Overpressure Protection Analysis Report-Feed

FEED PR OJEC T
FEED: Overpressure
Protection Analysis Report
00100W-N-G0-G020-SR-REP-0010 Rev 1
28 October 2013
WorleyParsons Europe Limited

Parkview, Great West Road
Brentford, Middlesex
TW8 9AZ
United Kingdom
Tel: +44 (0)20 8326 5000
Fax: +44 (0)20 8710 0220
FEED Project
FEED: OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION ANALYSIS
REVISION DESCRIPTION SHEET
Rev. Para. Reason for Revision
A Issued for Inter-Discipline Check
B Issued for Customer Review
C Re-issued for Customer Review based on PVN-0080-R and manifold

arrangement of wellhead gathering
D Re-issued for Customer Review based on IVR comments
0 Issued for FEED incorporating final IVR comments
1 Issued for Information
Hold
Para. Description of Hold
No.
00100W-N-G0-G020-SR-REP-0010 Page 3 of 6
Rev 1 (28 October 2013) Template R6
FEED Project
CONTENTS
1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................................................................................................... 5
APPENDIX 1- ......................................................................................................................................
WELLHEAD GATHERING TRUNKILNE OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION ANALYSIS . 6
FEED Project
1. EXECUTIVE S UMMARY
The FEED: Wellhead gathering trunkline overpressure protection analysis report was
produced in April 2013 by Worleyparsons. That report analysed the reliability of the
overpressure protection measures of the wellhead gathering system that is proposed to deliver
oil and gas to the Integrated Process Complex (IPC) in the field project (Segment B).
Additional cases were proposed by Worleyparsons for review. Atkins has been reviewed the
new cases which is included in this report. The updated cases are included in Appendix 1.
This report supersedes previous revision (Rev. 0).
FEED Project
APPENDIX 1- WELLHE AD G ATHERING TRUNKILNE

OVERPRESSURE PROTE CTION AN ALYSIS
Project
FEED: Wellhead Gathering
Trunkline Overpressure Protection
Analysis
WorleyParsons
October 2013
Project
FEED: Wellhead Gathering Trunkline Overpressure Protection Analysis
Notice
This document and its contents have been prepared and are intended solely for WorleyParsons’ information
and use in relation to the FEED: Wellhead Gathering Trunkline Overpressure Protection Analysis
ATKINS assumes no responsibility to any other party in respect of or arising out of or in connection with this
document and/or its contents.
Document history
Job number: 5114320 Document ref: 5114320/004
Revision Purpose description Originated Checked Reviewed Authorised Date
Rev 1.0 For Client Comments JG ARC October
2013
Rev 2.0 Final JG ARC October
2013
Private and confidential

Atkins FEED: Wellhead Gathering Trunkline Overpressure Protection Analysis | Version
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Table of contents
Chapter Pages
Acronyms 1
Executive summary 2
1. Introduction 4
2. Target Mitigated Event Likelihood 5
3. Cases Analysed 6
3.1. Case 6.1 6
3.2. Case 6.6 9
3.3. Case 6.3 11
3.4. Case 6.7 13
4. Fault Tree Development 16
4.1. Initiating Events 16
4.2. Common Cause Failure 16
5. Results 23
5.1. Case 6.1 23
5.2. Case 6.6 23
5.3. Case 6.3 24
5.4. Case 6.7 25
6. Sensitivity Analysis 27
6.1. Maximum Number of Wells (Case 6.7) 27
6.2. Increasing Proof Test Intervals (Case 6.7) 27
7. Conclusion 29
8. References 30
Appendices 31
Appendix A. Failure Rate Data Used and Sources 32
Appendix B. Case 6.1 - Fault Trees 39
B.1. Fault Trees (Before 2024) 39
B.2. Fault Trees (Before 2024) - Contribution List 40
Appendix C. Case 6.6 - Fault Trees 41
C.1. Fault Trees (Before 2024) 41
C.2. Fault Trees (Before 2024) - Contribution List 42
Appendix D. Case 6.3 - Fault Trees 43
D.1. Fault Trees (Before 2024) 43
D.2. Fault Trees (Before 2024) - Contribution List 44
Appendix E. Case 6.7 - Fault Trees 45
E.1. Fault Trees (Before 2024) 45
E.2. Fault Trees (Before 2024) - Contribution List 46
E.3. Fault Trees (After 2024) 47
E.4. Fault Trees (Before 2024) - Contribution List 48
Appendix F. Case 6.7 - Fault Trees (Sensitivity Analysis) 49
F.1. Fault Trees (Maximum Number of Wells) 49
F.2. Fault Trees (Maximum Number of Wells) - Contribution List 50
F.3. Fault Trees (Maximum Test Intervals) 51

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F.4. Fault Trees (Maximum Test Intervals) - Contribution List 52

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Acronyms
The following lists the acronyms used in this report:
CCF Common Cause Failure

EIL Environmental Integrity Level
ESDV Emergency Shutdown Valve
ESP Electrical Submersible Pump
FEED Front End Engineering Design
HV High Voltage
IPC Integrated Processing Complex
MCC Motor Control Centre
PLC Programmable Logic Control
RBD Reliability Block Diagram
RTU Remote Terminal Unit (wellhead control system)
SIL Safety Integrity Level
TMEL Target Mitigated Event Likelihood
VFD Variable Frequency Drive

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Executive summary
The FEED: Wellhead Gathering Trunkline Overpressure Protection Analysis Report [1] was
produced in April 2013 by WorleyParsons. That report analysed the reliability of the overpressure protection
measures of the wellhead gathering system that is proposed to deliver oil and gas to the Integrated
Processing Complex (IPC) in the field project (Segment B). A number of cases were identified in low
demand mode and the FEED: Overpressure Protection Analysis Report [1] concluded that the
overpressure controls associated with Case 3.3 would meet the Target Mitigated Event Likelihood (TMEL).
Seven additional cases were proposed by WorleyParsons for review. These cases were:
• Case 6.1 – an initial case using the previously assessed Case 3.3 as the basis;
• Case 6.2 – building upon Case 6.1 with an additional ESP inferred trip;
• Case 6.6 – using Case 6.1 as the basis with inclusion of two ESP HV breakers;
• Case 6.3 - using Case 6.6 as the basis and segregated wellhead logic solver (trip amplifier) from
manifold logic solver;
• Case 6.4 – building upon Case 6.1 with the inclusion of an additional Manifold ESD valve in 1oo2
configuration;
• Case 6.5 – a hybrid of Case 6.3 and Case 6.4; and,
• Case 6.7 – building upon Case 6.3 with an additional layer of protection at the wellheads (additional trip
amplifier) that shuts down the ESP via the ESP VFD.
Atkins has been asked to analysis additional cases - Case 6.1, Case 6.6, Case 6.3 and Case 6.7 - with low
and high demand mode. The additional cases to be assessed look at configurations before 2024 and after
2024. The purpose of this report is to present the results from development of fault trees for Case 6.1, Case
6.6, Case 6.3 and 6.7 for the before 2024 configuration and after 2024 configuration. Once the fault trees
were developed and an overpressure event frequency for each case determined an assessment was
conducted for each case to determine if it met the TMEL.
The fault trees developed for each of the cases gave the following predicted overpressure event frequencies
for the before 2024 configuration:
•
-1
Case 6.1 - 2.98 x 10 per year;
• Case 6.6 - 1.30 x 10-1 per year;
• Case 6.3 - 4.78 x 10-3 per year; and,
• Case 6.7 - 4.60 x 10-4 per year.
Of the cases above only Case 6.7 met the TMELs for safety and environmental impacts in high demand as
well as low demand mode. The overpressure event frequency for Case 6.7 resulted in the following impact
frequencies:
• Safety impact - 4.60 x 10-6 per year (including the occupancy factor of 0.01); and,
• Environmental impact - 4.60 x 10-4 per year.
When the above impact frequencies are compared to the TMELs for safety impact and environmental
impact, 1 x 10-4 per year and 1 x 10-3 per year respectively, it can be seen that the proposed overpressure
protection meets both the SIL and EIL requirements
The greatest contributors to the overpressure event frequency for Case 6.7 are given below, in order of
contribution:
• 6 trunklines;
• 4 wellpads;
• MESDLOG - ESD logic solver fails to operate (manifolds);
• CCFPITM – Common cause failure for PIT (Man & WH);
• MANVM1 – Manifold ESD valve fails to operate on demand (manifold 1); and,

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• MANVM2 – Manifold ESD valve fails to operate on demand (manifold 2).
The fault tree developed for Case 6.7 representing the configuration after 2024 gave an estimated
overpressure event frequency of 6.93 x 10-4 per year. The overpressure event frequency for the after 2024
configuration resulted in the following impact frequencies:
• Safety impact - 6.93 x 10-6 per year (including the occupancy factor of 0.01); and,
protection meets both the SIL and EIL requirements.
A sensitivity analysis conducted for Case 6.7 assessed the maximum number of wells that could be
connected and the maximum test interval using the before 2024 configuration. The analysis concluded that a
maximum number of 15 wells could be connected to each wellpad with a test interval of two years to give the
resulting overpressure frequency meeting the TMELs for safety and environmental impacts. With the Case
6.7 before 2024 configuration it was estimated that the test intervals could be increased to 3 year intervals
and still meet the TMELs for safety and environmental impacts.

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1. Introduction
The FEED: Overpressure Protection Analysis Report [1] was produced by WorleyParsons in April
2013. This report analyses the reliability of the overpressure protection measures of the wellhead gathering
system that delivers oil and gas to the Integrated Processing Complex (IPC) in the field project
(Segment B). A number of cases were identified in low demand mode and the FEED: Overpressure
Protection Analysis Report [1] concluded that the overpressure controls associated with Case 3.3 would
meet the TMEL in low demand mode (less than one demand/year). Atkins has been asked to analysis
additional cases - Case 6.1, Case 6.6, Case 6.3 and Case 6.7 - in high and low demand mode. The
additional cases to be assessed look at configurations before 2024 and after 2024; further details of these
configurations are given below.
Case 6.1 looked at the following configuration:
• Before 2024 configuration:

- Total number of wells = 288.
- 12 (max) ESP driven wells per wellpad.
- 2 manifolds per wellpad - 8 (max) ESP driven wells per manifold.
- 4 wellpads per trunkline.
- 6x2 trunklines feeding into the IPC.
Cases 6.3, 6.6 and 6.7 looked at the following configurations:
• Before 2024 configuration:

• After 2024 configuration:
The purpose of this technical note is to present the results from our analysis. In order to determine the
frequency of overpressure, fault trees were developed for Case 6.1, Case 6.6, Case 6.3 and 6.7 for the
before 2024 configuration and after 2024 configuration. Once the overpressure event frequency had been
determined for each case, an assessment was conducted for each case to determine if it meets the TMEL
for the high demand mode.

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2. Target Mitigated Event Likelihood

In line with [1], separate TMELs for safety and environmental impacts have been chosen for the assessment
as follows:
• For safety impact, a severity level of E with a TMEL of 1x10-4 per year.
• For environmental impact, a severity level of F with a TMEL of 1x10-3 per year.

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3. Cases Analysed
There were seven cases proposed by WorleyParsons for review. These cases were:
• Case 6.1 – an initial case using the previously assessed Case 3.3 [1] as the basis;
• Case 6.2 – building upon Case 6.1 with an additional ESP inferred trip;
• Case 6.6 – using Case 6.1 as the basis with inclusion of two ESP HV breakers;
• Case 6.3 - using Case 6.6 as the basis and segregated wellhead logic solver (trip amplifier) from
manifold logic solver;
• Case 6.4 – building upon Case 6.1 with the inclusion of an additional Manifold ESD valve in 1oo2
configuration;
• Case 6.5 – a hybrid of Case 6.3 and Case 6.4; and,
• Case 6.7 – building upon Case 6.3 with an additional layer of protection at the wellheads (additional trip
amplifier) that shuts down the ESP via the ESP VFD.
During the course of the assessment, it was clear that Cases 6.2, 6.4 and 6.5 would not provide the required
reliability so were discounted from the analysis.
The cases to be considered in this analysis are described below.
3.1. Case 6.1

Case 6.1 was the initial case to be considered and had the following overpressure features:
• High pressure set point from (PIT 1002) acts as a override controller on choke valve (HV 1001) and also
turndown of the Electrical Submerged Pump (ESP) speed to minimum via VFD at each wellhead;
• An independent pressure transmitter (PIT 1003) connected to an ESD logic solver at each wellhead will
trip power to the ESP at the wellhead via MCC (independent from VFD turndown facility);
• A trip from the IPC connected to the same ESD logic solver above at each wellhead will also trip power
to the ESP at the wellhead via MCC (independent from VFD turndown facility) ; and
• Manifold valves on each manifold (ESDV 1004 and ESDV 1005) closed with initiation via 2oo3 pressure
transmitters on each manifold (PIT 1009 and PIT 1011). The IPC trip also closes these valves.
The following technologies were incorporated into Case 6.1:
• The redundant network will be SIL2 equivalent with health check and one redundant cable routed to
each WHCP (wellhead control panel) at each multi-well wellpad;
• Each multi-well wellpad will have a dedicated IPC ESD network card at the IPC; and,
• Typical SIL2 ESD logic solvers with a failure rate of 2.33 x 10-3 per year for each IPC and ESD logic
solver.
Figure 3-1 presents the above description in a Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) for Case 6.1. A schematic for
Case 6.1 has been provided in Figure 3-2.

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Figure 3-1 Reliability Block Diagram for Case 6.1

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Figure 3-2 Schematic for Case 6.1

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3.2. Case 6.6

Case 6.6 will have the same overpressure features as Case 6.1 with the addition of 2 ESP HV breakers –
one to trip ESPs on manifold 1 wells and one to trip ESPs on manifold 2 wells – and an upgrade of the ESD
logic solvers to a SIL 3 Certified PLC (1002D)AI/DO with a failure rate of 2.11 x 10-3 per year. The circuit
breakers will be connected to the ESD logic solver at each manifold and will trip the ESPs.

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3.3. Case 6.3

Case 6.3 will have the same overpressure features as Case 6.6 except the logic solvers at the wellheads will
be replaced with a trip amplifier which shuts down the ESP via the MCC relay. The proposed trip amplifier
does not accept signals from remote initiators, therefore, the previous input from the IPC trip is removed from
the analysis for this case.

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3.4. Case 6.7

Case 6.7 will have the same overpressure features as Case 6.3 with an additional pressure transmitter and
trip amplifier layer of protection at the wellheads which shuts down the ESP via the ESP VFD.
Figure 3-7 and Figure 3-8 presents the above description in a Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) for Case 6.7
before and after 2024 respectively. A schematic for Case 6.7 has been provided in Figure 3-9.
Figure 3-7 Reliability Block Diagram for Case 6.7 (Before Year 2024)

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Figure 3-8 Reliability Block Diagram for Case 6.7 (After Year 2024)

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4. Fault Tree Development

4.1. Initiating Events
Appendix A lists each of the initiating events detailed within the fault trees for each case, the data references
and failure rates or probabilities used.
4.2. Common Cause Failure

Common Cause Failures (CCF) for different voting logic were insert ed separat ely for each initiating event
rather than combining the CCFs for various component failures as was done in [1].
CCFs were amended in line with Reliability Prediction Method for Safety Instrumented systems – PDS
Example collection [2]. Using this approach CCFs were calculated as follows:
• CCF = CMooN x Beta factor x component failure rate
Where:
- CMooN = modification factor for voting configurations other than 1oo2 in the beta factor model (e. g.
1oo3, 2oo3 and 2oo4 voting logics). MooN voting implies that at least M-out-of-N components must
function for the safety to work.
- Beta factor = the fraction of failures of a single component that causes both components of a
redundant pair to fail “simultaneously”. The bet a is application specific and should, therefore,
preferably reflect application specific conditions.
The CCF values used in developing the fault trees are presented in Table 4.1.

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Event Name – as presented Description – as presented Detailed Description CMooN Beta Component CCF failure
in the Fault Trees in the Fault Trees Factor [2] factor [1] failure rate [1] rate
CASE 6.1 (before 2024)
CCFPITW A to H and I to L Common cause failure for PIT CCF for 1oo2 PIT (PIT1002 and 1 0.05 1.40x10-6 7.00x10-8
(12 wells) 1oo2 (WH only) PIT1003) at each well failing to operate
on demand.
CCFPIT9 Common cause failure for PIT CCF for 2oo3 PIT (PIT1009A, 2 0.05 1.40x10-6 1.40x10-7
(2oo3) PIT1009B and PIT1009C) at the
manifold failing to operate on demand.
CCFVALM1 CCF Manifold ESD valve fails CCF associated with the Choke valves 2.93 0.05 2.15x10-6 3.14x10-7
to operate (Man & WH). on the wells and manifold 1 valve
failing to operate on demand.
8oo9 to guarantee isolation however if

the manifold valve operates then 1oo9.
CMooN taken to be the average of the
two.

two.
CCFPITM Common cause failure for PIT CCF associated with the PITs on the 0.15 0.02 1.40x10-6 4.20x10-9
(Man & WH) wells and manifold failing to operate on
demand

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CCFPITW A to D, I and J (6 Common cause failure for PIT CCF for 1oo2 PIT (PIT1002 and 1 0.05 1.40x10-6 7.00x10-8
wells) 1oo2 (WH only) PIT1003) at each well failing to operate
on demand.

two.

two
demand

Project
CCFPITWA to D, I and J (6 Common cause failure for PIT CCF for 1oo2 PIT (PIT1002 and 1 0.05 1.40x10-6 7.00x10-8
wells) 1oo2 (WH only) PIT1003) at each well failing to operate
on demand.

two.

two
demand

Project
CCFPITWA to J (6 wells) Common cause failure for PIT CCF for 1oo3 PIT (PIT1002, PIT1003 0.5 0.05 1.40x10-6 3.50x10-8
1oo3 (WH only) and PIT1013) at each well failing to
operate on demand.
CCFTAMPA to J (6 wells) Common cause failure for Trip CCF for 1oo2 trip amps (trip amp 1 1 0.05 3.60x10-8 1.80x10-9
amps 1oo2 (WH only) and 2) at each well failing to operate
on demand.

two.

two

Project
demand
CASE 6.7 (after 2024)
CCFPITWA to F and I to L (10 Common cause failure for PIT CCF for 1oo3 PIT (PIT1002, PIT1003 0.5 0.05 1.40x10-6 3.50x10-8
wells) 1oo3 (WH only) and PIT1013) at each well failing to
operate on demand.
CCFTAMP A to F and I to L Common cause failure for Trip CCF for 1oo2 trip amps (trip amp 1 1 0.05 3.60x10-8 1.80x10-9
(10 wells) amps 1oo2 (WH only) and 2) at each well failing to operate
on demand.

two.

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two.
demand
Table 4.1 – CCF Failure Rates
The CCFs calculated in Table 4.1 were used in the fault tree developed for the high demand.

