Aa Sim Study Guide

Flight Operations Training Department
Simulator Study Guide

Revision 16.3 – January 2019
SIMULATOR STUDY GUIDE

BOEING 737
Prepared by:
James Morrison
EMT Compliance & Regulation SME
Approved by:
Captain Senan O’Shea
Chief Instructor - Simulator
Issued by:
Captain Andy O’Shea
Head of Training
© Ryanair 2018
Contents 1 Revision Notes
Revision Notes
Page Description Date
Document structure and formatting revised.
ALL 13/11/2017
No content changes made apart from below.
Double Briefing & Non-Precision Approach
55-56 13/11/2017
Guidance Added.
Pitch / Thrust (Take-off & Climb)
196-197 13/11/2017
Guidance Added.
High Energy Approach
96-97 13/11/2017
Guidance Added.
Engine Out Cruise
73 13/11/2017
Guidance Added.
Navigation Performance Scales
135 22/01/2018
Added information regarding the indications of the NPS.
Windshear
216-219 25/04/2018
Added a new section on Windshear and the Windshear Escape Manoeuvre.
One Engine Inoperative Landing Checklist
137 10/07/2018
Typographical correction regarding VREF15.
Core Competencies Assessment and Behavioural Indicators
50-52 04/10/2018
Updated Core Competencies information.
Removing Oxygen Masks
57 04/10/2018
Added guidance on the CABIN ALTITUDE light.
Bug Up During Single Engine GA
69 04/10/2018
Clarified bug up at 1000ft or specific MA acceleration height if stated on SE GA.
Emergency Turn Procedures
70 04/10/2018
Guidance updated with information received from performance dept.
Removing Oxygen Masks
149 04/10/2018
Added guidance on the CABIN ALTITUDE light.
Double Briefing & Non-Precision Approach
56 31/10/2018
Typographical correction.
RNP Approach Operations
163 26/11/2018
Typographical correction.
Go Around
89 29/11/2018
Emphasised 90% N1 on go around ONLY applies to 2 engine operations
Single Engine Go-Around
90 29/11/2018
Added new section on differences on single engine go around
Level Bust Prevention
110 29/11/2018
Added additional guidance on level bust prevention
TCAS
197 22/01/2019
Added additional guidance on TCAS
NOTE: changes are highlighted with red change bars.

Contents
Revision Notes ......................................................................................................................................................... 2

Contents .................................................................................................................................................................. 3
Introduction ............................................................................................................................................................ 6
Ryanair Corporate Safety Strategy ........................................................................................................................... 7
Abnormal Flap Operation ........................................................................................................................................ 8
Acceleration to and Deceleration from VMO ......................................................................................................... 10
Airspace Awareness ............................................................................................................................................... 11
Airspeed Unreliable ............................................................................................................................................... 12
Approach Category ................................................................................................................................................ 18
Approach to Stall Recovery .................................................................................................................................... 19
Bird Strike .............................................................................................................................................................. 24
Bleed Trip Off ........................................................................................................................................................ 26
Cargo Fire .............................................................................................................................................................. 27
Checking Circuit Breakers ...................................................................................................................................... 29
Checklists (Use of and Guidance) ........................................................................................................................... 30
Use of QRH (Quick Reference Handbook) .............................................................................................................. 32
Checklist Discipline ................................................................................................................................................ 35
Circling Approach .................................................................................................................................................. 38
Communication ..................................................................................................................................................... 39
Communicating with the Passengers ..................................................................................................................... 42
Control Wheel Steering (CWS) ............................................................................................................................... 43
CRM Concepts ....................................................................................................................................................... 45
TEM (Threat and Error Management) .................................................................................................................... 46
CRM – The Decision Making Process...................................................................................................................... 48
Core Competencies Assessment and Behavioural Indicators ................................................................................. 50
Ditching ................................................................................................................................................................. 53
Double Briefing & Non Precision Approaches ........................................................................................................ 55
Emergency Descent ............................................................................................................................................... 57
“No 1 to the Flight Deck” – Inflight ........................................................................................................................ 59
Engine Malfunctions .............................................................................................................................................. 60
Flight Path Management ....................................................................................................................................... 74
Flight Path Vector (FPV) ......................................................................................................................................... 77
FMAs (Flight Mode Annunciations) ........................................................................................................................ 79

FMC Failure ........................................................................................................................................................... 80

Fuel System Non-Normals ..................................................................................................................................... 82
Ground Proximity Warning System Test................................................................................................................. 88
Go-Around............................................................................................................................................................. 89
High Altitude Approach to Stall and Stall Recovery ................................................................................................ 91
Inadvertent Toga Selection on Approach ............................................................................................................... 95
High Energy Approach - Prevention, Recognition & Recovery ................................................................................ 96
Jammed Stabiliser.................................................................................................................................................. 98
Landing Gear Essentials ....................................................................................................................................... 100
Landing Techniques ............................................................................................................................................. 102
Crosswind Landing ............................................................................................................................................... 108
Overweight Landing............................................................................................................................................. 109
Level Bust Prevention .......................................................................................................................................... 110
Loading Errors ..................................................................................................................................................... 115
Loss of Both Engine Driven Generators ................................................................................................................ 116
LVO Approach and Landing .................................................................................................................................. 118
Mach Buffet......................................................................................................................................................... 120
Manual Gear Extension........................................................................................................................................ 121
Monitoring .......................................................................................................................................................... 122
Management of Non Normal Conditions (FCTM) ................................................................................................. 125
Manual Reversion ................................................................................................................................................ 127
Narrow Runway Operations................................................................................................................................. 129
NITS Drill .............................................................................................................................................................. 131
No Engine Bleed Takeoff ...................................................................................................................................... 134
Navigation Performance Scales (NPS) Indications ................................................................................................ 135
One Engine Inoperative Landing Checklist ........................................................................................................... 136
On Ground Emergency ........................................................................................................................................ 139
Pack Trip Off ........................................................................................................................................................ 139
Passenger Announcements ................................................................................................................................. 141
Passenger Evacuation .......................................................................................................................................... 142
Pilot Incapacitation .............................................................................................................................................. 143
Rapid Depressurisation ........................................................................................................................................ 147
Raw Data ILS Approach ........................................................................................................................................ 150
Rejected Landing ................................................................................................................................................. 153
Rejected Takeoff.................................................................................................................................................. 154
Go/No Go Decision Making.................................................................................................................................. 160
Rotation............................................................................................................................................................... 161
Runaway Stabilizer............................................................................................................................................... 162
RNP Approach Operations ................................................................................................................................... 163
Runway Incursion Prevention .............................................................................................................................. 164
Smoke, Fire or Fumes .......................................................................................................................................... 167
Seat Adjustment .................................................................................................................................................. 169
Starting with Ground Air Source and Engine Crossbleed Start.............................................................................. 171
Steep Turns ......................................................................................................................................................... 172
Tailstrike Avoidance Techniques .......................................................................................................................... 174
Tailstrike on Takeoff ............................................................................................................................................ 180
Takeoff ................................................................................................................................................................ 182
Takeoff Rotation .................................................................................................................................................. 185
Taxiing ................................................................................................................................................................. 190
Thrust Lever Handling during Engine Fire, Failure or Shutdown ........................................................................... 193
TCAS Traffic Avoidance ........................................................................................................................................ 195
Turbulence Penetration ....................................................................................................................................... 200
UPRT.................................................................................................................................................................... 202
Visual Approach Procedures ................................................................................................................................ 206
Windshear ........................................................................................................................................................... 208
Weather Radar .................................................................................................................................................... 212
Wheel Well Fire ................................................................................................................................................... 214
Wing Body Overheat............................................................................................................................................ 215
25 Minute Turnaround ........................................................................................................................................ 217
Piston to Jet Aircraft Transition............................................................................................................................ 218

Introduction
This study guide is a reference document including many non-normal situations used during simulator training
exercises. Pilots should be familiar with procedures associated with non-normal exercises and this document
offers detailed guidance on many unusual conditions.
The purpose of this study guide is to provide guidance only on the topic. It should be viewed in conjunction with
the appropriate approved publications. It does not replace any official and more detailed information contained
in the Ryanair Operations Manuals, Boeing FCOM’s, Boeing FCTM or other official, approved publications. Where
any conflict arises between this guidance and the contents of official publications, then the information contained
in the official publications takes precedence.
This manual does not replace any official and more detailed
information contained in the Ryanair Operations Manuals,
Boeing FCOM’s, Boeing FCTM or other official approved
publications.
Where any conflict arises between this guidance and the

contents of official publications, then the information
contained in the official publications takes precedence.
If any errors or omissions are found in this manual then please report it here giving as much detail as possible.

Ryanair Corporate Safety Strategy

The Ryanair Corporate Safety Strategy for 2016 – 2019, focuses around two concepts:
Safety Management System (SMS)

The SMS enables a flow of information from the line operation and training process to managers who can then
identify any trends that need to be addressed. The main sources of information are OFDM (, SAIR, CSR, LASG and
statistics from Training and Checking.
Key Operational Risk Areas (KORA)

A number of KORAs have been identified in
the strategy as areas where Ryanair considers
that extra vigilance and focus is needed to
ensure the continuation of our excellent
safety record.
Certain elements of these scenarios relate

specifically to KORAs and this should be
emphasized during debriefing. (For example;
accurate flying of pitch and thrust settings
provides a control or prevention barrier to
LOC-I)
Safety in Ryanair is achieved by a systematic, proactive and documented approach. All crew should be familiar
with the Ryanair SMS, remember that safety is our highest priority.

Abnormal Flap Operation

Ref: QRH NNC Section 9, All Flaps Up Landing; Leading Edge Flap Transit; Trailing Edge Flap Asymmetry; Trailing
Edge Flap Disagree; Trailing Edge Flaps Up Landing.
Familiarise yourselves with the FCTM Section 6 (Landing) and Section 8 (Flight Controls). Review the FSEU and its
purpose (Vol 2).
FSEU functions include:

• TE Flap position indication;
• TE Flap Load Relief;
• TE Flap skew and asymmetry detection;
• TE Flap uncommanded motion detection;
• LE Flap and Slat position indication;
• LE Cruise depressurisation;
• LE Flap and Slat uncommanded motion detection and BITE.
Review the content of the Flap checklists; discuss implications / complications and correct use of the QRH for
these circumstances. Focus on the way the checklists have several paths within the body of the checklist. Review
the indent spacing and the symbol of black boxes which indicate that a checklist has been completed.
Crews are reminded that checklists may not cover every possible situation and a combination of several checklists,
careful analysis and good airmanship may be required. The all flaps up landing is the last resort and would only
be completed after trying to extend some flap with the use of other checklists. The trailing edge flap disagree
checklist is a good example.
Identification of the problem is the key to entering the correct checklist. Question – “Is the problem Trailing edge
or leading edge – are they symmetrical or asymmetrical.”
TE Flaps Asymmetry
Provided in normal operation by the FSEU and the LE flaps bypass valve. When the FSEU detects a TE flap
asymmetry, it sends a signal to the TE flaps bypass valve to move to the bypass position, in this position the bypass
valve prevents TE flap hydraulic motor operation. FSEU compares data from left and right TE flap position
transmitters. If they are different there is an asymmetry condition. During an asymmetry condition, the needles
on the flap position indicator show the actual data from the flap position transmitters. No asymmetry protection
is provided during alternate flaps operation.
If the TE flaps do not stay aligned or they move away from their commanded position, the TE flaps stop
automatically. You cannot operate the TE flaps again until the airplane lands and you correct the problem. The
flap position indicator gives you indication that the TE flaps are out of alignment. Understand the handling issues
associated with higher approach speeds, higher ROD on Approach, higher pitch attitudes for lower flap settings,
limiting bank angles below Flaps up manoeuvring speeds. A greater turning radius is required. A bad weather
approach would be more difficult due to the unusual perspective. Consider tire speed limits. At max landing
weight airfield combinations this could be exceeded (225MPH). With no flaps the engines will remain at low idle
state so manual thrust is recommended.

Review QRH NNC Non-Normal Configuration landing distance tables in the Advisory section of QRH P.I. section.
Auto brake is recommended and max reverse on touchdown for preserving brake energy limits. Ensure crews are
aware that there are three detents.
Flap Extension using the Alternate System

When extending the flaps using the alternate system, the recommended method for setting command speed
differs from the method used during normal flap extension. Since the flaps extend more slowly when using the
alternate system, it is recommended that the crew delay setting the new command speed until the flaps reach
the selected position. This method may prevent the crew from inadvertently getting into a low airspeed condition
if attention to airspeed is diverted while accomplishing other duties. There is no change to areas of responsibility
in this instance, the PM will be extending the flaps as directed by the QRH, the PF will have the radios and will be
matching the speed as required.
FCTM Guidance
The FCTM provides guidance on flap extension and retraction schedules. All flap manoeuvring speeds are based
on Vref for Flaps 40 at the current aircraft weight. Refer to FCTM Section 1.7 (Manoeuvre Margins to Stick Shaker).

Acceleration to and Deceleration from VMO

Ref FCTM Manoeuvres.
Acceleration to and deceleration from VMO is used to demonstrate performance capabilities and response to
speed, thrust, and configuration changes throughout the medium altitude speed range of the airplane. This
manoeuvre is performed in the full flight simulator and is for demonstration purposes only. It is normally
performed at 10,000 to 15,000 feet, simulating slowdown to 250 knots due to speed restrictions. VMO is a
structural limitation and is the maximum operating indicated airspeed. It is a constant airspeed from sea level to
the altitude where VMO and MMO coincide. MMO is the structural limitation above this altitude. Sufficient thrust
is available to exceed VMO in level flight at lower altitudes. Failure to reduce to cruise thrust in level flight can
result in excessive airspeed.
Overspeed – Background information (See FCTM Chapter 8 – Overspeed)

VMO/MMO is the aeroplane maximum certified operating speed and should not be intentionally exceeded.
However, crews occasionally can experience inadvertent overspeeds. The B737 has been flight tested beyond
VMO/MMO to ensure smooth pilot inputs will return the aeroplane safely to the normal flight envelope.
During cruise, the typical causes of overspeed events are windshear encounters or high altitude wave activity.
Although autothrottle logic provides for more aggressive control speed as the aircraft approaches VMO/MMO,
there are some wind shears and wave activity speed changes that are beyond the capability of the autothrottle
system to prevent short term overspeeds. When correcting from an over-speed during cruise at high altitude
avoid reducing thrust to idle. This can result in slow engine acceleration back to cruise thrust. This in turn may
result in over controlling the airspeed or a loss of altitude. If auto throttle corrections are not satisfactory,
temporary deploying partial speed brakes can assist in reducing speed and avoiding the need for idle thrust.
(The use of partial speed brakes in normal situations is not recommended, in the above recovery the option for
temporary deployment of speed brakes is clearly due to the abnormal situation and the aircraft being outside the
normal operating envelope)
Ryanair has had significant exposure to overspeeds at altitude. This lesson is an important part of pilot training to
deal with this situation.

Airspace Awareness
Ryanair, like many other airlines, operates to destinations located in E, F and G airspace where the ‘see and avoid’
principle applies. Ryanair has been operating safely to destinations located in class E, F and G airspace for many
years. Although the SAIR records would indicate that there is no higher risk of a loss of separation occurring in E,
F & G airspace than there is in A, B, C & D airspace, the fact remains that we must exercise more care when
operating in uncontrolled airspace.
Knowing when and where loss of separation is most likely to occur can help you maintain optimum vigilance in
high-risk situations, by enabling you to tailor “see and avoid” strategies to any given situation.
Most LOS occur in:
• Daylight VFR
• Between 10 a.m. and 5 p.m.
• Within five miles of an airport.
• About three-quarters (77%) occurred at or below 3,000 ft AGL
• Half (49%) occurred at or below 500 ft.
These last three statistics illustrate an important fact - most visual separation is lost near final approach. The
following table is derived from the Air Traffic Control section in Ops Manual Part C. Each State selects those
airspace classes appropriate to their needs – not all States use all airspace classifications. Further information is
available on the Ryanair eLearning platform.
When operating in classes A, B and C airspace crews are restricted to 250 kt below FL100 descending unless
otherwise instructed. Crews shall decline ATC offers of discretionary high speed below FL 100, and request
standard speeds. If a higher speed than 250 kt below FL100 is instructed by ATC crews shall fly this speed
instructed.

Airspeed Unreliable
Ref: QRH Flight Instruments, Displays; FCTM Non Normal Operations – Airspeed Unreliable
Condition:
Airspeed or Mach indications are suspected to be unreliable
Note:
QRH Revision 24 onwards has significant changes to the Airspeed Unreliable checklist, you should familiarise
yourself with this checklist and learn the new memory items. The following is generic information to the rationale
behind the checklist changes and is provided to enhance your understanding of the new Airspeed Unreliable
checklist.
Background Information
Boeing has made improvements to erroneous airspeed training and the Airspeed Unreliable checklists. Erroneous
indicated airspeed events can be the result of a variety of contributing factors related to environmental
conditions, human factors, and/or hardware failures. Service history has demonstrated that flight crew
recognition and timely and appropriate reaction is critical to the successful completion of flights in which indicated
airspeed anomalies occur.
In coordination with industry leaders, Boeing has developed a philosophy for Airspeed Unreliable checklists. A
change in philosophy is apparent in that the new memory items include an initial pitch attitude and thrust setting
for climb and cruise. These memorized settings are to allow time to stabilize the airplane, remain within the flight
envelope without overspeed or stall, and then continue with reference to the checklist.
Philosophy
The keys to successfully dealing with an Airspeed Unreliable event are recognition, procedures, and training.
The aircrew’s recognition of and initial reaction to an Airspeed Unreliable event are critical.
Manufacturers should attempt to ensure Airspeed Unreliable events are clearly identifiable to aircrews. The most
important function of the aircrew during an in-flight Airspeed Unreliable event is to maintain control over the
aircraft’s flight trajectory and energy situation by selection of attitude and power settings so that the aircraft’s
flight parameters remain within normal limits.
Crews should be aware of the instruments and critical systems that are not affected by an Airspeed Unreliable
event (e.g. Attitude displays, engines).
Procedures and training for Airspeed Unreliable events should include the effect of a URA event on other aircraft
systems, and potential alerts/warnings and indication system inaccuracies that could be expected.
Crew coordination and communication are important elements in successfully addressing an Airspeed Unreliable
event.
Guidelines
Airspeed Unreliable procedures should provide information on attitude and power settings that enable crews to
maintain the aircrafts flight parameters within normal limits during in-flight unreliable airspeed events for all
phases of flight.
Airspeed Unreliable procedures should address the availability and use of independent alternate sources of
airspeed information (e.g. GPS, inertial, angle of attack, etc.).
Airspeed Unreliable procedures should include memory items for critical immediate action steps.

Flight Deck Effects

Pitot blockage causes:
INDICATION CLIMBING DESCENDING
Mach Over reads Under reads
Airspeed Over reads Under reads
IVSI Normal Normal
Altitude Under reads* Over reads*
The IVSI may be unreliable depending on the failure but is susceptible to errors with static blockages.
The following text is offered as background information to be used in conjunction with the overriding directions and
procedures published in the B737 QRH and FCOM.
Important Note:
It is critical that a crew faced with either IAS Disagree alert or actual Airspeed Unreliable scenario must, as a
priority, determine and agree what condition they are faced with. The available course of action must be
determined by this decision. Options may be:
1. An isolated failure of one airspeed indication

Symptoms / Indications:
• The crew would expect to see an ‘IAS Disagree’ alert (with increasing or decreasing airspeed and/or altitude)
• A difference in airspeed indications between Captain, Standby and F/O instruments.
Crew Actions / Considerations:

• Aviate (Fly the Aircraft)
• Confirmation of condition
• Completion of non-normal checklists as appropriate
2. Failure of two or all sources of airspeed information / indications

Symptoms / Indications:
• The crew may or may not see an ‘IAS Disagree’ alert (with increasing or decreasing airspeed and/or altitude)
• The pitch attitude is not consistent with the phase of flight, altitude, thrust and weight, or noise or low
frequency buffeting is experienced.
Crew Actions / Considerations:

• Aviate (Fly the Aircraft)
• Confirmation of condition
• Completion of non-normal checklists as appropriate
Checklist Considerations
With a single failure as described in (1) above a crew is faced with an Airspeed Unreliable situation until such time
as they have completed Step 8 of the Airspeed Unreliable checklist and determined which airspeed indicator is
faulty. As the malfunction is isolated to one side and the remaining side is operating normally the crew are fully
able to operate the aircraft using the correct and functioning sources identified.

With a multiple failure of sources of airspeed information / indications as described in (2) above the crew is faced
with airspeed unreliable conditions.
Warnings
• Stick shaker activation is common with abnormal airspeed indications; continuous stick shaker activation
on the failed side may be present throughout flight, approach and landing. It is essential that the crew
determine whether the stick shaker is an actual warning or a nuisance warning. This can be anticipated
when a single source failure has been confirmed by the crew and a reliable IAS source is agreed. When
faced with no reliable IAS source the crew are required to fly pitch and thrust targets as specified in the
QRH.
• Remember:
─ A nuisance stick shaker warning will not normally be accompanied by buffet.
─ A functioning airspeed indicator followed correctly will not produce stickshaker on that side.
• Overspeed warning may occur, particularly during climb with blocked pitot static systems. Levelling off
or descending (if possible) can prevent or stop this distraction.
In ALL cases the crew must be aware of the failed system, confirm valid or nuisance warnings and determine the
most appropriate course of action based on aircraft performance.
Unreliable Airspeed - Additional Information (Ref FCTM):

Unreliable airspeed indications can result from blocking or freezing of the pitot/static system or a severely
damaged or missing radome. When the ram air inlet to the pitot head is blocked, pressure in the probe is released
through the drain holes and the airspeed slowly drops to zero.
If the ram air inlet and the probe drain holes are both blocked, pressure trapped within the system reacts
unpredictably.
The pressure may increase through expansion, decrease through contraction, or remain constant. In all cases, the
airspeed indications would be abnormal. This could mean increasing indicated airspeed in climb, decreasing
indicated airspeed in descent, or unpredictable indicated airspeed in cruise.
If the flight crew is aware of the problem, flight without the benefit of valid airspeed information can be safely
conducted and should present little difficulty.
Early recognition of erroneous airspeed indications requires familiarity with the interrelationship of attitude,
thrust setting, and airspeed. A delay in recognition could result in loss of airplane control.
The flight crew should be familiar with the approximate pitch attitude for each flight maneuver. For example,
climb performance is based on maintaining a particular airspeed or Mach number. This results in a specific body
attitude that varies little with gross weight and altitude.
Any significant change from the body attitude required to maintain a desired airspeed should alert the flight crew
to a potential problem.
If abnormal airspeed is recognized, immediately set the target pitch attitude and thrust setting for the aircraft
configuration from the Airspeed Unreliable memory items. When airplane control is established, accomplish the
Airspeed Unreliable NNC. The crew should alert ATC if unable to maintain assigned altitude or if altitude
indications are unreliable.
Memory items for target pitch and thrust must be accomplished as soon as it is suspected that airspeed
indications are incorrect. The intent of having memorized pitch and thrust settings is to quickly put the airplane
in a safe regime until the Airspeed Unreliable checklist can be referenced. The following assumptions and
requirements were used in developing these memory items:

• The memorized settings are calculated to work for all model/engine combinations, at all weights and at
all altitudes.
• The flaps up settings will be sufficient such that the actual airspeed remains above stick shaker and below
overspeed.
• The flaps extended settings will be sufficient such that the actual airspeed remains above stick shaker
and below the flap placard limit.
• The settings are biased toward a higher airspeed as it is better to be at a high energy state than a low
energy state.
• These memorized settings are to allow time to stabilize the airplane, remain within the flight envelope
without overspeed or stall, and then continue with reference to the checklist.
• Settings are provided for flight with and without flaps extended. The crew should use the setting for the
condition they are in to keep the airplane safe while accessing the checklist. The memorized pitch and
thrust setting for the current configuration (flaps extended/flaps up) should be applied immediately with
the following considerations:
• The flaps extended pitch and thrust settings will result in a climb.
• The flaps up pitch and thrust settings will result in a slight climb at light weights and low altitudes, and a
slight descent at heavy weights and high altitudes.
• At light weight and low altitude, the true airspeed will be higher than normal, but within the flight
envelope. At heavy weight and high altitude, the same settings will result in airspeed lower than normal
cruise but within the flight envelope.
• The goal of these pitch and power settings is to maintain the airplane safely within the flight envelope,
not to maintain a specific climb or level flight.
• The current flap position should be maintained until the memory pitch and thrust settings have been set
and the airplane stabilized. If further flap extension/flap retraction is required refer to PI-QRH Airspeed
Unreliable table. If the flight crew is aware of the problem, flight without the benefit of valid airspeed
information can be safely conducted and should present little difficulty. Early recognition of erroneous
airspeed indications requires familiarity with the interrelationship of attitude, thrust setting, and
airspeed. A delay in recognition could result in loss of airplane control.
Descent
Idle thrust descents to 10,000 feet can be made by flying body attitude and checking rate of descent in the QRH
tables. At 2,000 feet above the selected level off altitude, reduce rate of descent to 1,000 FPM. On reaching the
selected altitude, establish attitude and thrust for the airplane configuration. If possible, allow the airplane to
stabilize before changing configuration and altitude.
Approach
If available, accomplish an ILS or GLS approach. Establish landing configuration early on final approach. At glide
slope intercept or beginning of descent, set thrust and attitude per the QRH tables and control the rate of descent
with thrust.
All altimeter checks and standard callouts should be made with reference to the functioning altimeter if
applicable.
Landing
Control the final approach so as to touch down approximately 1,000 feet to 1,500 feet beyond the threshold. Fly
the airplane on to the runway, do not hold it off or let it “float” to touchdown.
Use autobraking if available. If manual braking is used, maintain adequate brake pedal pressure until a safe stop
is assured. Immediately after touchdown, expeditiously accomplish the landing roll procedure.
Pitch and Thrust Reference for Airspeed Unreliable

The following table provides pitch and thrust settings calculated to work for all model/engine combinations, at all
weights and at all altitudes.

QRH Checklist Step 7 and 8:

When setting pitch and thrust with a complete loss of reliable airspeed, it is important to allow the aircraft to
stabilise with those parameters set. For example if we want to fly level at 5000ft with an aircraft weight of 60T,
clean, the flight with unreliable airspeed table gives us a pitch and power of 5.0 degrees and 58% respectively.
When we set 5.0 pitch and 58%, the aircraft may not maintain level flight initially due to a difference in speed
between actual IAS and the PI reference speed. If we begin to descend, we must be slower than the target speed.
If we climb, we must be faster. Eventually the excess or under speed will be corrected and we will end up in level
flight, at the target speed, for that configuration. This is the point at which we can say the aircraft is “in trim and
stabilised” and we can now cross check the airspeed indications against the airspeed shown in the PI table.
An understanding of the aircraft energy is important. If we set the thrust to 58% and then maintain level flight, as
opposed to the reference pitch setting, the pitch attitude to achieve level flight will give us an indication as to
whether we are slower or faster than the target speed.
If a lower pitch than the PI is required to maintain level flight, we are flying faster than the target speed,
If a higher pitch than the PI is required to maintain level flight, we are flying slower than the target speed.
L = ½ ρ v2 CLs
In order to maintain level flight at a higher v2 we must reduce CL (AoA).
Use of Ground Speed

TAS indications on the ND during an airspeed unreliable event are not reliable however ground speed is.
Groundspeed can be used to indicate the TAS HOWEVER, GS is entirely dependent on the wind. Wind can be
found on the LIDO OFP, PIREPS, SIGWX etc.
GS (TAS) increases by approximately 20kts/5000’.When maintaining a constant IAS of 240 kts in still air, the
following table would apply:
FL100 280 kts GS

FL200 320 kts GS
FL300 380 kts GS
FL400 420 kts GS
This should not be used as a substitute to any memory items or QRH actions, but can be used as further
confirmation of your aircraft state.
Go-Around or Missed Approach - Airspeed Unreliable (FCTM Guidance)

Prior to Approach: If an airspeed unreliable event occurs prior to the approach and a valid airspeed indicator is
not available, ensure completion of the Airspeed Unreliable NNC and refer to the QRH-PI tables for appropriate
pitch and power settings for all phases of flight. If a go-around or missed approach is necessary, do not press
TOGA, execute a go-around using go-around thrust and pitch values from the QRH-PI tables. Upon reaching a safe
altitude set the target pitch attitude and thrust settings from the QRH-PI table for the current airplane
configuration and phase of flight.
On Approach: If an airspeed unreliable event occurs during approach, and a go-around or missed approach is
necessary, do not press TOGA, disconnect the AP and AT, execute a go-around using go-around thrust and 15°
pitch attitude. Upon reaching a safe altitude set the target pitch attitude and thrust settings from the Airspeed
Unreliable NNC and accomplish the checklist.

Approach Category
CAT.OP.MPA.320 Aircraft categories
Aircraft categories shall be based on the indicated airspeed at threshold (VAT) which is equal to the stalling speed
(VSO) multiplied by 1.3 or one-g (gravity) stall speed (VS1g) multiplied by 1.23 in the landing configuration at the
maximum certified landing mass. If both VSO and VS1g are available, the higher resulting VAT shall be used.
The aircraft categories specified in the table below shall be used.
For Ryanair operations and in accordance with Boeing Operational Suitability Data, both the 737-700 and 737-
800 fleets are operated as approach category C aircraft and the appropriate minima used.

Approach to Stall Recovery
An approach to a stall is a controlled flight manoeuvre; a stall is an out-of-control, but recoverable, condition.
However, the recovery manoeuvre is the same for either an approach to a stall or a fully developed stall.
Most approach to stall incidents have occurred where there was altitude available for recovery. The incidents that
progressed into accidents often occurred because the crew failed to make a positive recovery when the stall
warning occurred, the condition progressed to a full stall, and the airplane impacted the ground in a stalled
condition. For this reason, emphasis has shifted from a recovery with minimum loss of altitude to reducing the
angle of attack below the wing stalling angle to complete a positive and efficient recovery.
A stall warning should be readily identifiable by the pilot, either by initial buffet or an artificial indication (stick
shaker). During the initial stages of a stall, local airflow separation results in buffeting (initial buffet), giving a
natural warning of an approach to stall. At cruise Mach speed, stick shaker activation occurs just after reaching
initial buffet. Recovery from an approach to stall should be initiated at the earliest recognizable stall warning,
either initial buffet or stick shaker.
An airplane may be stalled in any attitude (nose high, nose low, high or low angle of bank) or any airspeed (turning,
accelerated stall). It is not always intuitively obvious that the airplane is stalled.
An airplane stall is characterized by one or more of the following conditions:
• stall warning
• buffeting, which could be heavy
• lack of pitch authority
• lack of roll control
• inability to arrest descent rate.
Approach to Stall or Stall Recovery

To recover from a stall, the angle of attack must be reduced below the wing stalling angle. Smoothly apply nose
down elevator to reduce the angle of attack until the wings are unstalled (buffet or stick shaker stops). Nose down
stabilizer trim may be needed if the control column does not provide the needed response.
Application of forward control column (as much as full forward may be required) and the use of some nose-down
stabilizer trim should provide sufficient elevator control to produce a nose-down pitch rate. It may be difficult to
know how much stabilizer trim to use, and care must be taken to avoid using too much. Pilots should not fly the
airplane using stabilizer trim, and should stop trimming nose down when they feel the g force on the airplane
lessen or the required elevator force lessen. The use of too much trim may result in the loss of control or high
structural loads.
If an attempt is made to roll to wings level before the wings are unstalled, the ailerons and spoilers are ineffective.
Unloading the wing by maintaining continuous nose-down elevator pressure keeps the wing angle of attack low
making the normal roll controls more effective. After the stall is broken, normal roll controls, up to full deflection
of ailerons and spoilers, may be used to roll in the shortest direction to wings level, if needed. The use of rudder
is normally not needed.
The Approach to Stall or Stall Recovery manoeuvre calls for the crew to advance the thrust levers as needed.
Under certain conditions, where high thrust settings are already applied such as during takeoff or go-around, it
may be necessary to reduce thrust in order to prevent the angle of attack from continuing to increase. This is
because airplanes with underwing-mounted engines have an upward pitch moment relative to increased thrust.
Furthermore, when thrust is applied this will cause a pitch up moment, so trimming forward during the recovery

would be prudent and reduce the control forces present during the recovery. However, do not trim to an extent
that could cause further upset.
Boeing: “Thrust is increased as needed to increase airspeed while remaining below stall angle of attack and to
recover altitude as necessary.” Higher altitudes require higher thrust settings.
Note: Use care during recovery from a nose low attitude after the buffet and/or stick shaker have stopped. If the
pull up is too aggressive, a "secondary" stall or sustained stick shaker may result. Secondary stalls can be avoided
by ensuring that the aircraft pitch does not exceed the Pitch Limit Indicators.
In extreme cases where the application of forward control column coupled with some nose-down stabilizer trim
and a thrust reduction do not stop an increasing pitch rate in a nose high situation, rolling the airplane to a bank
angle that starts the nose down may be effective. If normal roll control is ineffective, careful rudder input in the
direction of the desired roll may be required. Bank angles of about 45°, up to a maximum of 60°, could be needed.
Too much rudder applied too quickly or held too long may result in loss of lateral and directional control.
Do not change gear or flap configuration during the recovery, unless a stall warning indication is encountered
during liftoff and the flaps were inadvertently positioned up for takeoff. In this case, extend flaps 1 as directed in
the Approach to Stall or Stall Recovery manoeuvre.
Approach to Stall or Stall Recovery Training

The objective of the approach to stall or stall recovery training is to familiarize the pilot with the stall warning and
correct recovery techniques. Approach to Stall or Stall Recovery training manoeuvres should be done under
simulated instrument conditions with the autopilot engaged. Exercises include:
• level off
• turning base
• ILS final approach.
Initial Conditions
Set the command speed in accordance with normal procedures for the phase of flight.
During the level off exercise, the speedbrake remains extended until retracted during the Approach to Stall or
Stall Recovery manoeuvre. After the initial conditions are established, the instructor initiates each exercise by
disconnecting the autothrottle and placing the thrust levers to idle.
The airspeed low indication will be initiated during the entry to the manoeuvre. The airspeed low indication should
be ignored only for the purpose of training the manoeuvre.
Initial Buffet-Stick Shaker

The autopilot slowly establishes a pitch attitude by using stabilizer trim and/or elevator position to induce the
stall buffet or stick shaker. During the initial stages of the stall, local airflow separation results in buffeting giving
a natural warning of an approach to stall. A stall warning should be readily identifiable by the pilot, either by initial
buffet indication or an artificial indication (stick shaker).
Effect of Flaps
Flaps are used to increase low speed performance capability. The leading edge devices ensure that the inboard
wing stalls before the outboard wing. This causes the nose of the airplane to pitch down at the onset of the stall.
Effect of Speedbrakes
For any given airspeed, the angle of attack is higher with the speedbrakes up. This increases initial buffet speed
and stick shaker speed but has less effect on the actual stall speed.
Recovery
Recovery from an approach to stall should be initiated at the earliest recognizable stall warning, either initial
buffet or stick shaker. Initiate the Approach to Stall or Stall Recovery manoeuvre as published in the QRH. Once
stall recovery has been accomplished by reducing angle of attack with nose down elevator and, if needed, nose
down stabilizer trim, thrust is increased as needed to increase airspeed while remaining below stall angle of attack
and to recover altitude if necessary.
Subsequently the stall buffet and the stick shaker will stop. Check Airspeed and adjust thrust as needed – once
the wings have been un-stalled the thrust can be added, bearing in mind the nose up pitch tendency during an
increase in thrust, this can be anticipated.
Do not use flight director commands during the recovery. Flight director commands are not designed to provide
guidance that will lead to a recovery from an approach to stall or stall.
Maintain lateral control with ailerons. Rudder control should not be used because it causes yaw and the resultant
roll is undesirable.
When is it permitted to clean up and raise gear following a stall?

This should be done after the stall recovery is complete (thrust adjusted as needed, pitch attitude and desired
flight path are established). Also, ground contact should no longer be a factor.
What is meant by "desired flight path"?

Was the flight path that existed prior to the stall or approach to stall a safe flight path?
This is a judgment call by the flight crew. "Desired flight path" can be, but does not necessarily have to be, the
path that existed prior to the stall. For instance, if the stall occurred during the approach, if in PF's opinion, the
previous path can safely be attained without compromising the "stabilized approach" criteria it would be
acceptable to return to it. However, the "desired flight path" can also be a go-around in the correct configuration
or new vectors by ATC if it is safe to do so.

How much thrust should be used?

This will depend on the situation. Too much
thrust whilst the airspeed is low may cause an
additional nose up pitching moment, further
increasing the AoA. It is important to first
reduce the AoA with forward pressure on the
control column and if needed nose down trim.
If the stall occurred as a result of a slowly
reducing airspeed with the autopilot engaged
(such as was the case with the THY B737-800
accident at AMS) then the autopilot may have
added a significant amount of nose up trim
which should be trimmed out by the pilot
during the initial stall recovery. This is
particularly important if the stall occurs in the
landing configuration close to the ground
where a more expeditious application of thrust
is appropriate. If the airplane is in trim the risk
of an uncontrollable nose up pitching moment
as a result of adding thrust is reduced and the pitch attitude is easier to control through the control column and
elevator. Remember that turbofan engines may take up to 8 seconds or longer to spool up from idle.
Angle of Attack
As mentioned above, the angle of attack must be
reduced to recover from the stall. Historically,
stall recoveries were assessed and graded by the
amount of altitude lost during the recovery. This
meant that full thrust and minimum altitude loss
was desirable in training. This is no longer the
case. Thrust is only added “as needed” once the
angle of attack has been reduced below the stall
angle of attack, this is particularly important on
the B737 due to the under wing mounted
engines. Once the angle of attack is below the
stall AoA thrust is then added.
Approach to Stall Recovery Exercises

The following exercises are intended for
simulator training only.
Note: If during the ILS final approach exercises

the decision is made to go-around, the Approach
to Stall or Stall Recovery manoeuvre must be
completed before the go-around is initiated.

Completion of the Recovery:

Upon completion of the manoeuvre return to
desired flight path. Re-engage the autopilot and
autothrottle in accordance with normal
procedures
Approach to Stall or Stall Recovery
All recoveries from approach to stall should be

done as if an actual stall has occurred.
Immediately do the following at the first indication of stall (Buffet or stick shaker).
Note: Do not use flight director commands during the recovery.
WARNING: *If the control column does not provide the needed response, stabiliser trim may be necessary. Excessive use of
pitch trim may aggravate the condition, or may result in loss of control or in high structural loads.
WARNING: **Excessive use of pitch trim or rudder may aggravate the condition, or may result in loss of control or in high
structural loads.

Bird Strike
Bird strike is one of Ryanair’s KORAs and presents a significant risk to our operation. A study by Airbus has shown
that bird strikes occur on approximately 1 in every 1,000 flights and 20% of all bird strikes result in damage to the
aircraft. The greatest risk occurs during takeoff and landing with 90% of bird strikes occurring below 500’ AGL.
Crews should avoid bird concentrations if able, and react to bird strike effects as related to their effect on aircraft
systems.
Where flight crews find themselves in the middle of a flock of birds at low altitude, do not go around. Flying
through the birds and landing is the best course of action.
Effective use of TEM should be made to mitigate the risks associated with Bird strikes, further guidance is available
in the FCTM – Chapter 8 – Bird Strikes


Bleed Trip Off

Ref QRH Air Systems and FCOM Vol 2 Air Systems
The Bleed Trip Off must be completed as an individual exercise with the intention of achieving the following
objectives after which the instructor will inform the crew that this exercise is complete and the condition no
longer exists.
Objectives:
• Correct recognition of condition
• Correct checklist called for and actioned
• QRH checklist cautions and additional information understood
• Basic understanding of system, implications of failure and considerations
A Bleed Trip OFF occurs when one or more of the following occur:
• An Engine Bleed Air overheat
• An Engine Bleed Air overpressure
When either of the above conditions occurs the respective Engine Bleed air valve closes automatically. Correct
and timely recognition of this non-normal situation is essential as this is a critical system.
Caution: Use of Wing Anti Ice above approximately FL350 may cause bleed trip off and possible loss of cabin
pressure.
Additional Information:
When the aircraft is operated above FL250 following a failure to reset a bleed trip, the pressurisation panel shall
be monitored for correct indications during a descent. Increased thrust may be required to maintain
pressurisation.
The 737 is prone to PACK and BLEED TRIP problems. Crews should be very familiar with the contents of the bleed
trip off checklist. Ryanair has experienced many single bleed trip offs as well as bleed trip offs on both sides
simultaneously. Ensure the students are familiar with what the bleed trip reset button can reset (PACK, BLEED
TRIP OFF and ZONE TEMP).
When the checklist instructs the pilot to push the trip reset button, ensure it is pushed firmly and kept depressed
momentarily. It happens that a pilot does not put enough pressure on the trip reset button to activate the switch.
The trip reset may be attempted more than once and there is no Boeing recommended minimum time between
reset attempts.
The QRH BLEED TRIP OFF checklist advises the crew to consider descending to a lower FL if above FL250, fuel
permitting.

Cargo Fire
Reference FCTM Fire / Cargo Fire
FCTM Guidance
The cargo smoke detection system provides indication of smoke within the forward or aft lower lobe cargo
compartments. Once detection occurs the cargo fire checklist should be completed to activate the suppression
system and prevent smoke migration into occupied areas. Once the cargo fire suppression system is activated,
the fire should be controlled for the duration of the flight. Smoke may remain in or continue to be generated
within the compartment until the fire is extinguished by fire personnel. Cargo compartment fire warning
indications may extinguish, may remain illuminated or may extinguish and re-illuminate over the duration of the
flight. Continued indications of a cargo fire within the same compartment do not indicate the fire is uncontrolled.
Small amounts of smoke can migrate into occupied areas of the airplane. However, increasing amounts of smoke
can be an indication the fire is uncontrolled. The cargo smoke detection or fire suppression systems do not provide
an indication of the severity of the fire. Therefore, continued cargo compartment fire warnings alone should not
be considered an indication of an uncontrollable fire. The crew must assess the situation and use good judgement
to determine the safest course of action. All immediately available resources should be considered prior to
executing an off-airport landing or a ditching.
Ground Handling
The checklist instructs flight crew not to open the cargo door until all passengers and crew have exited the aircraft.
Opening the cargo door will increase oxygen content in the cargo area and may aggravate the fire.

Additional information
Crew should know their checklist – This information is provided at the end of the checklist and may not be read if
crew are not aware of its presence.

Checking Circuit Breakers
Checking of the circuit breaker panel is a vital task during the Flight Deck Safety Inspection and Preliminary Flight
Deck Procedure. It is also an important task when faced with a system failure as the verification of the status of
the circuit breaker could reveal a possible fix in accordance with the QRH Checklist Instructions.
Tripped circuit breakers protrude out of the panel, exposing the white portion of the stem as shown in the picture
below. They can be identified by either looking side on or running your hand lightly over the panel feeling for any
breakers sitting higher than usual.

