10.

1177_1747021819844503
research-article2019
QJP0010.1177/1747021819844503The Quarterly Journal of Experimental PsychologyBuijsman and Tirado

Original Article

Quarterly Journal of Experimental

Spatial–numerical associations: Psychology

2019, Vol. 72(10) 2423­–2436
© Experimental Psychology Society 2019
Shared symbolic and non-symbolic Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
numerical representations DOI: 10.1177/1747021819844503
https://doi.org/10.1177/1747021819844503
qjep.sagepub.com

Stefan Buijsman1 and Carlos Tirado2

Abstract
During the last decades, there have been a large number of studies into the number-related abilities of humans. As a
result, we know that humans and non-human animals have a system known as the approximate number system that
allows them to distinguish between collections based on their number of items, separately from any counting procedures.
Dehaene and others have argued for a model on which this system uses representations for numbers that are spatial
in nature and are shared by our symbolic and non-symbolic processing of numbers. However, there is a conflicting
theoretical perspective in which there are no representations of numbers underlying the approximate number system,
but only quantity-related representations. This perspective would then suggest that there are no shared representations
between symbolic and non-symbolic processing. We review the evidence on spatial biases resulting from the activation
of numerical representations, for both non-symbolic and symbolic tests. These biases may help decide between the
theoretical differences; shared representations are expected to lead to similar biases regardless of the format, whereas
different representations more naturally explain differences in biases, and thus behaviour. The evidence is not yet
decisive, as the behavioural evidence is split: we expect bisection tasks to eventually favour shared representations,
whereas studies on the spatial–numerical association of response codes (SNARC) effect currently favour different
representations. We discuss how this impasse may be resolved, in particular, by combining these behavioural studies with
relevant neuroimaging data. If this approach is carried forward, then it may help decide which of these two theoretical
perspectives on number representations is correct.

Keywords
Numerosity; representations; triple-code model; SNARC effect; spatial–numerical associations

Received: 28 August 2018; revised: 18 March 2019; accepted: 24 March 2019

Introduction and “Analog Magnitude System” are the most common

(see Feigenson, Dehaene, & Spelke, 2004; Gebuis, Cohen
Humans, and most animals, are capable of distinguishing Kadosh, & Gevers, 2016 for reviews) and also common is
between collections of items based on the number of items. the abbreviation ANS (Gebuis & van der Smagt, 2011;
Human infants, for example, will look longer at a picture Halberda & Feigenson, 2008; Holloway & Ansari, 2009;
of four dots after having habituated to one with two dots, Lipton & Spelke, 2003; Nieder, Freedman, & Miller, 2002;
than at a picture of two different dots. Whether or not J. Wood & Spelke, 2005). While it is clear that there is
the difference in the number of items is distinguishable such a system, it is still far from clear how it works
depends on the ratio between the numbers, a fact codified (Leibovich, Katzin, Harel, & Henik, 2017). There is a
by Weber’s law. Two versus four items is feasible even for
infants, who can distinguish anything at a ratio of 1 to 2
(for the usual performance levels). They, however, cannot 1Institute
for Future Studies, Leiden, The Netherlands
distinguish between 6 and 8. This ratio improves with age, 2Gösta
Ekman Laboratory, Department of Psychology, Stockholm
up to around 7-8 in human adults (Barth, Kanwisher, & University, Stockholm, Sweden
Spelke, 2003) and sometimes even 9-10 (Guillaume, Nys,
Corresponding author:
Mussolin, & Content, 2013). Carlos Tirado, Gösta Ekman Laboratory, Department of Psychology,
The system responsible for these abilities is known under Stockholm University, Frescati hagväg 9, 114 19 Stockholm, Sweden.
a variety of names, where “Approximate Number System” Email: carlos.tirado@psychology.su.se
2424 Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 72(10)
heated debate between two opposing theories of the ANS.
On one hand, theorists such as Dehaene have developed
the triple-code model (Arsalidou & Taylor, 2011; Dehaene,
1992; Dehaene, Bossini, & Giraux, 1993; Dehaene &
Changeux, 1993; Dehaene, Piazza, Pinel, & Cohen, 2003;
Klein et al., 2016; Knops, 2017). In this model, the repre-
sentations of the ANS (resulting from e.g., seeing an array
with nine dots) are the same as those for symbolic exact
numbers (e.g., “9”). In other words, we sense the “nine-
ness” of a set of nine dots with the ANS in the same way
we sense their colour and surface area with other systems.
More specifically, the triple-code model suggests that both
the ANS (Dehaene’s early papers refer to analogue magni-
tude representations, a terminological variant to our use of
“ANS representations”) and symbolic number representa-
tions are best seen as point activations along the same ana-
logue number line. At the neuronal level, the model
predicts that these point activations engage the bilateral
inferior parietal regions. Our numerical representations
are, on this view, inherently spatial and shared across
formats.
The triple-code model supplements these numerical
representations, which are activated both by the ANS and
the perception of symbolic numbers, with two other types
of representations (hence the “triple-code”). In the case of
written numerals, an additional verbal number form repre-
sentation is activated, which is used to link the symbolic
number to the numerical representation also used by the
ANS. This number form representation is predicted to
engage bilateral inferior ventral occipitotemporal regions
belonging to the ventral visual pathway. The third repre-
sentation is a verbal code (engaging general-purpose lan-
guage modules, including the left perisylvian network and
the left basal ganglia and thalamic nuclei) which affects
the same link, but in the case of spoken number words.
This basic framework, introduced by Dehaene (1992),
has had a few recent adjustments (see Knops, 2017 and
Leibovich et al., 2017 for more thorough discussions).
Arsalidou and Taylor (2011) pointed out the need to
include working memory in the model, in the case of cal-
culations with symbolic numbers that require multiple
steps (where the difficulty of the calculation determines
the exact role of our working memory). Klein et al. (2016)
suggest amending the model by extending the neural areas
associated with the numerical representation (from the
intraparietal sulcus to an area including Broca’s area and
three others, plus their interconnectivity). They also see a
more prominent role for verbal fact retrieval in the model
when applied to arithmetical calculations. Those changes
are not relevant for the current review, because we have
not included studies with calculating tasks. Such tasks do
not have clear analogues with non-symbolic stimuli.
