DEADLINE: JAN.
20, 2021 9 PM(CASE 1), 11 PM (CASE 2)
I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF REMEDIAL LAW
Bernabe v. Alejo, 374 SCRA
180
AREVALO
Claim of Illegitimacy
Art. 285 of CC is substantive
law - gives Adrian the right
to file his petition for
recognition within four years
from attaining majority age.
ERNESTINA BERNABE, Petitioner, v. CAROLINA ALEJO as guardian ad litem for the minor ADRIAN BERNABE,
Respondent.
Nature of Petition: Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by Ernestina Bernabe for
(1) the nullification of the CA Decision and Resolution denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, as well as
(2) the reinstatement of the two Orders issued by the RTC of Pasay City concerning the same case.
Dispositive Portion: Wherefore, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
Facts:
Fiscal Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his Secretary. Carolina, after the death of Fiscal Bernabe, filed the complaint
for Adrian to be acknowledged as illegitimate son and be given the share of Bernabe’s estate, which is now being held by
Ernestina as the sole surviving heir.
RTC of Pasay:
 1st Order - (July 26, 1995) - Dismissed the complaint and granted Ernestina Bernabe’s Motion for
Reconsideration of the trial court’s Decision. [Death of putative father had barred the action]
 2nd Order - (Oct. 6, 1995) - putative father had not acknowledged or recognized Adrian Bernabe in
writing, the action for recognition should have been filed during the lifetime of the alleged father.
CA: Adrian should be allowed to prove that he was the illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe. He was born in 1981 and his
rights are governed by Civil Code and not the Family Code.
The enactment of the Family Code did not take away that right. [Civil Code: an action for recognition to be filed within
four years after the child has attained the age of majority.]
One of the contentions that was made by Ernestina is that the filing of an action for recognition is procedural in nature and
that “as a general rule, no vested right may attach to [or] arise from procedural laws.
Issue:
Whether Adrian’s right to an action for recognition had already vested prior to the enactment of the Family Code.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in affirmative. A vested right is defined as “one which is absolute, complete and

Republic vs. CA, G.R. No.
141530, March 18, 2003
BIGOL
Land property is subject to
foreclosure by NCC to carry
out Tejeros Convention Proj.
Owner did not object the just
unconditional, to the exercise of which no obstacle exists, and which is immediate and perfect in itself and not
dependent upon a contingency.
Substantive Law v. Procedural Law
In the case of Bustos v Lucero, substantive law was distinguished from procedural law. Substantive law creates substantive
rights and the two terms in this respect may be said to be synonymous. Substantive rights are a term which includes those
rights which one enjoys under the legal system prior to the disturbance of normal relations. Substantive law is that part of
the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the rights and duties which give rise to a cause of
action; that part of the law which courts are established to administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which
prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtains redress for their invasion.
Test:
Fabian v. Desierto laid down the test for determining whether a rule is procedural or substantive in nature. In determining
whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or
modifies any substantive right, the test is whether the
(1) rule really regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by
substantive law and for
(2) justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. If the rule takes away a vested right,
it is not procedural.
If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a
means of implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure.”
Hence, Article 285 of the Civil Code is a substantive law, as it gives Adrian the right to file his petition for recognition
within four years from attaining majority age. Therefore, the Family Code cannot impair or take Adrian’s right to file an
action for recognition, because that right had already vested prior to its enactment.
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Facts:
A property owned by Fe Manuel with 3,497 sqm located in Tejeros, Rosario Cavite was subject to an extrajudicial
foreclosure because of a complaint filed by the government through the National Centennial Commission (NCC) to
carry out the Tejeros Convention Project in line with the centennial celebration of Philippine Independence on 12
June 1998. Fe Manuel did not object provided that just compensation was paid. The said property was declared as a
historical landmark by National Historical Institute (NHI) in its Resolution No. 2 dated 19 April 1995.
RTC of Cavite: dismissed the complaint for expropriation on the ground of lack of cause of action.
compensation
Property was declared
historical by NHI and filed
an MR to RTC – Neg. &
Certiorari to CA for GAD –
Neg.
rule no longer provides that
the 60-day period shall be
reckoned from receipt of the
assailed decision.
Instead, 60-day period shall
be reckoned from receipt of
the order denying the MR.
Sps. Bergonia v. CA, G.R. No.
189151, January 25, 2012
BORDADO, JR.
Petitioner: Petitioner filed a MR to RTC but was denied. Then filed a petition for certiorari before the CA
alleging grave abuse of discretion but was dismissed for having filed out of time. MR files were also denied on
January 2000 resolution. Petitioner filed the instant petition for review arguing that CA should not have applied the
amendment made to Section 4 Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure which took effect on 01 Sep 1998. Petitioner
invoke Section 6 Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil procedure which provides that liberality should be observed in
construing the rules of court.
Issue: WON the petition for certiorari filed by the Republic of the Philippines before the CA was filed out of time.
Held: Petition GRANTED. Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as amended by Bar Matter No.
803 effective September 1, 1998, was recently amended by AM. No. 00-2-03-SC effective September 1, 2000. The
recent rule no longer provides that the 60-day period shall be reckoned from receipt of the assailed decision ,
order or resolution. Instead, it provides that the 60-day period shall be reckoned from receipt of the order denying
the MR.
The rule at present reads as follows: Sec. 4. When and where petition filed.—The petition shall be filed not later than
60 days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely
filed, whether such motion is required or not, the 60 day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said
motion. The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of
a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as
defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. It if involves the acts or
omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed in and
cognizable only by the Court of Appeals. No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for
compelling reason and in no case exceeding days.
It is settled that procedural laws do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule
against retroactive operation of statutes. They may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at
the time of their passage and this will not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected,
inasmuch as there is no vested rights in rules of procedure.
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by the spouses David Bergonia and
Luzviminda Castillo (petitioners) assailing the Resolutions issued by the CA.
Facts:
The Law Firm of Lapea & Associates filed with the CA its formal entry of appearance as counsel for the
petitioners in lieu of the withdrawal of their former counsel. The  substitution was noted in a resolution CA issued
a resolution requiring the  filing of the Appellants Brief within 45 days from receipt
Respondent: filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal stating the petitioners failed to file their brief within the 45day
period Rule 50, ROC – prayed for the  dismissal of the petitioners appeal
Petitioners: alleged that respondents claims had no basis considering that they or their counsel did not receive any
resolution requiring them to file their brief
CA: issued a resolution that: The notice of brief was received by a certain Ruel de Tomas

Petitioners filed a Compliance and MR that the dismissal of their appeal be set aside in the interest of justice and
equity
Claimed that their failure to file the brief was due to the fact that they were ver furnished a copy of the said
resolution
In a manifestation they said Atty. Cabacungan an associate may have known a certain Ruel de Tomas, further
explained that he sometimes visits their office and who may have accidentally received the said Resolution; should be
considered officially served upon them as the latter was not connected on behalf of the counsel

Issue:
 W/N Ruled 65 is the proper remedy in the case, NO
 W/N the procedural rules should be relaxed for their failure to file their appellants brief within the
reglementary period, NO

Ruling: 
 Remedy - The SC ruled in the Negative. There was no hint as to gross and patent abuse of discretion on the
part of the CA when it dismissed the appeal of the petitioners for the failure of the latter to file their appellant
brief.
The remedy of a party against an adverse disposition of the CA would depend on whether the same is a
final order or merely an interlocutory order. If the Order or Resolution issued by the CA is in the nature of
a final order, the remedy of the aggrieved party would be to file a petition for review on certiorari under
 Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Otherwise, the appropriate remedy would be to file a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65.
The assailed Resolutions issued by the CA had considered the petitioners appeal below as having been
abandoned and dismissed. Thus, the assailed resolutions are in the nature of a final order as the same
completely disposed of the petitioners appeal with the CA. Thus, the remedy available to the petitioners is to
file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 with this court and not a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65

 Procedural rules – the SC ruled in the Negative. SC find that the petitioners excuse for their failure to file
their brief was flimsy and discreditable and this the proprietary of the dismissal of their appeal. CA record
showed that the petitioners, through their counsel, received the January 30, 2009 resolution.
Mere denial by the counsel of the receipt of his copy of the Resolution cannot be given weight in the
absence of any proof that the said person is neither an employee at his law office nor someone unknown to
him. It is highly implausible that any person in the building where the counsel holds office would simply
receive a correspondence delivered by a postman. – no other credible evidence

Substantial justice cannot be applied.

o Petitioners should be reminded that technical rules may be relaxed only for the furtherance of justice and to benefit
the deserving – setting this aside, there exists no such consideration
o The interest of substantial justice is not a magic wand that will automatically compel this Court to suspend
procedural rules. Procedural rules are not be belittled or dismissed. simply because their non-observance may have
resulted in prejudice to a party’s substantive rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed except only for the
most persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice commensurate with the
degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.

Philippine Numismatic and This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which seeks the reversal of the
Antiquarian Society vs. Decision, and Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed the dismissal of Civil Case by the
Aquino, G.R. No. 206617, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 24, Manila.
January 30, 2017
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a complaint with the RTC of Manila praying for the issuance of a writ of a preliminary
DIOLATA
injunction against respondent Angelo Bernardo, Jr. The complaint was verified by respondents Eduardo M.
Company president daw si
Atty. Villareal kaya sya nag
sign – has no authority
Corporation does not
recognize villareal
Pnas real party in interest
because it was different from
its stockholders.
Chua, Catalino M. Silangil and Percival M. Manuel who claimed to be the attorneys-in-fact of petitioner as
per Secretary's Certificate attached to the complaint.
Another complaint was filed by petitioner against respondents praying that the Membership Meeting
conducted by defendants be declared null and void. It is, likewise prayed that a temporary restraining order or
a writ of preliminary injunction be issued for the defendants to desist from acting as the true members, officers
and directors of petitioner. The verification was signed by Atty. Villareal.
Considering that there were two different parties claiming to be the representative of petitioner, the RTC
issued a Joint Order directing the parties to submit within 15 days from notice the appropriate pleadings as to
who are the true officers of PNAS and to submit all the documentary exhibits in support of their respective
positions.
Only respondents Chua, De Guzman, Silangil, Sy, Francisco, and Manuel in complied with the Joint Order.
They alleged that Atty. Villareal who signed the verification in the complaint was not authorized by the
Board of Directors of PNAS to institute the complaint in behalf of petitioner corporation, and that his
action in filing the complaint is an ultra vires act and was in violation of Section 23 of the Corporation Code.
On the part of respondents Aquino, Bernardo, Li Vi Ju, and Santos, they filed a Special Entry of Appearance
to Question the Issue of Improper Service of Summons and Notices and Motion to Defer the Proceedings
Until All the Said Issues Have Been Resolved.
Petitioner then filed a Motion to Declare Defendants in Default and for Judgment Based on the Complaint.
Petitioner likewise filed a Request for Admission.
RTC: issued a Joint Order dismissing the complaint. This Order likewise renders moot and academic the
Motion to Declare Defendants in Default and For Judgment Based on the Complaint filed by plaintiff.
Petitioner then filed a Petition for Review with the CA under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, in relation to A.M.
No. 04-09-07. CA dismissed the petition. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was
denied by the CA.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Villareal was authorized through a Board Resolution to represent PNAS in filing
Civil Case.
HELD: No. Petitioner's failure to submit proof that Atty. Villareal has been authorized by PNAS to file the
complaint is a sufficient ground for the dismissal.

The Rules of Court, specifically Section 2 of Rule 3 thereof, requires that unless otherwise authorized by law or
the Rules of Court, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest.

The provision has two requirements:

(1) to institute an action, the plaintiff must be the real party-in-interest; and
(2) the action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party-in-interest.

Interest within the meaning of the Rules of Court means material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by
the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved. One
having no material interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as the plaintiff in an action.

The purposes of the requirement for the real party in interest prosecuting or defending an action at law are:
(a) to prevent the prosecution of actions by persons without any right, title or interest in the case;
(b) to require that the actual party entitled to legal relief be the one to prosecute the action;
(c) to avoid a multiplicity of suits; and
(d) to discourage litigation and keep it within certain bounds, pursuant to sound public policy.

In the case at bar, PNAS is the real party-in-interest because its personality is distinct and separate from the
personalities of its stockholders. A corporation has no power, except those expressly conferred on it by the
Corporation Code and those that are implied or incidental to its existence. In turn, a corporation exercises said
powers through its board of directors and/or its duly-authorized officers and agents. Thus, it has been observed
that the power of a corporation to sue and be sued in any court is lodged with the board of directors that
exercises its corporate powers. In turn, physical acts of the corporation, like the signing of documents, can be
performed only by natural persons duly authorized for the purpose by corporate by-laws or by a specific act of
the board of directors. It necessarily follows that "an individual corporate officer cannot solely exercise any
corporate power pertaining to the corporation without authority from the board of directors".

Thus, it is clear that an individual corporate officer cannot solely exercise any corporate power pertaining to the
corporation without authority from the board of directors. Absent the said board resolution, a petition may not
be given due course.

Hence, since petitioner is a corporation, the certification attached to its complaint filed with the RTC must be
executed by an officer or member of the board of directors or by one who is duly authorized by a resolution of
the board of directors; otherwise, the complaint will have to be dismissed.
BPI v. CA, G.R. No. 168313, Topic: Application of Procedural Laws
October 6, 2010
Facts:
First Union took out Peso and Dollar loans from BPI, with sps. Tien (Linda and husband) executing a REM (real
DOMINGO
estate mortgage) of their 2 condo units as security to cover the obligation. Because they were remiss in payment,
foreclosure proceedings were eventually instituted by the Bank but this was not enough to cover the entire obligation.
(Peso loan partly paid; dollar not covered at all) As a result, a collection suit was instituted by BPI.

BPI filed the said complaint before the Makati RTC. Linda/First Union moved to have the case dismissed on the
ground of non-compliance to Sec 5, Rule 7 ROC for their complaint did not include a Board Resolution which was a
necessary attachment for juridical entities — to prove that representatives were authorized to file a case on behalf of
the company.

BPI’s defense was that the case can only be dismissed on the said ground if there was no cert. of non-forum shopping
and that they then subsequently provided the SPA (special power of atty) by the bank VP confirming that their
representatives were authorized.

Linda/First Union said this reading of the law was incorrect, and lacked jurisprudential support. Instead, cases such as
Public Estates Authority v Uy show that lack of board reso was tantamount to non-compliance to the cert. of non-
forum shopping requirement altogether. It also averred that this deficiency was not curable by mere amendment of the
pleading as the cited case showed that this was instead a cause for the dismissal of the complaint without prejudice.

Only after this point by First Union/Linda did BPI admit to their lapse and asked the court for consideration, citing
the case of Shipside where procedural rule was relaxed to give way for substantive justice.

RTC ruled in Linda/First Union’s favor. Motion to recon by BPI also denied.

Upon appeal to the CA (Rule 65), citing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the
lower court ruling was sustained using the Digital Microwave case as basis. (In that case, it was held that the rule did
not distinguish between natural/juridical persons, so the requirement of cert. of non-forum shopping applies and for
the latter, must be executed by duly authorized representatives to be proven by the lacking attachment.)

The CA did not agree with the contention of Linda/First Union that the motion to dismiss without prejudice was final
and so the proper recourse was an appeal and not certiorari by Rule 65. The CA said the motion to dismiss without
prejudice was interlocutory.
Aggrieved, BPI filed this certiorari petition based on Rule 45, praying for consideration and relaxation of procedural
rules as it did in the case of Shipside v CA.

Issue:

Was the dismissal of the collection suit by reason of non-compliance to the presentation of Board Resolution
attachment required for pleadings concerning juridical entities (as affirmed by the appellate court) warranted?

Held/Ruling:

YES. The SC stressed on the need to abide by the procedural requirements imposed by the courts.

Board resolution is a mandatory requirement that certifies the authority of the representatives and non-presentation
thereof renders the Certificate of Non-Forum shopping ineffective.

This is the general rule and exception (as was granted to Shipside) is warranted only for rare and special cases with
sufficient and justifiable grounds. Belated filing of BPI cannot be given consideration.

Shipside and BPI’s case were different in that the former’s representatives were duly given authority and merely the
document proving so was not attached; in BPI’s case, there really was no direct authority from the juridical entity as
SPA was from a bank VP only.

Note: SC ruling, citing the Limpot case, highlights importance of both substantive law and procedural (adjective law)
which work hand in hand.