Checklists (Use of and Guidance)

Reference: FCOM 1, NP.21.35
Normal Checklist Operation

Normal checklists are organized by phase of flight and
are used to verify that certain critical procedural steps
have been accomplished. Only procedural steps that,
if omitted, would have a direct and adverse impact on
normal operations are included.
Normal checklists are used by the flight crew after

accomplishing all applicable procedural items. When
parked at the gate, the pilot flying calls for checklists.
After engine start the PF completes the before taxi
procedure, however the Captain always calls for the
before taxi checklist. F/O reads the challenge; Captain gives the response.
During taxi, the captain calls for checklists. After takeoff, the pilot flying calls for checklists.
All Normal checklists are challenge and response with the exception of the After Takeoff checklist which is
completed silently by the PM. Due to the importance of the pressurisation system the Air Cond and Pressurisation
checks are read out loud, furthermore “Altimeters” in the AFTER TAKEOFF CHECKLIST is a challenge/response
item. During the AFTER TAKEOFF procedure and the ’10 Checks’ the Air Cond and Press check should be read
aloud as follows:
Start by calling the actual cabin DIFF (outer scale / long pointer) and checking the Cabin ALT (inner scale / short
pointer) as indicated on the CABIN Altimeter / Differential Pressure Indicator. The PM response to AIR COND
&PRESS challenge in the AFTER TAKEOFF procedure will be:”2.4 / SET”. The same procedure applies when
completing the ’10 Checks’.
Check the cabin rate of climb. Check pressurisation mode selector is selected to AUTO. Check the Engine Bleeds
are “ON” and Packs are Auto. Check the bleed air duct pressure noting any split. When setting the Air Conditioning
panel, a good rule of thumb is to have the 3 temperature gauges pointing at A, U and T respectively. During the
after T/O checks the Air Cond & Press check should be read aloud. This is a very important check and the correct
method should be stressed during training. Use the reverse “L” technique.
1. Start by checking the cabin DIFF and ALT, make sure that you are fully aware of which needle points to
which scale.
2. Ensure that the engine bleeds and packs are on.
3. Check the bleed air duct pressure.
4. Check the Air Con panel, a good rule of thumb is to have the 3 temp gauges pointing at “A, U and T”
respectively, monitor the cabin temperature in order to maintain 20-22’C.
Furthermore “ALTIMETERS” in the AFTER TAKEOFF checklist is a challenge/response item.
Remember - two separate systems are being checked:

1. The Air Cond system.
2. The Press system.

The altimeters check is a challenge and response. The standby altimeter will normally be changed by the Captain
when above the MSA. It is important to stress the need for SOP discipline when changing altimeter pressure
settings. This should be done by the crew together.
Boeing normal checklist philosophy: The position of the control or indication is visually verified and stated in
response to a checklist challenge. When a disagreement between the response and checklist answer occurs, it is
mandatory that the checklist be discontinued until the item is resolved.
Following the completion of each normal checklist, the crewmember reading the checklist states, “___ CHECKLIST
COMPLETE”. Further information can also be found in FCOM Vol. 1 and QRH C.I. Section 1.
Remember the importance that both crew members must be satisfied that the response to the checklist is fully
actioned and correct. The Pilot monitoring (PM) not only reads the checklist but must visually check that the
correct response has been actioned by the Pilot Flying (PF).
Boeing Feedback:
Observation
Ryanair’s ‘BEFORE START’ procedure requires checking of rudder and aileron freedom of movement on every
flight including through flights. The Boeing team observed flight crews did not always check the rudder and aileron
trim prior to responding “Free and zero”.
When asked if this was a required item, crews seemed unsure as to whether this check pertained only to the first
flight of the day or was required on every flight including through flights.
Recommendation
Complete the trim freedom of movement check as required for every flight.

Use of QRH (Quick Reference Handbook)
All Pilots must:

Be familiar with the layout and various sections of the QRH
Know where to find checklists
Know what the checklists are called / be able to call for a checklist using the correct title
Read and understand the QRH Checklist Instructions, Chapter CI Section 1 and 2.
QRH:
In flight, reset of a tripped circuit breaker is not recommended unless directed by a non-normal checklist.
However, a tripped circuit breaker may be reset once, after a short cooling period (approximately 2 minutes), if
in the judgment of the captain, the situation resulting from the circuit breaker has a significant adverse effect on
safety. On the ground flight crew reset of a tripped circuit breaker should only be done after maintenance has
determined that it is safe to reset the circuit breaker.
Some basic information:

The QRH is designed with a ‘Quick Action Index’ which is visible through the front cover. This Index refers to
actions which require immediate attention. The following section is the ‘LIGHTS’ index. This section is designed to
provide a simple alphabetical index of all the annunciated lights on the flightdeck. The next section is the
‘Unannunciated’ Chapter UNNAN checklists. Unannunciated checklists are those which are required to solve
problems that occur on the aircraft but are not annunciated by a warning light.
Then we have the Alphabetical checklists index, chapter ALPHA, which contains all available checklists within the
QRH in alphabetical order. RYR normal checklists follow the above. Although these are contained in the QRH we
do not read these from this section. Ryanair has a Handy Dandy (glareshield checklist) and a decal (control column
checklist) in the aircraft for everyday/common use and easy access.
The LVO Approach & Landing Checklist is located in the next section. This is used for planning and briefing
purposes and as a checklist prior to any low visibility approach – LTS CATI, OTS CATII, CATII/IIIA. (See LVP document
for specific information on these procedures). The Monitored Approach checklist is also regularly used in
circumstances when a monitored approach is required. This is read prior to descent following planning and setup.
The non-normal checklist chapters are numbered from 0 to 15. Chapters 1 to 15 correspond with the appropriate
Chapters of FCOM Volume 2 (Airplane General to Warning Systems) For example: QRH Chapter 5 is NNC (non –
normal checklists) for communications. FCOM Chapter 5 is the communications chapter.
Should you experience a non-normal situation during operations the pilot who first sees the problem will bring it
to the attention of the other crewmember e.g. “Master Caution, Flight Controls”. Having acknowledged the
problem, the PF will ask for the appropriate QRH checklist by its correct title e.g. “QRH, Mach Trim Fail”. The PM
will take out the QRH, locate and action the checklist.
To locate the required checklist, the PM should first decide on what category/chapter the checklist will be. Then
locate the chapter by using any one of the above indexes or any tabbed chapter separators, look for the
appropriate chapter number or page number and then turn to that chapter or page.
An important tip: The Master Caution (Amber Lights) will indicate what system is faulty (in most cases, see FCOM
Vol 2 Ch 15). The illuminated amber warning on the system panel will in most cases state the name of the actual
checklist to be used in the QRH. The arrangement of the two system annunciator panels depicts the layout of the
aircraft systems within the flightdeck as much as possible e.g. Master Caution FLT CONT (Top Left annunciator)
relates to a panel located on the overhead panel top left. This principle is used where possible.
Memory items:
ALL memory items must be studied thoroughly and pilots must be able to perform these actions from memory.
Following any memory actions taken during operations it is standard that the checklist is called for and fully
completed and that the memory items are re-read by the PM to ensure that the actions have been accomplished
correctly.
Memory Items – Redirection of Checklist

The Engine Overheat checklist contains memory items. If the Engine Overheat light illuminates and the light stays
illuminated after the memory items are completed, the QRH directs the crew to the Engine Fire or Engine Severe
Damage or Separation checklist.
Crew should proceed with the Engine Fire or Engine Severe Damage or Separation memory items.
Once the memory items are completed for

Engine Fire or Engine Severe Damage or
Separation the crew will read the QRH. The
Engine Overheat checklist is read first followed
by the Engine Fire or Engine Severe Damage or
Separation.
This ensures timely completion and enhances

the possibility of containing the problem. Only
once all memory items associated with the two
checklists have been completed, should the
PM reach for, and read the QRH.
The FCTM states: “After flight path control has

been established, do the memory steps of the appropriate NNC. The emphasis at this point should be on
containment of the problem. Reference steps are initiated after the airplane flight path and configuration are
properly established”.
QRH Notes
‘Do not use FMC fuel predictions with any flaps/slats extended’ & ‘Do not use FMC fuel predictions with gear
extended’. A rule of thumb calculation that can be used: “When the FMC fuel predictions are unreliable, calculate
endurance by dividing fuel on board, less reserve, by fuel flow.
For example, FOB 6000. Reserve 2000kg = 4000kg. Fuel flow = 4000 kg/hr, therefore Endurance = one hour”.
This rule of thumb works well for a given thrust setting and level. If the thrust setting is changed then it’s no longer
accurate. It is accurate for example if you are in a holding pattern or in the terminal area. This is something all
pilots should be aware of and use (flap problems, gear problems, engine out etc).

Resetting of Master caution without assessing the cause

Do NOT reset a master caution without properly assessing and identifying the cause. When a non-normal situation
occurs, the following guidelines apply:
Non-Normal Recognition:
The crewmember recognizing the malfunction calls it out clearly and precisely
MAINTAIN AIRPLANE CONTROL: It is mandatory that the Pilot Flying (PF) fly the airplane while the Pilot Monitoring
(PM) accomplishes the NNC. Maximum use of the autoflight system is recommended to reduce crew workload.
ANALYZE THE SITUATION: NNCs should be accomplished only after the malfunctioning system has been positively
identified. Review all caution and warning lights to positively identify the malfunctioning system(s)
Deferred items:
When there are deferred items, the Deferred Items section of the non-normal checklist will include the Descent,
Approach and Landing normal checklists.
These checklists should be used instead of the usual DESCENT, APPROACH and LANDING normal checklists.
In response to the landing data challenge in some deferred descent checklists the PM should call the actual
selected values of VREF, minimums etc as required by the ‘___’ (underscore) symbol. For example:
Landing data…………VREF_____, Minimums____ becomes “VREF 140, Minimums 200ft”.

Checklist Discipline
QRH Reading & Checklist discipline

The following information is provided to highlight and improve common areas of poor application and
understanding of the use of and principles of the QRH. This applies to ALL types of training.
Although some improvement is evident we are still seeing too many common weaknesses by students/crews
during training.
The importance of correct and effective use of the QRH during non-normal situations is paramount to flight safety.
Completing checklists effectively and safely requires:

• Clear communication & good CRM
• Accurate recollection and execution of memory items
• Recognition of the non-normal situation (clearly and precisely stated)
• Assessment of each individual condition in the QRH Condition Statement (as necessary)
• Understanding of required actions and consequences of actions
• Deliberate, systematic and co-ordinated crew actions
Confirmation, Communication and QRH Terminology
On recent audits it has been noted that some pilots are using the form of words “Thrust lever………..affected
engine” while closing the thrust lever etc. This does not make the best use of CRM in assuring that both pilots are
quite clear as to which engine is being shut down.
Boeing use the generic term “affected engine” when stating the action to be taken with each of these controls. It
is important to understand that when referencing the “affected” engine, it is good airmanship and our practice
to refer to the engine by its correct name, for example, state: “Thrust Lever Engine Number One” or “Thrust Lever
Engine Number Two”.
Example:
It is good airmanship and our practice to clearly identify the
control/switch that the pilot is moving in accordance with the QRH
especially in cases where the word ‘confirm’ is added to a required
action.
The word “Confirm” is added to checklist items when both

crewmembers must verbally agree before action is taken. During an
inflight non-normal situation, verbal confirmation is required for:
• an engine thrust lever
• an engine start lever
• an engine, APU or cargo fire switch
• a generator drive disconnect switch
• an IRS mode selector, when only one IRS is failed
• a flight control switch

Airframe Vibration
When reading the QRH checklist the following examples are often misinterpreted. Airframe vibrations are not
indicated on the Engine Vibration indicators; however, airframe vibrations may be caused by or associated with
Engine Severe Damage. Airframe vibration is sensed through various human senses.
FCTM Guidance: High Engine Vibration

Certain engine failures, such as fan blade separation can
cause high levels of airframe vibration. Although the
airframe vibration may seem severe to the flight crew, it
is extremely unlikely that the vibration will damage the
airplane structure or critical systems. However, the
vibration should be reduced as soon as possible by
reducing airspeed and descending. As altitude and
airspeed change, the airplane may transition through
various levels of vibration. In general, vibration levels
decrease as airspeed decreases; however, at a given altitude vibration may temporarily increase or decrease as
airspeed changes.
If vibration remains unacceptable, descending to a lower altitude (terrain permitting) allows a lower airspeed and
normally lower vibration levels. Vibration will likely become imperceptible as airspeed is further reduced during
approach. The impact of a vibrating environment on human performance is dependent on a number of factors,
including the orientation of the vibration relative to the body. People working in a vibrating environment may find
relief by leaning forward or backward, standing, or otherwise changing their body position.
Once airframe vibration has been reduced to acceptable levels, the crew must evaluate the situation and
determine a new course of action based on weather, fuel remaining, and available airports.
FCTM Guidance: Ditching

Additional guidance is available in the FCTM
Chapter 8 - Ditching

ALWAYS
KNOW YOUR MEMORY ITEMS
CALL FOR THE CORRECT CHECKLIST - KNOW YOUR QRH
UNDERSTAND WHAT THE STEPS ARE ACTUALLY DOING
WORK TOGETHER - USE TEAMWORK
THINK ‘WORKLOAD’-SLOW DOWN TO ENSURE BOTH PILOTS ARE INVOLVED AND UNDERSTANDING EACH STEP
STOP READING DURING HIGH WORKLOAD SITUATIONS
PAUSE TO ALLOW INFORMATION TO BE CONSIDERED
USE BODY LANGUAGE - CREATE A ‘TEAM ENVIRONMENT’
PAY ATTENTION TO THE PERSON READING
NEVER
READ WITHOUT THINKING WHAT EACH STEP MEANS
SKIP STEPS OR MOVE ON UNTIL YOU HAVE DETERMINED IF THE STEPS APPLY
READ SEVERAL CONDITIONS ONE AFTER THE OTHER WITHOUT KNOWING THE IMPORTANCE OF EACH STEP
OPERATE IN A VACUUM WITHOUT CONFERRING
QRH Reading & Checklist Discipline

Review the QRH Checklist Instructions chapter CI in the aft section of the QRH. This section explains how to read
a non-normal checklist.
The word “Confirm” is added to checklist items when both crewmembers must verbally agree before action is
taken.
CORRECT USE OF NON-NORMAL CHECKLISTS IS AN ESSENTIAL SKILL FOR EVERY PILOT.
The Checklist is there to assist and protect you, it is your Safety Net.
USE IT CORRECTLY.

Circling Approach
Follow the Procedures outlined in Volume 1 and QRH MAN Section. As with all approaches a thorough and structured setup
and briefing are essential to the outcome of the approach. You will need time to prepare. Plan ahead, know what headings,
timings and track corrections to expect, note these and keep them handy.
Some common faults during the circling procedure:

Crews become un-stabilised during the turn to final or on final, often due to the fact that they forget to reduce thrust when
pitching down to follow the PAPIs.
Once the aircraft is in a steady descent maintaining the PAPIs the thrust will need to be reduced to the standard N1 settings
for the approach flap 61-63% for F40 and 58-60% for F30. Think ahead, anticipate and watch for trends, a good thorough SCAN
will help eliminate many errors.
Remember the pitch/thrust relationship and make appropriate thrust corrections when changing the pitch
Downwind, abeam the landing threshold start timing. When TIME OUT is noted proceed as follows:
• Keep the landing threshold in sight
• Turn the MCP HDG to the runway heading
• Call for landing flaps
• Select MCP speed to VFLY
• Disconnect the autopilot at MDA. Disconnect the A/T at the same time.
• Descend on the PAPI’s or when established on an appropriate glide path to the landing threshold.
• Complete the landing checklist
The position trend vector is invaluable in giving early indication of how the aircraft will roll out relative to the runway extended
centre line. Use the bank angle selector to assist in adjusting the rate of turn as appropriate when above the autopilot MUH.
When disconnecting A/P and A/T, call “RECYCLE FLIGHT DIRECTORS.”
Minimums for a circling approach need to be rounded UP to the next hundred feet so that this can be set on the MCP at the
appropriate time.
Before conducting a circling approach, a 4nm ring on the approach runway and a 4.2nm ring on the landing runway will be
required.
The landing gate for a circling approach is 300ft AAL. The aircraft must be fully configured in the landing configuration by 500ft
AAL and manoeuvring completed by 300ft AAL.
Night landings from a circling approach require PAPI/VASI or an electronic glideslope.
Circling at night.
1. At night, the maximum reported surface crosswind component for a circling approach is 20kts. Gust
values shall not exceed 40kts.
2. At night, the ceiling required before commencing an approach shall be Circling Minimums +300ft.
3. “New” Captains may not conduct Circling approaches at night.

Communication
Keeping ATC Informed

Communication between pilots and air traffic controllers is a process that is vital for the safe and efficient control
of air traffic. Pilots must report their situation, intentions and requests to the controller in a clear and
unambiguous way; and the controller must respond by issuing instructions that are equally clear and
unambiguous. The process of communication is important and must be successful even in the most difficult
conditions. Good radio discipline is essential to this process.
Building situation awareness

• Radio communications contribute to building the pilot’s and the controller’s situation awareness.
• Flight crew and controllers may prevent misunderstandings by providing each other with timely
information, for better anticipation.
• At all times, pilots should build and update a mental picture of the other traffic in the vicinity of their
intended flight or ground path.
Non normal events or encounters should be reported as soon as practical to ATC, stating the nature of the event
or encounter, the actions taken and the flight crew’s further intentions
In an emergency, the flight crew should be aware that the controller may not be familiar with the aircraft and its
performance capability. The controller may not understand a message that is too technical; a simple message
should be used to inform the controller of the prevailing condition. Speak slowly and deliberately when dealing
with non-native English speaking ATC personnel.
In an emergency, the initial message should comply with the standard ICAO phraseology — “Pan Pan, Pan Pan,
Pan Pan” (urgency) or “Mayday, Mayday, Mayday” (emergency) — depending on the criticality of the prevailing
condition, to alert the controller to the level of urgency and trigger an appropriate response. In certain parts of
Europe, the PAN PAN prefix is not well understood and ATC may be unsure how to deal with the situation. Crews
should use the word emergency during any PAN PAN call with caution as very often the word emergency is
associated by ATC with a MAYDAY situation. This can increase the levels of confusion.
Then, to explain the situation, simple and short messages should be used highlighting the operational implications
of the prevailing condition. When confronted with an emergency or abnormal situation whilst in flight, crews must
prioritise their immediate actions in the following order.
Aviate
The pilot’s immediate priority is to ensure the safe flight path and condition of the aircraft. This not only includes
the flying of the aircraft but also the completion of appropriate checklists and actions.
In order to maintain the correct balance of workload, the flight crew must distribute the responsibilities and tasks
between each other. Typically, one flight crew member (PF) takes responsibility for the flight path of the aircraft
while the other flight crew member (PM) deals with all required actions / reads out checklists. During high
workload situations where non-normal checklists are being actioned it is recommended that the PF, if he/she has
the capacity, also take responsibility for the radio communications.

When there is a significant problem, the workload during the first moments is often high and the flight crew may
elect to inform air traffic control immediately by the most direct means. This normally entails the use of an initial
call incorporating the word “standby”.
Navigate
The flight crew will decide on whether to continue the flight to the originally intended destination, initiate an
immediate en-route diversion, carry out an emergency descent or just place the aircraft in a safe flying position.
The decision to divert may be immediate but normally it will require coordination with air traffic control and other
parties.
Communicate
Pilots believing themselves to be facing an emergency situation should declare an emergency as soon as possible
and cancel it later if the situation allows.
The correct method of communicating this information to ATC is by using the prefix “MAYDAY, MAYDAY, MAYDAY”
or “PAN PAN, PAN PAN, PAN PAN” as appropriate. This procedure, which is an international standard, is the single
most effective means of alerting the controller to the need to give priority to the message that will follow.
Controller response to emergency situation

The Operators Guide to Human Factors in Aviation Briefing Note - Pilot-Controller Communication offers the
following advice: "Controllers should recognize that, when faced with an emergency situation, the flight crew’s
most important needs are:
a) Time;
b) Airspace; and,
c) Silence."
The controller’s response to the emergency situation (when trained to Eurocontrol guidance) is patterned to
follow the ASSIST memory aid:
Acknowledge - Ensure that the reported emergency is well-understood and acknowledged;

Separate - Establish and maintain separation with other traffic and terrain;
Silence - Impose silence on your control frequency, if necessary; and do not delay or disturb urgent cockpit action
by unnecessary transmissions;
Inform - Inform your supervisor and other sectors, units and airports as appropriate;
Support - Provide maximum support to the flight crew; and,
Time - Allow the flight crew sufficient time to manage the emergency.
EUROCONTROL has produced guidelines for controller training in handling unusual or emergency situations which
contain much useful information and advice, including sample checklists for various types of emergency.
In correspondence with NATS in the UK, they informed Ryanair that “accurate notification of the nature of the
problem does help quite a bit. Our controllers are trained to expect a NITS (Nature, Intention, Time, Special
instruction) brief from flight crew in an emergency situation and have the appropriate means of recording the
detail so that it can be shared accurately with the relevant agencies. A NITS brief from the crew to ATC is a quick
and effective way of communicating the problem.”

TO: All Pilots

FROM: Chief Pilot
DATE: 14th March
SUBJECT: Urgency and Distress Calls- Corrected.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
ICAO Annex 10 – Aeronautical Telecommunications – section 5.3 (Distress and urgency radiotelephony communications procedures) refers.
Operational feedback has shown that some crews are unsure of the correct phraseology to be used when notifying ATC of a problem during flight.
Pan Pan, Pan Pan, Pan Pan:

This is an urgency call to indicate a non-normal situation with a precautionary landing.
The non-normal situation requires priority ATC clearances and may require the emergency services to be present for the landing.
The precautionary landing is expected to be made without a runway excursion.
An immediate evacuation on landing is not expected.
Examples of an urgency situation are a non-normal flap configuration, single engine landing and loss of hydraulic system A or B.
Mayday, Mayday, Mayday:

This is a distress call to indicate a non-normal situation with an emergency landing.
The non-normal situation demands priority clearances from ATC and will require the emergency services present for landing.
The non-normal situation will have an impact on the safety of the flight and the passengers.
The emergency landing may result in a runway excursion.
An immediate evacuation on landing may be required.
Examples of a distress situation are a partial gear landing, manual reversion, loss of both engine driven generators, emergency descent, crew
incapacitation and uncontrolled fire.
The level of emergency can be upgraded or downgraded by the crew as appropriate.
When making a “Pan Pan, Pan Pan, Pan Pan” or “Mayday, Mayday, Mayday” call, you should endeavour to give all or most of the following
information:
a) Name of the station addressed (time and circumstances permitting);
b) The identification of the aircraft;
c) The nature of the distress or urgency condition;
d) Intention of the person in command;
e) Present position, altitude or flight level, and heading.
The following extraction from ICAO Annex 10 should be noted:
5.3.1.2 The radiotelephony distress signal MAYDAY and the radiotelephony urgency signal PAN PAN shall be used at the commencement of the first
distress and urgency communication respectively.
5.3.1.2.1 At the commencement of any subsequent communication in distress and urgency traffic, it shall be permissible to use the radiotelephony
distress and urgency signals.
Therefore, there is no requirement to use Mayday or Pan Pan at the commencement of each radio transmission on the same frequency after the
initial distress/urgency call has been made. If it becomes necessary to re-emphasize the distress/urgency condition, then the Mayday or Pan Pan
call should be repeated with each ATC transmission on that frequency.
This information is for guidance only and crews should always articulate the level of urgency/distress deemed appropriate to the malfunction that
has occurred.

Communicating with the Passengers

Creating a relationship between the passengers and the flight deck can be essential to the successful outcome
of a non-normal situation.
The PA:
• Can play an important part in maintaining passenger confidence and control.
• Should be made calmly, slowly and clearly.
• Quality and clarity of the information will directly reflect the competence of the crew and the company
as a whole.
• Must be checked during pre-flight procedures
• Check includes verification of system operation using the hand held microphone on the control stand.
Check audibility in the cabin to ensure information can be given clearly.
• If poor quality or a lack of communication with the passengers can often exacerbate an already stressful
situation in the cabin.
• Being clear and concise is important from a commercial point of view.
• Is important to identify the crew’s voice in the event of an emergency. Passengers are more likely to
follow a PA from a recognised voice in the flight deck.
The reliability of any subsequent directions given by the crew may be judged by the passengers according to their
perception of the crew’s professionalism. Crews can become divorced from the requirement to keep the
passengers informed of the status and progress of flights. Obviously clear and concise emergency PAs are a vital
safety tool for all pilots. Practise and consideration during a normal PA will benefit crews greatly in the event of
a non-normal situation.
The PA handy-dandy is available in the flight deck. Use this guidance until you are confident in giving PA’s. If it is
not possible to complete the welcome PA on stand, it should be made prior to taxi once the “Before Taxi” Checklist
is completed. Develop your skills in delivery of passenger announcements, particularly during non-normal
situations. Be sure to impart timely information with cues that the aircraft is being flown by safe, competent
pilots.
Example:
Recently we were able (through reports from positioning crew) to observe passenger anxiety levels in the cabin
following a non-normal event. The key point that raised passenger concerns was:
• Information passed to the passengers by the Captain indicating that “you may see some fire engines near
and around the aircraft after landing” (or words to that effect). In this example all the passengers heard
was “FIRE!!” and the concern levels shot up.
Response / Actions:
• Consider content, impact and effectiveness of a PA during non-normal situations. Instructors and
examiners will insist that crews include appropriate content when making PA’s. Think about:
• What message you are passing to the passengers,
• Consider the negative effect of ‘over-information’,
• Analyse what information is necessary and keep content to a minimum.

Ensure that the words “FIRE”, “ENGINE FAILURE”, “Lost an Engine”, “Damaged” etc are not used in any context
that may induce high levels of stress. Think about the cabin, avoid introducing discomfort and know that your PA
will almost certainly be quoted by passengers when interviewed by the press.
Control Wheel Steering (CWS)
Objectives:
• To provide the student with a comprehensive understanding of the A/P CWS function
• Recognition of and understanding of FMA annunciations associated with CWS
• To train crews in Ryanair procedures associated with CWS modes.
Background Information:
A function of the auto-pilot that is seldom used is Control Wheel Steering (CWS). Pushing a CWS engage switch
engages the A/P pitch and roll axes in the CWS mode and displays CWS P (pitch) and CWS R (roll) on the FMAs.
With CWS engaged, the A/P manoeuvres the aeroplane in response to control pressures applied by either pilot.
The control pressure is similar to that required for manual flight, however when control pressure is released, the
A/P holds existing attitude and roll.
If aileron pressure is released within six (6) degrees or less bank, the A/P rolls wings level and will hold the existing
heading. This heading hold feature is inhibited when any of the following conditions exist:
• The aircraft is below 1,500 feet radio altitude with the landing gear down.
• After F/D VOR capture with TAS 250 knots or less.
• After F/D LOC capture in the APP mode.
With the autopilot in CMD, the pitch and roll axis will engage in CWS when:
• A command pitch or roll mode has not been selected or was deselected.
• Selecting CMD while not following a large deviation in the pitch flight director command (CWS P).
• Flying beyond FMS end of route or into a route discontinuity (CWS R).
CWS P and / or CWS R is annunciated on the FMAs in the above situation while the A/P is in CMD mode. Command
pitch modes can be selected.
CWS R with a CMD engage switch illuminated can be used to capture a selected radio course while the VOR/LOC
or APP mode is armed. Upon intercepting the radial or localizer, the F/D and A/P annunciations change from CWS
R to VOR/LOC engaged, and the A/P tracks the selected course.
All aircraft are fitted with revised FCC P8.0 software. This software incorporates modifications to the FCC which
will change existing Control Wheel Steering (CWS) mode transition logic to provide improved crew awareness and
functionality. There are 13 changes applicable to flight crew incorporated in the P8.0 software, most of which are
minor in nature.
This force override through control column or wheel, used to avoid nuisance RA’s as per SOP 6.5 ‘TCAS RA/Level
Bust Avoidance’ is not available. The following Notice to Crew will be recorded in the aircraft technical log as an
indication that FCC P8.0 software has been installed;
“AIRCRAFT FITTED WITH FCC P8.0. CWS FORCE OVERRIDE NOT AVAILABLE”
TCAS RA/Level Bust Avoidance < RYR >
Note: All aircraft are fitted with FCC software P8.0
Note: Ryanair aircraft DO NOT have the ability to automatically transition to Pitch and/or Roll CWS mode when the
autopilot is engaged by force override through the column or wheel.
ICAO guidance for ACAS training for pilot’s states: “If an RA manoeuvre is inconsistent with the current ATC
clearance, pilots shall follow the RA”. It follows that pilots are required to level off at previously assigned
altitudes/flight levels if doing so does not conflict with the vertical speed RA. There is an industry wide recognition
that poorly handled vertical speed RA’s have developed into unnecessary or erroneous level busts.
It is important to understand that a Vertical Speed RA is different from all other RA’s:
• “Adjust Vertical Speed, Adjust” RA’s always require the pilot to reduce vertical rate of the aircraft or to level off.
• “Monitor Vertical Speed” RA’s always require the pilot to avoid the vertical speeds prohibited on the RA display.
Note: Transitioning back from CWS PITCH to ALT ACQ will only occur if CWS PITCH has been engaged by manually
overriding the original pitch mode. This facility is no longer available on Ryanair aircraft.
Severe Turbulence
Selection of the autopilot Control Wheel Steering (CWS) is recommended for operation in severe turbulence. Do
not use Altitude Hold (ALT HLD) mode. The recommended procedures for flight in severe turbulence are:
• Airspeed - Target airspeed should be approximately 280 KIAS or 0.76 MACH, whichever is lower. Severe
turbulence will cause large and often rapid variations in indicated airspeed. DO NOT CHASE THE AIRSPEED
• FMC N1 limit page - Select CON*
• Yaw Damper - Engaged
• Autopilot - Optional - If the autopilot is engaged, use CWS position, do not use ALT HLD Mode
• Autothrottle - Disengage
• Attitude - Maintain wings level and the desired pitch attitude. Use the attitude indicator as the primary
instrument. In extreme drafts, large attitude changes may occur. DO NOT USE SUDDEN LARGE CONTROL
INPUTS. After establishing the trim setting for penetration speed, DO NOT CHANGE STABILZER TRIM
• Altitude - Allow the altitude to vary. Large altitude variations are possible in severe turbulence. Sacrifice
altitude in order to maintain the desired attitude and airspeed. DO NOT CHASE THE ALTITUDE
• Thrust - Engine ignition should be on. Make an initial thrust setting for the target airspeed. CHANGE
THRUST ONLY IN CASE OF EXTREME AIRSPEED VARIATION. The FMC cruise page displays N1 target value
for turbulence.
*Clear of turbulence manually reselect AUTO in FMC N1 limit page.

CRM Concepts
Crew Resource Management training is high on our training agenda. All Pilots must be aware of the importance of
CRM and the need to gradually move the concept of CRM from their “background thinking” to being more
prominent in their management of normal and non-normal situations.
The use of CRM on the flight deck is an important part of the aviation safety management system. It is seen as an
aid in controlling risks to the system. These risks are the situations and events which reduce operational safety
and the probability of safe flight.
Guidance and Reference

The following documents are available on eLearning and crewdock:
• CRM performance indicators (Simulator Workbook)
• CRM presentation Threat and Error Management (eLearning website)
It is important that Instructors integrate CRM concepts and best practices into all elements of training. The Type
Rating provides a platform on which we are able to build the foundations of good, effective CRM and Airmanship.

TEM (Threat and Error Management)
Threats
• Events or errors that occur outside the influence of the flight crew.
─ Threats increase the complexity of a flight.
─ Threats lead to flight crew errors.
─ Threats require crew attention and management.
Errors
Actions or inactions by the flight crew
─ Errors lead to unexpected events
─ Errors reduce safety margins
─ Errors increase the probability of incidents or accidents
Example:
A wet runway is a threat to a landing operation – more landing distance required.
The failure of the crew to anticipate the need for more landing distance or to adjust the level of braking would be
an error related to the threat.
Threats
A threat or hazard is any situation, event, or circumstance that may affect the safety of flight:
• The effects of threats occur in the future – so plan ahead, ANTICIPATE.
• Threats increase the potential for error
Error
It is human nature to make errors, thus error management is a vital safety device; the process is similar to threat
management:
• Anticipate situations that could lead to errors
• Avoid these situations and circumstances that promote errors
• Recognise and identify an error, take corrective action to recover to safe flight
When discussing threats it is not necessary to list every single possible threat that might, just might, impact on
the flight. TEM was introduced in the context of airmanship and the need to use good judgement in anticipating
threats to safe flight. It is not good airmanship to be unrealistic in discussing TEM. The whole point of MPA CRM
is to allow that threat to be identified and considered by the crew. This is evidence of good teamwork and CRM
and should not be interpreted, by either pilot, as poor performance on the part of one or the other.
Crews should be proactive in identifying and managing threats & errors. When dealing with errors remember is
not who is right that is important – it is what is right that matters!

• Expecting that an event will occur

Anticipate • Anticipation builds vigilance
• Vigilance is vital in aviation
• Identify the existance of a threat or error

Recognise • Recognition leads to recovery
Recover • Recover adequate safety margins to ensure

SAFE FLIGHT
Safe Flight

CRM – The Decision Making Process

Ryanair’s decision making process is well known to crews and is used in a variety of circumstances, particularly
during non-normal situations. A formal, structured process of decision making that is familiar to both
crewmembers is essential to a safe, co-ordinated response and resolution by the crew as a team.
1. PROBLEM
2. INFORMATION
3. OPTIONS
4. SELECT
5. EXECUTE
6. EVALUATE
It must be emphasised that P.I.O.S.E.E is not an end in itself. It is a process that can be used to arrive at a sound
decision & plan of action. A major threat to making a sound decision is Confirmation Bias. We are seeing evidence
of this phenomenon having a destructive effect on crew’s decision making in training and, critically, on the Line.
Typically, a Captain will decide and then use P.I.O.S.E.E to confirm that decision. In the vast majority of cases this
initial, unstructured decision is wrong and leads the crew into greater difficulty.
For instance, a recent event on the line exemplifies this where a crew identified a small unannunciated fuel
imbalance as a “Problem” and ended up shutting down an engine and diverting. There are many other examples.
Unexpected events can impose a ‘surprise factor’ which may impact significantly in the decision making process.
Unannunciated problems may not be identified as such and a P.I.O.S.E.E process may not be carried out because
the problem may be subtle. Good communication on the flight deck and with CC in the P.I.O.S.E.E process is
essential. Remember Inquiry and Advocacy in the communication process? Very often we are seeing a complete
absence of these essential aspects of communication and the outcome has been an appalling situation such as
above. Use of P.I.O.S.E.E (and within it good communication skills) as a structure to aid the recovery process is a
tool that can assist you when the unexpected happens.
You should always consider the process to follow continuous and circular. The image of a clock face will suggest
the basic structure and will also remind you that there is almost always TIME available to make a good decision.
1. The decision making process is not linear, it starts with defining a problem accurately and once an
evaluation has been completed you must evaluate whether or not the decision has effectively dealt with
the problem initially defined. If not the process continues.
2. The decision making process may take considerable time and need not be rushed. The nature of the
problem may require a prompt initial response followed by a more considered response by the crew;
this is where effective communications are essential to this process. PIOSEE is a time available decision
making tool.
REMEMBER:
This process is designed as part of a CRM initiative, it is critical that each crewmember work as a team to provide
support, to disclose pertinent information, to inquire and advocate themselves. This process does not absolve any
crewmember from using common sense and good judgement in an environment that can produce an array of
non-normal events and emergencies.

Problems with P-I-O-S-E-E

P-I-O-S-E-E is a structured decision making process that is designed to assist the crew to use their training and
airmanship to arrive at a sound decision when confronted with non-normal or emergency situations. The current
campaign of 5 different posters addresses the process from several angles and each seeks to emphasise a
particular aspect of P-I-O-S-E-E. Here are two aspects that have been giving cause for concern lately:
“Never start P-I-O-S-E-E with your mind made up!”

We have felt it necessary to emphasise this simple and obvious concept due to the number of times in training,
checking and SAIRs that we see P-I-O-S-E-E being used as a confirmation mechanism for a decision already made
(usually in the Captain’s mind) before P-I-O-S-E-E is started. This is an error that has led to some very peculiar
diagnosis of the problem and subsequent action. You must use P-I-O-S-E-E as an independent process through
which you will come to a safe decision.
“Encourage the F/O to analyse the problem first”

Another frequently observed error in the use of P-I-O-S-E-E is the undesirable effect that the authority gradient
has in the cockpit. Typically, the Captain takes control of the analysis of the problem and either fails to consult
the F/O at all or else uses the leading question “Do you agree”? It is rare that the F/O advocates a different
analysis. That is why we have also emphasised the need for the F/O to “Advocate your opinion........Speak Up!”
“Remember to evaluate”
Commonly crews come up with a good decision but fail to consider other options while executing there initial
plan. Situations can and will change, often quickly. Continually ask yourself “Is this still a good idea?”

Core Competencies Assessment and Behavioural Indicators

Throughout training sessions instructors will actively monitor, develop and train crews in the use of and importance of good
CRM concepts. Some of these CRM topics form part of the Ryanair Core Competencies which are used in all progress
assessments and checks to evaluate student progress.
The Ryanair Core Competencies Assessment

All the competencies are assessed on a scale of 1 to 5. The Ryanair Behavioural Marker Scheme is used to aid instructors
through assessment in the nine areas below.
Core Competency Performance Indicators

Competency Description Behavioural Indicators
Identifies and
applies
procedures in • Identifies the source of operating instructions.
accordance with • Follows SOPs unless a higher degree of safety dictates an
published appropriate deviation.
Application of operating • Identifies and follows all operating instructions in a timely
manner.
Procedures instructions and
• Correctly operates aircraft systems and associated
applicable equipment.
regulations, • Complies with applicable regulations.
using the • Applies relevant procedural knowledge.
appropriate
knowledge.
• Demonstrates knowledge of relevant Operational
Demonstrates Procedures.
relevant • Demonstrates technical knowledge of aircraft systems
operational, and their effect on the safe operation of the flight.
• Demonstrates knowledge of procedures for operating a
Knowledge technical and
commercial aircraft under IFR.
procedural
• Displays an appropriate level of background knowledge.
knowledge. • Applies knowledge effectively to practical scenarios.
• Displays ability to locate required information using all
reference material.
• Controls the aircraft using automation with accuracy and
Controls the smoothness as appropriate to the situation.
aircraft flight • Detects deviations from the desired aircraft trajectory and
path through takes appropriate action.
automation, • Contains the aircraft within the normal flight envelope.
Aircraft Flight Path • Manages the flight path to achieve optimum operational
including
Management performance.
appropriate use
Automation • Maintains the desired flight path during flight using
of flight
automation whilst managing other tasks and distractions.
management • Selects appropriate level and mode of automation in a
system(s) and timely manner considering phase of flight and workload.
guidance. • Effectively monitors automation, including engagement
and automatic mode transitions.

Competency Description Performance Indicators
• Controls the aircraft manually with accuracy and
smoothness as appropriate to the situation.
Controls the • Detects deviations from the desired aircraft trajectory and
aircraft flight takes appropriate action.
path through • Contains the aircraft within the normal flight envelope.
manual flight, • Controls the aircraft safely using only the relationship
Aircraft Flight Path including between aircraft attitude, speed and thrust.
Management appropriate use • Manages the flight path to achieve optimum operational
performance.
Manual of flight
• Maintains the desired flight path during manual flight
management whilst managing other tasks and distractions.
system(s) and • Selects appropriate level and mode of flight guidance
flight guidance systems in a timely manner considering phase of flight and
systems. workload.
• Effectively monitors flight guidance systems including
engagement and automatic mode transitions.
• Ensures the recipient is ready and able to receive the
information.
• Selects appropriately what, when, how and with whom to
communicate.
• Conveys messages clearly, accurately and concisely.
Demonstrates • Confirms that the recipient correctly understands
effective oral, important information.
non- verbal and • Listens actively and demonstrates understanding when
written receiving information.
Communication • Asks relevant and effective questions.
communications,
• Adheres to standard radiotelephone phraseology and
in normal and
procedures.
non-normal • Accurately reads and interprets required company and
situations. flight documentation.
• Completes accurate reports as required by operating
procedures.
• Correctly interprets non-verbal communication.
• Uses eye contact, body movement and gestures that are
consistent with and support verbal messages.
• Understands and agrees with crew’s roles and objectives
• Creates an atmosphere of open communication and
encourages team participation.
• Uses initiative and gives direction when required.
• Admits mistakes and takes responsibility.
• Anticipates/responds appropriately to other crew
member needs.
Demonstrates • Carries out instructions when directed.
Leadership & effective • Communicates relevant concerns and intentions
Teamwork leadership & • Gives and receives feedback constructively
team working • Confidently intervenes when important for safety.
• Demonstrates empathy and shows respect and tolerance
for other people.
• Engages others in planning and allocates activities fairly
and appropriately according to abilities.
• Addresses and resolves conflicts and disagreements in a
constructive manner.
• Projects self-control in all situations.

• Seeks accurate and adequate information from

appropriate sources.
Accurately • Identifies and verifies what and why things have gone
identifies risks wrong.
and resolves • Identifies proper problem solving strategies.
Problem Solving & • Perseveres in working through problems without reducing
problems. Uses
Decision Making safety.
the appropriate
• Uses appropriate and timely decision making processes.
decision making • Sets priorities appropriately.
process. • Identifies and considers options effectively.
• Improvises when faced with unforeseeable circumstances
to achieve the safest outcome.
• Identifies and assesses accurately the state of the aircraft
and its systems.
• Identifies and assesses accurately the aircrafts vertical and
lateral position, and its anticipated flight path.
Perceives and • Identifies and assesses accurately the general
comprehend all environment as it may affect the operation.
of the relevant • Keeps track of time and fuel.
information • Maintains awareness of the people involved in or affected
Situation Awareness available and by the operation and their capacity to perform as
expected.
anticipates what
• Anticipates accurately what could happen, plans and stays
could happen ahead of the situation.
that may affect • Develops effective contingency plans based upon
the operation. potential threats.
• Identifies and manages threats to the safety of the aircraft
and people.
• Recognizes and effectively responds to indications of
reduced situation awareness.

Ditching
Ref Ops Manual Part A + SEP Manual
Ditching is an emergency landing on water. Analysis has shown that, in the event of a water landing, the 737
should float at a depth and attitude favourable to safe evacuation of passengers and crew.
The possibility of a ditching is remote, but as long as the possibility exists, complete knowledge of procedures and
equipment is necessary. Ditching preparations are necessary to secure all loose objects and have all passengers
and crew safely belted into seats prior to the water landing. With few exceptions, ditching procedures are similar
to those used in land evacuation. Communication with the flight deck is required to ensure that the cabin is
prepared in a timely manner.
The passenger briefing must be amended to suit the location. Passengers are instructed to put on life jackets and
follow inflation instructions. Life jackets are stored under each passenger seat or in the PSU and crew life jackets
are located in the flight deck and under each jumpseat. There are also 5 spare life jackets in the hatbin at row 33
DEF.
Ditching studies for the 737 indicate that with an aft centre of gravity and high gross weight, the aft doors will be
just below water level. Opening the aft doors would seriously degrade the flotation characteristics of the aircraft
and therefore, it is imperative that the aft doors NOT be opened during a ditching. The remaining exits, forward
and overwing will provide sufficient evacuation capability.
The slides are certified as flotation devices but are not an approved survival raft. To release the slide from the
aeroplane, lift flap and pull handle. The slide remains attached to the aeroplane by a mooring line, until
automatically or manually separated. The mooring line automatically separates to prevent damage to the slide if
the aeroplane sinks. To manually disconnect the mooring line from the aeroplane girt, release the Velcro tab and
pull the line from metal rings.
In a ditching situation evacuation will begin immediately the aircraft has come to a complete stop.
Note 1
In an unplanned ditching, such as rejected takeoff, various openings in the aeroplane may cause water to enter
the aeroplane at high rates causing the aeroplane to settle in the water rapidly. As a result, the aeroplane will not
float as long as in a planned ditching, and will require a more rapid evacuation of passengers. If an immediate
passenger evacuation is necessary due to an unplanned ditching, priority should be given to getting the
passengers out of the aircraft.
Note 2
During a ‘time available’ ditching, the DITCHING checklist will guide the flight crew to instruct the cabin crew to
seat passengers as far forward as possible. This instruction means that passengers should be re-seated as
necessary to fill all empty seats as far forward as possible. Any empty seats should be as far aft as possible.
QRH Guidance
The DITCHING checklist instructs the flight crew to advise the cabin crew, via the PA, that ditching is imminent.
This occurs at approximately 30 seconds before ditching and is the prompt for the cabin crew to shout “Brace,

Brace” to the passengers. The flight crew will advise the cabin crew to brace for impact just prior to touch down
with the PA “Brace, Brace”.
Send Distress Signals

Transmit Mayday, current position, course, speed, altitude, situation, intention, time and position of intended
touchdown, and type of airplane using existing air-to-ground frequency. Set transponder code 7700 and, if
practical, determine the course to the nearest ship or landfall.
Advise Crew and Passengers

Alert the crew and the passengers to prepare for ditching. Assign life raft positions (as installed) and order all
loose equipment in the airplane secured. Put on life vests, shoulder harnesses, and seat belts. Do not inflate life
vests until after exiting the airplane.
Fuel Burn-Off
Consider burning off fuel prior to ditching, if the situation permits. This provides greater buoyancy and a lower
approach speed. However, do not reduce fuel to a critical amount, as ditching with engine thrust available
improves ability to properly control touchdown.
Passenger Cabin Preparation

Confer with cabin personnel either by interphone or by having them report to the flight deck in person to ensure
passenger cabin preparations for ditching are complete.
Ditching Final
Transmit final position. Select flaps 40 or landing flaps appropriate for the existing conditions.
Advise the cabin crew of imminent touchdown. On final approach announce ditching is imminent and advise crew
and passengers to brace for impact.
Maintain airspeed at VREF. Maintain 200 to 300 fpm rate of descent.
Plan to touchdown on the windward side and parallel to the waves or swells, if possible.
To accomplish the flare and touchdown, rotate smoothly to touchdown attitude of 10° to 12°. Maintain airspeed
and rate of descent with thrust.
Initiate Evacuation
After the airplane has come to rest, proceed to assigned ditching stations and evacuate as soon as possible,
ensuring all passengers are out of the airplane. Deploy slides/rafts. Be careful not to rip or puncture the
slides/rafts. Avoid drifting into or under parts of the airplane. Remain clear of fuel-saturated water.