On the other hand, Gebuis et al. (2016), Zimmerman
(2018), and others argue that the representations of the
ANS are fundamentally different from those of symbolic
numbers. They consider the ANS to be part of a more gen-
eral magnitude system, which allows us to distinguish
between collections with different numbers of items based
on our ability to determine length, surface area, density,
and other magnitudes. All the numerical information we
need is included in these magnitudes, and there is therefore
no separate representation of numbers. Rather, the ANS is
no more than the procedure of weighing the different fac-
tors to arrive at the more general judgement of one collec-
tion having more items than another. This is more general
when compared to the judgement that e.g., one collection
occupies a larger surface area than another, which would
be one of the inputs for this general magnitude system.
We do not yet know which of these two theories is cor-
rect. Since more direct types of evidence are currently
inconclusive (Leibovich et al., 2017), we explore an indi-
rect way of deciding between these two accounts in this
review. Our main question is then which account of the
ANS is correct? One with shared representations (of num-
bers) or one with distinct representations?
Interactions between numerical and spatial
representations
One way to decide which of these two perspectives is cor-
rect is to look at spatial–numerical associations: if number
representations are the same for symbolic and non-sym-
bolic stimuli, then it is likely that the spatial–numerical
associations are also the same for both types of stimuli. If,
instead, there are differences in the spatial–numerical
associations, then this is support for the claim that there are
differences in the underlying representations of numbers.
The abundance of evidence on spatial associations and the
difficulty of investigating representations directly make
such an argument attractive, though not ideal. After all,
behavioural evidence is no guarantee: the same behav-
ioural signatures may be produced even though the under-
lying processes and representations are different. Similarly,
different behaviour may be caused by the use of the same
representations in different processes—though the tasks
are similar enough, it becomes less likely that the pro-
cesses are different. While such alternative explanations
will be available, they will be less simple and, to our
knowledge, have yet to be developed. Therefore, we do
think that observations of the same behaviour count as
(non-conclusive) evidence in favour of shared representa-
tions, and observations of differing behaviour count as
(non-conclusive) evidence in favour of distinct representa-
tions. This review explores, within those limits, what
spatial–numerical associations can tell us about the degree
to which number representations are shared between sym-
bolic and non-symbolic formats.
There are a lot of spatial–numerical associations.
Decades of research have established that there is a close
link between our processing of numbers and our processing
Buijsman and Tirado 2425
of space. Suggestions that the two are intertwined go as far
back as Galton (1880), who found that some adults report
explicit visuospatial representations of numbers. It turns
out that roughly 15% of the population has such representa-
tions (Seron, Pesenti, Noël, Deloche, & Cornet, 1992).
There are, however, more fundamental links between our
numerical and spatial processing. Our performance on
numerical tasks is often influenced by spatial factors and
vice versa. To give two examples, we discuss further below:
we respond faster to the question if a number is odd or even
when we respond with our left hand for small numbers and
our right hand for large numbers. We also tend to bisect
lines with flanking numbers on a bias towards the higher
number. Recent research has focused on these numerous
links between space and number, providing us with a sub-
stantial amount of behavioural (and some neuroimaging)
evidence on the interactions between numerical and spatial
representations (for earlier reviews, see de Hevia, Vallar, &
Girelli, 2008; Fias & Fischer, 2005; Fias, van Dijck, &
Gevers, 2011; Fischer & Shaki, 2014; Gevers & Lammertyn,
2005; Hubbard, Piazza, Pinel, & Dehaene, 2005; McCrink
& Opfer, 2014; Rossetti et al., 2011; Rugani & de Hevia,
2017; Umilta, Priftis, & Zorzi, 2009; G. Wood, Willmes,
Nuerk, & Fischer, 2008).
The links found by these studies can be compared
between formats. Do we see the same biases associated
with non-symbolic representations as with symbolic repre-
sentations? In that case, there is reason to prefer the
hypothesis of shared representations (and so Dehaene’s
view of the ANS). If, however, the biases are very differ-
ent, then there is reason to prefer the hypothesis of differ-
ent representations (and the general magnitude system
view of Gebuis et al. (2016)).
Such an argument is different from the one made on the
basis of studies such as Izard, Sann, Spelke, and Streri
(2009). They argue for a shared representation of numbers
on the basis of tests where infants are able to match the
number of dots in an array with the number of tones they
heard. Their argument is that these representations have to
be shared, and abstract, because of their flexibility in use.
However, experiments such as these have been discussed
by Gebuis et al. (2016), and they have argued that there is
currently no decisive evidence in favour of either position,
based on these data. However, data on spatial–numerical
biases have not yet been considered in this context and
could also help decide between there being shared or dif-
ferent representations.
This review, therefore, separates the research on spa-
tial–numerical associations based on two broad categories:
our non-symbolic and our symbolic numerical representa-
tions. The former might not be representations of numbers;
in fact, they do not involve numbers if the account of
Gebuis et al. (2016) is correct, because then they are more
general magnitude representations. Since they do underlie
number-related abilities, and are thought to be numerical
in nature by other accounts, we believe that it is relevant to
include them in this review. Note also that non-symbolic
stimuli can still give rise to (symbolic) representations of
numbers: if we count the stimuli, we are guaranteed to end
up with representations of numbers on any account. In
studies with non-symbolic stimuli, participants were pre-
vented from counting, so we will set this slight complica-
tion aside; non-symbolic representations are always the
ones used by the ANS.
We proceed by highlighting differences and similarities
between the two cases, in accordance with our central
question: are the representations underlying symbolic and
non-symbolic tasks shared? To make the argument easier
to follow, we have organised the review by types of spatial–
numerical association: for each association, we discuss,
first, the non-symbolic findings and then the symbolic
findings, with a short comparison at the end of each section.
We begin with associations as measured by bisection tasks,
then move to spatial–numerical association of response
codes (SNARC) effects, and finally discuss associations
measured by ordinal tasks. At the end of the review, there
is also a discussion of the current neuroimaging studies
related to spatial–numerical associations.
Bisection tasks
One type of interaction between numerical representations
and spatial representations is observed in the case of line
bisection tasks. In these tasks, our ability to locate the mid-
point of a line is hampered by the (automatic) activation of
numerical representations, leading to biases towards the
higher number.
Non-symbolic tasks
Line bisection tasks are based on the procedure of bisect-
ing a line, which is flanked by arrays of dots (or symbolic
numerals, which will be discussed later). de Hevia and
Spelke (2009) performed this test with 3- to 7-year-old
children to see if they display a bias in bisecting lines when
there are flanking arrays of dots. They found that children
of all these ages display a bias towards the side which is
flanked by the largest number of dots. So, instead of bisect-
ing the line in the middle, as they were supposed to, they
bisected the lines closer to one side. Furthermore, de Hevia
and Spelke (2009) considered several possible explana-
tions for this bias.