Project
5. Results
5.1. Case 6.1
As mentioned in Section 3, Case 6.1 was the initial case to be considered and had the following
overpressure features:
• High pressure set point from (PIT 1002) acts as a override controller on choke valve (HV 1001) and also
turndown of the Electrical Submerged Pump (ESP) speed to minimum via VFD at each wellhead;
• An independent pressure transmitter (PIT 1003) connected to an ESD logic solver at each wellhead will
trip power to the ESP at the wellhead via MCC (independent from VFD turndown facility);
• A trip from the IPC connected to the same ESD logic solver above at each wellhead will also trip power
to the ESP at the wellhead via MCC (independent from VFD turndown facility) ; and
• Manifold valves on each manifold (ESDV 1004 and ESDV 1005) closed with initiation via 2oo3 pressure
transmitters on each manifold (PIT 1009 and PIT 1011). The IPC trip also closes these valves.
The following technologies were incorporated into Case 6.1:
• The redundant network will be SIL2 equivalent with health check and one redundant cable routed to
each WHCP (wellhead control panel) at each multi-well wellpad;
• Each multi-well wellpad will have a dedicated IPC ESD network card at the IPC; and,
•
-3
Typical SIL2 ESD logic solvers with a failure rate of 2.33 x 10 per year for each IPC and ESD logic
solver.
5.1.1. Fault Trees

The fault trees developed for Case 6.1 (high demand) before 2024 configuration can be found in Appendix B.
From the fault tree an overpressure event frequency of 3.40 x 10-5 per hour has been predicted and this
corresponds to an overpressure event frequency of 2.98 x 10-1 per year. A contribution list with respect to
frequency can be found in Appendix B.
5.1.2. Safety and Environmental Impacts

For safety impacts, in line with other mitigation measures [1], the chance of safety harm being realised has
been assessed as 0.01 per event. As per the result from the Case 6.1 fault tree the frequency of an
overpressure event frequency is 2.98 x 10-1 per year. Using the chance of safety harm being realised, the
following can be calculated:
• Frequency of safety impact = 0.01 * 2.98 x 10-1 = 2.98 x 10-3 per year.
When the calculated frequency is compared to the TMEL of 1x10-4 per year for severity level E events it can
be seen that the frequency of the safety impact is greater than the TMEL (almost 30 times greater) and
therefore the proposed overpressure protection does not meet the SIL requirement.
For environmental impacts the impact frequency equals that of the overpressure event frequency, 2.98 x 10-1
per year. When the calculated frequency is compared to the TMEL of 1x10-3 per year for severity level F
events it can be seen that the frequency of the impact is greater than the TMEL (almost 300 times greater)
for severity level F events and therefore the proposed overpressure protection does not meet the EIL
requirement.
5.2. Case 6.6

Case 6.6 will have the same overpressure features as Case 6.1 with the addition of 2 ESP HV breakers –
one to trip ESPs on manifold 1 wells and one to trip ESPs on manifold 2 wells – and an upgrade of the ESD
logic solvers to a SIL 3 Certified PLC (1002D)AI/DO with a failure rate of 2.11 x 10-3 per year. The circuit
breakers will be connected to the ESD logic solver at each manifold and will trip the ESPs.

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5.2.1. Fault Trees

The fault trees developed for Case 6.6 (high demand) before 2024 configuration can be found in Appendix
C.
frequency can be found in Appendix C.

be seen that the frequency of the safety impact is greater than the TMEL (13 times greater) and therefore the
proposed overpressure protection does not meet the SIL requirement.
events it can be seen that the frequency of the impact is greater than the TMEL (130 times greater) for
severity level F events and therefore the proposed overpressure protection does not meet the EIL
requirement.
5.3. Case 6.3

Case 6.3 will have the same overpressure features as Case 6.6 except the logic solvers at the wellheads will
be replaced with a trip amplifier which shuts down the ESP via the MCC relay. The proposed trip amplifier
does not accept signals from remote initiators, therefore, the previous input from the IPC trip is removed from
the analysis for this case.
5.3.1. Fault Trees

The fault trees developed for Case 6.3 (high demand) before 2024 configuration can be found in Appendix
D.
frequency can be found in Appendix D.

be seen that the frequency of the safety impact is less than the TMEL and therefore the proposed
overpressure protection frequency exceeds the SIL requirement by a factor of approximately 2.
events it can be seen that the frequency of the impact is greater than the TMEL (almost 5 times greater) for

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severity level F events and therefore the proposed overpressure protection does not meet the EIL
requirement.
5.4. Case 6.7

Case 6.7 will have the same overpressure features as Case 6.3 with an additional pressure transmitter and
trip amplifier layer of protection at the wellheads which shuts down the ESP via the ESP VFD.
5.4.1. Before 2024

5.4.1.1. Fault Trees
The fault trees developed for Case 6.7 (high demand) before 2024 configuration can be found in Appendix E.
frequency can be found in Appendix E.
5.4.1.2. Safety and Environmental Impacts

been assessed as 0.01 per event. As per the result from the Case 6.7 (before 2024) fault tree the frequency
of an overpressure event frequency is 4.60 x 10-4 per year. Using the chance of safety harm being realised,
the following can be calculated:
events it can be seen that the frequency of the impact is less than the TMEL for severity level F events and
therefore the proposed overpressure protection frequency exceeds the EIL requirement by a factor of just
over 2.
5.4.2. After 2024

The fault trees developed for Case 6.7 (high demand) after 2024 configuration can be found in Appendix E.
frequency can be found in Appendix E.

been assessed as 0.01 per event. As per the result from the Case 6.7 (after 2024) fault tree the frequency of
an overpressure event frequency is 6.93 x 10-4 per year. Using the chance of safety harm being realised, the

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therefore the proposed overpressure protection frequency exceeds the EIL requirement by a factor
approaching 1.5.

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6. Sensitivity Analysis
A sensitivity analysis was conducted for Case 6.7 to determine the following:
1. Increasing the maximum number of wells per well pad which could be connected to meet the TMELs for
safety and environmental impacts; and,
2. Increasing the proof test interval for each of the overpressure protection components which could meet
the TMELs for safety and environmental impacts
The results of these sensitivities are given in the following sections.
6.1. Maximum Number of Wells (Case 6.7)

The fault trees developed for the maximum number of wells connected for Case 6.7 can be found in
Appendix F.
From the fault tree it can be seen that a total of 15 wells can be connected to each wellpad with the resulting
overpressure frequency still meeting the TMELs for safety and environmental impacts (See Section 6.1.1.2)
with a proof test interval of two years. This means that a total of 360 wells can be connected to a single IPC
without exceeding safety and environmental TMEL targets. For the purposes of this sensitivity, 10 wells have
been assigned to manifold 1 with the remaining 5 assigned to manifold 2. From the fault tree an
overpressure event frequency of 1.12 x 10-7 per hour has been predicted and this corresponds to an
overpressure event frequency of 9.81 x 10-4 per year. A contribution list with respect to frequency can be
found in Appendix F.

been assessed as 0.01 per event. As per the result from the Case 6.7 sensitivity fault tree for maximum
number of wells the frequency of an overpressure event frequency is 6.94 x 10-4 per year. Using the chance
of safety harm being realised, the following can be calculated:
therefore the proposed overpressure protection frequency exceeds the EIL requirement by a factor of just
over 1.
6.2. Increasing Proof Test Intervals (Case 6.7)

The fault trees developed after increasing the proof test intervals for Case 6.7 can be found in Appendix F.
From the fault tree it can be seen that a maximum test interval i of 3 years (26,280 hours) can be applied for
the before 2024 configuration (i.e. 4 wells connected to manifold 1 and 2 wells connected to manifold 2) with
the resulting overpressure frequency still meeting the TMELs for safety and environmental impacts (See
Section 6.2.1.2). From the fault tree an overpressure event frequency of 9.51 x 10-8 per hour has been
i
Note - maximum test interval here means the period between two proof tests.

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predicted and this corresponds to an overpressure event frequency of 8.33 x 10-4 per year. A contribution list
with respect to frequency can be found in Appendix F.

been assessed as 0.01 per event. As per the result from the Case 6.7 sensitivity fault tree for increasing
proof test intervals the frequency of an overpressure event frequency is 8.33 x 10-4 per year. Using the
chance of safety harm being realised, the following can be calculated:
overpressure protection frequency exceeds the SIL requirement by a factor of 12.
therefore the proposed overpressure protection frequency exceeds the EIL requirement by a factor of 1.2.

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7. Conclusion
The fault trees developed for each of the cases estimates the following overpressure event frequencies for
the before 2024 configuration:
• Case 6.1 - 2.98 x 10-1 per year;

• Case 6.6 - 1.30 x 10-1 per year;
• Case 6.3 - 4.78 x 10-3 per year; and,
• Case 6.7 - 4.60 x 10-4 per year.
Of the cases above only Case 6.7 meets the TMELs for safety and environmental impacts. The overpressure
event frequency for Case 6.7 results in the following impact frequencies:
• Safety impact - 4.60 x 10-6 per year; and,

protection meets both the SIL and EIL requirements
The greatest contributors to the overpressure event frequency for Case 6.7 are given below in order of
contribution:
• 6 trunklines;
• 4 wellpads;
• MESDLOG - ESD logic solver fails to operate (manifolds);
• CCFPITM – Common cause failure for PIT (Man & WH);
• MANVM1 – Manifold ESD valve fails to operate on demand (manifold 1); and,
• MANVM2 – Manifold ESD valve fails to operate on demand (manifold 2).
The fault tree developed for Case 6.7 representing the configuration after 2024 estimates an overpressure
event frequency of 6.93 x 10-4 per year. The overpressure event frequency for the after 2024 configuration
results in the following impact frequencies:
• Safety impact - 6.93 x 10-6 per year; and,

protection meets both the SIL and EIL requirements.
A sensitivity analysis conducted for Case 6.7 assessed the maximum number of wells that could be
connected and the maximum test interval using the before 2024 configuration. The analysis concluded that a
maximum number of 15 wells could be connected to each wellpad with a test interval of two years to give the
resulting overpressure frequency meeting the TMELs for safety and environmental impacts. With the Case
6.7 before 2024 configuration it was estimated that the proof test intervals could be increased to 3 year
intervals and still meet the TMELs for safety and environmental impacts.

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8. References
1. FEED: Overpressure Protection Analysis Report prepared by WorleyParsons, 00100W-N-
G0-G020-SR-REP-0010 Rev. D, 22 April 2013.
2. Prediction Method for Safety Instrumented Systems – PDS Example collection, 2010 Edition,
SINTEF Technology and Society, Safety Research, 2010-12-14.

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Appendices
Project
Appendix A. Failure Rate Data Used and

Sources
The following tables list each of the initiating events detailed within the fault trees, the data references and
failure rates or probabilities used.
Table A-1 Failure Rate Data Used (and sources)
Fault Tree Data Ref. Description Failure Rate Proof Test Probability Failure Rate /
Event Name (per million Interval Probability
hours) (hours) Rationale
CASE 6.1
IPCESD GN 30-802 IPC shutdown 0.265 17520 - IPC Emergency

logic fails to Shutdown logic
operate failure, Generic
SIL2 Certified
PLC (1oo1D)
AI/DO
NETFAILM GN 30-802 Network failure 0.114 17520 - Network failure

(assumed as
Probes and cable
component
failure)
PITM9A / B / C GN 30-802 PIT1009 fails to 1.4 17520 - Instrument failure

operate(manifold) electronic
pressure
transmitter

pressure
transmitter
ESDLOG Advice Note Local shutdown 0.265 17520 - Local Shutdown

00100-AAN (20- logic fails to logic failure,
Mar-2013) operate (manifold Generic SIL2
1) Certified PLC
(1oo1D) AI/DO
SVF1 GN 30-802 Solenoid valve 1.10 17520 - Solenoid fails to

(ESDV 1004) operate, no
fails to operate change in
(manifold 1) position on
demand
MANVM1 GN 30-802 Valve (ESDV 2.15 17520 - Valve fails to

1004) fails to operate hydraulic
operate (manifold operated valve,
1) fails to close

demand

2) fails to close

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4WPM1 and 2 WP 4 well pads per - - 4
manifold
(manifold 1)
6TLM1 and 2 WP 6 trunklines per - - 6

manifold
(manifold 1)
PIT102A to L GN 30-802 PIT1002 fails to 1.4 17520 - Instrument failure

pressure
transmitter
RTUFAILA to L GN 30-802 High pressure 24.4 17520 - Dual PLC -

override logic Simplex I/O
solver fails
HVCHOKEA to L GN 30-802 Choke valve on 2.15 17520 - Valve fails to

wellhead fails to operate hydraulic
operate operated valve,
fails to close
MCCFA to L Exida 2006.2.02 MCC VFP relay 0.292 17520 - Generic motor
fails to turndown speed drive
to shutdown ESP interrupt, fails
dangerous
undetected
PIT103A to L GN 30-802 PIT1003 fails to 1.4 17520 - Instrument failure

pressure
transmitter
MCCRELA to L GN 30-802 MCC relay fails to 0.199 17520 - Control

turndown to relay/interposing
shutdown ESP relay
CASE 6.6
SIL2 Certified
PLC (1oo1D)
AI/DO

(assumed as
Probes and cable
component
failure)

pressure
transmitter

pressure
transmitter

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ESDLOG ETP Local shutdown 0.241 17520 - Local Shutdown
logic fails to logic failure,
operate Generic SIL3
Certified PLC
(1oo2D) AI/DO

demand

1) fails to close

demand

2) fails to close
HVBREAK1 GN 30-802 ESP HV Breaker 0.30 17520 - ESP HV Breaker

1 fails to trip ESP 1 fails to trip ESP

4WP WP 4 well pads per - - 4

manifold
(manifold 1)
6TL WP 6 trunklines per - - 6

manifold
(manifold 1)
PIT102A to D, I GN 30-802 PIT1002 fails to 1.4 17520 - Instrument failure

and J operate(manifold) electronic
pressure
transmitter
RTUFAILA to D, I GN 30-802 High pressure 24.4 17520 - Dual PLC -

and J override logic Simplex I/O
solver fails
HVCHOKEA to GN 30-802 Choke valve on 2.15 17520 - Valve fails to

D, I and J wellhead fails to operate hydraulic
fails to close
MCCFA to D, I Exida 2006.2.02 MCC VFP relay 0.292 17520 - Generic motor
and J fails to turndown speed drive
dangerous
undetected

2.0 | October 2013 | 5114320/004
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pressure
transmitter
MCCRELA to D, I GN 30-802 MCC relay fails to 0.199 17520 - Control

and J turndown to relay/interposing
shutdown ESP relay
CASE 6.3

SIL2 Certified
PLC (1oo1D)
AI/DO

(assumed as
Probes and cable
component
failure)

pressure
transmitter

pressure
transmitter
MESDLOG ETP Local shutdown 0.241 17520 - Local Shutdown

Certified PLC
(1oo2D) AI/DO

demand

1) fails to close

demand

2) fails to close


2.0 | October 2013 | 5114320/004
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manifold
(manifold 1)

manifold
(manifold 1)

pressure
transmitter

solver fails

fails to close
dangerous
undetected

pressure
transmitter
TAMP1 A to D, I Exida mtl 05-05- Trip amplifier fails 0.0571 17520 - Trip amplifier fails
and J 26 r007 V1 r1 to operate to operate
fmeda 5314.doc,
8/15/2006

shutdown ESP relay
CASE 6.7

SIL2 Certified
PLC (1oo1D)
AI/DO

(assumed as
Probes and cable
component
failure)

pressure
transmitter

2.0 | October 2013 | 5114320/004
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pressure
transmitter
MESDLOG ETP Local shutdown 0.241 17520 - Local Shutdown

Certified PLC
(1oo2D) AI/DO

demand

1) fails to close

demand

2) fails to close



manifold
(manifold 1)

manifold
(manifold 1)

pressure
transmitter

solver fails

fails to close

2.0 | October 2013 | 5114320/004
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dangerous
undetected

pressure
transmitter
TAMP1 A to D, I Exida mtl 05-05- Trip amplifier fails 0.0571 17520 - Trip amplifier fails
and J 26 r007 V1 r1 to operate to operate
fmeda 5314.doc,
8/15/2006

shutdown ESP relay

and J operate electronic
pressure
transmitter
TAMP2 A to D, I Pepperl+FUCHS Trip amplifier fails 0.09 17520 - Trip amplifier fails
and J Document FS- to operate to operate
0013PF-20C,
2011-Jan-17
VFDTRIPA to D, GN 30-802 VFD trip fails 0.199 17520 - Control

I and J relay/interposing
relay

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Appendix B. Case 6.1 - Fault Trees

B.1. Fault Trees (Before 2024)
There are a number of fault trees presented in this appendix. The following explains the fault trees:
• Fault tree Figure 1 takes the results from all the other fault trees (Figures 2 to 13) for the wellheads
components, combines these with the manifold components and presents the overall result for
overpressure of the pipework – the frequency value is used as the demand rate is assumed to be greater
than once per year, i.e. high demand.
• Fault tree Figures 2 to 13 are the fault trees for failure of the overpressure protection at each wellhead.
These trees feed directly into Figure 1.