Double Briefing & Non Precision Approaches

The Boeing guidance on conducting an NPA is to brief the approach chart and then the crew’s intentions on
conducting the approach. The RYR double briefing is fully in compliance with this guidance. Therefore, the PF
should brief the approach chart and then discuss how they will fly the approach. eg. Configuration sequence, A/P
and MCP selections, standard calls and RYR profile events etc.
Non Precision Approaches vary in complexity and in many destinations involve a significant amount of threats.
The respective airfield brief should be consulted before conducting the approach as it will contain detailed
guidance on managing the threats for the approach. For example, GCRR RWY 21.
Brief the approach chart as normal then brief how you are actually going to fly the Approach. The picture below
is a suggested method of using the approach chart picture to structure your double brief.
The double briefing handy dandy is used after the above as an aid memoir to ensure that nothing has been
missed when your briefing is complete. This should all be completed in the Approach part of DALTA.
DOUBLE BRIEF-NON PRECISION OR VISUAL APPROACH

Independently verify and pre-set QNH / Minimums…………….……………………………………………….Checked and Set
Cold Temp Correction…………………………………………………………………………………………………..………Checked and Set
Configuration Sequence…………………………………………………………………….……………………………….……………Reviewed
AFDS and A/T –Modes and Selections……………………………………………….……………………..……………….……..Reviewed
Actions when Visual……………………………………………………………………..…………………………….…………………...Reviewed
Actions at MDA / DA, if not Visual……………………………………………………………………………………….……………Reviewed
Landing Gate……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….…...Reviewed

Additionally, RNAV items should be read if conducting a RNAV approach.
Example Double Briefing

Are you ready for a double brief?
1. I will ask for F1 at 15 nm, F5 at 12 nm.
2. I will intercept the localizer with VORLOC.
3. Please call me ‘approaching descent’ 2nm before the descent point which is XXXXX, I will set XXX feet,
make sure VNAV is engaged and use speed intervent. At the FAF I will call “FAF, XXXX feet, mention flags
or no flags”.
4. I want you to call out altitude versus distance in advance and inform me on the profile at these distances.
5. At X NM, I will ask for GEAR DOWN F15 and landing checks to flaps. Thereafter I will ask for landing flaps
XX. At 1000 AAL, I will set the missed approach altitude, XXXX feet. Landing gate is XXX feet’.
6. When visual I will disconnect AT & AP and ask you to recycle the FD’s. Minimums are XXX feet, no/cold
temperature corrected. If we need to go around I will (explain the technique and actions, routing is already
discussed in the approach brief).
7. Any questions?
This is purely an example of the preferred structure and a possible sequence of events during a double briefing.
Where necessary and applicable the modes, settings, speed schedule and configuration changes may differ
from approach to approach. Settings used in this example are purely indicative and may not be the actual
setting for your approach. Ensure you make clear any threats that apply to the approach you are about to fly
and be sure to include how you will mitigate against these. Read the AFB as it contains much of this information
already.

Emergency Descent
Ref QRH - Emergency Descent, FCTM Chapter 7 - Rapid Descent
The Emergency Descent procedures in the QRH non-normal checklist remain unchanged in both the non-normal
checklists and the QRH ‘Manoeuvres’ section. The actions by the crew, however, must be to comply with the ICAO
recommendations specified in the Flight Supplement booklet ‘Emergency’ section.
Precautionary Note: If structural integrity is in doubt, limit speed as much as possible and avoid high manoeuvring
loads.
Structural damage must be considered following rapid or explosive decompression in which loss of pressurisation
is instantaneous, an instant loss of pressure would normally be associated with an airframe/skin rupture or
window blowout both of which may compromise the structural integrity of the airframe. If structural damage
exists or is suspected, limit airspeed to current speed or less.
The Rapid descent is normally made with the landing gear up. However, when structural integrity is in doubt and
airspeed must be limited, extension of the landing gear may provide a more satisfactory rate of descent. If the
landing gear is to be used during the descent, comply with the landing gear placard speeds. Where structural
damage is not suspected, crews should initially set MMO when descending from high altitude to ensure the
maximum rate of descent is achieved. Careful monitoring of the FMAs and the PFD is required. During descent,
the IAS/MACH speed window changes from MACH to IAS at approximately 300KIAS. Manually reset to VMO as
needed.
Follow the procedure outlined in the QRH Manoeuvres section (MAN)
Please reference the Rapid Depressurization section in this document.
The initial Captains actions can be easily summarised as follows:
• DIAL - select lower altitude at MCP

• LVL CHG - select level change at MCP
• TURN - initiate the turn at MCP HDG SEL
FCTM Guidance
“When approaching the target altitude, ensure the altitude is set in the MCP altitude select window, and the
command speed is set to LRC or approximately 300 knots before level-off is initiated. This aids in a smooth
transition to level flight.”
Removing Oxygen Mask

The oxygen masks should only be removed when the cabin altitude is below 10,000ft. This can be checked on the
cabin altitude indication on the pressurization panel. The CABIN ALTITUDE light will have illuminated when the
cabin altitude exceeds 10,000ft, however it should be noted that the light may not extinguish until the cabin
altitude reduces below 8500ft. The main point of reference to remove the oxygen masks is the cabin altitude
Indication and not the CABIN ALTITUDE light extinguishing.

Cabin Crew co-ordination during and following an Emergency Descent

General knowledge of and understanding the procedures carried out
by Cabin Crew during an incident or event is an important
requirement for all Pilots. As a Pilot you must be aware of what
actions Cabin Crew complete during an emergency, what
expectations they have in the form of communication from the flight
deck, what workload the Cabin Crew are subjected to during a non-
normal event and the importance of clear and concise
communication between flight deck and Cabin Crew.
Press ATTEND CALL and call “Number One to the Flight Deck” Ops Manual Part A, Emergencies in Flight. If an
emergency occurs during flight, the passengers will be instructed in such emergency action as may be appropriate
to the circumstances. The procedures to be used have been developed for various scenarios and are contained in
the Safety and Emergency Procedures Manual.
The call to initiate a line of communication with the Cabin Crew in an emergency is “No 1 to the flight deck”.
This will inform the Cabin Crew that an emergency situation exists. On hearing this call the No 1 will proceed to
the cabin interphone and await a communication from the Captain.
Ops Manual Part A, SEP, Decompression Drill:
MASK ON
Grab nearest available mask. Shout at passengers to do the same.
SIT DOWN
If necessary, sit on the floor or passengers lap.
STRAP IN
Put seatbelt on. (Will hear PA “Emergency Descent” (3 times) A/C will then do emergency descent)
• “No 1 to the flight deck” *It is now safe to get off O2*
• No 1 goes to the interphone to receive NITS, repeat it back and synchronise watches
• No 2, 3 and 4 stow the trolleys and go to the fwd galley
• Make a no-smoking and reassurance PA
• Receive NITS from No 1, repeat it back and synchronise watches
• Check the toilets for any incapacitated pax
• Administer first aid - go through cabin with portable O2
• Check for any fire or structural damage
• Brief ABP's to guard the doors (As the aircraft is now unpressurised the doors can be opened).

“No 1 to the Flight Deck” – Inflight

If “No 1 to the flight deck” is heard during the flight:
• No 1 picks up interphone and says “Cabin to FD – No 1 standing by”
• No 1 receives NITS from Captain, repeats back and synchronises watch
• No 2, 3 and 4 stow trolleys and go to FWD galley to wait for No 1
• No 1 gives NITS to No 2, 3 and 4. They repeat as a group and synchronise watches
• All Cabin Crew must carry out the drill relevant to NITS briefing
Note: Captain may ask for password and for No 1 to enter the flight deck for the NITS briefing or may decide to
keep the door locked and continue all communication via the interphone. This is at the Captain's discretion.

Engine Malfunctions
Engine Failure Recognition (Turbo Fan Malfunctions)
ENGINE FAILURE ENGINE SEVERE DAMAGE

The above indications are typical of an engine The above indications are typical of an engine having severe
flameout/failure or rundown. No apparent damage is damage / seizure. This is recognisable by the lack of rotation
evident, engine spools down normally. of the N1 gauge. Damage is therefore evident.
The Engine in this situation is generally considered The Engine in this situation is not suitable for an Engine
acceptable for an Engine Inflight start unless other Inflight start attempt.
conditions would indicate damage such as noise, smell etc. A condition such as this example would regularly be
The Engine Failure alert appears on the EGT gauge when N2 accompanied by a noise / bang or vibration.
drops below 50%. The Engine Failure alert appears on the EGT gauge when N2
drops below 50%.

ENGINE SEPARATION ENGINE TURBINE BLADE FAILURE

The above indications are typical of an engine separation. The above indications are typical of an engine turbine blade
This is recognisable by the loss of signal to the engine detaching from the turbine. Effects can include a loud bang,
instrumentation. high or rapidly rising EGT, high vibrations at high thrust
Of course in this situation an Engine Inflight start attempt is settings (see VIB indicator), decrease in N1 efficiency and or
pointless. decrease in available thrust. Damage is therefore evident.
A condition such as this example could be accompanied by The engine in this situation should be shut down and is not
a noise / bang or vibration etc. suitable for an Engine Inflight start attempt.
Asymmetry associated with a separated engine condition is
generally less than severe damage due to the removal of
drag from that wing.

Engine malfunction recognition
• A common error seen during simulator training is incorrect identification of engine malfunction leading
the crew to perform the incorrect QRH procedure. (i.e. is it severe damage, flameout, stall/surge, etc).
• The tabulation of engine conditions and their symptoms below shows that many failures have similar
symptoms, it may not be practicable to diagnose the nature of the engine problem solely from flight
deck instrumentation, additional information can be obtained from Cabin Crew reports, ATC, etc. It is
essential that action is taken with the correct engine, and airplane control is kept as the first priority, and
maintaining safe flight.
Vis cowl damage

Symptom ►
cabin / bleed air

Smoke/odour in
Oil ind change*
Visible flame
Fire warning
N1 change
N2 change
Engine
FF change
Vibration
High EGT
Condition
Bang
▼ Yaw
Engine separation ◘ ◘ ◘ ◘ • • • • •
Severe damage • ◘ ◘ • ◘ • • • ◘ ◘ • ◘
Surge • ◘ ◘ ◘ • ◘ ◘ ◘ ◘
Bird ingestion / FOD ◘ ◘ ◘ • ◘ ◘ ◘ ◘ ◘
Seizure ◘ ◘ ◘ ◘ • • ◘ ◘ ◘
Flameout ◘ • • • •
Fuel control problems ◘ • • • ◘
Fire • ◘ ◘ ◘ ◘
Tailpipe fires • ◘
Hot start ◘ •
Icing ◘ • ◘
Reverser
uncommanded • • •
deployment
Fuel leak • • •
• = Symptom very likely. ◘= Symptom possible. = blank fields mean that the symptom is unlikely.
For excellent guidance on turbofan malfunctions and symptoms please refer to the “videos” section on the
eLearning website.
FCTM Guidance
Oil pressure is considered as the most significant of several oil system indicators. Oil temperature, oil quantity
and oil pressure indications enable the flight crew to recognize a deteriorating oil system. While engine operation
is governed by both oil pressure and oil temperature limits, there is no minimum oil quantity limit.
Therefore, there is no low oil quantity NNC in the QRH.

If abnormal oil quantity indications are observed, check oil pressure and oil temperature. If oil pressure and oil
temperature indications are normal, operate the engine normally. Accomplish the appropriate NNC for any non-
normal oil pressure or oil temperature indications.

Engine Fire Switch Operation
When operating the engine or APU fire switches crews should ensure that the QRH guidance of ‘rotate to the stop
and hold for 1 second’ is followed:
The fire switch should be held to the stop position for 1 second and crews should confirm that the bottle has been
discharged.
Engine Failure during Takeoff at 500 Feet
➢ Aviate – Navigate – Communicate

➢ When the aircraft is under control PF asks for HDG SEL.
➢ PF then calls “STATE MALFUNCTION”
➢ Complete memory items as necessary
➢ Follow ETP if applicable

Engine Failure at V1
Ref: FCTM Chapter 7 - Engine Out Familiarization
An engine failure at or after V1 initially affects yaw much like a crosswind effect. Vibration and noise from the
affected engine may be apparent and the onset of the yaw may be rapid.
The airplane heading is the best indicator of the correct rudder pedal input. To counter the thrust asymmetry due
to an engine failure, stop the yaw with rudder.
Flying with lateral control wheel displacement or with excessive aileron trim causes spoilers to be raised
Rotation and Liftoff - One Engine Inoperative

If an engine fails between V1 and liftoff, maintain directional control by smoothly applying rudder proportionate
with thrust decay.
During a normal all engine takeoff, a smooth continuous rotation toward 15° (at 2-2.5°/sec or 2.5°-3° for 700s) of
pitch is initiated at VR. With one engine inoperative, a smooth continuous rotation is also initiated at VR; however,
the target pitch attitude is approximately 2° to 3° below the normal all engine pitch attitude. The rate of rotation
with an engine inoperative is also slightly slower (1/2° per second less) than that for a normal takeoff.
Consequently, a rotation rate of 1.5-2°/sec up to a pitch attitude of 12-13° should be attained (2-2.5°/sec for
700s). After liftoff adjust pitch attitude to maintain the desired speed.
If the engine failure occurs at or after liftoff, apply rudder and aileron to control heading and keep the wings level.
In flight, correct rudder input approximately centres the control wheel. To centre the control wheel, rudder is
required in the direction that the control wheel is displaced. This approximates a minimum drag configuration.
Typical Rotation - One Engine Inoperative

Liftoff attitude should be achieved in approximately 5 seconds. Adjust pitch attitude, as needed, to maintain
desired airspeed of V2 to V2+20 knots.
The rotation rate on with one engine inoperative for the B737-800 is 1.5° to 2° per second.
(737-700 One Engine Inop rotation 2° to 2.5° per second)
Follow the guidance in the QRH – Takeoff, Engine Failure at V1
Objectives:
• Correct recognition of engine failure and callouts
• Effective handling avoiding over controlling.
• Accurate handling during the acceleration and clean up phase
• Correct actions, callouts and memory items (if applicable).
• Compliance with applicable profile
• ATC co-ordination, notification and transponder emergency codes used as applicable (7700 for an
emergency unless other code requested by ATC)
• Communications with crew, announcements and passenger care
• Correct checklist called for and actioned
• PIOSEE and next course of action

Additional Information - Engine Failure after Takeoff

FCTM3.35 Flap Retraction ‐ One Engine Inoperative - On airplanes with FMC U10.7 and earlier, at engine out
acceleration height, select flaps up manoeuvring speed on the MCP. Engine‐out acceleration and climb capability
for flap retraction are functions of airplane thrust to weight ratio. The flight director commands a near level or a
slight climb (0‐200 fpm) flap retraction segment. Accelerate and retract flaps on the flap‐speed schedule.
“Do not allow the airplane to develop a significant climb at MFRA. Be aware that as the airplane accelerates the
nose becomes lighter, and constant forward trim inputs are required to avoid a climb developing. It is necessary
to include the IVSI and altimeter in the scan to ensure that the “near level” segment is flown correctly. The
objective is to retract the flaps (drag) and obtain flaps up configuration without undue delay to achieve the correct
climb gradients.
Engine Failure during an ATM Takeoff- Reduced Thrust - One Engine Inoperative
(FCTM guidance Ch3, 3.36-37) A reduced thrust takeoff using the ATM is based on a minimum climb gradient that
clears all obstacles with an engine failure after V1. If an engine failure occurs during an ATM takeoff, based on
takeoff performance data, it is not necessary to increase thrust on the remaining engine. However, if more thrust
is desired during an ATM takeoff, thrust on the operating engine may be increased to full takeoff thrust by
manually advancing the thrust levers to the green N1 reference bugs. This is because the takeoff speeds consider
VMCG and VMCA with full takeoff thrust for the actual temperature.
Advancing the operating engine to full takeoff thrust provides additional performance margin. This additional
performance margin is not a requirement of the reduced thrust takeoff certification and its use is at the discretion
of the flight crew. This means that additional thrust is available up to maximum thrust. Unless an engine out
profile is badly mishandled by the PF and the aircraft loses energy this extra thrust should not be required.
Engine Failure during a Fixed Derate Takeoff

During a fixed derate takeoff, the takeoff speeds at low gross weights may not provide a safe operating margin to
minimum control if the thrust levers are advanced beyond the fixed derate limit. A thrust increase beyond the
fixed derate limit following an engine failure, could result in loss of directional control and should not be
accomplished unless, in the opinion of the captain, terrain contact is imminent. This is because the takeoff speeds
consider VMCG and VMCA at the fixed derate level of thrust. This means that additional thrust is available up to
the fixed derate reference N1 bug at the Captains discretion. Maximum thrust is available if in the opinion of the
Captain terrain contact is imminent.
Engine Failure during a Combined Takeoff - Fixed Derate and Assumed Temperature During a takeoff using both
ATM and fixed derate methods of reduced thrust, the takeoff speeds at low gross weights may not provide a safe
operating margin to minimum control if the thrust levers are advanced beyond the fixed derate limit. This is
because the takeoff speeds consider VMCG and VMCA only at the fixed derate level of thrust for the actual
temperature. On airplanes where the fixed derate limit is not indicated on the reference N1 readout, the crew
has no indication where the fixed derate limit is. Therefore, thrust increase should not be accomplished unless in
the opinion of the captain, terrain contact is imminent. For airplanes where the fixed derate limit is indicated on
the reference N1 readout, thrust levers should not be advanced beyond the fixed derate limit unless in the opinion
of the Captain, terrain contact is imminent.
This means that additional thrust is available up to the fixed derate reference N1 bug at the Captains discretion.
Maximum thrust is available if in the opinion of the Captain terrain contact is imminent.
Unless an engine out profile is badly mishandled by the PF and the aircraft loses energy this extra thrust should
not be required.
Common Mistakes
There are a number of common weak areas that have been identified by feedback from training and checking.
These are explained below.
Raising the Gear following an Engine Failure

A common observation during type rating training is that students are automatically raising the gear in an EFATO
situation without due care and attention to ensure that an actual positive rate of climb has been established. The
criteria for determining that the aircraft has obtained a positive rate of climb and that it is safe to raise the gear
is the same for both PF and PM. Prior to the PF Calling “Gear Up” and the PM confirming “Positive Rate” and
retracting the gear, both crewmembers must be satisfied that the aircraft has a positive rate of climb and is safely
away from the ground. Only retract the gear after a positive rate of climb is indicated on the altimeter (Ref: FCTM
Ch 3 – Rotation and Lift off - One Engine Inoperative).
Rotation
Over-rotation or rotation rate too fast - A smooth continuous rotation is initiated at VR to a target pitch attitude
approximately 2° to 3° below the normal all engine pitch attitude of 15 degrees. The rate of rotation with an
engine inoperative is also slightly slower (1/2° per second less) than that for a normal takeoff. After lift-off adjust
pitch attitude to maintain the desired speed.
Pitch control
Poor understanding of what guidance the flight director system is providing. FCTM Ch 3, ‘Takeoff – Engine Failure’
has some very good information on correct handling techniques. Guidance on what the FDs provide is clearly
explained in the same chapter under ‘Initial Climb – One Engine Inoperative’, we would strongly recommend this
as pre-sim reading and study.
MFRA
Acceleration at MFRA should be such that the aircraft does not descend, the flight director commands a near level
or a slight climb (0-200 fpm) during the flap retraction segment. Do not allow the airplane to develop a significant
climb at MFRA. Be aware that as the airplane accelerates the lift increases, constant forward trim inputs are
required to avoid a climb developing. It is necessary to include the VSI and Altimeter in the scan to ensure that
“near level” segment is flown correctly. The objective is to retract the flaps (drag) and obtain flaps up configuration
without undue delay to achieve the correct climb gradients.
Yaw Control
Yaw Control When the rudder is trimmed to level the control wheel, the airplane maintains heading. A small
amount of bank toward the operating engine may be noticeable on the bank indicator. The slip/skid indicator is
displaced slightly toward the operating engine.
Trim
If the airplane is trimmed with too much control wheel displacement, full lateral control is not available and
spoilers on one wing may be raised, increasing drag. Make turns at a constant airspeed and hold the rudder
displacement constant. Do not attempt to coordinate rudder and lateral control in turns. Rudder pedal inputs
produce roll due to yaw and induce the pilot to counter rudder oscillations with opposite control wheel. The
following figure shows correct and incorrect use of the rudder.

Departing from the SID

An engine failure is a safety concern and therefore pilots are permitted to deviate from the assigned clearance
(SID/Missed approach). ATC should be informed of the pilot’s intentions at the most appropriate time but prior
to the aircraft leaving the assigned/expected routing.
Checklists
After the aircraft is under control and any required memory items are complete, a PAN/MAYDAY call should be
made advising ATC of the problem, the intended course of action and any planned deviation from the assigned
routing.
Diversion
Where an engine out climb to an alternate airfield is required, such as a single engine diversion to a takeoff
alternate, reference FMC ENG OUT CLB page for advisory information.

Engine Failure on Final Approach
Objectives:
• Recognition of failure
• Prompt, Effective handling to maintain control and a stabilised approach profile
• Anticipation of thrust requirements during approach and landing
• Reinforcement of Ryanair no blame go-around policy if required
• Landing flare, use of rudder and correct touchdown technique
Early recognition and prompt increase of thrust on the remaining engine with small positive control inputs and
anticipation of rudder make this an easy to manage exercise. Use the squeeze and freeze technique to apply
sufficient rudder to maintain directional control and centre the control wheel. Avoid trimming unless absolutely
necessary. Speed control is essential; recovering from a low speed situation requires significant thrust input which
in turn impacts on handling – Do not allow the speed to deteriorate below Vref.
Airmanship:
• Aviate, Navigate, Communicate
• If able it is acceptable to select Ground Proximity Flap Inhibit switch to...... Flap Inhibit (not required if
flaps are at 30 or 40).
• Master Caution and other warnings are reviewed to assist in recognition of the failure master caution is
reset as soon as the cause of the alert is recognised.
• Flight path control must never be compromised.
• Time permitting and only if deemed essential memory items may be completed at the discretion of the
Pilot in Command, these must not interfere with airplane flight path or configuration. Any memory items
actioned must be agreed and confirmed by each pilot (Reference QRH CI, Non Normal Checklist use)
• No checklist is done or called for when the aircraft is in a critical phase of flight.
The flight Crew must be aware that checklists cannot be created for all conceivable situations and are not intended
to replace good judgment. In some situations, at the Captains discretion deviation from a checklist may be
needed.
Reference FCTM Chapter 5, ILS Section
If an engine failure should occur on final approach with the flaps in the landing position, the decision to continue
the approach or execute a go-around should be made immediately. If the approach is continued and sufficient
thrust is available, continue the approach with landing flaps.
If the approach is continued and sufficient thrust is not available for landing flaps, retract the flaps to 15 and
adjust thrust on the operating engine. Command speed should be increased to VREF+20 (white bug). This sets a
command speed that is equal to at least VREF for flaps 15. Wind additives should be added as needed, if time and
conditions permit. For 737-700 airplanes flaps should be retracted to 15 and command speed increased to VREF
+15 kts (white bug). For further guidance see the FCTM 5.32.
If a go-around is required, follow the go-around and missed approach procedures except use flaps 15 initially if
trailing edge flaps are at 30 or 40. If flaps have been retracted to 15 then a go around will be flown with flaps 1.
Subsequent flap retraction should be made at a safe altitude, above 1000ft AGL (unless a specific missed approach
acceleration height is required for obstacle clearance, e.g. LOWS RW 15) in level flight or a shallow climb.

Emergency Turn Procedures – ETP
Emergency turn procedures are applicable to take-off with an engine failure only. They do not apply to go-
arounds. They are available to view in AIRPORT INFO > RUNWAY COMMENT. If there is no ETP published, then
“Engine Failure Procedure: NONE” is displayed. Complex ETPs requiring chart depictions are displayed in the
Airfield Brief, this will be stated at the bottom of the Boeing OPT TAKEOFF page. An ETP is published when the
straight-out take-off path is not available, for example due to obstacle, terrain or airspace limitations. The ETP is
company specific and is published by the Ryanair Performance Department. The ETP text indicates the route
(track, not heading) and profile to be flown in the event of engine failure during take-off. The acceleration for
flaps retraction shall start at MFRA unless specified otherwise in the ETP text.
SIDs are designed and based on normal all engine operations. Engine out obstacle clearance and all engines SID
requirements are independent. They can be very different including vertical and lateral obstacle clearance
requirements. Compliance with SID climb gradients, do not necessarily assure the engine out obstacle clearance
requirements are met, consequently an ETP must be followed in the engine out case.
An engine failure during take-off is a non-normal condition, and therefore, takes precedence over the SID, noise
abatement, air traffic and other normal operating procedures. It is very important that crew notify ATC about an
engine failure and the intended flight path. The standard statement to ATC should be: “PAN PAN/MAYDAY
MAYDAY (preferable 3 times) Ryanair ___, engine failure, emergency turn (left or right) onto track ___ climbing
to ____ft standby”.
The ETP is for use in the event of an engine failure during take-off. The termination of the take-off segment is
considered to be when the airplane reaches at least one of:
• A hold and minimum altitude
• MSA (25 NM around an airport aid)
The radius of turn will be based on TAS. The flight director pitch bar will command V2 to V2+20 knots depending
on what speed the engine failure occurred at. Consequently, it may be necessary to look ‘through’ the Flight
Director pitch bar if it is required to fly V2.
Normally, a Bank angle of 15⁰ is assumed below V2+15. If a turn is required before MFRA or if the turn must be
completed before acceleration, the bank angle selector can be set (by the PM), at or before turn initiation, to 15ᵒ
to allow the Flight Directors to command the correct angle of bank during the turn (MCP mode HDG SEL).
Minimum height, above end of the runway, to begin an engine out turn will ideally be 400ft but never less than
59ft. Turning point will be defined by fix (RNAV WAYPOINT, VOR, NDB, DME, VOR radial etc) or an altitude (QNH).
Once acceleration is commenced and speed above V2+15, bank angle should be increased to 25. Bank angles up
to 30⁰ are permitted at V2+15 with takeoff flaps, prior to this you must maintain 15⁰. If a turn is required to be
completed before acceleration, the restriction will be included in ETP text (for example “Do not accelerate until
established on track to XXXXX”). Otherwise, acceleration will be at or above MFRA, which may be during the turn.
The ETP applies only to the engine failure during take-off, and is not applicable to go-arounds. The published
missed approach procedure should be followed in case of a go-around with an engine failed.

Engine Failure Diagnosis
Following an engine failure it is critical that all engine parameters are examined by the PM before the Malfunction
is stated to the PF. This includes the Upper and Lower DU and the Fire Panel for confirmation of Engine Overheat
status. Do not forget to include the Engine Vibration indicators which are very reliable in modern aircraft.
The QRH calls for an assessment of the existence of “unusual airframe vibrations” on several occasions. Unusual
airframe vibrations will be evident to the crew on the aircraft (if they exist). However in the simulator these
vibrations cannot be reproduced apart from during the initial event. It is important that this parameter associated
with a severely damaged engine is not ignored or glossed over.
An engine fire is annunciated to the crew by means of:
a. A very loud fire warning bell (normally cancelled)

b. A red master FIRE WARN light annunciating the Fire on the MCP and
c. A red light identifying which engine, or other fire warning protected system is on fire
Given these design features it is not necessary for the PM to start at the top of the Upper DU and discuss each
engine parameter until finally a fire is identified.

Engine In-Flight Start
Objectives:
• Correctly determine whether an engine in-flight start is appropriate
• Correctly action the checklist and minimise threats relating to the checklists use
• Understand the information within the checklist
When to use the in-flight start checklist:

• All items of the condition statement correct.
• Only after completion of the:
o Engine Failure or Shutdown checklist or
o as directed by the Engine Limit or Surge or Stall checklist or
o by the Loss of Thrust on Both Engines checklist.
The in-flight start checklist should only be used under certain conditions as indicated in the checklist condition
statements.
There must be no indication of damage to the engine. Each of

the conditions must be verified as true before continuing with
the checklist. Consider each one carefully and discuss as a crew.
Review the notes within the checklist and consider their

implications. We must have completed one of the three listed
checklists first before attempting an in-flight start.
Completing the checklist

Use the information within the checklist to determine whether a cross bleed or windmill start is most appropriate
for the situation. In-flight start envelope is applicable to all engines and hence the X-BLD start indication above
the N2 indication may not match the envelope requirements.
Review the notes carefully. They give good information about what to expect to see from the engine during the
start. When you get to the step in the checklist that begins the engine start process, read ahead before completing
the items. This means that as a crew you know what you expect to see from the engine. Remember that there is
no EEC in-flight start protection. If an engine start malfunction occurs move the start lever to cutoff after
confirming this action with the PF.
Engine starts and runs normally:
• Check the engine parameters are within limits

• Check that the engine is running normally and responding.

Engine out Cruise

After flap retraction and when all obstructions are cleared ENG OUT can be selected on the FMC ACT ECON CLB
page.
This page provides information on Single Engine:

• Maximum Altitude
• Continuous N1 &
• Engine out speed
This information can be used to enhance decision making and planning particularly when the nearest suitable
airport is not the departure airport or when an engine fails in flight.

Flight Path Management

Flight path management is an area of focus in the airline. Data collected from line operations including SAIRs,
CSRs and ODFM data highlights the requirement for reviewing flight path management. In particular the pitch
and thrust setting during manoeuvres such as go around, and the windshear escape manoeuvre. Flight path
management is embedded in all our operations manuals and procedures. Pilot’s skills should be balanced
between the use of automation for flight path management and the need to maintain pilot manual flying skills.
Responsibility for flight path management remains with the pilots at all times.
There are piloting skills that help prevent the development of risks and threats including:
• FMA awareness
• Management and monitoring
• Active monitoring
• Good manual flying skills
• Clear crew communication
The above skills combined are the elements required to prevent and recover from an undesired aircraft state
should this happen.
Flight path management includes many things including autopilot modes used and when it is appropriate to use
which mode. Therefore, understanding the visual confirmation indicated by the FMAs that the AFDS is giving the
required output is essential – Remember SELECT – VERIFY - CALL. If the output indicates something that is not
expected then it is advisable to either reselect another mode (while establishing why the desired output is not
being received) or if in a critical stage of flight it may be safer to disconnect and fly manually, for example if the
MCP freeze when approaching a level off. Aviation is dynamic with many variables, but pilots should remember;
first and foremost – FLY THE AEROPLANE. At any time, if the aircraft does not follow the desired airspeed or
vertical or lateral profile do not hesitate to change to a lower level of automation.
The table below shows some manoeuvres and the associated pitch and thrust requirements. It also shows if
guidance in the form of the AFDS is available.

Manoeuvre AFDS Pitch Thrust

YES – Guidance is
FD pitch commands Go-around Thrust: advance
given by the FDs and
15° nose up until toward the reduced go-
TOGA x 1 should be followed.
reaching programmed around N1. The thrust
With 1 push of TOGA
rate of climb. mode will annunciate GA.
and Thrust and Pitch
TOGA x 2 set the rate of climb
Go-Around (second produced is between
push after 1000-2000fpm. Once FD pitch commands The A/T advances to the full
A/T achieved FD pitch 15° nose up until go-around N1 limit. The
reaches commands target reaching programmed thrust mode will
reduced airspeed for each flap rate of climb. annunciate N1.
go-around setting based on
thrust) MTOW.
FD commands target
Windshear
speed until ROC
Escape
600fpm. Then
Manoeuvre Aggressively apply
commands 15° pitch
YES - Guidance is maximum thrust. This
until stick shaker. As
(Any time two TOGA x 1 given by the FDs and requires the levers to be
rate of climb increases
tone siren is should be followed pushed to the forward stop.
above 600fpm, FD
heard Disconnect A/T
commands
followed by
deceleration back to
‘windshear’)
target speed.
Pitch to 20°. If terrain
remains a threat, Disconnect A/T, aggressively
NO – crew must
Terrain Escape Manoeuvre continue rotation to apply max thrust. This
disregard FD
(Any time ‘pull up’ is heard) the pitch limit requires the levers to be
commands
indicator or stick pushed to the forward stop.
shaker or initial buffet.
If manoeuvring required, disengage the A/P and A/T.
NO – crew must Smoothly adjust pitch and thrust to satisfy the RA
TCAS RA disregard vertical FD command. Follow the planned lateral flight path
commands unless visual contact with the conflicting traffic
requires other action.
Note: This list is not exhaustive; refer to Manoeuvres section of QRH, and FCOM Vol2 for expanded guidance. This
is not to say that pitch and thrust are the only things required of each manoeuvre, but the intuitive action of ‘fly
the aeroplane’ requires both pitch and thrust.
Energy management consists of continuously controlling each parameter: Airspeed, thrust, configuration and
flight path. The autopilot is simply there to assist the crew in these tasks. Flight path management and the use
of AFDS can divided into two parts, Guidance and Control.
The inability to assess or manage aircraft energy levels during approach is often cited as a causal factor for
unstabilised approaches and runway excursions. 70% of rushed and unstable approaches involve inappropriate
energy management resulting in an excess or deficit of energy.

Energy levels are a function of

• Airspeed,
• Altitude,
• Configuration,
• Thrust level and
• Rate of change of these (trend).
Optimum use of automation requires the integrated and coordinated use of the flight directors, autopilot,
Autothrottle and the FMS to set an appropriate level of guidance and control.
Levels of automation range from the very basic level where the autothrottle and AFDS are switched off to fully
FMS managed flight in LNAV/VNAV with the auto throttle and autopilot engaged.
There are many possible combinations of guidance and control. For example, the guidance can be LNAV and
Vertical Speed with the autopilot and auto throttle engaged or disengaged. Another example is a go-around which
may be flown with different levels of automation ranging from dual channel with the auto throttle engaged to a
manually flown go-around with or without the autothrottle.
Autothrottle use on the 737 is recommended during takeoff and climb in either automatic or manual flight. During
all other phases of flight, autothrottle use is recommended only when the autopilot is engaged in CMD. You must
be able to recognise situations where a reduction in the level of automation is appropriate and act accordingly.
Some situations require prompt action to reduce automation to avoid an undesired aircraft state or upset (e.g.
false glide capture or airspeed unreliable). During these events it may be safer to manually fly the aircraft using
appropriate guidance until the source of the problem can be identified. Conversely there may be situations where
an increase in the level of automation is appropriate, for example following unintentional Control Wheel Steering
pitch or roll activation.
Autoflight systems are not designed to replace the pilot, they are there to assist and reduce workload. You are
responsible for the flight path at all times, safe flight depends upon the pilots.

Flight Path Vector (FPV)

Ryanair does not prescribe procedures for the use of the Flight
Path Vector during normal flight procedures. Ryanair regards
the FPV as a pictorial presentation of the Flight Path Angle and
lateral drift and as such is a piece of information that is
available to crews during normal and non-normal procedures.
The use of the FPV may assist crews with flight path
management during certain flight situations.
The following information is provided to crews in the pre

simulator study guide for general guidance. The simulator will be used to
train crews in the basic functions of the FPV in the event that they would need to use this information.
The FPV symbol represents airplane flight path angle

vertically and drift angle laterally. The FPV is
displayed on the PFD when the EFIS control panel
FPV switch is selected on.
The FPV shows the Flight Path Angle (FPA) above or

below the horizon line and drift angle left or right of
pitch scale’s centre. The FPA uses inertial and
barometric altitude inputs. The vertical FPA is
unreliable with unreliable primary altitude displays.
The FPV symbol is displayed in two brightness levels.

The FPV symbol is displayed dim when either the
Flight Directors (FD) or a TCAS RA is displayed. The
FPV symbol is displayed bright when FD’s are off and
there is no TCAS RA.
The vertical axis shows FPA relative to the horizon. The lateral axis shows the drift angle relative to the centre of
the pitch scale on the ADI. The amount of drift cannot be determined from the display. During Ryanair flight
operations the FPV may be used.
The FPV can be used to maintain level flight. Simply place the FPV on the horizon to maintain altitude.
The primary and ONLY certain method of establishing a safe and appropriate flight path when faced with an
unreliable airspeed condition is to fly the airplane by establishing and confirming the proper attitude and thrust
settings for the phase of flight.
Pilot knowledge and anticipation of aircraft pitch and

thrust values for any given stage of flight is an
essential skill for every Pilot; recognition that an
unusual attitude or thrust setting exists for the phase
of flight is critical. These are values that every pilot
sees daily during operations yet flight with Unreliable
Airspeed remains extremely challenging for pilots.
The QRH Performance Inflight PI-QRH10.1 -10.2
sections contain target pitch and %N1 values for
various stages of flight. In circumstances when no
reliable airspeed source is available in the flight deck
these must be referenced.

Do not use the FPV to determine flight path during Unreliable Airspeed conditions as per the QRH.
The FPV can also be used during raw data or non-precision approaches. Once established on the approach, place
the FPV 3° below the horizon to maintain a 3° FPA.
Caution
The FPV does not indicate FPA relative to the runway, any ground based aid or FMC based navaid. There is no use
for the FPV drift angle feature during Ryanair operations.
The FPV can also be used in conjunction with the weather radar. To establish the correct radar tilt during climb or
descent adjust the tilt in relation to the displayed FPA.
FPV use during Airspeed Unreliable

Unreliable airspeed indications can result from
blocking or freezing of the pitot/static system or a
severely damaged or missing radome. During an
Airspeed Unreliable condition, the FPV should not
be used as a reference in maintaining proper path
control.

FMAs (Flight Mode Annunciations)

Crews must fully understand the importance of confirmation of Flight Mode Annunciations during all phases of
flight. Understanding the AFDS and available modes is essential to the safe operation of the aircraft.
If a pilot is not regularly referencing the FMAs during flight to confirm what AFDS mode is armed and active, then
they are not managing the operation of the aircraft appropriately and at risk of error. The correct understanding
of what the aircraft AFDS system is providing at any given stage of flight is essential. This is particularly true during
times of high workload, unexpected flight conditions and non-normal operations. Simply selecting a mode on the
MCP does not confirm that the mode is active. Not confirming that the expected autoflight mode is engaged or
captured by reference to the FMA is a threat to the safe operation of the aircraft. Students must study these
modes and annunciations; know what mode they require for any given stage of flight, understand what they
should expect when it is active, what limitations it has and most importantly, VERIFY that the system is engaged
in this mode.
This level of situation awareness extends to all aspects of operation, aircraft handling and systems management
e.g. Before Takeoff Checklist: Selecting the Transponder to TA/RA requires confirmation by observing the correct
annunciation on the ND (Navigation Display) [TA ONLY].

FMC Failure
The possibility of a dual FMC failure is a realistic assumption. Pilots / students should study the following guidance:
Recognition
• There are two checklists for FMC FAIL depending on the aircrafts registration and its FMC configuration.
• Information may be lost on the CDU displays.
• FMC supplied information may be lost on one or both map displays.
• Message VTK followed by map mode failure flags may be shown.
• LNAV and VNAV may disengage.
Conventional Navigation
Conventional Navigation skills remain an important part of a pilot’s skill/knowledge capability; this becomes very
apparent in the event of a dual FMC failure. Pilots should recognise the need to revise/study and retain the skills
and knowledge required to safely manage a flight in circumstances that are still considered normal procedures.
Remind crews of available guidance on navigation display and modes available, this information should be used
to the best advantage during a dual FMC failure. A lack of understanding of most suitable display modes is
common e.g. selection of VOR CTR mode on both pilot NDs removes any information on TCAS and weather radar.
Holding procedures during FMC Failure: Simple techniques like setting the inbound courses for the hold to
improve situation awareness.
The content and availability of Supplementary Procedures when required to manually set Vref speeds and gross
weight for approach and landing is an important requirement in a pilot’s knowledge base.
Ops Manual PART A 8.3.2.1 General Requirements (Navigation Equipment): Facing a dual FMC failure the correct
use of the NAVAIDS as per Ops Manual Part A must be followed.
For example:
• When appropriate (e.g. when filed route is not RNAV) tracking between two aids, as on airways, the
closer of the two aids will be used for navigation. When tracking inbound to a radio aid both radios should
be selected to that aid. After passing a radio aid both radios should remain tuned to aid until it has been
confirmed that the aircraft is established outbound from the aid. At this point if the next radio aid is
within range, the radio of the PM should be selected to this aid and a cross check made the aircraft is
proceeding towards the aid. At the midpoint the radio for the PF should then be selected to the inbound
aid, given equal reception quality;
• With VHF navigation aids, the outbound and inbound course direction between two stations may differ
because of different magnetic variation at each station. Course arrows/deviation points on CDIs/HSI’s
should be selected accordingly;
• The RMI pointers should be selected to the aids used for tracking unless otherwise used for cross cuts
• When reading the QRH checklist, the phrase “Resume Conventional Navigation” in Ryanair requires
careful consideration of the following actions:
─ Use VOR mode on the ND
─ Tune and identify navaids (auto ident of stations is acceptable)
─ Set courses as necessary to track TO or FROM the navaid. The desired course must be set on
the same side as the autopilot in CMD. i.e. if using CMB B, ensure course set on F/O’s side. The
autopilot cannot track a course set on the opposite side. However, the opposite side can be
used for cross fixes as required.

─ Use VOR/LOC to reduce workload

─ Be prepared to change course when overflying the navaid by:
▪ Select HDG SEL just prior to overflying the navaid
▪ Set outbound course
▪ Set an intercept heading for new course
▪ Arm VOR/LOC

Fuel System Non-Normals

In this section we will look at three fuel NNCs that are commonly mishandled by 737 flight crews worldwide. The
lesson here is to take your time, do not rush the checklists and do consider and assess the meaning of each step
of the checklist. Some of these checklists mention fuel leak, however it is important that crews take their time to
accurately assess the problem whilst deciding if a fuel leak does exist. It is more common that crews shut down
engines for a mis-diagnosed fuel leak than for actual fuel leaks. Keep an open mind to avoid confirmation bias.
It is a mandatory requirement to preserve CVR data after an incident/accident and it is the responsibility of the
aircraft Commander to ensure that the yellow-collared CVR circuit breaker is pulled at the earliest opportunity on
the ground. The CVR CB must never be pulled in flight.
IMBAL NNC
The objective of the checklist is to decide if a fuel leak is suspected or to balance fuel if there is no fuel leak. Be
aware of confirmation bias. There are several possible reasons for an IMBAL which will be looked at in turn.
The IMBAL checklist does not provide further checklist

steps for engine malfunctions. Sound judgement must
be used when determining if this condition applies.
Review primary and secondary engine display and
analyse engine indications before proceeding. This is
an “If” statement which should be answered with a YES
or NO by the crew prior to proceeding to the next step
or a different checklist that deals with the engine
malfunction.
In step 2 the crew is presented with three possible

causes. Each one of these is dealt with in the remaining
IMBAL checklist. The first possible cause in the checklist
is a fuel leak in steps 3 and 4:
There are two statements that will help the crew

decide if there is a fuel leak, “the total fuel remaining
is less than planned fuel remaining” and “an engine
has excessive fuel flow”.
The total fuel remaining is less than planned fuel

remaining. This step is often rushed when in fact it
requires diligence and accuracy by the flight crew.
Compare the fuel on board from the fuel gauges with
the planned fuel on the OFP, remembering to factor
in any extra fuel uplifted prior to departure.
The very basic lesson here is: if you haven’t lost any
fuelthen there is no fuel leak! The fuel is in the tanks
but the fuel system is not configured correctly.
An engine has excessive fuel flow. Check the fuel flow indicators.

