Professional Documents
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NOTE: The isolation tool is normally locked open at surface to allow fluid bypass
during running and installation.
The gauge hanger assembly is installed and retrieved by standard wireline methods. The
isolation tool is closed by an intermediate wireline trip.
Prior to running the isolation tool, the plunger assembly is locked in the open position as in
Figure 6.16a. This is achieved by the tapers on the collet fingers butting up against the
tapered stop on the lower end of the housing.
To close the tool for pressure build-up, an appropriate prong and weight bar are lowered
into the hanger assembly. As the prong contacts the plunger, the collet mandrel moves
downwards and allows the collet fingers to retract towards the collet mandrel. This
disengages the collet fingers from the tapered stop allowing the plunger to move upwards
and close off the flow ports on the isolation tool.
The plunger will contact the soft seat and, in combination with the packing on the lock
mandrel, will prevent the movement of well fluid past the assembly and up the tubing.
Pressure build-up below the isolation tool will be recorded on the BHP/BHT gauges.
NOTE The procedure for running and pulling this isolation tool will be
dependent on the local mandrel attached.
NOTE The procedure for equalisation will be dependent on the equalisation sub
attached.
Figure 7.14 - MST-2 Gauge Installation Figure 7.15- MST-2 System Schematic
No jarring is required to release the hanger. An upward pull on the wireline (also an
indication to the operator that hanger is locked in place) of 150 lbs. over toolstring weight
is designed to release running tool within 30 to 60 seconds.
A type ‘GS’ Otis pulling tool with shear-up adapter and pulling prong are used to retrieve
the hanger. The prong is designed to move the hanger's lock down, releasing the retaining
balls, allowing the fishing neck to engage and keys to retract. The assembly may then be
pulled.
When running in with running tool, the hanger is extended to keep the selective locking
keys in their retracted position. The running tool/hanger assembly is run below the landing
nipple or to the No-Go shoulder. The hanger is now in position for locating the landing
nipple profile.
Pulling the assembly back through the landing nipple's restricted bore trips the hanger's
keys. Continued pulling a few feet above the nipple places the hanger in its locating mode.
Upon setting down, the hanger is designed to be set and locked in the matching nipple
profile. Toolstring weight is designed to force the hanger fishing neck down, causing the
lock to force a set of balls against their retainers. This is designed to lock the hanger in the
nipple and allows for retrieving the running tool.
Unloading
1) Open up the gauge, disengage the stylus, and remove the chart holder.
2) Break the cohesion of the chart against the inside of the holder by pushing a tooth
pick, or opened up paper clip through the holes in the chart holder. Pull the chart out
of the holder.
The following information should be inscribed on the chart:
a) Well number
b) Date of survey
c) Element number and range
d) Clock number and range
e) Single or double pitch lead screw
f) Position of the gauge in the toolstring, i.e. top, middle, bottom.
3) Record the maximum temperature reading.
4) Complete data recording sheets.
General Rules
1) Avoid all rough handling and treat as instruments
2) Use lubriplate grease on all threads
3) Do not overtighten threads as the ‘O’-ring seals hold the pressure
4) Never use pipe wrenches on cases
5) Remember to draw a baseline
6) Turn on stylus before running.
Survey Procedure
1) Obtain relevant Work Permits.
2) Rig up the standard wireline lubricator and a standard toolstring (5 ft. stem,
mechanical jars, knuckle joint).
3) Make up the assembly to be run in the following order:
a) Shock absorber
b) Crossover
c) ‘RPG-3’ gauge 1
d) Crossover
e) ‘RPG-3’ gauge 2
f) Thermometer well
If an ‘RT7’ is to be used, leave off the thermometer well and attach a crossover.
4) Secure the shock absorber with the assembly to the Lock Mandrel and the appropriate
running tool
5) Attach the assembly to be run to the toolstring, connect up the Lubricator and
pressure test wireline surface equipment.
Running Procedure
1) Perform a lubricator calibration stop (15 mins.).
2) Run in the well at a speed not exceeding 150 ft/min. Reduce speed when passing
through crossovers, nipples, side pocket mandrels etc. in the tubing string.
3) Note times of all events which will affect the recording.
4) Make gradient stops as detailed in the test program (normally 3,000 ft., 2,000 ft. and
1,000 ft. above the hang-off point).
5) Slow down and stop at 300 ft. above the logging depth and note the exact time. If the
logging depth has been accidentally passed, pull back to 300 ft. above it again before
running to logging depth to eliminate hysteresis effect.
6) Set the lock mandrel and the gauges (with the appropriate procedure for the specific
type of gauge hanger in the toolstring) or hold a static survey at the specified depth
for the specified time.
7) Pull the gauges with a hanger pulling tool, if a hanger was used, and pull out of hole
at a speed of 150 ft/min.
8) Make gradient stops as per the program.
9) Pull gauges into the lubricator and rig down wireline surface equipment.
Pressure Elements
1) Check that pressure element has:
a) Been calibrated within the previous six months.
b) Not been run more than three times since the last calibration.
2) Check gauge for correct operation, eg. stylus arm, lead screw.
Loading
1) Remove the chart holder from the recorder section and insert a flanged chart by:
a) Using a mandrel and loading saddle, or
b) Rolling up the chart in one hand and gently pushing it into the holder.
Use no other method unless authorised by the Wireline Supervisor.
2) Reinstall the chart holder, pull the chart holder carrier to the top of the lead screw,
engage the stylus and draw a base line. Disengage the stylus.
In the case of a temperature element, fit a pressure simulating tool on the stylus arm, turn
and lock it against the body. This is done so that the base line will represent the stylus
position when the element is at its lowest temperature listed at the beginning of the data
calibration book.
Disengage the stylus. Pull the chart holder carrier to the top of the lead screw, engage the
stylus and draw a mechanical base line. Disengage the stylus.
3) Wind up the clock and screw it into the gauge housing, pull the chart holder carrier to
the top of the lead screw, engage the clutch between the clock and the lead screw and
engage the stylus.
4) Assemble the gauge and tighten up the connections having first checked all the ‘O’-
rings.
• Each time pressure is applied to the Bellows Assembly, rotate the calibration
adapter 1/4 turn to inscribe the chart.
• The load applied to the dead-weight tester must be kept spinning constantly to
prevent sticking of the piston. Do not manually apply any downward load on
the weights when spinning as the calibration chart will record the fluctuating
load from the dead-weight tester.
• When maximum load has been reached, remove all load to zero. Return to
maximum load again and decrease the load from maximum to zero.
• Remove the Amerada from the calibration test cell and remove the calibration
adapter. Clean the bellows Assembly with a suitable solvent and re-assemble
the Amerada. Leave the Outer Housing cover hand tight only. Tighten the
pressure Element Housing with a spanner using the blocks supplied for
supporting Ameradas.
• The final calibration chart should be similar in appearance to the one shown in
Figure 6.4. If not, check the Amerada for faults and re-calibrate until the chart
is satisfactory.
NOTE: All ‘O’-rings must be checked when the Amerada is dis-assembled. All
damaged ‘O’-rings must be replaced and all threads coated with the
special lubricant provided on assembly.
• Insert the chart holder, leaving the stylus disengaged, stand the Amerada in a
vertical position. Allow the chart holder to fall under its own weight and check
that the motion is completely free and uniform. If the motion is not free and
uniform, remove the lead screw and clean it with a suitable solvent
• When the lead screw travel is acceptable, pick up the chart holder to the
uppermost position, engage the stylus and draw a baseline. Disengage the
stylus before returning the chart holder back to the starting position
• Remove the Element Housing and clean it with a suitable solvent. Compare the
bellows assembly length with a 6 inch brass gauge piece to check that the
bellows assembly is not elongated
• Fit a calibration adapter in place of the clock
• Screw the Amerada into the calibration test cell/heating cell.
• Ensure that the dead-weight tester is full of oil and hat no air is trapped around
Amerada pressure element.
• Weights are then applied to the dead-weight tester and hence pressure to the
bellows assembly in suitable increments.