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EVENT DATA DESCRIPTION FAILURE Trep PROB Type
NAME REF RATE Ttest
WHA Fig 2 Wellhead A isolation 2.02E-07 1.10E-03 >>>

WHB Fig 3 Wellhead B isolation 2.02E-07 1.10E-03 >>>
WHC Fig 4 Wellhead C isolation 2.02E-07 1.10E-03 >>>
WHD Fig 5 Wellhead D isolation 2.02E-07 1.10E-03 >>> OR GATE10
WHE Fig 6 Wellhead E isolation 2.02E-07 1.10E-03 >>>
Overpressure
WHF Fig 7 Wellhead F isolation 2.02E-07 1.10E-03 >>>
protection fails
WHG Fig 8 Wellhead G isolation 2.02E-07 1.10E-03 >>>
>=1 WH on
WHH Fig 9 Wellhead H isolation 2.02E-07 1.10E-03 >>>
manifold 1
P=8.73E-03
F=1.61E-06
PITM9A PIT1009 at manifold 1 fails 2oo3 1.40E-06 1.75E+04 1.22E-02 Unreveald
CCFPIT9 CCF PIT1009 (2oo3) 1.40E-07 1.75E+04 1.23E-03 Unreveald OR GATE14
CCFPITM Common cause failure for PIT (Man & WH) 4.20E-09 1.75E+04 3.68E-05 Unreveald
PIT1009A
P=1.34E-02
& GATE17
F=1.54E-06
PITM9B PIT1009 at manifold 1 fails 2oo3 1.40E-06 1.75E+04 1.22E-02 Unreveald
OverP >=1WH on
CCFPIT9 CCF PIT1009 (2oo3) 1.40E-07 1.75E+04 1.23E-03 Unreveald OR GATE15 2 GATE13
manifold 1 &
PIT1009B 2oo3 PITs manifold 1
P=1.34E-02 (PIT1009) ESDV fails
F=1.54E-06 P=1.85E-03 P=5.09E-03
PITM9C PIT1009 at manifold 1 fails 2oo3 1.40E-06 1.75E+04 1.22E-02 Unreveald
F=2.46E-07 F=9.45E-07
CCFPIT9 CCF PIT1009 (2oo3) 1.40E-07 1.75E+04 1.23E-03 Unreveald OR GATE16 & GATE12
PIT1009C P=8.52E-06
& GATE18
P=1.34E-02 F=1.63E-09
F=1.54E-06 WH & Manifold 1
overpressure
IPCESD IPC ESD Inter-Trip Failure 2.65E-07 1.75E+04 2.32E-03 Unreveald OR GATE77 OR GATE11
protection fail >=
NETFAILM Network failure 1.14E-07 1.75E+04 9.98E-04 Unreveald
P=3.31E-03 P=3.29E-02 1W
& GATE2
F=3.79E-07 F=3.83E-06 P=2.02E-02
ESDLOG ESD logic solver fails to operate 2.65E-07 1.75E+04 2.32E-03 Unreveald
F=3.78E-06 P=1.16E-01
SVF1 Solenoid valve fails to operate manifold 1 1.10E-06 1.75E+04 9.56E-03 Unreveald
F=2.27E-05
MANVM1 Manifold ESD valve fails to operate (manifold 1) 2.15E-06 1.75E+04 1.86E-02 Unreveald
CCFVALM1 CCF ESD valve fails to op (Man 1 & WH) 3.14E-07 1.75E+04 2.74E-03 Unreveald
4WPM1 4 wellpads (manifold 1) 4.00E+00 Probab'ty
6TLM1 6 trunklines (manifold 1) 6.00E+00 Probab'ty
WHI Fig 10 Wellhead I isolation 2.02E-07 1.10E-03 >>>
WHJ Fig 11 Wellhead J isolation 2.02E-07 1.10E-03 >>> OR GATE79
WHK Fig 12 Wellhead K isolation 2.02E-07 1.10E-03 >>>
Overpressure
WHL Fig 13 Wellhead L isolation 2.02E-07 1.10E-03 >>>
protection fails
>+1 WH on
manifold 2
P=4.37E-03
F=8.07E-07
PITM11A PIT1011A at manifold 2 fails 2oo3 1.40E-06 1.75E+04 1.22E-02 Unreveald
CCFPIT11 CCF PIT1011 (2oo3) 1.40E-07 1.75E+04 1.23E-03 Unreveald OR GATE85 OR GATE1
PIT1010A Overpressure
P=1.34E-02 event predicted
& GATE80
F=1.54E-06 frequency
PITM11B PIT1011B at manifold 2 fails 2oo3 1.40E-06 1.75E+04 1.22E-02 Unreveald
OverP >=1WH on P=1.69E-01
manifold 2 & F=3.40E-05
PIT1010B 2oo3 PITs manifold 2
P=1.34E-02 (PIT1010) ESDV fails
F=1.54E-06 P=1.85E-03 P=2.54E-03
PITM11C PIT1011C at manifold 2 fails 2oo3 1.40E-06 1.75E+04 1.22E-02 Unreveald
F=2.46E-07 F=4.72E-07
PIT1010C P=8.52E-06
& GATE78
P=1.34E-02 F=1.63E-09
F=1.54E-06 WH & Manifold 2
overpressure
protection fail
P=3.31E-03 P=3.20E-02 >=1W
& GATE3
F=3.79E-07 F=3.73E-06 P=1.01E-02
F=1.89E-06 P=5.97E-02
F=1.13E-05
MANVM2 Manifold ESD valve fails to operate (manifold 2) 2.15E-06 1.75E+04 1.86E-02 Unreveald
4WPM2 4 wellpads (manifold 2) 4.00E+00 Probab'ty
6TLM2 6 trunklines (manifold 2) 6.00E+00 Probab'ty
Logan Fault and Event Tree Analysis Version 6.10

Date (dd-mm-yy):07-10-13 Time: 09.44.46
Fault Tree File: P:\GBGWA\PandMF\Safety\Data\Job Nos 511xxxx\5114320 - WP LOPA\004 - Fault Trees\Fault Trees\Before 2024\Case 6.1\2 year test intervals\131004_Case 6.1_Sensitivity
Cutset Order: 30 Evaluation Method: Upper limit
Proof Tests: Simultaneous
FIGURE 1. FAULT TREE FOR OVERPRESSURE EVENT PREDICTED FREQUENCY

NAME REF RATE Ttest
PIT102A PIT1002 Failure 1.40E-06 1.75E+04 1.22E-02 Unreveald

CCFPITM Common cause failure for PIT (Man & WH) 4.20E-09 1.75E+04 3.68E-05 Unreveald OR GATE5
CCFPITWA CCF PIT 1oo2 (WH only) 7.00E-08 1.75E+04 6.13E-04 Unreveald
PIT1002
P=1.28E-02
F=1.47E-06
RTUFAILA RTU logic solver fails (well A) 2.44E-05 1.75E+04 1.86E-01 Unreveald OR GATE4
P=1.97E-01
HVCHOKEA HV1001 choke valve well A fails to operate 2.15E-06 1.75E+04 1.86E-02 Unreveald OR GATE9
F=2.59E-05
HV1001 failure to
& GATE6
operate
P=2.13E-02 HV1001 & VFD
F=2.46E-06 both fail to
MCCFA MCC VFD fails to turndown ESP 2.92E-07 1.75E+04 2.55E-03 Unreveald
operate
& WHA
P=7.25E-05
F=1.25E-08 Wellhead A
isolation
P=1.10E-03
PIT1003 F=2.02E-07
& GATE8
P=1.28E-02
F=1.47E-06 P=5.66E-05
F=9.74E-09
P=3.31E-03 P=4.11E-03
F=3.79E-07 F=4.74E-07
MCCRELA MCC Relay fails to shutdown ESP 1.99E-07 1.75E+04 1.74E-03 Unreveald

Date (dd-mm-yy): 07-10-13 Time: 09.44.46
FIGURE 2. FAULT TREE FOR WELLHEAD A ISOLATION

NAME REF RATE Ttest
PIT102B PIT1002 Failure 1.40E-06 1.75E+04 1.22E-02 Unreveald

CCFPITWB CCF PIT 1oo2 (WH only) 7.00E-08 1.75E+04 6.13E-04 Unreveald
PIT1002
P=1.28E-02
F=1.47E-06
RTUFAILB RTU logic solver fails (well B) 2.44E-05 1.75E+04 1.86E-01 Unreveald OR GATE20
P=1.97E-01
HVCHOKEB HV1001 choke valve well B fails to operate 2.15E-06 1.75E+04 1.86E-02 Unreveald OR GATE25
F=2.59E-05
HV1001 failure to
& GATE23
operate
P=2.13E-02 HV1001 & VFD
MCCFB MCC VFD fails to turndown ESP 2.92E-07 1.75E+04 2.55E-03 Unreveald
operate
& WHB
P=7.25E-05
F=1.25E-08 Wellhead B
isolation
P=1.10E-03
PIT1003 F=2.02E-07
& GATE24
P=1.28E-02
F=1.47E-06 P=5.66E-05
F=9.74E-09
P=3.31E-03 P=4.11E-03
F=3.79E-07 F=4.74E-07
MCCRELB MCC Relay fails to shutdown ESP 1.99E-07 1.75E+04 1.74E-03 Unreveald

Date (dd-mm-yy): 07-10-13 Time: 09.44.46
FIGURE 3. FAULT TREE FOR WELLHEAD B ISOLATION

NAME REF RATE Ttest
PIT102C PIT1002 Failure 1.40E-06 1.75E+04 1.22E-02 Unreveald

CCFPITWC CCF PIT 1oo2 (WH only) 7.00E-08 1.75E+04 6.13E-04 Unreveald
PIT1002
P=1.28E-02
F=1.47E-06
RTUFAILC RTU logic solver fails (well C) 2.44E-05 1.75E+04 1.86E-01 Unreveald OR GATE27
P=1.97E-01
HVCHOKEC HV1001 choke valve well C fails to operate 2.15E-06 1.75E+04 1.86E-02 Unreveald OR GATE32
F=2.59E-05
HV1001 failure to
& GATE30
operate
P=2.13E-02 HV1001 & VFD
MCCFC MCC VFD fails to turndown ESP 2.92E-07 1.75E+04 2.55E-03 Unreveald
operate
& WHC
P=7.25E-05
F=1.25E-08 Wellhead C
isolation
P=1.10E-03
PIT1003 F=2.02E-07
& GATE31
P=1.28E-02
F=1.47E-06 P=5.66E-05
F=9.74E-09
P=3.31E-03 P=4.11E-03
F=3.79E-07 F=4.74E-07
MCCRELC MCC Relay fails to shutdown ESP 1.99E-07 1.75E+04 1.74E-03 Unreveald

Date (dd-mm-yy): 07-10-13 Time: 09.44.46
FIGURE 4. FAULT TREE FOR WELLHEAD C ISOLATION

NAME REF RATE Ttest
PIT102D PIT1002 Failure 1.40E-06 1.75E+04 1.22E-02 Unreveald

CCFPITWD CCF PIT 1oo2 (WH only) 7.00E-08 1.75E+04 6.13E-04 Unreveald
PIT1002
P=1.28E-02
F=1.47E-06
RTUFAILD RTU logic solver fails (well D) 2.44E-05 1.75E+04 1.86E-01 Unreveald OR GATE34
P=1.97E-01
HVCHOKED HV1001 choke valve well D fails to operate 2.15E-06 1.75E+04 1.86E-02 Unreveald OR GATE39
F=2.59E-05
HV1001 failure to
& GATE37
operate
P=2.13E-02 HV1001 & VFD
MCCFD MCC VFD fails to turndown ESP 2.92E-07 1.75E+04 2.55E-03 Unreveald
operate
& WHD
P=7.25E-05
F=1.25E-08 Wellhead D
isolation
P=1.10E-03
PIT1003 F=2.02E-07
& GATE38
P=1.28E-02
F=1.47E-06 P=5.66E-05
F=9.74E-09
P=3.31E-03 P=4.11E-03
F=3.79E-07 F=4.74E-07
MCCRELD MCC Relay fails to shutdown ESP 1.99E-07 1.75E+04 1.74E-03 Unreveald

Date (dd-mm-yy): 07-10-13 Time: 09.44.46
FIGURE 5. FAULT TREE FOR WELLHEAD D ISOLATION

NAME REF RATE Ttest
PIT102E PIT1002 Failure 1.40E-06 1.75E+04 1.22E-02 Unreveald

CCFPITWE CCF PIT 1oo2 (WH only) 7.00E-08 1.75E+04 6.13E-04 Unreveald
PIT1002
P=1.28E-02
F=1.47E-06
RTUFAILE RTU logic solver fails (well E) 2.44E-05 1.75E+04 1.86E-01 Unreveald OR GATE41
P=1.97E-01
HVCHOKEE HV1001 choke valve well E fails to operate 2.15E-06 1.75E+04 1.86E-02 Unreveald OR GATE46
F=2.59E-05
HV1001 failure to
& GATE44
operate
P=2.13E-02 HV1001 & VFD
MCCFE MCC VFD fails to turndown ESP 2.92E-07 1.75E+04 2.55E-03 Unreveald
operate
& WHE
P=7.25E-05
F=1.25E-08 Wellhead E
isolation
P=1.10E-03
PIT1003 F=2.02E-07
& GATE45
P=1.28E-02
F=1.47E-06 P=5.66E-05
F=9.74E-09
P=3.31E-03 P=4.11E-03
F=3.79E-07 F=4.74E-07
MCCRELE MCC Relay fails to shutdown ESP 1.99E-07 1.75E+04 1.74E-03 Unreveald

Date (dd-mm-yy): 07-10-13 Time: 09.44.46
FIGURE 6. FAULT TREE FOR WELLHEAD E ISOLATION

NAME REF RATE Ttest
PIT102F PIT1002 Failure 1.40E-06 1.75E+04 1.22E-02 Unreveald

CCFPITWF CCF PIT 1oo2 (WH only) 7.00E-08 1.75E+04 6.13E-04 Unreveald
PIT1002
P=1.28E-02
F=1.47E-06
RTUFAILF RTU logic solver fails (well F) 2.44E-05 1.75E+04 1.86E-01 Unreveald OR GATE48
P=1.97E-01
HVCHOKEF HV1001 choke valve well F fails to operate 2.15E-06 1.75E+04 1.86E-02 Unreveald OR GATE53
F=2.59E-05
HV1001 failure to
& GATE51
operate
P=2.13E-02 HV1001 & VFD
MCCFF MCC VFD fails to turndown ESP 2.92E-07 1.75E+04 2.55E-03 Unreveald
operate
& WHF
P=7.25E-05
F=1.25E-08 Wellhead F
isolation
P=1.10E-03
PIT1003 F=2.02E-07
& GATE52
P=1.28E-02
F=1.47E-06 P=5.66E-05
F=9.74E-09
P=3.31E-03 P=4.11E-03
F=3.79E-07 F=4.74E-07
MCCRELF MCC Relay fails to shutdown ESP 1.99E-07 1.75E+04 1.74E-03 Unreveald

Date (dd-mm-yy): 07-10-13 Time: 09.44.46
FIGURE 7. FAULT TREE FOR WELLHEAD F ISOLATION

NAME REF RATE Ttest
PIT102G PIT1002 Failure 1.40E-06 1.75E+04 1.22E-02 Unreveald

CCFPITWG CCF PIT 1oo2 (WH only) 7.00E-08 1.75E+04 6.13E-04 Unreveald
PIT1002
P=1.28E-02
F=1.47E-06
RTUFAILG RTU logic solver fails (well G) 2.44E-05 1.75E+04 1.86E-01 Unreveald OR GATE55
P=1.97E-01
HVCHOKEG HV1001 choke valve well G fails to operate 2.15E-06 1.75E+04 1.86E-02 Unreveald OR GATE60
F=2.59E-05
HV1001 failure to
& GATE58
operate
P=2.13E-02 HV1001 & VFD
MCCFG MCC VFD fails to turndown ESP 2.92E-07 1.75E+04 2.55E-03 Unreveald
operate
& WHG
P=7.25E-05
F=1.25E-08 Wellhead G
isolation
P=1.10E-03
PIT1003 F=2.02E-07
& GATE59
P=1.28E-02
F=1.47E-06 P=5.66E-05
F=9.74E-09
P=3.31E-03 P=4.11E-03
F=3.79E-07 F=4.74E-07
MCCRELG MCC Relay fails to shutdown ESP 1.99E-07 1.75E+04 1.74E-03 Unreveald

Date (dd-mm-yy): 07-10-13 Time: 09.44.46
FIGURE 8. FAULT TREE FOR WELLHEAD G ISOLATION

NAME REF RATE Ttest
PIT102H PIT1002 Failure 1.40E-06 1.75E+04 1.22E-02 Unreveald

CCFPITWH CCF PIT 1oo2 (WH only) 7.00E-08 1.75E+04 6.13E-04 Unreveald
PIT1002
P=1.28E-02
F=1.47E-06
RTUFAILH RTU logic solver fails (well H) 2.44E-05 1.75E+04 1.86E-01 Unreveald OR GATE62
P=1.97E-01
HVCHOKEH HV1001 choke valve well H fails to operate 2.15E-06 1.75E+04 1.86E-02 Unreveald OR GATE67
F=2.59E-05
HV1001 failure to
& GATE65
operate
P=2.13E-02 HV1001 & VFD
MCCFH MCC VFD fails to turndown ESP 2.92E-07 1.75E+04 2.55E-03 Unreveald
operate
& WHH
P=7.25E-05
F=1.25E-08 Wellhead H
isolation
P=1.10E-03
PIT1003 F=2.02E-07
& GATE66
P=1.28E-02
F=1.47E-06 P=5.66E-05
F=9.74E-09
P=3.31E-03 P=4.11E-03
F=3.79E-07 F=4.74E-07
MCCRELH MCC Relay fails to shutdown ESP 1.99E-07 1.75E+04 1.74E-03 Unreveald

Date (dd-mm-yy): 07-10-13 Time: 09.44.46
FIGURE 9. FAULT TREE FOR WELLHEAD H ISOLATION

NAME REF RATE Ttest
PIT102I PIT1002 Failure 1.40E-06 1.75E+04 1.22E-02 Unreveald

CCFPITWI CCF PIT 1oo2 (WH only) 7.00E-08 1.75E+04 6.13E-04 Unreveald
PIT1002
P=1.28E-02
F=1.47E-06
RTUFAILI RTU logic solver fails (well I) 2.44E-05 1.75E+04 1.86E-01 Unreveald OR GATE88
P=1.97E-01
HVCHOKEI HV1001 choke valve well I fails to operate 2.15E-06 1.75E+04 1.86E-02 Unreveald OR GATE105
F=2.59E-05
HV1001 failure to
& GATE103
operate
P=2.04E-02 HV1001 & VFD
MCCFI MCC VFD fails to turndown ESP 2.92E-07 1.75E+04 2.55E-03 Unreveald
operate
& WHI
P=6.95E-05
F=1.20E-08 Wellhead I
isolation
P=1.10E-03
PIT1003 F=2.02E-07
& GATE104
P=1.28E-02
F=1.47E-06 P=5.66E-05
F=9.74E-09
P=3.31E-03 P=4.11E-03
F=3.79E-07 F=4.74E-07
MCCRELI MCC Relay fails to shutdown ESP 1.99E-07 1.75E+04 1.74E-03 Unreveald

Date (dd-mm-yy): 07-10-13 Time: 09.44.46
FIGURE 10. FAULT TREE FOR WELLHEAD I ISOLATION

NAME REF RATE Ttest
PIT102J PIT1002 Failure 1.40E-06 1.75E+04 1.22E-02 Unreveald

CCFPITWJ CCF PIT 1oo2 (WH only) 7.00E-08 1.75E+04 6.13E-04 Unreveald
PIT1002
P=1.28E-02
F=1.47E-06
RTUFAILJ RTU logic solver fails (well J) 2.44E-05 1.75E+04 1.86E-01 Unreveald OR GATE98
P=1.97E-01
HVCHOKEJ HV1001 choke valve well J fails to operate 2.15E-06 1.75E+04 1.86E-02 Unreveald OR GATE111
F=2.59E-05
HV1001 failure to
& GATE109
operate
P=2.04E-02 HV1001 & VFD
MCCFJ MCC VFD fails to turndown ESP 2.92E-07 1.75E+04 2.55E-03 Unreveald
operate
& WHJ
P=6.95E-05
F=1.20E-08 Wellhead J
isolation
P=1.10E-03
PIT1003 F=2.02E-07
& GATE110
P=1.28E-02
F=1.47E-06 P=5.66E-05
F=9.74E-09
P=3.31E-03 P=4.11E-03
F=3.79E-07 F=4.74E-07
MCCRELJ MCC Relay fails to shutdown ESP 1.99E-07 1.75E+04 1.74E-03 Unreveald

Date (dd-mm-yy): 07-10-13 Time: 09.44.46
FIGURE 11. FAULT TREE FOR WELLHEAD J ISOLATION

NAME REF RATE Ttest
PIT102K PIT1002 Failure 1.40E-06 1.75E+04 1.22E-02 Unreveald

CCFPITWK CCF PIT 1oo2 (WH only) 7.00E-08 1.75E+04 6.13E-04 Unreveald
PIT1002
P=1.28E-02
F=1.47E-06
RTUFAILK RTU logic solver fails (well K) 2.44E-05 1.75E+04 1.86E-01 Unreveald OR GATE100
P=1.97E-01
HVCHOKEK HV1001 choke valve well K fails to operate 2.15E-06 1.75E+04 1.86E-02 Unreveald OR GATE117
F=2.59E-05
HV1001 failure to
& GATE115
operate
P=2.04E-02 HV1001 & VFD
MCCFK MCC VFD fails to turndown ESP 2.92E-07 1.75E+04 2.55E-03 Unreveald
operate
& WHK
P=6.95E-05
F=1.20E-08 Wellhead K
isolation
P=1.10E-03
PIT1003 F=2.02E-07
& GATE116
P=1.28E-02
F=1.47E-06 P=5.66E-05
F=9.74E-09
P=3.31E-03 P=4.11E-03
F=3.79E-07 F=4.74E-07
MCCRELK MCC Relay fails to shutdown ESP 1.99E-07 1.75E+04 1.74E-03 Unreveald