First, they tested with adults whether arrays with more
dots draw preferential attention, thus resulting in a bias.
Participants were supposed to locate a black triangle on the
left or right side of the screen, with an array of dots or an
arabic numeral present on each side. If attention is drawn
to the array with a larger number of dots, then it should be
easier for them to find the black triangle if it is located at
the same side as that array. However, they were unable to
2426 Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 72(10)
find such an effect of relative number of dots on relative
ease of finding the black triangle. Second, they ran sepa-
rate experiments with children where they controlled for
contour length and other experiments where they con-
trolled for the distance between the line and the flanking
arrays of dots. In both of these experiments, the observed
bias persisted, suggesting that it is not caused by contour
length or flanking distance (de Hevia & Spelke, 2009). de
Hevia and Spelke (2009) also tested adults using line
bisection task with flanking arrays of dots and found a bias
towards the more numerous array similar to that reported
for children.
These findings have been complicated by a replication
study by Gebuis and Gevers (2011). They managed to rep-
licate the bisection bias towards the higher number when
the higher number of dots had the larger total area. When
the higher number of dots had the smallest total area, how-
ever, the bisection bias was towards the lower number of
dots (and still highest total area). There is, at the moment,
no clear evidence for a line bisection bias based on the
number of dots.
Symbolic tasks
There are different kinds of symbolic bisection tasks: these
can involve the bisection of a line or, as with the first set of
experiments we report on, the bisection of a range of num-
bers. Participants in this latter study had to state the num-
ber in the middle of a range of two numbers, e.g., from 3 to
9. Longo and Lourenco (2007, 2010) found that adults
tend to underestimate the midpoint of a number interval in
such tasks. They have, as they put it, a “leftward bias,”
which seems to be correlated to the leftward bias in physi-
cal line bisection known as pseudoneglect. Participants
who displayed a larger bias in physical line bisection tasks
also displayed a larger bias in number interval bisection
tasks (Longo & Lourenco, 2007). When they tested how
this bias changes when physical lines and number intervals
are moved from near to far space, they found a correlated
rightward shift of the bisection bias (Longo & Lourenco,
2010). This suggests that the two biases are related, point-
ing to an origin in attentional biases that are known to
underlie physical line bisection biases.
If so, then we would expect to see similar results with
line bisection tasks that use flanking numbers. That is, if
numbers can lead to attentional biases, then it is to be
expected that they also do so if they are task irrelevant.
Fischer (2001) tested both bisection biases with flanking
numbers and bisection biases where participants had to
bisect a string of numerals. For example, they were asked
to find the midpoint of 1111111. The physical line bisec-
tion was biased towards the side with the larger number,
whereas with the numeral strings, bisection was biased
towards the left when small numbers were used and
towards the right when large numbers (8’s or 9’s) were
used (Fischer, 2001). The bisection bias with flanking
numbers has been tested in several other studies since, and
there too a bias towards the larger number was found (de
Hevia, Girelli, & Vallar, 2006; Ranzini & Girelli, 2012).
So, the observed bisection biases in healthy adults seem
related to attentional biases (Fischer & Knops, 2014).
Attentional biases have been observed in other studies; for
example, when generating random numbers, participants
tend to look to the left when they are about to name a small
number and to the right for a large number (Loetscher,
Bockisch, Nicholls, & Brugger, 2010), and brain imagery
has associated cortical circuits for spatial attention with the
performance of mental arithmetic (Knops, Thirion,
Hubbard, Michel, & Dehaene, 2009). These attentional
biases, which result from automatic number processing,
are likely to be the source of the bisection biases observed
in symbolic tasks.
Similarities and differences
The first type of interaction between numerical and spatial
representations we looked at are biases in bisection tasks.
There are clear interactions of this type in the case of sym-
bolic stimuli, which are probably caused by attentional
biases that result from automatic number processing. It is
therefore interesting that although the non-symbolic task
failed to replicate properly, there are eye-tracking studies
with infants that found a similar attentional bias for non-
symbolic stimuli.
Bulf, de Hevia, and Macchi Cassia (2016) found a left-
ward bias in attention after perceiving a small number of
dots, compared to a rightward bias after perceiving a large
number of dots. Infants’ attention was first focused on the
centre of a screen, where subsequently an array of (two or
nine) dots or a rainbow-coloured shape appeared. After
300 ms, the cue disappeared, and a little later, a target (a
flickering schematic face) appeared in a circle either to
the left or to the right of the location of the cue. When the
cue was an array with two dots, infants were faster at
detecting the target if it was on the left, whereas with an
array with nine dots, infants were faster if the target was
on the right. There was no difference between left and
right with any of the sizes. So, while arrays of dots pro-
duce attention biases, rainbow-coloured shapes do not
(Bulf et al., 2016; Figure 1).
The study by Bulf et al. (2016) is important for the case
of bisection biases since, as discussed, such biases appear
to stem from attentional biases in the case of symbolic
number tasks. The fact that this study found similar atten-
tional biases in the case of non-symbolic representations
leads us to expect that further studies with non-symbolic
stimuli will more clearly establish a bisection bias similar
to the one for symbolic stimuli.
If such a similarity is found, then the only difference
between behaviour is the type of stimulus flanking the
Buijsman and Tirado 2427
Figure 1.  The experimental setup of the eye-tracking study by
Bulf, de Hevia, and Macchi Cassia (2016).
Children first saw a stimulus to attract their attention to the place
where the array of dots subsequently appeared; at the same time,
two circles indicated the areas of interest where a target may appear;
eye-tracking software was calibrated to note whether there was an
attentional bias towards either of these areas.
lines: either symbolic numbers or arrays of dots. The task
will be exactly the same otherwise, which does make this
a good behavioural test to tease out any differences in the
underlying representations once more data are available.
SNARC-like effects
More important, or at least more studied, than bisection
tasks is a type of bias known as the SNARC effect in the
case of symbolic stimuli. Here, we discuss these, and the
closest correlates of them in the case of non-symbolic
stimuli, to see how closely they match.
Non-symbolic tasks
The experiments falling under this type have proceeded
from the SNARC effect found for symbolic stimuli and
looked for a similar effect with non-symbolic stimuli.