NOTE: Refer to Table 6.3 for information for recommended calibration steps.
Temperature Limitations
Recording Section (without Clock) 345o C 650o F
Diaphragms 345o C 650o F
Clocks Standard 150o C 300o F
High Temperature 260o C 500o F
Very High Temperature 345o C 500o F
(Kuster 370o C) (Kuster 700o C)
GRC Pressure Sensors
With Bellows 150o C 300o F
With Bellows or Filter 345o C 650o F
Kuster Pressure Sensors 370o C 700o F
NOTE: The actual relationship between pressure and stylus deflection is non-
linear and the Least Square Method fits this line to best represent the
actual calibration curve.
7.2.4 Clock
The clock (timing unit) is connected to the upper end of the recording section. Clocks are
supplied in a range from 3 to 180 hours which is the time defined to complete exactly
fifteen turns of a single pitch lead screw or 5 ins. of linear movement of the chart holder.
7.1 INTRODUCTION
Bottomhole Pressure and Temperature Recorders are designed to provide recordings of
well pressures and temperatures during static or sequential surveys. The information
recorded during these surveys is of great importance in well evaluation. The mechanical
type recorders normally used are the AMERADA ‘RPG’ Pressure Recorder and ‘RT’
Temperature Recorder. These self-contained wireline gauges are lowered into the wellbore
on slickline where recordings can be taken, either with them hanging from the Wireline or
set into a nipple with an appropriate locking device.
Electronic type memory gauges are increasingly being used in place of the Amerada and
some are discussed later in this section.
Temperature Element
The temperature element consists of a cylinder containing a volatile liquid in connection
with the helical Bourdon tube. Variations in temperature change the vapour pressure of the
liquid and therefore the pressure in the Bourdon tube, similarly causing the free end to
rotate.
NOTE: Reliability will also depend to great extent on the company history of
SCSSV failures.
As indicated in Table 5.3, material selection is an important requirement for some wells.
There are 3 classes of valve service defined by API:
1) Standard Service (Class 1) - an SCSSV of this class is suitable for service in oil or
gas wells which do not exhibit the detrimental effects caused by sand or stress
corrosion cracking.
2) Sandy Service (Class 2) - an SCSSV of this class is suitable for service in oil or gas
wells where sand or similar abrasive substances could be expected to cause valve
malfunction of failure. This type of valve must conform to Class 1 service.
3) Stress Corrosion Cracking Service (Class 3) - an SCSSV of this class is suitable for
service in wells where corrosive agents could be expected to cause stress cracking.
(Stress corrosion cracking occurs when a corrosive agent, eg. H2 S or CO2 enters the
material structure and reduces its mechanical properties making it more susceptible to
brittle cracking.) This type of valve must conform to Class 1 and Class 2 service and
be manufactured from materials resistant to stress corrosion cracking.
If an SCSSV fails a leak-off test, the safety valve should be equalised, the valve cycled
open then closed, and the leak-off test repeated. If the SCSSV again fails the test, the only
option will be to replace the valve.
viscosity of the control liquid will determine the flowrate through the control line and
hence the rate of closure of the valve. A highly viscous fluid may slow down valve action
to an unacceptable rate.
NOTE: The critical connections for the SCSSV control line are the connection to
the TRSV or the SVLN, and the connections to the lower and upper ends
of the tubing hanger.
NOTE: Water-based hydraulic liquids are generally diminishing in use since they
may cause corrosion in some steels or alloys. Also, due to their water
content, hydrate (‘ice’) formation may be promoted in a gas wells if a
leak develops past an SCSSV seal.
It is extremely important for hydraulic fluid containers to be kept properly sealed since oil-
based hydraulic fluids may absorb water from the atmosphere. Contamination of oil-based
control line fluids with water has implications for:
• Hydrate (‘ice’) formation which may block the control line
• Corrosion of the control line
Similarly, in environments where dust and sand are a problem, hydraulic control fluids
must be filtered (NACE 6).
NOTE: The backflow of wellfluids up the control line are indicative of problems
at the SCSSV. These problems must be investigated.
NOTE: The ingress of sand/debris from the tubing into the control line may
induce sand/debris to collect which may produce potential mechanical
problems; for example, with dynamic (moving) seal areas within an
SCSSV. Telltale signs may be the discolouration of the hydraulic oil
within the reservoir supply tank through closure of an SCSSV.
The speed of closure of an SCSSV is an important factor in the choice of hydraulic control
fluid. Since the force of the power spring must displace control fluid back to surface, the
NOTE: In certain wells, company policy may dictate that a TRSV be set deeply.
By inserting a spacer or spacers into the power spring system, the closing
force can be effectively increased; this will increase the maximum fail-
safe setting depth for the safety valve.
NOTE: The maximum fail-safe depth for a particular model of safety valve is not
a standard number. The maximum fail-safe depth must be determined
for each particular SCSSV installation.
These forces are illustrated in Figure 5.17. Thus, the closing force and hence the closing
pressure Pcl will be the determining factor for establishing the maximum depth at which a
TRSV or a WRSV can be set in the tubing.
For a column of control line fluid of gradient G, the pressure exerted at a (true vertical)
depth D is given by:
P= G×D
If this pressure balances the closing pressure of the power spring in an SCSSV, then the
depth D would represent a maximum depth consideration for that the safety valve. Fail-safe
closure of the safety valve should occur up to but not including this depth value; this depth
is usually called the maximum fail-safe setting depth.
Therefore, the maximum fail-safe setting depth Dfs is given by:
Pcl
Dfs =
G
where Pcl is the closing pressure of the power spring.
However, due to the fact that the closing pressures of a safety valve will vary with
operating conditions and with time, a safety factor SF is included to compensate for
temperature, seal wear, scale deposits, etc. The depth equation then becomes:
Pcl
Dfs =
(G x SF)
NOTE: This will depend on control line fluid gradient, operating valve friction
factors and manufacturer's recommended safety factors.
NOTE: For a well on gas lift, automatic sequencing of safety valve closure would
be injection gas valve first, the UMV second, and then (approximately 3
minutes later) the SCSSV along with the annulus safeguard system last.
A predetermined time interval between closures would be incorporated
into the hydraulic control system.
Surface control manifolds are supplied as complete units containing a hydraulic fluid
reservoir, pressure control regulators, relief valve, pressure gauges and pump with manual
override. An SCSSV control manifold requires only a hydraulic connection to the SCSSV
control line, a pneumatic connection to the low pressure pilot control system, and a
connection to a pneumatic supply line.
A manifold may have one or more air driven hydraulic pumps to maintain the desired
hydraulic pressure to actuate the safety valve. Hydraulic pressure is maintained by a
hydraulic control valve which is operated by the low pressure air control system. Loss of
pressure in either the low pressure control system, SCSSV control line, or the manual
shutdown will close the safety valve. Figure 5.15b illustrates the use of single well control
manifold. In this illustration, it will be assumed that:
• A Hi-Lo monitor pilot and a fusible plug are integrated into the low pressure
pneumatic control system
• The hydraulic system is connected via the control line from the manifold down
to the SCSSV.
Appropriate hydraulic pressure is maintained from the hydraulic pump, through the
hydraulic controller, through the SCSSV control line to hold the safety valve open.
Appropriate pneumatic pressure is maintained in the low pressure control system for the
flowline monitor pilot and the fusible plug; See Figure 5.15c.
If the monitor pilot senses a pressure variation outwith a preset range (eg. due to flowline
rupture) or the compound within the fusible plug melts (due to fire at the wellhead),
pressure will be lost from the low pressure control system. As this pressure exhausts, a
relay valve on the hydraulic controller will block any attempt by the hydraulic pump to
maintain pressure to the SCSSV; See Figure 5.15d. Simultaneously, the hydraulic
controller will allow pressure in the SCSSV control line to bleed off to the manifold
reservoir.