Date (dd-mm-yy): 07-10-13 Time: 09.44.46
FIGURE 12. FAULT TREE FOR WELLHEAD K ISOLATION

NAME REF RATE Ttest
PIT102L PIT1002 Failure 1.40E-06 1.75E+04 1.22E-02 Unreveald

CCFPITWL CCF PIT 1oo2 (WH only) 7.00E-08 1.75E+04 6.13E-04 Unreveald
PIT1002
P=1.28E-02
F=1.47E-06
RTUFAILL RTU logic solver fails (well L) 2.44E-05 1.75E+04 1.86E-01 Unreveald OR GATE90
P=1.97E-01
HVCHOKEL HV1001 choke valve well L fails to operate 2.15E-06 1.75E+04 1.86E-02 Unreveald OR GATE95
F=2.59E-05
HV1001 failure to
& GATE92
opertate
P=2.04E-02 HV1001 & VFD
MCCFL MCC VFD fails to turndown ESP 2.92E-07 1.75E+04 2.55E-03 Unreveald
operate
& WHL
P=6.95E-05
F=1.20E-08 Wellhead L
isolation
P=1.10E-03
PIT1003 F=2.02E-07
& GATE94
P=1.28E-02
F=1.47E-06 P=5.66E-05
F=9.74E-09
P=3.31E-03 P=4.11E-03
F=3.79E-07 F=4.74E-07
MCCRELL MCC Relay fails to shutdown ESP 1.99E-07 1.75E+04 1.74E-03 Unreveald

Date (dd-mm-yy): 07-10-13 Time: 09.44.46
FIGURE 13. FAULT TREE FOR WELLHEAD L ISOLATION

Project
B.2. Fault Trees (Before 2024) - Contribution List

2.0 | October 2013 | 5114320/004
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS WITH RESPECT TO FREQUENCY Page 1

Date(dd-mm-yy): 07-10-13 Time: 09.45.17
Fault Tree File: P:\GBGWA\PandMF\Safety\Data\Job Nos 511xxxx\5114320 - WP LOPA\004 - Fault Trees\Fault Trees\Before 2024\Ca
Top Event: GATE1
Event Name Description Sensitivity
ESDLOG ESD logic solver fails to operate 9.55E-01

4WPM1 4 wellpads (manifold 1) 6.67E-01
6TLM1 6 trunklines (manifold 1) 6.67E-01
6TLM2 6 trunklines (manifold 2) 3.33E-01
4WPM2 4 wellpads (manifold 2) 3.33E-01
RTUFAILD RTU logic solver fails (well D) 7.83E-02
RTUFAILG RTU logic solver fails (well G) 7.83E-02
RTUFAILB RTU logic solver fails (well B) 7.83E-02
RTUFAILH RTU logic solver fails (well H) 7.83E-02
RTUFAILE RTU logic solver fails (well E) 7.83E-02
RTUFAILF RTU logic solver fails (well F) 7.83E-02
RTUFAILC RTU logic solver fails (well C) 7.83E-02
RTUFAILA RTU logic solver fails (well A) 7.83E-02
RTUFAILL RTU logic solver fails (well L) 7.82E-02
RTUFAILK RTU logic solver fails (well K) 7.82E-02
RTUFAILJ RTU logic solver fails (well J) 7.82E-02
RTUFAILI RTU logic solver fails (well I) 7.82E-02
MANVM1 Manifold ESD valve fails to operate (manifold 1) 1.83E-02
SVF1 Solenoid valve fails to operate manifold 1 9.42E-03
PIT102G PIT1002 Failure 4.78E-03
PIT102E PIT1002 Failure 4.78E-03
PIT102H PIT1002 Failure 4.78E-03
PIT102A PIT1002 Failure 4.78E-03
PIT102D PIT1002 Failure 4.78E-03
PIT102C PIT1002 Failure 4.78E-03
PIT102B PIT1002 Failure 4.78E-03
PIT102F PIT1002 Failure 4.78E-03
PIT102J PIT1002 Failure 4.78E-03
PIT102I PIT1002 Failure 4.78E-03
PIT102L PIT1002 Failure 4.78E-03
PIT102K PIT1002 Failure 4.78E-03
MCCRELF MCC Relay fails to shutdown ESP 3.63E-03
MCCRELC MCC Relay fails to shutdown ESP 3.63E-03
MCCRELD MCC Relay fails to shutdown ESP 3.63E-03
MCCRELE MCC Relay fails to shutdown ESP 3.63E-03
MCCRELB MCC Relay fails to shutdown ESP 3.63E-03
MCCRELA MCC Relay fails to shutdown ESP 3.63E-03
MCCRELH MCC Relay fails to shutdown ESP 3.63E-03
MCCRELG MCC Relay fails to shutdown ESP 3.63E-03
MCCRELK MCC Relay fails to shutdown ESP 3.52E-03
MCCRELL MCC Relay fails to shutdown ESP 3.52E-03
MCCRELJ MCC Relay fails to shutdown ESP 3.52E-03
MCCRELI MCC Relay fails to shutdown ESP 3.52E-03
CCFVALM1 CCF ESD valve fails to op (Man 1 & WH) 2.77E-03
IPCESD IPC ESD Inter-Trip Failure 1.69E-03
NETFAILM Network failure 7.28E-04
CCFPITWC CCF PIT 1oo2 (WH only) 2.61E-04
CCFPITWA CCF PIT 1oo2 (WH only) 2.61E-04
CCFPITWH CCF PIT 1oo2 (WH only) 2.61E-04
CCFPITWB CCF PIT 1oo2 (WH only) 2.61E-04
CCFPITWD CCF PIT 1oo2 (WH only) 2.61E-04
CCFPITWF CCF PIT 1oo2 (WH only) 2.61E-04

Date(dd-mm-yy): 07-10-13 Time: 09.45.17
Top Event: GATE1
CCFPITWG CCF PIT 1oo2 (WH only) 2.61E-04

CCFPITWE CCF PIT 1oo2 (WH only) 2.61E-04
CCFPITWJ CCF PIT 1oo2 (WH only) 2.60E-04
CCFPITWL CCF PIT 1oo2 (WH only) 2.60E-04
CCFPITWK CCF PIT 1oo2 (WH only) 2.60E-04
CCFPITWI CCF PIT 1oo2 (WH only) 2.60E-04
CCFPITM Common cause failure for PIT (Man & WH) 7.44E-05
CCFPIT9 CCF PIT1009 (2oo3) 6.63E-05
MCCFB MCC VFD fails to turndown ESP 4.65E-05
MCCFE MCC VFD fails to turndown ESP 4.65E-05
MCCFC MCC VFD fails to turndown ESP 4.65E-05
MCCFF MCC VFD fails to turndown ESP 4.65E-05
MCCFH MCC VFD fails to turndown ESP 4.65E-05
MCCFG MCC VFD fails to turndown ESP 4.65E-05
MCCFA MCC VFD fails to turndown ESP 4.65E-05
MCCFD MCC VFD fails to turndown ESP 4.65E-05
MCCFJ MCC VFD fails to turndown ESP 4.35E-05
MCCFK MCC VFD fails to turndown ESP 4.35E-05
MCCFI MCC VFD fails to turndown ESP 4.35E-05
MCCFL MCC VFD fails to turndown ESP 4.35E-05
HVCHOKEB HV1001 choke valve well B fails to operate 3.72E-05
HVCHOKEJ HV1001 choke valve well J fails to operate 3.72E-05
HVCHOKEL HV1001 choke valve well L fails to operate 3.72E-05
HVCHOKEH HV1001 choke valve well H fails to operate 3.72E-05
HVCHOKEG HV1001 choke valve well G fails to operate 3.72E-05
HVCHOKEF HV1001 choke valve well F fails to operate 3.72E-05
HVCHOKEA HV1001 choke valve well A fails to operate 3.72E-05
HVCHOKEI HV1001 choke valve well I fails to operate 3.72E-05
HVCHOKEE HV1001 choke valve well E fails to operate 3.72E-05
HVCHOKED HV1001 choke valve well D fails to operate 3.72E-05
HVCHOKEK HV1001 choke valve well K fails to operate 3.72E-05
HVCHOKEC HV1001 choke valve well C fails to operate 3.72E-05
PITM9C PIT1009 at manifold 1 fails 2oo3 3.19E-05
PITM9A PIT1009 at manifold 1 fails 2oo3 3.19E-05
PITM9B PIT1009 at manifold 1 fails 2oo3 3.19E-05
PITM11A PIT1011A at manifold 2 fails 2oo3 1.59E-05
PITM11B PIT1011B at manifold 2 fails 2oo3 1.59E-05
PITM11C PIT1011C at manifold 2 fails 2oo3 1.59E-05
Sensitivity to proof test intervals = 2.05E+00

Sensitivity to repair times = 0.00E+00
Project
Appendix C. Case 6.6 - Fault Trees

C.1. Fault Trees (Before 2024)
• Fault tree Figure 1 takes the results from all the other fault trees (Figures 2 to 5 and Figure 10 and 11)
for the wellheads components, combines these with the manifold components and presents the overall
result for overpressure of the pipework – the frequency value is used as the demand rate is assumed to
be greater than once per year, i.e. high demand.
• Fault tree Figures 2 to 5 and Figure 10 and 11 are the fault trees for failure of the overpressure
protection at each wellhead. These trees feed directly into Figure 1.

2.0 | October 2013 | 5114320/004
NAME REF RATE Ttest

WHB Fig 3 Wellhead B isolation 1.92E-07 1.04E-03 >>> OR GATE9
Overpressure
WHD Fig 5 Wellhead D isolation 1.92E-07 1.04E-03 >>>
protection fails
>=1 WH on
manifold 1
& GATE13
P=4.15E-03
F=7.66E-07 OverP >=1WH on
manifold 1 &
IPCESD IPC ESD Inter-Trip Failure 2.65E-07 1.75E+04 2.32E-03 Unreveald OR GATE11
manifold 1
P=3.31E-03 ESDV fails
OR GATE10
F=3.79E-07 P=2.40E-03
P=3.50E-02 F=4.49E-07
F=4.08E-06
MANVM1 Manifold ESD valve fails to operate (manifold 1) 2.15E-06 1.75E+04 1.86E-02 Unreveald OR GATE12 OR GATE65
P=2.98E-02 Overpressure
F=3.46E-06 event at one well
pad
WHI Fig 10 Wellhead I isolation 1.92E-07 1.04E-03 >>> OR GATE40
P=3.60E-03
WHJ Fig 11 Wellhead J isolation 1.92E-07 1.04E-03 >>>
Overpressure F=6.74E-07
protection fails
>+1 WH on
manifold 2
& GATE41
P=2.08E-03
manifold 2 &
manifold 2
OR GATE42
F=3.79E-07 P=1.20E-03
P=3.44E-02 F=2.25E-07
F=4.00E-06
MANVM2 Manifold ESD valve fails to operate (manifold 2) 2.15E-06 1.75E+04 1.86E-02 Unreveald OR GATE44
P=2.91E-02
F=3.38E-06
PIT1009A P=3.35E-03
P=1.34E-02 F=6.16E-07
F=1.54E-06
PIT1009B 2oo3 PITs
P=1.34E-02 (PIT1009)
F=1.54E-06 P=1.85E-03
F=2.46E-07
PIT1009C
& GATE61
P=1.34E-02
F=1.54E-06 P=4.15E-05
F=5.22E-09
CCFPITM Common cause failure for PIT (Man & WH) 4.20E-09 1.75E+04 3.68E-05 Unreveald & GATE2
PIT1010A
P=1.34E-02 P=1.34E-02
F=1.54E-06 F=2.46E-06
PIT1010B 2oo3 PITs
P=1.34E-02 (PIT1010) P=7.37E-03
F=1.54E-06 P=1.85E-03 F=8.46E-07
PITM11C PIT1011C at manifold 2 fails 2oo3 1.40E-06 1.75E+04 1.22E-02 Unreveald & GATE1
F=2.46E-07
Overpressure
PIT1010C event predicted
P=1.34E-02 frequency
F=1.54E-06 P=7.79E-02
F=1.48E-05
HVBREAK1 ESP HV Breaker 1 fails to trip ESP 3.00E-07 1.75E+04 2.62E-03 Unreveald
4WP 4 wellpads 4.00E+00 Probab'ty
6TL 6 trunklines 6.00E+00 Probab'ty

Date (dd-mm-yy): 07-10-13 Time: 16.01.14
Fault Tree File: P:\GBGWA\PandMF\Safety\Data\Job Nos 511xxxx\5114320 - WP LOPA\004 - Fault Trees\Fault Trees\Before 2024\Case 6.6\2 year test intervals\Corrected Design Basis\131004_Case 6.6_Corrected Design Basis

NAME REF RATE Ttest

PIT1002
P=1.28E-02
F=1.47E-06
RTUFAILA RTU logic Solver fails (well A) 2.44E-05 1.75E+04 1.86E-01 Unreveald OR GATE3
P=1.97E-01
HVCHOKEA HV1001 choke valve Well A fails to operate 2.15E-06 1.75E+04 1.86E-02 Unreveald OR GATE8
F=2.59E-05
HV1001 failure to
& GATE5
operate
P=2.04E-02 HV1001 & VFD
operate
& WHA
P=6.95E-05
F=1.20E-08 Wellhead A
isolation
P=1.04E-03
PIT1003 F=1.92E-07
& GATE7
P=1.28E-02
F=1.47E-06 P=5.66E-05
F=9.74E-09
P=3.31E-03 P=3.90E-03
F=3.79E-07 F=4.50E-07

Date (dd-mm-yy): 07-10-13 Time: 16.01.14

NAME REF RATE Ttest

PIT1002
P=1.28E-02
F=1.47E-06
RTUFAILB RTU logic Solver fails (well B) 2.44E-05 1.75E+04 1.86E-01 Unreveald OR GATE15
P=1.97E-01
HVCHOKEB HV1001 choke valve Well B fails to operate 2.15E-06 1.75E+04 1.86E-02 Unreveald OR GATE20
F=2.59E-05
HV1001 failure to
& GATE18
operate
P=2.04E-02 HV1001 & VFD
operate
& WHB
P=6.95E-05
F=1.20E-08 Wellhead B
isolation
P=1.04E-03
PIT1003 F=1.92E-07
& GATE19
P=1.28E-02
F=1.47E-06 P=5.66E-05
F=9.74E-09
P=3.31E-03 P=3.90E-03
F=3.79E-07 F=4.50E-07

Date (dd-mm-yy): 07-10-13 Time: 16.01.14

NAME REF RATE Ttest

PIT1002
P=1.28E-02
F=1.47E-06
RTUFAILC RTU logic Solver fails (well C) 2.44E-05 1.75E+04 1.86E-01 Unreveald OR GATE22
P=1.97E-01
HVCHOKEC HV1001 choke valve Well C fails to operate 2.15E-06 1.75E+04 1.86E-02 Unreveald OR GATE27
F=2.59E-05
HV1001 failure to
& GATE25
operate
P=2.04E-02 HV1001 & VFD
operate
& WHC
P=6.95E-05
F=1.20E-08 Wellhead C
isolation
P=1.04E-03
PIT1003 F=1.92E-07
& GATE26
P=1.28E-02
F=1.47E-06 P=5.66E-05
F=9.74E-09
P=3.31E-03 P=3.90E-03
F=3.79E-07 F=4.50E-07

Date (dd-mm-yy): 07-10-13 Time: 16.01.14

NAME REF RATE Ttest

PIT1002
P=1.28E-02
F=1.47E-06
RTUFAILD RTU logic Solver fails (well D) 2.44E-05 1.75E+04 1.86E-01 Unreveald OR GATE29
P=1.97E-01
HVCHOKED HV1001 choke valve Well D fails to operate 2.15E-06 1.75E+04 1.86E-02 Unreveald OR GATE34
F=2.59E-05
HV1001 failure to
& GATE32
operate
P=2.04E-02 HV1001 & VFD
operate
& WHD
P=6.95E-05
F=1.20E-08 Wellhead D
isolation
P=1.04E-03
PIT1003 F=1.92E-07
& GATE33
P=1.28E-02
F=1.47E-06 P=5.66E-05
F=9.74E-09
P=3.31E-03 P=3.90E-03
F=3.79E-07 F=4.50E-07

Date (dd-mm-yy): 07-10-13 Time: 16.01.15

NAME REF RATE Ttest

PIT1002
P=1.28E-02
F=1.47E-06
RTUFAILI RTU logic Solver fails (well I) 2.44E-05 1.75E+04 1.86E-01 Unreveald OR GATE45
P=1.97E-01
F=2.59E-05
HV1001 failure to
& GATE50
operate
P=1.97E-02 HV1001 & VFD
operate
& WHI
P=6.72E-05
F=1.16E-08 Wellhead I
isolation
P=1.04E-03
PIT1003 F=1.92E-07
& GATE51
P=1.28E-02
F=1.47E-06 P=5.66E-05
F=9.74E-09
P=3.31E-03 P=3.90E-03
F=3.79E-07 F=4.50E-07

Date (dd-mm-yy): 07-10-13 Time: 16.01.15

NAME REF RATE Ttest

PIT1002
P=1.28E-02
F=1.47E-06
RTUFAILJ RTU logic Solver fails (well J) 2.44E-05 1.75E+04 1.86E-01 Unreveald OR GATE47
P=1.97E-01
HVCHOKEJ HV1001 choke valve Well J fails to operate 2.15E-06 1.75E+04 1.86E-02 Unreveald OR GATE58
F=2.59E-05
HV1001 failure to
& GATE56
operate
P=1.97E-02 HV1001 & VFD
operate
& WHJ
P=6.72E-05
F=1.16E-08 Wellhead J
isolation
P=1.04E-03
PIT1003 F=1.92E-07
& GATE57
P=1.28E-02
F=1.47E-06 P=5.66E-05
F=9.74E-09
P=3.31E-03 P=3.90E-03
F=3.79E-07 F=4.50E-07

Date (dd-mm-yy): 07-10-13 Time: 16.01.15

Project
C.2. Fault Trees (Before 2024) - Contribution List

2.0 | October 2013 | 5114320/004

Date(dd-mm-yy): 07-10-13 Time: 16.02.14
Top Event: GATE1
6TL 6 trunklines 1.00E+00

4WP 4 wellpads 1.00E+00
ESDLOG ESD logic solver fails to operate 9.99E-01
RTUFAILD RTU logic Solver fails (well D) 1.57E-01
RTUFAILB RTU logic Solver fails (well B) 1.57E-01
RTUFAILC RTU logic Solver fails (well C) 1.57E-01
RTUFAILA RTU logic Solver fails (well A) 1.57E-01
RTUFAILJ RTU logic Solver fails (well J) 1.57E-01
RTUFAILI RTU logic Solver fails (well I) 1.57E-01
HVBREAK1 ESP HV Breaker 1 fails to trip ESP 4.95E-04
HVCHOKEJ HV1001 choke valve Well J fails to operate 7.46E-05
HVCHOKED HV1001 choke valve Well D fails to operate 7.46E-05
HVCHOKEC HV1001 choke valve Well C fails to operate 7.46E-05
HVCHOKEB HV1001 choke valve Well B fails to operate 7.46E-05
HVCHOKEA HV1001 choke valve Well A fails to operate 7.46E-05

Date(dd-mm-yy): 07-10-13 Time: 16.02.14
Top Event: GATE1


Project
Appendix D. Case 6.3 - Fault Trees

D.1. Fault Trees (Before 2024)