Adults respond faster with a button to their left when
responding to small numbers and faster with a button on
their right when responding to large numbers (Dehaene
et al., 1993). Such a left-to-right bias has also been found
for non-symbolic numerical stimuli (Luccio, Fumarola,
Tamburini, & Agostini, 2012; Mitchell, Bull, & Cleland,
2012). Patro and Shaki (2016) used arrays of objects in
their experiment, verifying this effect for non-symbolic
representations of numbers. While they did find a tradi-
tional left-to-right bias when participants were asked to
choose the array with fewer items (from two choices), they
observed a right-to-left bias when participants were asked
to choose the one with more items. These results were
independent from reading direction, which is an important
factor for studies using numerals as stimuli, as discussed
below (Patro & Shaki, 2016).
This difference between symbolic and non-symbolic
representations, where the directionality is not task
dependent in this way, was first noticed by Shaki, Petrusic,
and Leth-Steensen (2012). Yates, Nemeh, Loetscher,
Ma-Wyatt, and Nicholls (2013) also found that there is a
leftward bias for responding with “less” and a rightward
bias for responding with “more” when having to determine
if a stimulus array of dots is more or less numerous than a
reference array. For non-symbolic stimuli, the direction of
the spatial bias reverses when the answer is different
(“more” rather than “less”) and does not reverse with read-
ing direction. For symbolic stimuli (discussed below), the
direction of the bias does not reverse depending on the
answer but does reverse depending on reading direction.
Such differences in reversal of directionality between sym-
bolic and non-symbolic stimuli are notable. The fact that
the conditions under which the spatial bias reverses are
different for symbolic and non-symbolic stimuli means
that these experiments do not support the presence of a
shared representation underlying symbolic and non-
symbolic number-related processes.
Symbolic tasks
The SNARC effect was the first known interaction between
numbers and spatial organisation. Dehaene, Dupoux, and
Mehler (1990) asked participants to classify numbers as
larger or smaller than 65 by pressing a key to their left or a
key to their right. They found, unexpectedly, that there is a
difference in response times depending on which key par-
ticipants have to press. If the answer is smaller, the
response times are lower if the corresponding key is to
their left. If the answer is larger, the response times are
lower if the key is to their right (Dehaene et al., 1990).
A follow-up study by Dehaene et al. (1993) looked at
this effect more directly. These experiments were based on
parity tests, where participants had to press one key if the
presented number was even and another if it was odd.
After a range of experiments around this task, some with
numbers from 0 to 9, others with two intervals, 0-4 and
5-9, and yet others with two-digit numbers, Dehaene et al.
(1993) found that in all of these cases, responses to lower
numbers in an interval are faster with the left key and
responses to higher numbers in an interval are faster with
the right key. So, 3 is responded to faster on the right for
the interval 0-4 but faster on the left for the interval 0-9. In
general, the SNARC effect is relative to the interval of
numbers chosen by the experimenters (Dehaene et al.,
1993; Nathan, Shaki, Salti, & Algom, 2009; Ren, Nicholls,
Ma, & Chen, 2011).
A number of characteristics of the SNARC effect have
become known since the first studies by Dehaene and his
colleagues. These are organised below and briefly explained
(for more extensive reviews, see Fischer & Shaki, 2014;
Gevers & Lammertyn, 2005).
Task irrelevance of numbers.  One of the first findings was
that for the SNARC effect to occur, there is no need for any
2428 Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 72(10)
Figure 2.  A typical response time curve for the SNARC effect.
There is a positive difference in response time between left and right
(i.e., RT for right minus the RT for left) for small digits and a negative
difference for large digits.
explicit processing of the numbers. Even when the tasks
had nothing to do with the numbers, participants saw there
was a measurable SNARC effect. For example, a SNARC
effect occurs when participants are asked to press buttons
for whether or not a verbal numeral contains the phoneme
/e/ (Fias, Brysbaert, Geypens, & D’Ydewalle, 1996) or
when asked if a superimposed triangle is pointing upwards
or downwards (Fias, Lauwereyns, & Lammertyn, 2001;
Lammertyn, Fias, & Lauwereyns, 2002). However, not all
such tasks result in a SNARC effect. When participants
were asked to answer questions about the colour of a
superimposed triangle, or whether the superimposed shape
was a circle or square, no SNARC effect was observed
(Fias et al., 2001; Lammertyn et al., 2002). Interestingly,
while the SNARC effect is associated with a left-to-right
orientation, similar tests with a button close to the partici-
pant and a button far away from the participant found that
response times are lower for the combinations of small
numbers and the close button and that of large numbers
and the far button (Santens & Gevers, 2008). There are
also some studies that found a top/bottom SNARC effect
(Holmes & Lourenco, 2012; Ito & Hatta, 2004; Shaki &
Fischer, 2012). Furthermore, while it is common to test for
the SNARC effect using buttons, it has also been observed
where participants use pointing (Fischer, 2003), eye move-
ments (Fischer, Warlop, Hill, & Fias, 2004) and grasping
(Andres, Ostry, Florence, & Paus, 2008). Little seems to
depend on the type of task (Figure 2).
Flexibility of the SNARC effect.  Another important character-
istic is that the direction of the SNARC effect is flexible.
One factor on which the direction seems to depend is the
standard reading direction of the participants. Dehaene
et al. (1993) found that French speakers, who read left to
right, exhibit a standard SNARC effect. Iranian speakers,
however, exhibit a reversed SNARC effect, probably
because they read right to left. Shaki and Fischer (2008)
extended this finding by studying bilingual speakers of
both Russian (left-to-right script) and Hebrew (right-to-
left script). These participants showed a left-to-right
SNARC effect after reading a Cyrillic text, but a right-to-
left SNARC effect after reading a Hebrew text (Shaki &
Fischer, 2008). Reading direction thus influences the
direction of the SNARC effect, possibly mediated by the
fact that counting direction is often the same as the reading
direction (see also Göbel, 2015; Shaki, Fischer, & Göbel,
2012; Shaki, Fischer, & Petrusic, 2009; Zebia, 2005).
The direction of the SNARC effect is also flexible.
However, it can be influenced in myriad ways. When west-
ern participants are asked to imagine a series of numbers
arranged along a clock face, the SNARC effect reverses
from a left-to-right direction to a right-to-left direction
(Bächtold, Baumüller, & Brugger, 1998). When partici-
pants are asked to memorise a sequence of numbers (e.g.,
3, 4, 5), the SNARC effect is only shown on unrelated
tasks (e.g., when memorising number sequences in ascend-
ing or random order; Lindemann, Abolafia, Pratt, &
Bekkering, 2008). Finally, Fischer, Mill, and Shaki (2010)
performed experiments where participants first read a text
in which numbers were distributed either left to right (i.e.,
1-4 on the far left side and 5-9 on the far right side) or right
to left. English-speaking participants reading the left-to-
right text exhibited a standard SNARC effect, but those
reading the right-to-left text exhibited no SNARC effect.
