-win" resolution.
But even if we tackle the other issues which the movants describe as "substantial," namely: (1) whether the
subject land is considered a prime agricultural land with irrigation facility; (2) whether the land has long
been covered by a Notice of Compulsory Acquisition (NCA); (3) whether the land is tenanted, and if not,
whether the applicants for intervention are qualified to become beneficiaries thereof; and (4) whether the
Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao has the legal authority to reclassify the land into industrial/institutional use,
to our mind, the March 29, 1996 OP Decision has thoroughly and properly disposed of the aforementioned
issues. We quote the pertinent portions of the said Decision:
After a careful evaluation of the petition vis-a-vis the grounds upon which the denial
thereof by Secretary Garilao was based, we find that the instant application for conversion
by the Municipality of Sumilao, Bukidnon is impressed with merit. To be sure, converting
the land in question from agricultural to agro-industrial would open great opportunities
for employment and bring about real development in the area towards a sustained
economic growth of the municipality. On the other hand, distributing the land to would-be
beneficiaries (who are not even tenants, as there are none) does not guarantee such
benefits.
Nevertheless, on the issue that the land is considered a prime agricultural land with
irrigation facility it maybe appropriate to mention that, as claimed by petitioner, while it is
true that there is indeed, an irrigation facility in the area, the same merely passes thru the
property (as a right of way) to provide water to the ricelands located on the lower portion
thereof. The land itself, subject of the instant petition, is not irrigated as the same was, for
several years, planted with pineapple by the Philippine Packing Corporation.
On the issue that the land has long been covered by a Notice of Compulsory Acquisition
(NCA) and that the existing policy on withdrawal or lifting on areas covered by NCA is not
applicable, suffice it to state that the said NCA was declared null and void by the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) as early as March 1, 1992.
Deciding in favor of NQSRMDC, the DARAB correctly pointed out that under Section 8 of
R.A. No. 6657, the subject property could not validly be the subject of compulsory
acquisition until after the expiration of the lease contract with Del Monte Philippines, a
multi-National Company, or until April 1994, and ordered the DAR Regional Office and
the Land Bank of the Philippines, both in Butuan City, to desist from pursuing any activity
or activities covering petitioner's land.
On this score, we take special notice of the fact that the Quisumbing family has already
contributed substantially to the land reform of the government, as follows: 300 hectares of
rice land in Nueva Ecija in the 70's and another 100 hectares in the nearby Municipality of
Impasugong, Bukidnon, ten (10) years ago, for which they have not received "just
compensation" up to this time.
Neither can the assertion that "there is no clear and tangible compensation package
arrangements for the benefiaries" hold water as, in the first place, there are no
beneficiaries to speak about, for the land is not tenanted as already stated.
Nor can procedural lapses in the manner of identifying/reclassifying the subject property
for agro-industrial purposes be allowed to defeat the very purpose of the law granting
autonomy to local government units in the management of their local affairs. Stated more
simply, the language of Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160, supra, is clear and affords no room for
any other interpretation. By unequivocal legal mandate, it grants local governments units
autonomy in their local affairs including the power to convert portions of their agricultural
lands and provide for the manner of their utilization and disposition to enable them to
attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities.
WHEREFORE, in pursuance of the spirit and intent of the said legal mandate and in view
of the favorable recommendations of the various government agencies abovementioned,
the subject Order, dated November 14, 1994 of the Hon. Secretary, Department of
Agrarian Reform, is hereby SET ASIDE and the instant application of
NQSRMDC/BAIDA is hereby APPROVED.23 (Emphasis supplied)
It is axiomatic that factual findings of administrative agencies which have acquired experties in their field are
binding and conclusive on the Court,24 considering that the Office of the President is presumed to be most
competent in matters falling within its domain.
The interest of justice is invoked by movants. We are aware of that famous adage of the late. President
Ramon Magsaysay that "those who have less in life should have more in law." Our affirmation of the finality
of the March 29, 1996 OP Decision is precisely pro-poor considering that more of the impoverised members
of society will be benefited by the agro-economic development of the disputed land which the province of
Bukidnon and the municipality of Sumilao, Bukidnon intend to undertake. To our mind, the OP Decision of
March 29, 1996 was for the eventual benefit of the many, no just of the few. This is clearly shown from the
development plan on the subject land as conceived by the petitioners. The said plan is supposed to have the
following components as indicated in the OP Decision of March 29, 1996:
1. The Development Academy of Mindanao which constitutes the following: Institute for
Continuing Higher Education; Institute for Livelihood Science (Vocational and Technical
School); Institute for Agribusiness Research; Museum, Library, Cultural Center, and
Mindanao Sports Development Complex which covers an area of 24 hectares;
2. Bukidnon Agro-Industrial Park which consists of corn processing for corn oil, corn
starch, various corn products; rice processing for wine, rice-based snacks, exportable rice;
cassava processing for starch, alcohol and food delicacies; processing plants, fruits and
fruit products such as juices; processing plants for vegetables processed and prepared for
market; cold storage and ice plant; cannery system; commercial stores; public market;
and abattoir needing about 67 hectares;
 3. Forest development which includes open spaces and parks for recreation, horse-back Finally, for those who refuse to understand, no explanations is possible, but for those who understand, no
riding, memorial and mini-zoo estimated to cover 33 hectares; and explanation is necessary.

4. Support facilities which comprise the construction of a 360-room hotel, restaurants, WHEREFORE, the separate motions for reconsideration of the April 24, 1998 Decision of this Court, filed by
dormitories and a housing project covering an area of 20 hectares. 25 the respondents and the applicants for intervention, are hereby DENIED with FINALITY.

Expressing full support for the proposed project, the Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao, Bukidnon, on March 4, SO ORDERED
1993, enacted Ordinance No. 24 converting or re-classifying the subjetc 114-hectare land from agricultural to
industrial/institutional use with a view of providing an opportunity to attrack investors who can inject new
economic vitality, provide more jobs and raise the income of its people. The said project was also supported
by the Bukidnon Provincial Board which, on the basis of a Joint Committee Report submitted by its
Committee on Laws, Committee on Agrarian Reform and Socio-Economic Committee, approved the said
ordinance on February 1, 1994, now docketed as Resolution No. 94-95.