Additional devices that can be integrated with the low pressure control system are:
• Melting or rupture of pressurised plastic line at the wellhead
• Operation of a sand (erosion) probe on the flowline
• Manual operation of emergency shutdown (ESD) system
• Operation of production shutdown (PSD) system (due to eg. high separator
liquid level).
Should the normal pressure integrity of the valve be lost for any reason, then the valve can
be permanently locked in the open position. This is achieved during a single trip with a
Baker permanent lock open tool. This single wireline trip, coupled with application of
tubing pressure, locks the flapper in the open position and allows control line
communication from the hydraulic control line to the ID of the tubing. Thus, a wireline
retrievable insert safety valve can be set in the nipple profile of the tubing retrievable safety
valve and can be activated by the same control line which operated the tubing retrievable
valve.
The ‘FVL’ safety valve has a rated working pressure of 6,000 psi. The flapper will open
with 1,600 psi. above the shut in tubing pressure on the control line. (Its maximum fail-safe
setting depth with salt water in the control line is 890 ft.)
This maximum fail-safe setting depth neglects the possibility of heavier annulus fluid. If
the annulus fluid is heavier than the control line fluid, it must be acknowledged that, should
the control line break, the hydrostatic pressure applied to the safety valve is based on the
gradient of the heavier annulus fluid. Therefore, the maximum setting depth should be
reduced accordingly.
NOTE: An equalising version of this TRSV exists, i.e. the Baker ‘FVLE’, which
provides an equalising button on the flapper valve. When the appropriate
amount of pressure is applied to the control line the flow tube contacts
the button to allow equalisation through the flapper.
Running Procedure
1) Visually inspect the safety valve prior to running it into the well. It is recommended
that a strap or chain wrench be used when making up the safety valve onto the tubing
string. Pipe wrenches must never be used on a critical part. If a pipe wrench is used
during make-up onto the tubing string, wrench marks must be filed off.
2) Verify that the tubing thread connections are made up to correct torque value.
3) Install the control line.
4) Pressurise the control line to 2,000 psi. plus shut-in pressure and isolate pressure to
verify control line/valve pressure integrity. Check visually to ensure that the valve is
fully open. Do not exceed specified control chamber test pressure.
5) Maintain this pressure on the control line while running the tubing and control line in
the hole. Band the control line to the tubing as required. Extreme care should be
exercised to ensure that the control line is not damaged while running in.
6) Make up the control line to the surface hanger using the appropriate surface hanger
fitting.
NOTE: The Baker ‘FVLD’ safety valve is of similar design to the ‘FVL’ except
that the ‘FVLD’ can be set deeper in wells.
Operation
The Baker ‘FVL’ TRSV has the following features:
Closure Mechanism Flapper and Seat
Actuator Type Concentric Piston
Equalization Internal Facility
If the flapper mechanism fails in service, a lock-open tool can be run to permanently hold
the flapper valve open.
Lock-open Procedure
Before locking open a TRSV, every effort must be made to open the valve by the proper
method. A locked-open TRSV cannot be operated again until retrieved from the well.
1) Pressure up the tubing string to equalise pressure across the TRSV. If the closure
mechanism is not equalised before the lock-open tool is installed, the TRSV will not
lock open.
2) Run the lock-open tool, See Figure 5.13, with approximately 100 lbs. of stem and
locate in the appropriate profile in the TRSV.
3) If possible, apply appropriate hold open pressure to the control line. An attempt
should be made to maintain this pressure by the continuous pumping of control line
fluid.
4) Jar downwards to shear the plugs to communicate control line pressure to the tubing.
A drop in control line pressure will be observed or an increase in pump strokes on the
hydraulic manifold.
During the process of opening the valve, the opening procedure should be followed. After
the valve is in the open position, the control line pressure may be adjusted according to the
guidelines.
Testing Procedure
1) Record the control line pressure.
2) Isolate the well to be closed in from the control manifold if it is a multi-well
platform.
3) Shut in the well at the wellhead.
4) Wait a minimum of five minutes to allow stabilisation and then bleed the control line
pressure to shut the SCSSV.
5) Bleed the pressure off the wellhead to the lowest pressure practical and then shut in
the well.
6) Observe the tubing pressure build-up for one hour or measure the flow from the well.
(On some installations, the build-up period may change).
7) If the SCSSV fails to close or if the leakage rate exceeds the manufacturers or
operators guidelines, corrective action such as cycling or setting an insert valve must
be taken.
8) After the SCSSV tests successfully, re-open the SCSSV as described in the ‘Opening
Procedure’.
Opening Procedure
NOTE: This valve has a protection feature which minimises the risk of damage to
the closure mechanism. Due to this feature, the valve will not open unless
pressure is completely equalised across the closure device. The opening
procedure instructions must be followed closely to assure proper results.
1) Pressure must be equalised completely across the closure mechanism. This is done by
pressuring the tubing string before attempting to open the valve. To open a TRSV
with pressure shut in below the valve, proceed as follows:
2) When operating a multi-well platform from one control manifold, all the SCSSVs
may be closed simultaneously, but each SCSSV must be opened individually.
3) To open a valve, close off all control line access to SCSSVs in other wells and close
the wing valve on the Xmas tree.
4) Fill the tubing above the valve with clean fluid or gas. Pressure the tubing to 1,000
psi. below the shut-in pressure.
5) Refer to the manufacturer’s documentation for the opening pressure of the TRSV.
Determine the control line pressure to be applied as follows:
Control line pressure = opening pressure + shut-in pressure
(Control line pressure may be increased to a maximum of 4,000 psi. above the shut-in
pressure if desired).
6) Apply the control line pressure determined in step 5. Set the regulator on the control
manifold pump to maintain this pressure.
7) Increase the tubing pressure until the manifold pump begins to stroke. This indicates
that the tubing pressure equalised across the flapper allowing the TRSV to open.
8) Refer to the ‘Guidelines for Hold-Open Pressure’. Set the regulator on the control
manifold pump to maintain the recommended hold open pressure on the TRSV
during production. The increased control line pressure allowed by the guidelines (up
to maximum hold-open pressure) should be used during non-production operations
such as completion, testing, acidising, etc. During production, the recommended hold
open pressure should be maintained.
Running Procedure
NOTE: The control line and apparatus used to convey control line fluid (tubing
hanger, Xmas tree, etc.) should be pumped through prior to installation
to check for blockage or debris.
1) Attach the control line to the TRSV and pressure the control line up to the opening
pressure.
2) Install the isolation assembly in the TRSV. The equalising sub should be in the
closed position.
3) Run the TRSV to the desired setting depth, strapping the control line securely to the
tubing as it is run in the well.
4) Slowly bleed pressure off the control line. Connect the control line to the tubing
hanger. Pressurise the control line to the opening pressure and land the tubing string.
5) After installing the Xmas Tree, the control line should be checked for trapped air or
gas as follows:
a) Pressure the control line to the opening pressure and hold for 20 minutes
b) Slowly bleed off control line pressure and observe for any passage of air or gas
c) Repeat steps (a) and (b) until control line returns are fluid only.
6) After completion mud is displaced from the tubing, the isolation assembly can be
removed as follows:
• Run the toolstring with the appropriate pulling tool and equalising prong
• Latch the pulling tool in the isolation assembly. Allow 10 minutes to equalise
the pressure in the TRSV through the equalising sub
• Apply sufficient control line pressure to ensure that the TRSV is fully open.
See the ‘Guidelines for Hold-Open Pressure’ for allowable pressures
• Pull the isolation assembly.
If other completion operations (testing the tubing, etc.) are to be performed, the control line
pressure should be sufficient to ensure that the TRSV stays open. See the ‘Guidelines for
Hold-Open Pressure’ for allowable pressures.
When the well is put into production, the control line pressure should be maintained at the
recommended hold-open pressure as outlined in the ‘Guidelines for Hold-Open Pressure’.
The valve is a non-equalising TRSV. Opening the valve requires applying pressure to the
tubing string above the valve to equalise pressure across the closure device. Equalising
pressure across the valve before opening minimises the stress on the sealing surface and
prolongs the life of the valve. The valve also has a ‘protection’ feature that will not allow it
to open unless pressure across the closure mechanism is equalised.