Hebrew-speaking participants showed no SNARC effect
before reading or after reading the left-to-right text.
However, they did display a right-to-left SNARC effect
after reading the text where numbers were distributed in
that direction (Fischer et al., 2010).
Notation dependence of the SNARC effect. The studies
reported so far have all used Arabic numerals. Some stud-
ies have also looked at the SNARC effect in relation to
which numerals are used. In particular, studies have looked
into differences in SNARC effect depending on whether
Arabic or Chinese numerals are used. Hung, Hung, Tzeng,
and Wu (2008) tested the SNARC effect in Chinese speak-
ers with Arabic numerals and the two different numeral
systems used in Chinese. They found a left-to-right
SNARC effect for Arabic numerals, but no such effect for
the Chinese numerals. However, they also found a top-to-
bottom SNARC effect for the simple Chinese numerals.
No effects were found for the complex Chinese numerals,
possibly because these are not used very frequently (Hung
et al., 2008). Kopiske et al. (2016) also looked at notation
dependence, testing Arabic numerals, simple Chinese
numerals, and Chinese hand signs (as used in sign lan-
guage). They, as opposed to Hung et al. (2008), did find a
left-to-right SNARC effect for all three notations on a par-
ity (odd/even) test. However, in a test where participants
had to decide if the presented number was larger or smaller
than 5, a clear SNARC effect was only observed for Arabic
numerals. There was weaker evidence for a SNARC effect
Buijsman and Tirado 2429
for simple Chinese numerals, but no evidence for a
SNARC effect for Chinese hand signs (Kopiske et al.,
2016). In the absence of more studies, it is hard to con-
clude whether the SNARC effect is notation dependent,
but there are some suggestions that notation may matter.
To sum up, the important characteristics of the SNARC
effect are, first, the relativity of the effect: which stimuli
are responded to faster with the left hand depends on the
range of stimuli that is presented. Second, a SNARC effect
can be observed whether numbers are relevant to the task
or not. Third, the SNARC effect is flexible in the sense that
it depends on reading direction and can disappear or even
reverse when participants read incongruent texts or have to
memorise conflicting sequences of numbers. Fourth, the
SNARC effect may even be dependent on the notation sys-
tem that is used.
Similarities and differences
The SNARC effect, as we know it from symbolic stimuli,
has a number of important features that are not mirrored in
the effects observed with non-symbolic stimuli on other-
wise identical tasks. The flexibility with respect to varia-
bles such as reading direction of the SNARC effect is not
found in the case of non-symbolic stimuli. Oddly enough,
the non-symbolic effect is flexible with respect to the task
formulation (formulated in terms of “more” or “less”),
whereas the symbolic SNARC effect is not flexible in this
way. It should be noted, though, that these tasks were
slightly different: for non-symbolic stimuli, both stimuli
were visible at the same time, whereas in symbolic SNARC
tasks, the numbers are usually presented one at a time.
Furthermore, the more/less task common to non-symbolic
formats is not standard for the symbolic SNARC tasks
(parity tests are more usual), so these differences in task
setup do make the comparison imperfect. Still, the cur-
rently observed differences in behaviour do suggest a dif-
ference in representations. Or is it possible to explain the
behavioural differences on the hypothesis that the repre-
sentations are the same?
One theory of the SNARC effect holds that these effects
are the result of reading habits (Dehaene et al., 1993;
Nuerk et al., 2015; Shaki & Fischer, 2008). One may think
that such an account can explain the difference, as this dif-
ferentiates the SNARC effect from any innate biases that
might be responsible for the effects observed with non-
symbolic stimuli. The SNARC effect would attach to the
representation of the visual number form (the symbol-spe-
cific part of the triple-code model). The non-symbolic
effect would be specific to the numerical representations
of the ANS.
However, such a simple solution is not readily availa-
ble. Both the visual number form and the ANS representa-
tion are activated in the symbolic tasks in question,
according to the triple-code model (Klein et al., 2016).
This raises the question why the non-symbolic effects,
which would attach to the ANS representation, are not
observed in symbolic tasks (recall that there are a number
of situations in which no spatial bias was found and that
the SNARC effect is not standardly in a left-to-right direc-
tion). If the non-symbolic ANS representation and pro-
cesses have an important role in processing symbolic
numbers, as the triple-code model suggests, we would also
expect the supposedly spatial nature of the ANS represen-
tation to filter through.
This seems to happen in a related case slightly out of
the scope of our review (because the non-symbolic biases
are not explicitly spatial): the operational momentum
effect observed with mental calculation. McCrink,
Dehaene, and Dehaene-Lambertz (2007) observed that
there is an upwards bias for mental addition with non-
symbolic stimuli and a downwards bias for mental sub-
traction with such stimuli. Adults, and 9-month-old
children (McCrink & Wynn, 2009), more readily accept
non-symbolic solutions to addition problems that are too
large and vice versa for subtraction problems. The idea is
that this is caused by the mental number line: addition car-
ries the representations rightward, towards higher num-
bers, and thus may overshoot. Subtraction moves leftward,
towards smaller numbers, and therefore can move too far
to the left. Pinhas and Fischer (2008) observed this hypoth-
esised spatial bias for symbolic stimuli when adults had to
locate the mentally computed result of an addition or sub-
traction on a number line. They explicitly link this to the
non-symbolic effect, which as we point out should also be
the case for the SNARC effects.
The SNARC data are easier to explain on the compet-
ing account of the ANS by e.g., Gebuis et al. (2016). In
that case, there is no direct link between the representa-
tions of the ANS, which are responsible for the inflexible
SNARC-like effects discussed here, and our representa-
tions of symbolic numbers, which are responsible for the
(flexible) SNARC effect. This makes it harder to explain
the operational momentum effect, but perhaps these theo-
rists can locate similarities in the way addition and sub-
traction are implemented, which underlie the similar
biases. So, while the SNARC data are far from a decisive
point in favour of accounts with distinct representations, it
is easier to explain the absence of the inflexible effect with
symbolic stimuli if the representations differ.