The ‘Fuel Used’ readout on the engine displays may provide useful information to help determine if there is a
leak. It is important that the fuel used is reset during pre-flight procedures.
If a fuel leak is suspected go to the fuel leak engine checklist. Go step 5 if a fuel leak is not suspected. In step 5 a
fuel leak has been ruled out as the cause of the IMBAL. Step 5 and 6 will look at the next possible cause – an
inoperative crossfeed valve:
The crossfeed valve has been the cause of several fuel imbalances. The indication to the crew of a functioning
crossfeed selector and valve is the light changing from bright to dim, and from dim to bright to extinguished when
commanded closed.
Crossfeed valve failures that have caused fuel imbalance problems include:

• During preflight preparation and during in-

flight fuel balancing the crew checks the
crossfeed valve operation. The light did go
bright blue followed by dim when opened
and when commanded closed the light went
bright and then extinguished. The crew
assumed that the valve had closed when in
fact the C/B had tripped leaving the
crossfeed valve partially open and the light
extinguished (the light and valve is
protected by the same C/B, see fuel system
general above)
• A valve that is in the closed position but
leaking.
• If the valve is open there is strong likelihood
of an imbalance developing. This is due to
allowable differences in fuel pump output
pressure. The tank with the highest fuel pump pressure will supply both engines with fuel. It is not
possible to predict which main tank fuel pumps will produce the highest pressure.
If the crossfeed selector is not operating correctly go to the crossfeed selector inoperative checklist. If the
crossfeed valve is operating correctly go to step 7.
Note: ensure you understand the difference between SELECTOR and VALVE.
Step 7 of the IMBAL checklist commences fuel balancing. Step 8 is done when fuel balancing is complete. The
crew must monitor the correct operation of the crossfeed valve.
Crossfeed Selector Inoperative NNC

The Valve open light may or may not be illuminated depending on the failure.
Conditions indicate:
• The crossfeed VALVE OPEN light stays illuminated bright
blue
It stays in bright blue indicating that valve position and

crossfeed selector disagree.
• The CROSSFEED selector is in the open position and the
crossfeed VALVE OPEN light is extinguished
The valve is closed, or; the C/B has tripped

• When the CROSSFEED selector is rotated to a new
position, the crossfeed VALVE OPEN light does not
illuminate bright blue.
This could indicate a tripped C/B.

It could indicate the valve is working correctly but the close and open limit micro switches within the valve are
not working. Then the valve could be fully open or fully closed as commanded but the light will remain dim (or
could be bright depending on selector position). In this case the light is not indicating valve position correctly.
Step number 1 asks the crew to check

the Fuel Crossfeed Valve C/B behind
the First Officer’s seat. The FUEL
CROSSFEED VALVE circuit breaker (P6-3:B7) protects both the crossfeed valve motor and the blue VALVE OPEN
light. If the C/B trips it is not possible to determine the position of the crossfeed valve as the blue VALVE OPEN
light is not powered and will be extinguished regardless of the valve position. Boeing considered if a step should
be added which would direct the crew to reset a tripped fuel crossfeed valve C/B. Boeing decided not to add a
step as they consider that their policy on resetting C/Bs is sufficiently covered in the QRH QRH CI.2.3 which states:
“In flight, reset of a tripped circuit breaker is not

recommended unless directed by a non-normal checklist.
However, a tripped circuit breaker may be reset once,
after a short cooling period (approximately 2 minutes), if
in the judgment of the captain, the situation resulting
from the circuit breaker trip has a significant adverse
effect on safety. On the ground, flight crew reset of a
tripped circuit breaker should only be done after
maintenance has determined that it is safe to reset the
circuit breaker.”
Step 2 is a ‘Choose one’ step. The fuel crossfeed valve

circuit breaker is tripped, or it is not tripped. If the C/B is
tripped the checklist states that it is not possible to
determine the position of the fuel crossfeed valve. The
checklist now assumes that the crossfeed is closed (worst case scenario). This means that each tank will supply
fuel to its respective engine only, with no possibility of balancing fuel with the normal fuel balancing procedure.
Of course the valve may have failed in the open or intermediate position. This could lead to a significant fuel
imbalance.
It can be very difficult to comprehend and project future outcomes in this condition.
If the crew decides to attempt a reset of the C/B, and if the reset attempt is successful, the crew has regained full
use of the crossfeed valve and all fuel on-board. The condition statement no longer applies meaning that normal
flight can be resumed.
There are 3 components in the crossfeed valve: actuator, shaft and a valve body. No electrical components come
into contact with fuel since the actuator is connected with the valve body through the shaft. It is strongly
recommended that the crew consider a reset attempt of the CB, if in flight. The following engineering drawing
shows the individual components of the crossfeed valve.

If the C/B is not tripped, then the crew moves on to step 3:

If the crossfeed selector is closed the valve is failed open and the crew must maintain fuel balance with selective
use of fuel pumps. Note the difference between selector and valve as they are often confused when reading a
NNC. The selector is located on the overhead panel in the cockpit, the valve is located on the right wing rear spar
accessible through the main wheel well.
If the crossfeed selector is open the valve is failed closed. The only way to balance fuel is through the use of
differential thrust. Note “As conditions allow”, this should not be attempted at high cruising altitudes. Each main
tank will supply its associated engine. This means the crew must manage each engine/tank individually rather
than simply total fuel onboard.
Fuel Leak Engine NNC

Two key words are used in this checklist, suspected and confirmed. The crew commences the fuel leak engine
checklist because a leak is suspected. Avoid confirmation bias. There are several steps and checks that must be
completed before a fuel leak is confirmed. The checklist only applies to engine fuel leaks (between spar fuel
shutoff valve and engine), not to unlikely tank leaks.
IF there is a leak it can only be stopped by shutting down the engine. As with the IMBAL NNC, the very basic lesson
here is: if you haven’t lost any fuel then there is no fuel leak! Take your time, do not rush. Consider and assess the

meaning of each step of the checklist. Review the additional information for reasons that an engine fuel leak
should be suspected.
Additional Information
Reasons that an engine fuel leak should be suspected:
• A visual observation of fuel spray
An observer, ideally a pilot, should look for fuel
spray. If at night, consider turning on wing lights
and other exterior lights to make spray more
visible.
• The total fuel quantity is decreasing at an abnormal
rate
Note: The statement in the IMBAL checklist is a good reference to achieve this; “the total fuel remaining
is less than planned fuel remaining”. This step is often rushed when in fact it requires diligence and
accuracy by the flight crew. Compare the fuel onboard from the fuel gauges with the planned fuel on the
PLOG remembering to factor in any extra fuel uplifted prior to departure.
• An engine has excessive fuel flow
Check fuel flow indication.
• The fuel IMBAL alert shows
An IMBAL may be caused by an engine malfunction, fuel leak, inoperative crossfeed valve or a fuel
imbalance. The IMBAL does not show if centre tank fuel is being used and the centre tanks pumps are
on and operating normally.
• The fuel LOW alert shows
There may be other reasons for a LOW alert than a fuel leak.
• The USING RSV FUEL message shows on the FMC CDU
May also be caused by inaccurate winds in the FMC, inaccurate route modifications, speed and altitude
restrictions etc.
• The INSUFFICIENT FUEL message shows on the FMC CDU
There may be other reasons for an INSUFFICIENT FUEL message than a fuel leak.
• The CHECK FMC FUEL QUANTITY message shows on the FMC CDU.
There may be other reasons for a CHECK FMC FUEL QUANTITY message than a fuel leak.
Take your time with step 5 and 6. Step 6 is where confirmation of a fuel leak is done. Ensure that the crossfeed
selector is closed (step 3), if the C/B has tripped the crossfeed valve may be open with the valve open light
extinguished. If a fuel leak is confirmed the crew is directed to complete and engine shutdown to stop the leak
and balance fuel as needed. All remaining fuel can be used for the running engine.

Ground Proximity Warning System Test

The EGPWS test is normally completed by the First Officer as part of the Preflight Procedure. Guidance on how to
complete this test is included in the FCOM 1 Supplementary Procedures. It is important to check that the IRS
alignment is complete before completing this test, failure to complete this test correctly has led to EGPWS failures
in flight.

Go-Around
Review FCOM Automatic Flight Chapter 4, ‘Go-around’ to refresh and clarify the actions, FMA annunciations,
profiles and operation of autopilot/flight director. Review both Automatic Flight go-around and F/D go-around.
Review the common errors highlighted below:
•The most common error made during the Go-Around is the failure to engage TOGA thereby not establishing the
aircraft and AFDS in go-around mode. Additionally, the failure to call “Set Go-Around Thrust” during this
procedure. Failure to select TOGA during the Go-around increases workload substantially as the AFDS system is
unable to provide correct guidance.
•A number of pilots are not aware that after pushing the TOGA once on the thrust levers they will get the reduced
thrust providing 1000-2000ft rate of climb when the F/Ds are followed. Full go-around thrust requires a second
push of the TOGA.
•During the go-around, PM (with auto-throttle engaged) often tries to push the thrust levers to the target go-
around values against the auto-throttle which is giving you 1000-2000ft rate of climb. This indicates a poor
understanding of the AFDS system.
• Remember, the amount of G/A thrust demanded and the amount given must be confirmed on the FMA. G/A
indicates one TOGA (reduced thrust), N1 indicates two TOGA (full thrust). Crews must familiarise themselves with
FCOM Vol 2 Automatic Flight.
• The command airspeed cursor automatically moves to a target airspeed for the existing flap position based on
max takeoff weight calculations. Flaps must be retracted correctly during the profile for the airspeed cursor to
provide appropriate acceleration guidance.
Go Around with A/T disengaged

Without the A/T the PF should advance the thrust levers when initiating the go around and then direct the PM
to “Set go around thrust”.
As there is no indication on the N1 gauges other than full go around thrust and to reduce the likelihood of a level
bust, the PM should set 90% N1 or full go-around thrust if performance requires. Setting of 90% N1 for the go
around only applies to two engine operations.
Two Engine Go-Around (not in the landing configuration)

A Go-Around may be commenced at any time during an approach, including before the aircraft is in landing
configuration. The FCOM, SOP Manual and QRH assume that the aircraft is in a landing configuration prior to
commencing the Go-Around. A crew must be prepared to adapt the Go-Around manoeuvre if the Go-Around is
commenced prior to the point where the aircraft is fully configured for landing.
Note: In a non-normal situation the NNC often provides guidance on Go-Arounds and must be followed by the
crew.
A situation where a crew may have to commence a go-around from a non-landing configuration includes high
energy approaches, ATC request, approach ban, etc. situation awareness in relation to flap and gear configuration,
aircraft speed and missed approach altitude is important.
CAUTION! Speed control during the Go-Around must be monitored closely to avoid flap speed exceedance, thrust
must be managed correctly.
CAUTION! The missed approach altitude may not have been set on the MCP, this can result in a level bust.
Follow the normal Go-Around procedure with the following consideration:
• Verify missed approach altitude set on MCP

• Push TOGA – A climb is commanded regardless of MCP selected altitude
• Flaps
─ If greater than 15, select 15
─ If at 15, 10, 5, 2, 1 or UP – Leave flaps at current selection initially. Then retract flaps on schedule above
400 feet, or leave flaps at a flap setting appropriate to speed restriction in the published missed approach
if applicable
• Set Thrust - Set thrust appropriate to aircraft altitude/MAA/cleared altitude
• Gear Up – Select gear to up if extended
• Above 400 feet – Select a roll mode. Do not turn before the missed approach point
• Retract flaps on schedule, or as needed to comply with speed restriction
• Tune radios for missed approach or as appropriate to clearance
Single Engine Go-Around

The main differences on the single engine go around include the following:
• After pressing TOGA, it is imperative that full go around thrust is selected, NOT just 90% as recommended for a
reduced thrust go around with 2 engines operating. It is the responsibility of PM to confirm that this is set.
• Flap retraction will commence at 1000ft unless a specific missed approach acceleration height is required for
obstacle clearance (e.g. LOWS RW15)
• Once the flaps are up with no lights, level change and MCT should be set be selected. MCT will be selected on
the N1 limit page and then physically set by matching the thrust to the green reference on the N1 Indication. It
is important that the aircraft climbs in level change with MCT at the UP speed until reaching a minimum of the
MSA or MAA.
Departing from the Missed Approach Procedure

An engine failure is a safety concern and therefore pilots are permitted to deviate from the assigned clearance
(SID/Missed approach). ATC should be informed of the pilot’s intentions at the most appropriate time but prior
to the aircraft leaving the assigned/expected routing.
While Missed Approach Procedures are not designed with one engine inoperative (OEI) performance in mind,
Ryanair procedures for dispatch ensure the MACG can be achieved with OEI. The missed approach procedure
should be followed but may be deviated from if a more appropriate course of action is available.
After the aircraft is under control and any required memory items are complete, a PAN/MAYDAY call should be
made advising ATC of the problem, the intended course of action and any planned deviation from the assigned
routing.

High Altitude Approach to Stall and Stall Recovery
Objectives:
• To train crews in recognition and recovery from high altitude approach to stall
• To train crew in understanding of operation at high altitudes, cautions, environmental effects and
general understanding of buffet margins and G-limits
• To refresh considerations for high altitude flight.
For recovery from approach to stall or stall condition follow the approach to stall or stall recovery procedure.
Contact ATC, the call should follow this format: ‘PAN PAN, PAN PAN, PAN PAN, Ryanair XXX (Aircraft Call Sign),
unable to maintain FL XXX, descending straight ahead, standby’, this will allow ATC to clear traffic. When
controlled flight is assured and safe manoeuvring speed has been obtained, stop descent and immediately notify
ATC of your situation and level maintaining.
Flying at high altitude has many benefits, not least from a fuel savings point of view. There are, however, certain
potential hazards associated with high altitude flying which pilots must be aware of.
There have been several incidents in Ryanair associated with high altitude flight. Whilst flying close to the
maximum altitude the flight envelope is greatly reduced, this is due to the formation of a shockwave over the
wings. The shockwave will cause an increase in stall speed and may also limit the maximum speed (high speed
stall); it can also limit the altitude capability of the aircraft. Since the speed envelope is very small, an aircraft
experiencing turbulence can easily get into an over-speed condition or a low speed condition, this in turn could
lead to a possible stall. If the potential hazards of operating at high altitude are clearly understood by the crew
the possibility of encountering a stall can be avoided.
What is OPTIMUM altitude?

The optimum (OPT) altitude shown on the CRZ page is determined based on aircraft gross weight and cruise speed
in still air. When operating in the ECON mode, OPT altitude results in minimum trip cost based on the entered
cost index. However, when operation is based on manually entered speed or selected LRC speed, OPT altitude is
based on minimum fuel burn. OPT altitude increases as weight decreases during the flight.
OPT altitude calculation does not consider the effects of temperature deviations from standard day or sensed or
forecast winds at altitude. Since OPT altitude only provides optimum performance in still air, when factoring
winds, it may not be the best altitude for the aircraft to minimize cost or fuel. For shorter trips, OPT altitude
computation is based on ECON speed and uses different logic and different input parameters than long trips.
What is MAXIMUM altitude?

There are three things that can limit altitude capability:
1) Maximum Certified Altitude (structural limit)
• The 737-800/700 is only limited by the max certified ceiling (41000 feet) at lower weights.
2) Thrust Limited Maximum Altitude
• Defined by thrust/drag relationship
• Company specific residual ROC (100 ft/min)
• Temperature dependant (changes with ISA deviation)
The amount of thrust available is affected by temperature. When the temperature deviates above ISA the
maximum altitude can be limited by thrust available. The effect of this is that the engines may not be producing
enough thrust to maintain the selected airspeed during a turn. LNAV has a bank angle protection feature to make
sure the aircraft will use reduced bank angles to ensure enough thrust is available for the turn. HDG SEL has no
such feature.
3) Buffet-Limited Maximum Altitude
• Defined by Initial Buffet CL (Coefficient of lift where buffet starts)
• 0.3g margin from initial buffet (JAR limitation)
The buffet limit is defined by the regulatory requirement to limit above an altitude where a 0.3g margin from high
speed buffet is available, i.e. the 1.3g altitude.
The maximum altitude is given by the FMC however there is no indication of which of the three limits (above) is
being used. To get an accurate max altitude it is important to enter the correct weight and ISA deviation. It is now
company policy to leave the CRZ CG at the defaulted value of 5%; this is the forward limit which will always be on
the conservative side.
The PFD amber bands (min and max manoeuvre speed) indicate the speed at which a 0.3g margin (equivalent to
40º angle of bank in level flight) is available. The indication can clearly be seen moving on the PFD during
turbulence as the SMYD computers take account for actual conditions such as gross weight, altitude, angle of
attack, g-loading etc. The amber band does not give any indication of thrust limits.
Potential Hazards
This is the ICAO definition of moderate and severe turbulence:
• Moderate:
o +/- 0.2 - 0.5g – Strong intermittent jolts.
• Severe:
o +/- 0.5 - 1.5g – Aircraft handling made difficult.
It follows that even at moderate levels of turbulence the aircraft may not be protected by the 1.3g limit. The
aircraft can stall under these conditions even if flying at the normal cruise Mach number.

Due to a low thrust /drag ratio at higher altitudes a stall or stick-shaker recovery will inevitably result in an altitude
loss.
When flying close to the maximum altitude avoid areas of turbulence such as CB’s, forecasted CAT, Jet streams
and mountain waves. Several of the Ryanair incidents happened around the Alps and Pyrenees where a warm air
rises above cold air and air masses are separated by extensive rising terrain. Flight through these areas, therefore,
should require a greater level of caution during planning. Never attempt to out-climb a CB.
Recommendations and considerations for high altitude flight:

1) To get accurate altitude limits from the FMC:
• Enter an accurate aircraft weight
• Enter an accurate cruise altitude temperature deviation – this may be updated in flight.
2) For LNAV operations:

• The FMC provides a real-time bank angle limiting function
• This function will protect the commanded bank angle from exceeding the current thrust
available limit
• This bank angle protection is NOT available when LNAV is deactivated
3) For other than LNAV operations:

• Fly at least ten knots above the lower amber band limit,
• If speed drops below the lower amber band limit, immediately increase speed by doing one or
more of the following:
a) Reduce bank angle (to 10 degrees maximum)
b) Increase thrust (Select ‘CON’ on the FMC N1 Page)
c) Descend
4) Avoid areas of moderate and severe turbulence:

• By climbing to a higher level to get clear of or avoid turbulence you may be backing yourself
into a corner (literally COFFIN CORNER), this is particularly true in the event that turbulence still
exists at the higher level.
• Study wind and significant weather charts carefully
• If the wind velocity at low level exceeds approx 25 knots, moderate turbulence can be expected
in mountainous areas
REF: Ops Manual Part A Ch 8

Maximum and Optimum Operating Levels <RYR>
Ryanair crews shall not enter a CG figure in the FMC at any time. The aircraft may be operated safely up to and
including maximum altitude indicated in the FMC. Crews should carefully consider the following prior to electing
to operate above the optimum altitude:
• Identify enroute areas of moderate turbulence and carefully consider reducing operating altitudes
accordingly.
• Review the shear indications on the plog. (Ref OM Part A 8.1.10 Operational Flight Plan OFP, Shear
values)
• Avoid flight in severe turbulence (greater than 1.5G).
• Not select wing anti-ice on with the SAT less than -40°C (including when ice is visible on wipers and L1
and R1 windows).
• Select 10degree bank angle on the MCP passing FL300 climbing (to provide over-bank protection in HDG
SEL) and 25 degrees passing FL300 descending.
• For operations other than LNAV, fly at least 10 knots above the minimum manoeuvre speed (lower
amber band).
• If speed drops below the lower amber band, immediately increase speed by reducing bank and/or
increase thrust to max continuous (N1 page FMC) and/or descend.

Inadvertent Toga Selection on Approach

Rest the thumb lightly on the autothrottle disconnect switch when guarding the thrust levers on approach. This
avoids inadvertent selection of TOGA when autothrottle disconnect is desired.
Keep fingers away from the TOGA switches during the approach. If a go-around is required a deliberate movement
is required in order to push TOGA. If TOGA is pushed by mistake the PF should disconnect the A/T immediately
and the approach may be continued if visual references can be maintained and the aircraft approach is stable.
Only small adjustments to pitch and thrust should be made from then on.
To prevent unnecessary go-arounds, instructors must actively encourage a

definite and deliberate pause between disconnecting the autothrottle and
autopilot. They should actively discourage simultaneous disconnection of
the two systems.
Not only will this help prevent the inadvertent selection of TOGA, it will also
help to ease the transition between automatic and manual flight. The key
element is ensuring the correct hand position on the thrust levers prior to
and during the approach.
< It is important to hold the thrust levers in the following way. This is to
ensure a positive change in hand position has to be made to press the TOGA
buttons.
Inexperienced F/Os have a tendency to press the TOGA switch instead of

the A/T disconnect switch. The correct hand position is to have the thumb
resting lightly on the A/T disconnect switch.
This hand position is important as it prevents inadvertent and unnecessary go-arounds due to mistakenly pressing
the TOGA switch when disconnecting the A/T.

High Energy Approach - Prevention, Recognition & Recovery

Flight Path Management and Manual Flying

Automation has contributed substantially to the overall improvement of flight safety by increasing the timeliness
and precision of routine procedures, and reducing the opportunity for errors and the associated risks to the safety
of the flight. It also generally decreases workload, allowing flight crews to dedicate more attention to monitoring
activities and maintaining situation awareness.
However, continuous use of autoflight systems could lead to overreliance, complacency or potential degradation
of the pilot’s ability to cope with the manual handling of the aeroplane. Pilots are normally required to revert to
manual flight operation in case of automation failure or disconnection, or when an aircraft is dispatched with an
inoperative autoflight system.
The term “flight path management”, amongst many other things, include:
• The use and active monitoring of automation
• Manual flying
• Aircraft energy awareness and management
• AFDS engagement sequence
• Communication
• High energy approach prevention
Flight path management is not a simple “add on”, instead it is embedded in all our operations manuals.
The overall aim of Ryanair’s flight path management policy is to reach an appropriate balance between the use
of automation for flight path management and the need to maintain pilot manual flying skills. At the core of this
policy are the pilots. Responsibility for flight path management remains with the pilots at all times.
The policy addresses many of our Key Operational Risk Areas, KORAs. It does this by promoting piloting skills that
help prevent these risks or threats developing into an incident or accident through, for example:
• FMA awareness,
• management and monitoring,
• an active pilot monitoring,
• good manual flying skills,
• clear crew communication
It also gives the pilots the skills to recover from an undesired aircraft state should this happen.
Flight path management is not a new concept and has always featured in Ryanair pilot training programmes. It
will continue to do so, however with the introduction of KORAs, will be elevated to the forefront of training
emphasises.
Manual flying is a psychomotor process which means that you need to use both motor skills and cognitive
processing to achieve the desired flight path. EMT, STC, DUB and BTC all have FTD’s available to use for Controlled
Training. See the Controlled Training Workbook in the Trainees section of Docunet for more information. A
variety of programs are available which focus on flightpath management skills.
So before you disconnect the automatics you need to know the attitude and thrust settings required to maintain
the desired flight path. You also need to understand how to monitor the descent profile. This will help reduce the
demand on your cognitive thinking.
An out of trim aircraft places a high demand on your motor skills. You must be able to trim the aircraft to reduce
your workload. This will increase your capacity to manage the aircraft flight path during all phases of flight.

Jammed Stabiliser
The first indication to the crew that they have a problem becomes evident when the aircraft does not
automatically trim; this will illuminate the STAB OUT OF TRIM Light. Correct sequencing of QRH checklists should
be: STABILIZER OUT OF TRIM, redirection to Stabiliser Trim Inoperative. Make sure that you are familiar with the
content of both checklists.
A common error is for the crew to call for the wrong checklist, the Jammed or Restricted Flight Controls checklist.
This checklist refers to Primary Flight Controls – Ailerons, Elevator or Rudder.
The STABILIZER OUT OF TRIM checklist has a ‘choose one’ statement in step 1:
To determine if the stabiliser is trimming

there must be a demand for trim. This
can be achieved by increasing or
reducing speed.
The Stabilizer trim inoperative checklist is

only applicable when both of the
following conditions are occur:
• Loss of electric trim through the
autopilot.
• Loss of electric trim through the control
wheel switches.
Handling
Maintaining in-trim airspeed (the airspeed at which the failure occurred) until start of approach relieves the
workload of the PF. Situation awareness and anticipation of deceleration and configuration are important. The
PM should assist the PF with appropriate relief of increased aft control column forces as the aircraft decelerates;
this can be done by clasping both hands around the control column (not control wheel) with fingers linked and
leaning back to relieve any nose down tendency, this should not interfere with PF inputs as necessary. Aft Control
Column forces required will increase with decrease in airspeed.
A Flap 15 landing ensures that sufficient elevator is available during the landing regardless of stabiliser position.
Anticipate an exaggerated pitch down during the flare as thrust is reduced.
Background Information (Reference FCTM) Stabilizer Trim Inoperative

The stabilizer trim may become inoperative for number of reasons. The most common reason is a failed stabilizer
motor. This failure mode causes a loss of electric trim through both the autopilot and control wheel switches, but
manual trim is still available using the trim wheels. This failure mode is addressed using the STABILIZER TRIM
INOPERATIVE NNC.
Other, less common failure modes that are also addressed using the STABILIZER TRIM INOPERATIVE NNC include:
• A lodged or stuck stabilizer motor. This failure mode causes a loss of electric trim through both the
autopilot and control wheel switches, but manual trim is still available using the trim wheels by overriding
autopilot and main electric trim brake systems. The effort needed to manually rotate the trim wheels in
this condition is higher than normal

• A lodged or stuck stabilizer actuator. This failure mode causes a loss of electric trim through both the
autopilot and control wheel switches and a loss of manual trim. The result is a stabilizer that cannot be
trimmed.
• Flight tests have demonstrated the airplane can be flown and landed safely with stabilizer trim
inoperative
• A lodged or stuck stabilizer actuator can be the result of ice on the jackscrew. If the crew suspects that
the failure could be due to ice accumulation, descend to a warmer temperature and try again.

Landing Gear Essentials
3 REDS - 3 GREENS?
GEAR SELECTOR HANDLE

• Make sure the gear selector handle is correctly seated in the DN position.
QRH GEAR DISAGREE NNC Refers:

• If a green landing gear indicator light is illuminated on either the centre main panel or the overhead
panel, even if you also have a red light indication, the related landing gear is down and locked.
• Verify landing gear lever is pushed in and fully in the DN detent.
• If unresolved go around and follow FCTM, QRH guidance.
Inadvertent Gear Down selection during the After Takeoff Procedure

With the aim of avoiding inadvertent gear down selection during the after takeoff procedure the following
technique for moving the landing gear lever to OFF must be followed:
1. Remove the lever from the UP position

2. Move the lever towards the OFF position in a slow and deliberate manner exerting a firm forward
pressure on the gear lever with the palm of the hand. DO NOT exert a pulling force on the lever as this
can lead to the lever going through the OFF position and the gear being extended by mistake.
3. The correct action allows the lever to slide into the OFF position when it is reached and ensures the lever
is not inadvertently moved to the DOWN position.
If the gear is inadvertently selected down the crew must observe the 235kt retract speed limit.
Note the landing gear limit speed placard (located below the landing gear)


Landing Techniques
Once on final approach the following radial scan should be used. The techniques discussed here are applicable to
all landings including one engine inoperative landings, crosswind landings and landings on slippery runways.
1. Attitude – Airspeed 2. Attitude – VSI 3.Attitude – Thrust
Use small thrust, pitch and roll adjustments. The most common mistakes include;
• Pitching for speed or thrust for height – this is a basic prop pilot error.
• Do not to use rudder until over the runway and established in the flare.
The fixed landing point is projected through the windscreen down to just before
the 1000ft point. That is the aiming point. The idea is to adjust the final approach
glide path until the aiming point is stationary in relation to the aircraft. Fly the a/c
down to 50ft, keeping the aiming point constant in the windscreen. Generally
aiming points are either at 300m, (UK, R/W less than 2400m), or 400m, (UK R/W
greater than 2400m and all R/W’s outside the UK).
Once on finals and having disconnected the A/T and A/P it is important to make
early corrections to speed, track and/or the vertical profile to make the flare as
easy as possible. Don’t fly 10 knots above the bug speed or to the right/left of
centreline and plan to correct for this later when over the runway. This will take
discipline.
Use the information available to you to make controlling the aircraft easier. The
track on top of the ND display is an excellent tool to maintain the runway centreline. If the approach is not offset
to the runway centreline, then the ND track should match the course set on the MCP.

On short finals and during the landing, the centreline should split your feet in the middle, as seen below.
Some students that have difficulty in landing tend to focus too much of their attention inside the flight deck. This
can lead to a student trying to chase either the glide slope or the flight director at low level which is damaging to
a stable approach. In addition, changing the focus from the electronic display of the PFD/ND and adjusting to the
dynamic external visual cues of the runway, aiming point, centre-line tracking, PAPIs and peripheral vision is
difficult for an in-experienced pilot. It is imperative that you look out of the aircraft at the touchdown point on
the runway more frequently the nearer you get to the runway. Once the runway is in sight a good rule of thumb
is to:
1,000’ - Look out 25% of the time.
500’ - Look out 50% of the time.
When looking out, you should keep the touchdown zone as the primary focus and then use the PAPI’s as a guide
to maintain the glide path.
When looking into the flight deck you should maintain your radial scan as indicated above. However, once through
500’, this scan reduces to speed, V/S and N1. At this stage the majority of the time is spent looking out.
From 500’ down, if the a/c is stable then

you don’t need to start making control or
thrust inputs. “If it’s not broken don’t fix
it”. Some students tend to want to make
unnecessary control or power inputs
especially immediately after disengaging
the A/P.
When thrust or control inputs are required

to correct a departure from the speed or
path profile, once the input has done its
job i.e. back on profile, then adjust the thrust or pitch to maintain.
The average attitude and thrust on approach for a 737-800 weighing 60T is 1⁰ nose up and 57% N1 for flap 30 and
0⁰ and 62% N1 for flap 40.
Knowledge of pitch and thrust for the approach will help greatly and can be found in the QRH PI, Flight with
Unreliable Airspeed table:
Below 300ft the aircraft may experience destabilising forces, wind speed decreasing or updrafts/downdrafts. At
the same time some students tend to be shy of the R/W and end up high on the glide path or fly towards the R/W
and end up low. Both these tendencies are undesirable not only because they de-stabilise the approach but they
make the landing phase very difficult. It is therefore important that you maintain the correct profile all the way to
the R/W. A stabilised approach to 50’ above the RW threshold will greatly increase your chances of making a good
landing on the RW centreline, on speed and in the touchdown zone.
Even if the R/W is in sight and a decision to land has been made the PF should always respond to the aircraft calls
i.e. 1000’, plus 100 etc as these are also incapacitation calls.
You should disconnect the A/T first and stabilize the N1 at a value appropriate to the weight, speed and ROD of
the aircraft. Before disconnecting the A/P press your shoulders back into the chair, look out the window and note
the position of the touchdown zone. Maintain the touchdown zone in this position throughout the approach. The
A/P should now be disconnected. Only small adjustments to pitch and thrust should be made from then on. The
autothrottle should be disconnected at the same time as the autopilot.
The Landing Flare

The landing begins from 50ft. Maintain the approach attitude down to the flare, concentrating on the touchdown
markers. The 50ft GPWS call is the point where you should shift your visual sighting point to the end of the runway.
Shifting the visual sighting point assists in controlling the pitch attitude during the flare. You must keep the aircraft
descending through 40ft and 30ft. At 20ft initiate the flare by increasing backpressure to check the attitude by
2⁰-3°. This slows the rate of decent. Do not use sudden, violent or abrupt control movements during landing.
After the flare is initiated, smoothly retard the thrust levers towards idle. Ideally, main gear touchdown should
occur simultaneously with thrust levers reaching idle. A smooth thrust reduction to idle assists in controlling the
natural nose-down pitch change associated with thrust reduction. Input sufficient backpressure on the control
column to keep the pitch attitude constant. Avoid rapid control column movements during the flare. If the flare
is too abrupt and thrust is excessive near touchdown, the airplane tends to float in ground effect. Do not extend
the flare by increasing pitch attitude in an attempt to achieve a perfectly smooth touchdown.
Thus, the landing technique is:

•Shift visual sighting point to the end of the runway

50
•Keep the aircraft descending at constant airspeed and decent rate

40
•Keep the aircraft descending at constant airspeed and decent rate

30
•Slow the rate of descent by initiating the flare.

•This is achieved by increasing the pitch attitude by approximately 2°- 3°
20
•Hold the pitch attitude.

•To achieve this you must make a pitch control input to maintain the attitude as thrust is reduced.
10
After 20 feet, initiate the flare by increasing backpressure to check attitude by 2-3°. This slows the rate of decent.
Do not use sudden, violent or abrupt control movements during landing. Slowly close the thrust levers. The rate
of closure will depend on the headwind or tailwind component. The lower the groundspeed, the slower the rate
of thrust lever closure.
You must have commenced the landing manoeuvre at 20 ft. PSCT training notes offer further guidance.
The concept is:
Check Close Hold

• Attitude • Thrust Levers • Attitude
Ensure that you do not “pump” the controls during the flare as this can lead to a difficult landing. Do not trim
during the flare or after touchdown as it increases the possibility of a tailstrike during touchdown. Avoid rapid
control column movements during the flare. If the flare is too abrupt and thrust is excessive near touchdown, the
airplane tends to float in ground effect. Do not extend the flare by increasing pitch attitude in an attempt to
achieve a perfectly smooth touchdown.
Once the main wheels are on the RWY, select the reverse thrust and gently lower the nose. This will require a
pitch input to achieve a smooth landing of the nose wheel. A G/A can be initiated at any time up to selecting
reverse
Transition to Manual Braking

The speed at which the transition from autobrakes to manual braking is made depends on airplane deceleration
rate, runway conditions and stopping requirements. Normally the speedbrakes remain deployed until taxi speed,

but may be stowed earlier if stopping distance within the remaining runway is assured. When transitioning to
manual braking, use reverse thrust as required until taxi speed. The use of speedbrakes and reverse thrust is
especially important when nearing the end of the runway where rubber deposits affect stopping ability. When
transitioning from the autobrake system to manual braking, the PF should notify the PM. Techniques for release
of autobrakes can affect passenger comfort and stopping distance. These techniques are:
Stow the speedbrake handle. When stopping distance within the remaining runway is assured, this method
provides a smooth transition to manual braking, is effective before or after thrust reversers are stowed, and is
less dependent on manual braking technique
Smoothly apply brake pedal force as in a normal stop, until the autobrake system disarms. Following disarming of
the autobrakes, smoothly release brake pedal pressure. Disarming the autobrakes before coming out of reverse
thrust provides a smooth transition to manual braking
Manually position the autobrake selector off (normally done by the PM at the direction of the PF).
Manual Braking
The following technique for manual braking provides optimum braking for all runway conditions:
The pilot’s seat and rudder pedals should be adjusted so that it is possible to apply maximum braking with full
rudder deflection. Immediately after main gear touchdown, smoothly apply a constant brake pedal pressure for
the desired braking. For short or slippery runways, use full brake pedal pressure.
• DO NOT attempt to modulate, pump or improve the braking by any other special techniques
• DO NOT release the brake pedal pressure until the airplane speed has been reduced to a safe taxi speed
• The antiskid system stops the airplane for all runway conditions in a shorter distance than is possible
with either antiskid off or brake pedal modulation.
The antiskid system adapts pilot applied brake pressure to runway conditions by sensing an impending skid
condition and adjusting the brake pressure to each individual wheel for maximum braking. When brakes are
applied on a slippery runway, several skid cycles occur before the antiskid system establishes the right amount of
brake pressure for the most effective braking.
If the pilot modulates the brake pedals, the antiskid system is forced to readjust the brake pressure to establish
optimum braking. During this readjustment time, braking efficiency is lost. Low available braking coefficient of
friction on extremely slippery runways at high speeds may be interpreted as a total antiskid failure. Pumping the
brakes degrades braking effectiveness. Maintain steadily increasing brake pressure, allowing the antiskid system
to function at its optimum capability.
Although immediate braking is desired, manual braking techniques normally involve a four to five second delay
between main gear touchdown and brake pedal application even when actual conditions reflect the need for a
more rapid initiation of braking. This delayed braking can result in the loss of 800 to 1,000 feet of runway, as
compared to the calculated PI-QRH landing distance which allows for a two second delay. Directional control
requirements for crosswind conditions and low visibility may further increase the delays. Distractions arising from
a malfunctioning reverser system can also result in delayed manual braking application.
Braking with Antiskid Inoperative

When the antiskid system is inoperative, the NNC provides the following guidance:

• Ensure that the nose wheels are on the ground and the speedbrakes are extended before applying the
brakes
• Initiate wheel braking using very light pedal pressure and increase pressure as ground speed decreases
• Apply steady pressure
• Use minimum braking consistent with runway length and conditions to reduce the possibility of tire
blowout
• Do not pump the brakes - each time the brakes are released, the required stopping distance is increased.
Also, each time the brakes are reapplied, the probability of a skid is increased.
Flight testing has demonstrated that braking effectiveness on a wet grooved runway is similar to that of a dry
runway. However, caution must be exercised when braking on any wet, ungrooved portions of the runway with
antiskid inoperative to avoid tire failure.

Crosswind Landing
Please refer to Ryanair Performance Manual (Operations Manual Part B) for all limitations associated with
crosswind landings.
Reference: 737 NG Flight Crew Training Manual - Landing

Sideslip only (zero crab) landings are not recommended with crosswind components in excess of 17 knots at flaps
15, 20 knots at flaps 30, or 23 knots at flaps 40. This recommendation ensures adequate ground clearance and is
based on maintaining adequate control margin.
Three methods of performing crosswind landings are presented. They are the touchdown in a crab, the de-crab
technique (with removal of crab in flare), and the sideslip technique (NOT USED IN RYANAIR). Whenever a crab is
maintained during a crosswind approach, offset the flight deck on the upwind side of centreline so that the main
gear touches down in the centre of the runway.
De-Crab During Flare

The objective of this technique is to maintain wings level throughout the approach, flare, and touchdown. On final
approach, a crab angle is established with wings level to maintain the desired track. Just prior to touchdown while
flaring the airplane, downwind rudder is applied to eliminate the crab and align the airplane with the runway
centreline. As rudder is applied, the upwind wing sweeps forward producing roll. Hold wings level with
simultaneous application of aileron control into the wind.
The touchdown is made with cross controls and both gear touching down simultaneously. Throughout the
touchdown phase upwind aileron application is utilized to keep the wings level.
Touchdown in Crab
The airplane can land using crab only (zero sideslip) up to the landing crosswind guideline speeds. On dry runways,
upon touchdown the airplane tracks toward the upwind edge of the runway while de-crabbing to align with the
runway. Immediate upwind aileron is needed to ensure the wings remain level while rudder is needed to track
the runway centreline. The greater the amount of crab at touchdown, the larger the lateral deviation from the
point of touchdown.
For this reason, touchdown in a crab only condition is not recommended when landing on a dry runway in strong
crosswinds. On very slippery runways, landing the airplane using crab only reduces drift toward the downwind
side at touchdown, permits rapid operation of spoilers and autobrakes because all main gears touchdown
simultaneously, and may reduce pilot workload since the airplane does not have to be de-crabbed before
touchdown. However, proper rudder and upwind aileron must be applied after touchdown to ensure directional
control is maintained.

Overweight Landing
Overweight landings may be safely accomplished by using normal landing procedures and techniques. There are
no adverse handling characteristics associated with overweight landings. Landing distance is normally less than
takeoff distance for flaps 30 or 40 landings at all gross weights. However, wet or slippery runway field length
requirements should be verified from the landing distance charts in the PI chapter of the QRH. Brake energy limits
will not be exceeded for flaps 30 or 40 normal landings at all gross weights.
Note: Use of flaps 30 rather than flaps 40 is recommended to provide increased margin to flap placard speed.
If stopping distance is a concern, reduce the landing weight as much as possible. At the captain’s discretion,
reduce weight by holding at low altitude with a high drag configuration (gear down) to achieve maximum fuel
burn-off.

Level Bust Prevention

We are as exposed to level busts as any other airline and while our statistical data is far better than the average,
it is still a cause for concern within Ryanair.
We have robust SOPs in Ryanair designed to avoid the threat of level busts. Good situation awareness is also
important in avoiding a level bust situation.
Ryanair’s causal factors are similar to other airlines:

In our operation the following have being recognised as the main threats:
• SID: Wrong MCP ALTs

• CLB/CRZ/DES: Wrong Aircraft
• FIR: Wrong Frequency
• CLB/CRZ/DES: Wrong MCP ALTs
• Approach: Wrong MAA ALTs
The chart below highlights that even with correct read back from the pilot the wrong ALT/FL is selected in the
MCP. Therefore, it is important to follow the RYR level bust SOP’s when setting a new level in the MCP.
Further guidance is available in FCOM and Line Training Student Notes in Docunet. Altitude (level) busts continue
to occur throughout the Ryanair operation for a variety of reasons. It is the job of all pilots to be vigilant in this
area at all times.
The most common form of altitude bust in recent years has been “Incorrect action, following correct pilot read
back”, or in other words, the incorrect altitude or flight level set in the MCP following an ATC instruction.
Ryanair has a series of robust SOPs to avoid altitude busts:

✓ SID briefing confirms cleared altitude/FL on departure
✓ Before takeoff checklist crosschecks FMC LEGS stop altitude with MCP selected altitude
✓ Sterile Cockpit
✓ Sterile Communications

✓ Change of frequency procedures and awareness of FIR boundaries. (Part A)

✓ PM Off Airways frequency discouraged (Part A)
✓ Altitude awareness including V/S restrictions approaching cleared altitudes and flight levels
✓ MCP discipline
✓ Fleet 100% equipped with Mode S transponders and ACP ‘hot mike’ facility
✓ Altitude MCP ALT Selection – Confirmation Bias
✓ PF “Set” – PM “XXXX Check”
✓ SID Stop & MAA Awareness
✓ Crewdock Query for Callsign Confusion
✓ Correct Callsign in RTE Page 1 – Mode S
SID Briefing
Both pilots must INDEPENDANTLY verify the applicable stop altitude from the SID chart. The PF shall verify that
the first stop altitude is displayed on the LEGS page and is set on the MCP (stop alt +100ft prior to receiving the
ATC clearance). Where the stop altitude is not displayed on the LEGS page, the PF & PM must agree on the
altitude and enter it as a hard altitude at the nearest appropriate waypoint.
Before Takeoff Checklist

The stop altitude must be referenced during the TAKEOFF BRIEFING challenge of the Before Takeoff Checklist.
The captain shall refer to the FMC LEGS page, then point to and call the hard altitude previously noted or inserted.
The captain shall then point to the selected MCP altitude and confirm that it is the same value as on the FMC
LEGS page and call “SET”
Sterile Cockpit
Flight crew shall avoid conversation not directly related to the safe operation of the aircraft from commencement
of push back to TOC, and from TOD to engine shutdown on stand. Headsets shall be worn and boom microphones
used in preference to hand microphones for communication with ATC during these phases of flight. No
unnecessary paperwork shall be accomplished during sterile cockpit operations.
Sterile Communications
Flight crew shall avoid operating on or listening to any frequency not required for current operations from
commencement of pushback to TOC and from TOD to engine shutdown on stand. The intention is that both pilots
are giving full attention to live ATC frequency. All unnecessary calls to handling agents, maintenance, unnecessary
weather, are prohibited.
If it is necessary to contact maintenance personnel in flight, the Commander should ensure this is done only
during periods of reduced workload and consistent with the sterile cockpit policy. When a non-normal condition
is identified after take-off and the aircraft is not intended to climb to FL100 the above procedure shall be utilised
when the requisite checklists are completed and the aircraft is established in a holding pattern or is under radar
control and ATC have been advised that communications with engineering is required.
Change of Radio Frequency

It is essential to pre-set and crosscheck the new frequency before changing and contacting ATC. The following
procedure shall apply to frequency changes:

• CRZ On receiving a frequency change the PF will enter the new frequency in the standby window on the
RTP and the PM will respond to ATC and note the new frequency on the PLOG. The PM will then
crosscheck the standby frequency with the PLOG before changing and contacting ATC.
• CLB, DESC, or AP disengaged The PM will be responsible for the frequency change. The PM will enter the
new frequency in the standby window on the RTP while responding to ATC. The priority is to change
frequency correctly before writing down a record of the new frequency or ATC instructions.
Awareness of FIR Boundaries

It is important to note the FIR boundaries on the PLOG as a point where ATC handover can be expected:
• The EETs for all the FIR boundaries are given at the top information section of the PLOG
• Using this information, it is a simple task to identify the waypoints corresponding to the FIR boundaries.
The time given to each boundary is the elapsed time from take-off
• These boundaries should be identified and underlined on the PLOG in anticipation of an ATC frequency
change
• For any direct routings the only abeam points required are those relating to these FIR boundaries
• Crews should anticipate a frequency change prior to reaching an FIR boundary. If none is forthcoming,
then a radio check with ATC should be initiated
In summary, establish where the boundaries are, enter them sequentially as a FIX in the FMC, exercise R/T
vigilance when approaching, and monitor 121.50 at all times in the cruise.
Checking Enroute Weather – PM off airways frequency.