Impressed with the proposed project, several government agencies and a private cooperative, including the
people of the affected barangay, recommended the same. Again, we quote the pertinent portion of the OP
Decision of march 29, 1996;

The said NQSRMDC Proposal was, per Certification dated January 4, 1995, adopted by
the Department of Trade and Industry, Bukidnon Provincial Office, as one of its flagship
projects. The same was likewise favorably recommended by the Provincial Development
Council of Bukidnon; the municipal, provincial and regional office of the DAR; the
Regional Office (Region X) of the DENR (which issued an Environmental Compliance
Certificate on June 5, 1995); the Executive Director, signing "By Authority of PAUL G.
DOMINGUEZ," Office of the President — Mindanao, the Secretary of DILG; and
Undersecretary of DECS Wilfredo D. Clemente.

In the same vein, the National Irrigation Administration, Provincial Irrigation Office,
Bagontaas Valencia, Bukidnon, thru Mr. Julius S. Maquiling, Chief, Provincial Irrigation
Office, interposed NO OBJECTION to the proposed conversion . . . . Also, the Kisolon-San
Vicente Irrigators Multi Purpose Cooperative, San Vicente, Sumilao, Bukidnon,
interposed no objection to the proposed conversion of the land in question as it will provide
more economic benefits to the community in terms of outside investments that will come
and employment opportunities that will be generated by the projects to be put up . . . .

On the same score, it is represented that during the public consultation held at the Kisolan
Elementary School on 18 March 1995 with Director Jose Macalindog of DAR Central
Office and DECS Undersecretary Clemente, the people of the affected barangay rallied
behind their respective officials in endorsing the project. 26 (Emphasis supplied)

In this regard, the petitioners gave this assurance: "The proposed project is petitioners' way of helping insure
food, shelter and lifetime security of the greater majority of Sumilao's 22,000 people. It is capable of
employing thousands of residents, enabling them to earn good income ranging about P40,000.00 to P50,000.00
for each.27

We express our grave concern with the manner some sectors of society have been trying to influence this
Court into resolving this case on the basis of considerations other than the applicable law, rules and settled
jurisprudence and the evidence on record. We wish to emphasize that notwithstanding the previous adverse
comments by some columnists in the print media, the assailed Decision was arrived at in the pursuit of justice
and the rule of law.