Ordinal tasks
The behavioural tests discussed so far have focussed on
cardinal numbers, as the ANS is best known for its func-
tion with amounts (e.g., seeing the difference between four
apples and eight apples). There are, however, also interac-
tions with spatial representations in the case of tasks with
ordinal numbers. It is important to keep in mind, though,
that these tasks may not tell us much about the ANS. The
2430 Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 72(10)
current evidence suggests that ordinality is processed dif-
ferently from cardinality. Instead of the ANS, it probably
relies on short-term memory mechanisms (Lyons, Vogel,
& Ansari, 2016 for a review). We nevertheless chose to
include these studies, since the effects are very similar to
the SNARC effect, and the tasks do involve numbers. As a
result, we think that the studies should be considered even
if it is only for the sake of demarcating the limits to study-
ing the nature of the ANS on the basis of spatial–numerical
associations.
Non-symbolic tasks
Another source of spatial biases is not related to cardinal
numbers (4, 5, etc.) but to ordinal numbers (4th, 5th, etc.).
For these numbers, too, there are a number of spatial–
numerical associations. One study looked at infants’
responses to increasing and decreasing series consisting of
arrays of dots, when presented left to right and right to left
(de Hevia, Girelli, Addabbo, & Macchi Cassia, 2014).
They found that increasing, but not decreasing, series of
three arrays of rectangles presented in a left-to-right for-
mat were detected by infants. Only for increasing series
did they look longer at test displays with the opposite (i.e.,
decreasing) series presented in the same format (de Hevia
et al., 2014).
A later study by de Hevia, Veggiotti, Streri, and Bonn
(2017) used increasing and decreasing sequences of tones
to see if 0- to 3-day-old infants associate increasing
sequences with the right side of space and decreasing
sequences with the left side. Infants only seem to make this
association when numerical information is available. In
control studies where the number of tones in the sequence
was kept constant, but duration and the length of associ-
ated lines was varied, children failed to associate the
increasing sequence with the right side of space (and vice
versa for the decreasing sequence). They do make the
association, however, when the number of tones varies but
duration or line length is kept constant. Even very young
infants associate “few” with the left side of space and
“many” with the right side (de Hevia et al., 2017).
Finally, there is a suggestion that a SNARC-like effect
can be observed even for notations that are not numerals
but do have an ordinal ordering (i.e., a fixed first element,
second element, etc.). Because no numbers are involved,
these stimuli are non-symbolic even though they are
linguistic.
Gevers, Reynvoet, and Fias (2003) first tested this by
looking for a SNARC effect with letters and names of the
months. A SNARC effect was observed both when the ordi-
nal information was task relevant and when it was task
irrelevant (Gevers et al., 2003; Gevers, Reynvoet, & Fias,
2004). In fact, SNARC effects have even been observed
for weakly (ordinally) ordered sequences such as the
Chinese colour words and for arbitrary sequences (Previtali,
de Hevia, & Girelli, 2010; Van Opstal, Fias, Peigneux, &
Verguts, 2009; Zhang et al., 2016).
Symbolic tasks
On the symbolic side, similar results have been found for
sequences of numbers which participants have to memo-
rise. van Dijck and Fias (2011) found a SNARC effect
related to the position of a number in the sequence that par-
ticipants memorised in a short period of time, in a test
where they had to answer if the number shown was part of
the sequence. Aside from short-term memory, verbal work-
ing memory also influences spatial attention: retrieving
items occurring later in a memorised sequence causes
attentional shifts towards the right (van Dijck, Abrahamse,
Acar, Ketels, & Fias, 2014; van Dijck, Abrahamse, Majerus,
& Fias, 2013).
Not all experiments with ordinal sequences found a
SNARC effect. Cheung and Lourenco (2016) tested
whether there is a SNARC effect in tasks where partici-
pants have to decide whether two numbers/letters are in
ascending or descending order. They found that in the case
of numbers, there is a SNARC effect: participants respond
faster with the left button for ascending pairs and faster
with the right for descending pairs. They found no such
effects for letters, where ascending order meant alphabeti-
cal order (Cheung & Lourenco, 2016). Another difference
between numerical and non-numerical sequences has been
reported by Schroeder, Nuerk, and Plewnia (2017). They
tested SNARC effects for both the numbers 1-5 and the
weekdays Monday-Friday. First, they found left-to-right
SNARC effects for both sequences. Second, when they
used transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) to test
whether the same prefrontal circuit was responsible for
both, they found a difference between the two. During
anodal tDCS, participants still had a left-to-right SNARC
effect with the number sequence, but displayed a right-to-
left SNARC effect with the weekdays (Schroeder et al.,
2017). This gives us some reasons to think that the SNARC
effect with other ordinally ordered sequences is not caused
in exactly the same way as the SNARC effect for the num-
bers. Furthermore, this prefrontal flexibility is consistent
with the flexibility of the SNARC effect that was previ-
ously shown in studies with different linguistic groups.
Similarities and differences
Spatial biases observed with ordinal number tasks are very
similar to those observed in the case of cardinal numbers.
Furthermore, it seems that the SNARC-like effects found
for non-symbolic stimuli (non-numerical sequences) are
very similar to those found for symbolic stimuli. However,
the evidential value of these experiments for the current
question (whether the representations of the ANS are shared
with the representations of symbolic numbers) is limited.
Buijsman and Tirado 2431
The SNARC-like effects observed with ordinal tasks do
not seem to stem from the same source as the SNARC
effect with cardinal numbers. The spatial biases in the
ordinal case seem related to working memory, as is the
case with ordinal number processing in general (Lyons
et al., 2016). The study by Schroeder et al. (2017) further
confirms this hypothesis of a relevant difference between
ordinal and cardinal numbers. As a result, it is unlikely that
ordinal tasks can tell us anything about the representations
of the ANS, even though the spatial biases are very similar
and the tasks can involve symbolic representations of car-
dinal numbers (as in the case of experiments with the
sequence 1-5). The similarity between the symbolic and
non-symbolic case is, as a result, more likely to be due to
the reliance on working memory with both tasks than due
to some feature of the numerical representations.
Neuroimaging studies
Most of the research on the spatial representation of num-
bers has been behavioural, which means that there are
currently no well-established hypotheses regarding the
underlying brain mechanisms (and is the reason that most
of the evidence reviewed here is behavioural). However,
the evidence indicates that arithmetic and other areas
linked to numerosity tasks are mostly located in the
left occipitotemporal and bilateral intraparietal cortex
(see Dehaene & Cohen, 2007 for a review). Therefore, a
neuro-recycling hypothesis seems suitable to explain
how these mechanisms build number representations.