Citing the Tible case:

“Procedural rules are not to be disdained as mere technicalities that may be ignored at will to suit the
convenience of a party. Adjective law is important in ensuring the effective enforcement of substantive rights
through the orderly and speedy administration of justice. xxx

It cannot be overemphasized that procedural rules have their own wholesome rationale in the orderly
administration of justice. Justice has to be administered according to the Rules in order to obviate
arbitrariness, caprice, or whimsicality.”
CMTC International
Marketing Corp v. Bhagis
International Trading Corp.,
G.R. No. 170488, December
10, 2012
EUSEBIO
Unfair Competition
FACTS:
Petitioner: Petitioner instituted a Complaint for Unfair Competition and/or Copyright Infringement and Claim
for Damages with Prayer for TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction against respondent before the RTC
Makati.
The trial court: rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint filed by petitioner. After receiving a copy of the trial
court's Decision, petitioner seasonably filed a Notice of Appeal before the CA. Thereafter, CA issued a Notice to File
the Appellant's Brief on May 20, 2005, which was received by the law office representing petitioner. However,
despite said notice, petitioner failed to let its appellant's brief timely. Hence, on August 19, 2005, the appellate court
issued a Resolution dismissing the appeal filed by petitioner.
Upon receipt of the order of dismissal, petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Admit
Appellant's Brief, which was filed 42 days late from the date of its expiration.
CA: the appellate court denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Admit Appellant's Brief. It
ruled that one of the grounds by which the Court of Appeals may dismiss the appeal is the failure on the part of the
appellant to serve and file the required number of copies of his brief within the time prescribed by the Rules of Court.
Accordingly, petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari before this Court questioning the August 19, 2005
and November 15, 2005 Resolutions of the appellate court.
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred when dismissed petitioner’s appeal for failure to file the appellant’s brief on time.
YES.
RULING:
● In Obut v. CA, this Court reiterated that it "cannot look with favor on a course of action which would place
the administration of justice in a straightjacket, for then the result would be a poor kind of justice if there
would be justice at all. Verily, judicial orders are issued to be obeyed, nonetheless a non-compliance is to be
dealt with as the circumstances attending the case may warrant. What should guide judicial action is the
principle that a party-litigant if to be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint of
defense rather than for him to lose life, liberty, honor or property on technicalities."
● Where strong considerations of substantive justice are manifest in the petition, the strict application of the
rules of procedure may be relaxed, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction. Thus, a rigid application of the
rules of procedure will not be entertained if it will obstruct rather than serve the broader interests of justice in

II. JURISDICTION
Bilag vs. Ay-ay, G.R. No.
189950, April 24, 2017
SANCHEZ
Land dispute – RTC has no
jurisdiction/ land belongs to
public domain. There must
be a certificate of title
the light of the prevailing circumstances in the case under consideration.
● In the instant case, it is apparent that there is a strong desire to file an appellant's brief on petitioner's part.
When petitioner filed its motion attaching therewith its appellant's brief, there was a clear intention on the
part of petitioner not to abandon his appeal. As a matter of fact, were it not for its counsel's act of
inadvertently misplacing the Notice to File Brief in another le, petitioner could have seasonably filed its
appellant's brief as its counsel had already prepared the same even way before the receipt of the Notice to
File Brief.
● If the strict application of the rules would tend to frustrate rather than promote justice, this Court is not
without power to exercise its judicial discretion in relaxing the rules of procedure.
● All told, petitioner should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his
cause, free from the constraints of technicalities.
WHEREFORE the instant petition is GRANTED, insofar as this case is REMANDED to the CA for further
proceedings, subject to the payment of the corresponding docket fees within 15 days from notice of this Decision.
FACTS:
Petition for review on certiorari
This is a case of Quieting of Title with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction filed by respondents Estela Ay-Ay
against petitioner Bilag before the RTC.
Respondents: alleged that Iloc Bilag sold to them separately various portions of a 159,496-sqm parcel of land
designated by the Bureau of Lands situated at Baguio City, and that they registered the corresponding Deeds of Sale
with the Register of Deeds of Baguio City.
Petitioners refused to honor the foregoing sales by asserting their adverse rights on the subject lands.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, prescription/ laches/ estoppel, and res
judicata. Petitioners averred that the subject lands are untitled, unregistered, and form part of the Baguio Townsite
Reservation which were long classified as lands of the public domain. As such, the RTC has no jurisdiction over the
case as it is the Land Management Bureau which is vested with the authority to determine issues of ownership over

Wesleyan University
Philippines vs. Maglaya, Sr.,
G.R. No. 212774, January 23,
2017
MAGARZO
unregistered public lands.
RTC: ruled in petitioners' favor. Aggrieved, respondents appealed to the CA. The CA set aside the dismissal of
Civil Case
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the case. [No]
RULING:
PD 1271 provides for a means to validate ownership over lands forming part of the Baguio Town site Reservation, it
requires, among others that a Certificate of Title be issued on such lands on or before July 31, 1973. In this case,
records reveal that the subject lands are unregistered and untitled, as petitioners' assertion to that effect was not
seriously disputed by respondents. Clearly, the award of the 159,496-square meter parcel of land designated by the
Bureau of Lands to Iloc Bilag by virtue of the reopening of Civil Reservation Case is covered by the blanket
nullification provided under PD 1271, and consistently affirmed by the prevailing case law. In view of the foregoing,
it is only reasonable to conclude that the subject lands should be properly classified as lands of the public domain as
well.
In conclusion, RTC has no jurisdiction over the Civil Case as the plaintiffs seek to quiet title over lands which
belong to the public domain. Necessarily, the Civil Case must be dismissed on this ground. It should be stressed
that the court a quo's lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the case renders it without authority and necessarily
obviates the resolution of the merits of the case. To reiterate, when a court has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter, the only power it has is to dismiss the action, as any act it performs without jurisdiction is null and void, and
without any binding legal effects. In this light, the Court finds no further need to discuss the other grounds relied
upon by petitioners in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the CA are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, Civil Case is DISMISSED on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC of Baguio City.
Nature of the Case: Petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the CA.
Facts:
Wesleyan University (Pet.) is a non stock, non profit, non sectarian corporation duly organized and existing under
Philippine law. Guillermo Maglaya (Resp.) was appointed as a corporate member since 2004 and was elected
president for a 5year term and was re-elected as a trustee on 2007
In a Memo, the Bishops of the United Methodist apprised all the corporate members unless they are renewed. The
Illegal Dismissal – NLRC =
No due to RTC has
jurisdiction over election (PD
902)
Maglaya is an officer
chairman of the board informed the Bishops of the cessation of the corporate terms of some of the trustees and that
vacancy shall only be filed by the Bishops upon the recommendation of the Board. Maglaya was removed from his
position as President and Board member.
[First Case] - Not the topic case
Maglaya and others filed for a complaint for injunction and damages before the RTC. RTC dismissed the complaint
and declared the same as nuisance or harassment suit prohibited by Interim Rules for Intra Corporate Controversies.
CA and SC both affirmed RTC
[Second Case ] - Topic Case
Maglaya filed for Illegal Dismissal before the Labor Arbiter that he was unceremoniously dismissed. Wesleyan
University asserted that Maglaya being a corporate officer and his termination is a corporate act or intra-corporate
controversy which is under the jurisdiction of the RTC. Labor Arbiter favored Wesleyan University and that
Maglaya was a corporate officer, that it is beyond their jurisdiction. NLRC favored Maglaya that the dismissal falls
within the labor tribunals because he was appointed and not elected. CA favored Maglaya. Wesleyan University
appealed the case before the SC through a certiorari.
Issue: W/N NLRC had jurisdiction over the illegal dismissal case - NO
Held:
Jurisdiction over the Subject Matter is conferred by law. Corporate officers in PD 902 are those officers of the
corporation who are given that character by the Corporation Code or by the corporations by laws.
Maglaya is not an ordinary employee but a corporate officer described in the corporation law. It is apparent in the
rules of the university that the President was one of the officers of the corporation and was an honorary member of
the Board. He was appointed by the board and not by a managing officer of the corporation – therefore making him a
corporate officer and not a regular employee.
A corporate officer’s dismissal is always a corporate act of an intra-corporate controversy which arises between a
stockholder and a corporation and the nature is not altered by the reason or wisdom with which the Board of
Directors may have in taking such action. It is long established rule that jurisdiction over a Subject Matter is
conferred by law
○ Sec. 5 of PD 902-A, as amended by Subsec. 5.2, Section 5 of RA 8799 provides that the RTC
exercise exclusive jurisdiction over all controversies in the election or appointment of directors,
trustees, officers or managers of corporations, partnerships or associations, applies in the case at
bar.
AAA vs. BBB, G.R. No.
212448, January 11, 2018 FACTS:

MARANAN This is a Petition for the issuance of a writ of certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, to nullify the
Resolutions of the RTC of Pasig City in Criminal Case No. 146468. The assailed resolutions granted the motion to
RA 9262 – Jurisdiction in quash the Information which charged respondent BBB under Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262.
Singapore
AAA and BBB were married in QC, Their union produced 2 children. In 2007, BBB started working in Singapore as
a chef, where he acquired permanent resident status after a year. This petition nonetheless indicates his address to be
Transitory or Continuous in QC where his parents reside and where AAA also resided from the time they were married until March 2010,
when AAA and their children moved back to her parents’ house in Pasig City.

AAA: AAA claimed that BBB sent little to no financial support, and only sporadically. This allegedly compelled her
to fly extra hours and take on additional jobs to augment her income as a flight attendant. There were also allegations
of virtual abandonment, mistreatment of her and their child CCC, and physical and sexual violence. To make matters
worse, BBB supposedly started having an affair with a Singaporean woman with whom he allegedly has been living
in Singapore. Things came to a head when AAA and BBB had a violent altercation at a hotel room in Singapore
during her visit with their kids. Despite the claims of varied forms of abuses, the investigating prosecutor found
sufficient basis to charge BBB with causing AAA mental and emotional anguish through his alleged marital
infidelity.

An information was filed, a warrant of arrest and hold departure order were issued but BBB continued to evade
arrest. Consequently, the case was archived. However, an Entry of Appearance as Counsel for the Accused With
Omnibus Motion to Revive Case, Quash Information, Lift Hold Departure Order and Warrant of Arrest was filed on
behalf of BBB. The motion to quash was granted on ground of lack of jurisdiction.

AAA’s motion for reconsideration was denied so she sought direct recourse to the Supreme Court via petition
for review under Rule 45 on pure question of law. In the main, AAA argues that mental and emotional anguish is an
essential element of the offense charged against BBB, which is experienced by her wherever she goes, and not only
in Singapore where the extra-marital affair takes place; thus, the RTC of Pasig City where she resides can take
cognizance of the case. In support of her theory, AAA cites Section 7 on Venue of R.A. 9262 and Section 4 on
liberal construction of the law to promote the protection and safety of victims of violence against women and
their children.
BBB: In his Comment, BBB contends that the grant of the motion to quash is in effect an acquittal; that only the
civil aspect of a criminal case may be appealed by the private offended party, and that the petition should be
dismissed for having been brought before the Court by AAA instead of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) as
counsel for the People in appellate proceedings. BBB also asserts that the petition is belatedly filed.

ISSUE: Whether or not Philippine courts are deprived of territorial jurisdiction over a criminal charge of
psychological abuse under R.A. No. 9262 when committed through marital infidelity and the alleged illicit
relationship took place outside the Philippines.

RULING: Even if the alleged extra marital affair causing the offended wife mental and emotional anguish is
committed abroad, the same does not place a prosecution under R.A. No. 9262 absolutely beyond the reach of
Philippine courts.

The Court find that under the circumstances, the ends of substantial justice will be better served by entertaining the
petition if only to resolve the question of law. In Morillo v. People,where the Court entertained a Rule 45 petition
which raised only a question of law filed by the private offended party in the absence of the OSG's participation, we
recalled the instances when the Court permitted an offended party to file an appeal without the intervention of the
OSG. One such instance is when the interest of substantial justice so requires.

The grant of BBB's motion to quash may not be viewed as an acquittal, which in limited instances may only be
repudiated by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 upon showing grave abuse of discretion lest the accused would
be twice placed in jeopardy.

In Sec. 7 of RA 9262, venue undoubtedly pertains to jurisdiction. As correctly pointed out by AAA, Sec. 7 provides
that the case may be filed where the crime or any of its elements was committed at the option of the complainant.
While the psychological violence as the means employed by the perpetrator is certainly an indispensable element of
the offense, equally essential also is the element of mental or emotional anguish which is personal to the
complainant.

What may be gleaned from Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 9262 is that the law contemplates that acts of violence against women
and their children may manifest as transitory or continuing crimes; meaning that some acts material and essential
thereto and requisite in their consummation occur in one municipality or territory, while some occur in another. In
such cases, the court wherein any of the crime's essential and material acts have been committed maintains
jurisdiction to try the case; it being understood that the first court taking cognizance of the same excludes the other.
Thus, a person charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or territory
where the offense was in part committed.

It is necessary, for Philippine courts to have jurisdiction when the abusive conduct or act of violence under
Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262 in relation to Section 3(a), Paragraph (C) was committed outside Philippine
territory, that the victim be a resident of the place where the complaint is filed in view of the anguish suffered being
a material element of the offense. In the present scenario, the offended wife and children of respondent husband
are residents of Pasig City. Hence, the RTC of Pasig City may exercise jurisdiction over the case.

Certainly, the act causing psychological violence which under the information relates to BBB's marital infidelity
must be proven by probable cause for the purpose of formally charging the husband, and to establish the same
beyond reasonable doubt for purposes of conviction. It likewise remains imperative to acquire jurisdiction over the
husband. What this case concerns itself is simply whether or not a complaint for psychological abuse under R.A.
No. 9262 may even be filed within the Philippines if the illicit relationship is conducted abroad. We say that even
if the alleged extramarital affair causing the offended wife mental and emotional anguish is committed abroad, the
same does not place a prosecution under RA 9262 absolutely beyond the reach of Philippine courts.

The petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions of the RTC of Pasig City in Criminal Case No. 146468 are SET
ASIDE. Accordingly, the Information filed in Criminal Case No. 146468 is ordered REINSTATED.

Notes:

As jurisdiction of a court over the criminal ease is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information,
threshing out the essential elements of psychological abuse under RA 9262 is crucial.

Contrary to the interpretation of the RTC, what RA 9262 criminalizes is not the marital infidelity per se but the
psychological violence causing mental or emotional suffering on the wife. Otherwise stated, it is the violence
inflicted under the said circumstances that the law seeks to outlaw. Marital infidelity as cited in the law is only one of
the various acts by which psychological violence may be committed. Moreover, depending on the circumstances of
the spouses and for a myriad of reasons, the illicit relationship may or may not even be causing mental or emotional
anguish on the wife. Thus, the mental or emotional suffering of the victim is an essential and distinct element in the
 commission of the offense.

In criminal cases, venue is jurisdictional. Thus, in Treñas v. People, the Court explained that:

The place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but is an essential
element of jurisdiction. It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases, the
offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients should have taken place within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court.

Galang vs. Wallis, G.R. No.

223434, July 19, 2019 FACTS:

Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Order dated August 27, 2015
MEDINA
and the Order dated February 8, 2016 of the RTC of Benguet, dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.

IP dispute, land not included (They traced the provenance of their title to a certain Wasiwas Bermor, the Teñiente Del Bario of Ampucao Itogon,
Benguet, who occupied the land as early as 1908 and registered the same in his name in 1961. Then, by virtue of a
Deed of Absolute Sale, petitioner Brenda Fagyan acquired the land from Wasiwas Bermor and divided and
transferred portions to the rest of the petitioners.)

Petioners assert that the respondents have been intruding into their land in bad faith and without any color of title, the
documents being used by respondents to justify their intrusion were fraudulently acquired and are patent nullities.

As such, petitioners prayed that the RTC:

(1) declare them as the true and absolute owners of the subject lands;
(2) issue a TRO restraining respondents from pursuing any more improvements and excavations thereon;
(3) order respondents to vacate the portions of the lands that they are unlawfully occupying;
(4) restore them of their lawful possession of the same;
(5) declare as null and void the documents of ownership being used by respondents; and
(6) order respondents to pay them damages and costs of the suit.

Respondent: Respondents alleged in their Answer and Motion to Dismiss that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case because of the fact that the land subject of the controversy is an ancestral land and that
said controversy is among members of indigenous peoples' groups. That this case falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Hearing Officer of the NCIP.