G.R. No. 135297               June 8, 2000
GAVINO CORPUZ, petitioner,
vs.
Spouses GERONIMO GROSPE and HILARIA GROSPE, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The sale, transfer or conveyance of land reform rights are, as a rule, void in order to prevent a circumvention of
agrarian reform laws. However, in the present case, the voluntary surrender or waiver of these rights in favor of the
Samahang Nayon is valid because such action is deemed a legally permissible conveyance in favor of the
government. After the surrender or waiver of said land reform rights, the Department of Agrarian Reform, which
took control of the property, validly awarded it to private respondents.
The Case
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the May 14, 1998 Decision 1 and the August 19, 1998
Resolution 2 in CA-GR SP No. 47176, in which the Court of Appeals (CA) 3 dismissed the petitioner's appeal and
denied reconsideration respectively.
The decretal portion of the assailed Decision reads: 4
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Petition is denied due course and is hereby dismissed.
The Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. With costs against the Petitioner.
The Facts
Petitioner Gavino Corpuz was a farmer-beneficiary under the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program of the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Pursuant to Presidential Decree (PD) No. 27, he was issued a Certificate of
Land Transfer (CLT) over two parcels of agricultural land (Lot Nos. 3017 and 012) with a total area of 3.3 hectares
situated in Salungat, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija. The lots were formerly owned by a certain Florentino Chioco and
registered under Title No. 126638.
To pay for his wife's hospitalization, petitioner mortgaged the subject land on January 20, 1982, in favor of Virginia
de Leon. When the contract period expired, he again mortgaged it to Respondent Hilaria Grospe, wife of Geronimo
Grospe, for a period of four years (December 5, 1986 to December 5, 1990) to guarantee a loan of P32,500. The
parties executed a contract denominated as "Kasunduan Sa Pagpapahiram Ng Lupang Sakahan," 5 which allowed the
respondents to use or cultivate the land during the duration of the mortgage.
Before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) in Cabanatuan City (Region III),
petitioner instituted against the respondents an action for recovery of possession. 6 In his Complaint, he alleged that
they had entered the disputed land by force and intimidation on January 10 and 11, 1991, and destroyed the palay
that he had planted on the land.
Respondents, in their Answer, claimed that the "Kasunduan" between them and petitioner allowed the former to take
over the possession and cultivation of the property until the latter paid his loan. Instead of paying his loan, petitioner
allegedly executed on June 29, 1989, a "Waiver of Rights" 7 over the landholding in favor of respondents in
consideration of P54,394.
Petitioner denied waiving his rights and interest over the landholding and alleged that his and his children's
signatures appearing on the Waiver were forgeries.
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) Ernesto P. Tabara ruled that petitioner abandoned and
surrendered the landholding to the Samahang Nayon of Malaya, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, which had passed
Resolution Nos. 16 and 27 recommending the reallocation of the said lots to the respondent spouses, who were the
"most qualified farmer[s]-beneficiaries." 8
The Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), 9 in a Decision promulgated on October 8, 1997
in DARAB Case No. 1251, affirmed the provincial adjudicator's Decision. 10 Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration
was denied in the Resolution dated February 26, 1998. 11 As earlier stated, petitioner's appeal was denied by the
Court of Appeals.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The appellate court ruled that petitioner had abandoned the landholding and forfeited his right as a beneficiary. It
rejected his contention that all deeds relinquishing possession of the landholding by a beneficiary were
unenforceable. Section 9 of Republic Act (RA) 1199 and Section 28 of RA 6389 allow a tenant to voluntarily sever
his tenancy status by voluntary surrender. The waiver by petitioner of his rights and his conformity to the Samahang
Nayon Resolutions reallocating the landholding to the respondents are immutable evidence of his abandonment and
voluntary surrender of his rights as beneficiary under the land reform laws.
Furthermore, petitioner failed to prove with clear and convincing evidence the alleged forgery of his and his sons'
signatures.
Hence, this recourse. 12
Issues
Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner alleges in his Memorandum that the appellate court committed these reversible
errors: 1
I
. . . [I]n relying on the findings of fact of the DARAB and PARAD as conclusive when the judgment is
based on a misapprehension of facts and the inference taken is manifestly mistaken.
II
 . . . [I]n disregarding and/or ignoring the claim of petitioner that the alleged waiver documents are all
forgeries.
III
. . . [I]n ruling that petitioner had forfeited his right to become a beneficiary under PD No. 27.
IV
. . . [I]n failing to rule on the legality and/or validity of the waiver/transfer action.
In short, the focal issues are: (1) Was the appellate court correct in finding that the signatures of petitioner and his
sons on the Waiver were not forged? (2) Assuming arguendo that the signatures in the Waiver were genuine, was it
null and void for being contrary to agrarian laws? (3) Did the petitioner abandon his rights as a beneficiary under PD
27? (4) Did he, by voluntary surrender, forfeit his right as a beneficiary?
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is devoid of merit.
First Issue: Factual Findings
Alleging that an information for estafa through falsification was filed against the respondents, petitioner insists that
his signature on the Waiver was forged.
We are not persuaded. The filing of an information for estafa does not by itself prove that the respondents forged his
signature. It only means that the public prosecutor found probable cause against the respondents, but such finding
does not constitute binding evidence of forgery or fraud. 14 We agree with the well-reasoned CA ruling on this
point: 15
. . . We are not swayed by Petitioner's incantations that his signature on the "Waiver of Rights" is a
forgery. In the first place, forgery is never presumed. The Petitioner is mandated to prove forgery with
clear and convincing evidence. The Petitioner failed to do so. Indeed, the "Waiver of Rights" executed by
the Petitioner was even with the written conformity of his four (4) sons (at page 11, Rollo). The Petitioner
himself signed the Resolution of the Board of Samahang Nayon of Malaya, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija,
surrendering his possession of the landholding to the Samahang Nayon, (idem, supra). Under
Memorandum Circular No. 7, dated April 23, 1979 of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, transactions
involving transfer of rights of possession and or cultivation of agricultural lands are first investigated by a
team leader of the DAR District who then submits the results of his investigation to the District Officer
who, in turn, submits his report to the Regional Director who, then, acts on said report. In the present
recourse, the requisite investigation was conducted and the report thereon was submitted to and approved
by the Regional Director. Under Section 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Evidence, public officers are
presumed to have performed their duties regularly and in accordance with law.
As a rule, if the factual findings of the Court of Appeals coincide with those of the DARAB — an administrative
body which has acquired expertise on the matter — such findings are accorded respect and will not be disturbed on
appeal. 16 The presence or the absence of forgery was an issue of fact that was convincingly settled by the agrarian
and the appellate tribunals. Petitioner utterly failed to convince us that the appellate court had misapprehended the
facts. Quite the contrary, its findings were well-supported by the evidence.
Second Issue: Validity of the "Waiver of Rights"
Petitioner insists that agreements purportedly relinquishing possession of landholdings are invalid for being violative
of the agrarian reform laws.
Private respondents contend that petitioner was no longer entitled to recognition as a farmer-beneficiary because of
the series of mortgages he had taken out over the land. They also cite his "Waiver of Rights" and abandonment of
the farm.
We have already ruled that the sale or transfer of rights over a property covered by a Certificate of Land Transfer is
void except when the alienation is made in favor of the government or through hereditary succession. This ruling is
intended to prevent a reversion to the old feudal system in which the landowners reacquired vast tracts of land, thus
negating the government's program of freeing the tenant from the bondage of the soil. 17 In Torres v. Ventura, 18 the
Court clearly held:
. . . As such [the farmer-beneficiary] gained the rights to possess, cultivate and enjoy the landholding for
himself. Those rights over that particular property were granted by the government to him and to no other.
To insure his continued possession and enjoyment of the property, he could not, under the law, make any
valid form of transfer except to the government or by hereditary succession, to his successors.
. . . [T]he then Ministry of Agrarian Reform issued the following Memorandum Circular [No. 7, Series of
1979, April 23, 1979]:
Despite the above prohibition, however, there are reports that many farmer-beneficiaries of PD 27 have
transferred the ownership, rights, and/or possession of their farms/homelots to other persons or have
surrendered the same to their former landowners. All these transactions/surrenders are violative of PD 27
and therefore, null and void.
Third Issue: Abandonment
Based on the invalidity of the Waiver, petitioner concludes that the PARAD, the DARAB and the CA erroneously
ruled on the basis of the said document that he had abandoned or voluntarily surrendered his landholding. Denying
that he abandoned the land, he contends that the transaction was a simple loan to enable him to pay the expenses
incurred for his wife's hospitalization.
We agree. Abandonment 19 requires (a) a clear and absolute intention to renounce a right or claim or to desert a right
or property; and (b) an external act by which that intention is expressed or carried into effect. 20 The intention to
abandon implies a departure, with the avowed intent of never returning, resuming or claiming the right and the
interest that have been abandoned. 21
The CA ruled that abandonment required (a) the tenant's clear intention to sever the agricultural tenancy
relationship; and (b) his failure to work on the landholding for no valid reason. 22 The CA also deemed the following
as formidable evidence of his intent to sever the tenancy relationship: (a) the mortgage and (b) his express approval
and conformity to the Samahang Nayon Resolution installing the private respondents as tenants/farmers-
beneficiaries of the landholding. We disagree.
As earlier shown, the Waiver was void. Furthermore, the mortgage expired after four years.1awphil Thus, the
private respondents were obligated to return possession of the landholding to the petitioner. At bottom, we see on the
part of the petitioner no clear, absolute or irrevocable intent to abandon. His surrender of possession did not amount
to an abandonment because there was an obligation on the part of private respondents to return possession upon full
payment of the loan.
Fourth Issue: Voluntary Surrender
Contrary to the finding of the appellate court, the petitioner also denies that he voluntarily surrendered his
landholding.
We disagree. Petitioner misconstrued the Cocoma ruling because what was prohibited was the perpetration of the
tenancy or leasehold relationship between the landlord and the farmer-beneficiary. The case did not rule out
abandonment or voluntary surrender by the agricultural tenant or lessee in favor of the government.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED insofar as it
dismissed petitioner's appeal. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

His contention is untenable. The nullity of the Waiver does not save the case for him because there is a clear
showing that he voluntarily surrendered his landholding to the Samahang Nayon which, under the present
circumstances, may qualify as a surrender or transfer, to the government, of his rights under the agrarian laws.

PD 27 provides that title to land acquired pursuant to the land reform program shall not be transferable except
through hereditary succession or to the government, in accordance with the provisions of existing laws and
regulations. Section 8 of RA 3844 also provides that "[t]he agricultural leasehold relation . . . shall be extinguished
by: . . . (2) [v]oluntary surrender of the landholding by the agricultural lessee, . . . ."