During periods of general poor weather, enroute weather should be recorded during the cruise to satisfy the
requirement to land at the nearest suitable airport in accordance with stated QRH procedure. Preference will be
to get weather for enroute Ryanair bases as these are the most likely enroute diversion airports. You may use the
ND to pick the airports that you want and then check the ATIS frequency on the E (LO) chart (above the airport
name). Spending a lot of time listening to a VOLMET is not recommended. Never try and get weather when
monitoring the ATC frequency. Always hand over the radio.
Management of ATC Clearances / MCP with One Pilot on Operational VHF Frequency.
Where the PM is off the radio to get weather or operational information the PF will monitor the Operational VHF
frequency. Where the PF gets an ATC instruction to change ALT or HDG, the PF will make the MCP change but will
not execute the change until the PM is back on frequency and the change of HDG or ALT has been verified with
the appropriate ATC centre. Where ATC requires an immediate change of ALT or HDG the PF will interrupt the PM
and point out the change to the MCP. The PM will immediately return to the operational frequency and ask for
confirmation of the instruction. "XXX Control, confirm the HDG/cleared ALT/LVL for RYR 123 ".
Altitude Awareness
Altitude awareness is achieved by the active attention of the flight crew. This awareness with associated
continuous monitoring is the primary means of ensuring that cleared altitudes are adhered to and clearances are
not infringed. The standard operating procedure mandates altitude checks which confirm altitude awareness, and
mandate vertical speeds to be flown to reduce closure rates. Flight crews will reduce rate of climb to 2000 FPM
at 2000 feet to level-off and 1000 FPM at 1000 feet to level-off where necessary.
The altitude alert system should only be considered as a back-up aid. Its operation must not be permitted to
replace the requirement to make the standard altitude calls.

Incorrect setting of the QNH in the descent is an insidious mistake frequently made. An altitude crosscheck on
final approach path is an essential crew action to detect this.
MCP Discipline
When the autopilot, flight director, or autothrottle are in use and a mode change is selected or is scheduled to
occur, the annunciation must be verified on the flight mode annunciation display. Airplane course, vertical path,
and speed must always be monitored. Similarly, when a thrust mode change is selected or is scheduled to occur,
the annunciation must be verified on the thrust mode display.
In LNAV and VNAV, all airplane course, vertical path, thrust and speed changes must be verified. With autopilot
engaged, all MCP changes will be made by the PF. In manual flight, the PM will make all MCP changes at the
direction of the PF.
All changes to the MCP will be called out by the PF. The crewmember making a change to the MCP altitude (usually
the PF) will keep one finger in contact with the selector and call “SET” until the change has been confirmed by the
other crewmember with the call “FLXXX CHECKED.”
MODE S Transponder
Flight crews shall operate mode S transponders in the approved manner, (as detailed in ICAO Doc 4444 -
Procedures for Air Navigation Services: Air Traffic Management and ICAO Doc 8168 - Procedures for Air Navigation
Services: Aircraft Operations) The flight call sign on the plog shall be entered correctly in the data field provided
on the RTE page and the format is the three letter IATA designator for the aircraft operating agency, followed by
the flight alphanumeric (e.g. RYR 212 or RYR 2G etc).
Ryanair aircraft are fitted with Enhanced Mode S transponders and ATC can view:
the flight number,

current heading, altitude and speed selected on the MCP,
the current V/S
AFDS Re-engagement sequence
The types of situation when this might arise are: TCAS RA, Stall recovery, Windshear Escape Manoeuvre, Terrain
Avoidance Manoeuvre, missed approaches from visual approach, circling and low missed approach altitude.

ATC Communications Stuck Mike Protection

The Ryanair fleet has a stuck mike modification programme completed. This modification means that after 35
seconds of continuous transmission the VHF comm. transceiver will revert to the receive mode. Both the PF and
the PM have a responsibility to monitor ATC transmissions and to query any transmission that is not received fully
and/or understood. Any uncertainty must be resolved by confirmation with ATC.
Both pilots shall react independently and simultaneously to an ATC instruction. Both pilots have defined actions
to do on receipt of a clearance and there is a cross check built into the process. The reason for independent
simultaneous action is to ensure that both pilots have heard the instruction, have acted on the instruction and
the crosscheck will identify any error by an individual pilot. If the response is not independent and simultaneous
one pilot tends to follow the other and there is no opportunity to capture an error if one is made at this point.
All ATC communications shall be conducted in the English language. Both flight crew members shall normally
maintain a listening watch on the appropriate ATC frequency, including on the ground during pre-flight. If a flight
crew member goes off frequency, he must inform the other flight crew member. Flight Crew Members shall
maintain good R/T discipline and make every effort to reduce speech traffic, particularly on congested
frequencies.
The following general rules apply:

✓ Always listen out before transmitting.
✓ The full call sign is to be used preceding the message. Enunciate clearly and avoid clipped responses or
replying without giving a call sign.
✓ On first contact after changing frequency during the departure, give call sign, SID, passing altitude/FL,
cleared altitude/FL. Thereafter cleared FL or current FL as appropriate, e.g." RYR 3015 FL 380".
✓ Read back all clearances followed by your call sign. The word "CLEARED" shall only be used by ATC for an
airways clearance, a takeoff and a landing clearance.
✓ A take-off clearance shall be issued separately from any other clearance message.
✓ When requested to advise that you have vacated altitude or flight level, do not say you have vacated it
until you actually have.
✓ Ryanair has produced an RT manual addressing the most common ATC issues.

Loading Errors
Loading errors have caused a number of high profile incidents and accidents. Loading errors can lead to incorrect
performance data, early rotation or tailstrike.
Performance calculations must be completed and load sheets checked carefully to avoid errors. There are simple
gross error checks that can be made to ensure the load sheet has been completed accurately. Awareness of the
EZFW and ETOW from the LIDO flight plan will also help to identify any potential errors.
Load sheet Gross Error Checks

1. No of Pax x 100 + 42,000kg ≈ ZFW
2. Allowed Traffic Load – Traffic Load + TOW ≈ Max TOW
Further information on load sheets and performance is available on the Ryanair eLearning system.

Loss of Both Engine Driven Generators

REFERENCE: 737 NG Flight Crew Training Manual & QRH NNC Section 6
Prior to completing this training exercise it is essential to prepare by studying the following guidance and
appropriate References as shown above:
• Review the Loss of Both Engine Driven Generators checklist.
• The probability of a total and unrecoverable AC power failure is remote. There is no associated QRH NN
checklist for this situation as it is not required.
• The purpose of the QRH checklist is to lead the crew through a process of attempting to restore power.
• On completion of the checklist the crew must consider the outcome. If only one AC power source
remains the crew must elect to land at the nearest suitable airfield (FCTM section 8) and review QRH
checklist section C.I non normal checklist operation.
• Review approach and landing on standby power (FCTM section 8).
Total Loss of AC Power

Ref. FCOM Volume 2, Chapter 6 for a list of significant equipment powered by standby power. The following are
some of the more significant items to be considered:
• Pressurization is only available in manual mode. The workload on the PM will be very high between doing
the NNC and keeping control of the cabin pressure
• Only some system lights will give correct system status (e.g. bleed trip off lights will give correct system
status, probe heat lights will not)
• All 6 fuel boost pumps will be inoperative, flame out may occur at high altitude due to suction feeding
• The batteries provide a minimum of 60 minutes’ standby power. Each start attempt of the APU will
decrease this time
• Window heat inoperative
• Captains pitot heat is working normally, however a subsequent failure would not illuminate the system
light
• Thermal Anti-ice not available
• Door annunciator working (useful in case of an evacuation)
• ELEC hydraulic pumps inoperative, engine driven pumps solenoid “locked” in the on position
• Use right igniter, left is inoperative
• MCP – only Captains course can be changed
• A/P and A/T inoperative
• Captains outboard and inboard DU as well as upper DU available
• Standby instruments available (however the pitot tube is not heated)
• Captains clock available, F/O’s clock light and chronograph available (time not available since GPS R is
inoperative)
• Flap position indicator inoperative
• Autobrake not available on landing
• Only partial antiskid (on inboard wheels)
• FMC available (FMC L only on dual FMC installations)
• Captains CDU available
• Auto speedbrakes not available, raise manually on touchdown
• Reversers available
• ELEC trim inoperative, manual pitch trim available
• Rudder and aileron trim inoperative

• Fire warning available (except for wheel well and cargo which are AC powered)
• Fire extinguishing available (including cargo)
• Only Com 1 operative
• Only VHF NAV 1 operative
• W/X radar inoperative
• PA mic operative
• Flight deck door will automatically unlock
There is no checklist for total loss of AC power

Use the ‘Loss of Both Engine Driven Generators’ NNC (this is used in an attempt to restore AC power).
The last section of that NNC highlights what to do if both source OFF lights remain illuminated. i.e. total loss of AC
power:
• Avoid icing conditions

▪ Note: Flight in icing conditions may result in erroneous flight instrument indications
• PLAN to land at the nearest suitable airport
▪ Note: Fully charged batteries provide a minimum of 60 minutes of standby power
Prioritise
Use the master caution recall to determine what systems are inoperative, press the system annunciator (six-Pack),
review the INOP systems as a crew. AIR COND is very significant at higher levels as pressurisation is essential to
the safety of the flight, if at high levels you will need to complete the AUTO FAIL/UNSCHEDULED PRESSURISATION
CHANGE checklist and control the cabin pressure. It is not necessary to read every checklist associated with each
warning illuminated following the use of master caution recall.
Having reviewed INOP systems as above, continue to review and discuss any other systems affected by the loss
of AC power. Start with the forward instrument panel, and continue with the control stand, discuss all INOP items
as a crew. Review any handling issues anticipated as a result of failed systems: Manual trimming, partial antiskid,
no anti-skid etc (see list above).
There is no non-normal configuration landing distance in the QRH for total loss of AC power. However, the landing
distance will increase greatly due to partial antiskid and manual speedbrakes.

LVO Approach and Landing

Study the following:
• ‘All Weather Operations Guide’ on Crewdock
• Operations manual Part A 8.4
• FCOM Volume 2, Chapter 4 Autoflight
• FCOM 1, Limitations
• QRH
Review the callouts that are specific to the Captain.

• Ref. FCOM Volume 1, NP 40.5, Additional Autoland callouts.
The Captain may call out any visual cues or references as he sees them, he maintains his role as PM until minimums
call. If a system failure occurs in-flight the crew must check the MEL to verify whether or not, they still can conduct
a CAT II/III approach. Review reasons for a mandatory go-around (Refer ‘All Weather Operations Guide’)
In addition to routine operational reasons the following are reasons for a mandatory go-around below 500ft AGL:
• A/P malfunction
• Ground equipment failure (OPS A 8.4.1.5)
• Instrument DISAGREE or flashing LOC or G/S indicator
• Rate of descent greater than 1000 fpm occurs
• Visual reference inadequate
• Touchdown in touchdown zone cannot be accomplished
• LOC deviation of 1/3 dot or G/S deviation 1 dot
• Pilot incapacitation
If an A/P failure occurs during the approach a go-around is mandatory. However, the Low visibility document
states that, after a failure, “it is not forbidden to continue the approach and complete the landing when the
commander determines that this is the safest course of action.”
It is recommended that a go around be executed in such situations where a malfunction occurs below DH with
RVR values in the TDZ of less than 300m. This means that a go around is the normal action.
It does recognise that circumstances might apply where a continued landing may be permitted but it gives very
explicit guidance as to what these circumstances are: Typically, it would be during the late stages of the flare. In
other words, the aircraft is almost on the ground i.e. </- 10ft RA.
Low Visibility Approach Briefing

For a CAT II/III approach, it is important that you check which runway at the destination airport is CAT II or CAT III
approved. The list of runway ends approved for Ryanair CAT III operations is contained in the EFB on Docunet and
is revised by the performance department. The current list is also available on Crewdock > Operational
>Performance> Ryanair Cat III Approved Runways. This needs to be established prior to the briefing. The QRH CAT
II/III brief should also be completed prior to the approach brief as it lays down the criteria, weather/pilot
qualification/aircraft certification etc. that are required.

LVO Takeoff and Procedures

Refer to the ‘All Weather Operations Guide’ on Crewdock and OM A.

Mach Buffet
Objectives
• To demonstrate Mach Buffet (“G” Buffet) after reaching the critical Mach number, and other specific
flight characteristics of the airplane
• To ensure crews are able to anticipate, recognise and recover from an overspeed condition
Mach buffet is a function of the speed of the airflow over the wing—not necessarily the speed of the aircraft. Any
time that too great a lift demand is made on the wing, whether from too fast an airspeed or from too high an AOA
near MMO, “high-speed” buffet occurs. There are also occasions when the buffet can be experienced at much
lower speeds known as the “low-speed Mach buffet.”
An aircraft flown at a speed too slow for its weight and altitude necessitating a high AOA is the most likely situation
to cause a low-speed Mach buffet. This very high AOA has the effect of increasing airflow velocity over the upper
surface of the wing until the same effects of the shock waves and buffet occur as in the high-speed buffet
situation. The AOA of the wing has the greatest effect on inducing the Mach buffet at either the high-speed or
low-speed boundaries for the aircraft. The conditions that increase the AOA, the speed of the airflow over the
wing, and chances of Mach buffet are:
• High altitudes—the higher an aircraft flies, the thinner the air and the greater the AOA required to
produce the lift needed to maintain level flight.
• Heavy weights—the heavier the aircraft, the greater the lift required of the wing, and all other things
being equal, the greater the AOA.
• G loading—an increase in the G loading on the aircraft has the same effect as increasing the weight of
the aircraft. Whether the increase in G forces is caused by turns, rough control usage, or turbulence, the
effect of increasing the wing’s AOA is the same.
Ref FCTM: High Altitude Manoeuvring, “G” Buffet

Airplane buffet reached as a result of airplane manoeuvring is commonly referred to as “g” buffet. During
turbulent flight conditions, it is possible to experience high altitude “g” buffet at speeds less than MMO. In
training, buffet is induced to demonstrate the airplane's response to control inputs during flight in buffet.
Study Note
QRH section 15, Warning Systems section has a memory item for ‘Overspeed’.

Manual Gear Extension

Manual gear extension may be required in any of the following circumstances:
• Loss of system A hydraulics
• Manual reversion (loss of system A and B hydraulics)
• If any landing gear is NOT down and locked when the landing gear lever is down
• The landing gear lever is jammed in the OFF position
In the case of loss of system A and manual reversion QRH checklists the manual gear extension is integral to the
checklist. In the other two categories above the crew would be required to use the QRH ‘Manual Gear Extension’
checklist, Section 14 – Landing Gear.
With loss of system A hydraulics and manual reversion it is important to remember that once the gear is extended
it cannot be retracted. The drag penalty with the gear extended may make it impossible to reach an alternate
airfield.
Objectives
• To demonstrate the non-normal procedure associated with extending the gear manually
• To train the crew in the use of the manual gear extension handles, location and method to release the
landing gear uplocks
• To demonstrate to crews the time required to complete a manual extension
• To review appropriate QRH checklist procedures
In the Simulator
The PM will need to slide his/her seat back fully to be in a suitable position to pull the manual gear extension
handles. The process of extending the gear must be well coordinated by the Crew. Follow the QRH checklist
carefully. The landing gear lever (if possible) should be placed in the OFF position. The gear uplocks are only
released when the handle is pulled to its limit. The related red landing gear indicator light will illuminate when the
uplock releases.
Note
It is important in the simulator that the pilot releases the uplock handle/cable slowly to avoid any damage to the
spring loaded cable assembly.

Monitoring
Monitoring in the aviation context can be defined as “The observation and interpretation of the flight path data,
configuration status, automation modes and on-board systems appropriate to the phase of flight. It involves a
cognitive comparison against the expected values, modes and procedures. It also includes observation of the
other crew member and timely intervention in the event of deviation.”
Types of monitoring can be classified as follows:

Passive Monitoring (watch, maintain regular surveillance, listen to). Maintaining a scan of:
• Instruments/displays
• Autopilot and auto throttle modes
• Engine display
• Flight progress
• Systems
• Attending to communication requirements
Active Monitoring (cross check, oversee, report on) relates to all monitoring tasks where a call out is required and
also includes cross checks of for example:
• Engine instruments
• Flight parameters
• A/C configurations (operation and confirmation of indications)
• FMA modes
• Cross check flight path parameters against selected FMS parameters
• Cross check navigation accuracies
• Check condition of other crew member (look for signs of stress, tiredness)
Good Monitoring
Good monitoring relies upon effective task management and ‘making time for monitoring’. Flight path monitoring
must be a priority task that is not compromised by other tasks. Task scheduling (e.g. carrying out normal checklist),
sharing (e.g. balancing the monitoring workload and being aware when the PM has very limited capacity) and
shedding (e.g. prioritising tasks) must be considered as strategies to achieve a good monitoring practice.
Good monitoring requires knowledge, skill, experience, attitude and communication. None of these can be taken
in isolation. Knowledge is provided through training, experience is the application of the knowledge and skill is
the product of both knowledge and experience. Attitude is a personal trait that can be shaped and developed.
Communication is fundamental to monitoring as both an output and input.
Strategies for Good Monitoring

These are a few strategies that should be employed to enhance good monitoring behaviour:
• Stay in the loop by mentally flying the aircraft even when the autopilot or other pilot is flying the
aircraft
• When you have been distracted ensure that you always check the FMAs and your flight instruments
to get back in the loop as soon as possible
• Monitor the flight instruments just as you would when you are manually flying the aircraft
• Be diligent in monitoring all flight path changes – pilot ACTIONS, system MODES, aircraft
RESPONSES. Always make monitoring of the PF a priority task when flight path changes are being
made
• Always check the FMA after a change has been selected on the autopilot mode control panel
• During briefings include ‘monitor me’ type comments to encourage intervention – ‘remind me if I
haven’t asked for flaps 5 by 10 miles’
• Provide the occasional monitoring reminders e.g. – ‘make sure that the tail wind doesn’t exceed
10kt’
• During flight the captain should ensure that the shared mental model remains intact this can be
achieved through:
o Expression of intent (I will be flying the descent at 220kt); and
o Providing a situation update to the PM when he/she has been carrying out a non-
monitoring task
Manage the workload

When the workload gets too high, prioritise which parameters to monitor – don’t multi-task for too long;
When dealing with emergency situations ensure adequate time and space to enable the continuation of the
monitoring tasks; and
• Avoid programming the FMS at critical phases of flight
• Don’t rely on memory when receiving aural communications – write it down or request it again
• Mentally rehearse during low periods of workload, monitoring tasks that will occur in the next phase
of flight
• Make cross checking achievement of the autopilot targets a force of habit
• Verbalize your observations and activities
• At the end of the flight discuss how well the monitoring was carried out – did you both share the
same plan
• When the aircraft is carrying defects that are acceptable in the MELs consider the impact on the
monitoring task – make a note (mental or otherwise) of the affected flight parameters, modes or
systems that will require more attentive monitoring (discuss this during briefing)
• Judicious use of acronyms are a good way of remembering monitoring tasks or techniques:
o RIBETS
o DALTA
o FRISC
o PIOSEE
Briefings
Briefings are required to keep both pilots ‘in the loop’, so there is a common plan in the flight deck. Pilots must
maintain selective application of mental resources whilst performing a goal orientated task. The goal is translated
to the other pilot during the brief. It is at this point that any discrepancies in the plan will be brought to the
attention of both crew members.
Intent forms a crucial part of monitoring. It provides a baseline against which to monitor
CRM impact on PF/PM cohesion

CRM helps to achieve an effective balance among crewmembers. SOPs provide rules from which deviation is easily
noticed and therefore preventable. Emphasis on cross checking and clear task sharing provides a basis for sound
attitudes. Example: A pilot acting as PM is tasked with monitoring the progress of the flight, monitoring
instruments, and effectively and adequately informing the PF of any significant deviations. This function is
particularly important when the PF is manually flying the aircraft and has less capacity to monitor his own
performance. The PF’s role in relation to the PM is to operate in accordance with SOPs; encouraging
communication and advocacy but also to monitor the flight progress.

The PM has a vital role to play in all phases of flight, particularly during manual handling
Barriers to Effective Monitoring

Instructors should be vigilant for crew members inhibiting their ability to monitor effectively. Barriers can be
physical and mental. Being aware of these threats allows pilots to mitigate the risks they present.
Physical
• Seating Position – are tactile and visual inputs effective?
• Is the pilot guarding the rudder pedals?
• Is the pilot able to see the PFD and FMAs?
• Is the pilot able to see the runway and monitor the approach path?
Vision – impairment of visual inputs degrades monitoring effectiveness.

• Is the pilot able to read the approach plate?
• Is flight path monitoring affected by the external environment (night time, low sun etc).
• Is flight deck lighting appropriate?
• Hearing – impairment of auditory inputs degrades monitoring effectiveness.
• Are both crew members using the intercom and headsets?
• Is a pilot monitoring other audio inputs (Service Interphone, VOLMET, Handling agents)
• Are volume levels set appropriately?
Human Vulnerabilities
Humans are naturally poor monitors of mundane tasks. Causal factors of incidents where a lack of monitoring
contributed to an undesired aircraft state are listed below.
Being aware of this weakness will allow pilots to put strategies in place to actively monitor the flight.

Management of Non Normal Conditions (FCTM)

The FCTM details specific guidance on the management of certain non-normal situations.
Situations beyond the scope of non-normal checklists

It is rare to encounter in-flight events which are beyond the scope of the Boeing recommended NNCs. These
events can arise as a result of unusual occurrences such as a mid-air collision, bomb explosion or another major
malfunction. In these situations, the flight crew may be required to accomplish multiple NNCs, selected elements
of several different NNCs applied as necessary to fit the situation, or be faced with little or no specific guidance
except their own judgment and experience. As these situations are rare, it is not practical or possible to create
definitive flight crew NNCs to cover all events.
The FCTM contains guidance in determining the proper course of action should an in-flight event of this type be
encountered. Although these guidelines represent what might be called “conventional wisdom”, circumstances
determine the course of action which the crew perceives will conclude the flight in the safest manner.
Basic aerodynamic and systems knowledge

Knowledge of basic aerodynamic principles and airplane handling characteristics and a comprehensive
understanding of airplane systems can be key factors in situations of this type.
• if aileron control is affected, rudder inputs can assist in countering unwanted roll tendencies. The
reverse is also true if rudder control is affected.
• if both aileron and rudder control are affected, the use of asymmetrical engine thrust may aid roll
and directional control.
• if elevator control is affected, stabilizer trim, bank angle and thrust can be used to control pitch
attitude. To do this effectively, engine thrust and airspeed must be coordinated with stabilizer trim
inputs. The airplane continues to pitch up if thrust is increased and positive corrective action is not
taken by re-trimming the stabilizer. Flight crews should be aware of the airplane’s natural tendency
to oscillate in the pitch axis if the stable pitch attitude is upset. These oscillations are normally self-
damping in Boeing airplanes, but to ensure proper control, it may be desirable to use thrust and/or
stabilizer trim to hasten damping and return to a stable condition. The airplane exhibits a pitch up
when thrust is increased and a pitch down when thrust is decreased. Use caution when attempting
to dampen pitch oscillations by use of engine thrust so that applications of thrust are timed
correctly, and diverging pitch oscillations do not develop.
• a flight control break-out feature is designed into all Boeing airplanes. If a jammed flight control
exists, both pilots can apply force to either clear the jam or activate the break-out feature. There
should be no concern about damaging the mechanism by applying too much force. In certain cases,
clearing the jam may permit one of the control columns to operate the flight controls with portions
of a control axis jammed. It may be necessary to apply break-out forces for the remainder of the
flight on the affected control axis.
• stall margin decreases with angle of bank and increasing load factors. Therefore, it is prudent to limit
bank angle to 15° in the event manoeuvre capability is in question. Increasing the normal flap/speed
manoeuvre schedule while staying within flap placard limits provides extra stall margin where
greater bank angels are necessary
• all Boeing airplanes have the capability to land using any flap position, including flaps up. Use proper
manoeuvre and final approach speeds and ensure adequate runway is available to stop the airplane
after landing.

Flight path control:

When encountering an event of the type described above, the flight crew’s first consideration should be to
maintain or regain full control of the airplane and establish an acceptable flight path. This may require use of
unusual techniques such as the application of full aileron or rudder or in an asymmetrical thrust situation,
reduction of thrust on the operating engine(s) to regain lateral control. This may also require trading altitude for
airspeed or vice versa. The objective is to take whatever action is necessary to control the airplane and maintain
a safe flight path. Even in a worst case condition where it is not possible to keep the airplane flying and ground
contact is imminent, a “controlled crash” is a far better alternative than uncontrolled flight into terrain.
If the operation of flaps is in doubt, leading and trailing edge flap position should not be changed unless it appears
that airplane performance immediately requires such action. Consideration should be given to the possible effects
of an asymmetrical flap condition on airplane control if flap position is changed. If no flap damage exists, wing
flaps should be operated as directed in the associated NNC. Anytime an increasing rolling moment is experienced
during flap transition (indicating a failure to automatically shut down an asymmetric flap situation), return the
flap handle to the previous position. Unusual events adversely affecting airplane handling characteristics while
airborne may continue to adversely affect airplane handling characteristics during landing ground roll. Aggressive
differential braking and/or use of asymmetrical reverse thrust, in addition to other control inputs, may be required
to maintain directional control.
Checklists with memory items:

After flight path control has been established, do the memory steps of the appropriate NNC. The emphasis at this
point should be on containment of the problem. Reference steps are initiated after the airplane flight path and
configuration are properly established. Complete all applicable NNCs prior to beginning final approach. Exercise
common sense and caution when accomplishing multiple NNCs with conflicting directions. The intended course
of action should be consistent with the damage assessment and handling evaluation.
Communications:
Establish flight deck communications as soon as possible. This may require use of the flight deck interphone
system or, in extreme cases of high noise levels, hand signals and gestures in order to communicate effectively.
Declare an emergency with Air Traffic Control (ATC) to assure priority handling and emergency services upon
landing. Formulate an initial plan of action and inform ATC. If possible, request a discrete radio frequency to
minimize distractions and frequency changes. If unable to establish radio communication with ATC, squawk 7700
and proceed as circumstances dictate. Communications with the cabin crew and with company ground stations
are important, but should be accomplished as time permits. If an immediate landing is required, inform the cabin
crew as soon as possible.

Manual Reversion
Objectives
• Correct handling techniques associated with flight in manual reversion
• Correct recognition of manual use of QRH checklist
• Teamwork and Workload management during non-normal situations of high workload.
Manual Reversion Handling Characteristics

• Noticeable dead band in both pitch and roll controls with high control forces
• Rudder as normal – caution – do not over control with rudder
• Both electric and manual trim available – do not over-trim
• Trim slight nose up to eliminate dead band in pitch
• WTRIS – effects and handling assistance during manual reversion
WTRIS (Wheel to Rudder Interconnect System) - Although not available in the FCOM ‘Systems Description’, the
WTRIS system is fully explained in our aircraft maintenance manual. It is useful information to impart to students
when describing and demonstrating manual reversion. If understood this system assists crews with handling
during these circumstances. If unknown the effect can be over controlling during manual reversion.
WTRIS Explained
• Assists manual reversion during turns, reducing pilot workload
• Available only when system A & B hydraulic systems are depressurised
• FLT CONTROL Switches are in STBY RUD and YAW Damper has been reset to; ON
• SMYD 2 computer commands small amounts of standby rudder deflection (up to 2.5°) when it
senses control wheel input – WTRIS is only in SMYD2
• Pilot can override WTRIS input with rudder or trim
• Rudder movements by WTRIS does not displace rudder pedals
Planning
• Weather / runway / services / maintenance
• You must clearly indicate to ATC your operational requirements / limitations
• Carefully plan landing distance
• Manual gear extension and 2 mins to F15 – Distance covered/required is a big consideration when
positioning for approach
• Fly a long straight in approach
• Keep really small thrust changes (switch off A/T) to avoid pitching
• Configuration and airspeed should be established early - do not make a flat approach
• Anticipate pitch down as T/L closed for landing (eliminated by trim up)
After touchdown
• Thrust reverser operation is slow!
• Steady brake pressure (accumulator)
• Do not apply excessive forward control pressure (less weight on main gear and reduced braking
capability)
• No taxi options (do not attempt) (accumulator depletion)

If Go around
• Apply thrust smoothly and coordinate with stab trim
• Rapid thrust application results in nose up forces
• No gear up option; flaps to 15 (cycles)
• Course of action in event of diversion; fuel considerations (additional drag)
• Flaps – after a complete extend/retract cycle (0-15-0) allow 5 minutes cooling before attempting
another extension. See FCOM 1 Limitations

Narrow Runway Operations

• Captains ONLY approach and landing.
• VMCG will be increased by 5kts.
• VMCG is determined with zero crosswind on a 45-meter-wide runway
• The increase in VMCG decreases deviation from centreline when V1 is limited by VMCG (a 5kt increase will
decrease deviation by 10 feet with an engine failure at VMCG)
• The “uncorrected” VMCG could result in as little as 1-meter edge margin on a 30-meter-wide runway
• Reduced thrust, when performance permits, will minimize thrust asymmetry following an engine failure and
increase crosswind capability. Use de-rated thrust
• Autoland not allowed as the autoland certification is performed on a 45-meter-wide runway
• MEL dispatch: Rudder pedal nose wheel steering, reverse thrust and anti-skid must be operative. Note: If any
of these systems become inoperative during flight, diversion to a 45m wide runway is recommended
• Crosswind limits may be more restrictive than normal, always read the applicable airfield brief.
• Operations on narrow runway are not permitted if runway is contaminated or slippery
• Increased risk of FOD
Takeoff and Rejected Takeoff

• VMCG has been increased to reduce centreline deviation in the “GO’ case (engine failure after V1)
• The greatest deviation from centreline will occur with engine failure at low speed combined with a
crosswind
• Decrease thrust on operating engine as quickly as possible to remove asymmetric thrust
• Worst case scenario for directional control is when the engine fails at low speed before the rudder
becomes effective
• Differential braking may be required for RTO below 65 kts
• The most critical conditions during an RTO are:
• Crosswind (remember VMCG is determined in zero wind)
• Low speed (before the rudder becomes effective)
• High thrust (large thrust asymmetry in case of an engine failure)
• Light weight (less inertia)
• Aft CG (directional control, Ryanair policy is to load a forward CG, i.e bags in hold 2 and 1)
• Max takeoff flap (lower speed, VMCG does not change with flaps setting but the takeoffs speeds will
be lower and closer to VMCG)
Landing
• Pilot judgment is critical especially in adverse weather (most landing incidents occur during heavy
rain and gusty/strong wind conditions)
• Particular care must be made during the briefing to discuss visual references, expectations and
threats during the approach and landing. e.g. a runway that does not have centreline lighting would
present a threat to the crew during reduced visibility approach and landing, especially in relation to
centreline tracking.
• Two primary components contribute to centreline deviation on landing
o Touchdown dispersion
o Later deviation after touchdown due to crab
• Tendency to flare late due to the optical illusion of being higher than you actually are
o Crews must maintain situation awareness in regards to their height above the ground during
the flare by paying particular attention to the EGPWS callouts (50, 40, etc.)
• Autolands not allowed

Training
Training for Narrow Runway Operations will be completed in accordance with the Narrow Runway Ops Training Record.

NITS Drill
If an emergency occurs during flight, the passengers will be instructed in such emergency actions as may be
appropriate to the circumstances. The procedures to be used have been developed for various scenarios and are
contained in the Safety and Emergency Procedures Manual.
The call to initiate a line of communication with the cabin crew in an emergency is “No 1 to the flight deck”. This
call is backed up with a single press of the ‘Attend’ button to give the cabin crew a visual indication of the call.
This will inform the cabin crew that an emergency situation exists. On hearing this call the CSS will proceed to the
cabin interphone and await a communication from the Captain.
NITS and Security

Security procedures associated with locked cockpit door are still valid in an emergency situation. A pilot must view
the cabin prior to opening the cockpit door. It is therefore preferable that the NITS drill is accomplished over the
cabin interphone with the cockpit door locked. The final decision as to how this communication occurs rests with
the Commander.
NITS Terminology
Correct terminology for initiating a NITS drill is:
“This is a NITS briefing please listen carefully”
In conducting the NITS drill the pilot issuing it shall clearly state the individual components of the drill, i.e.
“The NATURE of the …”
“My INTENTIONS are …”
“The TIME available …”
“SPECIAL instructions …”
The No 1 will repeat the NITS back to the Captain so that there is no misunderstanding and that nothing has been
forgotten or misunderstood. They must then synchronize watches.

•Nature of the emergency.

•I.E engine fire, decompression, technical problem.
Nature
•Intention of the Captain.

•I.E whether to make an emergency landing or ditching, whether to
Intention divert, continue or return to base.
•Time reamaining airborune.

•I.E Time Available or Time Avalible - Short Notice.
Time
•Special Instuctions given by the Captain.

•I.E any known factors affecting evacuation and exits to be used.
Special
Instructions •Captain must advise if an SOS demo is required or not required.
Examples:
It would be appropriate to inform the cabin crew that we have had an engine fire, that it has been secured and is
no longer a threat. It would be over-technical to use terms such as “we have had an air conditioning duct
overheat”
Please be thoughtful in the way you present NITS Information to cabin crew so that it may be easily understood
and does not induce unnecessary stress.
What is the SOS Demo?
No 1 Briefing to Passengers.
Sequence of SOS DEMO

Before commencing the SOS Demo PA, the No 1 MUST ensure all cabin lights are put to bright.
S – SURVIVE THE IMPACT – Seatbelts, Brace Position

O – GET OUT – Exits, Strip Lighting
S – SURVIVE OUTSIDE – Lifejackets, Safety Card
This briefing will normally be given by the No 1 over the PA system – if this is not available, loudhailers may be
used instead. The Cabin Crew will require approximately 15-20 minutes to complete all the steps of the QRG Time
Available Land / Ditching. This should be taken into account when requesting an SOS demo as part of the NITS
briefing. A timely NITS briefing to the cabin crew will allow them maximum time to complete their procedures
and prepare the cabin for landing.
(Special instructions given by the Captain, i.e. any know factors affecting evacuation and exits to be used. Captain
must advise if SOS demo is required.)
The information that is passed to the number 1 should be sufficient only to convey the information that might be
helpful to the cabin crew in performing their duties. Over-technical descriptions of events must be avoided as
often these are misunderstood. Mentioning severe problems which are now resolved and under control with no
further implications for cabin crew are also best avoided.

No Engine Bleed Takeoff
Procedures
The supplementary procedures chapter in FCOM volume 1 contains the “No engine bleeds takeoff and landing”
checklist. You must review this checklist thoroughly before presenting for the simulator session as it contains
some important notes:
o “If anti-ice is required for taxi configure for a “no engine bleed takeoff” just prior to takeoff”.
o “If anti-ice is not required for taxi configure for a “no engine bleed takeoff” just after engine start”
o “If engine failure occurs, do not position engine BLEED air switches ON until reaching 1500 feet or until
obstacle clearance height has been attained” (ref FCOM 1, SP). The preferred sequencing of checklists
is QRH, After Takeoff No Engine Bleed checklist, QRH recovery checklist.
When initiating a checklist sequence with a non-standard system panel configuration the following important
notes must be considered:
1. Momentary/temporary unpressurised flight is acceptable below 10 000ft.
2. If planning to operate above 10 000ft the aircraft must be pressurized by at least one air source.
Maximum use of the autopilot / AFDS must be used to ensure both pilots are engaged in solving a complicated
and often confusing scenario for which no checklist can be written.
After a number of associated incidents in Ryanair where the crews mis-configured the pressurization panel after
takeoff, a NO ENGINE BLEED TAKEOFF checklist with the ‘‘BEFORE TAXI – NO ENGINE BLEED’ CHECKLIST and ‘AFTER
TAKE OFF – NO ENGINE BLEED’ CHECKLIST was created.
Precautions
o Previous incidents have proved that the crew must use great care when reconfiguring the pressurization
panel after takeoff.
o You are reminded that checking that the APU is off during
the ten checks is another “safety net” in the event that the crew
would have completed the wrong after takeoff checklist.
Important Note
The Non Normal Checklist (QRH) assumes that system controls
are in the normal configuration for the phase of flight.
Therefore, when any system is not set to the normal
configuration (i.e. dispatching with Pack INOP or No Engine
Bleed Takeoff etc., and a non-normal event or malfunction
occurs) it is essential that crew pay particular attention to the
affected system and agree the most appropriate method of
reconfiguration where necessary. Good situation awareness,
teamwork and airmanship are essential to ensure that all
essential aircraft systems remain operative (e.g. aircraft remains
pressurised).

Navigation Performance Scales (NPS) Indications
Navigation Performance Scales are fitted to newer Ryanair aircraft to enhance situation awareness. Although the
principle behind them is simple crew may find the indications confusing at first glance.
Before localiser and glideslope capture the white bugs (Circled in white above) show localiser and glideslope
indications – This is contrary to crew expectation (Magenta is expected). The indications are white because the
AFDS is not engaged and not following the localiser and glide slope – the AFDS is following LNAV and VNAV
guidance as indicated by the FMAs.
When localiser or glideslope is captured the indications will switch to magenta (Expected indications).

One Engine Inoperative Landing Checklist

To provide an efficient, safe and standardised procedure for the use of the QRH ‘One Engine Inoperative Landing’
checklist the following guidance is issued:
Assumptions:
• A failed engine has been properly secured following ‘Engine Fire, Severe Damage or Separation’, ‘Engine
Failure and Shutdown’ OR following an unsuccessful ‘Engine In-flight Start’ attempt
• The After Takeoff Checklist has been completed
• PIOSEE – NITS – PA has been completed
Monitoring of checklist by the PF:

At all times during the operation of the NN checklist the PF should be sufficiently aware of the conduct of the
checklist so that an error or misunderstanding can be corrected. This is a passive function by the PF. The PF does
not need to give a response to each reference item that the PM is completing but an acknowledgement of certain
system selections will be appropriate. These would include the fuel, air con & press and others.
PM Callouts
The PM will read the challenge and response. The appropriate switch or system selection will be made or
confirmed. Having done the necessary action, the PM will read the response again.
Example: PM reads out “Isolation Valve.......................CLOSE”, PM closes the valve and responds “CLOSE”
Use of Checklist:
• PF calls for “QRH, One Engine Inoperative Landing Checklist”, “My Radios”.
• PM reads and actions the first page of this checklist
• ‘Plan a Flap 15 Landing’ - the PM will obtain the necessary weather/ surface conditions/ landing distance/
ATIS etc. If not obtained during PIOSEE
• The PM will enter the basic approach in the FMC and calculate the landing weight. Any adjustments to
the FMC approach will be made later by the PF
• The landing distance will be calculated from the QRH. 1900 meters is the minimum landing distance
required for Ryanair NN operations. Reference – Ops Manual Part B (Performance preamble)
• Set VREF 15 - the PM will set either VREF 15 or VREF ICE depending on the applicable conditions referred
to in the checklist
When the first page is complete the PM will hold the checklist at ---DEFERRED ITEMS--- DESCENT and inform the
PF “Holding at deferred items, descent checklist”.
The PF will:
• Hand over control and start to set up the flight deck for the anticipated arrival/approach using the
D.A.L.T.A process
• He will set-up Nav Aids
• Make any adjustments to the FMC
• Select auto brake (As required) (see note 3 below)
• Give a full approach briefing
• Minima will be checked and set independently by both pilots

• On completion of the setup and briefing, resume the role of PF

• PF calls for “One Engine Inoperative Descent checklist”
• PM continues with the checklist – read and do. PM actions and responds to all checklist items ensuring
that all actions have been completed
-DEFERRED ITEMS--- APPROACH checks are completed when cleared to an altitude.
Together with the gear and flaps, the PF calls for the “One Engine Inoperative Landing checklist” at one dot below
the Glideslope (ILS) or 1nm before descent point. The aircraft is configured landing gear down and F15.
The ‘One Engine Inoperative Landing’ checklist is a challenge and response checklist. The PM reads the challenge
and the response, the PM checks the challenge and confirms with the appropriate response by the PF.
Example: PM reads: “Landing Gear........Down”.
PF confirms visually and responds “Down”.
Good airmanship is essential - during the landing checklist the PM must be considerate of PF workload and only
make a challenge when this will not overload a busy PF or interrupt a standard callout. (It is better to wait until
the aircraft is established on the glideslope before commencing the checklist.)
Important notes / Common weak areas

VRFE ICE
If VREF ICE (VREF 15 + 10) is required, add 10kts to the F15 VREF speed in the FMC. The FMC will now show a new
VREF. e.g. if VREF 15 = 15/154 then VREF ICE must be entered as 15/164 below the FLAP/SPD prompt.
Fuel
When master caution recall is pressed during the deferred items – descent checklist, if the master caution - fuel
warning illuminates, you must reconfigure the fuel panel to ensure that fuel remains balanced. Check the
imbalance between Tanks 1 and 2, if less than 453kg, then configure “4 pumps on, cross feed remains open”.
Then fuel panel may remain in this configuration, however, you must manage the fuel and monitor the balance
regularly. Any imbalance must be corrected early.
Mishandled fuel x-feed valve selection

Failure to correctly observe the transition of the fuel crossfeed valve through bright / dim illumination of the blue
valve position light results in poor management and awareness of fuel status and endurance. All crews need to

be reminded of the importance of monitoring valve positions through the transit light indications in all associated
systems.
Auto Brake
Landing autobrake use in non-normal situations (ref FCTM) –The use of autobrakes in non-normal landing
situations is recommended because maximum auto braking may be more effective than maximum manual braking
due to timely application upon touchdown and symmetrical braking. However, the advisory PI chapter of the QRH
provides non-normal configuration landing distance data based upon the use of maximum manual braking. When
used properly, maximum manual braking provides the shortest stopping distance.
Operations on One Engine

QRH ‘One Engine Inoperative Landing’ checklist: Reference - Go-around procedure review - This section reviews
the requirements for the handling of the go-around:
• Use flaps 1
• Maintain VREF 15+5 knots or VREF ICE + 5 knots until reaching flap retraction altitude
• Limit Bank Angle to 15° when airspeed is less than VREF 15 + 15 knots or VREF ICE + 5 knots or minimum
manoeuvre speed, whichever is lower
• Accelerate to flaps 1 manoeuvring speed before flap retraction
Bank Angle Selections

It is important that the statement ‘Limit bank angle to 15°’ is understood correctly, a common misunderstanding
and error is the selection 15° AOB on the AOB selector prior to the approach, this can induce serious implications
during positioning to final approach due to the increase turn radius required with 15°AOB. It is a performance
related requirement that must be adhered to during the go-around procedure. Note: With LNAV engaged, the
AFDS may command bank angles greater than 15°AOB.
Obtaining WX
Getting weather whilst putting APU on line – interrupts QRH reading – This is an ideal time to get weather as
necessary; however, it is a function of airmanship/workload management that should dictate whether or not this
is done depending on the circumstances prevailing at the time.
Single Engine ILS Approach – Landing Configuration point

1. QRH MAN – ILS Approach – One Engine Inoperative <RYR> correctly states that the gear down, flap 15
configuration point is at one dot below glideslope. The one dot below glideslope configuration point is
based on a particular set of circumstances of groundspeed and altitude that may not be relevant to the
approach being flown.
2. The glideslope should be captured from level flight. Minimise thrust lever movements to reduce
asymmetry and speed changes. Airplane configuration changes require little thrust change until
capturing the glideslope. Large thrust changes make airplane control more difficult and are indicative of
an unstable approach.
3. It is important to train crews that PF has the discretion to alter the gear down and landing flap
configuration point based on any number of criteria and circumstances at the time, these may include
ground speed / altitude / weather conditions / crew experience etc.
4. Low drag approaches to 5nm or 4nm are not approved for one engine inoperative circumstances.