It is retrieved only with the tubing. The valve should not be used to regularly shut in the
well.
Installation
The Otis series ‘10-S’ tubing retrievable sub-surface safety valves are run as part of the
tubing string. When running the safety valve, it should be held open by pressuring the
control line to the recommended hold-open pressure (see Guidelines for Hold Open
Pressure in section ). The control line is to be strapped securely to the tubing directly above
the valve and just below the tubing hanger with no less than two straps per joint. If the
tubing is ‘riding’ one side of the hanger or riser pipe while running in the hole, the control
line must face away from this to prevent damage.
NOTE: Completion mud entering the spring chamber can adversely affect the
operation of the TRSV.
During pressure testing the string, ensure that the TRSV operating pressure is sufficient to
hold the TRSV open.
During assembly of the valve, the spring chamber is filled with grease to act as a barrier to
mud. Also, the use of an isolation assembly to isolate the TRSV from mud during
completion is recommended.
The isolation assembly is made up, from top to bottom, of a lock mandrel, equalising valve
assembly, extension and isolation sleeve with O-rings; See Figure 5.12.
NOTE: Different end subs exist for the ‘FNX’ and ‘FNR’ TRSVs which
incorporate ‘X’ and ‘R’ nipple profiles respectively for the installation of
an isolation assembly or WRSV insert valve.
Operation
The Otis ‘FN’ TRSV has the following features:
Closure Mechanism Flapper and Seat
Actuator Type Concentric Piston
Equalisation No Internal Facility
(ie. must be performed manually)
If the flapper mechanism fails in service, a lock-open tool can be run to permanently hold
the flapper valve open.
The Otis ‘FN’ tubing retrievable safety valve contains a piston (opposed by a compression
spring and well pressure) which operates a flapper mechanism. When pressure is released
from the piston chamber, the spring moves the piston up and the torsion spring rotates the
flapper to the ‘closed’ position.
Method A
1) Shut the well in at the wellhead.
2) Slowly apply hydraulic pressure to the control line in 50 psi. stages until the first sign
of an increase in tubing head pressure is observed at surface. This indicates that the
secondary valve has moved fractionally offseat. (Wellfluid will flow through the
outer equalisation ports, upwards past the secondary valve and through the inner
ports into the tubing above the flapper.) Maintain this control line pressure until the
tubing head pressure is stable indicating that equalisation is complete.
3) Increase the hydraulic control line pressure to a pressure equal to the CITHP plus the
opening pressure of the valve plus a 400 psi. safety margin minus the hydrostatic
head of control line fluid. This will fully open the secondary valve system. This
hydraulic pressure should be maintained on the control line to keep the safety valve
open.
4) Open the well.
NOTE: It is essential that this control line pressure does not exceed the rated
working pressure of the wellhead connections.
Method B
1) Shut the well in at the wellhead.
2) Slowly apply pressure to the tubing above the safety valve at least equal to the CITHP
of the well.
3) Apply hydraulic pressure to the safety valve control line. This hydraulic pressure
should be equal to the CITHP plus the opening pressure of the valve plus a 400 psi.
safety margin minus the hydrostatic head of control line fluid. This hydraulic
pressure should be maintained on the control line to keep the safety valve open.
4) Open the well.
Operation
The Camco ‘WRDP-2’ WRSV has the following features:
Closure Mechanism Flapper and Seat.
Actuator Type Rod Piston.
Equalisation Internal Facility.
The ‘WRDP-2’ operates as follows
Hydraulic pressure is applied from surface through the control line. The rod pistons and the
flow tube are moved downwards, opening the flapper valve. The hydraulic pressure applied
must produce sufficient force to compress the power spring and overcome the force
generated by production pressure acting on the cross sectional area of the rod pistons.
Loss of hydraulic fluid pressure from the control line allows the restoring force of the
power spring to move the flow tube upwards and out of the flapper system. The flapper
spring, assisted by well pressure, closes the valve.
Testing Procedure
1) Record the control pressure.
2) Isolate the well to be closed in from the control manifold if it is a multi-well
platform.
3) Shut in the well at the wellhead.
4) Wait a minimum of five minutes to allow stabilisation and then bleed the control line
pressure to shut the SCSSV.
5) Bleed the pressure off the wellhead to the lowest pressure practical and then shut in
the well.
6) Observe tubing pressure build-up for an appropriate time as per Company policy to
determine the leak-off rate if any.
7) If the SCSSV fails to close or if the leakage rate exceeds Company policy, corrective
action such as cycling or pulling the valve must be taken.
8) After the SCSSV tests successfully, equalise and re-open the SCSSV.
Pulling Procedure
1) Close in the well at the Xmas tree.
2) Attach the pulling prong to the pulling tool (type ‘GR’) and make up onto the
wireline toolstring.
3) Lower the pulling tool into the lock mandrel while holding pressure on the control
line to maintain the SCSSV in the ‘open’ position.
4) Tap down to ensure that the dogs on the pulling tool are engaged properly in the
fishing neck of the lock mandrel.
5) Bleed the control line pressure to CITHP and isolate control manifold pump.
6) Tap down to ensure that any binding between the keys and the expander sleeve is
relieved.
7) Pick up the estimated weight of the toolstring. Include the SCSSV and lock mandrel
plus 200 lbs. to ensure that the pulling tool has latched the fishing neck.
8) Upward jarring will move the expander mandrel up, unlocking the lock mandrel.
Continued upward jarring will move the packing stacks out of the polished bores,
allowing the valve to be pulled to the surface.
Running Procedure
1) Make up the appropriate prong onto the running tool (type ‘X’).
2) Attach the appropriate locking mandrel (type ‘X’) to the SCSSV.
3) Connect a pressure source to the threaded connection in the valve housing and apply
enough pressure to open the ball.
4) Insert the running tool through the bore of the locking mandrel and into the bore of
the valve far enough to engage the upper end of the piston.
NOTE: The running prong should hold the ball open. If it closes when pressure is
released, remove the running tool and prong and repeat steps 1 through 4
using the correct running prong.
NOTE: If it is desirable to set this valve deeper, additional spring modules may
be added to offset the increased hydrostatic head of the hydraulic control
fluid.
The ‘DKX’ valve has been designed with a theoretical opening ratio of 1.1. However,
additional pressure is required to overcome seal friction and it should not be unexpected
that an opening ratio of the order of 1.2 to 1.4 times the pressure below the valve in order
to open the valve.
Running and Pulling Equipment
Wireline Running Equipment ‘X’ Running Tool c/w Prong.
Wireline Pulling Equipment ‘GR’ Pulling Tool c/w Prong.
Wireline Lock ‘X’ Lock Mandrel
Operation
The Otis ‘DK’/‘DKX’ Safety Valve has the following features:
Closure Mechanism Ball and Seat
Actuator Type Concentric Piston
Equalisation Internal Facility
This ball valve assembly consists of a ball, seat, control arms, sleeve weldment (with guide
and drive pins), and alignment pins; the ball is provided with slots to accommodate the
drive pins. The operation of the ball valve assembly is as follows. Downward movement of
the valve seat and control arms within the sleeve weldment will move the ball downwards.
This downward movement causes a 90o rotation of the ball to the open position due to the
(stationary) drive pins; guide pins ensure that this rotation occurs in the same plane. The
reverse of the above action will close the valve assembly.
Figure 5.9 illustrates the operation of the ‘DK’ valve. Figure 5.9a shows the safety valve in
its closed position with well pressure trapped beneath the ball valve.
To open the valve, hydraulic pressure greater than the well pressure is applied to move the
piston downwards by concentric piston actuation. With the valve seat screwed directly to
the lower end of the piston this downward movement will offseat the secondary valve and
expose the equalisation ports allowing well pressure to equalise across the valve; See
Figure 5.9b. This minimises the possibility of damage to primary sealing surfaces when
opening the valve. As additional pressure is applied, the piston continues its downward
movement, the sleeve weldment butts up against the body, and the ball rotates to the open
position, See Figure 5.9c. The ‘wiping’ action of the ball across the seat ensures a good
clean sealing surface.
