Pangkatipu ● The spouses Getulio Pagkatipunan and 1. Are the 1. NO.

Petitioners' contention that the Republic is

nan v. CA, Lucrecia Esquires, filed with the CFI of petitioners now barred from questioning the validity of the
379 SCRA Gumaca, Quezon an application for judicial correct in certificate of title issued to them considering that
621 confirmation and registration of their title claiming it took the government almost 18 years to assail
to 4 lots in Quezon province that their the same is erroneous. It is a basic precept that
○ to Lots 1 and 2 of Plan title to the prescription does not run against the State.
Psu-174406 and Lots 1 and 2 of land became
Plan Psu-112066, all located in incontrovert The lengthy occupation of the disputed land by
San Narciso, Quezon. ible and petitioners cannot be counted in their favor, as it
○ On May 4, 1961, the CFI entered indefeasible remained part of the patrimonial property of the
an order of default against the 1 year after State, which is inalienable and indisposable.
whole world, except spouses issuance of 2. NO. Unless public land is shown to have been
Felicisimo Almace and Teodulo the decree reclassified or alienated to a private person by
Medenilla who were given 10 of the State, it remains part of the inalienable public
days to file their written registration, domain. Occupation thereof in the concept of
opposition as regards Lot No. 2 of barring the owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into
Plan Psu- 174406. Republics ownership and be registered as a title.2 Before
○ Upon motion of petitioners cause of any land may be declassified from the forest
predecessors, Lot No. 2 of Plan action due group and converted into alienable or disposable
Psu-174406 was removed from to land for agricultural or other purposes, there
the coverage of the application. prescription must be a positive act from the government. Even
○ On June 15, 1967, the Court of and res rules on the confirmation of imperfect titles do
First Instance promulgated a judicata? not apply unless and until the land classified as
decision confirming petitioners 2. Are the forest land is released in an official proclamation
title to the property. petitioners to that effect so that it may form part of the
○ On October 23, 1967, OCT No. correct in disposable agricultural lands of the public
O-12665 was issued in the name claiming domain. Declassification of forest land is an
of petitioners. that the land express and positive act of Government. It cannot
● Almost 18 years later, or on September 12, is be presumed. Neither should it be ignored nor
1985, the Republic of the Philippines filed agricultural deemed waived.
with the IAC an action to declare the and the
proceedings in LRC Case No. 91-G, LRC vested Thus, it is clear that the applicant must prove not
Record No. N-19930 before the CFI of rights only his open, continuous, exclusive and
Gumaca, Quezon null and void, and to acquired by notorious possession and occupation of the land
cancel OCT No. 0- 12665 and titles derived petitioners either since time immemorial or for the period
therefrom as null and void, to direct the predecessor prescribed therein, but most importantly, he must
register of deeds to annul said certificates s-in-interest prove that the land is alienable public land. In the
of title, and to confirm the subject land as who have case at bar, petitioners failed to do so since there
part of the public domain. The Republic been in was no evidence showing that the land has been
claimed that at the time of filing of the open, reclassified as disposable or alienable.
land registration case and of rendition of continuous,
the decision on June 15, 1967, the subject adverse and Evidence extant on record would also show that
land was classified as timberland under public at the time of filing of the application for land
LC Project No. 15-B of San Narciso, possession registration and issuance of the certificate of title
Quezon, as shown in BF Map No. LC-1180, of the land over the disputed land in the name of petitioners,
hence inalienable and not subject to in question it was classified as timberland and formed part of
registration. Moreover, petitioners title since time the public domain, according to the certification
thereto cannot be confirmed for lack of immemorial issued by the Bureau of Forest Development on
showing of possession and occupation of and for April 1, 1985.
the land in the manner and for the length more than
of time required by Section 48(b), CA No. 30 years Petitioners even admitted this fact during the
141, as amended. Neither did petitioners prior to the proceedings on March 10, 1986, when they
have any fee simple title which may be filing of the confirmed that the land has been classified as
registered under Act No. 496, as amended. application forming part of forest land, although only on
Consequently, the CFI did not acquire for August 25, 1955. Since no imperfect title can be
jurisdiction over the res and any registration confirmed over lands not yet classified as
proceedings had therein were null and in 1960 disposable or alienable, the title issued to herein
void. cannot be petitioners is considered void ab initio.
● Petitioners raised the special defenses of impaired by
 indefeasibility of title and res judicata. the
They argued that due to the lapse of a classificatio
considerable length of time, the judgment n of the
of the CFI of Quezon in the land Bureau of
registration case has become final and Forestry in
conclusive against the Republic. Moreover, 1955 as
the action for reversion of the land to the timberland?
public domain is barred by prior
judgment.
● The IAC held that the land in question was
forestral land, hence not registrable. There
was no evidence on record to show that
the land was actually and officially
delimited and classified as alienable or
disposable land of the public domain.
Therefore, the CFI did not acquire
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
application for registration and to decide
the same. Consequently, the action to
declare null and void the June 15, 1967
decision for lack of jurisdiction did not
prescribe.
● Petitioners moved for the reconsideration
of the afore-cited decision reiterating that
the land in question was agricultural
because it was possessed and cultivated as
such long before its classification as
timberland by the Bureau of Forestry in
1955. Petitioners and their
predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, notorious
possession and occupation of said land for
agricultural and cattle raising purposes as
far back as the Spanish regime. Following
the doctrine in Oracoy v. Director of Lands,
private interest had intervened and
petitioners acquired vested rights which
can no longer be impaired by the
subsequent classification of the land as
timberland by the Director of Forestry.