Order dated August 27, 2015, the RTC dismissed the complaint on the finding that it is bereft of jurisdiction to hear
and decide the case.

The trial court used as its basis Sec. 66 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8371, otherwise known as IPRA of 1997, which
provides that "the NCIP, through its regional offices, shall have jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving
rights" of ICC/Indigenous Peoples IP, as well as Sec. 5, Rule III of NCIP Administrative Circular No. 1-03, known
as the Rules on Pleadings, Practice and Procedure before the NCIP, reiterating the exclusive jurisdiction of the
NCIP over claims and disputes involving ancestral lands.

Thus, since the case involves a dispute or controversy of property rights over an ancestral land between members of
the IP, jurisdiction properly pertains with the NCIP.

The RTC held further that even if it subscribes to the contention that both the trial courts and the NCIP have
jurisdiction over the present action, still jurisdiction should pertain to the latter under the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction.

Order dated February 8, 2016, the RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration of the petitioners and ruled that the
parties may litigate before the NCIP.

Thus, the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Orders of the
RTC.

Issue:

Whether the NCIP has jurisdiction over their complaint such that it precludes the RTC from taking cognizance of the
case.

HELD:

The bone of contention in the present case has already been extensively discussed in our pronouncement in Unduran,
v. Aberasturi: There, the Court unequivocally declared that pursuant to Sec. 66 of the IPRA, the NCIP shall have
jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of ICC/IP only when they arise between or among parties
belonging to the same ICC/IP group. When such claims and disputes arise between or among parties who do not
belong to the same ICC/IP group, the case shall fall under the jurisdiction of the regular courts, instead of the
NCIP. Thus, even if the real issue involves a dispute over a land which appears to be located within the ancestral
domain of the ICC/IP, it is not the NCIP, but the RTC, which has the power to hear, try and decide the case.

The Court noted that the two conditions cannot be complied with if the parties to a case either
(1) belong to different ICCs/IP groups which are recognized to have their own separate and distinct customary laws,
or
(2) if one of such parties was a non-ICC/IP member who is neither bound by customary laws or a Council of
Elders/Leaders, for it would be contrary to the principles of fair play and due process for parties who do not belong
to the same ICC/IP group to be subjected to its own distinct customary laws and Council of Elders/Leaders.

In which case, the Court ruled that the regular courts shall have jurisdiction, and that the NCIP's quasi-judicial
jurisdiction is, in effect, limited to cases where the opposing parties belong to the same ICC/IP group.

They do not, however, belong to the same ICC/IP group. Thus, applying the doctrine in Unduran, it is the RTC, and
not the NCIP, which has jurisdiction over the instant case. This is so even if it was also found that the subject land
appears to be classified as ancestral land. We, therefore, find that the RTC should not have dismissed the complaint
as it actually had jurisdiction over the same.

The allegations in petitioners' complaint neither alleged that the parties are members of ICC/IP nor that the case
involves a dispute or controversy over ancestral lands/domains of ICC/IP. Rather, the allegations in their complaint
make up for an accion reivindicatoria, a civil action involving an interest in a real property with an assessed value of
more than P20,000.00.

A court of general jurisdiction has the power or authority to hear and decide cases whose subject matter does not fall
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function.
In contrast, a court of limited jurisdiction, or a court acting under special powers, has only the jurisdiction expressly
delegated. An administrative agency, acting in its quasi-judicial capacity, is a tribunal of limited jurisdiction which
could wield only such powers that are specifically granted to it by the enabling statutes. Limited or special
jurisdiction is that which is confined to particular causes or which can be exercised only under limitations and
circumstances prescribed by the statute.

In view of the fact that the parties herein do not belong to the same ICC/IP group, some of whom do not even belong
to any ICC/IP at all, the Court rules that it is the RTC, and not the NCIP, which has jurisdiction over the present
controversy. Unduran clearly teaches us that under Section 66 of the IPRA, the NCIP shall have limited
jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of IP/ICC only when they arise between or among parties
belonging to the same ICC/IP group; but if such claims and disputes arise between or among parties who do not
belong to the same ICC/IP group, the proper regular courts shall have jurisdiction. Thus, even if the land

Tumaodos vs. San Miguel
Yamamura Packaging, G.R.
No. 241865, February 19, 2020
MENDOZA
NLRC – Employee –
Employer Relation not
include money dispute
subject of the instant case appears to be classified as ancestral, since the dispute thereon does not comply with the
requirements under Section 66, nor does it involve the exceptional matters under Sections 52 (h) and 53, in relation
to Section 62, as well as Section 54 of the IPRA; we, therefore, hold that the RTC erred in dismissing the complaint
before it, being the proper tribunal clothed with jurisdiction to entertain the same.
Orders dated August 27, 2015 and February 8, 2016 of the RTC, First Judicial Region La Trinidad, Benguet, are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to said trial court for further proceedings and for proper
disposition on the merits.
FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 assailing the CA’s decision which granted the Petition for Certiorari
filed by respondent.
Petitioner became an employee of the respondent in 1988. He became a member of SMC Cooperative. Due to its
plant reorganization, respondent implemented an Involuntary Separation Program to which petitioner availed of. His
separation packages was computed at P3, 080, 244.66, but respondent withheld the amount of P 1.4M on behalf of
the Cooperative, to which petitioner allegedly had an outstanding indebtedness. Due to conflicting claims,
respondentfiled a Complaint for Interpleader with Consignation before the RTC-Mandaue. Petitioner filed a
complaint before the NLRC RAB for non-payment of separation pay and damages.
Petitioner alleged that in 2007 he applied for an ordinary loan with the Cooperative. As payment of the loan,
respondent deducted P 10,182 per month from his salary. He claimed that the deductions made amounted to P 529,
464 which was more than double the sum he owed and made without authority. It is further alleged by petitioner that
respondent merely relied on the Authority to Deduct in withholding his separation pay without seeing the loan
documents or determining his total obligations.
LA: rendered a Decision which ordered respondent to pay the withheld sum with interest. Respondent appealed to
the NLRC.
NLRC: affirmed the LA’s ruling. In a resolution, it merely noted the motion to reduce bond. It also denied the
respondent's MR Respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA on the ground of GADAL/EJ.
CA: granted Petition for Certiorari which nullified and set aside the proceedings in the NLRC. It held that the issue
raised and reliefs prayed by petitioner in his position paper are not cognizable by the labor tribunals. The CA held
that the money claim presented before the labor tribunal relates to petitioner's financial obligations to the Cooperative
and to respondent’s contractual obligation to the Cooperative pursuant to the MOA.

ISSUE: W/N the labor tribunals have jurisdiction over the money claim issue.

RULING: NO. The Court agrees with the CA that although employment relations existed between respondent and
petitioner, and the of the subject complaint before the LA was petitioner’s money claim against respondent, such
money claims did not involve and did not arise out of such employment relationship. The LA’s jurisdiction over
money claims and damages is confined to those cases which are either accompanied by a claim for reinstatement or
arising from employer-employee relations.

Jurisprudence has held that for labor courts to have jurisdiction over claims involving employees, there must be a
reasonable causal connection between the claim asserted and the employer-employee relations. In the present case,
there is no reasonable causal connection between the petitioner’s claim and his employment relation with the
respondent. His complaint was for alleged non-payment of separation benefits and damages, not a complaint for
illegal dismissal nor a claim for reinstatement. Moreover, the respondent never denied petitioner’s entitlement to his
separation pay and, in fact, paid out the latter’s separation package, excluding the withheld amount. Further, he
signed a Receipt and Release in favor of the respondent but noted the withheld amount. Hence, what he is seeking is
the release of the withheld amount and, in addition, the return of the alleged excess deduction made for his 2007
loan. Given this, it becomes apparent that the controversy involves debtor-creditor relations between petitioner and
the Cooperative, rather than employer-employee relations between petitioner and respondent. Evidently, the latter
relationship is merely incidental and the principal relief sought by the petitioner can be resolved by the general civil
law.

The Court held that the respondent appropriately filed a Complaint for Interpleader with Consignation before the
RTC-Mandaue. Under Sec.1, Rule 62, a person may file a special civil action for interpleader if conflicting
claims are made against him/her/it over the subject matter in which he/she/it has no interest. The action is
brought against the claimants to compel them to litigate their claims among themselves. The Court emphasizes that
the interpleader case before the RTC was filed prior to petitioner’s filing of his complaint before the LA which
indicated the good faith on the part of the respondent as both claimants would be given the right to have their
respective claims ventilated before the court.

WHEREFORE, the Petitioner for REview is DENIED. The Decision dated August 9, 2017 and the REsolution
dated April 19, 2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 10322 are AFFIRMED.

[NOTES]
The Court mentioned that neither the petitioner nor the respondent presented before the LA the purported loan
agreement between the petitioner and the Cooperative despite it being a necessary document to the money claim.
Sebastian vs. Ng, G.R. No.
164594, April 22, 2015 FACTS:

This case is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals where
TAGUIBA
the CA decision reversed and set aside the RTC decision.

Naghiwalay at di na binalik Angelita Lagmay (Respondent’s mom) filed a complaint before the Barangay Justice of Siclong, Laur, Nueva Ecija
pera pero may kasunduan na where she sought to collect from Michael Sebastian (Petitioner) the sum of P350,000.00. It was agreed between
di nasunod Lagmay’s daughter and Michael (previous lovers) that the money would be used to purchase a truck, however
their relationship ended and Michael allegedly refused to return the money to Lagmay.

The parties entered into an amicable settlement where Michael agreed to pay Lagmay P250,000 on specific dates
evidenced by a kasunduan. However, Michael failed to honor the kasunduan, so Lagmay brought the matter back to
the Barangay, but the Barangay Captain failed to enforce the kasunduan, and instead, issued a Certification to File
Action.

Lagmay alleged that the kasunduan was not repudiated within a period of ten (10) days from the settlement, in
accordance with the Katarungang Pambarangay Law embodied in the Local Government Code and its IRR. After
about one and a half years from the date of the execution of the kasunduan, Lagmay filed with the MCTC of Laur
and Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija, a Motion for Execution of the kasunduan.

Michael moved for the dismissal of the Motion for Execution, citing as a ground Angelita’s alleged violation of
Section 15, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

MCTC: The MCTC rendered a decision in favor of Lagmay and ruled that Lagmay has satisfactorily proved that
Michael has the obligation to pay Lagmay in the amount of P250,000 and that he has 15 days upon receipt of the
decision to pay the amount.

Michael filed an appeal with the RTC arguing that the MCTC committed grave abuse of discretion in prematurely
deciding the case. Michael also pointed out that a hearing was necessary for the petitioner to establish the
genuineness and due execution of the kasunduan.

RTC: The RTC upheld the MCTC decision, finding Michael liable to pay Lagmay the sum of P250,000.00. It held
that Michael failed to assail the validity of the kasunduan, or to adduce any evidence to dispute Annabel’s claims.
Hence he was ordered to pay the sum of money plus interest and attorney’s fees.

Michael: filed an MR and argued that an amicable settlement or arbitration award can be enforced by the Lupon
within 6 months from date of settlement or after the lapse of 6 months, by ordinary civil action in the appropriate
City or MTC and not by a mere Motion for execution that the MCTC does not have jurisdiction over the case since
the amount of P250,000.00 (as the subject matter of the kasunduan) is in excess of MCTC’s jurisdictional amount of
P200,000.00.

RTC: The RTC granted Michael’s Motion for Reconsideration and dismissed Lagmay’s Motion for Execution,
and set aside the MCTC Decision.

Lagmay: Lagmay moved for the reconsideration, but the motion was subsequently denied. Hence, she filed a
Petition for Review with the CA.

Court of Appeals: The CA initially dismissed the petition for review on a mere technical ground of failure to attach
the Affidavit of Service but Lagmay moved for reconsideration and attached in her motion the Affidavit of
Service. The CA granted the motion. The CA rendered its decision granting the petition, and reversing the RTC’s
decision. The CA declared that the appropriate local trial court stated in Section 2, Rule VII of the Implementing
Rules of the Local Government Code refers to the municipal trial courts. Thus, contrary to Michael’s contention, the
MCTC has jurisdiction to enforce any settlement or arbitration award, regardless of the amount involved. The CA
also ruled that Michael’s failure to repudiate the kasunduan in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the
Implementing Rules of the Local Government Code, rendered the kasunduan final. Hence, Michael can no longer
assail the kasunduan on the ground of forgery.

Michael: Michael moved to reconsider this decision, but the CA denied his motion in its resolution.

Supreme Court: In the present petition for review on certiorari, Michael alleges that the kasunduan cannot be given
the force and effect of a final judgment because it did not conform to the provisions of the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law embodied in Book III, Title One, Chapter 7 of the Local Government Code and points
irregularities and claims that the kasunduan was forged. He also reiterates that since the amount of P250,000.00 —
the subject matter of the kasunduan — is in excess of MCTC’s jurisdictional amount of P200,000.00, the kasunduan
is beyond the MCTC’s jurisdiction to hear and to resolve.

ISSUE: Whether or not the MCTC has the authority and jurisdiction to execute the kasunduan regardless of the
amount involved. YES.

HELD:

Section 417 of the Local Government Code that after the lapse of the six 6 month period from the date of the

Madriñan vs. Madriñan, G.R.
No. 159374, July 17, 2007
PINPIN
Family Arraignment
settlement, the agreement may be enforced by action in the appropriate city or municipal court. The law provides for
the “appropriate city or municipal court” as the forum for the execution of the settlement or arbitration award
issued by the Lupon. Section 417 made no distinction with respect to the amount involved or the nature of the issue
involved.
Thus, there can be no question that the law’s intention was to grant jurisdiction over the enforcement of
settlement/arbitration awards to the city or municipal courts the regardless of the amount. A basic principle of
interpretation is that words must be given their literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation where
the words of a statute are clear, plain and free from ambiguity.
Facts:
Petitioner Felipe and respondent Francisca were married on 1993. After a bitter quarrel, petitioner allegedly left their
conjugal abode and took their three sons with him to Ligao City, Albay and subsequently to Sta. Rosa, Laguna.
Respondent sought the help of her parents and parents-in-law to patch things up between her and petitioner to no
avail. She then brought the matter to the Lupong Tagapamayapa in their barangay but this too proved futile.
Respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus of the 3 children in the CA, alleging that petitioner’s act of leaving the
dwelling and going to Albay and then to Laguna disrupted the education of their children and deprived them of their
mother’s care.
Petitioner: Petitioner and respondent appeared at the hearing and agreed that petitioner would return their three sons
to respondent. However, he had a change of heart and decided to file a memorandum alleging that respondent was
unfit to take custody of their sons because she was habitually drunk, frequently went home late at night or in the wee
hours of the morning, spent much of her time at a beer house and neglected her duties as a mother.
He also questioned the jurisdiction of the CA claiming that under Sec. 5(b) of RA 8369, family courts have exclusive
original jurisdiction to hear and decide the petition for habeas corpus filed by respondent.
Respondent: She averred that she did not leave their home but was driven out by petitioner. She alleged that it was
petitioner who was an alcoholic, gambler and drug addict.
CA: rendered a decision asserting its authority to take cognizance of the petition and ruling that, under Article 213 of
the Family Code, respondent was entitled to the custody of their sons who were at that time underaged and subject to
the visitation rights of petitioner. With respect to the eldest son, the court ruled that his custody should be determined
by the proper family court in a special proceeding on custody of minors under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the CA decision but it was denied. Petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of
the CA over the petition for habeas corpus and insists that jurisdiction over the case is lodged in the family courts
under RA 8369.

Issue:
Whether or not that the CA has jurisdiction to entertain petition for Habeas Corpus

Ruling:
Yes. In Thornton v. Thornton, Court resolved the issue of the Court of Appeals’ jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas
corpus in cases involving custody of minors in the light of the provision in RA 8369 giving family courts exclusive
original jurisdiction over such petitions:

The CA should take cognizance of the case since there is nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its jurisdiction to issue
writs of habeas corpus involving the custody of minors.

xxx xxx

We rule therefore that RA 8369 did not divest the CA and the SC of their jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases
involving the custody of minors.

xxx xxx

The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to revoke the jurisdiction of the CA and SC to issue writs of
habeas corpus relating to the custody of minors. Further, it cannot be said that the provisions of RA 8369, RA 7092
and BP 129 are absolutely incompatible since RA 8369 does not prohibit the CA and the SC from issuing writs of
habeas corpus in cases involving the custody of minors. Thus, the family courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the
CA and the SC in petitions for habeas corpus where the custody of minors is at issue.