Upon loss of hydraulic pressure, the power spring is designed to lift the hydraulic head of
control fluid and mechanically rotate the ball into a closed position by the reverse of the
above action.
NOTE: The ‘DKX’ safety valve is of similar design to the ‘DK’ except that the
‘DKX’ permits faster equalisation across the ball valve.
NOTE: The ‘DKD’ safety valve is of similar design to the ‘DK’ except that the
‘DKD’ can be set deeper in the well. A modified SVLN with balance line
and Lock Mandrel are required to operate this valve.
All valves having an equalising facility require a secondary seal. The ball and seat
comprises the primary sealing system while the equalising valve and seat comprises the
secondary system. Both the primary and secondary sealing surfaces in the ‘DK’ and ‘DKX’
valves are metal-to-metal. Well pressure in excess of 3,500 psi, should provide the
necessary energy to produce good sealing ability with metal-to-metal surfaces, but
unloading across this metal surface when equalising under high differential pressure is
likely to damage the sealing surface.
Pressure sealing within the nipple is achieved by the packing stacks on the lock mandrel
and on the attached WRSV which locate in the landing nipple's upper and lower seal bores
respectively. These packing stacks also provide a seal above and below the control line port
within the nipple. Control fluid, introduced through the control line (usually a 1 /4 inch OD
conduit), enters the valve and the build up of hydraulic pressure will actuate (open) the
valve.
b) Tubing Retrievable SCSSVs
A tubing retrievable SCSSV is run as an integral part of the completion string. The
equipment requirements for tubing retrievable safety valves (TRSVs) are:
• TRSV
• Hydraulic control line
• Hydraulic control manifold.
If a TRSV fails in service, the following additional equipment may be required to continue
production:
• Lockout tool
• Insert wireline retrievable safety valve (WRSV)
• Wireline installation and retrieval tools.
To replace the TRSV, the completion string will need to be pulled, at least to the depth of
the safety valve.
NOTE: WRSVs and TRSVs are available with ball or flapper type closure
systems.
An SVLN is machined with an internal profile which receives the locking keys of the
appropriate lock mandrel used to run, locate and lock the WRSV. The control line
connection is solid in construction and its geometry, being raised, offers a large degree of
protection for the hydraulic control line; an external lug is often provided to increase this
protection. In general, SVLNs are usually non-welded nipples designed to absorb shock
while being run in the casing and to resist cracking due to corrosion.
SVLNs are available in various configurations depending on the intended WRSV, top and
bottom thread connections and tubing weight characteristics.
A Lock Mandrel is a removable locking device used to locate, lock and seal off a WRSVs
in the appropriate SVLN. The WRSV is attached to the lower end of the lock mandrel. The
lock mandrel provides a positive lock where keys are mechanically locked out into the
internally machined recess in the SVLN.
NOTE: When running a WRSV, an opening prong on the wireline toolstring will
be used to retain the valve in the open position. When locked into the
SVLN, hydraulic pressure will be applied to the control line to keep the
valve open before retrieval of the toolstring.
A safety valve landing nipple is a short tubular component primarily designed to lock a
WRSV in the production tubing string. The main features of an SVLN are:
• Control line port
• Locking groove or profile
• Polished seal bore above the control line port
• Polished seal bore below the control line port
• No-Go shoulder.
1) Direct Controlled
This type of SSSV uses the flowing characteristics of a well to keep the valve open. Any
deviations from these ‘normal’ conditions (eg. destruction of the wellhead or a rupture of a
surface production flowline producing a change in flowrate) will cause the safety valve to
close. Such valves are generally termed Sub-Surface Controlled Sub-Surface Safety
Valves or ‘storm chokes’. However, if an emergency arose on surface (eg. surface fire near
oil and gas separation equipment) which does not directly affect the flowing characteristics
of the well, closure of the safety valve will not occur. Since such a system lacks human
control, the use of safety valves of this type are diminishing. Directly controlled SSSVs
will not be discussed here as they have little or no application in North Sea wells.
2) Remote Controlled
This type of safety valve, as the name suggests, moves the point of control from downhole
to the surface. The remote operation of this type of valve from surface can be integrated
with pressure pilots, emergency shut-down systems (ESD, PSD) and surface safety control
manifolds. Thus, Surface Controlled Sub-Surface Safety Valves (SCSSVs) are better suited
to the manual and automatic action required for many wells today.
In the simplest system, a remotely controlled safety valve is held open by transmitting
hydraulic pressure, supplied by a manifold at surface, through a stainless steel line to the
valve. This pressure is supplied by hydraulic pumps controlled by a pressure pilot installed
at some strategic point at the wellhead. Damage to the wellhead or flowline causes the
pressure pilot to be activated resulting in a loss of hydraulic pressure from the control line
and closure of the safety valve shutting off all flow up the tubing.
A typical SCSSV installation is shown in Figure 5.1; this well schematic also features
annulus safeguard for the gas lift system.
Thus, the main reasons for utilising SSSVs on land, platform and offshore installations are:
• To protect the surface from corrosive well fluids
• To protect people, equipment (especially on offshore installations), the
environment and the reservoir
• General ‘what if’ safety.
and these reasons have greater implications for wells which have been drilled and
completed in geologically unstable areas and politically unstable areas/potential war zones.
Nowadays, in the light of the potential effects of oil and gas discharges into the
environment, most operating companies have a definitive policy regarding wells that can
sustain natural flow. In many countries, the inclusion of an SSSV as the primary safety
device in a well in the event of an emergency is dictated by government legislation.
Figure 5.1 - ‘Tear Drop’ Rope Socket and Conventional Rope Socket
This design is also available for braided line up to 5/ 16” diameter. There are two types of
slips, the overload release type and the plain type; See Figure 4.2.
The overload release type is designed to cause the line to break under severe loading at a
specific percentage of the full strength of the line. A range of five breaking strength slips
are available: 50%, 60%, 70%, 80% and 90% of line strength.
The plain type is designed without the overload release feature. Experience indicates that
the line will usually break near the top end of these slips at approximately 90% of the
breaking strength of the line. It is recommended to pull test these rope sockets prior to
running in the hole.
5 ROPE SOCKETS
The rope socket provides the means to attach the wireline to the tool string.
Two types of rope sockets exist for the different sizes of wireline.
NOTE: Different sizes of clamps must be used for 3 /16 “ braided lines.
The measuring device is normally mounted on moveable supports so that it can move
laterally, guided by the operator as the wire is spooled onto or from the drum. This is
controlled with a handwheel inside the cab through a spindle and chain arrangement.
A measuring wheel exists for each wire diameter and may be calibrated in feet or metres.
When changing the diameters of wire, it is only necessary to change the wheel and pressure
wheels which are supplied in matched sets.
Prior to threading the wire through the counter, check that the counter wheel is free to
rotate and that the odometer is recording - this is especially important when there is a
flexible connection to the odometer in the cab. Also check for wear in the counter rim and
pressure wheels.
b) Description
The main component of the counter is an accurately machined grooved sheave around
which the wireline is normally wrapped once; See Figure 3.13. Contact of the wireline with
this measuring wheel is maintained by the tension in the wireline and by two adjustable
pressure wheels machined to fit into the groove of the measuring wheel. The wheel is
attached, either directly to the axis of a digital meter (odometer) or by means of a flexible
drive, permitting location of the meter on the panel inside the cabin of the wireline unit.
For braided lines, straight line type measuring devices, such as those manufactured by
Mathey, Bowen, Gearhardt Owen and Otis are utilised. Alternatively, the measuring wheel
on the Halliburton type head can be changed and the 3/ 16“ line run straight through the
head and not wrapped around the wheel. Care should be taken to ensure that the correct
path for the line round the measuring wheels is selected to avoid reverse bending of the
wire.
In addition to preventing the overloading of the wireline, the Weight Indicator will also
show changes in tension due to:
• Fluid levels or changes in fluid density
• Jar action
• Position of downhole equipment.