According to Gould and Vrba (1982), the neuronal recy-
cling hypothesis proposes that neuronal mechanisms that
evolved for different purposes are now being reassigned
to processes, such as reading or arithmetic, without
changes in the genetic characteristics of the species (for
evidence on this hypothesis, see Formisano et al., 2003;
Lee, 2000; Pica, Lemer, Izard, & Dehaene, 2004). This
means that representations of numbers need some degree
of modal input and that the mechanisms have been mod-
erated by our evolutionary process.
To continue along the lines of Schroeder et al. (2017),
there have been studies into the SNARC effect, number
representation, and numerosity tasks that use neuroimag-
ing to locate which brain areas are involved with number
processing. Arshad et al. (2016) were interested in finding
the neural mechanism that modulated numerical cognition
and, more specifically, numerical magnitude. To achieve
this, they combined visual (two elongated rectangles) and
vestibular (cold or warm water flowing past one ear) stim-
ulation to induce interhemispheric conflict. Follow-up
experiments using tDCS confirmed the occurrence of such
conflict and subsequent unihemispheric inhibition.
Participants performed a number pair bisection task, hav-
ing to name the number in the middle of the interval given
by a pair of numbers in both types of experiment. They
also drew clock faces to test for lateralised spatial attention
bias. Their research shows that interhemispheric competi-
tion can help to explain the directionality of numerical
magnitude and distinguish these spatial biases from gen-
eral behavioural attention bias. Dynamic interhemispheric
competition seems to underlie the spatial biases for sym-
bolic numbers. The dynamic nature of this competition
also helps explain the flexibility of the SNARC effect
somewhat, though no experiments have been done yet to
confirm that the situations in which the SNARC effect
reverses fit the hypothesis that reversals are due to dynamic
interhemispheric competition.
Another finding that supports interhemispheric compe-
tition is the one found by Cohen Kadosh, Kadosh, Kaas,
Henik, and Goebel (2007). They showed that representa-
tions of numbers are located in the parietal lobes in a func-
tional magnetic resonance adaptation (fMRA) study
looking at brain activation when perceiving natural lan-
guage and symbolic numerals (“two” and “2”). Participants
were presented with different stimuli of all symbolic
numerals, all natural language numerals, or a mix. Brain
activation patterns were then compared for the different
stimuli. These suggest that both types of numerals are pro-
cessed (in the same way) in the parietal lobes. They also
found evidence of a left–right asymmetry in the parietal
lobe function regarding number representations. Despite
that their findings seem to support a shared representation
between written and spoken numerals, Cohen Kadosh
et al. (2007) do not discard that other neuronal populations
are involved in numeric processing in the left parietal lobe,
but are being masked. It may be that the resolution limita-
tions of non-invasive imaging techniques have an effect on
the mapping of these neuron populations. Still, in combi-
nation with the previous study, such an interpretation is
less likely (Figure 3).
In addition, Harvey, Klein, Petridou, and Dumoulin
(2013) used high-field magnetic resonance imaging to
map the neural populations involved with numerosity
tasks in the brain. They found that the neural population
are organised topographically in the parietal cortex and
that numerical representations require a certain degree of
sensorimotor activation. Piazza and Eger (2016) review
findings which show that intraparietal activation occurs
in humans and macaque monkeys’ brains when encoding
for numerosity tasks. Following this line, other studies
have found a similar link between numerosity and num-
ber representation and its link to the parietal cortex (in
line with the triple-code model). To be more precise, the
inferior parietal lobes are needed for processing numeri-
cal and visual spatial information (see Chochon, Cohen,
Moortele, & Dehaene, 1999; Dehaene et al., 2003; Fias,
Lammertyn, Reynvoet, Dupont, & Orban, 2003; Pesenti,
Thioux, Seron, & De Volder, 2000). The parietal cortex
seems to be the key area regarding numerosity and spatial
coding, with additional areas activated for more complex
2432 Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 72(10)
Figure 3.  The stimuli used by Cohen Kadosh, Kadosh, Kaas, Henik, and Goebel (2007) to test for the locations of numerical
processing in the brain.
They compared imaging data for observations of digits, words and a mix of the two.
numerical tasks as mentioned in the introduction. The
overlap between the numerical and spatial areas is why it
is possible to accept that visual spatial coding is vital for
numerosity tasks (Knops et al., 2009). So, the data are in
accordance with the neuro-recycling hypothesis men-
tioned above.
Discussion
We set out to compare spatial–numerical associations for
symbolic and non-symbolic stimuli, to see to what extent
such a comparison can help decide whether the represen-
tations of the ANS are shared with our symbolic number
representations. This question is one way in which the
competing views of Dehaene et al. (2003) and Gebuis
et al. (2016) can be distinguished. For the triple-code
model to be correct, there has to be a representation of
numbers that is shared between symbolic and non-sym-
bolic formats. For the sensory integration view of the ANS
to be correct, there have to be different representations for
the symbolic and non-symbolic case, since the non-sym-
bolic representations are not numerical but magnitude
based. Evidence that tries to decide between these two
views more directly is currently inconclusive (Gebuis
et al., 2016; Leibovich et al., 2017). As this review has
shown, evidence based on spatial–numeric associations is
also not yet conclusive, but has the potential to help decide
the question.
The behavioural evidence is mixed, but we think it may
swing in favour of shared representations between the
ANS and the symbolic number system. Line bisection
tasks, which are good measures, since the only alteration is
to exchange flanking numbers for flanking arrays of dots,
can be an important test if done more thoroughly. While
they are currently inconclusive due to replication failure,
in the spatial–numerical bias on the non-symbolic side, we
expect that there may be such effects since arrays of dots
induce the same type of attentional bias as symbolic num-
bers. Those attentional biases are in turn responsible for
line bisection biases, so it would be surprising if there are
no bisection biases for non-symbolic stimuli even though
there are relevant attentional biases.
For now, though, the little behavioural evidence we
have on bisection tasks suggests that there are different
underlying representations—since we cannot be sure that
there are relevant spatial biases for non-symbolic stimuli.
This is consistent with the findings from our comparison
of SNARC effects with symbolic and non-symbolic stim-
uli. Even on otherwise identical tasks (numerical compari-
sons with numbers vs numerical comparisons with arrays
of dots), the behavioural signature is different. The bias
with symbolic representations is flexible, whereas the only
kind of flexibility found with non-symbolic stimuli (the
phrasing of the question) is one of the few points in which
the symbolic bias seems to be unchanged.