The jurisdiction of the CA over petitions for habeas corpus was further affirmed by A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC in Re:
Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors:

In any case, whatever uncertainty there was has been settled with the adoption of A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC Re: Rule
on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors.

Sec. 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus. – A verified petition for a writ of habeas corpus involving custody of

Gonzales vs. GJH Land, Inc.
G.R. No. 202664, Nov. 10,
2015
RIVERA
Special Commercial Court
minors shall be filed with the Family Court. The writ shall be enforceable within its judicial region to which the
Family Court belongs.
The petition may likewise be filed with the SC, CA, or with any of its members and, if so granted, the writ shall be
enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. The writ may be made returnable to a Family Court or to any regular
court within the region where the petitioner resides or where the minor may be found for hearing and decision on the
merits.
Rule: when by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other
means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer. Once a court acquires jurisdiction
over the subject matter of a case, it does so to the exclusion of all other courts, including related incidents and
ancillary matters.
Petition is DENIED.
FACTS: This is a direct recourse to the Court, via a petition for review on certiorari from the Orders of the
RTC. dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioners filed a Complaint against respondents GJH Land, Inc.
seeking to enjoin the sale of S.J. Land, Inc.'s shares which they purportedly bought from S.J. Global, Inc. Essentially,
petitioners alleged that the subscriptions for the said shares were already paid by them in full in the books of S.J.
Land, Inc., but were nonetheless offered for sale to the corporation's stockholders, hence, their plea for injunction.
The case was raffled to Branch 276, which is not a Special Commercial Court. Said branch issued a temporary
restraining order, and later, granted the application for a writ of preliminary injunction. After filing their respective
answers to the complaint, respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter, pointing out that the case involves an intra-corporate dispute and should, thus, be heard by the designated
Special Commercial Court. RTC granted the motion to dismiss filed by respondents. It found that the case involves
an intra-corporate dispute that is within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the RTCs designated as Special
Commercial Courts.
Dissatisfied, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that they filed the case with the Office of the
Clerk of Court of the RTC of Muntinlupa City which assigned the same to Branch 276 by raffle. As the raffle was
beyond their control, they should not be made to suffer the consequences of the wrong assignment of the case,
especially after paying the filing fees. Branch 276 denied the motion for reconsideration
ISSUE: W/N Branch 276 of the RTC of Muntinlupa City erred in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter.
 RULING: YES. Court finds Branch 276 to have correctly categorized Civil Case No. 11-077 as a commercial case,
more particularly, an intra-corporate dispute. The case should be referred to the Executive Judge for re-raffling
among the designated Special Commercial Courts of the same station. A court’s acquisition of jurisdiction is
different from the exercise of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is conferred by law whereas the exercise of jurisdiction is
governed by the Rules of Court or by the orders issued of the Supreme Court.

In the instant case, from the time of filing of the intra-corporate controversy and payment of docket and filing fees,
the RTC of Muntinlupa City (station) acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. However, RTC
Branch 276 is prohibited from exercising jurisdiction over the intra-corporate controversy.

When a commercial case such as an intra-corporate controversy is filed in the official RTC station but is wrongly
assigned by raffle to a regular branch of that station, the said regular branch, instead of dismissing the complaint,
should first refer the case to the Executive Judge for re-docketing as a commercial case; thereafter, the Executive
Judge should re-raffle the said case among the designated Special Commercial Courts of that station.

Concorde Condominium, Inc. FACTS:

vs. Baculio, G.R. 203678, Feb. Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
16, 2016
Petitioner Concorde Condominium, Inc. filed with the RTC Makati City a Petition for Injunction against respondents
New PPI Corporation, its President Baculio; Asian Security and Investigation Agency and its security guards.
SANCHEZ
Petitioner seeks
Condo land dispute (1) to enjoin respondents Baculio and New PPI Corporation from misrepresenting to the public that they are the
owners of the disputed lots and Concorde Condominium Building, and from pushing for the demolition of the
building which they do not even own;
(2) to prevent respondent Asian Security and Investigation Agency from deploying its security guards within the
perimeter of the said building; and
(3) to restrain respondents Engr. Morales, Supt. Perdigon and F/C Supt. Laguna from responding to and acting
upon the letters being sent by Baculio, who is a mere impostor and has no legal personality with regard to matters
concerning the revocation of building and occupancy permits, and the fire safety issues of the same building.

The case was eventually raffled to the Makati RTC which was designated as a Special Commercial Court.
Respondents Baculio and New PPI Corporation filed an Urgent Motion to Re-Raffle, claiming that it is a regular
court, not a Special Commercial Court, which has jurisdiction over the case.

The RTC denied the motion to re-raffle on the ground of failure to comply with Sections 44 and 55 of Rule 15 of the
Rules of Court. In their Motion to Vacate Order and Motion to Dismiss respondents Baculio and New PP1
Corporation assailed the RTC Order stating that the case is beyond its jurisdiction as a Special Commercial Court.
Respondents claimed that the petition seeks to restrain or compel certain individuals and government officials to stop
doing or performing particular acts, and that there is no showing that the case involves a matter embraced in Section
5 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 902-A, which enumerates the cases over which the SEC [now the RTC acting as
Special Commercial Court pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8799] exercises exclusive jurisdiction. They added
that petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies, which is a condition precedent before filing the said
petition.

The RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. It noted that by petitioner's own allegations and admissions,
respondents Baculio and New PPI Corporation are not owners of the two subject lots and the building. Due to the
absence of intra-corporate relations between the parties, it ruled that the case does not involve an intra-corporate
controversy cognizable by it sitting as a Special Commercial Court. It also held that there is no more necessity to
discuss the other issues raised in the motion to dismiss, as well as the motion to vacate order, for lack of jurisdiction
over the case.

RTC likewise denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC Branch 149 (designated as Special Commercial Court) has jurisdiction to hear
the petition for injuction with damages filed by petitioner

RULING:
YES. Court is guided by the rule "that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and
determined by the allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting
the plaintiffs cause of action. The nature of an action is determined based on the allegations contained in the
complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the
claims asserted therein. The averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be
consulted. Once vested by the allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested irrespective of whether or
not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein."

As a rule, actions for injunction and damages lie within the jurisdiction of the RTC, pursuant to Section 19 of BP
Blg. 129, Special Commercial Courts are still considered courts of general jurisdiction which have the power to
hear and decide cases of all nature, whether civil, criminal or special proceedings. Section 5.2 of RA 8799 directs
merely the Supreme Court's designation of RTC branches that shall exercise jurisdiction over intra-corporate
disputes. Nothing in the language of the law suggests the diminution of jurisdiction of those RTCs to be designated
as SCCs. The assignment of intra-corporate disputes to SCCs is only for the purpose of streamlining the workload of
the RTCs so that certain branches thereof like the SCCs can focus only on a particular subject matter.
The RTC exercising jurisdiction over an intra-corporate dispute can be likened to an RTC exercising its probate
jurisdiction or sitting as a special agrarian court. The designation of the SCCs as such has not in any way limited
their jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of all nature, whether civil, criminal or special proceedings.

As a basic premise, let it be emphasized that a court's acquisition of jurisdiction over a particular case's subject
matter is different from incidents pertaining to the exercise of its jurisdiction. Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a
case is conferred by law, whereas a court's exercise of jurisdiction, unless provided by the law itself, is governed by
the Rules of Court or by the orders issued from time to time by the Court.

The matter of whether the RTC resolves an issue in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited
jurisdiction as a special court is only a matter of procedure and has nothing to do with the question of jurisdiction.
Therefore, one must be disabused of the notion that the transfer of jurisdiction was made only in favor of particular
RTC branches, and not the RTCs in general. There is no doubt that the petition filed before the RTC is an action for
injunction, as can be gleaned from the allegations made and reliefs sought by petitioner.

A careful review of the allegations in the petition for injunction with damages indicates no intra-corporate relation
exists between the opposing parties. Clearly, as the suit between petitioner and respondents neither arises from an
intra-corporate relationship nor does it pertain to the enforcement of their correlative rights and obligations under the
Corporation Code, and the internal and intra-corporate regulatory rules of the corporation, Branch 149 correctly
found that the subject matter of the petition is in the nature of an ordinary civil action.

The same principles apply to the inverse situation of ordinary civil cases filed before the proper RTCs but wrongly
raffled to its branches designated as Special Commercial Courts. In such a scenario, the ordinary civil case should
then be referred to the Executive Judge for re-docketing as an ordinary civil case; thereafter, the Executive Judge
should then order the raffling of the case to all branches of the same RTC, subject to limitations under existing
internal rules, and the payment of the correct docket fees in case of any difference. Unlike the limited
assignment/raffling of a commercial case only to branches designated as Special Commercial Courts in the scenarios
stated above, the re-raffling of an ordinary civil case in this instance to all courts is permissible due to the fact that a
particular branch which has been designated as a Special Commercial Court does not shed the RTCs general
jurisdiction over ordinary civil cases under the imprimatur of statutory law, i.e., BP 129.

But as a more fundamental reason, the designation of Special Commercial Courts is, to stress, merely an incident
related to the court's exercise of jurisdiction, which, as first discussed, is distinct from the concept of jurisdiction over
the subject matter. The RTCs general jurisdiction over ordinary civil cases is therefore not abdicated by an
internal rule streamlining court procedure.

A.L. Ang Network, Inc. v.
Mondejar, G.R. No. 200804,
January 22, 2014
SANTOS
Small money claims on water
usage
Charged respondent higher
than the rate of 75 per month
It is apt to note, however, that the foregoing guideline applies only in a situation where the ordinary civil case filed
before the proper RTCs was "wrongly raffled" to its branches designated as Special Commercial Courts, which
situation does not obtain in this case. Here, no clear and convincing evidence is shown to overturn the legal
presumption that official duty has been regularly performed when the Clerk of Court of the Makati RTC docketed the
petition for injunction with damages as an ordinary civil case -not as a commercial case - and, consequently, raffled
it among all branches of the same RTC, and eventually assigned it to Branch 149.
To recall, the designation of the said branch as a Special Commercial Court by no means diminished its power as a
court of general jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of all nature, whether civil, criminal or special proceedings.
There is no question, therefore, that the Makati RTC, Branch 149 erred in dismissing the petition for injunction with
damages, which is clearly an ordinary civil case. As a court of general jurisdiction, it still has jurisdiction over the
subject matter thereof.
DISPOSITION: Petition is GRANTED. CA Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE
Facts:
This is a direct recourse to the Court from the Decision and Order of the RTC of Bacolod City in RTC which
was dismissed, on the ground of improper remedy, petitioner A.L. Ang Network, Inc.'s (petitioner) petition for
certiorari from the Decision of the MTCC of Bacolod City in Civil Case No. SCC-1436, a small claims case for sum
of money against respondent Emma Mondejar (respondent).
Petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money under Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases before the
MMTC, seeking to collect the amount of P23,111.71 from respondent representing her unpaid water bills.
Respondent contended that since April 1998 up to February 2003, she religiously paid petitioner the agreed monthly
flat rate of P75.00 for her water consumption. Notwithstanding their agreement that the same would be adjusted only
upon prior notice to the homeowners, petitioner unilaterally charged her unreasonable and excessive adjustments far
above the average daily water consumption for a household of only 3 persons. She also questioned the propriety or
basis of the aforesaid P23,111.71 claim. Petitioner disconnected respondent’s water line for not paying the
adjusted water charges.
MTCC: rendered a Decision holding that since petitioner was issued a Certificate of Public Convenience (CPC)
by the National Water Resources Board (NWRB) only on August 7, 2003, then, it can only charge respondent the
agreed flat rate of ₱75.00 per month prior thereto or the sum of ₱1,050.00 for the period June 1, 2002 to August 7,
2003. Thus, given that respondent had made total payments equivalent to ₱1,685.99 for the same period, she should
be considered to have fully paid petitioner. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari20 under Rule 65 of the
 Rules of Court before the RTC, ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MTCC in finding that it
(petitioner) failed to establish with certainty respondent’s obligation, and in not ordering the latter to pay the full
amount sought to be collected.

RTC: issued a Decision dismissing the petition for certiorari, finding that the said petition was only filed to
circumvent the non-appealable nature of small claims cases as provided under Section 23 of the Rule of Procedure on
Small Claims Cases. To this end, the RTC ruled that it cannot supplant the decision of the MTCC with another
decision directing respondent to pay petitioner a bigger sum than that which has been awarded.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied in an Order24 dated February 16, 2012, hence, the instant
petition.

Issue: Whether or not RTC erred in dismissing petitioner’s recourse under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
assailing the propriety of the MTCC Decision in the subject small claims case.

Ruling: Yes. Section 23 of the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases states that:
SEC. 23. Decision. — After the hearing, the court shall render its decision on the same day, based on the facts
established by the evidence (Form 13-SCC). The decision shall immediately be entered by the Clerk of Court in the
court docket for civil cases and a copy thereof forthwith served on the parties.

A petition for certiorari is an original action designed to correct only errors of jurisdiction and not of judgment.
Owing to its nature, it is therefore incumbent upon petitioner to establish that jurisdictional errors tainted the MTCC
Decision. The RTC, in turn, could either grant or dismiss the petition based on an evaluation of whether or not the
MTCC gravely abused its discretion by capriciously, whimsically, or arbitrarily disregarding evidence that is
material to the controversy. The Court thus finds that petitioner correctly availed of the remedy of certiorari to
assail the propriety of the MTCC Decision in the subject small claims case, contrary to the RTC's ruling.

Hence, considering that small claims cases are exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, certiorari petitions
assailing its dispositions should be led before their corresponding Regional Trial Courts. This petitioner complied
with when it instituted its petition for certiorari before the RTC which, as previously mentioned, has jurisdiction over
the same. In One, the RTC erred in dismissing the said petition on the ground that it was an improper remedy, and,
as such, RTC Case No. 11-13833 must be reinstated and remanded thereto for its proper disposition.

Orbe vs. Judge Gumarang, FACTS:

A.M. No. MTJ-11-1792,
September 26, 2011
SORSONA
Judge failed to decide civil
case on small claims within 5
days due to complainant’s
delays
OCA Fined judge 5k
lone argument of the judge
was that he hears small
claims cases on Thursdays
only, hence, he claimed that
the period of 5 working days
being referred to by Section
22 of the Rule should pertain
only to Thursdays.
Law in provides the period to
hear and decide cases falling
under the Rule of Procedure
for Small Claims Cases,
which is within 5 days from
the receipt of the order of
assignment.
Orbe is the plaintiff of a small claims case filed before the MTC of Imus, Cavite. During the hearing of the case on
February 9, 2010, the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement. On the same day, the case was assigned to
respondent Judge Gumarang, Assisting Judge of the MTC of Imus, Cavite, for the continuation of the trial.
Complainant alleged that the case was scheduled for hearing but was postponed by respondent to because of
power interruption. On March 11, 2010, again the hearing was reset by respondent Judge Gumarang to March
25, 2010 as he was due for medical check-up. On March 25, 2010, respondent conducted another Judicial Dispute
Resolution (JDR), and again reset the hearing to April 15, 2010 when the parties failed to reach an amicable
agreement. Complainant argued that Judge Gumarang violated the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases
for failure to decide the civil case within five (5) days from receipt of the order of reassignment.
On August 2, 2010, the OCA directed Judge Gumarang to submit his comment on the complaint against him. In his
Comment, Judge Gumarang explained that as Assisting Judge in the MTC of Bacoor, Cavite, he tried small claims
cases only on Thursdays. He admitted that he failed to decide the case within five (5) working days from receipt of
the order, as mandated by the Rule. However, he pointed out that the Rule needed clarification since, as in his case,
the five (5) working days should be construed to refer to five (5) calendared trial dates falling on Thursdays only,
considering that he allotted only one day, that is Thursday, to hear and try small claims cases.
On May 10, 2011, the OCA, in its Memorandum, recommended that the instant matter be redocketed as a regular
administrative complaint. It likewise found Judge Gumarang guilty of Gross Ignorance of the Law, but
recommended that he be fined in the amount of 5,000.00 only for violating the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims
Cases.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Gumarang violated the Rules of Procedure for Small Claims Cases.
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that Judge Gumarang is guilty of violation of the rules of procedure for small claims
 cases.