A different Martin Decker Weight Indicator is used for 3/16“ line because of the higher pull
which can be exerted. The load cell for this instrument has a smaller cross-sectional area in
the diaphragm and is matched to a higher range dial (gauge). The gauge load cell cannot be
interchanged.
• Maximum loading(standard) = 2,000 lbs. (approx.)
• 3/16“ unit = 4,000 lbs. (approx.).
Fluid loss can occur due to leaks or punctured hose etc. and occasionally the system needs
to be refilled.
The load cell must then be calibrated against a tensiometer or another weight indicating
device.
NOTE: Prior to bleeding the system, the hydraulic line should be laid out with no
bends in it to allow free flow of the fluid.
The load cell is provided with a connection at the top to attach to the hay pulley and at the
bottom to attach to the Xmas Tree forming a pull at 90o . The system is calibrated to this
right angle pull and accuracy will be slightly affected if this angle is not true but the
sensitivity of the system is always maintained.
NOTE: If a 90o angle cannot be achieved, refer to Guidex for correction factor.
The gauge is a 6 ins. diameter fluid filled instrument which can be fastened onto the winch.
A damper is provided on the gauge to set the pointer motion to the required sensitivity. The
fluid filled case eliminates severe vibrations and also lubricates and protects the load gap
before and during wireline operations. If fluid leaks out and this gap closes, the readings on
the gauge will be incorrect.
The lower Hay Pulley should be so positioned that the wireline goes through an angle of
90o at the wellhead or lubricator/riser as this is necessary to ensure accurate weight
indicator readings when the hay pulley is attached to the wellhead via a weight indicator. In
addition, the location of the hay pulley must be such that wireline handling when jarring up
by hand, hand feeling of the wireline toolstring into the lubricator or when pulling out of
the well, etc. can be readily accomplished. It is also important to secure the hay pulley as
close as possible to the wellhead or riser in order to avoid lateral loading of the lubricator
during heavy jarring operations. Securing of the hay pulley to the wellhead is best
accomplished by means of a chain or a wire rope sling. The hay pulley should be installed
with the lock pin facing upwards to ensure that it cannot fall out during wireline operations.
Sheaves are manufactured to suit the wireline size.
The sheave diameters for well measuring lines should be as large as the design of the
equipment will permit but not less than 120 times the diameter of the wire, otherwise cold
working of wireline material will occur, resulting in premature failure.
The Hay Pulley generally has a hole for the attachment of a line wiper which is used to
remove corrosive liquids and dirt from the line as it is spooled onto the drum.
b) Maintenance
Always check the shackle connection and the swivel for wear and tear and replace any
worn parts as the connection is subject to high shock loading and the pulley can cause
severe injuries if it breaks loose.
WARNING: HIGH PRESSURE - Never allow any part of the human body to come
in front of or in direct contact with the grease outlet. Accidental
operation of the pump could cause an injection into the flesh. If
injection occurs, medical aid must be immediately obtained from a
physician.
a) Grease System
The system pump draws grease from the grease reservoir through the pump suction tube
and it is pumped to the outlet port which is split into two lines. One line delivers grease to
the control panel vent valve which allows the operator to vent grease pressure to
atmosphere via a short hose into an alternate grease reservoir which is not in use (this is
normally permissible as grease from this source should be clean; however, care should be
taken to isolate grease from airborne contamination). The other line is the grease supply
line plumbed via a rotary valve to hose storage reels and then to the appropriate grease
head; See Figure 3.9.
The grease return line via the hose reel, rotary valve, and system pressure gauge leads to a
system pressure control vent valve from which the vented grease flow rate is controlled.
This grease is plumbed (now at atmosphere pressure) through a short flexible hose to a
waste grease container and should not be re-used as this may be contaminated. Excessive
grease returns will indicate incorrectly sized flow tubes.
NOTE: If a 5 /16 ” line is used, the supply pump must be fitted with at least a 3 /4 ”
ID. hose to ensure adequate supply to retain seal.
b) Pneumatics
The drive air enters the unit via a bulkhead quick connect to a pressure control valve which
is pilot controlled from the control panel and also acts as a stop/start control. A separate
supply is plumbed to the control panel into a three way, two position valve. Position one is
where the supply is blocked with the reservoir vented to atmosphere, position two is where
the supply air is directed to the reservoir via the reservoir lid pressure controller; both allow
the operator an auto pre-set reservoir pressurisation or vent to atmosphere in one control
valve.
The Grease Injection Control Head is composed of three flow tube sleeves, a flow tube
sleeve coupling, a quick union pin end, a flow hose and a line rubber and hydraulic packing
nut assembly at the upper end. The amount of flow tube sleeve used depends on the well
pressure. For 3/ 16” Braided Line:
• 3 flow tubes 0 - 4,000 psi.
• 4 flow tubes 4,000 - 6,000 psi.
• 5 or 6 flow tubes 6,000 - 10,000 psi.
The flow tubes are close-fitting around the wireline and they, along with the flow tube
sleeves, form the main length of the grease head. This appreciable length affords sufficient
length to form an effective pressure barrier.
The flow tube sleeves are simplified body parts which hold the various other components
rigidly together and seal them. In addition, they are made of a very hard metal and the wire
predominantly bears on them, preventing wear on the other parts. The flow tube coupling
forms a junction for the flow tubes and also as the point of entry for the grease.
The Hydraulic Packing Nut is a simple but efficient device which is remotely operated by a
hydraulic hand-pump assembly. The Hydraulic Packing Nut is actuated by pumping
pressure into the cylinder. When a complete seal is established, the pressure is maintained
by closing the valve at the hand pump assembly. The pressure may be relieved by opening
the valve and thus relaxing the seal. Thus, the piston in the packing nut is retracted by a
strong spring when the pressure is relieved from the piston.
The body has a port into which is assembled a flow hose to lead off any seepage that
migrates through the line and finds its way above the two flow tubes.
The optional differential pressure regulator valve, when used, controls the flow of grease to
the control head which is supplied by the grease supply system. In all cases, the grease is
delivered at a pressure of 350 psi. to 400 psi. greater than the wellhead pressure.
The Grease Injection Head, See Figure 3.7, is designed to effectively seal off stranded
wirelines, such as fishing and logging cables. The Grease Injection Head utilises grease or
honey oil, pumped under high pressure from a grease pump, into a very small annular
space between the outside of the wire and the inside of a tube covering it. The high
pressure fluid provides two sealing mechanisms:
• Since stranded lines have interstices between the strands and between layers
which cannot be packed off in a more direct, conventional manner, the sealing
fluid fills these spaces, depriving the well fluid of escape paths inside and
around the wire
• The sealing fluid in the small annular space is held at a higher pressure than
that in the well, forming a barrier to the flow of wellhead fluids and gases.
This results in the complete sealing and also lubrication of the wireline which reduces
friction.
NOTE: When calculating the amount of stem required to overcome the well
pressure, a percentage must be added to compensate for friction.
a) Benefits
The need for a man to climb the Lubricator is eliminated.
The hand pump is positioned away from the nut itself, and therefore possible escaping well
fluid.
b) Operation
The Hydraulic Packing Nut Assembly includes a piston which has a permissible travel of
0.4 in. enclosed in a housing. The housing has a 1/ 4“ NPT connection for a hydraulic hose.
The area above the piston is arranged so that when hydraulic pressure is applied to this
area, the piston is forced downward against the force of the spring. This downward action
of the piston is transmitted to the upper packing gland. This is designed to cause the
Stuffing Box packing to be squeezed around the wireline, sealing off well fluids within the
Stuffing Box.
For solid wirelines, only pressure containing Stuffing Boxes are utilised. The standard
Stuffing Box is available in 5,000 psi. and 10,000 psi. pressure ratings although higher
pressure ratings are now also available.