In this case, petitioner's intention to surrender the landholding was clear and unequivocal. He signed his concurrence
to the Samahang Nayon Resolutions surrendering his possession of the landholding. The Samahan then
recommended to the team leader of the DAR District that the private respondent be designated farmer-beneficiary of
said landholding.

To repeat, the land was surrendered to the government, not transferred to another private person. It was the
government, through the DAR, which awarded the landholding to the private respondents who were declared as
qualified beneficiaries under the agrarian laws. Voluntary surrender, as a mode of extinguishment of tenancy
relations, does not require court approval as long as it is convincingly and sufficiently proved by competent
evidence. 2

Petitioner's voluntary surrender to the Samahang Nayon qualifies as a surrender or transfer to the government
because such action forms part of the mechanism for the disposition and the reallocation of farmholdings of tenant-
farmers who refuse to become beneficiaries of PD 27. Under Memorandum Circular No. 8-80 of the then Ministry
of Agrarian Reform, the Samahan shall, upon notice from the agrarian reform team leader, recommend other tenant-
farmers who shall be substituted to all rights and obligations of the abandoning or surrendering tenant-farmer.
Besides, these cooperatives are established to provide a strong social and economic organization to ensure that the
tenant-farmers will enjoy on a lasting basis the benefits of agrarian reform.

The cooperatives work in close coordination with DAR officers (regional directors, district officers, team leaders
and field personnel) to attain the goals of agrarian reform (DAR Memorandum Circular No. 10, Series of 1977). The
Department of Local Government (now the Department of Interior and Local Government) regulates them through
the Bureau of Cooperative Development (Section 8, PD 175). They also have access to financial assistance through
the Cooperative Development Fund, which is administered by a management committee composed of the
representatives from the DILG, the Central Bank, the Philippine National Bank, the DAR and the DENR (Section 6,
PD 175).

Petitioner insists that his act of allowing another to possess and cultivate his land did not amount to abandonment or
voluntary surrender, as the rights of an OLT beneficiary are preserved even in case of transfer of legal possession
over the subject property, as held in Coconut Cooperative Marketing Association (Cocoma) v. Court of Appeals. 24
 7. EDGAR DUENAS TCT No. T-949/EP No. A-037658 4.01
8. MARIO P. ERIBAL TCT No. T-952/EP No. A-037836 2.30
9. REYNALDO C. ESENCIA TCT No. T-950/EP No. A-037844 2.09
10. RUBEN A. IBOJO TCT No. T-928/EP No. A-037873 1.57
11. SAMUEL JAMANDRE TCT No. T-909/EP No. A-159348 2.26
12. HILARION V. LANTIZA TCT No. T-288/EP No. A-037674 4.55
TCT No. T-401/EP No. A-037825 0.45
G.R. No. 159674 June 30, 2006 13. ANSELMO LOPEZ TCT No. T-973/EP No. A-037840 4.49
14. TERESITA NACION TCT No. T-900/EP No. A-037849 2.21
SAMUEL ESTRIBILLO, CALIXTO P. ABAYATO, JR., RONGIE D. AGUILAR, TACIANA D. AGUILAR,
ARTEMIO G. DE JUAN, ESTANISLAO DELA CRUZ, SR., EDGAR DUENAS, MARIO ERIBAL, 15. CHARIE E. NASTOR TCT No. T-825/EP No. A-037829 3.92
REYNALDO C. ESENCIA, EMMA GONZAGA, RUBEN A. IBOJO, SAMUEL JAMANDRE, HILARION
V. LANTIZA, ANSELMO LOPEZ, TERESITA NACION, CHARIE E. NASTOR, NELSON L. NULLAS, 16. NELSON L. NULLAS TCT No. T-396/EP No. A-037826 2.74
CARLITO S. OLIA, ANA PATIÑO, ROBERTO T. PATIÑO, ANTONIO P. ROCHA, FERNANDO C.
RUFINO, PATERNO P. SAIN, CLAUDIO S. SAYSON, and JOEMARIE VIBO, Petitioners, 17. CARLITO S. OLIA TCT No. T-910/EP No. A-037673 1.79
vs. 18. ROBERTO T.PATIÑO TCT No. T-912/EP No. A-037860 6.42
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM and HACIENDA MARIA, INC., Respondents.
19. ANTONIO P. ROCHA TCT No. T-914/EP No. A-037830 2.21
DECISION
20. FERNANDO C. RUFINO TCT No. T-923/EP No. A-037848 4.53

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: 21. PATERNO P. SAIN TCT No. T-954/EP No. A-037813 4.32
22. CLAUDIO S. SAYSON, and TCT No. T-891/EP No. A-037880 3.71
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the review and reversal of
the Resolutions1 of the Court of Appeals dated 27 January 2003 and 28 August 2003, respectively. 23. JOEMARIE VIBO TCT No. T-893/EP No. A-037827 1.31

The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows: The two other petitioners, Emma Gonzaga and Ana Patiño, are the surviving spouses of deceased recipients of EPs
over parcels of land also located at Barangay Angas, Sta. Josefa, Agusan del Sur, with their corresponding TCT and
The petitioners, with the exception of two, are the recipients of Emancipation Patents (EPs) over parcels of land EP numbers identified as follows:
located at Barangay Angas, Sta. Josefa, Agusan del Sur, with their respective Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) and
EP numbers presented below:
A
(Deceased) Registered Owners TCT/EP Nos.
(
Petitioners TCT/EP Nos. 1. MANUEL S. GONZAGA TCT No. T-920/EP No. A-037832 4.19

1. SAMUEL ESTRIBILLO TCT No. T-287/EP No. A-037675 1.7833 2. RAFAEL PATIÑO TCT No. T-929/EP No. A-037861 3.00

2. CALIXTO P. ABAYATO, JR. TCT No. T-297/EP No. A-037814 2.0000

TCT No. T-829/EP No. A-027293
3. RONGIE D. AGUILAR TCT No. T-913/EP No. A-027295
4. TACIANA D. AGUILAR TCT No. T-944/EP No. A-027296
5. ARTEMIO G. DE JUAN TCT No. T-302/EP No. A-037809
6. ESTANISLAO DELA CRUZ, SR. TCT No. T-290/EP No. A-035676
The parcels of land described above, the subject matters in this Petition, were formerly part of a forested area which
0.1565
have been denuded as a result of the logging operations of respondent Hacienda Maria, Inc. (HMI). Petitioners,
3.1441
together with other persons, occupied and tilled these areas believing that the same were public lands. HMI never
disturbed petitioners and the other occupants in their peaceful cultivation thereof.
4.2405
HMI acquired such forested area from the Republic of the Philippines through Sales Patent No. 2683 in 1956 by
3.3082
virtue of which it was issued OCT No. P-3077-1661. The title covered three parcels of land with a total area of
3.1437
527.8308 hectares, to wit:

Area
Lot No.
(in hectares)
Lot No. 1620, Pls – 4 28.52
Lot No. 1621, Pls – 4 11.64
Lot No. 1622, Pls – 4 487.47
TOTAL 527.834
On 21 October 1972, Presidential Decree No. 275 was issued mandating that tenanted rice and corn lands be brought
under Operation Land Transfer and awarded to farmer-beneficiaries.
HMI, through a certain Joaquin Colmenares, requested that 527.8308 hectares of its landholdings be placed under
the coverage of Operation Land Transfer. Receiving compensation therefor, HMI allowed petitioners and other
occupants to cultivate the landholdings so that the same may be covered under said law.
In 1973, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) conducted a parcellary mapping of the entire landholdings of
527.8308 hectares covered by OCT No. P-3077-1661. In 1975 and 1976, the DAR approved the Parcellary Map
Sketching (PMS) and the Amended PMS covering the entire landholdings.
HMI, through its representatives, actively participated in all relevant proceedings, including the determination of the
Average Gross Production per hectare at the Barangay Committee on Land Production, and was a signatory of an
undated Landowner and Tenant Production Agreement (LTPA), covering the 527.8308 hectares. The LTPA was
submitted to the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) in 1977.
Also in 1977, HMI executed a Deed of Assignment of Rights in favor of petitioners, among other persons, which
was registered with the Register of Deeds and annotated at the back of OCT No. P-3077-1661. The annotation in the
OCT showed that the entire 527.8308 hectares was the subject of the Deed of Assignment.
In 1982, a final survey over the entire area was conducted and approved. From 1984 to 1988, the corresponding
TCTs and EPs covering the entire 527.8308 hectares were issued to petitioners, among other persons.
In December 1997, HMI filed with the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) of CARAGA, Region
XIII, 17 petitions seeking the declaration of erroneous coverage under Presidential Decree No. 27 of 277.5008
hectares of its former landholdings covered by OCT No. P-3077-1661. HMI claimed that said area was not devoted
to either rice or corn, that the area was untenanted, and that no compensation was paid therefor. The 17 petitions,
which were later consolidated, sought for the cancellation of the EPs covering the disputed 277.5008 hectares which
had been awarded to petitioners. HMI did not question the coverage of the other 250.3300 hectares under
Presidential Decree No. 27 despite claiming that the entire landholdings were untenanted and not devoted to rice and
corn.
On 27 November 1998, after petitioners failed to submit a Position Paper, the RARAD rendered a Decision
declaring as void the TCTs and EPs awarded to petitioners because the land covered was not devoted to rice and
corn, and neither was there any established tenancy relations between HMI and petitioners when Presidential Decree
No. 27 took effect on 21 October 1972. The Decision was based on a 26 March 1998 report submitted by the
Hacienda Maria Action Team. Petitioners’ TCTs and EPs were ordered cancelled. Petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, but the same was denied. Petitioners appealed to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB) which affirmed the RARAD Decision.
After the DARAB denied petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration, the latter proceeded to the Court of Appeals with
their Petition for Review on Certiorari. The Court of Appeals issued the following assailed Resolution:
A perusal of the petition reveals that the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping was executed by
Samuel A. Estribillo who is one of the petitioners, without the corresponding Special Power of Attorneys executed
by the other petitioners authorizing him to sign for their behalf in violation of Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED DUE COURSE and necessarily DISMISSED. 6
Petitioners filed a "Motion for Reconsideration With Alternative Prayer with Leave of Court for the Admission of
Special Power of Attorney (SPA) Granted to Petitioner Samuel Estribillo by his Co-Petitioners." The Court of
Appeals denied the motion by issuing the following assailed Resolution:
Petitioners seek the reconsideration of Our Resolution promulgated on January 27, 2003 which dismissed the
petition for certiorari.
We find no reason to reverse, alter or modify the resolution sought to be reconsidered, since petitioners have failed
to show that their belated submission of the special power of attorney can be justified as against the unequivocal
requirements set forth by Sec. 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
While it is true that the Supreme Court has recognized special circumstances that justify the relaxation of the rules
on non-forum shopping, such circumstances, however, are not present in the case at bar.
More importantly, said Rules cannot be relaxed in view of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Loquias vs. Ombudsman,
338 SCRA 62, which stated that, substantial compliance will not suffice in a matter involving strict observance by
the rules. The attestation contained in the certification [on] non-forum shopping requires personal knowledge by the
party who executed the same.
Since the Verification and Certification on Non-Forum shopping was executed without the proper authorization
from all the petitioners, such personal knowledge cannot be presumed to exist thereby rendering the petition fatally
defective.
Par. 2, Sec. 5 of Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended states:
"Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or
other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice x x x"
It is, thus, clear that the Motion for Reconsideration has no legal basis to support it and should be dismissed
forthwith. Moreover, granting arguendo that a special power of attorney belatedly filed could cure the petition’s
defect, the requirement of personal knowledge of all the petitioners still has not been met since some of the other
petitioners failed to sign the same.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED. 7
Petitioners now file this present Petition contending that there had been compliance with Rule 7, Section 5 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. They further reiterate their argument that the EPs are ordinary titles which become
indefeasible one year after their registration.
The petition is impressed with merit.1awphil.net
Petitioners have sufficiently complied with Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure concerning the
Certification Against Forum shopping
Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure was preceded by Revised Circular No. 28-91 and
Administrative Circular No. 04-94, which required a certification against forum shopping to avoid the filing of
multiple petitions and complaints involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and other
tribunals and agencies. Stated differently, the rule was designed to avoid a situation where said courts, tribunals and
agencies would have to resolve the same issues. Rule 7, Section 5, now provides:
Sec. 5. Certification against forum shopping. – The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the
complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and
simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving
the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action
or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present
status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is
pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or
initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or
other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise
provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the
undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding
administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate
forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt
as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.
Revised Circular No. 28-91 "was designed x x x to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice and
should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective or the
goal of all rules of procedure – which is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as possible." 8 Technical rules
of procedure should be used to promote, not frustrate, justice. 9 The same guidelines should still apply in interpreting
what is now Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Petitioner Samuel A. Estribillo, in signing the Verification and Certification Against Forum Shopping, falls within
the phrase "plaintiff or principal party" who is required to certify under oath the matters mentioned in Rule 7,
Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Such was given emphasis by this Court when we held in Mendigorin
v. Cabantog10 and Escorpizo v. University of Baguio11 that the certification of non-forum shopping must be signed
by the plaintiff or any of the principal parties and not only by the legal counsel. In Condo Suite Club Travel, Inc. v.
National Labor Relations Commission,12 we likewise held that:
The certification in this petition was improperly executed by the external legal counsel of petitioner. For a
certification of non-forum shopping must be by the petitioner, or any of the principal parties and not by counsel
unless clothed with a special power of attorney to do so. This procedural lapse on the part of petitioner is also a
cause for the dismissal of this action. (Emphasis supplied)
The Court of Appeals heavily relied on the seemingly conflicting case of Loquias v. Office of the
Ombudsman,13 where this Court ruled that:
At the outset, it is noted that the Verification and Certification was signed by Antonio Din, Jr., one of the petitioners
in the instant case. We agree with the Solicitor General that the petition is defective. Section 5, Rule 7 expressly
provides that it is the plaintiff or principal party who shall certify under oath that he has not commenced any action
involving the same issues in any court, etc. Only petitioner Din, the Vice-Mayor of San Miguel, Zamboanga del Sur,
signed the certification. There is no showing that he was authorized by his co-petitioners to represent the latter and
to sign the certification. It cannot likewise be presumed that petitioner Din knew, to the best of his knowledge,
whether his co-petitioners had the same or similar actions or claims filed or pending. We find that substantial
compliance will not suffice in a matter involving strict observance by the rules. The attestation contained in the
certification on non-forum shopping requires personal knowledge by the party who executed the same. Petitioners
must show reasonable cause for failure to personally sign the certification. Utter disregard of the rules cannot justly
be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction. (Emphasis supplied)
Loquias, however, was a case involving only five petitioners seeking relief from the Resolution of the Ombudsman
charging them with violation of Republic Act No. 3019, where the above declaration "at the outset" was made
together with a determination on the lack of jurisdiction on our part to decide the Petition. 14 There being only five
petitioners in Loquias, the unreasonableness of the failure to obtain the signatures of Antonio Din, Jr.’s four co-
accused is immediately apparent, hence the remark by this Court that "[p]etitioners must show reasonable cause for
failure to personally sign the certification." In the present petition, petitioners allege that they are farmer-
beneficiaries who reside in a very remote barangay in Agusan del Sur. While they reside in the same barangay, they
allegedly have to walk for hours on rough terrain to reach their neighbors due to the absence of convenient means of
transportation. Their houses are located far apart from each other and the mode of transportation, habal-habal, is
scarce and difficult. Majority of them are also nearing old age. On the other hand, their lawyers (who are members
of a non-government organization engaged in development work) are based in Quezon City who started assisting
them at the latter part of the RARAD level litigation in 1998, and became their counsel of record only at the
DARAB level. The petitioner who signed the initiatory pleading, Samuel Estribillo, was the only petitioner who was
able to travel to Manila at the time of the preparation of the Petition due to very meager resources of their farmers’
organization, the Kahiusahan sa Malahutayong mga Mag-uugma Para sa Ekonomikanhong Kalambuan (KAMMPE).
When the Petition a quo was dismissed, petitioners’ counsel went to Agusan del Sur and tried earnestly to secure all
the signatures for the SPA. In fact, when the SPA was being circulated for their signatures, 24 of the named
petitioners therein failed to sign for various reasons – some could not be found within the area and were said to be
temporarily residing in other towns, while some already died because of old age. 15 Be that as it may, those who did
not sign the SPA did not participate, and are not parties to this petition.
The Court of Appeals merely said that the special circumstances recognized by this Court that justify the relaxation
of the rules on the certification against forum shopping are not present in the case at bar, 16 without discussing the
circumstances adduced by the petitioners in their Motion for Reconsideration. Thus, assuming for the sake of
argument that the actuation of petitioners was not strictly in consonance with Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, it should still be determined whether there are special circumstances that would justify the
suspension or relaxation of the rule concerning verification and certification against forum shopping, such as those
which we appreciated in the ensuing cases.
In General Milling Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, 17 the appeal to the Court of Appeals had a
certificate against forum shopping, but was dismissed as it did not contain a board resolution authorizing the
signatory of the Certificate. Petitioners therein attached the board resolution in their Motion for Reconsideration but
the Court of Appeals, as in this case, denied the same. In granting the Petition therein, we explained that:
[P]etitioner complied with this procedural requirement except that it was not accompanied by a board resolution or a
secretary’s certificate that the person who signed it was duly authorized by petitioner to represent it in the case. It
would appear that the signatory of the certification was, in fact, duly authorized as so evidenced by a board
resolution attached to petitioner’s motion for reconsideration before the appellate court. It could thus be said that
there was at least substantial compliance with, and that there was no attempt to ignore, the prescribed procedural
requirements.
The rules of procedure are intended to promote, rather than frustrate, the ends of justice, and while the swift
unclogging of court dockets is a laudable objective, it, nevertheless, must not be met at the expense of substantial
justice. Technical and procedural rules are intended to help secure, not suppress, the cause of justice and a deviation
from the rigid enforcement of the rules may be allowed to attain that prime objective for, after all, the dispensation
of justice is the core reason for the existence of courts. [Acme Shoe, Rubber and Plastic Corp. vs. Court of Appeals;