On Ground Emergency
Objective
• Prompt, correct actioning of QRH ‘Evacuation’ checklist
• Effective communications with all crewmembers and ATC
Anytime an emergency situation is experienced on ground the following ‘ON GROUND EMERGENCY’ actions must
be followed:
Notes
• The Captain will set the parking brake
• The F/O will select flaps 40
• These items are done by memory
NP.21, Initial Emergency Briefing

“We will identify the failure and carry out any
drills as appropriate.”
Before continuing with an evacuation, it is
expected the crew will complete any memory
items as required.
Note: When completing engine fire

memory items on ground, the FO must
confirm each memory item with the
Captain in a similar fashion to the in-
flight completion of memory items.

Pack Trip Off
Objectives
• Correct recognition of condition (MCWS)
• Correct QRH checklist called for and actioned
• Understanding of system, implications of failure and considerations
A Pack Trip OFF occurs when one or more of the following occur:
• The primary and standby pack controls are failed
• A pack overheat
Overheat in a pack will cause the respective pack to trip automatically. A failure of both primary and standby
controls will trigger a master caution PACK system annunciator light, the pack will continue to operate without
control unless excessive temperatures cause the pack to trip off. The remaining pack will automatically switch to
“high air flow” to maintain the necessary ventilation rate.
The QRH informs crews to select a warmer temperature on all temperature selectors to reduce the workload of
the pack. Crew should monitor cabin temperatures for passenger comfort following this action.
Note: A single pack in high flow is capable of maintaining pressurisation and acceptable temperatures throughout
the airplane up to the maximum certified ceiling. Dispatch with one pack inoperative requires MEL/DDPG
reference. Dispatching with a pack INOP restricts cruise to a maximum of FL250 (ref MEL/DDPG).

Passenger Announcements
The quality of passenger announcements by flight crew has a direct impact on the customer’s perception of both
the safety and competence of Ryanair as an airline. This includes both normal and non-normal situations and
needs to be carefully considered prior to picking up the hand mic.
There are some general techniques that should be applied to ensure a consistent and acceptable standard of PAs:
1. Know what you are going to say before you start your PA
2. Listen out on the ACP to ensure you don’t interrupt a cabin announcement
3. Hold the mic close to your mouth so that the upper flange rests on your upper lip
4. Speak clearly, slowly and ensure you pronounce each word carefully, especially if using a second
language
5. Use the PA Handy Dandy as guidance for the structure but do not read from it
6. Seek feedback from the cabin crew on the clarity of your PAs post flight and adapt your technique.
Cadets will be expected to make PAs during simulator training from FBS 5 onwards; CU and OCC students will be
expected to make PAs from day 2 onwards.

Passenger Evacuation
The passenger evacuation is no longer a memory item. Steps 1 and 3 of the ‘Evacuation’ checklist will have been
actioned during the ‘On Ground
Emergency’ drills.
The F/O (RHS) reads the challenge and

the response. The appropriate pilot
actions the item and responds with the
abbreviated response listed below.
Checklist items are completed
sequentially.
Steps 8 & 9 are considered complete

once each step has been actioned by the
appropriate pilot. No response is
required to the completed action.
Note that the fire switches

are the F/O’s responsibility

Pilot Incapacitation
Succession of Command
In the event that the Commander can no longer act in the capacity of Pilot-in-Command then the authority, duties
and responsibilities of Commander devolve on the Co-Pilot.
If there is a company qualified pilot on board who is fit to operate, (subject to appropriate security check of
ID/Licence,) this pilot may assist and occupy a pilot seat. A non-company pilot may NOT occupy a pilot seat.
Operational Concept
The basic safety standards sought in operations are achieved, in part, by carrying two fully qualified flight crew
members on commercial aircraft and by defining standard operating procedures.
The case of complete incapacitation of the pilot-in-command is one where it is reasonable to expect that by the
intervention of the co-pilot the safety of the flight will not be prejudiced.
However, a more serious safety hazard occurs where partial incapacitation or severe distraction causes the flight
crew member in control to depart from normally accepted flight procedures so as to endanger the aircraft.
General
Incapacitation is a real air safety hazard which occurs more frequently than many of the other emergencies which
are the subject of routine training and has caused accidents. Incapacitation can occur in many forms varying from
obvious sudden death to subtle, partial loss of function. It occurs in all age groups and during all phases of flight.
The administrative aspects of illness or incapacity generally while on duty are dealt with in Chapter 6, Crew Health
Precautions.
While this section deals exclusively with incapacity of operating crew and flight crew members in particular
occurring during flight, a crew member shall not commence or perform duties on an aircraft while under the
influence of any drug that may affect his faculties in a manner contrary to safety, or if he knows or suspects that
he is suffering from fatigue or feels unfit to the extent that the flight may be endangered.
Sudden and total incapacity are obvious but subtle incapacity is insidious and may be difficult to recognise and to
take appropriate action. This section sets out intervention criteria for different phases of flight which are
particularly important as the basis for a co-pilot making a corrective input or taking control of the flight.
Recognition
The critical operational problem is early recognition of the incapacitation. The keys to early recognition of
incapacitation are deviations or variation from normal operation and path control which may be identified by the
application of:
1. Standard Operating Procedures.
2. Routine monitoring and cross-checking of flight instruments, particularly during critical phases of flight,
i.e., take-off climb out, descent, approach, landing and go-around.
3. Use of crew concept method of operation.
4. Use of the “Two Communications Rule” – Flight Crew should suspect “subtle incapacitation” if a crew
member does not respond appropriately to two verbal communications, OR a crew member does not
respond to a verbal communication associated with a significant deviation from a standard flight profile.
“Subtle” incapacitation means what it says! Any lack of response to normal stimuli should put the remaining Flight
Crew member on his guard.

8.3.14 Incapacitation of Crew Members

When a crew member is incapacitated, that crewmember shall not resume duties for the remainder of the flight,
regardless of how brief the incapacitation may have been. As soon as possible after landing the Commander, or
next senior crewmember if the Commander was incapacitated, shall contact Ryanair Operations. Ops will inform
crewing and rostering of the crewmember incapacitation and the crewmember shall not be assigned further flight
duty until in the case of a pilot, a qualified AME certifies that the crewmember is medically fit for flight duties, or
for CC a doctor certifies that the CC is fit for flight duties. On receipt of the correspondence from the AME crew
control/rostering will assign flight duties as appropriate.
A pilot incapacitation cannot be “undeclared” or “downgraded” and the affected pilot, for route and diversion
planning purposes, must be treated as incapacitated until the aircraft is on the ground at the nearest suitable
airport
Incapacitation Procedures
Particular crew monitoring procedures to recognise flight crew member incapacitation and action to be taken in
the event of incapacitation are identified in Part A, Chapter 8, Section 8.3.14.
Flight crew members are required to understand the concept of intervention and act in accordance with this
principle. This can be a difficult decision for a co-pilot. Hence criteria for intervention have evolved to provide
guidance for intervention in the case of co-pilots but also for Commanders where the co-pilot is flying.
Two levels of intervention are identified:

• The first is where the PM must direct the attention of the PF to departure from standard procedures.
• The second is where, if a correction has not been effected, the PM must intervene and communicate
clearly that he is now the PF and ensure as much as possible that the other pilot understands this
handover of control
Such intervention should only take place where the safety of the flight is prejudiced (i.e incapacitation) and the
following actions should to be taken.
If the flight crew member does not react normally at any time or appears to be ill, speak to him and ask questions.
If his replies are not normal or he appears to be irrational, ask him how he feels, etc. If another crew member is
in the cockpit, discuss the matter with him. If the flight crew member appears ill, persuade him to allow you to fly
the aircraft. Do not wait until the flight crew member is at point of collapse.
Action
If an incapacitation occurs: (time permitting refer SEP Manual Ch5)
1. The remaining flight crew member should take over the controls and double check the position of essential
controls and switches and maximize use of A/P, A/T and F/Ds. Remember the priority is to fly the aircraft.
2. Press ‘Attend’ button and call “Number 1 to the flight deck”
3. Declare an emergency – MAYDAY -, MAYDAY -, MAYDAY – Ryanair ABC -, PILOT INCAPACITATION -, STANDBY”.
ATC will acknowledge your MAYDAY
4. The incapacitated flight crew member should be restrained and his seat should be moved back such that the
incapacitated crewmember has no access to controls
5. Cabin crew should be used (minimum number of two) to remove the incapacitated flight crew member from
his seat I.A.W. SEP Manual procedures
6. Re-organise cockpit duties for landing. If the PIC is incapacitated, the co-pilot should stay in his own seat and
operate from there

7. If there is a company qualified pilot on board who is fit to operate, (subject to appropriate security check of
ID/licence), this pilot may assist and occupy a pilot seat. A non-company pilot may NOT occupy a pilot seat.
Company cabin crew may NOT occupy a pilot seat
8. Conduct PIOSEE, NITS, PA and plan to land at nearest suitable airport
9. Using MAYDAY callsign advise ATC of the medical condition of the incapacitated pilot, and advise your
intention to land at nearest suitable airport
10. In the event of pilot incapacitation, the requirement to utilise a competent CC or company pilot to assist the
operating pilot by reading the approach and landing check lists, or any other checklists requested by the
operating pilot is necessary. The additional presence of another crewmember in the flight deck is a necessary
safety measure.
11. The operating pilot will then explain any other assistance required. Flight crew other than the operating pilot
(e.g. jump seating pilot, safety pilot) shall be seated in the flight deck.
12. If there is no other pilot available, the CC assisting the operating pilot shall occupy the first observer centre
jumpseat (a CC should only occupy a pilot seat if there is no serviceable jumpseat available) to assist the
operating pilot by reading the approach and landing check lists, or any other checklists requested by the
operating pilot. At the pilot’s request, the items on the check list should be read clearly. The CC must remain
in the flight deck until the aircraft has come to a complete stop.
13. The remaining CC in the cabin will take revised crew positions as per section 5.11.9 of the SEP Manual.
NOTE: The F/O shall not taxi from the left hand seat. Advise ATC that you will be stopping on the runway and will
be unable to taxi. Consider the actions you would take once landed to safely offload the Captain. This will require
making the aircraft safe for emergency personnel to approach the aircraft.
Important note
Pilot incapacitation requires the use of the internationally recognised emergency phraseology, “Mayday, Mayday,
Mayday” must be used to alert ATC.
ATC must be made aware that the incapacitation of a pilot is a situation that affects the safety of a flight and that
must be treated as such. In particular for the purposes of activating the emergency plan at the airport where the
aircraft will be landing.
Declaration of a “medical emergency” alone is not sufficient and may be interpreted by personnel on the ground
as being solely of a medical nature and not necessarily the incapacitation of an operating flight crewmember.
It is a mandatory requirement to preserve CVR data after an incident/accident and it is the responsibility of the
aircraft Commander to ensure that the yellow-collared CVR circuit breaker is pulled at the earliest opportunity on
the ground following flight crew incapacitation in flight. The CVR CB must never be pulled in flight.
✓ If you don't feel well – SAY SO!

✓ Let the other flight crew member fly
✓ The fit flight crew member takes over and keeps the aircraft under control & maintains a safe flight profile
Safety and Emergency Procedures (Pilot Incapacitation Drill)

Protect the Aircraft Controls
1. Remove the pilot from the controls, ensure airway is open
2. Ensure seat belt is fastened and shoulder harness is secured

3. Cross the pilot’s arms and secure them behind the shoulder harness
4. Engage inertia reel lock
5. Ensure seatback is in the fully upright position (Recline lever)
6. Slide seat fully aft (“H” lever)
7. Remove pilot’s feet from rudder pedals, cross the legs behind the yoke
Care of the Pilot

1. Check airway is clear (if choking - i.e. back slaps).
2. Check for normal breathing for 10 seconds.
BREATHING ABSENT
BREATHING NORMAL
(or ONLY OCCASSIONAL GASP)
↓ ↓
Consider moving pilot to the forward galley First Aid and monitor, consider use of emergency
(exercise extreme caution) oxygen bottle from the cabin
↓
↓
Commence CPR
↓
Assist Operating Pilot
Assist Operating Pilot
If breathing of the incapacitated pilot is normal, consider administering oxygen to the operating pilot (may require
oxygen due to hypoxia).
Note: Should a pilot be incapacitated following a decompression, quick don oxygen should be used on emergency.
If breathing is not normal and subject to approval from the remaining pilot and depending on the phase of flight,
2 CC will remove incapacitated pilot from his seat and commence CPR immediately at forward of aircraft. The No1
will assign crew members to this task (normally No 2 and No 3) taking account of the physical size of the pilot to
be removed.
To remove incapacitated flight crew member two CC will hold him underneath his arms and manipulate him out
of his seat to the FWD galley.

Rapid Depressurisation
Objectives
• Prompt correct actioning of memory items
• Immediate donning of oxygen masks at 100%
• Cancelling of cabin altitude warning horn
• Prompt decision making and effective communications
• Timely actioning of emergency descent checklist
A decompression occurs if there is a failure of the structure or pressurisation systems of the aircraft. Due to the
failure, the air from inside the aircraft will rush out, therefore the altitude of the cabin will climb and eventually
equalise with the altitude outside the aircraft. Depending on the nature of the failure, the time it takes for the
cabin altitude to climb to the same altitude as the aircraft will vary.
The following points are worth noting:

• There are no obvious warning lights associated with incorrect switching of PACKS or BLEEDS on a 737
• The leak rate on the 737 is a lot less than the potential climb rate therefore there can be a short lived
indication of “pressure” while the aircraft is climbing, even with the PACKS and BLEEDS in the OFF
position
• The needle positions on the cabin altimeter and differential pressure indicator will swap initially after
take-off with the cabin unpressurised. This can coincide with the time when the After Take Off checks
are being performed i.e. 5000’ cabin altitude and 1 PSI can look awfully like 1000’ cabin alt and 5 PSI
• It is more likely to mistake a reading when performing a routine task then when performing a non-routine
task
• There is no warning light to advise crews that the cabin altitude remains above 10,000’ after the warning
horn has been cancelled by the crew. (Cabin altitude lights are to be installed and activated on the
Ryanair B737-800 fleet but not the -700 fleet)
• The statement “Thrust set indications normal” implies that the achieved N1 is the same value as the
calculated N1, this should be cross checked against the values entered on the load sheet
• Anytime you hear the altitude warning horn the crews’ first reaction must be to don oxygen masks and
establish communications. The problem can then be investigated
Three distinct types of decompression are recognised:
Explosive decompression
Explosive decompression occurs at a rate faster than that at which air can escape from the lungs, typically in less
than 0.1 to 0.5 seconds. The risk of lung trauma is very high, as is the danger from any unsecured objects that can
become projectiles because of the explosive force, which may be likened to a bomb detonation. After an explosive
decompression within an aircraft, a heavy fog may immediately fill the interior as the cabin air very rapidly cools
and condenses.
Rapid decompression
Rapid decompression typically takes more than 0.1 to 0.5 seconds, allowing the lungs to decompress faster than
the cabin. The risk of lung damage is still present, but significantly reduced compared to explosive decompression.
Causes of a rapid decompression include a door blow out. The effects of a sudden lack of oxygen to the brain are
very serious particularly as the brain is adversely affected without the person being aware of it. A "lack of self-

criticism" occurs and the subject will think they are acting more efficiently and competently than is actually the
case. This euphoric condition is dangerous and must be guarded against, as the need for oxygen may not seem
obvious.
Material Effects of a Rapid Decompression

1. A loud explosive noise
2. Air rising towards the failure carrying loose articles, papers, dust, etc
3. A dense fog will form in the cabin momentarily as moisture held in the cabin condenses. Passengers may
confuse this with smoke and need reassurance. This fog may cause toilet smoke detectors to activate
4. Hot liquids will suddenly boil over (risk of scalding)
5. Oxygen masks will drop down
6. Fasten Seatbelt sign will automatically illuminate
Physical Effects of a Rapid Decompression

1. Severe ear and sinus pain
2. Chest and joint pain caused by nitrogen bubbles in the blood expanding
3. Forced expulsion of air
4. You will feel very cold
Slow decompression
Slow, or gradual, decompression occurs slowly enough to go unnoticed and might only be detected by
instruments. Causes of a slow decompression can include a damaged door seal or cracked window. This type of
decompression may also come about from a failure to pressurize as an aircraft climbs to altitude. An example of
this is the Helios Airways Flight 522 crash, in which the pilots failed to check the aircraft was pressurising
automatically and then react to the warnings that the aircraft was de-pressurising.
Crew members must be able to recognise the symptoms of hypoxia (lack of oxygen to the brain) in order to quickly
identify a slow decompression. Symptoms of hypoxia include: headaches, nausea, yawning and occasional deep
breaths.
If a slow decompression is suspected, it is the responsibility of the cabin crew to ensure the flight deck is informed
immediately via the interphone.
Ryanair has robust SOPs to avoid subtle depressurisations:

• After take-off checklist (AIR COND & PRESS)
• 10 checks (Air Conditioning and Pressurisation)
• Silent pressurization checks every 10,000 feet
• Pressurisation checks when cleared to cruise flight level
The rapid depressurisation and emergency descent procedure is a commonly failed exercise during simulator
checks. The most regular error made by crews is to rush this procedure. To assist you with preparation, study the
following guidance:
Study the memory items associated with this emergency procedure. Practice these drills as a crew on a regular
basis, the use of touch drills will enhance your ability to complete these drills with confidence.

The rapid depressurisation drill can be regarded to consist of 3 sections
The Crew
• Oxygen – ON 100% (100% selection check is completed during the cockpit safety inspection) (oxygen
mask regulator mid position). EMERG may be used as necessary to remove fogging.
• Crew communications – Establish (Ensure that you can both hear each other through the intercom
system and make sure that you are both alert and not affected by hypoxia)
The Aircraft
• Pressurisation Mode Selector – Manual (allows for manual input to the outflow valve)
• Outflow Valve Switch – Close (Attempts to hold residual pressure in the cabin)
The Passengers
• Passenger Signs – On
• Passenger Oxygen Switch – On
Other Considerations
• Handover of controls –Flight crew must use oxygen when the cabin altitude is above 10,000ft. Once the
cabin altitude is at or below 10,000ft and the use of crew oxygen is no longer required, the masks should
be removed using the following procedure to ensure the aircraft is always fully under control.
o F/O removes mask first
o F/O reconfigures ACP and establishes communication with the Captain
o Captain hands over control to the F/O
o Captain reconfigures ACP and establishes communication with the F/O
It should be noted that the CABIN ALTITUDE light may still be illuminated until the cabin altitude is below
8,500ft. However, the defining criteria in order to remove the oxygen masks is a cabin altitude of
10,000ft or lower which can be identified by the cabin altitude indication on the pressurization panel.
It is important that one pilot remains fully in control of the aircraft at all times and there is no confusion
regarding the PF/PM roles.
• Passenger comfort – once the aircraft is stabilised below 10,000ft and the crew oxygen masks have been
removed, MEA/MSA and fuel permitting, crews could consider descending further for passenger health
and comfort.
• Descent management – the descent should be planned to minimise the descent rate and passenger
discomfort. Track mileage required from 10,000ft would be approximately 50 nm.
Oxygen Mask Fogging

When using the oxygen mask the visor often becomes fogged with the condensation of moisture from the pilot’s
breath. This can be easily removed by rotating the crew oxygen regulator to the emergency setting. The EMER
setting supplies 100% oxygen under positive pressure at all cabin altitudes. Use EMER to purge contaminants from
the mask and remove condensation or fogging from interior of mask lens.

Raw Data ILS Approach

The requirement to train for and be checked in your ability to fly a Raw Data ILS is based solely on the skill test
requirement. This is not an approach you will fly on the line unless significant failure of equipment occurs. As this
is a skill test requirement it is important that some guidance is given to this procedure.
It is Ryanair policy to maximize the use of the Autopilot and Flight Director System (AFDS) available on Ryanair
aircraft. This policy has been vindicated by evidence from the Ryanair Safety Management System (SMS) which
confirms that use of this automation is safety enhancing, in particular in managing threats in Key Operational Risk
Areas (KORAs) including upsets, HEA (high energy approach) and task saturation. Use of automation reduces
workload, improves capacity and situational awareness during all phases of flight. Procedures for re-engaging of
AFDS automation is provided in FCOM Vol 1 and SOP Manual. The Flight Director system should not be switched
off when serviceable during flight operations.
Objectives
• Development of scan
• Anticipation of configuration changes, thrust and pitch requirements
• Recognition of trends and prompt corrections to maintain correct profile and speed
• Handling skills
• Quality of handling during landing phase, touchdown and rollout
• Review the target (approximate) pitch and thrust settings for the approach
─ Prior to LOC intercept F1 / F5; Level Flight; 5.5° - 6.0° NUP; 60%N1
─ Glide Slope Alive; G/Down; F15; Level Flight; 5.5° - 6.0° NUP; 70%N1
─ Glide Slope Capture; F30; 1.0° NUP; 57%N1
• Flown from an intercept heading at platform altitude. The exercise will begin once stabilised
• Train standard callouts – Localiser Alive, Glideslope Alive etc
• Observe and correct any physical handling errors / over controlling / tunnel vision etc – patter if
necessary to improve the cadet skills
• Build confidence
Raw Data - (No AFDS)

Raw data approaches are normally used during training to improve the instrument scan. If a raw data approach is
required during normal operations, refer to the DDG or airline equivalent for the possibility of increased landing
minima.
ILS deviation is displayed on the PFD. ILS deviation may also be displayed on the navigation display by selecting
an ILS mode on the EFIS Control Panel. The localizer course deviation scale on the PFD remains normal scale during
the approach. Continue to cross-check the map display against the attitude indicator raw data. The magnetic
course/bearing information from the VOR/ADF pointers on the navigation display may be used to supplement the
attitude display localizer deviation indication during initial course interception.
Maintain the intercept heading; be alert for movement of the localiser pointer, as it starts to move the PM must
call “Localiser alive” to aid in positive intercept of the localiser. Begin the turn to the inbound track at the first
movement of the localizer pointer. After course intercept, the track line and ‘track up’ read-out on the navigation
display may be used to assist in maintaining the desired course. Bank as needed to keep the localizer pointer
centred and the track line over the course line. This method automatically corrects for wind drift with very little
reference to actual heading required.

Large bank angles are rarely required while tracking inbound on the localizer. Use 5° to 10° of bank angle. When
the glide slope pointer begins to move (glide slope alive), lower the landing gear, extend flaps 15, and decelerate
to flaps 15 speed. Intercepting the glide slope, extend landing flaps and establish the final approach speed. When
established on the glide slope, pre-set the missed approach altitude in the altitude window. On final approach,
maintain VREF + 5 knots or an appropriate correction for headwind component. Check altitude crossing the FAF.
To stabilize on the final approach speed as early as possible, it is necessary to exercise precise speed control during
the glide slope intercept phase of the approach. The rate of descent varies with the glide slope angle and
groundspeed. Expeditious and smooth corrections should be made based on the ILS course and glide slope
indications. Apply corrections at approximately the same rate and amount as the flight path deviations.
Raw Data Approach (ILS, No Flight Director) – The Basics

The most positive element of training for the Raw Data approach is that it helps develop a significant amount of
skills. The most important skills being:
SCAN – You need to develop your SCAN to incorporate all the necessary instruments for a successful approach.
You will need to include the following instruments in your SCAN:
PITCH - Maintain the target attitude for each phase of the approach
AIRSPEED - Maintain the required airspeed, once established in the descent establish the correct airspeed early,
watch for TRENDS and correct unwanted acceleration/deceleration early with either pitch or thrust as required.
THRUST - Set the target thrust setting for the approach. Avoid large thrust changes as this will destabilise the
approach. Make as few thrust changes as possible.
LOC/GLIDESLOPE - Constant scan of both LOC and Glideslope will indicate any tendencies to deviate. Again,
watch for TRENDS, keep changes small.
ND DISPLAY - The ND display provides an immediate and useful picture of progress in the tracking sense. Regular
reference to this with a suitable increased scale is important for situation awareness. It is NOT a requirement in
Ryanair to have the ND display to MAP for Raw Data Approaches, use whatever mode on the ND that you feel
most comfortable to pass the LST. MAP must be used for all other approaches.
VERTICAL SPEED - Use the digital readout below the needle for accuracy; only bring this into your scan
occasionally to confirm that you are maintaining the required target V/S. Use Navtech chart to attain FPM
requirements for a given speed.
ANTICIPATE – (Think ahead) Anticipate what will happen next. For example: Flaps 1, 5 and 15 are lift flaps and
will produce a pitch up moment, be prepared to act on this with a little forward control column pressure during
flap extension. Gear Extension also produces a pitch up moment. Flap 25 -40 are drag flaps, these will cause a
pitch down moment.
THRUST – this should be considered an additional flight control during the Raw Data approach. Increase of thrust
causes a pitch up moment, reduction a pitch down. Use thrust sparingly, small changes are best, wait for the
response to a thrust input to occur as there is always a slight delay.
TRIM – A properly trimmed aircraft is fundamental. If you have to continually manipulate the controls to maintain
a constant condition, then you are poorly trimmed. Flying the aircraft with light pressure on the controls is good,
a tight grip of the control column and evidence of forced control inputs is a sign of over controlling. To assist in
avoidance of over controlling the use of the right armrest can be helpful; this takes some pressure off your flying
arm and restricts the amount of input to the control column.
TRENDS – Watching for trends during the scan will offer early warning of deviations which, if caught, can be
corrected with minimal control inputs. The Airspeed indicator offers a 10 second trend vector (green arrow) which
clearly highlights a change is occurring. Once you are ‘on-speed’ with the required attitude you should not see
the speed trend indicator come into view.
The position trend vector on the ND (this sits on the apex of the Airplane symbol (triangle) also acts as a trend
indication to show where you will be in any given number of seconds dependant on scale settings.
Other trends could be: High or low Rate of descent i.e. greater than 800’/min, less than 600’/min. Unless these
descent rates are actively being used to manage recovery to the Glideslope they should not be seen. An abnormal
descent rate is a good trend indicator. Tracking can be aided by maintaining the required track, this is seen at the
top of the ND display (Current Magnetic Track indication).
The Bank pointer at the top of the PFD display is a useful tool to consider. Once you are on track/on heading keep
the Bank pointer at the top position and avoid any large changes, bring this into your scan.
ATTITUDE + THRUST = PERFORMANCE

Know your target pitch attitudes and target thrust settings!
Example:
737-800 GW 60T
During approach with F40
selected, aim to fly a pitch
attitude of 0° and a thrust
setting of 63% N1 to maintain
a 3° Glideslope.

Rejected Landing
Objectives
• Positive response to go-around call
• Prompt actions to achieve go-around thrust and pitch
• Firm, clear callouts by PM
• Standard go-around profile complied with, accurate tracking acceleration and level off management
In the Simulator
Instructor shall introduce an ATC go-around at 50ft above threshold due to runway incursion.
Background Information: Rejected Landing

A rejected landing manoeuvre is trained and evaluated as part of the practical training elements of the Type
Rating. It is a go-around that requires prompt reactions and inputs to the controls to safely climb away from the
ground. Although the FCOM/QRH does not contain a procedure or manoeuvre titled Rejected Landing, the
requirements of this manoeuvre can be accomplished by the go-around procedure if it is initiated prior to
touchdown. Ref FCOM Vol 1 Go-Around procedure.
Note: During a go-around initiated at 50 feet, approximately 30 feet of altitude is lost. If touchdown occurs after
a go-around is initiated, the go-around continues. If automatic go-around - Observe that the auto throttle applies
go-around thrust or manually apply go-around thrust as the airplane rotates to the go-around attitude.
If Single Channel or Manual Go-around make sure that go-around thrust is achieved and maintained and that
correct pitch attitude is attained.
Go-Around after Touchdown

If a go-around is initiated before touchdown and touchdown occurs, continue with normal go-around procedures.
The F/D go-around mode will continue to provide go-around guidance commands throughout the manoeuvre.
If a go-around is initiated after touchdown but before thrust reverser selection, auto speedbrakes retract and
autobrakes disarm as thrust levers are advanced. The F/D go-around mode will not be available until TOGA is
selected after becoming airborne.
Caution: Once reverse thrust is initiated following touchdown; a full stop landing must be
made. If an engine stays in reverse, safe flight may not be possible.
Communications
Remember to include all aspects of the safety and emergency procedures manual in relation to a go-around.
Note: In the event of a go-around the cabin crew will:
• Make an initial PA to the passengers stating “Ladies and gentlemen, please remain in your seats with
your seatbelts securely fastened. The Captain has decided not to land the aircraft on this occasion. This
is perfectly normal. We will give you more information as soon as we have it. Thank you.
• After 4-5 minutes the number one will contact the flight deck and say “Cabin to flight deck, number 1
standing by”.
• The number two picks up the aft interphone and says “Cabin to flight deck, number 2 standing by”.
• Inform the Captain of any relevant information from the cabin.
• The Captain will make a PA to the passengers advising reason for go-around.

Rejected Takeoff
REFERENCE: QRH NNM and B737 NG Flight Crew Training Manual Section 3, Operations manual Part A Chapter 8
and QRH NNM
The actions required when rejecting a takeoff are often poorly performed due to rushed actions by the crew. It is
very important not to rush the RTO actions during the deceleration to stop phase.
A high speed RTO is a demanding and high risk manoeuvre. The company mitigates the risks associated with the
RTO by clearly specifying the circumstances when an RTO above 80kts must be carried out:
• Fire or Fire Warning
• Engine Failure
• Predictive Windshear warning
• Airplane is unsafe or unable to fly
In a 12-month period there were 14 RTOs executed by Ryanair aircraft at speeds in excess of 80kts. Of these 14
RTOs, only three fell into the categories listed above. The remainder were initiated for various reasons including
Master Caution – FLT CONT STBY Rudder. All were successfully executed and the RTO led only to minor passenger
disruption. Without exception however, the Crew perception of the RTO initiation speed, was considerably less
than the actual speed achieved in the manoeuvre with many cases achieving speeds in excess of 130kts.
As speed approaches V1, the successful completion of an RTO becomes increasingly more difficult. FAA studies of
97 rejected takeoff runway excursion accidents/incidents have revealed that 55% were initiated at speeds in
excess of V1. Additionally, when the accident records involving Go/No Go decisions were reviewed, virtually no
revenue flight was found where a ‘GO’ decision was made and the aircraft was incapable of continuing the takeoff.
V1 is the maximum speed at which the rejected takeoff must have been initiated to allow the aircraft to stop
within the remaining field length. Conducting RTOs at speeds above 80kts for reasons other than those specified
above is not recommended as any benefits in these circumstances are at best questionable.
Crews are reminded that the RTO ‘STOP’ call is a Commanders call, it is made only for the reasons described above
and the call must be made before the aircraft reaches V1. Furthermore, a commander should never decide to
reject a takeoff at or after V1 unless he/she is certain that the safety of the aircraft would be endangered if it
became airborne.
Use of the call ‘KEEP GOING’ is described in FCOM Vol 1. It is described in the context of the Emergency Brief
conducted by each PF prior to his/her first flight of the day. The briefing specifies events and circumstances where
the captain must call ‘STOP’. For all other events and circumstances where the Captain’s decision is to continue
the takeoff the call ‘KEEP GOING’ is used.
Deviations from these very prescriptive requirements will put crews and passengers at risk and may expose the
crew should an incident or accident occur as a result of the RTO manoeuvre.

Background information and Statistics
The FAA studies highlight that in more than half of the 97

accident the crew rejected the takeoff after V1. The diagram
below categorises the speed at which these RTOs were
initiated:
Reasons why these unsuccessful RTOs were initiated vary, but

approximately one fifth were prompted by engine failures or
engine indication warnings.
Although historically training has centred on engine failure as

the primary reason to reject, the statistics show that wheel or
tire problems have caused just about as many accidents and
incidents as have engine events. Other reasons that rejects occurred were for unsafe configuration, indication or
light, crew coordination problems, bird strikes, or ATC. Undetermined causes make up the rest. What is important
to note here is that the majority of past RTO accidents were not engine failure events. Full take-off power from
all engines was available. Analysis of the available data suggests that of these RTO accidents and incidents,
approximately 82% were avoidable.
These potentially avoidable accidents can be divided into three categories:

1) Roughly 15% of the RTO accidents of the past were the result of improper preflight planning. Some of
these instances were caused by loading errors and others by incorrect preflight procedures.
2) About 15% of the accidents and incidents could be correlated with incorrect pilot technique or
procedures in the stopping effort. Delayed application of the brakes, failure to deploy the speedbrakes,
and the failure to make a maximum effort stop until late in the RTO were the chief characteristics of this
category.
3) Finally, in approximately 52% of these events, the airplane was capable of continuing the takeoff and
landing safely.
The US NTSB concludes

“…pilots faced with unusual or unique situations may perform high-speed RTOs unnecessarily or may perform
them improperly.”
Therefore, a review of the reason to reject above 80 knots and the RTO manoeuvre is completed every day by the
Captain during the initial emergency briefing.
• Statistically 1 in every 3000 take-offs end with an RTO
• From 1959 to 1990 there were 74 RTO overrun accidents or incidents recorded, almost all of these RTOs
happened above 80kts
• RTOs before 80kts almost never result in an accident

• Approx. ¼ of RTO accidents were due to engine failure or engine indications

• Historically as many RTO accidents were due to wheel or tire failure
• What’s important to notice is that the majority of past RTO accidents were not due to engine failure. Full
takeoff power from all engines were available
• Analysis shows that 80% of these accidents could have been avoided
• What should these statistics tell you?
o RTOs are not very common. This speaks well of our maintenance procedures and the reliability of
the B737.
o More importantly the infrequency may lead to complacency.
o You MUST be prepared to make the “Go/No Go” decision on every take-off
Understanding Take-off Speeds

Pilots are used to calculating take-off speeds and, therefore, understand the operational significance of V1, VR,
and V2. However, they are slightly less familiar with the definitions of VMCG, and VMCA.
Take-off speeds are a safety key element for take-off, and enable pilot situation awareness and decision-making
in this very dynamic situation. The use of erroneous take-off speeds can lead to tail strikes, high-speed rejected
take-offs or initial climb with degraded performance. The objective of the following guidance is to provide, from
an operational perspective, an overall review of take-off speeds, and of the factors that affect the calculation and
use of V speeds.
VMCG (Velocity of Minimum Control on Ground)

This is the minimum speed at which there is sufficient rudder authority available to continue the take-off in the
event of an engine failure. V1 must not be lower than VMCG.
What is V1?
o “The speed at which the pilots first application of the first retarding means during accelerate stop
tests”
o It is not a decision speed, the decision to Go or No Go must have been made before V1
o When the V1 call is made during the take-off roll, the take-off must be continued
“V1 is the end of the Go/ No Go decision process, not the beginning. If you have not applied the brakes by the
time you hear the V1 call, you have made the Go decision by default”.
VR: Rotation Speed

The rotation speed ensures that, in the case of an engine failure, lift-off is possible and V2 is reached at 35 feet at
the latest.
Note: Therefore, at 35 feet, the actual speed is usually greater than V2. The rotation of the aircraft begins at VR,
which makes lift-off possible, at the end of the manoeuvre.
VMCA (Velocity of Minimum Control in the Air)

The rudder is used to compensate for the yaw moment caused by thrust asymmetry. There is a minimum speed
at which full rudder will be necessary, in order to fly a constant heading with level wings. To reduce sideslip, this
speed can be reduced even more, if the aircraft is banked on the live engines side.
The lower the speed, the greater the necessary bank angle. A maximum of 5 degrees’ bank is allowed during
certification.

V2: Takeoff Safety Speed

V2 is the minimum speed that needs to be maintained up to acceleration altitude, in the event of an engine failure
after V1. Flight at V2 ensures that the minimum required climb gradient is achieved, and that the aircraft is
controllable. V2 speed is always greater than VMCA, and facilitates control of the aircraft in flight.
In an all-engines operative take-off, V2+20 provides a better climb performance than V2 .If one engine is lost
before reaching V2, then the initial climb is flown at V2.If thrust is lost at a speed between V2 and V2+20, then
the current speed is maintained, to ensure the most efficient climb speed.
It is not necessary to increase pitch, in order to reduce the speed to V2, when a higher speed has already been
reached, unless complying with a Ryanair (ETP) Emergency Turn Procedure which is normally flown at V2 (unless
otherwise specified).
Maximum Stopping Performance

The objective of the rejected take-off procedure is to quickly reconfigure the airplane to produce the maximum
retarding forces possible under the prevailing conditions. The “correct” procedure for accomplishing a rejected
take-off is contained in the QRH. It is important that these procedures be followed in order to achieve the
maximum stopping performance.
Basically, thrust must come to idle, full brakes must be applied, the speedbrakes/spoilers must be raised, and
maximum reverse thrust consistent with airplane controllability must be applied until the crew is assured that the
airplane will stop within the remaining runway.
A review of overrun accidents indicates that, in many cases, the stopping capability available was not used to the
maximum during the initial and mid portions of the stop manoeuvre, because there appeared to be “plenty of
runway available”. In some cases, less than full reverse thrust was used and the brakes were released for a period
of time, letting the airplane roll on the portion of the runway that would have produced good braking action.
When the airplane moved onto the final portion of the runway, the crew discovered that the presence of moisture
on the top of rubber deposits in the touchdown and turnoff areas resulted in very poor braking capability, and
the airplane could not be stopped on the runway. When an RTO is initiated on wet or slippery runways, it is
especially important to use full stopping capability until the airplane is completely stopped.
Tires and Brakes (See FCTM Chapter 8 - Tire Failure during or after Take-off)
A tire failure can go unnoticed by the crew. On the other hand, tire failures have in some cases been incorrectly
interpreted as engine problems due to the bang and vibration it may produce. If engine parameters are normal
and engines are producing the required thrust, the take-off should not be rejected after 80 knots following a tire
failure.
You may only have a second or two to analyse the problem and decide. The UK AAIB has been investigating tire
failure and RTO decisions. They reported that pilots often incorrectly interpret a tire failure as an event that
threatens the safety of flight. As a result, the pilots do an unnecessary RTO.
When a tire fails at high speed it is possible that pieces of it can be thrown against the aft body or the flaps, but it
is usually not going to affect the ability of the airplane to fly.
Unless a tire failure in the high speed regime has produced damage that puts the ability of the airplane to fly in
serious doubt, the crew should be “Go” minded and the take-off continued.
There will be more distance available for the stop with a blown tire if the take-off is continued and the airplane
returns to land. Braking capability and directional control during an RTO will be greatly reduced with a tire failure;
therefore, the aircraft may not be able to stop on the remaining runway.

Clear Communication
The few seconds of communication regarding a non-normal situation during take-off can mean the difference
between success and disaster. For this reason, communications must be precise, effective, and efficient. Standard
callouts contribute to situation awareness. The callouts, coupled with both crew members monitoring airspeed,
leave the crew with a common perception of what actions are proper in the event of a non-normal indication.
The crew member noting a problem should communicate this clearly and precisely without inferring things that
may not be true.
When making the RTO decision the Captain should clearly announce the decision to reject or continue the take-
off using the standard phrase “STOP” or “KEEP GOING”.
Basic operating procedures call for the pilot flying the airplane to include airspeed in his/her instrument scan
during the take-off ground roll. Hence he/she is always aware of the approximate speed. The pilot monitoring
monitors airspeed in more detail and calls “V1” as a confirmation of reaching this critical point in the acceleration.
The pilot flying cannot react properly to V1 unless the V1 call is made in a timely, clear, and audible manner. The
V1 callout should be completed by the time the airplane reaches V 1. This should preclude a situation where the
“NO GO” decision is inadvertently made after V1.
During take-off roll the 80kt call has three functions:

1. An incapacitation check.
2. Airspeed crosscheck.
3. It defines the high and low speed RTO (reasons to reject, refer to NNM section)
It is expected that if the 80kts incapacitation check is failed due to an incapacitated crewmember it is expected
that the take-off will be rejected. This is in keeping with the policy of rejecting the take-off above 80kts if the
aircraft is unsafe to fly.
If the 80kt incapacitation check was successful and a crewmember becomes incapacitated at a later point in the
take-off roll the decision to reject the take-off is more complex. The remaining crewmember will be required to
make a judgment based on the prevailing circumstances for that take-off - such as runway condition / runway
length available / headwind - tailwind component etc, and the condition / position of the incapacitated
crewmember in relation to the flight controls.
In general, having had a successful 80kt incapacitation check, statistics would suggest that it is safer to continue
the take-off. Even though, there may be genuine reasons to reject a take-off above 80 kts, the crew should be GO
minded.
If a take-off can be continued, the crew has the entire runway to land back on or the option to fly to a different
runway. There is also a lot more time to evaluate the situation when airborne.
The following expands on some of the reason to reject before 80 kts (Ref. QRH MAN.1.2 for a full list of reason to
reject before 80 kts):
➢ System Failure
o MASTER CAUTION During Take-off Roll
▪ It must be clear that if any MASTER CAUTION is annunicated below 80kts during the
Take-off, the Take-off should be rejected in accordance with the QRH.
➢ Tire Failure
o Ref. FCTM chapter 8, landing gear
o The takeoff may be rejected prior to 80 kts
o Do not reject above 80 kts
o Braking capability and directional control during an RTO will be greatly reduced

o It is safer to get airborne, you will have the entire runway or a different runway available to
land on
➢ Configuration warning
o The takeoff must be rejected if it happens prior to 80 knots
o It is NOT acceptable to change configuration during the takeoff roll
➢ Above 80 knots (Between 0kts and V1)
o Fire or Fire warning
o Engine failure
o Predictive windshear warning
o Airplane unsafe or unable to fly
Operations Part A Chapter 8 - Rejected Take-off

The decision to reject a take-off will be made by the Commander, unless incapacitated. The F/O shall indicate to
the Commander if he disagrees with a course of action during any flight phase, e.g. a continued take-off with a
CONFIG WARNING.
1. The rejected take-off procedures are presented in FCOM Vol 1, Normal procedures & QRH MAN.
2. Additional guidance material and best operating practice is provided in the Boeing Flight Crew Training
Manual for Rejected take-off.
3. RTO > 80 kt and runway vacated:
• Ask ATC for parking on taxiway/return to stand
• Call Maintrol and report a high energy RTO
• Do not take-off again until released by Maintrol
• Calculate the turnaround time required from the brake cooling schedule
• File a SAIR on completion of duty.
Summary
A successful rejected takeoff is dependent upon the Captain making timely decisions and using the proper
procedures. The FCTM Chapter 3, Rejected Takeoff Decision, Rejected Takeoff Manoeuvre, Go/Stop Decision Near
V1, RTO Execution Operational Margins contain valuable information on the RTO manoeuvre including effects of
various configuration items and procedural variations on the stopping performance of the airplane.
If rejecting due to fire, in windy conditions, consider positioning the airplane so the fire is on the downwind side.
After an RTO, comply with brake cooling requirements before attempting a subsequent takeoff.
CRM plays an important role in the successful execution of a RTO. A common observation made by examiners is
the tendency for the Captain to rush the F/O before he/she can effectively complete their required items.
It is important that the execution of the RTO procedure is done in a timely manner and as stated in the QRH MAN
chapter. Once the aircraft has stopped the crew must act in a methodical manner, action individual memory items
as specified in the on ground emergency procedure and work as a team. The on ground emergency requires the
Captain to evaluate the situation and then call for the appropriate action. Not every RTO requires an evacuation!
Captains should not demand that the F/O completes actions before they have completed their required
functions. For example – the aircraft is stopped after a RTO and before the First Officer is able to select F40 the
Captain interrupts and calls for the memory items for the condition. This interruption leaves the F/O’s
requirement to select F40 and contact ATC incomplete. Each pilot must monitor each other’s actions and
ensure that the required actions are complete.