The essential function of the Wireline Stuffing Box is to ensure containment or sealing off
around solid wirelines, whether stationary or in motion, at the upper end of the Lubricator
during wireline operations. In addition, most Stuffing Boxes contain a BOP plunger which
is forced out of the packing section to seal off flow in the event of wireline breakage.
A swivel-mounted (360o free movement) sheave wheel and guard are fitted to the top half
of the Stuffing Box. The wheel is positioned so as to maintain the passage of the wire
through the centre of the packing rubbers.
The sheave guard on the Stuffing Box is designed to trap any wire which breaks on the
surface before it drops downhole.
The adjustment to the packing retainer nut at the top of the Lubricator is time consuming
and a Hydraulic Packing Nut (See Section 3.4) can be installed so that control can be
executed from the deck.
A colour coding system is implemented by Shell Expro. The colour coding system uses
one or two bands of colour to identify the service. The pressure rating is identified by the
base colour of the item (eg. lubricator) or accessory and should satisfy the following:
Maximum Working Pressure Colour
psi.
3,000 Red
5,000 Dark Green
10,000 White
15,000 Yellow
Table 4.1 - Colour Coding and Pressure Rating of Pressure Control Equipment
b) Construction
Lubricators for normal service (up to 5,000 psi.) can be made of carbon or manganese
steel. Over 5,000 psi., consideration should be given to sour service as quantities of H2S
can be absorbed into the steel of the Lubricator body and heat treatment becomes
necessary.
All Lubricator sections must have full certification from the manufacturer or test house. A
standard colour code identifies different pressure ratings of lubricator.
d) Equalising Valves
Permits equalisation of pressure from below the closed rams, after bleed off of the
lubricator. The equalising valve must be opened and closed prior to use.
A check should be made to ensure that the equalising assembly is not inverted and that the
retainer screw is towards the bottom of the valve; See Figure 3.1.
When operating with stranded/braided line, it is strongly recommended that a twin valve or
two single valves (one on top of the other), be installed and equipped with the appropriate
size moulded rams with the lower rams inverted to shut off from above. This enables
grease injection between the rams to block off the interstices of the braided line, preventing
leakage through the internal parts of the wire.
NOTE: If the BOP fails test, the equalising valve should be checked to confirm it
is fully closed.
a) Description
A Lubricator allows wireline tools to enter or be removed from the well under pressure. It
is a tube of selected ID. and can be connected with other sections to the desired length by
means of Quick Unions; See Figure 3.3.
The following factors govern the selection of Lubricators:
• Shut-in wellhead pressure
• Well fluid
• Wireline tool diameter
• Length of wireline tools.
The lowermost Lubricator section normally has one or more bleed off valves installed; a
pressure gauge can be connected to one of the valves to monitor pressure in the Lubricator.
If the Lubricator has no facility to install valves then a Bleed-off Sub, a short Lubricator
section with two valves fitted, should be connected between the Wireline Valve and
Lubricator.
Quick Unions connect Lubricator sections together and to the Wireline Valve; these unions
have Acme type threads and seal by means of an O-ring, thereby requiring only tightening
by hand; See Figure 3.4.
c) Description of Operation
A mechanical or hydraulic force is applied to close the rams to seal against well pressure.
The sealing elements are arranged so that the differential pressure across them forces them
closed and upwards, assisting in the sealing action.
Figure 3.2 shows the ram configuration of a Wireline Valve. Blind rams close without wire
and will also close on 0.108 in. wire without damage. Both 3/ 16 in. and 7/ 32 in. rams have a
semi circular groove in each of the two ram faces to permit the ram to close and seal on 3/16
in. or 7/ 32 in. braided line.
NOTE: Ensure that the correct guide is installed as an incorrect guide may
damage or cut the wire.
NOTE: Damage and abuse may not always be obvious or the significance be
appreciated. Wire damage (mechanical, corrosion, wire winding) effects
are cumulative.
If the number of turns is satisfactory, the test piece is deemed to have passed the test,
irrespective of the position of the failure. If the number of turns does not satisfy the
requirements of the specification and if failure is within 0.5 cm of the grips, the test shall
be considered as invalid and shall be repeated.
If, when making any individual test, the first specimen fails, then two additional specimens
should be tested. The average from any two will then be taken as the value to represent the
wire. If these also fail, 450 ft. of wire should be pulled from the drum and the test repeated.
On further failure of the tests, a maximum of two more 450 ft. lengths should be removed
and tests conducted. If, after this, the wireline still fails, the Wireline Supervisor should be
informed in order to make a decision on the disposition of the line.
Few people appreciate the significance of the torsion test as a definitive wire quality arbiter
for carbon steel wirelines. It is not just the number of twists to failure that is important, but
more specifically, whether the material exhibits a ‘ductile’ or a ‘brittle’ primary fracture.
As the end of the wire is used for testing, it will not give true representative conditions of
work hardened areas on the spool.
3 BRAIDED LINE
The conventional cable comprises 16 (9+6+1) strands; See Figure. 2.1a. The core and the
right - lay inner wires are thinner than the left-lay outer wires. By using right and left lay
the twisting tendency of the wire under load is prevented.
Table 2.1 gives wireline data relating to conventional braided line.
Size dia. Flow Weight Rec. Minimum Breaking Load
Min.
Tube Pulley Galvanised 316 Supa 60 Supa 70
Bore dia. Stainles /Supa 75
s Steel
ins. ins. lbs/1,000 ins. lbs. lbs. lbs. lbs.
ft
3/16 0.196 71.1 12 4,960 3,990 3680 4,320
1/4 0.228 95.9 14 6,610 5,400 4960 5,842
7/32 0.261 125.5 16 8,640 7,030 6480 7,600
3/4 0.327 195.9 20 13,490 11,000 10120 11,660
Table 3.1 - Relative Strengths of Various Conventional Braided Wirelines
Some time ago Bridon introduced Dyform cable; See Figure 2.1b. Around the single centre
core are nine thinner right-lay wires, the outer wires are also right-lay, but thicker. The
finished cable is pulled through a die, and by doing this the following improvements are
made:
• 20% increase in breaking load, because there is more steel in the same diameter
• Smooth external periphery and closer tolerance of outside diameter, reducing
leakage at the stuffing box
• Higher crush resistance because of the increased steel content of the cable. Low
twist tendency because of the Dyform process.
b) Performing Authority
The Performing Authority is the senior person actually in charge of the task on a
continuous basis who is present on the site during the work.
The Performing Authority is responsible for and signs the Permit to acknowledge that both
he/she and his/her men will:
• Comply with the conditions specified on the Permit
• Use the protective equipment specified on the Permit.
The Performing Authority signs the Permit at the end of the task to certify:
• The status of the task specified on the Permit
• That all his workforce has been withdrawn from the worksite
• That the worksite has been left safe and clean.
c) Isolating Authority
An Isolating Authority is appointed by the Permit Officer and is responsible for the
application and removal of isolations under an ICC. The Isolating Authority carries out his
duties under the instructions of the Permit Officer. His expertise in his particular discipline
will enable him to advise the Permit Officer as to the isolations required for an ICC or
Sanction to Test. His discipline can be:
• Mechanical
• Electrical
• Process
• Control.
b) Period of Validity
The Entry Certificate is valid for an indefinite period subject to gas retest which will be
carried out at a maximum interval of 12 hours. The Permit Officer or Authorised Gas
Tester may stipulate a more frequent retest if conditions dictate.
c) Signatories
The Entry Certificate must be signed by the Permit Officer.
d) Copies
There are two copies of each Entry Certificate. They are distributed as follows:
• Original Performing Authority, for display at worksite
• First Copy Permit office.
a) Activities Covered
Before a Permit to Work can be issued for a task it may be necessary for the equipment or
plant to be worked on to be isolated. The Isolation Confirmation Certificate (ICC)
combines on one document a record of all the isolations required for a task to proceed in
safety. The equipment may require isolation from:
• Sources of electricity
• Process fluids and pressure
• Mechanical drive
• Control systems.