2.0 | October 2013 | 5114320/004
NAME REF RATE Ttest

Overpressure
protection fails
>=1 WH on
manifold 1
& GATE13
P=1.76E-02
manifold 1 &
manifold 1
OR GATE10
F=3.79E-07 P=9.26E-04
MESDLOG ESD logic solver fails to operate (manifolds) 2.41E-07 1.75E+04 2.11E-03 Unreveald
P=3.50E-02 F=2.15E-07
F=4.08E-06
pad
P=1.38E-03
protection fails
>+1 WH on
manifold 2
& GATE33
P=8.84E-03
manifold 2 &
manifold 2
OR GATE34
F=3.79E-07 P=4.55E-04
P=3.44E-02 F=1.05E-07
F=4.00E-06
P=2.91E-02
F=3.38E-06
PIT1009A P=9.65E-05
P=1.34E-02 F=2.27E-08
F=1.54E-06
PIT1009B 2oo3 PITs
P=1.34E-02 (PIT1009)
F=1.54E-06 P=1.85E-03
F=2.46E-07
PIT1009C
& GATE49
P=1.34E-02
F=1.54E-06 P=4.15E-05
F=5.22E-09
PIT1010A
P=1.34E-02 P=3.86E-04
F=1.54E-06 F=9.10E-08
PIT1010B 2oo3 PITs
P=1.34E-02 (PIT1010) P=7.37E-03
F=1.54E-06 P=1.85E-03 F=8.46E-07
F=2.46E-07
Overpressure
F=1.54E-06 P=2.31E-03
F=5.46E-07

Date (dd-mm-yy): 07-10-13 Time: 16.07.39
Fault Tree File: P:\GBGWA\PandMF\Safety\Data\Job Nos 511xxxx\5114320 - WP LOPA\004 - Fault Trees\Fault Trees\Before 2024\Case 6.3\2 year interval tests\Corrected Design Basis\trip amp\20131004_Case 6.3_with trip amp

NAME REF RATE Ttest

PIT1002
P=1.28E-02
F=1.47E-06
RTUFAILA RTU Logic Solver fails (well A) 2.44E-05 1.75E+04 1.86E-01 Unreveald OR GATE3
P=1.97E-01
F=2.59E-05
HV1001 failure to
& GATE5
operate
P=2.04E-02 HV1001 & VFD
& WHA
operate Wellhead A
P=6.95E-05 isolation
F=1.20E-08 P=4.45E-03
F=7.74E-07
PIT1003
OR GATE6
P=1.28E-02
F=1.47E-06 P=1.50E-02
TAMP1A Trip amplifier fails to operate (well a) 5.71E-08 1.75E+04 5.00E-04 Unreveald
F=1.73E-06

Date (dd-mm-yy): 07-10-13 Time: 16.07.39

NAME REF RATE Ttest

PIT1002
P=1.28E-02
F=1.47E-06
RTUFAILB RTU Logic Solver fails (well B) 2.44E-05 1.75E+04 1.86E-01 Unreveald OR GATE14
P=1.97E-01
F=2.59E-05
HV1001 failure to
& GATE17
operate
P=2.04E-02 HV1001 & VFD
& WHB
operate Wellhead B
F=1.20E-08 P=4.45E-03
F=7.74E-07
PIT1003
OR GATE15
P=1.28E-02
F=1.47E-06 P=1.50E-02
TAMP1B Trip amplifier fails to operate (well b) 5.71E-08 1.75E+04 5.00E-04 Unreveald
F=1.73E-06

Date (dd-mm-yy): 07-10-13 Time: 16.07.39

NAME REF RATE Ttest

PIT1002
P=1.28E-02
F=1.47E-06
RTUFAILC RTU Logic Solver fails (well C) 2.44E-05 1.75E+04 1.86E-01 Unreveald OR GATE20
P=1.97E-01
F=2.59E-05
HV1001 failure to
& GATE23
operate
P=2.04E-02 HV1001 & VFD
& WHC
operate Wellhead C
F=1.20E-08 P=4.45E-03
F=7.74E-07
PIT1003
OR GATE21
P=1.28E-02
F=1.47E-06 P=1.50E-02
TAMP1C Trip amplifier fails to operate (well c) 5.71E-08 1.75E+04 5.00E-04 Unreveald
F=1.73E-06

Date (dd-mm-yy): 07-10-13 Time: 16.07.39

NAME REF RATE Ttest

PIT1002
P=1.28E-02
F=1.47E-06
RTUFAILD RTU Logic Solver fails (well D) 2.44E-05 1.75E+04 1.86E-01 Unreveald OR GATE26
P=1.97E-01
F=2.59E-05
HV1001 failure to
& GATE29
operate
P=2.04E-02 HV1001 & VFD
& WHD
operate Wellhead D
F=1.20E-08 P=4.45E-03
F=7.74E-07
PIT1003
OR GATE27
P=1.28E-02
F=1.47E-06 P=1.50E-02
TAMP1D Trip amplifier fails to operate (well d) 5.71E-08 1.75E+04 5.00E-04 Unreveald
F=1.73E-06

Date (dd-mm-yy): 07-10-13 Time: 16.07.39

NAME REF RATE Ttest

PIT1002
P=1.28E-02
F=1.47E-06
RTUFAILI RTU Logic Solver fails (well I) 2.44E-05 1.75E+04 1.86E-01 Unreveald OR GATE37
P=1.97E-01
F=2.59E-05
HV1001 failure to
& GATE42
operate
P=1.97E-02 HV1001 & VFD
& WHI
operate Wellhead I
F=1.16E-08 P=4.45E-03
F=7.74E-07
PIT1003
OR GATE38
P=1.28E-02
F=1.47E-06 P=1.50E-02
TAMP1I Trip amplifier fails to operate (well I) 5.71E-08 1.75E+04 5.00E-04 Unreveald
F=1.73E-06

Date (dd-mm-yy): 07-10-13 Time: 16.07.39

NAME REF RATE Ttest

PIT1002
P=1.28E-02
F=1.47E-06
RTUFAILJ RTU Logic Solver fails (well J) 2.44E-05 1.75E+04 1.86E-01 Unreveald OR GATE39
P=1.97E-01
F=2.59E-05
HV1001 failure to
& GATE46
operate
P=1.97E-02 HV1001 & VFD
& WHJ
operate Wellhead J
F=1.16E-08 P=4.45E-03
F=7.74E-07
PIT1003
OR GATE40
P=1.28E-02
F=1.47E-06 P=1.50E-02
TAMP1J Trip amplifier fails to operate (well J) 5.71E-08 1.75E+04 5.00E-04 Unreveald
F=1.73E-06

Date (dd-mm-yy): 07-10-13 Time: 16.07.39

Project
D.2. Fault Trees (Before 2024) - Contribution List

2.0 | October 2013 | 5114320/004

Date(dd-mm-yy): 07-10-13 Time: 16.08.01
Top Event: GATE1

MESDLOG ESD logic solver fails to operate (manifolds) 8.40E-01
RTUFAILD RTU Logic Solver fails (well D) 1.39E-01
RTUFAILC RTU Logic Solver fails (well C) 1.39E-01
RTUFAILB RTU Logic Solver fails (well B) 1.39E-01
RTUFAILA RTU Logic Solver fails (well A) 1.39E-01
RTUFAILJ RTU Logic Solver fails (well J) 1.39E-01
RTUFAILI RTU Logic Solver fails (well I) 1.39E-01
TAMP1D Trip amplifier fails to operate (well d) 5.12E-03
TAMP1B Trip amplifier fails to operate (well b) 5.12E-03
TAMP1C Trip amplifier fails to operate (well c) 5.12E-03
TAMP1A Trip amplifier fails to operate (well a) 5.12E-03
TAMP1J Trip amplifier fails to operate (well J) 5.10E-03
TAMP1I Trip amplifier fails to operate (well I) 5.10E-03

Date(dd-mm-yy): 07-10-13 Time: 16.08.01
Top Event: GATE1


Project
Appendix E. Case 6.7 - Fault Trees

E.1. Fault Trees (Before 2024)

2.0 | October 2013 | 5114320/004
NAME REF RATE Ttest

Overpressure
protection fails
>=1 WH on
manifold 1
& GATE14
P=1.61E-03
manifold 1 &
manifold 1
OR GATE11
F=3.79E-07 P=7.95E-05
P=3.50E-02 F=1.61E-08
F=4.08E-06
pad
P=1.19E-04
protection fails
>+1 WH on
manifold 2
& GATE37
P=8.25E-04
manifold 2 &
manifold 2
OR GATE38
F=3.79E-07 P=3.98E-05
P=3.44E-02 F=8.05E-09
F=4.00E-06
P=2.91E-02
F=3.38E-06
PIT1009A P=1.10E-05
P=1.34E-02 F=2.19E-09
F=1.54E-06
PIT1009B 2oo3 PITs
P=1.34E-02 (PIT1009)
F=1.54E-06 P=1.85E-03
F=2.46E-07
PIT1009C
& GATE55
P=1.34E-02
F=1.54E-06 P=4.15E-05
F=5.22E-09
PIT1010A
P=1.34E-02 P=4.40E-05
F=1.54E-06 F=8.74E-09
PIT1010B 2oo3 PITs
P=1.34E-02 (PIT1010) P=7.37E-03
F=1.54E-06 P=1.85E-03 F=8.46E-07
F=2.46E-07
Overpressure
F=1.54E-06 P=2.64E-04
F=5.25E-08

Date (dd-mm-yy): 07-10-13 Time: 16.12.37
Fault Tree File: P:\GBGWA\PandMF\Safety\Data\Job Nos 511xxxx\5114320 - WP LOPA\004 - Fault Trees\Fault Trees\Before 2024\Case 6.7\20131004_Case 6.7_with trip amp

NAME REF RATE Ttest

PIT1002
P=1.25E-02
F=1.44E-06
P=1.96E-01
F=2.59E-05
HV1001 failure to
& GATE5
operate
P=2.04E-02 HV1001 & VFD
operate
P=6.95E-05
F=1.20E-08
PIT103A PIT1003 Failure 1.40E-06 1.75E+04 1.22E-02 Unreveald & WHA
Wellhead A
PIT1003 isolation
P=1.25E-02 P=4.31E-04
OR GATE6
F=1.44E-06 F=6.01E-08
TAMP1A Trip amplifier 1 fails to operate (well A) 5.71E-08 1.75E+04 5.00E-04 Unreveald
P=1.47E-02
CCFTAMPA CCF Trip Amps 1oo2 (WH A only) 1.80E-09 1.75E+04 1.58E-05 Unreveald
F=1.70E-06
PIT1013A PIT1013A Failure 1.40E-06 1.75E+04 1.22E-02 Unreveald
P=1.25E-02
OR GATE9
F=1.44E-06
TAMP2A Trip amplifier 2 fails to operate (wells A) 9.00E-08 1.75E+04 7.88E-04 Unreveald
P=1.50E-02
F=1.73E-06
VFDTRIPA VFD Trip fails well A 1.99E-07 1.75E+04 1.74E-03 Unreveald

Date (dd-mm-yy): 07-10-13 Time: 16.12.37

NAME REF RATE Ttest

PIT1002
P=1.25E-02
F=1.44E-06
P=1.96E-01
F=2.59E-05
HV1001 failure to
& GATE19
operate
P=2.04E-02 HV1001 & VFD
operate
P=6.95E-05
F=1.20E-08
PIT103B PIT1003 Failure 1.40E-06 1.75E+04 1.22E-02 Unreveald & WHB
Wellhead B
PIT1003 isolation
P=1.25E-02 P=4.31E-04
OR GATE16
F=1.44E-06 F=6.01E-08
TAMP1B Trip amplifier 1 fails to operate (well B) 5.71E-08 1.75E+04 5.00E-04 Unreveald
P=1.47E-02
CCFTAMPB CCF Trip Amps 1oo2 (WH B only) 1.80E-09 1.75E+04 1.58E-05 Unreveald
F=1.70E-06
PIT1013B PIT1013B Failure 1.40E-06 1.75E+04 1.22E-02 Unreveald
P=1.25E-02
OR GATE17
F=1.44E-06
TAMP2B Trip amplifier 2 fails to operate (wells B) 9.00E-08 1.75E+04 7.88E-04 Unreveald
P=1.50E-02
F=1.73E-06
VFDTRIPB VFD Trip fails well B 1.99E-07 1.75E+04 1.74E-03 Unreveald

Date (dd-mm-yy): 07-10-13 Time: 16.12.38

NAME REF RATE Ttest

PIT1002
P=1.25E-02
F=1.44E-06
P=1.96E-01
F=2.59E-05
HV1001 failure to
& GATE26
operate
P=2.04E-02 HV1001 & VFD
operate
P=6.95E-05
F=1.20E-08
PIT103C PIT1003 Failure 1.40E-06 1.75E+04 1.22E-02 Unreveald & WHC
Wellhead C
PIT1003 isolation
P=1.25E-02 P=4.31E-04
OR GATE23
F=1.44E-06 F=6.01E-08
TAMP1C Trip amplifier 1 fails to operate (well C) 5.71E-08 1.75E+04 5.00E-04 Unreveald
P=1.47E-02
CCFTAMPC CCF Trip Amps 1oo2 (WH C only) 1.80E-09 1.75E+04 1.58E-05 Unreveald
F=1.70E-06
PIT1013C PIT1013C Failure 1.40E-06 1.75E+04 1.22E-02 Unreveald
P=1.25E-02
OR GATE24
F=1.44E-06
TAMP2C Trip amplifier 2 fails to operate (wells C) 9.00E-08 1.75E+04 7.88E-04 Unreveald
P=1.50E-02
F=1.73E-06
VFDTRIPC VFD Trip fails well C 1.99E-07 1.75E+04 1.74E-03 Unreveald

Date (dd-mm-yy): 07-10-13 Time: 16.12.38

NAME REF RATE Ttest

PIT1002
P=1.25E-02
F=1.44E-06
P=1.96E-01
F=2.59E-05
HV1001 failure to
& GATE33
operate
P=2.04E-02 HV1001 & VFD
operate
P=6.95E-05
F=1.20E-08
PIT103D PIT1003 Failure 1.40E-06 1.75E+04 1.22E-02 Unreveald & WHD
Wellhead D
PIT1003 isolation
P=1.25E-02 P=4.31E-04
OR GATE30
F=1.44E-06 F=6.01E-08
TAMP1D Trip amplifier 1 fails to operate (well D) 5.71E-08 1.75E+04 5.00E-04 Unreveald
P=1.47E-02
CCFTAMPD CCF Trip Amps 1oo2 (WH D only) 1.80E-09 1.75E+04 1.58E-05 Unreveald
F=1.70E-06
PIT1013D PIT1013D Failure 1.40E-06 1.75E+04 1.22E-02 Unreveald
P=1.25E-02
OR GATE31
F=1.44E-06
TAMP2D Trip amplifier 2 fails to operate (wells D) 9.00E-08 1.75E+04 7.88E-04 Unreveald
P=1.50E-02
F=1.73E-06
VFDTRIPD VFD Trip fails well D 1.99E-07 1.75E+04 1.74E-03 Unreveald

Date (dd-mm-yy): 07-10-13 Time: 16.12.38

NAME REF RATE Ttest

PIT1002
P=1.25E-02
F=1.44E-06
P=1.96E-01
F=2.59E-05
HV1001 failure to
& GATE48
operate
P=1.97E-02 HV1001 & VFD
operate
P=6.72E-05
F=1.16E-08
PIT103I PIT1003 Failure 1.40E-06 1.75E+04 1.22E-02 Unreveald & WHI
Wellhead I
PIT1003 isolation
P=1.25E-02 P=4.31E-04
OR GATE42
F=1.44E-06 F=6.01E-08
TAMP1I Trip amplifier 1 fails to operate (well I) 5.71E-08 1.75E+04 5.00E-04 Unreveald
P=1.47E-02
CCFTAMPI CCF Trip Amps 1oo2 (WH I only) 1.80E-09 1.75E+04 1.58E-05 Unreveald
F=1.70E-06
P=1.25E-02
OR GATE43
F=1.44E-06
TAMP2I Trip amplifier 2 fails to operate (wells I) 9.00E-08 1.75E+04 7.88E-04 Unreveald
P=1.50E-02
F=1.73E-06
VFDTRIPI VFD Trip fails well I 1.99E-07 1.75E+04 1.74E-03 Unreveald

Date (dd-mm-yy): 07-10-13 Time: 16.12.38

NAME REF RATE Ttest

PIT1002
P=1.25E-02
F=1.44E-06
P=1.96E-01
F=2.59E-05
HV1001 failure to
& GATE52
operate
P=1.97E-02 HV1001 & VFD
operate
P=6.72E-05
F=1.16E-08
PIT103J PIT1003 Failure 1.40E-06 1.75E+04 1.22E-02 Unreveald & WHJ
Wellhead J
PIT1003 isolation
P=1.25E-02 P=4.31E-04
OR GATE45
F=1.44E-06 F=6.01E-08
TAMP1J Trip amplifier 1 fails to operate (well J) 5.71E-08 1.75E+04 5.00E-04 Unreveald
P=1.47E-02
CCFTAMPJ CCF Trip Amps 1oo2 (WH J only) 1.80E-09 1.75E+04 1.58E-05 Unreveald
F=1.70E-06
PIT1013J PIT1013J Failure 1.40E-06 1.75E+04 1.22E-02 Unreveald
P=1.25E-02
OR GATE46
F=1.44E-06
TAMP2J Trip amplifier 2 fails to operate (wells J) 9.00E-08 1.75E+04 7.88E-04 Unreveald
P=1.50E-02
F=1.73E-06
VFDTRIPJ VFD Trip fails well J 1.99E-07 1.75E+04 1.74E-03 Unreveald

Date (dd-mm-yy): 07-10-13 Time: 16.12.38

Project
E.2. Fault Trees (Before 2024) - Contribution List

2.0 | October 2013 | 5114320/004

Date(dd-mm-yy): 07-10-13 Time: 16.13.21
Top Event: GATE1

PIT1013D PIT1013D Failure 3.70E-02
PIT1013C PIT1013C Failure 3.70E-02
PIT1013B PIT1013B Failure 3.70E-02
PIT1013A PIT1013A Failure 3.70E-02
PIT1013J PIT1013J Failure 3.69E-02
VFDTRIPC VFD Trip fails well C 5.29E-03
VFDTRIPB VFD Trip fails well B 5.29E-03
VFDTRIPA VFD Trip fails well A 5.29E-03
VFDTRIPD VFD Trip fails well D 5.29E-03
VFDTRIPJ VFD Trip fails well J 5.28E-03
VFDTRIPI VFD Trip fails well I 5.28E-03

Date(dd-mm-yy): 07-10-13 Time: 16.13.21
Top Event: GATE1

TAMP2A Trip amplifier 2 fails to operate (wells A) 2.39E-03
TAMP2C Trip amplifier 2 fails to operate (wells C) 2.39E-03
TAMP2D Trip amplifier 2 fails to operate (wells D) 2.39E-03
TAMP2B Trip amplifier 2 fails to operate (wells B) 2.39E-03
TAMP2J Trip amplifier 2 fails to operate (wells J) 2.39E-03
TAMP2I Trip amplifier 2 fails to operate (wells I) 2.39E-03
CCFTAMPB CCF Trip Amps 1oo2 (WH B only) 1.68E-03
CCFTAMPD CCF Trip Amps 1oo2 (WH D only) 1.68E-03
CCFTAMPC CCF Trip Amps 1oo2 (WH C only) 1.68E-03
CCFTAMPA CCF Trip Amps 1oo2 (WH A only) 1.68E-03
CCFTAMPJ CCF Trip Amps 1oo2 (WH J only) 1.67E-03
CCFTAMPI CCF Trip Amps 1oo2 (WH I only) 1.67E-03
TAMP1B Trip amplifier 1 fails to operate (well B) 1.55E-03
TAMP1C Trip amplifier 1 fails to operate (well C) 1.55E-03
TAMP1D Trip amplifier 1 fails to operate (well D) 1.55E-03
TAMP1A Trip amplifier 1 fails to operate (well A) 1.55E-03
TAMP1J Trip amplifier 1 fails to operate (well J) 1.54E-03
TAMP1I Trip amplifier 1 fails to operate (well I) 1.54E-03

Project
E.3. Fault Trees (After 2024)

 Fault tree Figure 1 takes the results from all the other fault trees (Figures 2 to 13) for the wellheads
 Fault tree Figures 2 to 13 are the fault trees for failure of the overpressure protection at each wellhead.