Section 22. Failure of Settlement – If efforts at settlement fail, the hearing shall proceed in an informal and
expeditious manner and be terminated within one (1) day. Either party may move in writing to have another judge
hear and decide the case. The reassignment of the case shall be done in accordance with existing issuances.

The referral by the original judge to the Executive Judge shall be made within the same day the motion is filed and
granted, and by the Executive Judge to the designated judge within the same day of the referral. The new judge shall
hear and decide the case within five (5) days from the receipt of the order of reassignment.

In this case, it is undisputed that it took more than two (2) months for respondent to render a decision on the
subject case as he himself admitted the series of postponements which occurred during the pendency of the case. His
lone argument was that he hears small claims cases on Thursdays only, hence, he claimed that the period of 5
working days being referred to by Section 22 of the Rule should pertain only to Thursdays. The SC is not
convinced by this.

The theory behind the small claims system is that ordinary litigation fails to bring practical justice to the parties when
the disputed claim is small, because the time and expense required by the ordinary litigation process is so
disproportionate to the amount involved that it discourages a just resolution of the dispute. The small claims process
is designed to function quickly and informally. There are no lawyers, no formal pleadings and no strict legal rules of
evidence.

Thus, the intent of the law in providing the period to hear and decide cases falling under the Rule of Procedure for
Small Claims Cases, which is within 5 days from the receipt of the order of assignment, is very clear. The exigency
of prompt rendition of judgment in small claims cases is a matter of public policy. There is no room for further
interpretation; it does not require respondent's exercise of discretion. He is duty-bound to adhere to the rules and
decide small claims cases without undue delay.

Villagracia v. Fifth Shari’a

District Court, G.R. No. FACTS
188832, April 23, 2014
This is a petition for certiorari with application for issuance of temporary restraining order and/or preliminary
TAGUIBA
Respondent bought a land
which the petitioner owns
which he has a title.
Petitioner failed to answer so
respondent filed to the
shari’a court which ordered
the petitioner to vacate
SC held that the muslim
court dismissed the case
knowing that the subsequent
possessor of the land was
christian
Article 143 of the Muslim
Code, Shari’a District Courts
have concurrent original
jurisdiction with “existing
civil courts” over real actions
not arising from customary
contracts wherein the parties
involved are Muslims.
what was involved is an
action in personam, hence
injunction to set aside the Fifth (5th) Shari’a District Court’s decision and order in SDC Special Proceedings.
Barangay Conciliation Proceedings
Mala (Respondent) purchased a 300-squaremeter parcel of land which at the time was occupied by Petitioner Vivencio
Villagracia who has secured a Katibayan ng Orihinal na Titulo on the said parcel of land. Upon surveying the parcel of
land, Roldan (Respondent) discovered about the existence of Vivencio (Petitioner) so Roldan initiated barangay
conciliation proceedings before the Office of the Chairman of Poblacion II. Roldan prayed that the respondent Fifth
Shari’a District Court order Vivencio to vacate his property.
Respondent court took cognizance of the case and caused service of summons on Vivencio. However, despite service of
summons, Vivencio failed to file his answer. Thus, Roldan moved that he be allowed to present evidence ex parte, which
motion respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court granted in its order.
The Fifth Shari’a District Court
The Fifth Shari’a District Court ruled that Roldan, as registered owner, had the better right to possess the parcel of land. It
ordered Vivencio to vacate the property and turn it over to Roldan.
Vivencio, a Christian, filed a petition for relief from judgment with prayer for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction. In
his petition for relief from judgment, Vivencio cited Article 155, paragraph (2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of
the Philippines and argued that Shari’a District Courts may only hear civil actions and proceedings if both parties are
Muslims. Hence, according to Vivencio, the Fifth Shari’a District Court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of Roldan’s
action for recovery of possession of a parcel of land.
The Fifth Shari’a District Court ruled that Vivencio intentionally waived his right to defend himself. He was duly served
with summons and had notice of Roldan’s motion to present evidence ex parte, respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court’s
decision, and the writ of execution. However, Vivencio only went to court when he lost his right to assail the decision via
certiorari.
Thus, the Fifth Shari’a District Court denied Vivencio’s petition for relief from judgment for lack of merit and ruled that it
had jurisdiction over Roldan’s action for recovery of possession. Regardless of Vivencio being a non-Muslim, his rights
were not prejudiced since respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court decided the case applying the provisions of the Civil
Code of the Philippines.
According to the Fifth Shari’a District, the law cited by Vivencio was the wrong provision of law as it pertained to the
service of summons on
Vivencio was necessary for
respondent Shari’a District
Court to acquire jurisdiction
over Vivencio’s person. Fifth
Shari’a District Court has no
jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the action, with
Vivencio not being a Muslim.
Therefore, all the
proceedings before
respondent Shari’a District
Court, including the service
of summons on Vivencio, are
void.
SC held that Vivencio should
have filed his petition for
certiorari with the Shari’a
Appellate Court which has
exclusive original jurisdiction
over petitions for certiorari
of decisions of the Shari’a
District Courts.
jurisdiction of Shari’a Circuit Courts and not Shari’a District Courts.
Supreme Court
Vivencio filed the petition for certiorari with prayer for issuance of temporary restraining order with the Supreme Court
and argued that respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court acted without jurisdiction.
Under Article 143, paragraph (2) (b) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines,24 Shari’a District Courts
may only take cognizance of real actions where the parties involved are Muslims. Since Vivencio is not a Muslim, he
argues that the proceedings and decisions before the Fifth Shari’a District Court are void.
Resolution of the SC: The SC issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the implementation of the writ of execution
against Vivencio.
Roldan: filed the action for recovery of possession with the Shari’a District Court where a more speedy disposition of the
case would be obtained. As to the jurisidiction of the Fifth Shari’a District Court to non-muslims, Roldan argues that there
is no provision in the Code of Muslim Personal Laws that prohibits non-Muslims from participating in Shari’a Court
proceedings.Respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court acquired jurisdiction over the person of Vivencio upon service on him
of summons. When Vivencio failed to file his answer, he “effectively waived his right to participate in the proceedings
before the Fifth Shari’a District Court and he cannot argue that his rights were prejudiced.
Vivencio: he would no longer file a reply to the comment as he had exhaustively discussed the issue presented for
resolution in his petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not a Shari’a District Court has jurisdiction over a real action where one of the parties is not a
Muslim. NO JURISDICTION.
HELD:
Jurisdiction over the subject matter - the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in
question belong. This power is conferred by law, hence parties cannot choose, consent to, or agree as to what a court or
tribunal should decide their disputes. If a court hears, tries, and decides an action in which it has no jurisdiction, all its
proceedings, including the judgment rendered, are void. To determine whether a court has jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the action, the material allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought are examined.
Under Article 143 of the Muslim Code, Shari’a District Courts have concurrent original jurisdiction with “existing civil
courts” over real actions not arising from customary contracts wherein the parties involved are Muslims. When ownership
is acquired over a particular property, the owner has the right to possess and enjoy it. If the owner is dispossessed of his or
her property, he or she has a right of action to recover its possession from the dispossessor. When the property involved is
real, such as land, the action to recover it is a real action.

In such actions, the parties involved must be Muslims for Shari’a District Courts to validly take cognizance of them.
According to the SC, respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court should have motu proprio dismissed the case when it
became apparent that Vivencio is not a Muslim. Respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had no authority under the law to
decide Roldan’s action because not all of the parties involved in the action are Muslims. Thus, it had no jurisdiction over
Roldan’s action for recovery of possession. The applicability of the “concurrent jurisdiction” of Shari’a District Courts
with Civil Courts is applicable when both parties are Muslims as already ruled in previous jurisprudence (Tomawis v.
Balindong). When one of the parties is not a Muslim, the action must be filed before the regular courts.

In real actions not arising from contracts customary to Muslims, there is no reason for Shari’a District Courts to apply
Muslim law. In such real actions, Shari’a District Courts will necessarily apply the laws of general application, which in
this case is the Civil Code of the Philippines, regardless of the court taking cognizance of the action.

The fact that Vivencio raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter only after respondent Fifth Shari’a
District Court had rendered judgment is immaterial. A party may assail the jurisdiction of a court or tribunal over a subject
matter at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal because jurisdiction is conferred by law, and lack of it affects the
very authority of the court to take cognizance of and to render judgment on the action.

Roldan argues that the proceedings before respondent Shari’a District Court were valid since the Shari’a District Court
acquired jurisdiction over the person of Vivencio. When Vivencio was served with summons, he failed to file his answer
and waived his right to participate in the proceedings before respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court, hence waiving his
right to participate in the proceedings, and he cannot argue that his rights were prejudiced.

Jurisdiction over the person is the power of a court to render a personal judgment or to subject the parties in a particular
action to the judgment and other rulings rendered in the action.Jurisdiction over the person is required in actions in
personam or actions based on a party’s personal liability. It is necessary that the parties to the action “are properly
impleaded and duly heard or given an opportunity to be heard.The defendant must have been duly served with summons to
be considered properly impleaded; otherwise, the proceedings in personam, including the judgment rendered, are void.

o A court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff once he or she files the initiatory
pleading. As for the defendant, the court acquires jurisdiction over his or her person either by his or her
voluntary appearance in court81 or a valid service on him or her of summons.

On the other hand, jurisdiction over the person is not necessary for a court to validly try and decide actions in rem. Actions
in rem are “directed against the thing or property or status of a person and seek judgments with respect thereto as against
the whole world. In actions in rem, summons must still be served on the defendant but only to satisfy due process

Republic v. Bantigue Point
Development Corp., G. R. No.
162322, March 14, 2012
AREVALO
Dispute over land in batangas
requirements.
In this case, what was involved is an action in personam, hence service of summons on Vivencio was necessary for
respondent Shari’a District Court to acquire jurisdiction over Vivencio’s person. However, Fifth Shari’a District Court has
no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, with Vivencio not being a Muslim. Therefore, all the proceedings
before respondent Shari’a District Court, including the service of summons on Vivencio, are void.
As to the filing of the Petition of Certiorari
The SC held that Vivencio should have filed his petition for certiorari with the Shari’a Appellate Court pursuant to RA
9054, which has exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari of decisions of the Shari’a District Courts.
However, the Shari’a Appellate Court is yet to be organized. Thus, The SC calls for the organization of the court system
created under Republic Act No. 9054 to effectively enforce the Muslim legal system.
o The Shari’a Appellate Court created under RA 9054 shall exercise appellate jurisdiction over all cases
tried in the Shari’a District Courts. It shall also exercise original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, habeas corpus, and other auxiliary writs and processes in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction. The decisions of the Shari’a Appellate Court shall be final and executory, without prejudice
to the original and appellate jurisdiction of this court
Tomawis v Balindong held that “until such time that the Shari’a Appellate Court shall have been organized, decisions of
the Shari’a District Court shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals and “shall be referred to a Special Division to be
organized in any of the Court of Appeals stations preferably composed of Muslim Court of Appeals Justices.”
However, considering that Tomawis was not yet promulgated when Vivencio filed his petition for certiorari with the SC,
the SC takes cognizance of Vivencio’s petition for certiorari in the exercise of its original jurisdiction over petitions for
certiorari.
Nature of Petition: This Rule 45 Petition requires this Court to address the issue of the proper scope of the
delegated jurisdiction of municipal trial courts in land registration cases.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic) assails the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 70349, which affirmed the Decision of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Juan, Batangas in LRC Case
No. N-98-20, LRA Record No. 68329, granting respondent Bantigue Point Development Corporation’s
(Corporation) application for original registration of a parcel of land. Since only questions of law have been
raised, petitioner need not have filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the assailed CA Decision before filing this

RTC transmitted the case to
the MTC of San Juan
because the assessed value of
the property was allegedly
less than P100,000.
Republic is not estopped
from questioning the
jurisdiction of the lower
court, even if the former
raised the jurisdictional
question only on appeal. The
rule is that lack of
jurisdiction over the subject
matter may be raised at any
stage of the proceedings.
MTC may handle cases with
no dispute that will not
exceed 100k
Petition for Review.
Dispositive Portion: Wherefore, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is DENIED. Let this case be
REMANDED to the Municipal Trial Court of San Juan, Batangas, for reception of evidence to prove that the
property sought to be registered is alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
Facts:
Respondent Bantigue Point Devt. Corp. filed with the Regional Trial Court of Rosario Batangas an application for
Original Registration of Title over a parcel of Land located at San Juan, Batangas.
In 1997, The RTC issued an Order setting the case for initial hearing on 22 Oct. 1997 and 4 Nov. 1997.
Petitioner Republic filed an Opposition for the Registration while the records were still with the RTC.
The RTC transmitted the case to the Municipal Trial Court of San Juan because the assessed value of the property
was allegedly less than P100,000.
MTC entered an Order of General Default and commenced with the reception of evidence. Documents presented
were Tax Declaration, a Deed of Absolute Sale, Certification from DENR CENRO that the land was disposable.
Thereafter, it awarded the land to the Corporation.
The Republic appealed before the CA and the latter court ruled that since the Republic had actively participated in
the proceedings before the lower court, but failed to raise the jurisdictional challenge, petitioner Republic was
thereby estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the lower court on appeal.
Issue:
Whether the Republic cannot be estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court over the
application for original registration of land title even for the first time on appeal.
Ruling:
1. Republic is not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the lower court, even if the former raised the
jurisdictional question only on appeal. The rule is settled that lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be
raised at any stage of the proceedings. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or the
law. It cannot be acquired through a waiver or enlarged by the omission of the parties or con-ferred by the
acquiescence of the court. Consequently, questions of jurisdiction may be cognizable even if raised for the first time
on appeal.

People of the Philippines vs.
CA, G.R. No. 154557,
February 13, 2008
BIGOL
Petition for Certiorari
Respondents Lipao were
indicted for and pleaded not
guilty to violation of Sec 68 of
PD 705
Note:
The ruling of the Court of Appeals that “a party may be estopped from raising such [jurisdictional] question if
he has actively taken part in the very proceeding which he questions, belatedly objecting to the court’s jurisdiction in
the event that the judgment or order subsequently rendered is adverse to him” is based on the doctrine of estoppel by
laches. We are aware of that doctrine first enunciated by this Court in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29 (1968). In
Tijam, the party-litigant actively participated in the proceedings before the lower court and filed pleadings therein.
Only 15 years thereafter, and after receiving an adverse Decision on the merits from the appellate court, did the
party-litigant question the lower court’s jurisdiction. Considering the unique facts in that case, we held that estoppel
by laches had already precluded the party-litigant from raising the question of lack of jurisdiction on appeal. In
Figueroa v. People, 558 SCRA 63 (2008), we cautioned that Tijam must be construed as an exception to the general
rule and applied only in the most exceptional cases whose factual milieu is similar to that in the latter case.
2. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts may be assigned by
the Supreme Court to hear and determine cadastral or land registration cases covering lots where there is no
controversy or opposition, or contested lots where the value of which does not exceed P100,000.00, such value to be
ascertained by the affidavit of the claimant or by agreement of the respective claimants if there are more than one, or
from the corresponding tax declaration of the real property. Their decision in these cases shall be appealable in the
same manner as decisions of the Regional Trial Courts. (As amended by R.A. No. 7691) Thus, the MTC has
delegated jurisdiction in cadastral and land registration cases in two instances:
first, where there is no controversy or opposition; or,
second, over contested lots, the value of which does not exceed P100,000.
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
Facts:
Private respondents Rico and Rickson Lipao were indicted for and pleaded not guilty to violation of Sec 68 of PD
705, as amended by EO 277.
During the proceedings RA 7691 took effect on 15 April 1994 or 15 days after its publication on 30 March 1994. RA
7691 expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the MeTCs, MTCs, and MCTCs in criminal cases to cover all
offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding 6 years irrespective of the amount of fine and regardless of
other imposable accessory or other penalties, including civil penalties arising from such offenses or predicated
thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof.
25 July 1994 RTC rendered private respondents guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged.
An appeal was filed before the CA, which dismissed the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the RTC.
During the proceedings RA
7691 took effect and
expanded the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the
MeTCs, MTCs, and MCTCs
in criminal cases to cover all
offenses punishable with
imprisonment not exceeding
6 years
Issue: Whether RTC retained jurisdiction over the criminal case and the passage of RA 7691 did not ipso facto
relieve the RTC of Jurisdiction.
Held: Petition GRANTED.
RTC clearly had jurisdiction at the inception of the criminal case. Since jurisdiction over the criminal case attached
upon the filing of the information, then the RTC is empowered and mandated to try and decide said case
notwithstanding a subsequent change in the jurisdiction over criminal cases of the same nature under a new statute.
The rule is settled that jurisdiction continues until the court has done all that it can do to exercise that jurisdiction
unless the law provides otherwise.