BA Savings Bank vs. Sia, 336 SCRA 484].
In Shipside Incorporated v. Court of Appeals,18 the authority of petitioner’s resident manager to sign the certification
against forum shopping was submitted to the Court of Appeals only after the latter dismissed the Petition. It turned
out, in the Motion for Reconsideration, that he already had board authority ten days before the filing of the Petition.
We ratiocinated therein that:
On the other hand, the lack of certification against forum shopping is generally not curable by the submission
thereof after the filing of the petition. Section 5, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the
failure of the petitioner to submit the required documents that should accompany the petition, including the
certification against forum shopping, shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof. The same rule applies to
certifications against forum shopping signed by a person on behalf of a corporation which are unaccompanied by
proof that said signatory is authorized to file a petition on behalf of the corporation.
In certain exceptional circumstances, however, the Court has allowed the belated filing of the certification. In
Loyola v. Court of Appeals, et al. (245 SCRA 477 [1995]), the Court considered the filing of the certification one
day after the filing of an election protest as substantial compliance with the requirement. In Roadway Express, Inc.
v. Court of Appeals, et al. (264 SCRA 696 [1996]), the Court allowed the filing of the certification 14 days before
the dismissal of the petition. In Uy v. Landbank, supra, the Court had dismissed Uy’s petition for lack of verification
and certification against non-forum shopping. However, it subsequently reinstated the petition after Uy submitted a
motion to admit certification and non-forum shopping certification. In all these cases, there were special
circumstances or compelling reasons that justified the relaxation of the rule requiring verification and certification
on non-forum shopping.
In the instant case, the merits of petitioner’s case should be considered special circumstances or compelling reasons
that justify tempering the requirement in regard to the certificate of non-forum shopping. Moreover, in Loyola,
Roadway, and Uy, the Court excused non-compliance with the requirement as to the certificate of non-forum
shopping. With more reason should we allow the instant petition since petitioner herein did submit a certification on
non-forum shopping, failing only to show proof that the signatory was authorized to do so. That petitioner
subsequently submitted a secretary’s certificate attesting that Balbin was authorized to file an action on behalf of
petitioner likewise mitigates this oversight.
It must also be kept in mind that while the requirement of the certificate of non-forum shopping is mandatory,
nonetheless the requirements must not be interpreted too literally and thus defeat the objective of preventing the
undesirable practice of forum-shopping. Lastly, technical rules of procedure should be used to promote, not frustrate
justice. While the swift unclogging of court dockets is a laudable objective, the granting of substantial justice is an
even more urgent ideal.
In Uy v. Land Bank of the Philippines,19 we, likewise, considered the apparent merits of the substantive aspect of the
case as a special circumstance or compelling reason for the reinstatement of the case, and invoked our power to
suspend our rules to serve the ends of justice. Thus:
The admission of the petition after the belated filing of the certification, therefore, is not unprecedented. In those
cases where the Court excused non-compliance with the requirements, there were special circumstances or
compelling reasons making the strict application of the rule clearly unjustified. In the case at bar, the apparent merits
of the substantive aspects of the case should be deemed as a "special circumstance" or "compelling reason" for the
reinstatement of the petition. x x x
There were even cases where we held that there was complete non-compliance with the rule on certification against
forum shopping, but we still proceeded to decide the case on the merits. In De Guia v. De Guia, 20 petitioners raised
in their Petition for Review the allowance of respondents’ Appeal Brief which did not contain a certificate against
forum shopping. We held therein that:
With regard to the absence of a certification of non-forum shopping, substantial justice behooves us to agree with
the disquisition of the appellate court. We do not condone the shortcomings of respondents’ counsel, but we simply
cannot ignore the merits of their claim. Indeed, it has been held that "[i]t is within the inherent power of the Court to
suspend its own rules in a particular case in order to do justice."
In Damasco v. National Labor Relations Commission, 21 the non-compliance was disregarded because of the
principle of social justice, which is equally applicable to the case at bar:
We note that both petitioners did not comply with the rule on certification against forum shopping. The certifications
in their respective petitions were executed by their lawyers, which is not correct. The certification of non-forum
shopping must be by the petitioner or a principal party and not the attorney. This procedural lapse on the part of
petitioners could have warranted the outright dismissal of their actions.
But, the court recognizes the need to resolve these two petitions on their merits as a matter of social justice involving
labor and capital. After all, technicality should not be allowed to stand in the way of equitably and completely
resolving herein the rights and obligations of these parties. Moreover, we must stress that technical rules of
procedure in labor cases are not to be strictly applied if the result would be detrimental to the working woman.
The foregoing cases show that, even if we assume for the sake of argument that there was violation of Rule 7,
Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a relaxation of such rule would be justified for two compelling
reasons: social justice considerations and the apparent merit of the Petition, as shall be heretofore discussed.
Certificates of Title issued pursuant to Emancipation Patents are as indefeasible as TCTs issued in registration
proceedings.
Petitioners claim that the EPs have become indefeasible upon the expiration of one year from the date of its
issuance. The DARAB, however, ruled that the EP "is a title issued through the agrarian reform program of the
government. Its issuance, correction and cancellation is governed by the rules and regulations issued by the
Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Hence, it is not the same as or in the same category of a
Torrens title."
The DARAB is grossly mistaken.
Ybañez v. Intermediate Appellate Court,22 provides that certificates of title issued in administrative proceedings are
as indefeasible as certificates of title issued in judicial proceedings:
It must be emphasized that a certificate of title issued under an administrative proceeding pursuant to a homestead
patent, as in the instant case, is as indefeasible as a certificate of title issued under a judicial registration proceeding,
provided the land covered by said certificate is a disposable public land within the contemplation of the Public Land
Law.
There is no specific provision in the Public Land Law (C.A. No. 141, as amended) or the Land Registration Act (Act The only defense of respondents, that the issue of indefeasibility of title was raised for the first time on appeal with
496), now P.D. 1529, fixing the one (1) year period within which the public land patent is open to review on the the DARAB, does not hold water because said issue was already raised before the RARAD. 28