These differences in behaviour are more easily
explained if the underlying representations are different.
The main reason is that, on the triple-code model, the rep-
resentations and processes of the ANS are also used in
tasks involving symbolic numbers. Since these representa-
tions are activated on the triple-code model, and are sup-
posed to be inherently spatial, one would expect to see
some effects of the spatial biases observed with non-sym-
bolic stimuli in the case of symbolic stimuli. Currently, the
triple-code model does not seem to have an explanation as
to why this is not observed with SNARC-like effects.
Buijsman and Tirado 2433
This puts the behavioural evidence in a tricky position.
We expect the bisection tasks to show similar behavioural
signatures, but the SNARC tasks are unlikely to turn out
more similar across formats with continued testing. We see
two ways out of this position. On one hand, the observations
with bisection tasks may be due to more general attentional
biases. In other words, the effects may be the result of differ-
ent representations (in line with the SNARC findings) if
magnitude-related variables such as total surface area can
explain the attentional bias with non-symbolic stimuli. The
one eye-tracking study with non-symbolic stimuli suggests
otherwise, but since it is a single study which is in conflict
with the replication study on bisection biases, there is good
reason to attempt a replication similar to what Gebuis and
Gevers (2011) did for bisection tasks in tandem to more
studies with bisection tasks using non-symbolic stimuli.
The alternative is that the bisection biases are specific to
numerical stimuli (whether symbolic or non-symbolic) and
stem from the spatial nature of our numerical representa-
tions. In this case, the discrepancy in SNARC-like effects
requires explanation. The brain studies discussed may be of
some help here. The interhemispheric competition found for
symbolic representations can, with further studies, be com-
pared to the source of the SNARC-like effect with non-sym-
bolic stimuli. A clearer picture of the neural differences may
help pinpoint why we do not observe the non-symbolic
biases when testing with symbolic stimuli. It may be possible
for the triple-code model to be refined in a way that explains
why the spatial nature of the ANS representations (suppos-
edly demonstrated by the non-symbolic SNARC-like effect)
does not influence our performance with tasks that demon-
strate a symbolic SNARC effect. Neuroimaging studies
focussing on this difference may help the theoretical work
necessary to fit this discrepancy into the triple-code model.
The review also discussed findings that tried to establish
what neural mechanisms underlie these spatial–numeric
associations. These findings can also help to decide the
central question. Should brain studies find that the spatial–
numeric associations for non-symbolic and symbolic
numerical stimuli are based on the same neural mecha-
nisms, then this would support the hypothesis of shared
representations. Vice versa, an observation of different neu-
ral mechanisms for the two cases supports the hypothesis
that there are different representations. Furthermore,
they are an important addition to the behavioural studies
discussed earlier. It is difficult to say that the observed
behaviour fits, or does not fit, the existence of shared repre-
sentations when we are unsure which processes produced
the behaviour. By looking for overlap in the processes
across formats (e.g., the symbolic SNARC effect and the
non-symbolic SNARC-like effect), we get a better sense of
the relation between the observed behaviour and the under-
lying representations and processes.
So far, however, there are not enough data available to
further clarify the behavioural studies discussed here. The
neuroimaging studies that are available do point at fruitful
avenues of research, though. A combination of methods
has lead to the hypothesis that spatial–numerical biases for
symbolic numbers are based on dynamic interhemispheric
competition. If these studies are supplemented with exper-
iments that look at the SNARC-like effects observed with
non-symbolic stimuli, then the source of the difference
between the two should become a lot clearer. There are,
more importantly, suggestions that there is a shared repre-
sentation for the different formats of symbolic numerical
stimuli. Since no studies have been done with non-symbolic
stimuli, it is too early to say anything based on brain imag-
ing studies, but it seems that future studies that include
non-symbolic stimuli would be helpful for deciding the
question raised in this review.
In general, we have found that there is no clear support
for either of the two positions; the triple-code model with
shared representations across formats or the general mag-
nitude system with different representations for symbolic
and non-symbolic stimuli. The situation may become
clearer if there is further research on a number of points.
First, the data on line bisection tasks are unclear, which
calls for further research on bisection tasks with non-sym-
bolic stimuli together with research on attentional biases
due to non-symbolic stimuli. Since line bisection with
symbolic stimuli is the result of attentional biases, the cur-
rently supported combination of attentional bias without
bisection bias seems unlikely. This will also clarify whether
there is a specific numerical bisection/attentional bias,
which would point in favour of the triple-code model.
Second, the reason for the marked difference between
the non-symbolic SNARC-like effect and the symbolic
SNARC effect requires further study. We expect that the
behavioural effects are sufficiently well-studied for there
to be few surprises from further behavioural testing.
However, since there is a clear hypothesis on the neural
mechanism behind the symbolic SNARC effect, it will be
helpful if similar studies are carried out for the non-symbolic
effect.
Third, there is a total absence of brain studies that look
at numerical processes across symbolic and non-symbolic
formats. Such studies seem extremely relevant given the
heated debate between the triple-code model and the gen-
eral magnitude system. Furthermore, since a similar study
has been carried out successfully with different symbolic
formats, there is a template readily available for such
cross-format studies.
Fourth, we want to encourage behavioural studies that
make the comparison between spatial biases with sym-
bolic and non-symbolic stimuli with the same subjects.
Such an intraindividual comparison can be helpful particu-
larly for the differences observed with the SNARC effect.
We have assumed that the results for non-symbolic stimuli
are culture independent, but to the best of our knowledge,
this has not been investigated thoroughly. There may be
2434 Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 72(10)
some variability in the non-symbolic effect in line with the
variability in the dominant direction of the SNARC effect.
In other words, the difference in flexibility may be more a
difference of degree than a difference in kind.
Altogether, we think these are promising directions
of research that will help us decide between accounts
such as the triple-code model on which symbolic and
non-symbolic representations are shared and accounts
that prefer a general magnitude system with distinct
representations. Currently, the behavioural data are
unclear, even taken aside from the difficult to say that
behaviour on similar tasks is not the result of different
processes. However, with the directions outlined here,
the behavioural evidence should become clearer. By
linking it to neuroimaging studies, it should, moreover,
be possible to say with more certainty that the observed
behaviours are relevant to understanding our numerical
representations. So, even though this review has not
managed to add strong support for either position, we
do think that it suggests a way forward that may help
resolve the debate.
Declaration of conflicting interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with
respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this
article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research,
authorship, and/or publication of this article.
ORCID iD
Carlos Tirado https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3937-9372
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