Go/No Go Decision Making

Crews will practice multiple failures during takeoff. This exercises the rapid decision making process and
demonstrates how once the decision is made, the actions must be completed accordingly.
• RTO before V1
SAIRs tell us that RTOs have
been initiated above 80kts
without proper cause. This is
why it is detailed in the Initial
Emergency Briefing - listing
the only four reasons why a
take-off should be rejected
above 80kts.
• CRM
Audits and checks have
revealed that on several
occasions, the PF has not
rotated at VR just because
the PM did not make the
“Rotate” call! This is clearly a
breakdown in CRM involving communications and situation awareness. The PF must rotate at VR regardless
of the call from the PM.
• Situation Awareness
The pilot’s awareness of speed is essential to make the correct decision. Both pilots should be aware of their
position, relative to V1 during the takeoff roll.
Carefully review all aircraft loading computations

and be alert for flight management system (FMS)
data entry errors (e.g., weights, speeds, trim
settings, runway length and takeoff thrust). The
effects of all environmental conditions on aircraft
performance must be evaluated (e.g. temperature,
pressure, wind, runway contamination, slope,
obstacles, etc.), and the effects of inoperative aircraft
systems (e.g. wheel brakes, anti-skid, thrust reversers,
spoilers) must be considered. Adequate takeoff
performance safety margins should be applied. Directional
control issues should be identified as a threat, especially during strong
or gusty crosswinds. Application of takeoff thrust should be in accordance with the aircraft manufacturer’s
recommendations, and a rolling takeoff should be made when appropriate. Being ‘go-minded’ has many benefits
resulting in reduced errors: Standard takeoff briefings and use of TEM and RIBETS are essential functions to
improve awareness of factors that can increase the risk of a runway excursion. Flight crews should consider
carefully the effects of multiple risk factors, exercise appropriate vigilance and be prepared to take appropriate
action. One significant threat during takeoff that stands out as a primary factor in runway excursions is the failure
to recognize the need for and to properly execute a Rejected Takeoff (RTO).

Rotation
The Ryanair safety management system has identified rotation rates in excess of recommended values as a
notable occurrence during line flying. A strict focus on rotation rate and rotation technique is required during all
simulator training and checking, including FBS and FFS sessions.
The FCTM shows that:

• Liftoff should be achieved about 3-4 seconds after Vr
• Early or rapid rotation may cause a tail strike
• Late, slow, or under-rotation increases takeoff ground roll
• Any improper rotation decreases initial climb flight path
• An aggressive rotation into the flight director pitch bar is not appropriate.
“With a consistent rotation technique, where the pilot uses approximately equal control forces and similar visual
cues, the resultant rotation rate differs slightly depending upon airplane body length.” “Using the technique
above, resultant rotation rates vary from 2° to 3° per second with rates being lowest on longer airplanes” The
Boeing 737 FCTM covers the B737-300 to B737-900ER models. The B737-800 falls into the category of “longer
airplane”.
The rotation rates for the B737-800 are:

• 2° to 2.5° per second for 2 engines
• 1.5° to 2° per second with 1 engine inoperative.
For the B737-700 the rotation rates are:

• 2.5° to 3° per second for 2 engines
• 2° to 2.5° per second for 1 engine
The control column force required varies depending on conditions during the departure. The forces should be
adjusted to achieve the required rate during normal departures. Do not over focus on the ‘dead band’. One
elevator position is required before the deadband, and another is required to keep a continuous rotation through
the deadband. During the rotation minimize late secondary column pulls that result in the maximum rotation rate
occurring just prior to lift-off.

Runaway Stabilizer
Objectives
• Correct recognition of runaway stabiliser condition
• Correct QRH memory items
• Understanding of system, implications of failure and considerations
• Anticipation of trim requirements and handling.
Background information
Runaway Stabilizer: Hold the control column firmly to maintain the desired pitch attitude. If uncommanded trim
motion continues, the stabilizer trim commands are interrupted when the control column is displaced in the
opposite direction.
Manual Stabilizer Trim

If manual stabilizer trim is necessary; ensure both stabilizer trim cutout switches are in CUTOUT prior to extending
the manual trim wheel handles.
Excessive air loads on the stabilizer may require effort by both pilots to correct the mis-trim. In extreme cases it
may be necessary to aerodynamically relieve the air loads to allow manual trimming. Accelerate or decelerate
towards the in-trim speed while attempting to trim manually.
Anticipate the trim changes required for the approach. Configure the airplane early in the approach. When
reaching the landing configuration, maintain as constant a trim setting as possible. If a go-around is required,
anticipate the trim changes as airspeed increases.
The crew should action the memory items, resume control with use of manual trim inputs and complete the QRH
checklist. They should discuss any further considerations / anticipate any increase to workload during handling.
Simulator Safety
Ensure that manual trim handles are stowed inside the trim wheel when not in use. Injury can result from
unstowed trim wheel handles once the system is restored.

RNP Approach Operations
Pilot Reference Guide

See PBN Pilots Reference Guide which is located within Docunet within the GENERAL tab.

Runway Incursion Prevention

Runway incursion is one of Ryanair’s Key Operational Risk Areas. A recent study by EASA produced a number of
recommendations for airport users including flight crews, ATC and ground staff.
The information below summarises the information for flight crew. The full report can be viewed at:
http://easa.europa.eu/essi/ecast/main-page-2/runway-incursion-prevention/
Communication
• Use standard ICAO radio phraseology at all times to avoid miscommunication
• Ensure you are tuned to the correct frequency at all times and volume set to an appropriate value
• Instructions should be read back in full, always include:
o Full callsign to avoid callsign confusion at busy airports
o ATC taxi route clearances
o Clearances and instructions to enter, land on, takeoff on, hold short of, cross or backtrack any
runway
o Runway designator to ensure correct runway selection
• Listen to clearances being issued to other aircraft to enhance your own situation awareness
• If instructed to follow other traffic, be aware this does not automatically include the clearance to enter
or cross a runway. Each aircraft requires specific clearance to cross a runway
• Prior to entering or crossing a runway, either active or inactive, crews shall make a “Two Phase” call. This
“Two Phase” call requires the captain to establish with the RHS pilot that the runway may be entered or
crossed. This SOP is a crucial safety net to help prevent runway incursions
Sterile Flight Deck

Taxiing is considered a critical phase of flight and as such the Ryanair sterile cockpit SOP should apply. Ensure both
crew members remain heads up as much as possible. Any changes to SID or departure runway require the aircraft
to be stopped, the parking brake set and appropriate changes made to the FMC and MCP. Only essential PAs
should be made during taxi out and in. Stop the aircraft and set the parking brake when doing so.
Situation Awareness
A comprehensive taxi briefing as part of RIBETS or DALTA will help to ensure that runway incursions are prevented.
Consideration of runway incursion hotspots, NOTAMs and WIP are vital, as complacency due to familiarity with
an airport is a considerable threat. Airport diagrams should be up to date and visible throughout the taxi phase.
Be aware of any changes to the planned routing and if in doubt stop and ask for further clearance of assistance.
The first officer should note any taxi clearance in the FMC scratchpad as a reminder of the routing, this should be
monitored as the taxi progresses to ensure full compliance with the clearance.
IF IN DOUBT - ASK
Airport Markings and Lighting

When manoeuvring the aircraft on the ground you should be fully aware of all ground markings and signage. Full
information is available in the Navtech Route Manual and further guidance is given in the ‘All Weather Operations
Guide’ Crewdock.

Low Visibility
The risk of runway incursion increases greatly in low visibility conditions and care should be taken to mitigate the
threats associated with this.
Green taxiways centreline lights may be illuminated beyond the Cat II/III holding point if it does not coincide with
a taxiway stop-bar, or if a preceding aircraft is just lining up. It is most important for pilots to be particularly careful
at all times, NOT to inadvertently stray on to operating runways, but particularly when visibility on the aerodrome
is impaired by fog or low cloud.
Discuss and review any runway incursion hotspots depicted on the aerodrome chart. Great care must be taken to
read and interpret correctly the marker boards that are placed to identify taxiways, intersections and approaches
to runways (active or non-active and holding points) prior to entering the active runway. Very careful perusal of
the aerodrome surface charts and maintaining a watchful lookout for taxiway identification and other marker
boards is vital, if incursions on to an active runway are to be avoided.
Where green centreline lighting is provided, blue taxiway edge lighting may also be installed as additional
guidance on sections of taxiway that are difficult to negotiate. Green taxiway centreline lighting may be provided
on the runway prior to an exit taxiway in order to give leadoff guidance. The edge of aprons, turning and holding
areas are normally marked by blue lighting.
Note
Where centreline lighting is installed on a taxiway leading onto a runway, the taxiway lighting is curved onto the
near side of the runway centreline and pilots should make an appropriate allowance for any loss of runway
declared distance incurred in following the 'lead-on' lighting whilst lining up for take-off.

Note 2
Taxiway centrelines are intended to provide safe clearance between the largest aircraft that the taxiway is
designed to accommodate and fixed objects such as buildings, aircraft stands etc., provided that the pilot of the
taxiing aircraft keeps the 'cockpit' of the aircraft on the centreline and that aircraft on stands are properly parked.
Taxi holding positions are normally located so as to ensure clearance between an aircraft holding and any aircraft
passing in front of the holding aircraft, provided that the holding aircraft is properly positioned behind the holding
position. Clearance to the rear of any holding aircraft cannot be guaranteed. When following a taxiway route,
pilots and persons towing aircraft are expected to keep a good lookout, consistent with the prevailing visibility
and are responsible for taking all possible measures to avoid a collision with another aircraft or a vehicle .
Runway Lighting and Stop Bars

Lighted Stop Bars and lead-on lights are provided at those aerodromes authorised for low visibility operations. A
stop bar consists of a row of lights spaced equally across the taxiway normally at right angles to the centreline
and showing red towards an approaching aircraft when lit. Stop bars are normally installed in association with
green lead-on lights, which form part of the taxiway centreline lighting beyond the stop bar. The lead-on lights
are interlinked with the stop bar so that when the stop bar is 'on' the green centreline beyond the stop bar is 'off'
and vice versa, as shown below.
In this way, the stop bar and associated lead-on lights act in the same sense as traffic lights; therefore, pilots must
not taxi an aircraft across a stop bar that is lit. Stop bars are provided at entrances to runways, e.g. runway holding
positions, and may also be provided at taxiway intersections and at other locations.

Smoke, Fire or Fumes

The QRH ‘Smoke, Fire or Fumes’ checklist is a complex checklist that requires familiarisation and understanding
by crews if it is to be used correctly and efficiently. Circumstances where this checklist is required would most
likely be demanding situations and high workload. Knowledge of and confidence in the use of the ‘Smoke Fire or
Fumes’ checklist is important in dealing with potentially life threatening circumstances.
‘Smoke, Fire or Fumes’ checklist use

Anytime smoke, fire or fumes is identified on board the aircraft in flight the crew will commence this checklist.
The checklist prioritises actions to maintain safe flight by first indicating that a diversion may be needed. The next
step is to keep crew safe through use of oxygen and smoke goggles as needed. Pilots should don oxygen masks
and establish crew communications anytime oxygen deprivation or air contamination is suspected, even though
an associated warning has not occurred.
Some initial electrical switching is required to isolate electrical systems. Steps 1 to 9 in the checklist are completed
as normal. Step 10 requires the crew to make a decision to determine if the smoke or fumes are ‘the greatest
threat’ at this time OR smoke or fumes are not an immediate priority. Depending on the answer to this question
the QRH checklist will either re-direct you to the ‘Smoke or Fumes Removal’ checklist OR allow you to continue
with the current checklist.
If smoke or fumes are not the greatest threat the checklist allows you to continue with steps 11 through 23. This
checklist takes you through steps to help identify / isolate and remove the source of the smoke or fumes. Time
must be taken to allow for a change in condition between each step. Remember ‘ANYTIME the smoke or fumes
becomes the greatest threat’ you must go to the ‘Smoke or Fumes Removal’ checklist.
If smoke or fumes are the greatest threat you are redirected to the ‘Smoke or Fumes Removal’ checklist. This
checklist prioritises removal of smoke or fumes through a series of options. Having selected the correct option
and completed the required actions it is important to know that you are always redirected back to the original
‘Smoke, Fire or Fumes’ checklist and are required to complete the remaining steps. If in doubt, divert.
Reminder (Non-Normal Checklist Operation – Ref QRH CI)

There are some situations where the flight crew must land at the nearest suitable airport. These situations include,
but are not limited to, conditions where:
• the non–normal checklist includes the item “Plan to land at the nearest suitable airport.”
• fire or smoke continues
• only one AC power source remains (engine or APU generator)
• only one hydraulic system remains (the standby system is considered a hydraulic system)
• any other situation determined by the flight crew to have a significant adverse effect on safety if the flight is
continued
It must be stressed that for smoke that continues or a fire that cannot be positively confirmed to be completely
extinguished, the earliest possible descent, landing, and evacuation must be done.
If a smoke, fire or fumes situation becomes uncontrollable, the flight crew should consider an immediate landing.
Immediate landing implies immediate diversion to a runway. However, in a severe situation, the flight crew should
consider an overweight, tailwind, off-airport landing, or a ditching.

The following table describes the rationale for the ‘Smoke, Fire or Fumes’ checklist steps. The rationale includes
the purpose of the step and the reason for its sequential placement in the checklist.
Protect the flight crew then assess the situation.
1 Diversion may be needed.

Rationale This step establishes the mindset that a diversion may be needed.
We use the word “may” because the crew should not initiate a diversion before a preliminary
assessment of the fire/source. This step is placed at the beginning of the checklist to immediately
establish that a diversion may be needed.
2 Oxygen Masks (If required) ……………………….....ON, 100%
3 Smoke Goggles (If required) ………….………….................ON
Rationale These steps protect the flight crew from smoke inhalation and fume absorption. Oxygen masks are on at
100% so the oxygen supply does not mix with the smoke or fumes. Steps are early in the checklist to
ensure the flight crew is protected immediately after smoke/fumes detection. Steps are separate
because they may be separate devices (RYR has quick donning Oxygen Masks with visors).
The flight crew should don oxygen masks anytime smoke/fumes are detected on the flight deck. The
trigger to don masks is the smoke not the checklist. The steps are not ‘memory items’ nor are they
required because oxygen masks and smoke goggles may not be required for all smoke events. We rely
on flight crew judgment to decide when to don the devices. The “if required” statement also permits
airlines to be flexible in training when to don the masks or to leave the timing decisions to the flight
crew’s discretion.
4 Establish Crew and Cabin Communications
Rationale This step initiates timely coordination and communication between the flight and cabin crew. The step is
placed after steps 2 and 3 to not delay donning of oxygen masks and goggles, if required. The
communication with cabin crew is made explicit because the cabin crew is an important resource for
assisting the flight crew with source identification and confirmation of elimination.
5 to 13 Initial steps to accomplish based on Boeing 737 guidance
Rationale These steps quickly isolate probable ignition sources based on historical fleet data or analysis. The flight
crew is expected to take action without delay and without assessment. The steps are placed early in the
checklist to immediately isolate probable sources to reduce the risk of event escalation.
14 Anytime smoke or fumes become the greatest threat: ►► Go to the Smoke or Fumes Removal
checklist.
Rationale Smoke removal should be accomplished only when the smoke/fumes are the greatest threat or when
the source is confirmed extinguished.
Smoke removal may change the airflow and make the situation worse by fanning a source or it may mask
the source. Smoke removal steps are clearly identified and be easy to find.
15 Assessment and actions required to confirm, isolate and extinguish the source. The crew must
determine if the source is extinguishable. The outcome of the assessment is a decision to extinguish the
source or initiate a diversion. After the source is identified, the crew should use all available resources to
actively extinguish the source.
16 The crew must confirm that the source is extinguished. The outcome of the assessment is a decision that
the source is extinguished or to continue the checklist.
19, 20, 21 • The cockpit crew should not delay a diversion if the source remains unknown or cannot be
WARNINGS extinguished.
• If the Smoke, Fire or Fumes situation becomes unmanageable, consider an immediate landing.
• The purpose of this warning is to remind the crew that an immediate landing may be required if the
situation deteriorates.

Seat Adjustment
You must be in the correct position, every time you fly for consistency.
The following controls are provided:
Seat height – Adjust so that;
Sight along the upper surface of the glareshield with a small amount of the
airplane nose structure visible.
Sight over the control column (in the neutral position) until the bottom edge
of the outboard display unit is visible.
Back cushion up and down

Thigh pad position
Seat backwards and forwards
Armrest height
Back cushion (lumbar support) position
Seat Elevation (can also be

Much like a handbrake lever)
Seat recline
Headrest position (push outboard to adjust position)
Armrest in stowed position

There is a five-point harness, incorporating two side straps, two shoulder straps and one
crotch strap. When the shoulder straps are released (by pushing the toggle on top of the
circular buckle forward) the shoulder straps are retracted automatically. This can cause
the straps to retract with some force. There is a caution in FCOM VOL 1 to hold both
straps to allow them to retract slowly, preventing possible damage to the circuit breakers
directly behind the pilot seat.
CAUTION: To Avoid the possibility of shoulder harness buckles snapping back and pulling or
damaging circuit breakers, hold both straps before releasing and then allow straps to
retract slowly to the stowed position.
Once the seat is in position the pilot should have full range of movement of all controls
and feel comfortable with hands and feet on the controls.

Starting with Ground Air Source and Engine Crossbleed Start

Use the supplementary procedure ‘Starting with Ground Air Source’ (Ref. Vol. 1 SP) and ‘Engine Crossbleed Start’
(Ref. Vol. 1 SP).
When the APU is U/S engine number 1 must be started first with a ground air source. To minimize the hazard to
ground personnel, the external air should be disconnected, and engine No. 2started using the Engine Crossbleed
Start procedure. Inform ATC that one engine will be started on stand.
Once engine number 1 is started the crew must put generator 1 on line before disconnecting the GPU, after the
crew has confirmed that the bypass pin is installed. Complete the pushback and set the brakes.
Note: Do not attempt a crossbleed start until pushback is complete and the parking brake is set and the tug is
disconnected and ATC clearance is obtained. Confirm with the ground crewman that the area behind the aircraft
is clear before increasing thrust on engine number 1. Complete the crossbleed start procedure.
The “Captain and ground crewman” callouts will have to be modified slightly for this exercise.

Steep Turns
Objectives
The objective of the steep turn manoeuvre is to familiarize the pilot with airplane handling characteristics beyond
35° of bank and improve the instrument scan.
Steep Turns (Ref FCTM)

During training, 45° of bank is used for this manoeuvre. It is not intended that the pilot should ever be required
to bank greater than 30° in any normal or non-normal condition.
Note: Stabilizer trim is not recommended during the steep turn manoeuvre because of increased workload during
roll out.
Entry
(Steep turns completed in IMC conditions, no F/D or FPV)
Stabilise airspeed at 250 knots on heading and altitude FL100. Use a normal turn entry.
An increase in pitch is required as the bank angle is increased to maintain constant altitude. An increase in thrust
is required to maintain constant airspeed.
During Turn
Pitch and thrust control are the same as for a normal turn; however, larger pitch adjustments are required for a
given altitude deviation. Varying the angle of bank while turning makes pitch control more difficult. If altitude loss
becomes excessive, reduce the angle of bank as needed to regain positive pitch control.
Smooth and positive control is required. A rapid instrument scan is required to detect deviations early enough to
be corrected by small adjustments.
Attitude Indicator
The attitude indicator is reliable for accurate pitch and bank information throughout the turn. Precession error
does not exist because the IRS is the source of attitude information.
Vertical Speed Indicator

IRS vertical speed indications are reliable during the turn.
Altimeter
Crosscheck the direction and rate of change, and make smooth minor adjustments to the pitch attitude for
corrections.
Airspeed
Airspeed changes very slowly because of small changes in thrust and drag.
Anticipate thrust changes and apply them at the first indication of change on the airspeed indicator or speed tape
(speed trend vector). An increase in thrust is required as bank angle increases.

Rollout
Roll out at the same rate as used during normal turns. Normally rollout should begin 15° to 20° prior to the desired
heading. A decrease in pitch is required as the bank angle is decreased to maintain constant altitude. A decrease
in thrust is required to maintain constant airspeed.

Tailstrike Avoidance Techniques

Tail strikes occur when the lower aft fuselage or tail skid contacts the runway during takeoff or landing. A
significant factor that appears to be common is the lack of flight crew experience in the model being flown.
Understanding the factors that contribute to a tail strike can reduce the possibility of a tail strike occurrence.
A tail strike can be identified by the flight crew or cabin crew. Any one of the following conditions can be an
indication of a tail strike during rotation or flare:
• a noticeable bump or jolt

• a scraping noise from the tail of the airplane
• pitch rate stopping momentarily
Note: Anytime a tail strike is suspected or known to have occurred during takeoff, accomplish the Non-Normal
‘Tail-strike’ checklist (Ref QRH NNC, Unannunciated Checklists)
Takeoff Risk Factors
Mistrimmed Stabiliser
This usually results from using erroneous takeoff data e.g. the wrong weights or an incorrect centre of gravity. In
addition, accurate information can sometimes be entered incorrectly either in the flight management system or
set incorrectly on the stabilizer.
Rotation at improper speed

Usually caused by early rotation due to some unusual situation n or rotation at too low an airspeed for the weight
and or flap setting.
Trimming during rotation

Trimming the stabilizer during rotation may contribute to a tail strike. The pilot flying may easily lose the feel of
the elevator while the trim is running which may result in an excessive rotation rate.
Excessive rotation rate

Flight crews operating an aeroplane model new to them, especially when transitioning from an aircraft with
unpowered flight controls to one with hydraulic assistance, are most vulnerable to using excessive rotation rate.
Improper use of flight director

The flight director provides accurate pitch guidance only after the aeroplane is airborne. With the proper rotation
rate, the aircraft reaches 35 feet with the desired pitch attitude of about 15 degrees. However, an aggressive
rotation into the pitch bar at takeoff is not appropriate and can cause a tail strike.
Rotation and lift off – all engines

Takeoff speeds are established based on minimum control speed, stall speed, and tail clearance margins. Shorter
bodied aircraft are normally governed by stall speed margin while longer bodied aircraft (B737-800) are normally
limited by tail clearance margin. When a smooth continuous rotation is initiated at VR, tail clearance margin is

assured because computed takeoff speeds depicted in the QRH, RTOW airport analysis or FMC are developed to
provide adequate tail clearance.
For optimum takeoff and initial climb performance, initiate a smooth continuous rotation at VR toward 15 degrees
of pitch attitude. The use of stabiliser trim during rotation is not recommended. After liftoff, use the attitude
indicator as the primary pitch reference. The flight director, in conjunction with indicated airspeed and other flight
instruments are used to maintain the proper vertical path.
Using this technique, liftoff attitude is achieved in approximately 3 to 4 seconds. Resultant rotation rate is
approximately 2 - 2.5 degrees per second.
Note: The flight director pitch command is not used for rotation.
Typical tail clearance for the Boeing 737-800 is merely 13 inches (33cm) with the use of flap one (1) and 20 inches
(51cm) with flap five (5). The pitch attitude for tail contact with the wheels on the runway and landing gear struts
extended is 11 degrees, compared to a lift off attitude of 8.5 degrees for a flap 1 takeoff and 8.0 degrees for flap
5 takeoffs. Tail clearance is greater on the shorter 700 models.
Tailstrike on Landing Prevention

A recent line event has demonstrated how with very little error, tail strikes on landings can occur. The following
guidance will help to mitigate this threat.
Landing Risk Factors

A tail strike on landing tends to cause more serious damage than the same event during takeoff and is usually
more expensive and time consuming to repair. In the worst case, the tail can strike the runway before the landing
gear, thus absorbing large amounts of energy for which it is not designed. The aft pressure bulkhead is often
damaged as a result.
Any one of the following landing risk factors

may precede a tail strike:
Unstabilized Approach
Although unstable approaches are not
common in Ryanair due to our robust SOP’s
and NO BLAME policy for go-arounds,
throughout the industry an unstabilized
approach is the biggest single cause of tail strike. Flight crews should stabilize all approach variables - on
centreline, on approach path, on speed, and in the final landing configuration - by the time the airplane descends
through 1,000 feet AFE. This is not always possible. Under normal conditions, if the airplane descends through
1,000 feet AFE (IMC), or 500 feet AFE (VMC), with these approach variables not stabilized, a go-around should be
initiated. Flight recorder data shows that flight crews who continue with an unstabilized condition below 500 feet
seldom stabilize the approach. When the airplane arrives in the flare, it often has either excessive or insufficient
airspeed. The result is a tendency toward large thrust and pitch corrections in the flare, often culminating in a
vigorous pitch change at touchdown resulting in tail strike shortly thereafter. If the pitch is increased rapidly when
touchdown occurs as ground spoilers deploy, the spoilers add additional nose up pitch force, reducing pitch
authority, which increases the possibility of a tail strike. Conversely, if the airplane is slow, increasing the pitch
attitude in the flare does not effectively reduce the sink rate; and in some cases, may increase it. A firm

touchdown on the main gear is often preferable to a soft touchdown with the nose rising rapidly. In this case, the
momentary addition of thrust may aid in preventing the tail strike. In addition, unstabilized approaches can result
in landing long or a runway over run.
Holding Off in the Flare

The second most common cause of a landing tail strike is an extended flare, with a loss in airspeed that results in
a rapid loss of altitude, (a dropped-in touchdown). This condition is often precipitated by a desire to achieve an
extremely smooth/soft landing. A very smooth/soft touchdown is not essential, nor even desired, particularly if
the runway is wet.
Trimming in the Flare

Trimming the stabilizer in the flare may contribute to a tail strike. The pilot flying may easily lose the feel of the
elevator while the trim is running. Too much trim can raise the nose, even when this reaction is not desired. The
pitch up can cause a balloon, followed either by dropping in or pitching over and landing in a three-point attitude.
Flight crews should trim the airplane during the approach, but not in the flare.
Mishandling of Crosswinds
When the airplane is placed in a attitude to compensate for the wind effects, this cross-control maneuver reduces
lift, increases drag, and may increase the rate of descent. If the airplane then descends into a turbulent surface
layer, particularly if the wind is shifting toward the tail, the stage is set for a tail strike. The combined effects of
high closure rate, shifting winds with the potential for a quartering tail wind, can result in a sudden drop in wind
velocity commonly found below 100 feet. Combining this with turbulence can make the timing of the flare very
difficult. The pilot flying can best handle the situation by using additional thrust, if needed, and by using an
appropriate pitch change to keep the descent rate stable until initiation of the flare. Flight crews should clearly
understand the criteria for initiating a go-around and plan to use this time-honoured avoidance maneuver when
needed.
Over-Rotation during Go-Around

Go-arounds initiated very late in the approach, such as
during the landing flare or after touching down, are a
common cause of tail strikes. When the go-around
mode is initiated, the flight director immediately
commands a go-around pitch attitude. If the pilot flying
abruptly rotates up to the pitch command bar, a tail
strike can occur before the airplane responds and
begins climbing. During a go-around, an increase in
thrust as well as a positive pitch attitude is needed. If
the thrust increase is not adequate for the increased pitch attitude, the resulting speed decay will likely result in
a tail strike. Another contributing factor in tail strikes may be a strong desire by the flight crew to avoid landing
gear contact after initiating a late go-around when the airplane is still over the runway. In general, this concern
is not warranted because a brief landing gear touchdown during a late go-around is acceptable. This had been
demonstrated during autoland and go-around certification programs.
Using the Correct Landing Technique

The application of the correct landing technique is essential for the prevention of tail strike on landing. The
techniques discussed here are from the FCTM, they are applicable to all landings including one engine inoperative
landings, crosswind landings and landings on slippery runways. Unless an unexpected or sudden event occurs,
such as windshear or collision avoidance situation, it is not appropriate to use sudden, violent or abrupt control
inputs during landing. Begin with a stabilized approach on speed, in trim and on glide path.
Note: When a manual landing is planned from an approach with the autopilot connected, the transition to manual
flight should be planned early enough to allow the pilot time to establish airplane control before beginning the
flare. The PF should consider disconnecting the autothrottle and disengaging the autopilot 1 to 2 nm before the
threshold, or approximately 300 to 600 feet above field elevation.
When the threshold passes under the airplane nose and out of sight, shift the visual sighting point to the far end
of the runway. Shifting the visual sighting point assists in controlling the pitch attitude during the flare.
Maintaining a constant airspeed and descent rate assists in determining the flare point. Initiate the flare when
the main gear is approximately 20 feet above the runway by increasing pitch attitude approximately 2° - 3°. This
slows the rate of descent.
After the flare is initiated, smoothly retard the thrust levers to idle, and make small pitch attitude adjustments to
maintain the desired descent rate to the runway. A smooth thrust reduction to idle also assists in controlling the
natural nose-down pitch change associated with thrust reduction. Hold sufficient back pressure on the control
column to keep the pitch attitude constant. A touchdown attitude as depicted in the figure below is normal with
an airspeed of approximately VREF plus any gust correction. Ideally, main gear touchdown should occur
simultaneously with thrust levers reaching idle.
Avoid rapid control column movements during the flare. If the flare is too abrupt and thrust is excessive near
touchdown, the airplane tends to float in ground effect. Do not allow the airplane to float or attempt to hold it
off. Fly the airplane onto the runway at the desired touchdown point and at the desired airspeed.
Note: Do not trim during the flare. Trimming in the flare increases the possibility of a tail strike.
Prolonged flare increases airplane pitch attitude 2° to 3°. When prolonged flare is coupled with a misjudged height
above the runway, a tail strike is possible. Do not prolong the flare in an attempt to achieve a perfectly smooth
touchdown. A smooth touchdown is not the criterion for a safe landing.
Typically, the pitch attitude increases slightly during the actual landing, but avoid over-rotating. Do not increase
the pitch attitude, trim, or hold the nose wheel off the runway after landing. This could lead to a tail strike.
Airspeed Control
During an autoland, the autothrottle retards the thrust so as to reach idle at touchdown. The 5 knot additive is
bled off during the flare. If the autothrottle is disconnected, or is planned to be disconnected prior to landing,
maintain VREF plus the wind additive until approaching the flare. The steady headwind additive is bled off before
touchdown while the gust correction is maintained to touchdown. Plan to touchdown at VREF plus the gust
correction. With proper airspeed control and thrust management, touchdown should occur at no less than VREF
- 5 knots. The QRH data includes 305m air distance from 50ft above threshold to touchdown, with the touchdown
speed assumed to be 98% of the approach speed at the Runway Threshold.
Landing Flare Profile

The following diagrams use these conditions:
• 3° approach glide path
• Flare distance is approximately 1,000 to 2,000 feet beyond the threshold
• Typical landing flare times range from 4 to 8 seconds and are a function of approach speed
• Airplane body attitudes are based upon typical landing weights, flaps 30, VREF 30 + 5 knots (approach)
and VREF 30 + 0 (touchdown), and should be reduced by 1° for each 5 knots above this speed

In Ryanair we use the de-crab during flare and the touchdown with crab techniques for crosswind landings. (Refer
to FCTM 6.54)
De-crab during Flare

The objective is to maintain wings level during approach, flare and touchdown. During the approach a crab angle
is established with wings level in order to maintain the desired track. During the flare downwind rudder is applied
to eliminate the crab and align the aircraft with the centreline. At the same time apply upwind aileron in order
to maintain wings level. These cross controls are maintained throughout the landing phase and the aileron during
the landing roll.
Touchdown with Crab

It is recommended to use this method when landing on slippery runways as it reduces drift on touchdown and
allows for rapid deployment of the spoilers and autobrake as all main gear have touched down simultaneously.
However, rudder and aileron inputs to de-crab after touchdown must be applied in order to maintain proper
directional control.
This method is not recommended on dry runways as on landing the aircraft will tend to track upwind until the
correct de-crab technique is accomplished. This lack of initial directional control is undesirable.
Bounced Landing Recovery

If the airplane should bounce, hold or re-establish a normal landing attitude and add thrust as necessary to control
the rate of descent. Thrust need not be added for a shallow bounce or skip. When a high, hard bounce occurs,
initiate a go-around. Apply go-around thrust and use normal go-around procedures. Do not retract the landing
gear until a positive rate of climb is established because a second touchdown may occur during the go-around.
If higher than idle thrust is maintained through initial touchdown, the automatic speedbrake deployment may be
disabled even when the speedbrakes are armed. This can result in a bounced landing. During the resultant bounce,
if the thrust levers are then retarded to idle, automatic speedbrake deployment can occur resulting in a loss of lift and
nose up pitching moment which can result in a tail strike or hard landing on a subsequent touchdown.
Go-Around after Touchdown

If a go-around is initiated before touchdown and touchdown occurs, continue with normal go-around procedures.
The F/D go-around mode will continue to provide go-around guidance commands throughout the maneuver. If a
go-around is initiated after touchdown but before thrust reverser selection, auto speedbrakes retract and
autobrakes disarm as thrust levers are advanced. The F/D go-around mode will not be available until go-around
is selected after becoming airborne. Once reverse thrust is initiated following touchdown, a full stop landing must
be made. If an engine stays in reverse, safe flight is not possible.

Speedbrakes
Speedbrakes can be fully raised AFTER touchdown while the nose wheels are lowered to the runway with no
adverse pitch effects. This places the airplane weight on the main landing gear, providing excellent brake
effectiveness. If speedbrakes are not raised after touchdown braking effectiveness may be reduced initially as
much as 60%.
If crew identify this malfunction the speedbrake must be extended manually by the PF or PM. Pilot awareness of
the position of the speedbrake lever during the landing phase is important in the prevention of Runway
Excursions.
The position of the speedbrakes should be announced during the landing phase by the PM. This improves the
crews situation awareness of the position of the spoilers during landing and builds good habit patterns which can
prevent failure to observe a malfunctioned or disarmed spoiler system.
TAKEOFF – DOs: LANDING – DOs:

•DO Use Normal Rotation Technique (i.e. 2º to 2.5º per • DO maintain specific target airspeed for landing (Vref + 5
sec) Minimum to start of flare).
• DO Ensure Takeoff V speeds are correctly entered and • DO ensure the aircraft is in trim at start of flare.
that they are appropriate for prevailing conditions. • DO fly a stabilised approach in accordance with Ryanair
• DO Use Flap 5 to provide additional tail clearance unless procedures, if not stabilized then Go-Around.
the airfield brief states otherwise. • DO fly the nose wheel onto the runway immediately
• DO know your airplane! Have an idea of approximate after main landing gear touchdown.
T/O and Approach speeds. • DO Remember – Sometimes a Go around is the correct
• DO consider using Full thrust during gusty/crosswind option.
conditions
TAKEOFF – DON’Ts: LANDING – DON’Ts:

• DON’T rotate early • DON’T hold off in the flare.
• DON’T Over-rotate • DON’T trim in the flare or after touchdown.
• DON’T Assume! Double check takeoff data, especially if • DON’T allow pitch to increase after touchdown.
something doesn’t look right. Always ensure you double
check the zero fuel weight entry

Tailstrike on Takeoff
Good Information Processing and Situation Awareness are important when completing this non-normal checklist.
Boeing recommends that the aircraft not be climbed above 10,000ft if a tailstrike is suspected.
The objective of the tailstrike checklist is to ensure the aircraft remains depressurized to avoid further structural
damage. The importance of stopping the climb at minimum safe altitude cannot be overemphasized. In the case
that the aircraft does climb above 10,000 feet the crew should immediately descend below 10,000 feet (MSA
permitting) and, without delay, depressurize the aircraft. There is no altitude limit at which the aircraft must be
below when accomplishing the tailstrike checklist. It is up to the crew to determine the safest course of action if
they inadvertently climb higher than the minimum safe altitude.
When a tailstrike is known or suspected the crew should complete the tailstrike checklist as soon as possible after
takeoff. In the case that the aircraft does climb above 10,000 feet the crew should immediately descend below
10,000 feet (MSA permitting) and, without delay, depressurize the aircraft. There is no altitude limit at which the
aircraft must be below when accomplishing the tailstrike checklist. It is up to the crew to determine the safest
course of action if they inadvertently climb higher than the minimum safe altitude.
Altitude awareness combined with good Air System knowledge and teamwork must be applied by the crew.
Careful decision making in relation to airplane pressurisation, altitude awareness, unnecessary passenger oxygen
deployment and additional crew workload is essential.
Good Airmanship when operating the Outflow Valve must be used to limit passenger discomfort. One flick toward
open can provide approx. 500ft/min rate of cabin climb. Subsequent descent rates once depressurised should be
reduced for further passenger comfort.
When operating the Outflow valve switch verify the valve position indicator moves right, cabin altitude climbs at
the desired rate, and differential pressure decreases. Repeat as necessary. This switch should be moved
‘momentarily’ as prolonged use can lead to large pressure changes. Good Airmanship when operating the valve
must be used to limit passenger discomfort. One, momentary movement can provide approximately 500ft/min

rate of cabin climb. Subsequent descent rates once depressurised should be reduced for further passenger
comfort.
When calculating landing performance following a tailstrike crews should give consideration to the cause of the
tailstrike. Incorrect performance figures for take-off, for example an incorrectly entered FMC ZFW, will also
produce an incorrect landing weight and FMC calculated VREF. Crews should crosscheck their performance figures
in conjunction with the loadsheet to verify landing performance figures are correct.

Takeoff
Takeoff - General
As part of the before start procedure, review the takeoff reference page to ensure the entries are correct and the
preflight is complete. Ensure V2 is set on the MCP. The map display, map range and LEGS page sequence should
be consistent with the departure procedure.
Review the LEGS page for any climb constraints. Ensure the CLB page contains the appropriate altitude and
airspeed restrictions consistent with the departure procedure.
Note: The lower centre MFD is normally blank for take-off to reduce the display of unnecessary information.
The PF normally displays the take-off reference page on the CDU. Display of the take-off reference page allows
the crew to have immediate access to V-speeds during take-off in the event that V-speeds are inadvertently
removed from the airspeed display. After changes to the take-off briefing have been updated during the Before
Take-off Procedure, the PF may elect to display the CLB page for take-off. However, to reduce heads down activity,
climb constraint modification immediately after take-off should normally be accomplished on the mode control
panel. Modify the CLB page when workload permits. The PM normally displays the LEGS page during take-off and
departure to allow timely route modification if necessary.
Take-off Flap Setting

Take-off Flap Setting for take-offs, when conditions permit, consider using larger flap settings to provide shorter
take-off distance. Larger flap settings also provide greater tail clearance. Refer to the Typical Take-off Tail
Clearance table in this chapter to determine minimum tail clearance for different take-off flap settings.
Take-off Speeds
Proper take-off speeds (V1, VR, and V2) are based on take-off weight, flaps setting, thrust rating and assumed
temperature, ambient temperature, QNH, wind, runway surface condition, and performance options. The FCOM
and FMC computed take-off speeds (if enabled) are only valid for dispatch performance based on balanced field
length, no improved climb, the most forward CG limit, and dry or wet runway.
The FCOM and FMC computed take-off speeds do not consider runway length available, minimum engine-out
climb gradient capability, or obstacle clearance requirement. The FCOM and FMC computed take-off speeds can
only be used when compliance of these requirements has been verified separately with a take-off analysis
(runway/airport analysis), another approved source, or by dispatch. The FCOM and FMC computed take-off
speeds are not valid for dispatch performance based on optimized V1 (unbalanced field length), Improved Climb,
alternate forward CG limit, or contaminated or slippery runway.
Thrust Management
Thrust Management – Take-off The EEC simplifies thrust management procedures. Having the EEC functioning
does not relieve the pilots from monitoring the engine parameters and verifying proper thrust is obtained. High
thrust settings from jet engine blast over unpaved surfaces or thin asphalt pavement intended only to support
occasional airplane movements can cause structural blast damage from loose rocks, dislodged asphalt pieces, and
other foreign objects. Ensure run ups and take-off operations are only conducted over well maintained paved
surfaces and runways.

Initiating Take-off Roll

Autothrottle and flight director use is recommended for all take-offs. However, do not follow F/D commands until
after liftoff. A rolling take-off is recommended for setting take-off thrust. It expedites the take-off and reduces
the risk of foreign object damage or engine surge/stall due to a tailwind or crosswind. Flight test and analysis
prove that the change in take-off roll distance due to the rolling take-off is negligible when compared to a standing
take-off.
Rolling take-offs are accomplished in two ways

If cleared for take-off before or while entering the runway, maintain normal taxi speed. When the airplane is
aligned with the runway centreline ensure the nose wheel steering wheel is released and apply take-off thrust by
advancing the thrust levers to just above idle (40%N1).
Allow the engines to stabilize momentarily then promptly advance the thrust levers to take-off thrust
(autothrottle TO/GA). There is no need to stop the airplane before increasing thrust.
If holding in position on the runway, ensure the nose wheel steering wheel is released, release brakes and then
apply take-off thrust as described above.
Note: Brakes are not normally held with thrust above idle unless a static run-up in icing conditions is required.
A standing take-off may be accomplished by holding the brakes until the engines are stabilized, ensure the nose
wheel steering wheel is released, then release the brakes and promptly advance the thrust levers to take-off
thrust (autothrottle TO/GA).
Allowing the engines to stabilize provides uniform engine acceleration to take-off thrust and minimizes directional
control problems. This is particularly important if crosswinds exist or the runway surface is slippery. The exact
initial setting is not as important as setting symmetrical thrust. If thrust is to be set manually, smoothly advance
thrust levers toward take-off thrust.
Note: Allowing the engines to stabilize for more than approximately 2 seconds before advancing thrust levers to
take-off thrust may adversely affect take-off distance.
Ensure the target N1 is set by 60 knots. Minor increases in thrust may be made immediately after 60 knots to
reach the target N1. After take-off thrust is set, a small deviation in N1 between the engines should not warrant
a decision to reject the take-off unless this deviation is accompanied by a more serious event. (Refer to the QRH,
Maneuvers Chapter, Rejected Take-off, for criteria.) Due to variations in thrust settings, runway conditions, etc.,
it is not practical to specify a precise tolerance for N1 deviation between the engines.
Limited circumstances such as inoperative rudder pedal steering may require the use of the nose wheel steering
wheel at low speeds during take-off when the rudder is not effective. Reference the airplane Dispatch Deviations
Guide (DDG) for more information concerning operation with rudder pedal steering inoperative.
If an engine exceedance occurs after thrust is set and the decision is made to continue the take-off, do not retard
the thrust lever in an attempt to control the exceedance. Retarding the thrust levers after thrust is set invalidates
take-off performance. When the PF judges that altitude (minimum 400 feet AGL) and airspeed are acceptable,
the thrust lever should be retarded until the exceedance is within limits and the appropriate NNC accomplished.
Light forward pressure is held on the control column. Keep the airplane on centerline with rudder pedal steering
and rudder. The rudder becomes effective between 40 and 60 knots. Maximum nose wheel steering effectiveness
is available when above taxi speeds by using rudder pedal steering.
Regardless of which pilot is making the takeoff, the captain should keep one hand on the thrust levers until V1 in
order to respond quickly to a rejected takeoff condition. After V1, the captain’s hand should be removed from
the thrust levers.
The PM should monitor engine instruments and airspeed indications during the takeoff roll and announce any
abnormalities. The PM should announce passing 80 knots and the PF should verify that his airspeed indicator is in
agreement.
A pitot system blocked by protective covers or foreign objects can result in no airspeed indication, or airspeed
indications that vary between instruments. It is important that aircrews ensure airspeed indicators are functioning
and reasonable at the 80 knot callout. If the accuracy of either primary airspeed indication is in question, reference
the standby airspeed indicator. Another source of speed information is the ground speed indication. Early
recognition of a malfunction is important in making a sound go/stop decision. Refer to the Airspeed Unreliable
section in Chapter 8 for an expanded discussion of this subject. The PM should verify that takeoff thrust has been
set and the throttle hold mode (THR HLD) is engaged. A momentary autothrottle overshoot of 4% N1 may occur
but thrust should stabilize at +/- 2% N1, after THR HLD. Thrust should be adjusted by the PM, if required, to - 0%
+ 1% target N1. Once THR HLD annunciates, the autothrottle cannot change thrust lever position, but thrust levers
can be positioned manually. The THR HLD mode remains engaged until another thrust mode is selected.
Note: Takeoff into headwind of 20 knots or greater may result in THR HLD before the autothrottle can make final
thrust adjustments.
The THR HLD mode protects against thrust lever movement if a system fault occurs. Lack of the THR HLD
annunciation means the protective feature may not be active. If THR HLD annunciation does not appear, no crew
action is required unless a subsequent system fault causes unwanted thrust lever movement. As with any
autothrottle malfunction, the autothrottle should then be disconnected and desired thrust set manually.

Takeoff Rotation
The Ryanair safety management system has identified rotation rates in excess of recommended values as a
notable occurrence during line flying. A strict focus on rotation rate and rotation technique is required during all
simulator training and checking, including FBS and FFS sessions.
The FCTM shows that:

• Liftoff should be achieved about 3-4 seconds after Vr
• Early or rapid rotation may cause a tail strike
• Late, slow, or under-rotation increases takeoff ground roll
• Any improper rotation decreases initial climb flight path
• An aggressive rotation into the flight director pitch bar is not appropriate.
“With a consistent rotation technique, where the pilot uses approximately equal control forces and similar visual
cues, the resultant rotation rate differs slightly depending upon airplane body length.” “Using the technique
above, resultant rotation rates vary from 2° to 3° per second with rates being lowest on longer airplanes” The
Boeing 737 FCTM covers the B737-300 to B737-900ER models. The B737-800 falls into the category of “longer
airplane”.
The rotation rates for the B737-800 are:

• 2° to 2.5° per second for 2 engines
• 1.5° to 2° per second with 1 engine inoperative.
For the B737-700 the rotation rates are:

• 2.5° to 3° per second for 2 engines
• 2° to 2.5° per second for 1 engine
The control column force required varies depending on conditions during the departure. The forces should be
adjusted to achieve the required rate during normal departures. Do not over focus on the ‘dead band’. One
elevator position is required before the deadband, and another is required to keep a continuous rotation through
the deadband. During rotation minimize late secondary column pulls that result in the maximum rotation rate
occurring just prior to lift-off.