2.0 | October 2013 | 5114320/004
NAME REF RATE Ttest

WHC Fig 4 Wellhead C isolation 6.01E-08 4.31E-04 >>> OR GATE10
Overpressure
WHE Fig 6 Wellhead E isolation 6.01E-08 4.31E-04 >>>
protection fails
>=1 WH on
manifold 1
& GATE14
P=2.40E-03
manifold 1 &
manifold 1
OR GATE11
F=3.79E-07 P=1.20E-04
P=3.55E-02 F=2.44E-08
F=4.14E-06
pad
WHJ Fig 11 Wellhead J isolation 6.01E-08 4.31E-04 >>> OR GATE36
P=1.99E-04
WHK Fig 12 Wellhead K isolation 6.01E-08 4.31E-04 >>>
protection fails
>+1 WH on
manifold 2
& GATE37
P=1.61E-03
manifold 2 &
manifold 2
OR GATE38
F=3.79E-07 P=7.95E-05
P=3.50E-02 F=1.61E-08
F=4.08E-06
P=2.98E-02
F=3.46E-06
PIT1009A P=1.63E-05
P=1.34E-02 F=3.29E-09
F=1.54E-06
PIT1009B 2oo3 PITs
P=1.34E-02 (PIT1009)
F=1.54E-06 P=1.85E-03
F=2.46E-07
PIT1009C
& GATE55
P=1.34E-02
F=1.54E-06 P=4.15E-05
F=5.22E-09
PIT1010A
P=1.34E-02 P=6.52E-05
F=1.54E-06 F=1.32E-08
PIT1010B 2oo3 PITs
P=1.34E-02 (PIT1010) P=7.37E-03
F=1.54E-06 P=1.85E-03 F=8.46E-07
F=2.46E-07
Overpressure
F=1.54E-06 P=3.91E-04
F=7.91E-08

Date (dd-mm-yy): 07-10-13 Time: 16.26.04
Fault Tree File: P:\GBGWA\PandMF\Safety\Data\Job Nos 511xxxx\5114320 - WP LOPA\004 - Fault Trees\Fault Trees\After 2024\Case 6.7\20131004_Case 6.7_with trip amp

NAME REF RATE Ttest

PIT1002
P=1.25E-02
F=1.44E-06
P=1.96E-01
F=2.59E-05
HV1001 failure to
& GATE5
operate
P=2.09E-02 HV1001 & VFD
operate
P=7.11E-05
F=1.23E-08
Wellhead A
PIT1003 isolation
P=1.25E-02 P=4.31E-04
OR GATE6
F=1.44E-06 F=6.01E-08
P=1.47E-02
F=1.70E-06
P=1.25E-02
OR GATE9
F=1.44E-06
P=1.50E-02
F=1.73E-06
VFDTRIPA VFD Trip Fails (well A) 1.99E-07 1.75E+04 1.74E-03 Unreveald

Date (dd-mm-yy): 07-10-13 Time: 16.26.04

NAME REF RATE Ttest

PIT1002
P=1.25E-02
F=1.44E-06
P=1.96E-01
F=2.59E-05
HV1001 failure to
& GATE19
operate
P=2.09E-02 HV1001 & VFD
operate
P=7.11E-05
F=1.23E-08
Wellhead B
PIT1003 isolation
P=1.25E-02 P=4.31E-04
OR GATE16
F=1.44E-06 F=6.01E-08
P=1.47E-02
F=1.70E-06
P=1.25E-02
OR GATE17
F=1.44E-06
P=1.50E-02
F=1.73E-06
VFDTRIPB VFD Trip Fails (well B) 1.99E-07 1.75E+04 1.74E-03 Unreveald

Date (dd-mm-yy): 07-10-13 Time: 16.26.04

NAME REF RATE Ttest

PIT1002
P=1.25E-02
F=1.44E-06
P=1.96E-01
F=2.59E-05
HV1001 failure to
& GATE26
operate
P=2.09E-02 HV1001 & VFD
operate
P=7.11E-05
F=1.23E-08
Wellhead C
PIT1003 isolation
P=1.25E-02 P=4.31E-04
OR GATE23
F=1.44E-06 F=6.01E-08
P=1.47E-02
F=1.70E-06
P=1.25E-02
OR GATE24
F=1.44E-06
P=1.50E-02
F=1.73E-06
VFDTRIPC VFD Trip Fails (well C) 1.99E-07 1.75E+04 1.74E-03 Unreveald

Date (dd-mm-yy): 07-10-13 Time: 16.26.04

NAME REF RATE Ttest

PIT1002
P=1.25E-02
F=1.44E-06
P=1.96E-01
F=2.59E-05
HV1001 failure to
& GATE33
operate
P=2.09E-02 HV1001 & VFD
operate
P=7.11E-05
F=1.23E-08
Wellhead D
PIT1003 isolation
P=1.25E-02 P=4.31E-04
OR GATE30
F=1.44E-06 F=6.01E-08
P=1.47E-02
F=1.70E-06
P=1.25E-02
OR GATE31
F=1.44E-06
P=1.50E-02
F=1.73E-06
VFDTRIPD VFD Trip Fails (well D) 1.99E-07 1.75E+04 1.74E-03 Unreveald

Date (dd-mm-yy): 07-10-13 Time: 16.26.04

NAME REF RATE Ttest

PIT1002
P=1.25E-02
F=1.44E-06
RTUFAILE RTU Logic Solver fails (well A) 2.44E-05 1.75E+04 1.86E-01 Unreveald OR GATE73
P=1.96E-01
HVCHOKEE HV1001 choke valve Well A fails to operate 2.15E-06 1.75E+04 1.86E-02 Unreveald OR GATE86
F=2.59E-05
HV1001 failure to
& GATE83
operate
P=2.09E-02 HV1001 & VFD
operate
P=7.11E-05
F=1.23E-08
PIT103E PIT1003 Failure 1.40E-06 1.75E+04 1.22E-02 Unreveald & WHE
Wellhead E
PIT1003 isolation
P=1.25E-02 P=4.31E-04
OR GATE74
F=1.44E-06 F=6.01E-08
TAMP1E Trip amplifier 1 fails to operate (well E) 5.71E-08 1.75E+04 5.00E-04 Unreveald
P=1.47E-02
CCFTAMPE CCF Trip Amps 1oo2 (WH E only) 1.80E-09 1.75E+04 1.58E-05 Unreveald
F=1.70E-06
PIT1013E PIT1013E Failure 1.40E-06 1.75E+04 1.22E-02 Unreveald
P=1.25E-02
OR GATE75
F=1.44E-06
P=1.50E-02
F=1.73E-06
VFDTRIPE VFD Trip Fails (well E) 1.99E-07 1.75E+04 1.74E-03 Unreveald

Date (dd-mm-yy): 07-10-13 Time: 16.26.04

NAME REF RATE Ttest

PIT1002
P=1.25E-02
F=1.44E-06
RTUFAILF RTU Logic Solver fails (well A) 2.44E-05 1.75E+04 1.86E-01 Unreveald OR GATE76
P=1.96E-01
HVCHOKEF HV1001 choke valve Well A fails to operate 2.15E-06 1.75E+04 1.86E-02 Unreveald OR GATE91
F=2.59E-05
HV1001 failure to
& GATE88
operate
P=2.09E-02 HV1001 & VFD
operate
P=7.11E-05
F=1.23E-08
PIT103F PIT1003 Failure 1.40E-06 1.75E+04 1.22E-02 Unreveald & WHF
Wellhead F
PIT1003 isolation
P=1.25E-02 P=4.31E-04
OR GATE77
F=1.44E-06 F=6.01E-08
TAMP1F Trip amplifier 1 fails to operate (well F) 5.71E-08 1.75E+04 5.00E-04 Unreveald
P=1.47E-02
CCFTAMPF CCF Trip Amps 1oo2 (WH F only) 1.80E-09 1.75E+04 1.58E-05 Unreveald
F=1.70E-06
PIT1013F PIT1013F Failure 1.40E-06 1.75E+04 1.22E-02 Unreveald
P=1.25E-02
OR GATE78
F=1.44E-06
P=1.50E-02
F=1.73E-06
VFDTRIPF VFD Trip Fails (well F) 1.99E-07 1.75E+04 1.74E-03 Unreveald

Date (dd-mm-yy): 07-10-13 Time: 16.26.04

NAME REF RATE Ttest

PIT1002
P=1.25E-02
F=1.44E-06
P=1.96E-01
F=2.59E-05
HV1001 failure to
& GATE48
operate
P=2.04E-02 HV1001 & VFD
operate
P=6.95E-05
F=1.20E-08
Wellhead I
PIT1003 isolation
P=1.25E-02 P=4.31E-04
OR GATE42
F=1.44E-06 F=6.01E-08
P=1.47E-02
F=1.70E-06
PIT1013I PIT1013I Failure 1.40E-06 1.75E+04 1.22E-02 Unreveald
P=1.25E-02
OR GATE43
F=1.44E-06
P=1.50E-02
F=1.73E-06
VFDTRIPI VFD Trip Fails (well I) 1.99E-07 1.75E+04 1.74E-03 Unreveald

Date (dd-mm-yy): 07-10-13 Time: 16.26.04

NAME REF RATE Ttest

PIT1002
P=1.25E-02
F=1.44E-06
P=1.96E-01
F=2.59E-05
HV1001 failure to
& GATE52
operate
P=2.04E-02 HV1001 & VFD
operate
P=6.95E-05
F=1.20E-08
Wellhead J
PIT1003 isolation
P=1.25E-02 P=4.31E-04
OR GATE45
F=1.44E-06 F=6.01E-08
P=1.47E-02
F=1.70E-06
P=1.25E-02
OR GATE46
F=1.44E-06
P=1.50E-02
F=1.73E-06
VFDTRIPJ VFD Trip Fails (well J) 1.99E-07 1.75E+04 1.74E-03 Unreveald

Date (dd-mm-yy): 07-10-13 Time: 16.26.04

NAME REF RATE Ttest

PIT1002
P=1.25E-02
F=1.44E-06
RTUFAILK RTU Logic Solver fails (well K) 2.44E-05 1.75E+04 1.86E-01 Unreveald OR GATE79
P=1.96E-01
HVCHOKEK HV1001 choke valve well I fails to operate 2.15E-06 1.75E+04 1.86E-02 Unreveald OR GATE96
F=2.59E-05
HV1001 failure to
& GATE93
operate
P=2.04E-02 HV1001 & VFD
operate
P=6.95E-05
F=1.20E-08
PIT103K PIT1003 Failure 1.40E-06 1.75E+04 1.22E-02 Unreveald & WHK
Wellhead K
PIT1003 isolation
P=1.25E-02 P=4.31E-04
OR GATE80
F=1.44E-06 F=6.01E-08
TAMP1K Trip amplifier 1 fails to operate (well K) 5.71E-08 1.75E+04 5.00E-04 Unreveald
P=1.47E-02
CCFTAMPK CCF Trip Amps 1oo2 (WH K only) 1.80E-09 1.75E+04 1.58E-05 Unreveald
F=1.70E-06
PIT1013K PIT1013K Failure 1.40E-06 1.75E+04 1.22E-02 Unreveald
P=1.25E-02
OR GATE81
F=1.44E-06
P=1.50E-02
F=1.73E-06
VFDTRIPK VFD Trip Fails (well K) 1.99E-07 1.75E+04 1.74E-03 Unreveald

Date (dd-mm-yy): 07-10-13 Time: 16.26.04

NAME REF RATE Ttest

PIT1002
P=1.25E-02
F=1.44E-06
RTUFAILL RTU Logic Solver fails (well L) 2.44E-05 1.75E+04 1.86E-01 Unreveald OR GATE97
P=1.96E-01
HVCHOKEL HV1001 choke valve well I fails to operate 2.15E-06 1.75E+04 1.86E-02 Unreveald OR GATE104
F=2.59E-05
HV1001 failure to
& GATE101
operate
P=2.04E-02 HV1001 & VFD
operate
P=6.95E-05
F=1.20E-08
PIT103L PIT1003 Failure 1.40E-06 1.75E+04 1.22E-02 Unreveald & WHL
Wellhead L
PIT1003 isolation
P=1.25E-02 P=4.31E-04
OR GATE98
F=1.44E-06 F=6.01E-08
TAMP1L Trip amplifier 1 fails to operate (well L) 5.71E-08 1.75E+04 5.00E-04 Unreveald
P=1.47E-02
CCFTAMPL CCF Trip Amps 1oo2 (WH L only) 1.80E-09 1.75E+04 1.58E-05 Unreveald
F=1.70E-06
PIT1013L PIT1013L Failure 1.40E-06 1.75E+04 1.22E-02 Unreveald
P=1.25E-02
OR GATE99
F=1.44E-06
P=1.50E-02
F=1.73E-06
VFDTRIPL VFD Trip Fails (well L) 1.99E-07 1.75E+04 1.74E-03 Unreveald

Date (dd-mm-yy): 07-10-13 Time: 16.26.04

Project
E.4. Fault Trees (Before 2024) - Contribution List

2.0 | October 2013 | 5114320/004

Date(dd-mm-yy): 07-10-13 Time: 16.26.26
Fault Tree File: P:\GBGWA\PandMF\Safety\Data\Job Nos 511xxxx\5114320 - WP LOPA\004 - Fault Trees\Fault Trees\After 2024\Case
Top Event: GATE1

RTUFAILE RTU Logic Solver fails (well A) 2.90E-02
RTUFAILF RTU Logic Solver fails (well A) 2.90E-02
RTUFAILK RTU Logic Solver fails (well K) 2.89E-02
RTUFAILL RTU Logic Solver fails (well L) 2.89E-02
PIT1013E PIT1013E Failure 2.46E-02
PIT1013F PIT1013F Failure 2.46E-02
PIT1013K PIT1013K Failure 2.46E-02
PIT1013L PIT1013L Failure 2.46E-02
PIT1013I PIT1013I Failure 2.46E-02

Date(dd-mm-yy): 07-10-13 Time: 16.26.26
Top Event: GATE1

VFDTRIPA VFD Trip Fails (well A) 3.52E-03
VFDTRIPD VFD Trip Fails (well D) 3.52E-03
VFDTRIPE VFD Trip Fails (well E) 3.52E-03
VFDTRIPF VFD Trip Fails (well F) 3.52E-03
VFDTRIPC VFD Trip Fails (well C) 3.52E-03
VFDTRIPB VFD Trip Fails (well B) 3.52E-03
VFDTRIPL VFD Trip Fails (well L) 3.51E-03
VFDTRIPK VFD Trip Fails (well K) 3.51E-03
VFDTRIPJ VFD Trip Fails (well J) 3.51E-03
VFDTRIPI VFD Trip Fails (well I) 3.51E-03
TAMP2E Trip amplifier 2 fails to operate (well E) 1.59E-03
TAMP2F Trip amplifier 2 fails to operate (well F) 1.59E-03
TAMP2L Trip amplifier 2 fails to operate (well L) 1.59E-03
TAMP2K Trip amplifier 2 fails to operate (well K) 1.59E-03
CCFTAMPF CCF Trip Amps 1oo2 (WH F only) 1.12E-03
CCFTAMPE CCF Trip Amps 1oo2 (WH E only) 1.12E-03
CCFTAMPK CCF Trip Amps 1oo2 (WH K only) 1.11E-03
CCFTAMPL CCF Trip Amps 1oo2 (WH L only) 1.11E-03

Date(dd-mm-yy): 07-10-13 Time: 16.26.26
Top Event: GATE1

HVCHOKEL HV1001 choke valve well I fails to operate 1.41E-05
HVCHOKEK HV1001 choke valve well I fails to operate 1.41E-05
HVCHOKEF HV1001 choke valve Well A fails to operate 1.41E-05
HVCHOKEE HV1001 choke valve Well A fails to operate 1.41E-05

Project
Appendix F. Case 6.7 - Fault Trees

(Sensitivity Analysis)
F.1. Fault Trees (Maximum Number of Wells)
• Fault tree Figure 1 takes the results from all the other fault trees (Figures 2 to 16) for the wellheads
• Fault tree Figures 2 to 16 are the fault trees for failure of the overpressure protection at each wellhead.