RTC has jurisdiction It is basic that the jurisdiction of a court is determined both by the law in force at the time of the commencement of
the action and by the allegations in the Complaint or Information.
RTC is empowered and
mandated to try and decide
said case notwithstanding a
subsequent change in the
jurisdiction over criminal
cases

RTC is has the power to try

and decide cases
notwithstanding change in
the jurisdiction of criminal
cases.

Sps. Estacion vs. Hon.
Secretary of DAR, G.R. No.
163361, March 12, 2014
BORDADO
FACTS: In February 1974, spouses Estacion were informed that their properties were placed under the coverage of
the Operation Land Transfer program of PD No. 27. They contested the coverage, claiming that it was untenanted
and primarily devoted to crops other than rice and corn. Despite their protest, their properties were forcibly covered
for agrarian purposes, and that the tenants to whom the properties were awarded were enjoying the benefits, without
the petitioners having been duly compensated for the value of said properties.

Sps. Land is under the land In their Motion to Dismiss, public respondents claimed that:
transfer program which they (1) the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case;
contested it claiming that it
was devoted to crops other
than rice and corn. Despite
protest, property were still
forcibly covered for agra
purposes
RTC acting as SAC has
jurisdiction to determine just
compensation and doesn’t
need to pass initial valuation
through DAR
Determination of
Compensation is a judicial
function vested in RTC
Taking of property under RA
6657 is an exercise of the
State’s power of eminent
domain.
Mendoza v. Germino, G.R. No.
165676, November 22, 2010
DIOLATA
Petition for review on
certiorari filed by petitioner
Mendoza to challenge the
decision and the resolution of
the CA.
(2) the petitioners have no legal personality to sue the public respondents;
(3) the petitioners have no cause of action against the public respondents; and
(4) the case is barred by the statute of limitations.
ISSUE: whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.
HELD: YES.
The RTC, acting as a SAC, has jurisdiction to determine just compensation at the very first instance, and the
petitioners need not pass through the DAR for initial valuation. The determination of just compensation is essentially
a judicial function, which is vested in the RTC acting as SAC. It cannot be lodged with administrative agencies such
as the DAR.
The taking of property under RA 6657 is an exercise of the State’s power of eminent domain. "The valuation of
property or determination of just compensation in eminent domain proceedings is essentially a judicial function
which is vested with the courts and not with administrative agencies." Specifically, "[w]hen the parties cannot agree
on the amount of just compensation, only the exercise of judicial power can settle the dispute with binding effect on
the winning and losing parties."
Before us is the petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Jose Mendoza to challenge the decision and
the resolution of the CA.
FACTS:
1. On June 27, 1988, the petitioner and Aurora Mendoza (plaintiffs) filed a complaint with the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) of Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija against respondent Narciso Germino for forcible entry.
2. The plaintiffs claimed that they were the registered owners of a five-hectare parcel of land in Soledad, Sta.
Rosa, Nueva Ecija (subject property) under TCT No. 34267.
A case of Forcible Entry on
plaintiff’s property where
Germino entered the
property and claim that his
brother is the agra. lessee and
helped him in cultivating.
Plaintiff’s claim that they had
a different lessee. However,
benigno entered through
stealth and transferred
possession to the respondent
in which he appropriated the
fruits of the land for himself
and ignored the demands to
leave
Due to postponements,
plaintiff’s filed a motion to
remand case to DARAB.
MTC issued an order
remanding the case to
DARAB Cabanatuan
W/N MTC or DARAB has
Jurisdiction
MTC has jurisdiction. Under
BP 129, the MTC shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction
over cases of forcible entry
and unlawful detainer.
3. Sometime in 1988, respondent Narciso unlawfully entered the subject property by means of strategy
and stealth, and without their knowledge or consent. Despite the plaintiffs' repeated demands, respondent
Narciso refused to vacate the subject property.
4. On August 9, 1988, respondent Narciso filed his answer, claiming, among others, that his brother,
respondent Benigno Germino, was the plaintiffs' agricultural lessee and he merely helped the latter in the
cultivation as a member of the immediate farm household.
5. After several postponements, the plaintiffs filed a motion to remand the case to the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), in view of the tenancy issue raised by respondent Narciso.
6. The MTC issued an order on October 27, 1995, remanding the case to the DARAB, Cabanatuan City for
further proceedings.
7. On December 14, 1995, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint with the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (PARAD), impleading respondent Benigno as additional defendant.
8. The plaintiffs alleged that Efren Bernardo was the agricultural lessee of the subject property. Respondent
Benigno unlawfully entered the subject property in 1982 or 1983 through strategy and stealth, and without their
knowledge or consent. He withheld possession of the subject property up to 1987, and appropriated for himself
its produce, despite repeated demands from the plaintiffs for the return of the property.
9. In 1987, they discovered that respondent Benigno had transferred possession of the subject property to
respondent Narciso, who refused to return the possession of the subject property to the plaintiffs and
appropriated the land's produce for himself. Thus, they prayed that the respondents be ordered to jointly and
severally pay 13,000 cavans of palay, or its monetary equivalent, as actual damages, to return possession of the
subject property, and to pay P15,000.00 as attorney's fees.
10. On January 9, 1996, the respondents filed their answer denying the allegations in the complaint, claiming,
among others, that the plaintiffs had no right over the subject property as they agreed to sell it to respondent
Benigno for P87,000.00. As a matter of fact, respondent Benigno had already made a P50,000.00 partial
payment, but the plaintiffs refused to receive the balance and execute the deed of conveyance, despite repeated
demands. The respondents also asserted that jurisdiction over the complaint lies with the Regional Trial Court
since ownership and possession are the issues.
11. PARAD’s Ruling: Respondents were mere usurpers of the subject property, noting that they failed to prove
 that respondent Benigno was the plaintiffs' bona fide agricultural lessee. The PARAD ordered the respondents
to vacate the subject property, and pay the plaintiffs 500 cavans of palay as actual damages.

12. DARAB’s Ruling: It held that it acquired jurisdiction because of the amended complaint that sufficiently
alleged an agrarian dispute, not the MTC's referral of the case. Thus, it affirmed the PARAD decision.

13. The respondents elevated the case to the CA via a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.

14. CA’s Ruling: It found that the MTC erred in transferring the case to the DARAB since the material
allegations of the complaint and the relief sought show a case for forcible entry, not an agrarian dispute. It
noted that the subsequent filing of the amended complaint did not confer jurisdiction upon the DARAB. Thus, the
CA set aside the DARAB decision and remanded the case to the MTC for further proceedings. MR- denied by
CA.

ISSUE: Whether the MTC or the DARAB has jurisdiction over the case.

HELD: MTC has jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint. It is a basic rule that
jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations in the complaint. It is determined exclusively
by the Constitution and the law. It cannot be conferred by the voluntary act or agreement of the parties, or acquired
through or waived, enlarged or diminished by their act or omission, nor conferred by the acquiescence of the court.
Well to emphasize, it is neither for the court nor the parties to violate or disregard the rule, this matter being
legislative in character.

Under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, the MTC shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer.

In the present case, the petitioner, as one of the plaintiffs in the MTC, made the following allegations and prayer in
the complaint, and based on these allegations and reliefs prayed, it is clear that the action in the MTC was for
forcible entry.

Although respondent Narciso averred tenancy as an affirmative and/or special defense in his answer, this did not
automatically divest the MTC of jurisdiction over the complaint. It continued to have the authority to hear the case
precisely to determine whether it had jurisdiction to dispose of the ejectment suit on its merits. After all, jurisdiction
is not affected by the pleas or the theories set up by the defendant in an answer or a motion to dismiss.

In the present case, instead of conducting a preliminary conference, the MTC immediately referred the case to the

Irene Sante and Reynaldo v.
Hon. Edilberto T. Claravall,
etc., et al., G.R. No. 173915,
February 22, 2010.
DOMINGO
Respondent filed a complaint
for damages on the basis of
the alleged injury and shame
she suffered because of
petitioners’ utterance in
public.
Petitioner spouses moved to
have the case dismissed,
contending that it was the
MTCC that had jurisdiction
instead as only Php 300k
should be considered for
assessing jurisdiction since
moral damages was the main
claim.
RTC ruled in Vita’s favor
DARAB. This was contrary to the rules.
In the absence of any allegation of a tenancy relationship between the parties, the action was for recovery of
possession of real property that was within the jurisdiction of the regular courts.
The CA, therefore, committed no reversible error in setting aside the DARAB decision.
Petitioner: IRENE SANTE AND REYNALDO SANTE
Respondents: Baguio RTC Judge and VITA N. KALASHIAN
Ponente: VILLARAMA, JR.
Topic: Jurisdiction determined by the allegations of the complaint or other initiatory pleading
Facts:
Respondent Vita Kalashian filed a complaint for damages on the basis of the alleged injury and shame she suffered
because of the petitioners’ utterance in public. (The petitioner spouses Sante were claimed to have spread the news around
Natividad, Pangasinan that Vita was protecting one Bert Gacusan and some others who were suspects to the killing of a
relative of the spouses. In the police station were Bert was detained, the spouses also accused Bert of having sexual
relations with Vita.) Prayer was mainly for Php 300k moral damages, but also included Php 50k for exemplary, 50k atty’s
fees and 20k litig. expenses and costs of suit.
As the case was filed before the Baguio RTC, the petitioner spouses moved to have the case dismissed, contending that it
was the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) that had jurisdiction instead as only Php 300k should be considered for
assessing jurisdiction since moral damages was the main claim.
RTC ruled in Vita’s favor and denied the motion to dismiss, saying that pursuant to the Movers-Baseco ruling, Php 420k
was the basis (totality of all damages prayed for) and such amount was beyond MTCC’s jurisdiction. Petitioners filed a
motion for reconsideration (MR) but the same was denied in an order by the RTC.
Petitioners appealed to the CA, while the respondent filed an amendment to her complaint and increased the amount of
moral damages from Php 300k to Php 1M. To this amendment, the petitioners filed a motion to dismiss with answer ad
cautelam and counterclaim but was denied. That led to another appeal to the CA.
In the first petition to the CA - CA-G.R. SP No. 85465 (appealing RTC’s decision in favor of Vita), the CA found merit to
the points raised by the spouses and found the RTC to have committed grave abuse of discretion. It ruled that the totality of
claim rule cannot be applied for the other damages prayed for were not separate / distinct from moral damages and were
and denied the motion to
dismiss. 420k was the basis
(totality of all damages) and
such amount was beyond
MTCC’s jurisdiction.
Petitioners filed a MR but the
same was denied in an order
by the RTC.
Petitioners appealed to the
CA, while the respondent
filed an amendment to her
complaint and increased the
amount of moral damages
from 300k to 1M.
RTC has jurisdiction. claim
for damages is the main cause
of action, or one of the causes
of action, the amount of such
claim shall be considered in
determining the jurisdiction
of the court.
RTC did not commit grave
abuse of discretion. Rule 10,
Sec 2, amendment of
complaints are allowed and
RTC remains with
jurisdiction over the case
based on the amended
amount.
merely incidental to it. Therefore, only the moral damages should be considered and the value being Php 300k was well
within MTCC jurisdiction.
However, in the second CA petition - CA-G.R. SP No. 87563 raffled to the 17th division, the CA affirmed the RTC’s order
dismissing the motion to dismiss (amended complaint) ad cautelam*. It did not find merit to the contention of the spouses
that the exemplary damages and others prayed for were merely incidental. It likewise ruled that under the Rules of Civil
Procedure, amending a complaint was a matter of right that the respondent was entitled to.
Aggrieved, petitioner then came before the Supreme Court via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. (SC however treated
it as a petition under Rule 45 instead, given the circumstances.)
*Ad cautelam = “with caution”
Issues:
1. Did RTC acquire jurisdiction over the case?
2. Did the RTC commit grave abuse of discretion in allowing the amendment of the complaint?
3. Where damages is the main cause of action, what should serve as the basis for determining court jurisdiction — merely
moral damages or the totality of the damages (including exemplary, costs of suit) prayed for?
Held/Ruling:
1. Yes. RTC has jurisdiction. The SC said that the Administrative Circular No. 09-94 was instructive — where the claim
for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in
determining the jurisdiction of the court. Hence, Php 420k should be the basis and given this and in light of Section 5 of
Rep. Act No. 7691, MTCC would no longer have jurisdiction as Php 300k is their limit per the OCA Circular No. 65-2004.
2. No, RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion. Per Rule 10, Sec 2, amendment of complaints are allowed and RTC
remains with jurisdiction over the case based on the amended amount.
3. Citing Mendoza v Soriano and Iniego v Purganan, the SC said that in such cases, is the claim for all kinds of damages
that is the basis of determining the jurisdiction of courts, whether the claims for damages arise from the same or from
different causes of action. Thus, the SC held, “It is settled that jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the facts
alleged in the complaint since the latter comprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the
plaintiff’s causes of action. It is clear, based on the allegations of the complaint, that respondent’s main action is for
damages. Hence, the other forms of damages being claimed by respondent, e.g., exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and

SC held, “It is settled that
jurisdiction is conferred by
law based on the facts alleged
in the complaint since the
latter comprises a concise
statement of the ultimate
facts constituting the
plaintiff’s causes of action.
Indophil Textile Mills vs.
Adviento, G.R. No. 171212,
August 14, 2014
EUSEBIO
Petition for review on
certiorari (Labor Case/
Illegal Dismissal due to
disease)
Petitioner hired respondent
Engr. Adviento as Civil
Engineer to maintain its
facilities in Marilao, Bulacan.
Was diagnosed as sick and
was dismissed by the
company.
Respondent filed a complaint
against petitioner with the
NLRC in Pampanga, for
litigation expenses, are not merely incidental to or consequences of the main action but constitute the primary relief prayed
for in the complaint.”
FACTS:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
Petitioner Indophil Textile Mills, Inc. is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing thread for
weaving. Petitioner hired respondent Engr. Salvador Adviento as Civil Engineer to maintain its facilities in
Lambakin, Marilao, Bulacan. On August 7, 2002, respondent consulted a physician due to recurring weakness and
dizziness. Few days later, he was diagnosed with Chronic Poly Sinusitis, and thereafter, with moderate, severe and
persistent Allergic Rhinitis. Accordingly, respondent was advised by his doctor to totally avoid house dust mite and
textile dust as it will transmute into health problems.
Distressed, respondent filed a complaint against petitioner with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC),
San Fernando, Pampanga, for alleged illegal dismissal and for the payment of backwages, separation pay, actual
damages and attorney’s fees.
Subsequently, respondent filed another Complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Aparri, Cagayan, alleging
that he contracted such occupational disease by reason of the gross negligence of petitioner to provide him with a
safe, healthy and workable environment.
In his Complaint, respondent alleged that as part of his job description, he conducts regular maintenance check on
petitioner’s facilities including its dye house area, which is very hot and emits foul chemical odor with no adequate
safety measures introduced by petitioner. According to respondent, the air washer dampers and all roof exhaust vests
are blown into open air, carrying dust thereto. Concerned, respondent recommended to management to place roof
insulation to minimize, if not, eradicate the health hazards attendant in the work place. However, said
recommendation was turned down by management due to high cost.
alleged illegal dismissal and
for the payment of
backwages, separation pay,
actual damages and atty’s
fees. And filed another
complaint w/ RTC of
Cagayan claim that he
contracted disease by reason
of petitioner’s negligence in
providing safe environment.
Petitioner filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the ground that
the RTC has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the
complaint because the same
falls under the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the
LA
W/N RTC has jurisdiction
over labor cases
RTC has jurisdiction over the
subject matter of
respondent's complaint
Case falls squarely within the
elements of quasi-delict
under Article 2176 of the
Civil Code since the
negligence is direct,
In reply, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the complaint because the same falls under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter (LA) under
Article 217(a)(4) of the Labor Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter of respondent’s complaint praying for moral
damages, exemplary damages, compensatory damages, anchored on petitioner’s alleged gross negligence in failing to
provide a safe and healthy working environment for respondent.
RULING: YES.
True, the maintenance of a safe and healthy workplace is ordinarily a subject of
labor cases. More, the acts complained of appear to constitute matters involving
employee-employer relations since respondent used to be the Civil Engineer of
petitioner. However, it should be stressed that respondent’s claim for damages is
specifically grounded on petitioner’s gross negligence to provide a safe, healthy
and workable environment for its employees −a case of quasi-delict. This is easily
ascertained from a plain and cursory reading of the Complaint, which enumerates
the acts and/or omissions of petitioner relative to the conditions in the workplace.
It is a basic tenet that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined upon the allegations made in the complaint,
irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon the claim asserted therein, which is a matter
resolved only after and as a result of a trial. In this case, a perusal of the complaint would reveal that the subject
matter is one of claim for damages arising from quasi-delict, which is within the ambit of the regular court's
jurisdiction.
In the case at bar, respondent alleges that due to the continued and prolonged exposure to textile dust seriously
inimical to his health, he suffered work-contracted disease which is now irreversible and incurable, and deprived him
of job opportunities. Clearly, injury and damages were allegedly suffered by respondent, an element of quasi-delict.
Secondly, the previous contract of employment between petitioner and respondent cannot be used to counter the
element of "no pre-existing contractual relation" since petitioner’s alleged gross negligence in maintaining a
hazardous work environment cannot be considered a mere breach of such contract of employment, but falls squarely
within the elements of quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code since the negligence is direct, substantive
and independent. Hence, we ruled in Yusen Air and Sea Services Phils., Inc. v. Villamor that:
When, as here, the cause of action is based on a quasi-delict or tort, which has no reasonable causal connection with
any of the claims provided for in Article 217, jurisdiction over the action is with the regular courts.
substantive and independent.
Therefore, the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter of respondent's complaint praying for moral damages,
exemplary damages, compensatory damages, anchored on petitioner's alleged gross negligence in failing to provide a
safe and healthy working environment for respondent.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated May 30, 2005, and its
Resolution dated January 10, 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 83099 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Julao v. Spouses De Jesus, FACTS:

G.R. No. 176020, September ● This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the Decision dated
29, 2014 December 4, 2006 of the Court of Appeals
● 1960 Telesforo filed before DENR 2 Townsite Sales Applications.
● 6/1/71 Upon his death his applications were transferred to his heirs
SANTOS ● 4/30/79, Solito Julao executed a Deed of Transfer of Rights, transferring his hereditary share in the property
TSA V-6667 to Sps De Jesus.
Petition for Review on ● 1983 Sps constructed a house on the property they got from Solito.
Certiorari on Decision of the ● In 1986, Solito went missing.
CA ● 12/21/98 OCTP- 2446 641sqm, was issued in favor of the heirs
● 3/2/99 Heirs filed for Recovery of Possession of Real Property alleging:
○ true & lawful ownership of a 641sqm parcel at Naguilian Rd Baguio; the property originated from
TSAV-2132; & the Sps house encroached on 70sqm of the subject property, among others.
○ RTC Baguio granted
● CA reversed: (1) Heirs failed to identify property sought to be recovered; & (2) lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE: W/N RTC acquired jurisdiction over the complaint.

● In an action for recovery of possession, the assessed value of the property sought to be recovered determines
the court’s jurisdiction.
○ for the RTC to exercise jurisdiction, the assessed value of the subject property must exceed
P20,000.
● Since petitioners failed to allege in their Complaint the assessed value of the subject property, CA
correctly dismissed the Complaint as petitioners failed to establish that the RTC had jurisdiction over it.
○ since assessed property value wasn’t alleged, it can’t be determined which trial court had original &
exclusive jurisdiction
○ In an action to recover, the property must be identified.
 ● Article 434: in an action to recover, the property must be identified, & the plaintiff must rely on the strength
of his title & not on the weakness of the defendant’s claim.
○ Plaintiff’s duty-bound to clearly identify land sought to be recovered, in accordance with the title on
which he anchors his ownership right.
○ It bears stressing that the failure of the plaintiff to establish the identity of the property claimed is
fatal to his case.
● Ps failed to identify the property they seek to recover as they failed to describe the location , the area, as well
as the boundaries thereof.
○ no survey plan was presented by petitioners to prove that sps actually encroached upon the 70-sqm
portion of petitioners’ property.
● Failing to prove their allegation, Ps aren’t entitled to relief prayed for.
DISPOSITION: DENIED

Tumpag v. Tumpag, G.R. No. Petitioner: Esperanza Tumpag

199133, September 29, 2014 Respondent: Samuel Tumpag

Nature of the Case: Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the decision of the CA.
MAGARZO
Facts:
● Esperanza Tumpag (Pet.) is the absolute owner of a parcel of land, identified as Lot No. 1880-A
○ 12, 992 sqm in Negros Occidental
● Samuel Tumpag (Resp.) has been occupying the said portion of not less than 1K sqm for 10years at the
tolerance of Esperanza.
● Esperanza wanted to recover the portion but Samuel refused to vacate despite repeated demands from
Esperanza.
● Esperanza filed for recovery of possession before the RTC.
● RTC then ordered Samuel to return the possession of the subject portion of land to Esperanza and to pay
damages.
● CA ruled in favor of Samuel, effectively dismissing the case.
● CA ruled that Esperanza’s failure to allege in her complaint the assessed value of the disputed property
warranted the nullification of the RTCs decision.
○ Samuel alleges that Esperanza is now estopped from from assailing the RTCs jurisdiction because
the case had been litigated for almost 8years.
○ Esperanza argues that the dismissal of her complaint was not warranted since she attached to
her complaint a copy of a Declaration of Real Property indicating the assessed value of the
disputed property is Php20,790.
● Esperanza appealed before the SC through Rule 45, assailing CA decision dismissing the complaint for
 recovery of possession and damages because the complaint failed to allege the assessed value of the
disputed property. Esperanza argues that she attached a declaration that the property was valued at
Php20,790 but the CA disregarded it.

Issue: W/N RTC lacks jurisdiction over the case due to the failure of the petitioner to allege in her complaint
the assessed value of the disputed property. - NO

Held:
● It is well-settled that jurisdiction over a subject matter is conferred by law, not by the parties' action or
conduct, and is, likewise, determined from the allegations in the complaint.
● Under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, the jurisdiction of Regional
Trial Courts over civil actions involving title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, is
limited to cases where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00), except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings.
● The CA was fully aware of this attachment but still proceeded to dismiss the petitioner's complaint.
● General Rule:
○ Factual allegations in a complaint should be considered in tandem with the statements and
inscriptions on the documents attached to its as annexes or integral parts.
Exception:
○ A mere reference to the attached document could facially resolve the question on jurisdiction and
would have rendered lengthy litigation on this point unnecessary.
● Estoppel cannot be applied:
○ Records show that the respondent has consistently brought the issue of the court’s lack of
jurisdiction in his motions, pleadings, and submissions throughout the proceedings.
● Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case can always be raised anytime, even for the first time
on appeal, since jurisdictional issues, as a rule, cannot be acquired through a waiver or enlarged by the
omission of the parties or conferred by the acquiescence of the court. Thus, the respondent is not prevented
from raising the question on the court's jurisdiction in his appeal, if any, to the June 3, 2002 decision of the
RTC in Civil Case No. 666.

Pajares vs. Remarkable

Laundry, G.R. No. 212690, FACTS:
February 20, 2017
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari is the Decision of the CA in that set aside the Order of the RTC
of Cebu City dismissing Civil Case for lack of jurisdiction.
MARANAN
On September 3, 2012, Remarkable Laundry and Dry Cleaning (respondent) filed a Complaint denominated as
“Breach of Contract and Damages” against spouses Pajares (petitioners) before the RTC,. Respondent alleged
that it entered into a Remarkable Dealer Outlet Contract with petitioners acting as a dealer outlet, shall accept and
receive items or materials for laundry which are then picked up and processed by the former in its main plant or
laundry outlet; that petitioners violated Article IV (Standard Required Quota & Penalties) of said contract, which
required them to produce at least 200 kilos of laundry items each week, when, on April 30, 2012, they ceased dealer
outlet operations on account of lack of personnel; that respondent made written demands upon petitioners for
the payment of penalties imposed and provided for in the contract, but the latter failed to pay; and, that petitioners’
violation constitutes breach of contract.

RTC issued an Order dismissing Civil Case for lack of jurisdiction, stating that Under the provisions of BP 129
as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, the amount of demand or claim in the complaint for the RTCs to exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction shall exceed P300,000.00; otherwise, the action shall fall under the jurisdiction of the
Municipal Trial Courts. In this case, the total amount of demand in the complaint is only P280,000.00, which is less
than the jurisdictional amount of the RTCs. Hence, this Court (RTC) has no jurisdiction over the instant case.

Respondent filed its Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that as Civil Case is for breach of contract, or one whose
subject is incapable of pecuniary estimation, jurisdiction thus falls with the RTC. However, in an April 29, 2013
Order, the RTC held its ground.

Respondent filed CA-G.R. CEB SP No. 07711, a Petition for Certiorari seeking to nullify the RTC's February 19,
2013 and April 29, 2013 Orders. It argued that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing Civil
Case.

The CA rendered the assailed Decision setting aside the February 19, 2013 Order of the RTC and remanding
the case to the court a quo for further proceedings. It held that In determining the jurisdiction of an action whose
subject is incapable of pecuniary estimation, the nature of the principal action or remedy sought must first be
ascertained. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary
estimation and the jurisdiction of the court depends on the amount of the claim. But, where the primary issue is
something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a
consequence of the principal relief sought, such are actions whose subjects are incapable of pecuniary estimation,
hence cognizable by the RTCs. “Verily, what determines the nature of the action and which court has jurisdiction
over it are the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought. In our considered view, the
complaint, is one incapable of pecuniary estimation; thus, one within the RTC's jurisdiction.”

Petitioners’ argument: They asserted that in determining jurisdiction over the subject matter, the allegations in the
Complaint and the principal relief in the prayer must be considered; that since respondent merely prayed for the
payment of damages in its Complaint and not a judgment on the claim of breach of contract, then jurisdiction should
be determined based solely on the total amount of the claim or demand as alleged in the prayer; that while breach of
contract may involve a claim for specific performance or rescission, neither relief was sought in respondent's
Complaint; and, that respondent "chose to focus his primary relief on the payment of damages.

Respondent’s argument: It is primarily based on breach of contract, and the damages prayed for are merely
incidental to the principal action;

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in declaring that the RTC had jurisdiction over respondent's Complaint which,
although denominated as one for breach of contract, is essentially one for simple payment of damages.

RULING: The RTC was correct in categorizing Civil Case No. CEB-39025 as an action for damages seeking to
recover an amount below its jurisdictional limit. Respondent's complaint denominated as one for ''Breach of
Contract & Damages" is neither an action for specific performance nor a complaint for rescission of contract.

An analysis of the factual and material allegations in the Complaint shows that there is nothing which would
support a conclusion that respondent's Complaint is one for specific performance or rescission of contract. It
should be recalled that the principal obligation of petitioners under the Remarkable Laundry Dealership Contract is
to act as respondent's dealer outlet. Respondent, however, neither asked the RTC to compel petitioners to perform
such obligation as contemplated in said contract nor sought the rescission thereof. The Complaint's body, heading,
and relief are bereft of such allegation. In fact, neither phrase appeared on or was used in the Complaint when, for
purposes of clarity, respondent's counsels, who are presumed to be learned in law, could and should have used any of
those phrases to indicate the proper designation of the Complaint. To the contrary, respondent's counsels designated
the Complaint as one for "Breach of Contract & Damages," which is a misnomer and inaccurate. This erroneous
notion was reiterated in respondent's Memorandum30 wherein it was stated that "the main action of CEB 39025 is one
for a breach of contract."31There is no such thing as an "action for breach of contract." Rather, "[b]reach of contract is
a cause of action,32 but not the action or relief itself"33 Breach of contract may be the cause of action in a complaint
for specific performance or rescission of contract, both of which are incapable of pecuniary estimation and, therefore,
cognizable by the RTC.

The Court neither sustain the respondent's contention that its Complaint is incapable of pecuniary estimation since it
primarily seeks to enforce the penal clause contained in Article IV of the Remarkable Dealer Outlet Contract

In an action for damages, the court which has jurisdiction is determined by

the total amount of damages claimed.

Paragraph 8, Section 19 of BP 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, provides that where the amount of the
demand exceeds P100,000.00, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses,
and costs, exclusive jurisdiction is lodged with the RTC. Otherwise, jurisdiction belongs to the Municipal Trial
Court.

The above jurisdictional amount had been increased to P200,000.00 on March 20, 1999 and further raised to
P300,000.00 on February 22, 2004 pursuant to Section 5 of RA 7691.

Then in Administrative Circular No. 09-9442 this Court declared that "where the claim for damages is the main cause
of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction
of the court." In other words, where the complaint primarily seeks to recover damages, all claims for damages should
be considered in determining which court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case regardless of whether
they arose from a single cause of action or several causes of action.

Since the total amount of the damages claimed by the respondent in its Complaint filed with the RTC on September
3, 2012 amounted only to P280,000.00, said court was correct in refusing to take cognizance of the case.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the December 11, 2013 Decision and March 19, 2014 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB SP No. 07711 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The February 19, 2013
Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Cebu City dismissing Civil Case No. CEB-39025 for lack of
jurisdiction is REINSTATED.
Sps. Aboitiz vs. Sps. Po, G.R.
No. 208450, June 5, 2017 FACTS:

MEDINA • This resolves 2 Petitions for Review on Certiorari assailing the CA Decision and its Resolution in CA-G.R.
CV No. 03803. The assailed decision affirmed the Regional Trial Court's Decision, which declared the spouses
Peter Po and Victoria Po (Spouses Po) as the rightful owners of the parcel of land. However, the Court of Appeals
ruled that respondents Jose Maria Moraza (Jose), spouses Ernesto Aboitiz (Ernesto), and Isabel Aboitiz (Isabel)
were innocent buyers in good faith whose titles were entitled to protection. The assailed resolution denied the
Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Spouses Aboitiz

• A parcel of land originally belonged to the late Mariano Seno. Mariano executed a Deed of Absolute Sale
in favor of his son, Ciriaco Seno, over a 1.0120-hectare land in Cebu. In 1990, Peter Po discovered that Ciriaco
"had executed a quitclaim renouncing his interest over Lot [No.] 2807 in favor of Roberto Aboitiz." In the
quitclaim, Ciriaco stated that he was "the declared owner of Lot [Nos.] 2835 and 2807." The Spouses Po
confronted Ciriaco. By way of remedy, Ciriaco and the Spouses Po executed a Memorandum of Agreement in
which Ciriaco agreed to pay Peter the difference between the amount paid by the Spouses Po as consideration for
the entire property and the value of the land the Spouses Po were left with after the quitclaim.

• In its Decision, the trial court granted the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 0-887 in the name of
Roberto. The lot was immediately subdivided with portions sold to Ernesto and Jose.

• Spouses Po filed a complaint to recover the land and to declare nullity of title with damages docketed in
Branch 55, Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City. The trial court ruled in favor of the Spouses Po in its Decision.

• The Spouses Aboitiz appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated, partially
affirmed the trial court decision, declaring the Spouses Po as the rightful owner of the land. However, it ruled that
the titles issued to Jose, Ernesto, and Isabel should be respected.

• The Court of Appeals discussed the inapplicability of the rules on double sale and the doctrine of buyer in good
faith since the land was not yet registered when it was sold to the Spouses Po. However, it ruled in favor of the
Spouses Po on the premise that registered property may be reconveyed to the "rightful or legal owner or to
the one with a better right if the title [was] wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person's name." The
Court of Appeals held that the Mariano Heirs were no longer the owners of the lot at the time they sold it to
Roberto in 1990 because Mariano already sold this to Ciriaco in 1973. However, the Court of Appeals ruled that
the certificates of title of Jose, Ernesto, and Isabel were valid as they were innocent buyers in good faith.

• The Spouses Aboitiz thus filed their Petition for Review.

• They argue that the Decision of RTC of Mandaue City granting the complaint of the Spouses Po is void for lack
of jurisdiction over the matter. They claim that a branch of the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction to nullify a
final and executory decision of a co-equal branch; it is the Court of Appeals that has this jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

Whether the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the Spouses Peter and Victoria Po's complaint.