ground of actual fraud as in Section 38 of the Land Registration Act, now Section 32 of P.D. 1529, and clothing a
public land patent certificate of title with indefeasibility. Nevertheless, the pertinent pronouncements in the The recommendation of the Hacienda Maria Action Team to have the EPs cancelled and the lots covered under the
aforecited cases clearly reveal that Section 38 of the Land Registration Act, now Section 32 of P.D. 1529 was Republic Act No. 6657,29 with the farmer-beneficiaries later on being issued with CLOAs, would only delay the
applied by implication by this Court to the patent issued by the Director of Lands duly approved by the Secretary of application of agrarian reform laws to the disputed 277.5008 hectares, leading to the expenditure of more time and
Natural Resources, under the signature of the President of the Philippines in accordance with law. The date of resources of the government.
issuance of the patent, therefore, corresponds to the date of the issuance of the decree in ordinary registration cases
because the decree finally awards the land applied for registration to the party entitled to it, and the patent issued by
the Director of Lands equally and finally grants, awards, and conveys the land applied for to the applicant. This, to The unreasonable delay of HMI in filing the Petition for cancellation more than 20 years after the alleged wrongful
our mind, is in consonance with the intent and spirit of the homestead laws, i.e. conservation of a family home, and annotation of the Deed of Assignment in OCT No. P-3077-1661, and more than ten years after the issuance of the
to encourage the settlement, residence and cultivation and improvement of the lands of the public domain. If the title TCTs to the farmers, is apparently motivated by its desire to receive a substantially higher valuation and just
to the land grant in favor of the homesteader would be subjected to inquiry, contest and decision after it has been compensation should the disputed 277.5008 hectares be covered under Republic Act No. 6657 instead of
given by the Government through the process of proceedings in accordance with the Public Land Law, there would Presidential Decree No. 27.30 This is further proved by the following uncontested allegations by petitioners:
arise uncertainty, confusion and suspicion on the government’s system of distributing public agricultural lands
pursuant to the "Land for the Landless" policy of the State. (i) HMI neither asked for rentals nor brought any action to oust petitioners from the farm they were
cultivating;
The same confusion, uncertainty and suspicion on the distribution of government-acquired lands to the landless
would arise if the possession of the grantee of an EP would still be subject to contest, just because his certificate of (ii) HMI had not paid realty taxes on the disputed property from 1972 onwards and never protested
title was issued in an administrative proceeding. The silence of Presidential Decree No. 27 as to the indefeasibility of petitioners’ act of declaring the same for realty taxation;
titles issued pursuant thereto is the same as that in the Public Land Act where Prof. Antonio Noblejas commented:
(iii) HMI, represented by a certain Angela Colmenares, signed the LTPA covering the entire landholdings
Inasmuch as there is no positive statement of the Public Land Law, regarding the titles granted thereunder, such or the area of 527.8308 hectares, which was then represented to be rice and corn lands;
silence should be construed and interpreted in favor of the homesteader who come into the possession of his
homestead after complying with the requirements thereof. Section 38 of the Land Registration Law should be (iv) HMI abandoned the entire landholdings after executing the Deed of Assignment of Rights in 1977.
interpreted to apply by implication to the patent issued by the Director of Lands, duly approved by the Minister of
Natural Resources, under the signature of the President of the Philippines, in accordance with law. 23
WHEREFORE, the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 73902 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The following EPs and the corresponding TCTs issued to petitioners or to their successors-in-interest are
After complying with the procedure, therefore, in Section 105 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as hereby declared VALID and SUBSISTING:
the Property Registration Decree (where the DAR is required to issue the corresponding certificate of title after
granting an EP to tenant-farmers who have complied with Presidential Decree No. 27), 24 the TCTs issued to
petitioners pursuant to their EPs acquire the same protection accorded to other TCTs. "The certificate of title Original Grantees TCT/EP Nos.
becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from the date of the issuance of the order
for the issuance of the patent, x x x. Lands covered by such title may no longer be the subject matter of a cadastral 1. SAMUEL ESTRIBILLO TCT No. T-287/EP No. A-037675
proceeding, nor can it be decreed to another person." 25
2. CALIXTO P. ABAYATO, JR. TCT No. T-297/EP No. A-037814
TCT No. T-829/EP No. A-027293
As we held through Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Lahora v. Dayanghirang, Jr. 26 :
3. RONGIE D. AGUILAR TCT No. T-913/EP No. A-027295
The rule in this jurisdiction, regarding public land patents and the character of the certificate of title that may be 4. TACIANA D. AGUILAR TCT No. T-944/EP No. A-027296
issued by virtue thereof, is that where land is granted by the government to a private individual, the corresponding
patent therefor is recorded, and the certificate of title is issued to the grantee; thereafter, the land is automatically 5. ARTEMIO G. DE JUAN, TCT No. T-302/EP No. A-037809
brought within the operation of the Land Registration Act, the title issued to the grantee becoming entitled to all the
safeguards provided in Section 38 of the said Act. In other words, upon expiration of one year from its issuance, the 6. ESTANISLAO DELA CRUZ, SR. TCT No. T-290/EP No. A-035676
certificate of title shall become irrevocable and indefeasible like a certificate issued in a registration
proceeding. (Emphasis supplied.) 7. EDGAR DUENAS TCT No. T-949/EP No. A-037658
8. MARIO P. ERIBAL TCT No. T-952/EP No. A-037836
The EPs themselves, like the Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) in Republic Act No. 6657 (the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), are enrolled in the Torrens system of registration. The Property 9. REYNALDO C. ESENCIA TCT No. T-950/EP No. A-037844
Registration Decree in fact devotes Chapter IX27 on the subject of EPs. Indeed, such EPs and CLOAs are, in
10. RUBEN A. IBOJO TCT No. T-928/EP No. A-037873
themselves, entitled to be as indefeasible as certificates of title issued in registration proceedings.
 11. SAMUEL JAMANDRE
12. HILARION V. LANTIZA
13. ANSELMO LOPEZ
14. TERESITA NACION
15. CHARIE E. NASTOR
16. NELSON L. NULLAS
17. CARLITO S. OLIA
18. ROBERTO T.PATIÑO
19. ANTONIO P. ROCHA
20. FERNANDO C. RUFINO
21. PATERNO P. SAIN
22. CLAUSIO S. SAYSON
23. JOEMARIE VIBO
24. MANUEL S. GONZAGA
25. RAFAEL PATIÑO
Costs against respondent Hacienda Maria, Inc.
SO ORDERED.
TCT No. T-909/EP No. A-159348
TCT No. T-288/EP No. A-037674
TCT No. T-401/EP No. A-037825
TCT No. T-973/EP No. A-037840
TCT No. T-900/EP No. A-037849
TCT No. T-825/EP No. A-037829
TCT No. T-396/EP No. A-037826
TCT No. T-910/EP No. A-037673
TCT No. T-912/EP No. A-037860
TCT No. T-914/EP No. A-037830
TCT No. T-923/EP No. A-037848
TCT No. T-954/EP No. A-037813
TCT No. T-891/EP No. A-037880
TCT No. T-893/EP No. A-037827
TCT No. T-920/EP No. A-037832
TCT No. T-297/EP No. A-037861