2.0 | October 2013 | 5114320/004
NAME REF RATE Ttest

WHE Fig 6 Wellhead E isolation 6.01E-08 4.31E-04 >>> OR GATE10
Overpressure
WHG Fig 8 Wellhead G isolation 6.01E-08 4.31E-04 >>>
protection fails
WHH Fig 9 Wellhead H isolation 6.01E-08 4.31E-04 >>>
>=1 WH on
WHM Fig 14 Wellhead M isolation 6.01E-08 4.31E-04 >>>
manifold 1
WHN Fig 15 Wellhead N isolation 6.01E-08 4.31E-04 >>> & GATE14
P=3.97E-03
F=5.63E-07 OverP >=1WH
on manifold 1 &
manifold 1
OR GATE11
F=3.79E-07 P=2.02E-04
P=3.61E-02 F=4.11E-08
F=4.21E-06
CCFVALM1 CCF ESD valve fails to op (Man 1 & WH) 3.41E-07 1.75E+04 2.98E-03 Unreveald OR GATE59
P=3.09E-02
F=3.59E-06 Overpressure
event at one
well pad
WHK Fig 12 Wellhead K isolation 6.01E-08 4.31E-04 >>> OR GATE36
P=3.02E-04
WHO Fig 16 Wellhead O isolation 6.01E-08 4.31E-04 >>>
protection fails
>+1 WH on
manifold 2
& GATE37
P=2.01E-03
F=2.84E-07 OverP >=1WH
on manifold 2 &
manifold 2
OR GATE38
F=3.79E-07 P=9.96E-05
P=3.53E-02 F=2.02E-08
F=4.11E-06
P=3.00E-02
F=3.49E-06
PIT1009A P=2.29E-05
P=1.34E-02 F=4.68E-09
F=1.54E-06
PIT1009B 2oo3 PITs
P=1.34E-02 (PIT1009)
F=1.54E-06 P=1.85E-03
F=2.46E-07
PIT1009C
& GATE55
P=1.34E-02
F=1.54E-06 P=4.15E-05
F=5.22E-09
PIT1010A
P=1.34E-02 P=9.16E-05
F=1.54E-06 F=1.87E-08
PIT1010B 2oo3 PITs
P=1.34E-02 (PIT1010) P=7.37E-03
F=1.54E-06 P=1.85E-03 F=8.46E-07
F=2.46E-07
Overpressure
F=1.54E-06 P=5.49E-04
F=1.12E-07

Date (dd-mm-yy):07-10-13 Time: 16.36.46
Fault Tree File: P:\GBGWA\PandMF\Safety\Data\Job Nos 511xxxx\5114320 - WP LOPA\004 - Fault Trees\Fault Trees\Before 2024\Case 6.7\Sensitivity\Increase number of wells\20131004_Case 6.7_with trip amp (increase no of wells)

NAME REF RATE Ttest

PIT1002
P=1.25E-02
F=1.44E-06
P=1.96E-01
F=2.59E-05
HV1001 failure to
& GATE5
operate
P=2.15E-02 HV1001 & VFD
operate
P=7.33E-05
F=1.26E-08
Wellhead A
PIT1003 isolation
P=1.25E-02 P=4.31E-04
OR GATE6
F=1.44E-06 F=6.01E-08
P=1.47E-02
F=1.70E-06
P=1.25E-02
OR GATE9
F=1.44E-06
P=1.50E-02
F=1.73E-06
VFDTRIPA VFD Trip Fails (well A) 1.99E-07 1.75E+04 1.74E-03 Unreveald

Date (dd-mm-yy): 07-10-13 Time: 16.36.46

NAME REF RATE Ttest

PIT1002
P=1.25E-02
F=1.44E-06
P=1.96E-01
F=2.59E-05
HV1001 failure to
& GATE19
operate
P=2.15E-02 HV1001 & VFD
operate
P=7.33E-05
F=1.26E-08
Wellhead B
PIT1003 isolation
P=1.25E-02 P=4.31E-04
OR GATE16
F=1.44E-06 F=6.01E-08
P=1.47E-02
F=1.70E-06
P=1.25E-02
OR GATE17
F=1.44E-06
P=1.50E-02
F=1.73E-06
VFDTRIPB VFD Trip Fails (well B) 1.99E-07 1.75E+04 1.74E-03 Unreveald

Date (dd-mm-yy): 07-10-13 Time: 16.36.46

NAME REF RATE Ttest

PIT1002
P=1.25E-02
F=1.44E-06
P=1.96E-01
F=2.59E-05
HV1001 failure to
& GATE26
operate
P=2.15E-02 HV1001 & VFD
operate
P=7.33E-05
F=1.26E-08
Wellhead C
PIT1003 isolation
P=1.25E-02 P=4.31E-04
OR GATE23
F=1.44E-06 F=6.01E-08
P=1.47E-02
F=1.70E-06
P=1.25E-02
OR GATE24
F=1.44E-06
P=1.50E-02
F=1.73E-06
VFDTRIPC VFD Trip Fails (well C) 1.99E-07 1.75E+04 1.74E-03 Unreveald

Date (dd-mm-yy): 07-10-13 Time: 16.36.46

NAME REF RATE Ttest

PIT1002
P=1.25E-02
F=1.44E-06
P=1.96E-01
F=2.59E-05
HV1001 failure to
& GATE33
operate
P=2.15E-02 HV1001 & VFD
operate
P=7.33E-05
F=1.26E-08
Wellhead D
PIT1003 isolation
P=1.25E-02 P=4.31E-04
OR GATE30
F=1.44E-06 F=6.01E-08
P=1.47E-02
F=1.70E-06
P=1.25E-02
OR GATE31
F=1.44E-06
P=1.50E-02
F=1.73E-06
VFDTRIPD VFD Trip Fails (well D) 1.99E-07 1.75E+04 1.74E-03 Unreveald

Date (dd-mm-yy): 07-10-13 Time: 16.36.46

NAME REF RATE Ttest

PIT1002
P=1.25E-02
F=1.44E-06
RTUFAILE RTU Logic Solver fails (well A) 2.44E-05 1.75E+04 1.86E-01 Unreveald OR GATE73
P=1.96E-01
HVCHOKEE HV1001 choke valve Well A fails to operate 2.15E-06 1.75E+04 1.86E-02 Unreveald OR GATE86
F=2.59E-05
HV1001 failure to
& GATE83
operate
P=2.15E-02 HV1001 & VFD
operate
P=7.33E-05
F=1.26E-08
PIT103E PIT1003 Failure 1.40E-06 1.75E+04 1.22E-02 Unreveald & WHE
Wellhead E
PIT1003 isolation
P=1.25E-02 P=4.31E-04
OR GATE74
F=1.44E-06 F=6.01E-08
P=1.47E-02
F=1.70E-06
PIT1013E PIT1013E Failure 1.40E-06 1.75E+04 1.22E-02 Unreveald
P=1.25E-02
OR GATE75
F=1.44E-06
P=1.50E-02
F=1.73E-06
VFDTRIPE VFD Trip Fails (well E) 1.99E-07 1.75E+04 1.74E-03 Unreveald

Date (dd-mm-yy): 07-10-13 Time: 16.36.46

NAME REF RATE Ttest

PIT1002
P=1.25E-02
F=1.44E-06
RTUFAILF RTU Logic Solver fails (well A) 2.44E-05 1.75E+04 1.86E-01 Unreveald OR GATE76
P=1.96E-01
HVCHOKEF HV1001 choke valve Well A fails to operate 2.15E-06 1.75E+04 1.86E-02 Unreveald OR GATE91
F=2.59E-05
HV1001 failure to
& GATE88
operate
P=2.15E-02 HV1001 & VFD
operate
P=7.33E-05
F=1.26E-08
PIT103F PIT1003 Failure 1.40E-06 1.75E+04 1.22E-02 Unreveald & WHF
Wellhead F
PIT1003 isolation
P=1.25E-02 P=4.31E-04
OR GATE77
F=1.44E-06 F=6.01E-08
P=1.47E-02
F=1.70E-06
PIT1013F PIT1013F Failure 1.40E-06 1.75E+04 1.22E-02 Unreveald
P=1.25E-02
OR GATE78
F=1.44E-06
P=1.50E-02
F=1.73E-06
VFDTRIPF VFD Trip Fails (well F) 1.99E-07 1.75E+04 1.74E-03 Unreveald

Date (dd-mm-yy): 07-10-13 Time: 16.36.46

NAME REF RATE Ttest

PIT1002
P=1.25E-02
F=1.44E-06
RTUFAILG RTU Logic Solver fails (well A) 2.44E-05 1.75E+04 1.86E-01 Unreveald OR GATE97
P=1.96E-01
HVCHOKEG HV1001 choke valve Well A fails to operate 2.15E-06 1.75E+04 1.86E-02 Unreveald OR GATE104
F=2.59E-05
HV1001 failure to
& GATE101
operate
P=2.15E-02 HV1001 & VFD
MCCFG MCC VFD fails to turndown ESP 2.92E-07 1.75E+04 2.55E-03 Unreveald
operate
P=7.33E-05
F=1.26E-08
PIT103G PIT1003 Failure 1.40E-06 1.75E+04 1.22E-02 Unreveald & WHG
Wellhead G
PIT1003 isolation
P=1.25E-02 P=4.31E-04
OR GATE98
F=1.44E-06 F=6.01E-08
TAMP1G Trip amplifier 1 fails to operate (well G) 5.71E-08 1.75E+04 5.00E-04 Unreveald
P=1.47E-02
CCFTAMPG CCF Trip Amps 1oo2 (WH G only) 1.80E-09 1.75E+04 1.58E-05 Unreveald
F=1.70E-06
MCCRELG MCC Relay fails to shutdown ESP 1.99E-07 1.75E+04 1.74E-03 Unreveald
PIT1013G PIT1013G Failure 1.40E-06 1.75E+04 1.22E-02 Unreveald
P=1.25E-02
OR GATE99
F=1.44E-06
TAMP2G Trip amplifier 2 fails to operate (well G) 9.00E-08 1.75E+04 7.88E-04 Unreveald
P=1.50E-02
CCFTAMPG CCF Trip Amps 1oo2 (WH G only) 1.80E-09 1.75E+04 1.58E-05 Unreveald
F=1.73E-06
VFDTRIPG VFD Trip Fails (well G) 1.99E-07 1.75E+04 1.74E-03 Unreveald

Date (dd-mm-yy): 07-10-13 Time: 16.36.46
FIGURE 8. FAULT TREE FOR WELLHEAD G ISOLATION

NAME REF RATE Ttest

PIT1002
P=1.25E-02
F=1.44E-06
RTUFAILH RTU Logic Solver fails (well A) 2.44E-05 1.75E+04 1.86E-01 Unreveald OR GATE105
P=1.96E-01
HVCHOKEH HV1001 choke valve Well A fails to operate 2.15E-06 1.75E+04 1.86E-02 Unreveald OR GATE112
F=2.59E-05
HV1001 failure to
& GATE109
operate
P=2.15E-02 HV1001 & VFD
MCCFH MCC VFD fails to turndown ESP 2.92E-07 1.75E+04 2.55E-03 Unreveald
operate
P=7.33E-05
F=1.26E-08
PIT103H PIT1003 Failure 1.40E-06 1.75E+04 1.22E-02 Unreveald & WHH
Wellhead H
PIT1003 isolation
P=1.25E-02 P=4.31E-04
OR GATE106
F=1.44E-06 F=6.01E-08
TAMP1H Trip amplifier 1 fails to operate (well H) 5.71E-08 1.75E+04 5.00E-04 Unreveald
P=1.47E-02
CCFTAMPH CCF Trip Amps 1oo2 (WH H only) 1.80E-09 1.75E+04 1.58E-05 Unreveald
F=1.70E-06
MCCRELH MCC Relay fails to shutdown ESP 1.99E-07 1.75E+04 1.74E-03 Unreveald
PIT1013H PIT1013H Failure 1.40E-06 1.75E+04 1.22E-02 Unreveald
P=1.25E-02
OR GATE107
F=1.44E-06
TAMP2H Trip amplifier 2 fails to operate (wells H) 9.00E-08 1.75E+04 7.88E-04 Unreveald
P=1.50E-02
CCFTAMPH CCF Trip Amps 1oo2 (WH H only) 1.80E-09 1.75E+04 1.58E-05 Unreveald
F=1.73E-06
VFDTRIPH VFD Trip Fails (well H) 1.99E-07 1.75E+04 1.74E-03 Unreveald

Date (dd-mm-yy): 07-10-13 Time: 16.36.46
FIGURE 9. FAULT TREE FOR WELLHEAD H ISOLATION

NAME REF RATE Ttest

PIT1002
P=1.25E-02
F=1.44E-06
P=1.96E-01
F=2.59E-05
HV1001 failure to
& GATE48
operate
P=2.06E-02 HV1001 & VFD
operate
P=7.04E-05
F=1.21E-08
Wellhead I
PIT1003 isolation
P=1.25E-02 P=4.31E-04
OR GATE42
F=1.44E-06 F=6.01E-08
P=1.47E-02
F=1.70E-06
P=1.25E-02
OR GATE43
F=1.44E-06
P=1.50E-02
F=1.73E-06
VFDTRIPI VFD Trip Fails (well I) 1.99E-07 1.75E+04 1.74E-03 Unreveald

Date (dd-mm-yy): 07-10-13 Time: 16.36.46

NAME REF RATE Ttest

PIT1002
P=1.25E-02
F=1.44E-06
P=1.96E-01
F=2.59E-05
HV1001 failure to
& GATE52
operate
P=2.06E-02 HV1001 & VFD
operate
P=7.04E-05
F=1.21E-08
Wellhead J
PIT1003 isolation
P=1.25E-02 P=4.31E-04
OR GATE45
F=1.44E-06 F=6.01E-08
P=1.47E-02
F=1.70E-06
P=1.25E-02
OR GATE46
F=1.44E-06
P=1.50E-02
F=1.73E-06
VFDTRIPJ VFD Trip Fails (well J) 1.99E-07 1.75E+04 1.74E-03 Unreveald

Date (dd-mm-yy): 07-10-13 Time: 16.36.47

NAME REF RATE Ttest

PIT1002
P=1.25E-02
F=1.44E-06
RTUFAILK RTU Logic Solver fails (well I) 2.44E-05 1.75E+04 1.86E-01 Unreveald OR GATE79
P=1.96E-01
HVCHOKEK HV1001 choke valve well I fails to operate 2.15E-06 1.75E+04 1.86E-02 Unreveald OR GATE96
F=2.59E-05
HV1001 failure to
& GATE93
operate
P=2.06E-02 HV1001 & VFD
operate
P=7.04E-05
F=1.21E-08
PIT103K PIT1003 Failure 1.40E-06 1.75E+04 1.22E-02 Unreveald & WHK
Wellhead K
PIT1003 isolation
P=1.25E-02 P=4.31E-04
OR GATE80
F=1.44E-06 F=6.01E-08
P=1.47E-02
F=1.70E-06
PIT1013K PIT1013K Failure 1.40E-06 1.75E+04 1.22E-02 Unreveald
P=1.25E-02
OR GATE81
F=1.44E-06
P=1.50E-02
F=1.73E-06
VFDTRIPK VFD Trip Fails (well K) 1.99E-07 1.75E+04 1.74E-03 Unreveald

Date (dd-mm-yy): 07-10-13 Time: 16.36.47

NAME REF RATE Ttest

PIT1002
P=1.25E-02
F=1.44E-06
RTUFAILL RTU Logic Solver fails (well I) 2.44E-05 1.75E+04 1.86E-01 Unreveald OR GATE113
P=1.96E-01
HVCHOKEL HV1001 choke valve well I fails to operate 2.15E-06 1.75E+04 1.86E-02 Unreveald OR GATE120
F=2.59E-05
HV1001 failure to
& GATE117
operate
P=2.06E-02 HV1001 & VFD
operate
P=7.04E-05
F=1.21E-08
PIT103L PIT1003 Failure 1.40E-06 1.75E+04 1.22E-02 Unreveald & WHL
Wellhead L
PIT1003 isolation
P=1.25E-02 P=4.31E-04
OR GATE114
F=1.44E-06 F=6.01E-08
P=1.47E-02
F=1.70E-06
PIT1013L PIT1013L Failure 1.40E-06 1.75E+04 1.22E-02 Unreveald
P=1.25E-02
OR GATE115
F=1.44E-06
P=1.50E-02
F=1.73E-06
VFDTRIPL VFD Trip Fails (well L) 1.99E-07 1.75E+04 1.74E-03 Unreveald

Date (dd-mm-yy): 07-10-13 Time: 16.36.47

NAME REF RATE Ttest
PIT102M PIT1002 Failure 1.40E-06 1.75E+04 1.22E-02 Unreveald

CCFPITWM CCF PIT 1oo3 (WH only) 3.50E-08 1.75E+04 3.06E-04 Unreveald
PIT1002
P=1.25E-02
F=1.44E-06
RTUFAILM RTU Logic Solver fails (well A) 2.44E-05 1.75E+04 1.86E-01 Unreveald OR GATE121
P=1.96E-01
HVCHOKEM HV1001 choke valve Well A fails to operate 2.15E-06 1.75E+04 1.86E-02 Unreveald OR GATE128
F=2.59E-05
HV1001 failure to
& GATE125
operate
P=2.15E-02 HV1001 & VFD
MCCFM MCC VFD fails to turndown ESP 2.92E-07 1.75E+04 2.55E-03 Unreveald
operate
P=7.33E-05
F=1.26E-08
PIT103M PIT1003 Failure 1.40E-06 1.75E+04 1.22E-02 Unreveald & WHM
Wellhead M
PIT1003 isolation
P=1.25E-02 P=4.31E-04
OR GATE122
F=1.44E-06 F=6.01E-08
TAMP1M Trip amplifier 1 fails to operate (well M) 5.71E-08 1.75E+04 5.00E-04 Unreveald
P=1.47E-02
CCFTAMPM CCF Trip Amps 1oo2 (WH M only) 1.80E-09 1.75E+04 1.58E-05 Unreveald
F=1.70E-06
MCCRELM MCC Relay fails to shutdown ESP 1.99E-07 1.75E+04 1.74E-03 Unreveald
PIT1013M PIT1013M Failure 1.40E-06 1.75E+04 1.22E-02 Unreveald
P=1.25E-02
OR GATE123
F=1.44E-06
TAMP2M Trip amplifier 2 fails to operate (well M) 9.00E-08 1.75E+04 7.88E-04 Unreveald
P=1.50E-02
CCFTAMPM CCF Trip Amps 1oo2 (WH M only) 1.80E-09 1.75E+04 1.58E-05 Unreveald
F=1.73E-06
VFDTRIPM VFD Trip Fails (well M) 1.99E-07 1.75E+04 1.74E-03 Unreveald

Date (dd-mm-yy): 07-10-13 Time: 16.36.47
FIGURE 14. FAULT TREE FOR WELLHEAD M ISOLATION

NAME REF RATE Ttest
PIT102N PIT1002 Failure 1.40E-06 1.75E+04 1.22E-02 Unreveald

CCFPITWN CCF PIT 1oo3 (WH only) 3.50E-08 1.75E+04 3.06E-04 Unreveald
PIT1002
P=1.25E-02
F=1.44E-06
RTUFAILN RTU Logic Solver fails (well A) 2.44E-05 1.75E+04 1.86E-01 Unreveald OR GATE129
P=1.96E-01
HVCHOKEN HV1001 choke valve Well A fails to operate 2.15E-06 1.75E+04 1.86E-02 Unreveald OR GATE136
F=2.59E-05
HV1001 failure to
& GATE133
operate
P=2.15E-02 HV1001 & VFD
MCCFN MCC VFD fails to turndown ESP 2.92E-07 1.75E+04 2.55E-03 Unreveald
operate
P=7.33E-05
F=1.26E-08
PIT103N PIT1003 Failure 1.40E-06 1.75E+04 1.22E-02 Unreveald & WHN
Wellhead N
PIT1003 isolation
P=1.25E-02 P=4.31E-04
OR GATE130
F=1.44E-06 F=6.01E-08
TAMP1N Trip amplifier 1 fails to operate (well N) 5.71E-08 1.75E+04 5.00E-04 Unreveald
P=1.47E-02
CCFTAMPN CCF Trip Amps 1oo2 (WH N only) 1.80E-09 1.75E+04 1.58E-05 Unreveald
F=1.70E-06
MCCRELN MCC Relay fails to shutdown ESP 1.99E-07 1.75E+04 1.74E-03 Unreveald
PIT1013N PIT1013N Failure 1.40E-06 1.75E+04 1.22E-02 Unreveald
P=1.25E-02
OR GATE131
F=1.44E-06
TAMP2N Trip amplifier 2 fails to operate (well N) 9.00E-08 1.75E+04 7.88E-04 Unreveald
P=1.50E-02
CCFTAMPN CCF Trip Amps 1oo2 (WH N only) 1.80E-09 1.75E+04 1.58E-05 Unreveald
F=1.73E-06
VFDTRIPN VFD Trip Fails (well N) 1.99E-07 1.75E+04 1.74E-03 Unreveald

Date (dd-mm-yy): 07-10-13 Time: 16.36.47
FIGURE 15. FAULT TREE FOR WELLHEAD N ISOLATION