RULING:

• The instant action is not for the annulment of judgment of a Regional Trial Court. It is a complaint for
reconveyance, cancellation of title, and damages.

• A complaint for reconveyance is an action which admits the registration of title of another party but claims that
such registration was erroneous or wrongful. It seeks the transfer of the title to the rightful and legal owner, or
to the party who has a superior right over it, without prejudice to innocent purchasers in good faith. It seeks
the transfer of a title issued in a valid proceeding. The relief prayed for may be granted on the basis of intrinsic
fraud-fraud committed on the true owner instead of fraud committed on the procedure amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.

• An action for annulment of title questions the validity of the title because of lack of due process of law. There
is an allegation of nullity in the procedure and thus the invalidity of the title that is issued.

• An action for reconveyance and annulment of title is an action involving the title to real property.

• The complaint of the Spouses Po is clearly an action for reconveyance and annulment of title. Thus, the
Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to hear the case.

The Heirs of the Late Sps.
Ramiro vs. Sps. Bacaron, G.R.
No. 196874, Feb. 6, 2019
MENDOZA
Property dispute raised to
RTC
Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45
assailing the Decision and
Resolution of the CA which
• While the CA has jurisdiction to annul judgments of the RTC, the case at bar is not for the annulment of a
judgment of a RTC. It is for reconveyance and the annulment of title.
• An action for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so exceptional in nature that it may be availed of
only when other remedies are wanting, and only if the judgment, final order or final resolution sought to be
annulled was rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction or through extrinsic fraud. An action for reconveyance, on
the other hand, is a legal and equitable remedy granted to the rightful owner of land which has been wrongfully or
erroneously registered in the name of another for the purpose of compelling the latter to transfer or reconvey the
land to him. The Court of Appeals has exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of
Regional Trial Courts whereas actions for reconveyance of real property may be filed before the Regional Trial
Courts or the Municipal Trial Courts, depending on the assessed value of the property involved.
• Considering the Spouses Aboitiz's fraudulent registration without the Spouses Po's knowledge and the
latter's assertion of their ownership of the land, their right to recover the property and to cancel the Spouses
Aboitiz' s88 title, the action is for reconveyance and annulment of title and not for annulment of judgment.
• Thus, the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to hear this case.
FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the Decision and Resolution of the CA which
affirmed in toto the RTC-Lupon, Davao Oriental’s Decision.
Sps. Bacaron claims that the late Alejandro Ramiro, the father of the petitioners, was the registered owner of the
subject lot. Sps. Ramiro sold them the property as evidenced by a Deed of Sale (1991) and the latter took possession
of the property afterwards. They also paid DBP the redemption price of P 430, 150 of the property as Sps. Ramiro
earlier mortgaged the property to the bank. However, in 1998, the petitioners forcibly disposed them of the property.
This prompted Sps. Bacaron to file a complaint against the petitioners before the RTC. They submitted an amended
complaint with their allegations.
Petitioners denied the allegations and raised the following affirmative defenses:
(a) RTC does not have jurisdiction over the case as it involves recover of possession of the property;
(b) the Deed of Sale should be interpreted as an equitable mortgage; and
(c) laches barred them from instituting the complaint.
affirmed in toto the RTC-
Lupon
Sps. Bacaron claims that the
late Ramiro was the
registered owner of the lot.
Sps. Ramiro sold them the
property as evidenced by a
Deed of Sale and the latter
took possession of the
property.
In 98, the petitioners forcibly
disposed them of the
property. This prompted Sps.
Bacaron to file a complaint
against the petitioners before
the RTC.
RTC ruled in favor of Sps.
Bacaron. However,
Petitioners alleged that Sps.
Bacaron failed to alleged the
assessed value of the property
and raising that RTC has no
jurisdiction as provided in
BP 129
CA dismissed the appeal and
affirmed the RTC’s decision
in toto. It upheld the
jurisdiction of the RTC over
RTC: ruled in favor of Sps. Bacaron. It held that the deed of sale was duly executed. It directed the petitioners to
execute a deed of extrajudicial partition with confirmation of tha sale in favor of Spr. Bacaron. It also directed the
petitioners to vacate the subject property. Petitioners appealed the RTC’s decision to the CA arguing that the main
thrust of the complaint was to recover the property yet Sps. Bacaron failed to alleged the assessed value of the
property. They asserted that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case pursuant to BP
129, as amended.
CA: dismissed the appeal and affirmed the RTC’s decision in toto. It upheld the jurisdiction of the RTC over the
subject matter. Noting that the amended complaint alleged causes of action for the declaration of validity of the Deed
of Sale or specific performance, and recovery of possession, damages, attorney's fees and injunction all of which are
incapable of pecuniary estimation, joinder in the RTC is allowed by the Rules of Court. It rejected the petitioner’s
contentions that the transaction between the parties was an equitable mortgage. It also denied the MR filed by
petitioners. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action.
RULING: NO. Settled is the rule that the nature of the action and which court has original and exclusive jurisdiction
over the same is determined by the material allegations of the complaint, the type of relief prayed for by the plaintiff
and the law in effect when the action is filed, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to some or all of the
claims asserted therein. It is clear from Sps. Bacaron’s amended complaint that while they claim that their
amended complaint before the RTC is denominated as one for the declaration of validity of the Deed of Sale
and for specific performance, the averments in their amended complaint and the character of the reliefs
sought therein reveal that the action primarily involves title to or possession of real property . An action
"involving title to real property" means that the plaintiff's cause of action is based on a claim that he owns such
property or that he has the legal rights to have exclusive control, possession, enjoyment, or disposition of the same.
Title is the "legal link between
(1) a person who owns property and
(2) the property itself”.
The ultimate relief sought by respondents is for the recovery of the property through the enforcement of its sale in
their favor by the late spouses Ramiro. Their other causes of action for the cancellation of the original title and the
issuance of a new one in their name, as well as for injunction and damages, are merely incidental to the recovery of
the property. Before any of the other reliefs respondents prayed for in their complaint can be granted, the issue of
who between them and petitioners has the valid title to the lot must first be determined.
the subject matter.
W/N the RTC acquired
jurisdiction over the subject
matter
No. Court ruled that the
court which has jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the
case is determined by the
assessed value of the subject
property. Here, respondents
neither alleged the assessed
value of the property. The
Court cannot take judicial
notice of the assessed or
market value of lands. Thus,
absent any allegation in the
complaint of the assessed
value of the property, it
cannot be determined which
between the RTC or the
Municipal Trial Court had
original and exclusive
jurisdiction over
respondents' action
Berbano vs. Tupalao, G.R. NO.
227482, July 1, 2019
The Court had ruled that the court which has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case is determined by
the assessed value of the subject property. Here, respondents neither alleged the assessed value of the property. The
Court cannot take judicial notice of the assessed or market value of lands. Thus, absent any allegation in the
complaint of the assessed value of the property, it cannot be determined which between the RTC or the Municipal
Trial Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction over respondents' action. Consequently, the complaint filed before
the RTC should be dismissed.
Furthermore, it is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading but the payment of the
prescribed docket fee that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. In
resolving the issue of whether or not the correct amount of docket fees were paid, it is also necessary to determine
the true nature of the complaint. Having settled that the action instituted by respondents is a real action and not one
incapable of pecuniary estimation, the basis for determining the correct docket fees shall, therefore, be the assessed
value of the property, or the estimated value thereof as alleged by the claimant. As already discussed, however,
respondents did not allege the assessed value of the property in their amended complaint. They also did not allege its
estimated value. As a result, the correct docket fees could not have been computed and paid by respondents and the
RTC could not have acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. All the proceedings before it are
consequently null and void.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated October 19, 2010 and Resolution dated May 3,
2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 01350-MIN are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Decision of the Regional Trial Court dated July 13, 2007 is declared NULL and VOID. The amended complaint in
Civil Case No. 1966 (045) is dismissed without prejudice.
Facts:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision of the CA in affirming the Judgment of the
RTC which granted the complaint for Recovery of Possession and Damages, declared respondents as the rightful
PINPIN
Petition for Review on
Certiorari assails the
Decision of the CA in
affirming the Judgment of
the RTC which granted the
complaint for Recovery of
Possession and Damages
Heirs of Tapulao filed a
Complaint for Recovery of
Possession and Damages
against petitioners. In their
Complaint, respondents
averred that their father was
the registered owner of a lot
located Cagayan in which
they paid the realty taxes.
After the death of their
respondent’s parents,
respondents survey the lot
and revealed that petitioners
occupied portions of the lot.
Petitioner’s argue that Pena
was the orig. owner because
sometime before Pena took
half hectare in favor of
joaquin and sold the adjacent
lot to respondent’s father
which mistakenly added some
owners of the subject property, and ordered petitioners to vacate the specific portion of the property they occupy.
Respondents Heirs of Roman Tapulao filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession and Damages against
petitioners Joaquin, Trinidad, and Melchor Berbano. In their Complaint, respondents averred that their father was the
registered owner of a lot located Cagayan in which they paid the realty taxes.
After the death of their father and mother, respondents caused the survey of the lot and revealed that petitioners
occupied portions of the lot. Despite several demands, petitioners refused to vacate and return the lot to respondents.
In their Answer, petitioners argued that the original owner of the lot was Peña. Sometime in 1954, Peña ceded his
possession over half hectare of the lot in favor of Joaquin. From that time on, Joaquin had been in open and exclusive
possession of the lot.
Peña sold the adjacent lot to their father. When Roman caused its registration, the survey mistakenly included therein
the adjacent lot belonging to Joaquin. As a result, it also covered Joaquin's lot. Roman and Catalina acknowledged
this error through their Affidavit.
Trial Court: After due proceedings, the trial court rendered its Judgment in respondents' favor in which the
petitioners raised the issue of jurisdiction. They asserted that since the value of the lot, the case fell within the
jurisdiction of the first level courts.
Under Resolution, the trial court denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration in view of the clear allegation in the
complaint itself that the lot had an assessed value of P22,070.00, hence, within the court's jurisdiction.
The case was then called for pre-trial which for one reason or another got reset for 8 consecutive times. During the
pre-trial, petitioners and counsel failed to appear. Thus, respondents moved to present evidence ex-parte which the
trial court granted.
On appeal, petitioners, again for the first time, justified their failure to appear at the pre-trial. They claimed they were
allegedly not notified of the pre-trial. They also insisted that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case. According to
them, the assessed value of the whole lot should not be taken into consideration considering that only a portion
thereof was in dispute. Hence, only the value of the specific portion they were occupying must be the determining
jurisdictional factor.
CA’s Ruling: The CA affirmed. It held that respondents sufficiently proved their ownership of the lot including the
specific portion which petitioners were physically occupying. The trial court acquired jurisdiction over the case
because properties with assessed value of more than P20,000.00 fell within the jurisdiction of the RTCs.
of joaquin’s due to error on
registry which was
acknowledged.
Trial court affirms
petitioners contention that
MTC has jurisdiction and
claimed that RTC had no
jurisdiction
CA ruled in favor of the
respondents because they
sufficiently proved their
ownership.
Petitioners raised jurisdiction
under the lot value
RTC has jurisdiction over the
case because civil actions
which involve the title to, or
possession of, real property,
or any interest where the
assessed value of the property
involved exceeds P20,000.00.
Complaint clearly alleged
that the assessed value of the
lot subject of the case is
P22,070.00. In accordance
with BP 129 since the value of
the subject matter exceeds
Petitioners: They now ask the Court to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction to review and reverse the decision of
the CA. Petitioners reiterate their argument that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the case because although the
entire lot has a total area of 18,512 square meters and an assessed value of P22,070.00, the real subject matter of the
case is only a small part; by simple computation, carried an assessed value of P8,111.72. This amount is within the
jurisdiction of the MTC and not the RTC. The trial court and the CA erred in holding that the trial court had
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint.
In their Comment, respondents riposte that the nature of the action and value of the subject matter are determined
by the allegations of the complaint. The complaint alleged that the assessed value of the lot was P22,070.00, an
amount well within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
In their Reply, petitioners simply assert a new their argument against the trial court's jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case.
Issue:
Is petitioners' challenge against the trial court's jurisdiction tenable?
Ruling:
No, Jurisdiction is defined as the power and authority of a court to hear, try, and decide a case. In order for the court
or an adjudicative body to have authority to dispose of the case on the merits, it must acquire, among others,
jurisdiction over the subject matter. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is the power to hear and determine the
general class to which the proceedings in question belong; it is conferred by law and not by the consent or
acquiescence of any or all of the parties or by erroneous belief of the court that it exists.
Sec. 19 of BP 129, as amended by RA 7691, enumerates the cases falling within the jurisdiction of the RTCs, viz:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. — RTC shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;
2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where
the assessed value of the property involved exceeds P20,000.00 or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such
value exceeds 50,000.00 except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original
jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts.
P20,000.00, the same falls
within the jurisdiction of the
RTCs. On the other hand, Sec. 33 of BP 129 enumerates the cases falling within the jurisdiction of the MTC, MeTC, and
MCTC, viz:

Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in
civil cases. — Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

xxxx

3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or
any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed P20,000.00 or, in
civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed 50,000.00 exclusive of interest, damages of
whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation
purposes, the value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots.

The Court has repeatedly held that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by examining the material
allegations of the complaint and the relief sought.

The Complaint clearly alleged that the assessed value of the lot subject of the case is P22,070.00. In accordance with
BP 129, as amended by RA 7691, since the value of the subject matter exceeds P20,000.00, the same falls within
the jurisdiction of the RTCs. Hence, the RTC of Tuguegarao City, Cagayan had jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case.

Too, petitioners' claim that the property in dispute is only a specific portion of the lot which supposedly carries the
proportional assessed value of 8,111.72, is irrelevant. It does not alter what is actually alleged in the complaint.
Petitioners cannot limit the dispute to the alleged area actually being contested because the rest of the contiguous
portion of the lot could be relevant to the remedy or remedies.

Lastly, petitioners never questioned the trial court's jurisdiction in the proceedings before it. In fact,
petitioners even filed their Answer and sought affirmative relief. It is only after the case was decided against them
that they challenged it for the first time via their motion for reconsideration.

The CA did not err in affirming the trial court's jurisdiction over the case. The petition is DENIED, and the
Decision of the CA is AFFIRMED
Heirs of Balucanag vs. Dole
Philippines, G.R. No. 225424,
Jan. 6, 2020
RIVERA
Land dispute: Dole’s claim of
plaintiff’s land.
Dole’s complaint of the land
was by mere tolerance
MTC has jurisdiction over
the case as determined by
allegations which are
possession of the property of
the defendant was by
contract with of by tolerance
of the plaintiff which became
illegal upon notice and
determination of latter’s
right of possession and
remaining in the property.
FACTS:
DOLE filed a case for unlawful detainer against Romeo Balucanag and several others with the MTC of Polomolok,
South Cotabato, over a parcel of land registered in the name of Sarangani Resources Corp. DOLE alleged that it
was the lessee of such land and it merely tolerated its possession by the petitioners. However, when demands to
vacate were unheeded, the ejectment case was filed. The MTC ruled in favor of DOLE. Balucanag filed an MR
with the MTC, but subsequently filed a manifestation before the RTC to treat the MR as his memorandum on the
appeal filed by his co-defendants with the RTC. Balucanag questioned the jurisdiction of the MTC because he
alleged that the complaint did not make out a case for unlawful detainer. The RTC denied the appeal. The CA also
denied the appeal on the ground that Balucanag failed to file an appeal because the MR was a prohibited pleading in
summary procedure and thus, did not stop the running of the period to file the appeal. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
W/n the MTC had jurisdiction over the case
HELD:
YES. Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the
complaint, which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting a plaintiff’s cause of action. A
complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it states the following:
a) the possession of the property by the defendant was by contract with of by tolerance of the plaintiff;
b) such possession became illegal upon notice by the plaintiff to the defendant about the determination of the
latter’s right of possession;
c) the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of its enjoyment; and
d) within one year from the making of the last demand to vacate the property on the defendant, the plaintiff
instituted the complaint for ejection.
In this case, DOLE’s complaint sufficiently alleged that Balacunag’s possession of the property was by mere
tolerance; that such possession became illegal when demand to vacate was made and disregarded; that the defendants
remained in possession of the subject property; and the complaint was filed within one year from the last demand. As
the MTC validly acquired jurisdiction, its decision is valid; and by failure of Balacunag to timely file their appeal,
the decision became final.