The ICC ensures that the isolations are applied and documented in a thorough, systematic
manner.
b) Period of Validity
The ICC is raised before the Permit to Work is issued, and it remains in force at least until
the Permit to Work is cancelled. The ICC will only be cancelled upon the cancellation
declaration being signed by the Area Authority.
c) Signatories
The ICC must be signed by the Permit Officer or his deputy and each of the involved
Isolating Authorities. The Permit Officer signs for isolations to be applied or removed and
to certify that the plant is available for return to normal operations.
The Isolating Authorities sign for each isolation they apply and remove.
d) Copies
There are two copies of each ICC. One copy is retained by the issuing Isolating Authority,
the second copy is given to the Permit Office.
e) Copies
There are two copies of each Cold Work (General Operation) Permit. They are distributed
as follows:
• Original Performing Authority, for display at worksite
• First Copy Permit office.
No Permit Required
a) Activities Covered
Under certain circumstances the Permit Officer may allow work to be carried out in his
area of control without the issue of a Permit. The discretion to use this facility lies entirely
with the Permit Officer. The decision must be taken only after deliberate consideration of
the circumstances.
The Permit Officer may give a verbal instruction or use a Maintenance Request form to
allow work to be carried out by suitably competent persons.
The work must not be hazardous to either the person who carries it out or to anyone else,
and the Permit Officer must be satisfied that all reasonably practicable steps have been
taken to ensure the safety of those involved, and anyone else that the work might affect.
Activities covered may include:
• Routine materials handling
• Routine work in offices.
• General cold work inside workshops
• Visual inspection of areas (not including confined spaces)
• Operating or demonstrating portable fire-fighting equipment or life saving
appliances during drills or training.
b) Workshop Operations
At his discretion the Permit Officer may issue, in the form of a memorandum, standing
orders to cover operations in workshops. Such orders can be valid only for designated
workshops and the authorised use of permanent facilities provided in the workshops. The
order should be prominently displayed in the workshops to which it refers. The
memorandum should include specific precautions and conditions to be observed.
b) Colour
The Cold Work (General Operation) Permit is blue in colour.
c) Period of Validity
The Cold Work (General Operation) Permit is valid for a continuous period of up to 72
hours. Revalidation is required every 12 hours or at a shift change.
b) Colour
The Cold Work (Well Intervention) Permit is yellow in colour.
c) Period of Validity
The Cold Work (Well Intervention) Permit is valid for continuous period of up to 24 hours.
Revalidation is required every 12 hours or at a shift change.
d) Signatories
The Cold Work (Well Intervention) Permit must be approved by the Permit Officer or his
appointed deputy.
e) Copies
There are two copies of each Cold Work (Well Intervention) Permit. They are distributed
as follows:
• Original Performing Authority, for display at worksite
• First Copy Permit Office.
b) Colour
The Hot Work (Spark Potential) Permit is green in colour.
c) Period of Validity
The Hot Work (Spark Potential) Permit is valid for a continuous period of up to 72 hours.
Revalidation is required every 12 hours or at a shift change.
d) Signatories
The Hot Work (Spark Potential) Permit must be approved by the Permit Officer or his
appointed deputy..
e) Copies
There are two copies of each Hot Work (Spark Potential) Permit. They are distributed as
follows:
• Original Performing Authority, for display at worksite
• First Copy Permit office.
b) Colour
The Hot Work (Naked Flame) Permit is red in colour.
c) Period of Validity
The Hot Work (Naked Flame) Permit is valid for a continuous period of up to 24 hours.
Revalidation is required every 12 hours or at a shift change.
d) Signatories
The Hot Work (Naked Flame) Permit must be approved by the Permit Officer or his
appointed deputy.
e) Copies
There are two copies of each Hot Work (Naked Flame) Permit. They are distributed as
follows:
• Original Performing Authority, for display at worksite
• First Copy Permit office.
The PTW system requires the involvement of competent and responsible persons as well as
the application of particular safety measures in a controlled sequence. The PTW system
ensures that responsibility and accountability for safe working practices is passed in a
logical sequence to those responsible for the work being carried out at any given time, and
ensures that specified effective safeguards are provided.
The Tristar PTW system in operation at the training centre, has been formulated from
various offshore PTW systems to cover the activities carried out at Tristar’s unique training
facility.
Supplementary certificates may be required to augment the PTW when specialist activities
are performed in conjunction with a task. While separate from the PTW, they are clearly
cross-referenced on each document.
• Confirmation of isolation
• Entry
CAUTION: The guidelines are not precise weights. Use them with caution. If in
doubt, make a more detailed assessment.
f) Don’t jerk
Lift smoothly, keeping control of the load.
i) Individual capability
For the working population the guideline weights will give reasonable protection to nearly
all men and between one-half and two-thirds of women. To provide similar protection to
nearly all working women, reduce the guideline weights by about a third.
Any operation involving more than twice the guideline weights should be rigorously
assessed - even for very fit, well-trained individuals working under favourable conditions.
2.2.3 Control
As with other hazardous substances, safe working with H2 S is controlled by the Control of
Substances Hazardous to Health (COSHH) Regulations. Company Health and Safety
System N0. 802 - Hydrogen Sulphide, details the procedures that have to be followed to
control exposure to H2 S.
If it has been concluded that there is no likelihood of risk to health, or any risk is
insignificant, the assessment is complete and no further action is needed (until review of
the assessment). If it is concluded that there are risks to health, it has to be decided what
else is needed to comply fully with the regulations.
2.2 H2 S GAS
Properties and dangers of H2 S gas
• H2 S is a highly toxic (as dangerous as cyanide), flammable, colourless gas
heavier than air with the odour of rotten eggs.
• Even very low concentrations impairs the sense of smell, quickly causes
unconsciousness and kills.
• Be aware of the hazards and the proper precautions to avoid its effects.
• H2 S concentrations greater than 10 parts per million are dangerous.
• H2 S dangerously corrodes equipment not designed for H2 S (sour) service.
2.1.4 Hazard
The hazard presented by a substance is its potential to cause harm. It may cause coughing,
damage to internal organs or even cause death. Some substances can cause harm in several
ways, by breathing, swallowing or absorption through the skin.
2.1.5 Risk
The risk from a substance is the likelihood that it will cause harm during use. This depends
on:
• The hazard presented by the substance
• How it is used
• Control of exposure
• Quantity exposed to
• Length of exposure
• Personal vulnerability
There can be a substantial risk even from a substance that is not particularly hazardous, if
exposure is excessive. With proper precautions, however, the risk of being harmed by even
the most hazardous of substances can be very small.
Apart from the pain and suffering, there is also a high economic price to be paid for all this
occupation ill health. The workers and their families lose earnings. Employers lose money
from reduced productivity and lost production. Accidents cause disruption. Prosecutions
and civil actions can be very expensive. The nation as a whole has to pay for the sickness
benefit and National Health Service care involved.
SIGNED DATE
b) Wellsite
We must assume the work area is a pipe deck offshore and respect it the same manner.
• All equipment must be rigged up and laid out neatly.
• All oil or diesel spillage must be mopped up immediately using the oil spill
granules or cleaning fluids provided.
• After rigging down the unit, the workbench and tools must be cleaned and
returned to the appropriate storage place and left as you would expect to find it.
c) All downhole tools used will be stripped, cleaned and redressed, if necessary, ready
for the next class.
d) When outside on the Training Well you will always wear the following:
• Hard Hat
• Safety Boots
• Coveralls
• Safety Glasses
• Gloves
• Hearing Protection as required
f) Safety harness
As offshore, all students must wear a safety harness while working any more than 1.5
metres off the ground.
• While rigging the equipment up or down these safety harnesses will be
provided and will be used.
b) All materials, handouts etc. will be collected and left tidy on your desk at the end of
each day.
• Empty coffee cups and rubbish must be disposed in the bins provided.
c) Due to the number of students which may be using the facility at the same time, the
canteen will become busy. We therefore request that after you have finished eating
you return to the recreation area, smoking area or elsewhere until the class begins
again. This will allow other students and staff access to the canteen.
d) A sensible dress code will be expected while working in the classroom.