NAME REF RATE Ttest
PIT102O PIT1002 Failure 1.40E-06 1.75E+04 1.22E-02 Unreveald

CCFPITWO CCF PIT 1oo3 (WH only) 3.50E-08 1.75E+04 3.06E-04 Unreveald
PIT1002
P=1.25E-02
F=1.44E-06
RTUFAILO RTU Logic Solver fails (well I) 2.44E-05 1.75E+04 1.86E-01 Unreveald OR GATE137
P=1.96E-01
HVCHOKEO HV1001 choke valve well I fails to operate 2.15E-06 1.75E+04 1.86E-02 Unreveald OR GATE144
F=2.59E-05
HV1001 failure to
& GATE141
operate
P=2.06E-02 HV1001 & VFD
MCCFO MCC VFD fails to turndown ESP 2.92E-07 1.75E+04 2.55E-03 Unreveald
operate
P=7.04E-05
F=1.21E-08
PIT103O PIT1003 Failure 1.40E-06 1.75E+04 1.22E-02 Unreveald & WHO
Wellhead O
PIT1003 isolation
P=1.25E-02 P=4.31E-04
OR GATE138
F=1.44E-06 F=6.01E-08
TAMP1O Trip amplifier 1 fails to operate (well O) 5.71E-08 1.75E+04 5.00E-04 Unreveald
P=1.47E-02
CCFTAMPO CCF Trip Amps 1oo2 (WH O only) 1.80E-09 1.75E+04 1.58E-05 Unreveald
F=1.70E-06
MCCRELO MCC Relay fails to shutdown ESP 1.99E-07 1.75E+04 1.74E-03 Unreveald
PIT1013O PIT1013O Failure 1.40E-06 1.75E+04 1.22E-02 Unreveald
P=1.25E-02
OR GATE139
F=1.44E-06
TAMP2O Trip amplifier 2 fails to operate (well O) 9.00E-08 1.75E+04 7.88E-04 Unreveald
P=1.50E-02
CCFTAMPO CCF Trip Amps 1oo2 (WH O only) 1.80E-09 1.75E+04 1.58E-05 Unreveald
F=1.73E-06
VFDTRIPO VFD Trip Fails (well O) 1.99E-07 1.75E+04 1.74E-03 Unreveald

Date (dd-mm-yy): 07-10-13 Time: 16.36.47
FIGURE 16. FAULT TREE FOR WELLHEAD O ISOLATION

Project
F.2. Fault Trees (Maximum Number of Wells) - Contribution List

2.0 | October 2013 | 5114320/004

Date(dd-mm-yy): 07-10-13 Time: 16.37.15
Top Event: GATE1

CCFPITWH CCF PIT 1oo3 (WH only) 3.70E-02
CCFPITWG CCF PIT 1oo3 (WH only) 3.70E-02
CCFPITWN CCF PIT 1oo3 (WH only) 3.70E-02
CCFPITWM CCF PIT 1oo3 (WH only) 3.70E-02
CCFPITWO CCF PIT 1oo3 (WH only) 3.68E-02
RTUFAILF RTU Logic Solver fails (well A) 2.05E-02
RTUFAILE RTU Logic Solver fails (well A) 2.05E-02
RTUFAILN RTU Logic Solver fails (well A) 2.05E-02
RTUFAILM RTU Logic Solver fails (well A) 2.05E-02
RTUFAILG RTU Logic Solver fails (well A) 2.05E-02
RTUFAILH RTU Logic Solver fails (well A) 2.05E-02
RTUFAILO RTU Logic Solver fails (well I) 2.04E-02
RTUFAILK RTU Logic Solver fails (well I) 2.04E-02
RTUFAILL RTU Logic Solver fails (well I) 2.04E-02
PIT103N PIT1003 Failure 1.77E-02
PIT103M PIT1003 Failure 1.77E-02
PIT103O PIT1003 Failure 1.76E-02

Date(dd-mm-yy): 07-10-13 Time: 16.37.15
Top Event: GATE1
PIT1013H PIT1013H Failure 1.74E-02

PIT1013F PIT1013F Failure 1.74E-02
PIT1013M PIT1013M Failure 1.74E-02
PIT1013N PIT1013N Failure 1.74E-02
PIT1013E PIT1013E Failure 1.74E-02
PIT1013G PIT1013G Failure 1.74E-02
PIT1013K PIT1013K Failure 1.73E-02
PIT1013O PIT1013O Failure 1.73E-02
PIT1013L PIT1013L Failure 1.73E-02
MCCRELM MCC Relay fails to shutdown ESP 2.53E-03
MCCRELH MCC Relay fails to shutdown ESP 2.53E-03
MCCRELG MCC Relay fails to shutdown ESP 2.53E-03
MCCRELN MCC Relay fails to shutdown ESP 2.53E-03
MCCRELO MCC Relay fails to shutdown ESP 2.52E-03
VFDTRIPC VFD Trip Fails (well C) 2.48E-03
VFDTRIPD VFD Trip Fails (well D) 2.48E-03
VFDTRIPF VFD Trip Fails (well F) 2.48E-03
VFDTRIPN VFD Trip Fails (well N) 2.48E-03
VFDTRIPE VFD Trip Fails (well E) 2.48E-03
VFDTRIPH VFD Trip Fails (well H) 2.48E-03
VFDTRIPM VFD Trip Fails (well M) 2.48E-03
VFDTRIPA VFD Trip Fails (well A) 2.48E-03
VFDTRIPG VFD Trip Fails (well G) 2.48E-03
VFDTRIPB VFD Trip Fails (well B) 2.48E-03
VFDTRIPO VFD Trip Fails (well O) 2.47E-03
VFDTRIPJ VFD Trip Fails (well J) 2.47E-03
VFDTRIPK VFD Trip Fails (well K) 2.47E-03
VFDTRIPL VFD Trip Fails (well L) 2.47E-03
VFDTRIPI VFD Trip Fails (well I) 2.47E-03
PIT102M PIT1002 Failure 1.29E-03
PIT102N PIT1002 Failure 1.29E-03

Date(dd-mm-yy): 07-10-13 Time: 16.37.15
Top Event: GATE1

PIT102O PIT1002 Failure 1.29E-03
TAMP2N Trip amplifier 2 fails to operate (well N) 1.12E-03
TAMP2M Trip amplifier 2 fails to operate (well M) 1.12E-03
TAMP2H Trip amplifier 2 fails to operate (wells H) 1.12E-03
TAMP2G Trip amplifier 2 fails to operate (well G) 1.12E-03
TAMP2O Trip amplifier 2 fails to operate (well O) 1.12E-03
CCFTAMPM CCF Trip Amps 1oo2 (WH M only) 7.87E-04
CCFTAMPN CCF Trip Amps 1oo2 (WH N only) 7.87E-04
CCFTAMPF CCF Trip Amps 1oo2 (WH F only) 7.87E-04
CCFTAMPH CCF Trip Amps 1oo2 (WH H only) 7.87E-04
CCFTAMPE CCF Trip Amps 1oo2 (WH E only) 7.87E-04
CCFTAMPG CCF Trip Amps 1oo2 (WH G only) 7.87E-04
CCFTAMPK CCF Trip Amps 1oo2 (WH K only) 7.85E-04
CCFTAMPO CCF Trip Amps 1oo2 (WH O only) 7.85E-04
CCFTAMPL CCF Trip Amps 1oo2 (WH L only) 7.85E-04
TAMP1G Trip amplifier 1 fails to operate (well G) 7.27E-04
TAMP1N Trip amplifier 1 fails to operate (well N) 7.27E-04
TAMP1M Trip amplifier 1 fails to operate (well M) 7.27E-04
TAMP1H Trip amplifier 1 fails to operate (well H) 7.27E-04
TAMP1O Trip amplifier 1 fails to operate (well O) 7.24E-04

Date(dd-mm-yy): 07-10-13 Time: 16.37.15
Top Event: GATE1

MCCFG MCC VFD fails to turndown ESP 1.34E-05
MCCFM MCC VFD fails to turndown ESP 1.34E-05
MCCFH MCC VFD fails to turndown ESP 1.34E-05
MCCFN MCC VFD fails to turndown ESP 1.34E-05
MCCFO MCC VFD fails to turndown ESP 1.20E-05
HVCHOKEE HV1001 choke valve Well A fails to operate 8.65E-06
HVCHOKEF HV1001 choke valve Well A fails to operate 8.65E-06
HVCHOKEO HV1001 choke valve well I fails to operate 8.65E-06
HVCHOKEG HV1001 choke valve Well A fails to operate 8.65E-06
HVCHOKEM HV1001 choke valve Well A fails to operate 8.65E-06
HVCHOKEN HV1001 choke valve Well A fails to operate 8.65E-06
HVCHOKEH HV1001 choke valve Well A fails to operate 8.65E-06
HVCHOKEK HV1001 choke valve well I fails to operate 8.65E-06
HVCHOKEL HV1001 choke valve well I fails to operate 8.65E-06

Project
F.3. Fault Trees (Maximum Test Intervalsii)

 Fault tree Figure 1 takes the results from all the other fault trees (Figures 2 to 5 and Figure 10 and 11)
 Fault tree Figures 2 to 5 and Figure 10 and 11 are the fault trees for failure of the overpressure
ii
Note - maximum test interval here means the period between two proof tests.

2.0 | October 2013 | 5114320/004
NAME REF RATE Ttest

Overpressure
protection fails
>=1 WH on
manifold 1
& GATE14
P=2.70E-03
manifold 1 &
manifold 1
OR GATE11
F=3.79E-07 P=1.96E-04
P=5.21E-02 F=2.88E-08
F=4.08E-06
pad
P=2.94E-04
protection fails
>+1 WH on
manifold 2
& GATE37
P=1.38E-03
manifold 2 &
manifold 2
OR GATE38
F=3.79E-07 P=9.85E-05
P=5.11E-02 F=1.44E-08
F=4.00E-06
P=4.33E-02
F=3.38E-06
PIT1009A P=2.77E-05
P=2.00E-02 F=3.96E-09
F=1.54E-06
PIT1009B 2oo3 PITs
P=2.00E-02 (PIT1009)
F=1.54E-06 P=3.21E-03
F=2.97E-07
PIT1009C
& GATE55
P=2.00E-02
F=1.54E-06 P=6.52E-05
F=5.86E-09
PIT1010A
P=2.00E-02 P=1.11E-04
F=1.54E-06 F=1.59E-08
PIT1010B 2oo3 PITs
P=2.00E-02 (PIT1010) P=1.10E-02
F=1.54E-06 P=3.22E-03 F=8.47E-07
F=2.97E-07
Overpressure
F=1.54E-06 P=6.65E-04
F=9.51E-08

Date (dd-mm-yy): 07-10-13 Time: 16.43.11
Fault Tree File: P:\GBGWA\PandMF\Safety\Data\Job Nos 511xxxx\5114320 - WP LOPA\004 - Fault Trees\Fault Trees\Before 2024\Case 6.7\Sensitivity\Test Intervals\20131004_Case 6.7_with trip amp (test frequency)

NAME REF RATE Ttest

PIT1002
P=1.87E-02
F=1.44E-06
P=2.76E-01
F=2.59E-05
HV1001 failure to
& GATE5
operate
P=3.04E-02 HV1001 & VFD
operate
P=1.52E-04
F=1.79E-08
Wellhead A
PIT1003 isolation
P=1.87E-02 P=7.16E-04
OR GATE6
F=1.44E-06 F=7.48E-08
P=2.20E-02
F=1.70E-06
P=1.87E-02
OR GATE9
F=1.44E-06
TAMP2A Trip amplifier 2 fails to operate (wells A) 9.00E-08 2.63E+04 1.18E-03 Unreveald
P=2.24E-02
F=1.73E-06
VFDTRIPA VFD Trip fails well A 1.99E-07 2.63E+04 2.61E-03 Unreveald

Date (dd-mm-yy): 07-10-13 Time: 16.43.11

NAME REF RATE Ttest

PIT1002
P=1.87E-02
F=1.44E-06
P=2.76E-01
F=2.59E-05
HV1001 failure to
& GATE19
operate
P=3.04E-02 HV1001 & VFD
operate
P=1.52E-04
F=1.79E-08
Wellhead B
PIT1003 isolation
P=1.87E-02 P=7.16E-04
OR GATE16
F=1.44E-06 F=7.48E-08
P=2.20E-02
F=1.70E-06
P=1.87E-02
OR GATE17
F=1.44E-06
TAMP2B Trip amplifier 2 fails to operate (wells B) 9.00E-08 2.63E+04 1.18E-03 Unreveald
P=2.24E-02
F=1.73E-06
VFDTRIPB VFD Trip fails well B 1.99E-07 2.63E+04 2.61E-03 Unreveald

Date (dd-mm-yy): 07-10-13 Time: 16.43.12

NAME REF RATE Ttest

PIT1002
P=1.87E-02
F=1.44E-06
P=2.76E-01
F=2.59E-05
HV1001 failure to
& GATE26
operate
P=3.04E-02 HV1001 & VFD
operate
P=1.52E-04
F=1.79E-08
Wellhead C
PIT1003 isolation
P=1.87E-02 P=7.16E-04
OR GATE23
F=1.44E-06 F=7.48E-08
P=2.20E-02
F=1.70E-06
P=1.87E-02
OR GATE24
F=1.44E-06
TAMP2C Trip amplifier 2 fails to operate (wells C) 9.00E-08 2.63E+04 1.18E-03 Unreveald
P=2.24E-02
F=1.73E-06
VFDTRIPC VFD Trip fails well C 1.99E-07 2.63E+04 2.61E-03 Unreveald

Date (dd-mm-yy): 07-10-13 Time: 16.43.12

NAME REF RATE Ttest

PIT1002
P=1.87E-02
F=1.44E-06
P=2.76E-01
F=2.59E-05
HV1001 failure to
& GATE33
operate
P=3.04E-02 HV1001 & VFD
operate
P=1.52E-04
F=1.79E-08
Wellhead D
PIT1003 isolation
P=1.87E-02 P=7.16E-04
OR GATE30
F=1.44E-06 F=7.48E-08
P=2.20E-02
F=1.70E-06
P=1.87E-02
OR GATE31
F=1.44E-06
TAMP2D Trip amplifier 2 fails to operate (wells D) 9.00E-08 2.63E+04 1.18E-03 Unreveald
P=2.24E-02
F=1.73E-06
VFDTRIPD VFD Trip fails well D 1.99E-07 2.63E+04 2.61E-03 Unreveald

Date (dd-mm-yy): 07-10-13 Time: 16.43.12

NAME REF RATE Ttest

PIT1002
P=1.87E-02
F=1.44E-06
P=2.76E-01
F=2.59E-05
HV1001 failure to
& GATE48
operate
P=2.94E-02 HV1001 & VFD
operate
P=1.48E-04
F=1.74E-08
Wellhead I
PIT1003 isolation
P=1.87E-02 P=7.16E-04
OR GATE42
F=1.44E-06 F=7.48E-08
P=2.20E-02
F=1.70E-06
P=1.87E-02
OR GATE43
F=1.44E-06
TAMP2I Trip amplifier 2 fails to operate (wells I) 9.00E-08 2.63E+04 1.18E-03 Unreveald
P=2.24E-02
F=1.73E-06
VFDTRIPI VFD Trip fails well I 1.99E-07 2.63E+04 2.61E-03 Unreveald

Date (dd-mm-yy): 07-10-13 Time: 16.43.12

NAME REF RATE Ttest

PIT1002
P=1.87E-02
F=1.44E-06
P=2.76E-01
F=2.59E-05
HV1001 failure to
& GATE52
operate
P=2.94E-02 HV1001 & VFD
operate
P=1.48E-04
F=1.74E-08
Wellhead J
PIT1003 isolation
P=1.87E-02 P=7.16E-04
OR GATE45
F=1.44E-06 F=7.48E-08
P=2.20E-02
F=1.70E-06
P=1.87E-02
OR GATE46
F=1.44E-06
TAMP2J Trip amplifier 2 fails to operate (wells J) 9.00E-08 2.63E+04 1.18E-03 Unreveald
P=2.24E-02
F=1.73E-06
VFDTRIPJ VFD Trip fails well J 1.99E-07 2.63E+04 2.61E-03 Unreveald

Date (dd-mm-yy): 07-10-13 Time: 16.43.12

Project
F.4. Fault Trees (Maximum Test Intervals) - Contribution List

2.0 | October 2013 | 5114320/004

Date(dd-mm-yy): 07-10-13 Time: 16.43.40
Top Event: GATE1

VFDTRIPD VFD Trip fails well D 1.00E-02
VFDTRIPC VFD Trip fails well C 1.00E-02
VFDTRIPB VFD Trip fails well B 1.00E-02
VFDTRIPA VFD Trip fails well A 1.00E-02
VFDTRIPI VFD Trip fails well I 1.00E-02
VFDTRIPJ VFD Trip fails well J 1.00E-02
TAMP2B Trip amplifier 2 fails to operate (wells B) 4.54E-03
TAMP2A Trip amplifier 2 fails to operate (wells A) 4.54E-03
TAMP2D Trip amplifier 2 fails to operate (wells D) 4.54E-03
TAMP2C Trip amplifier 2 fails to operate (wells C) 4.54E-03
TAMP2I Trip amplifier 2 fails to operate (wells I) 4.53E-03

Date(dd-mm-yy): 07-10-13 Time: 16.43.40
Top Event: GATE1
TAMP2J Trip amplifier 2 fails to operate (wells J) 4.53E-03


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‘Plan Design Enable’ are trademarks of Atkins Ltd.

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REVISION DESCRIPTION SHEET

Rev. Para. Reason for Revision

A Issued for Inter-Discipline Check

B Issued for Customer Review

C Re-issued for Customer Review based on PVN-0080-R and manifold

D Re-issued for Customer Review based on IVR comments

0 Issued for FEED incorporating final IVR comments

1 Issued for Information

This report supersedes previous revision (Rev. 0).

APPENDIX 1- WELLHE AD G ATHERING TRUNKILNE

Private and confidential

Private and confidential

F.4. Fault Trees (Maximum Test Intervals) - Contribution List 52

Private and confidential

CCF Common Cause Failure

Private and confidential

Private and confidential

• MANVM2 – Manifold ESD valve fails to operate on demand (manifold 2).

Private and confidential

Case 6.1 looked at the following configuration:

• Before 2024 configuration:

Cases 6.3, 6.6 and 6.7 looked at the following configurations:

• Before 2024 configuration:

Private and confidential

2. Target Mitigated Event Likelihood

Private and confidential

The cases to be considered in this analysis are described below.

3.1. Case 6.1

The following technologies were incorporated into Case 6.1:

Private and confidential

Figure 3-1 Reliability Block Diagram for Case 6.1

Private and confidential

Figure 3-2 Schematic for Case 6.1

Private and confidential

3.2. Case 6.6

Figure 3-3 Reliability Block Diagram for Case 6.6

Private and confidential

Figure 3-4 Schematic for Case 6.6

Private and confidential

3.3. Case 6.3

Figure 3-5 Reliability Block Diagram for Case 6.3

Private and confidential

Figure 3-6 Schematic for Case 6.3

Private and confidential

3.4. Case 6.7

Private and confidential

Private and confidential

Figure 3-9 Schematic for Case 6.7

Private and confidential

4. Fault Tree Development

4.2. Common Cause Failure

• CCF = CMooN x Beta factor x component failure rate

Private and confidential

CASE 6.1 (before 2024)

8oo9 to guarantee isolation however if

4oo5 to guarantee isolation however if

Private and confidential

CASE 6.6 (before 2024)

4oo5 to guarantee isolation however if

2oo3 to guarantee isolation however if

Private and confidential