Crosswind Takeoff Techniques
Please refer to Ryanair Performance Manual (Operations Manual Part B) for all limitations associated with
crosswind takeoffs.
Reference: 737 NG Flight Crew Training Manual - Directional Control

Initial runway alignment and smooth symmetrical thrust application result in good crosswind control capability
during takeoff. Light forward pressure on the control column during the initial phase of takeoff roll (below
approximately 80 knots) increases nose wheel steering effectiveness. Any deviation from the centreline during
thrust application should be countered with immediate smooth and positive control inputs. Smooth rudder
control inputs combined with small control wheel inputs result in a normal takeoff with no over controlling. Large
control wheel inputs can have an adverse effect on directional control near V1 (MCG) due to the additional drag
of the extended spoilers.
Note: With wet or slippery runway conditions, the PM should give special attention to ensuring the engines have
symmetrically balanced thrust indications.
Rotation and Takeoff

Maintain wings level during the takeoff roll by applying control wheel displacement into the wind. During rotation
continue to apply control wheel in the displaced position to keep the wings level during liftoff. The airplane is in
a sideslip with crossed controls at this point. A slow, smooth recovery from this sideslip is accomplished after lift
off by slowly neutralizing the control wheel and rudder pedals.
Gusty Wind and Strong Crosswind Conditions

It is important to use the correct crosswind takeoff methods, the FCTM guidance is very clear. This in conjunction
with previous memos issued by Chief Pilot on tailstrike prevention will ensure correct techniques and safe
handling of crosswinds in gusty conditions. The following text is taken from the FCTM.
For takeoff in gusty or strong crosswind conditions, use of a higher thrust setting than the minimum required is
recommended.
For takeoff in gusty or strong crosswind conditions, use of a higher thrust setting than the minimum required is
recommended. When the prevailing wind is at or near 90° to the runway, the possibility of wind shifts resulting
in gusty tailwind components during rotation or liftoff increases. During this condition, consider the use of thrust
settings close to or at maximum takeoff thrust. The use of a higher takeoff thrust setting reduces the required
runway length and minimizes the airplane exposure to gusty conditions during rotation, liftoff, and initial climb.
To increase tail clearance during strong crosswind conditions, consider using a higher VR if takeoff performance
permits. This can be done by:
• Using improved climb takeoff performance methods
• Increasing VR speed to the performance limited gross weight rotation speed, not to exceed actual gross
weight VR + 20 knots. Set V speeds for the actual gross weight. Rotate at the adjusted (higher) rotation speed.
This increased rotation speed results in an increased stall margin, and meets takeoff performance
requirements.

Avoid rotation during a gust. If a gust is experienced near VR, as indicated by stagnant airspeed or rapid airspeed
acceleration, momentarily delay rotation. This slight delay allows the airplane additional time to accelerate
through the gust and the resulting additional airspeed improves the tail clearance margin.
Do not rotate early or use a higher than normal rotation rate in an attempt to clear the ground and reduce the
gust effect because this reduces tail clearance margins.
Limit control wheel input to that required to keep the wings level.
Use of excessive control wheel increases spoiler deployment which has the effect of reducing tail clearance. All
of these factors provide maximum energy to accelerate through gusts while maintaining tail clearance margins at
liftoff. The airplane is in a sideslip with crossed controls at this point. A slow, smooth recovery from this sideslip
is accomplished after liftoff by slowly neutralizing the control wheel and rudder pedals.
Rolling Takeoff
REFERENCE: SOP Manual
It is preferable to conduct a rolling takeoff as this greatly reduces the possibility of FOD without significantly
affecting takeoff performance. Further, engine surge can occur if T/O thrust is set prior to brake release.
Therefore, it is strongly advised that a rolling T/O procedure is used even in crosswind conditions.
Reference: FCTM
A rolling takeoff procedure is recommended for setting takeoff thrust. It expedites the takeoff and reduces the
risk of foreign object damage or engine surge/stall due to a tailwind or crosswind. Flight test and analysis prove
that the change in takeoff roll distance due to the rolling takeoff procedure is negligible when compared to a
standing takeoff.
Rolling takeoffs are accomplished in two ways:

If cleared for takeoff before or while entering the runway, maintain normal taxi speed. When the airplane is
aligned with the runway centreline ensure the nose wheel steering wheel is released and apply takeoff thrust by
advancing the thrust levers to just above idle (40%N1). Allow the engines to stabilize momentarily then promptly
advance the thrust levers to takeoff thrust (autothrottle TO/GA). There is no need to stop the airplane before
increasing thrust.
If holding in position on the runway, ensure the nose wheel steering wheel is released, release brakes, then apply
takeoff thrust as described above.
Allowing the engines to stabilize provides uniform engine acceleration to takeoff thrust and minimizes directional
control problems. This is particularly important if crosswinds exist or the runway surface is slippery. The exact
initial setting is not as important as setting symmetrical thrust. If thrust is to be set manually, smoothly advance
thrust levers toward takeoff thrust.
Delayed Rotation
REFERENCE: SOP Manual
To increase tail clearance during strong crosswind conditions, consider using a higher VR if takeoff performance
permits. This can be done by:
1. Increasing Vr speed to the performance limited gross weight rotation speed.
2. Set V speeds for the actual gross weight.

3. Rotate at the adjusted (higher) rotation speed.
This increased rotation speed results in an increased stall margin, and meets takeoff performance. In practice,
this means that there is no change to procedure and PM will call Vr at the set speed but PF will delay rotation to
the performance limited gross weight Vr. Nevertheless do not rotate later than actual gross weight Vr+20 knots.”
After Take-off
With the autothrottle engaged, and after V1, the PF must have both hands on the control column until the
autopilot is engaged.
During flap retraction the speed must not only be at the manoeuvring speed for the existing flap setting but also
showing a speed trend vector to accelerate. This is important in order to ensure that the aircraft is accelerating
to the next flap speed as the flaps are retracting. Below are target attitudes after take-off through flap retraction
and acceleration to 250kts for a TOW of 60T
After take-off, allow the aircraft to fly the FMC programmed climb rate during the initial departure. At ALT ACQ,
always “BUG UP” when the flaps are still extended. V/S should not be used to control climb rate with flaps
extended.
Most departures from STN require a relatively early level off. Particularly departing towards BKY from Rwy 04,
there is a potential TCAS RA threat with inbound a/c descending to 1000’ above departures. Therefore, providing
that flaps are fully retracted and LE Flap Transit Light extinguished, good airmanship may dictate that you select
V/S and reduce ROC at 2,000 or 1,000 feet approaching the cleared altitude which may be prior to 3000’ AGL.
NP.21.49 states that “V/S should not be used before the flaps are up” – not to be confused with the “Flaps up, No
lights” call.
After the “Flaps Up No Lights” call, an MCP climb selection should be made and the After T/O Checklist called for.
If using VNAV then any departure speed or altitude restrictions should be considered. The pilot who sets the MCP
ALT should select ALT INTV if selected altitude exceeds the SID requirements. The top right hand corner of the
FMC CLB page or the legs page can be used to reference any altitude restrictions and should be checked prior to
VNAV engagement.
During the After T/O Checks the Air Conditioning & Pressurisation check should be read aloud. This is a very
important check and must be completed diligently. Use the reverse “L” technique.
Start by calling the actual cabin DIFF (outer scale / long pointer) and checking the Cabin ALT (inner scale / short
pointer) as indicated on the CABIN Altimeter /Differential Pressure Indicator.
In the example below the PM response to the AIR COND & PRESS:
6
1. Challenge in the After Take – Off Procedure will be: “2.4 / SET”.
2. Check the cabin rate of climb.
5 3.
4.
Check pressurisation mode selector is selected to AUTO.
Check that the Engine Bleeds are On and Packs are AUTO.
5. Check the bleed air duct pressure noting any split.
4 6. Avoid Hot Heads. Keep it cool in the cabin. The Air Temp Source
Selector should always default to the PASS CAB FWD/AFT positions to
ensure a Temperature of 20°-22°C.
1
3
2

Taxiing
Taxi techniques are given in the Ryanair SOP manual section 4 and the FCTM section 2.3 onwards.
Some students, especially command upgrade students, tend to follow the exit taxi line from the opposite runway
on entering their active runway for T/O. This is obviously undesirable on a runway where TODA is the limiting
factor as the performance figures do not allow for such an extended line up allowance. Under normal
circumstances you should line up as expeditiously as possible in anticipation of a rolling take off clearance from
ATC.
Maximum ground speed in a straight line is 30 knots, 15 knots on the apron and 10 knots around corners over
45⁰. On contaminated and slippery taxiways or runways, max taxi speed is 5 knots. These speeds are maximum
and Captains must exercise sound judgement when other factors may require slower speeds.
Back-tracking a runway is relevant for the active runway only – Speed limit is 50kts. Disused runways such as in
LGW and PSA are restricted to the 30 kts maximum for taxiing. Turning away from stand: (Ref FCTM 2.8, FCOM
VOL1 NP 21.40/41)
Using the correct turning technique is very important to ensure safety while turning away from a non-pushback
stand. The guidelines below will ensure minimum thrust use while keeping the turning radius close to minimum.
Note: Close liaison with ground crew is recommended.
To initiate the turn:
• Release parking brake but maintain brake pressure. This is to ensure that the aircraft does not move
before sufficient thrust is set
• Perform the config check
• Set the N1 command sectors to 30% N1
• When the thrust is achieved release brakes
• When the aircraft starts moving apply full nose wheel steering in the desired direction
• Close the thrust lever for the inboard engine, this is important since any thrust produced by this engine
is actually decreasing your turn capability
During the turn:
• During the turn only very small thrust adjustments would normally be required, remember that we are
aiming for the minimum required thrust, usually 30% N1 is sufficient but adjust as necessary to keep
momentum throughout the turn
• It would be unusual to use more than 35% N1. There is a risk of damage to equipment and/or injury to
personnel if more than minimum is used
• If you reduce the thrust before the turn is complete the aircraft will stop and you will require a significant
amount of thrust to regain momentum
• When approaching the end of the turn increase thrust once again on the inboard engine

Engine Out Taxi (EOT) After Landing:

EOT should be considered the default taxi procedure after landing. Below is the current guidance given in the RST
5 pre-simulator notes.
EOT for departing flights is not authorized for Ryanair operations. Following landing, crews are encouraged to
taxi-in using single engine taxi procedures. EOT operations have the potential to save fuel and to reduce carbon
emissions (OPS Part A 8.3.0.3.12) As most GOPS equipment is prepositioned on the right side of the aircraft stands,
Ryanair recommends EOT with #2 Engine shutdown (APU Off) when possible to minimize aircraft systems impact
and reduce FOD hazards when arriving on stand.
During EOT operations, the flight crew's attention should be focused on taxiing the airplane. Taxi-in is a critical
phase of flight and sterile cockpit must be observed. The crew should consider their familiarity with the airport
and the complexity of the taxi route before conducting EOT operations. Prior to shutting down an engine after
landing, consideration should be given to the following:
• No EOT option discussed during DALTA Briefing (EOT should be standard procedure)
• After Landing Taxi-In Procedure Completed
• 3 min Engine Cool-Down Completed.
• No LVPs, Freezing Conditions (as defined by Ryanair) or contamination present (reported or observed)
on Taxiways / Aprons; BA Good or better
• Actual Gross Weight ≤ 63,000 kgs
• No conflicting MEL/DDPG restrictions (EOT not authorized with any system inoperative which impacts
braking or steering capability)
• Taxiway and Apron slope accommodate use of minimum thrust on one engine (typically ≤ 40% N1) and
no FOD hazards exist en-route to, or around the stand
• Airplane systems configured and managed appropriately to maintain safety, redundancy, and optimized
for passenger comfort
Avoid thrust levels in excess of 40% N1. Give due consideration to personnel and equipment near the aircraft that
may be affected by the air blast associated with increased thrust levels, particularly areas behind the aircraft. Use
a thrust setting normally used for taxi operations however be prepared for slow acceleration. When taxiing on a
single engine it may take twice as long for the aircraft to accelerate to a comparable taxi speed than when taxiing
on two engines. Therefore, allow time for airplane response before increasing thrust.
Should a situation arise where single engine thrust levels are clearly insufficient to manoeuvre the Aircraft,
consider re-starting the second engine. If restarting an engine, the aircraft must be stopped and the parking brake
set.
TEM
• Captains will have to exercise discipline on power & energy management especially when approaching
a stand with laser ranging guidance, if he/she runs out of momentum and stops short, a lot of thrust will
be required to get the aircraft moving.
• Tight left turns onto a stand which does not allow a wide radius turn may present problems / a problem
with the outboard engine shut down. If you must stop then always allow room to move forward before
commencing a turn.

Line Up Performance Allowance

The Performance Preamble and RTOW charts provide information on line up allowances. When entering a runway
to takeoff ensure the aircraft is aligned with the runway to comply
with the line-up allowance used in the RTOW. Failure to do so will
invalidate takeoff performance calculations.
The photo below shows the correct technique to line up on runway 16

in Dublin due to the orientation of the runway relative to the taxiway.

Thrust Lever Handling during Engine Fire, Failure or Shutdown

The FCTM is very specific as to the situations that it addresses and the guidance it gives regarding the handling of
the thrust lever during a Non Normal situation. The two specific situations that the FCTM addresses are:
1. Inflight Engine Shutdown
2. Engine Fire
No other Non-Normal engine conditions such as Engine Overheat, are specifically addressed. Regardless, the
procedures to be trained and used for any engine related Non Normal event will derive from the requirements of
the B737 QRH, in particular those relating to “Areas of Responsibility”.
The QRH CI states: “When a non–normal situation occurs, at the direction of the pilot flying, both crewmembers
do all memory items in their areas of responsibility without delay.”
The autothrottle disengage switch and the thrust levers are the responsibility of the PF (NP.10.6).
The QRH familiarization document on Crewdock states:

“The PM reads the challenge, the word “Confirm” and the response. The PF must verbally confirm the checklist
item. This assures that both crewmembers are aware of the action before it is taken. This helps prevent incorrect
actions and supports the situation awareness of both crewmembers. Action is taken by the PF or PM based on
each crewmember’s area of responsibility. After moving the control, the crewmember taking the action also
states the checklist response.”
The following examples give guidance on how to achieve the above. The examples show the ideal training scenario
but since non-normal situations can be very dynamic and develop quickly, it is not possible to cover every
eventuality.
Example 1: Memory items, Engine fire or severe damage or separation

PF PM
“State Malfunction”
“Fire, engine number 1”
“Engine fire or severe damage or separation memory
items”
“Autothrottle (if engaged), Disengage”
PF disengages the A/T and then calls “Disengaged”
“Thrust lever engine number 1, Confirm, Close”
PF puts hand on thrust lever number one confirming The PM verifies that the PF puts the hand on the
that the item (thrust lever number 1) is correct and correct thrust lever. If the PF selects the wrong thrust
that the action called by the PM is correct (close) and lever the PM will challenge this verbally.
then calls “confirm”
The PF retards the thrust lever to close and then calls
“Close”
The PF visually confirms that the item and intended
action is correct and then calls “confirmed”
The PM moves the start lever to CUTOFF and then
calls “CUTOFF”
The PM puts one hand on the start lever ETC
Example 2: Engine failure or shutdown

The engine failure or shutdown checklist is accomplished in a very similar way to example 1 but the items are read
aloud from the checklist.
PF PM
“Engine failure, engine number 1”
“Engine failure or shutdown checklist”
The PM reads the checklist title, the condition statement
and step number one. Then proceeds as below.

“Thrust lever engine number 1, Confirm, Close”
PF puts hand on thrust lever number one confirming thatThe PM verifies that the PF puts the hand on the correct
the item (thrust lever number 1) is correct and that thethrust lever. If the PF selects the wrong thrust lever the
action called by the PM is correct (close) and then callsPM will challenge this verbally.
“confirm”
The PF retards the thrust lever to close and then calls
“Close”
Complete step 4
“Engine start lever engine number 1, Confirm, CUTOFF”
The PM puts one hand on the start lever
The PF visually confirms that the item and intended action
is correct and then calls “confirmed”
The PM moves the start lever to CUTOFF and then calls
“CUTOFF”
ETC…
Example 3: EEC ALTERNATE MODE

This demonstrates an example with no thrust asymmetry.
PF PM
“EEC Alternate mode”
“EEC alternate mode checklist”
The PM reads aloud the checklist title, the condition
statement. Then proceeds as below.

“Thrust levers (both), Retard to mid position”

“This prevents exceeding thrust limits when switching to
the EEC alternate mode.”
The PF retards the thrust levers to mid position then calls
“retarded to mid position”
ETC…

TCAS Traffic Avoidance
Objectives
• Understanding and recognition of TCAS Symbols on ND and PFD displays
• Understanding of the recovery actions in accordance with QRH MAN Traffic Avoidance
• Recognition and correct reaction to RA pitch command
• Smooth handling, effective recovery to normal flight when clear of conflict
• Correct R/T communications with ATC.
TCAS equipment interrogates the transponders of other airplanes to determine their range, bearing, and altitude.
A traffic advisory (TA) is generated when the other airplane is approximately 40 seconds from the point of closest
approach. If the other airplane continues to close, a resolution advisory (RA) is generated when the other airplane
is approximately 25 seconds from the point of closest approach.
The RA provides aural warning and guidance as well as manoeuvre guidance to maintain or increase separation
from the traffic.
(White) Other Traffic - is beyond the six mile and 1200 feet vertical criteria.
(White) Proximate Traffic - within six miles and 1200 feet vertically.
(Amber) TA Traffic Advisory – Lookout / Increase Scale on the ND.
(Red) RA Resolution advisory
These symbols are displayed only when the EFIS control panel traffic
(TFC) switch is selected on. Refer to Chapter 15, Warning Systems.
The arrow indicates traffic climbing or descending at a rate
>= 500 fpm. At rates < 500 fpm, the arrow is not displayed.
The number and associated signs indicate altitude of traffic in
hundreds of feet relative to the airplane.
The number is below the traffic symbol when the traffic is below, and
above the traffic symbol when the traffic is above the airplane.
Absence of the number implies altitude unknown.
Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System Pitch Command

The area(s) inside the red lines indicate(s) the pitch region(s) to avoid in order to resolve the
traffic conflict. The airplane symbol must be outside the TCAS pitch command area(s) to
ensure traffic avoidance. Refer to Chapter 15, Warning Systems.

TCAS ATC Communications

ATC shall be advised of the TCAS commanded manoeuvres with the call “TCAS RA” as soon as possible. After the
‘Clear of Conflict’ Resolution Advisory aural callout is received the pilot should report when returning to the
assigned clearance or when the assigned clearance has been resumed. ATC shall be advised using the phrase
“Clear of conflict, returning to (assigned clearance)” or “Clear of conflict (assigned clearance) resumed”.
If an ATC clearance or instruction contradictory to the TCAS RA is received, the Flight Crew shall follow the RA and
inform ATC directly: “Unable, TCAS RA”.
Prescribed TCAS/ACAS ATC communications are specified as follows:
Callsign +:
• "TCAS RA"
• "Unable TCAS RA"
• "Clear of conflict, returning to (assigned clearance)” OR;
• “Clear of conflict (assigned clearance) resumed”
TCAS cannot issue any RAs against aircraft which do not report their altitude.
As a result, the TCAS safety net is disabled. Pilots therefore shall NOT turn off altitude reporting unless so
instructed by ATC after it has been established that the reported altitudes are incorrect.
The corrective action must:

1. Never be in a sense opposite to that indicated by the RA.
2. Be in the correct sense indicated by the RA even if this is in conflict with the vertical element of an ATC
instruction.
3. Be the minimum possible to comply with the RA indication.
Windshear, GPWS, and stall warnings take precedence over TCAS advisories.
Stick shaker must take priority at all times. Complying with RAs may result in brief exceedance of altitude and/or
placard limits. However, even at the limits of the operating envelope, in most cases sufficient performance is
available to safely maneuver the airplane. Smoothly and expeditiously return to appropriate altitudes and speeds
when clear of conflict. Manoeuvring opposite to an RA command is not recommended since TCAS may be
coordinating manoeuvres with other airplanes.
A SAIR shall be filed for all TCAS RA’s
During the RA manoeuvre, the crew should be aware that when attempting to establish visual contact with the
target, perception of the encounter can be misleading, particularly at night. You should be aware that the traffic
acquired visually may not be the intruder traffic causing the RA.

Terrain Avoidance Manoeuvre (GPWS)
Objective
• Correct recognition and reaction to ground proximity warnings
• To show the crew examples of visual and aural warnings
• To train the difference between Ground Proximity Cautions and Ground Proximity Warnings
• Immediate recovery from any unsafe condition in accordance with the QRH MAN, Terrain avoidance
procedures.
Study
• All QRH MAN Procedures and pilot actions associated with Terrain Avoidance.
• Review all cautions and warnings, both display and aural warnings. Reference FCOM Vol 2 Warning
Systems, Ground Proximity alerts and Look Ahead Terrain Alerting and Radio Altitude based alerts.
Terrain Avoidance
The Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) PULL UP Warning occurs when an unsafe distance or closure rate
is detected with terrain below the airplane. The look-ahead terrain alerting also provides an aural warning when
an unsafe distance is detected from terrain ahead of the airplane.
Immediately accomplish the Terrain Avoidance manoeuvre found in the non-normal manoeuvres section in the
QRH. Do not attempt to engage the autopilot and/or autothrottle until terrain clearance is assured.

TERRAIN ALERTING, VSD AND RESPONSE TO EGPWS “2500”
The EGPWS “Twenty-Five Hundred” call is intended to alert the crew that they are within striking distance of
terrain. It is one of the pillars of the structure that the industry has built in an effort to prevent the number one
cause of accidents CFIT. On hearing it the crew should move to a heightened state of alert in terms of their Vertical
Situation Awareness.
“Twenty-Five Hundred” Callout – Departure, Climb and Cruise

When the EGPWS “Twenty-Five Hundred” callout occurs during descent or approach the PF will call “Terrain
Noted”. The PF will visually confirm that TERRAIN mode is selected on the First Officer’s ND. The crew will consider
the Terrain Display and assess the callout for Altitude/Distance logic to the landing runway and ensure that the
intended routing is safe with respect to terrain clearance.
Consideration must be given to the MSA area if manoeuvring near an airport or the current active waypoint/safety
height specified on the plog. If any doubt exists, turn away from high ground immediately and confirm your
location.
“Twenty-Five Hundred” Callout – Descent and Approach

When the EGPWS “Twenty-Five Hundred” callout occurs during descent or approach the PF will call “Terrain
Noted”. The PF will visually confirm that TERRAIN mode is selected on the First Officer’s ND. The crew will consider
the Terrain Display and assess the callout for Altitude/Distance logic to the landing runway and ensure that the
intended routing is safe with respect to terrain clearance.
Nothing in this procedure prevents either pilot alternately selecting TERRAIN or WXR as required however, the
default selections are as described above.
The captain will have WXR selected for the Descent and Approach on the left hand ND and will confirm that the
intended arrival routing is clear of adverse weather and shall monitor the approach track and go-around for cell
activity. The first officer will have Terrain (TERR) selected on the right hand ND and both crew will ensure that the
arrival routing is safe with respect to terrain clearance.
VSD
The Captain will have WXR selected for the descent and approach on the left hand ND and will confirm that the
intended arrival routing is clear of adverse weather and shall monitor the approach track and go-around for
thunderstorm activity. The first officer will have Terrain (TERR) selected on the right hand ND and both crew will
ensure that the arrival routing is safe with respect to terrain clearance.
VSD is normally selected ON in descent passing MSA or FL100 whichever is higher. Verify that all remaining altitude
restrictions can be achieved. Where terrain or energy management is a factor VSD should remain on until clear
of terrain or back on profile. VSD may be selected off at this stage but must be reselected on with the completion
of the Approach Checks. Nothing in this procedure prevents either pilot alternately selecting TERRAIN or WXR as
required however, the default selections are as described above.

CFIT Avoidance
The terrain profile always accurately depicts the airplane’s relative altitude above the local terrain. The airplane’s
clearance above local terrain is based on geometric altitude as calculated by the (EGPWC) Enhanced Ground
Proximity Warning Computer.
The terrain profile relative to the aircraft is based on the terrain database –
immune to QNH Blunder Error
If the runway appears significantly above or below the terrain profile line, the crew should verify that the baro
setting is correct.
Runway appears below the

terrain.
CFIT RISK
HEA Avoidance
The VSD allows you to determine your vertical position relative to the desired path. The range to speed dot indicates where
the airplane will achieve the FMC or MCP target speed and can be used the indication can be used to verify whether or not
the correct speed will be achieved by a certain point.
In this picture we can see that we will not

achieve our required speed of 165 knots by
the EME point.
The use of active PM skills can draw the PF
attention to this discrepancy in speed.
PF can then increase the available drag to
achieve the correct speed by the required
point.
We can see after increasing the drag (in this

example, gear down and flaps 15) the aircraft
will achieve the required speed by the EME.

Turbulence Penetration
Turbulence is one of the leading causes of injury in non-fatal accidents. To manage the threat, turbulence should
be avoided if possible, or protected against if necessary. To avoid or protect, it is essential to know the extent of
the threat, communicate with all affected parties, and share an attitude of respect for the consequences of
turbulence. Possible areas of clear air turbulence should be identified during flight preparation to provide prior
warning to flight deck and cabin crew.
The shear value on all OFP can be consulted to aid the crew on determining the level of turbulence expected
enroute. Theoretically there is no upper limit to this value but generally it will appear as a single digit. The wind
shear value is calculated from wind speed and direction samples taken 2000 ft above and 2000 ft below the datum
level. The lower the number the less chance of turbulence. Moderate turbulence can be expected whenever the
shear is equal to or greater than three (3). Severe turbulence can be anticipated whenever the shear is equal to
or greater than five (5). Commanders should review this section of the OFP at the pre-flight stage, compare it with
forecast areas of turbulence and brief the SCCM on any anticipated areas of turbulence enroute.
Turbulence encountered in flight can be associated with thunderstorms, convective clouds (CB's), wind over
mountainous terrain, strong winds at lower altitudes, jet streams giving rise to clear air turbulence (CAT), and
windshear in which severe downdrafts and micro bursts can occur. As of yet, CAT cannot be detected by airborne
equipment. It is however, associated with jet streams and vertical wind shear. It is more likely to occur at the
edges of the jet stream, on its cold side and where the wind speed is beginning to slow and the stream spreads
out. CAT is forecast and marked on the significant Weather Chart and where experienced by other aircraft backed
up with SIGMET warnings. If it is not possible to reroute to avoid forecast CAT Flight Crew Members should select
a lower cruise altitude. Guidance is provided in FCOM Vol. 1, max and Opt altitudes. When encountered in flight,
the vertical band of CAT may be quite limited and often a small change in altitude may be sufficient to get out of
the turbulence.
Turbulence is categorised basically as "light", "moderate" or "severe". Light turbulence is defined as that which
momentarily causes slight, erratic changes in altitude and/or attitude.
Moderate turbulence is similar to light but of a greater intensity. Changes in altitude and or attitude occur but the
aircraft always remains in positive control. Some variations in indicated airspeed can be expected. ICAO defines
+/- 0.2 - 0.5g loadings with strong intermittent jolts as Moderate Turbulence. Normally, no change to cruise
altitude or airspeed is required when encountering moderate turbulence.
Seat belts are usually switched ON for light to moderate and higher categories of turbulence. It is a requirement
for all passengers to be seated with seatbelts fastened and for all cabin service to be terminated for moderate or
higher categories of turbulence. For severe turbulence flight crew and cabin must be strapped in using the full
harness. Severe turbulence exemplified by negative "G" and positive "G" (+/- 0.5 - 1.5g) forces or higher, makes
the instruments difficult to read, the aircraft difficult to control, and unsecured items in the cabin and equipment
to be thrown around. Increasingly severe turbulence can cause loss of control, structural damage, and in the
extreme catastrophic structural failure. So, severe turbulence must be avoided not just for passenger comfort but
for safety.
Flight crew members encountering turbulence should report the conditions to ATC.
The maximum degree of turbulence encountered at the pilot’s station during certification flight tests on the B737-
800 was evaluated as moderate. Flight through severe turbulence should be avoided, if possible.
When flying at 30,000 feet or higher, it is not advisable to avoid a turbulent area by climbing over it unless it is
obvious that it can be over flown well in the clear. For turbulence of the same intensity, greater buffet margins
are achieved by flying the recommended speeds at reduced altitudes. Selection of the autopilot Control Wheel
Steering (CWS) is recommended for operation in severe turbulence. Do not use Altitude Hold (ALT HLD) mode.

The recommended procedure for flying the aircraft in severe turbulence/mountain wave conditions is:
• Airspeed - Target airspeed during climb / descent should be approximately 280 KIAS or 0.76 MACH,
whichever is lower. Severe turbulence will cause large and often rapid variations in indicated airspeed.
DO NOT CHASE THE AIRSPEED
• Yaw Damper - Engaged
• Autopilot - Optional - If the autopilot is engaged, use CWS position, do not use ALT HLD mode
• Auto-Throttle - Disengage
• Attitude - Maintain wings level and the desired pitch attitude. Use the attitude indicator as the primary
instrument. In extreme drafts, large attitude changes may occur. DO NOT USE SUDDEN LARGE CONTROL
INPUTS. After establishing the trim setting for penetration speed, DO NOT CHANGE STABILZER TRIM.
• Altitude - Allow the altitude to vary. Large altitude variations are possible in severe turbulence. Sacrifice
altitude in order to maintain the desired attitude and airspeed. DO NOT CHASE THE ALTITUDE.
• Thrust - Engine ignition should be on. Make an initial thrust setting for the target airspeed. CHANGE
THRUST ONLY IN CASE OF EXTREME AIRSPEED VARIATION. The FMC cruise page displays N1 target value
for turbulence.
• FMC – Select CON on N1 Limit Page, when clear of turbulence reselect Auto.
Note: If an approach must be made into an area of severe turbulence, delay flap extension as long as possible.
The airplane can withstand higher gust loads in the clean configuration.
As stated above, no change to cruise altitude or airspeed is normally required when encountering moderate
turbulence. However, if operating at cruise thrust limits, it may be difficult to maintain cruise speed. If this occurs,
select a higher thrust limit (if available) or descend to a lower altitude.
SEVERE TURBULENCE PROCEDURE SUMMARY PHASE OF FLIGHT AIRSPEED

CLIMB ↑
280 knots or .76 Mach
CRUISE →
Use FMC recommended thrust settings. If the FMC is inoperative, refer to the Unreliable Airspeed page in the
performance – in-flight section of the QRH for approximate N1 settings that maintain near optimum penetration
airspeed.
DESCENT ↓
.76 Mach/280/250 knots. If severe turbulence is encountered at altitudes below 15,000 feet and the airplane
gross weight is less than the maximum landing weight, the airplane may be slowed to 250 knots in the clean
configuration.

UPRT
UPRT is trained to mitigate the risk of LOC-I one of our Key Operation Risk Areas. Other KORAs that are impacted
by UPRT are CFIT, Mid Air Collision and Runway Excursion.
Loss of Control in Flight (LOC-I) continues to be the major cause of loss of life in commercial aviation accidents.
Aviation regulators have addressed the LOC-I issue and have formulated requirements for pilot Upset Prevention
and Recovery Training, or UPRT, which may be delivered in both theoretical and practical simulator training units.
A critical emphasis of UPRT is ‘Prevention’. Pilot training should provide the tools and expertise necessary: -
• To prevent getting into an Upset situation in the first place,
• To ensure the Upset condition is recognised at the earliest possible opportunity,
• To practise and develop a pilot's Flight Upset recovery skills.
The topic of UPRT is wide ranging and many of the manoeuvres found during UPRT simulator training will be found
in other parts of this Guide including;
• Acceleration and Deceleration from VMO
• Airspeed Unreliable
• Approach to Stall Recovery
• Flight Path Management
• High Altitude Approach to Stall
• Mach Buffet
• Raw Data ILS Approach
• Steep Turns
• Take-off – Crosswind Take-off Techniques
• Terrain Avoidance Manoeuvre
• Visual Approach Procedures
All students should have completed UPRT on the Ryanair eLearning site prior to UPRT Simulator Training. The
certificate of completion should be presented to your Instructor during the briefing of the UPRT simulator training.
Refer to the FCTM 7.20 and QRH MAN 1.7 for the Upset Recovery Manoeuvre.
Upset Recovery Manoeuvres

If an upset situation is recognized, immediately accomplish the Upset Recovery manoeuvre found in the non-
normal manoeuvres section in the QRH.
It is possible to consolidate upset recovery manoeuvres into two basic scenarios, nose high and nose low, and to
acknowledge the potential for high bank angles in each scenario. Recognizing and confirming the upset, reducing
automation, and completing the recovery are included in the Upset Recovery manoeuvres in the QRH. The
manoeuvres provide a logical progression for recovering the airplane.
To recognize and confirm the situation the crew must assess the airplane attitude, airspeed, altitude and trend
information through instrument crosscheck.
The ADI should be used as the primary reference in assessing airplane attitude. The pitch scales and colour coding
above/below the horizon (blue/brown) should be used when making the pitch assessment.
For any pitch attitude, the bank pointer stays perpendicular to the horizon. When completing the upset recovery
manoeuvre, roll the shortest direction to wings level (toward the bank pointer).
General
Though flight crews in line operation rarely, if ever, encounter an upset situation, understanding how to apply
aerodynamic fundamentals in such a situation helps them control the airplane. Several techniques are available
for recovering from an upset. In most situations, if a technique is effective, it is not recommended that pilots use
additional techniques. Several of these techniques are discussed in the example scenarios below:

• stall recovery
• nose high, wings level
• nose low, wings level
• high bank angles
• nose high, high bank angles
• nose low, high bank angles
Note: Higher than normal control forces may be required to control the airplane attitude when recovering from
upset situations. Be prepared to use a firm and continuous force on the control column and control wheel to
complete the recovery.
Stall Recovery
In all upset situations, it is necessary to recover from a stall before applying any other recovery actions. A stall
may exist at any attitude and may be recognized by continuous stick shaker activation accompanied by one or
more of the following:
• buffeting which could be heavy at times
• lack of pitch authority and/or roll control
• inability to arrest descent rate
If the airplane is stalled, recovery from the stall must be accomplished first by applying and maintaining nose
down elevator until stall recovery is complete and stick shaker activation ceases. Under certain conditions, it may
be necessary to reduce some thrust in order to prevent the angle of attack from continuing to increase. Once stall
recovery is complete, upset recovery actions may be taken and thrust reapplied as needed.
Nose High, Wings Level

In a situation where the airplane pitch attitude is unintentionally more than 25° nose high and increasing, the
airspeed is decreasing rapidly. As airspeed decreases, the pilot's ability to manoeuvre the airplane also decreases.
If the stabilizer trim setting is nose up, as for slow-speed flight, it partially reduces the nose-down authority of the
elevator. Further complicating this situation, as the airspeed decreases, the pilot could intuitively make a large
thrust increase. This causes an additional pitch up. At full thrust settings and very low airspeeds, the elevator,
working in opposition to the stabilizer, has limited control to reduce the pitch attitude.
In this situation the pilot should trade altitude for airspeed, and manoeuvre the airplane's flight path back toward
the horizon. This is accomplished by the input of up to full nose-down elevator and the use of some nose-down
stabilizer trim. These actions should provide sufficient elevator control power to produce a nose-down pitch rate.
It may be difficult to know how much stabilizer trim to use, and care must be taken to avoid using too much trim.
Pilots should not fly the airplane using stabilizer trim, and should stop trimming nose down when they feel the g
force on the airplane lessen or the required elevator force lessen. This use of stabilizer trim may correct an out-
of-trim airplane and solve a less-critical problem before the pilot must apply further recovery measures. Because
a large nose-down pitch rate results in a condition of less than 1 g, at this point the pitch rate should be controlled
by modifying control inputs to maintain between 0 g and 1 g. If altitude permits, flight tests have determined that
an effective way to achieve a nose-down pitch rate is to reduce some thrust.
If normal pitch control inputs do not stop an increasing pitch rate, rolling the airplane to a bank angle that starts
the nose down should work. Bank angles of about 45°, up to a maximum of 60°, could be needed. Unloading the
wing by maintaining continuous nose-down elevator pressure keeps the wing angle of attack as low as possible,
making the normal roll controls as effective as possible. With airspeed as low as stick shaker onset, normal roll
controls - up to full deflection of ailerons and spoilers - may be used. The rolling manoeuvre changes the pitch
rate into a turning manoeuvre, allowing the pitch to decrease. Finally, if normal pitch control then roll control is
ineffective, careful rudder input in the direction of the desired roll may be required to induce a rolling manoeuvre
for recovery.

Only a small amount of rudder is needed. Too much rudder applied too quickly or held too long may result in loss
of lateral and directional control. Because of the low energy condition, pilots should exercise caution when
applying rudder.
The reduced pitch attitude allows airspeed to increase, thereby improving elevator and aileron control
effectiveness. After the pitch attitude and airspeed return to a desired range the pilot can reduce angle of bank
with normal lateral flight controls and return the airplane to normal flight.
Nose Low, Wings Level

In a situation where the airplane pitch attitude is unintentionally more than 10° nose low and going lower, the
airspeed is increasing rapidly. A pilot would likely reduce thrust and extend the speedbrakes. Thrust reduction
causes an additional nose-down pitching moment. Speedbrake extension causes a nose-up pitching moment, an
increase in drag, and a decrease in lift for the same angle of attack. At airspeeds well above VMO/MMO, the ability
to command a nose-up pitch rate with elevator may be reduced because of the extreme aerodynamic loads on
the elevator.
Again, it is necessary to manoeuvre the airplane's flight path back toward the horizon. At moderate pitch attitudes,
applying nose-up elevator, reducing thrust, and extending speedbrakes, if necessary, changes the pitch attitude
to a desired range. At extremely low pitch attitudes and high airspeeds (well above VMO/MMO), nose-up elevator
and nose-up trim may be required to establish a nose-up pitch rate.
High Bank Angles

A high bank angle is one beyond that necessary for normal flight. Though the bank angle for an upset has been
defined as unintentionally more than 45°, it is possible to experience bank angles greater than 90°.
Any time the airplane is not in “zero-angle-of-bank” flight, lift created by the wings is not being fully applied against
gravity, and more than 1 g is required for level flight. At bank angles greater than 67°, level flight cannot be
maintained within AFM load factor limits. In high bank angle increasing airspeed situations, the primary objective
is to manoeuvre the lift of the airplane to directly oppose the force of gravity by rolling in the shortest direction
to wings level. Applying nose-up elevator at bank angles above 60° causes no appreciable change in pitch attitude
and may exceed normal structure load limits as well as the wing angle of attack for stall. The closer the lift vector
is to vertical (wings level), the more effective the applied g is in recovering the airplane.
A smooth application of up to full lateral control should provide enough roll control power to establish a very
positive recovery roll rate. If full roll control application is not satisfactory, it may even be necessary to apply some
rudder in the direction of the desired roll.
Only a small amount of rudder is needed. Too much rudder applied too quickly or held too long may result in loss
of lateral and directional control or structural failure.
Nose High, High Bank Angles

A nose high, high angle of bank upset requires deliberate flight control inputs. A large bank angle is helpful in
reducing excessively high pitch attitudes. The pilot must apply nose-down elevator and adjust the bank angle to
achieve the desired rate of pitch reduction while considering energy management. Once the pitch attitude has
been reduced to the desired level, it is necessary only to reduce the bank angle, ensure that sufficient airspeed
has been achieved, and return the airplane to level flight.
Nose Low, High Bank Angles

The nose low, high angle of bank upset requires prompt action by the pilot as altitude is rapidly being exchanged
for airspeed. Even if the airplane is at a high enough altitude that ground impact is not an immediate concern,
airspeed can rapidly increase beyond airplane design limits. Simultaneous application of roll and adjustment of
thrust may be necessary. It may be necessary to apply nose-down elevator to limit the amount of lift, which will
be acting toward the ground if the bank angle exceeds 90°. This also reduces wing angle of attack to improve
roll capability. Full aileron and spoiler input should be used if necessary to smoothly establish a recovery roll
rate toward the nearest horizon. It is important to not increase g force or use nose-up elevator or stabilizer until
approaching wings level. The pilot should also extend the speedbrakes as needed.

Visual Approach Procedures
Definition
An approach where either part of, or all of, an instrument approach procedure is not completed and the approach
is executed with visual reference to the terrain.
Concept
A visual approach in Ryanair is normally carried out because there is no approach procedure for that runway or a
time saving can be achieved by carrying out a visual approach as opposed to a long protracted arrival and
approach procedure.
General
A visual approach may be carried out or continued only if it is clearly determined that the meteorological
conditions are adequate for the approach (Ryanair shall not use an RVR of less than 800 m for a visual approach)
the aircraft will remain in visual contact with the ground and that the aircraft can be positioned for a landing by
visual reference to the runway, and most importantly after prior double briefing of the procedure. ATC must be
informed and have approved the visual manoeuvre prior to executing it.
Verification of aircraft position before commencing a visual approach is particularly important and should be cross
checked by all available means. Radio aids should be used for this purpose and will in any case be selected, tuned
and identified as for an instrument approach onto the landing runway and/or to facilitate monitoring of the
approach when available.
A visual approach is a non-precision approach (NPA) by Ryanair standards and is therefore subject to the Double
Brief. A crew may not elect to fly a visual approach without completing the Double Brief. The briefing must include
the position of all configuration changes and autopilot/FD handling for the approach and the complete go-around
manoeuvre. The crew must be alert for airfields, disused runways or roads that may be mistaken for the runway.
Use the map display to back up the visual picture. A visual approach may only be flown in conditions where
constant contact with the runway and its environment can be maintained throughout the manoeuvre
Aircraft shall not fly below glidepath, or follow a descent path lower than the approach path normally indicated
by the glidepath/PAPI.
The latest position to select Flap 1 on a visual approach is 10 nm from touchdown. Additional configuration
changes must be made to allow the aircraft to be fully stable (as defined in -800 FCOM Volume 1) with the landing
checklist complete to the landing clearance by 500 ft AAL. Minimums therefore for visual approaches are 500 ft
AAL (the landing gate for a visual approach shall be land alt plus 500) which shall be set on the BARO MINS. The
EGPWS, “FIVE HUNDRED”, callout will act as a minimums call.
Visual approaches are required to utilise the stabilised approach technique and follow a constant angle electronic
or VASI/PAPI glide path.
When manoeuvring for a visual approach, care must be taken to avoid and remain well clear of all terrain and
obstruction. This means that pilots shall not conduct self-manoeuvring/positioning below the MSA at night. Pilots
can conduct a visual landing at night only from a published approach procedure. Where a night time circling
approach is necessary the initial approach shall be conducted as an instrument approach with a break at MDA to
a circling approach. Night landings from a circling approach require a PAPI/VASI.
Circling At Night
1. At night, the maximum reported tower surface wind shall be 20kts
2. At night, the cloud ceiling required before commencing an approach shall be circling minimums +300’.
3. New Commanders prohibited from making night circling approaches.

In the event that a go-around is required the published missed approach procedure must be flown either to
completion, or to level flight under radar vectors and after take-off checks completed.
Visual approaches shall be conducted by Commanders and experienced F/O’s (>500 hrs in RYR).
Except where there is an existing FMC approach for the runway, the pilot should generate an RX point at 4.0nm
from runway threshold with a 3-degree glide path (or PAPI glide path angle if available). The corresponding
altitude at this point should be made a “hard altitude” in the FMC. The pilot should use LNAV track and VNAV
path information for guidance. When cleared for the approach and terrain clearance is guaranteed, select ‘direct
to’ the RX point. Once the ‘Direct To’ has been selected, the PF shall review the path and shall not turn final unless
on path +/- 400’.
Crews shall plan to be established on final approach with landing gear down and Flap 15 by 4nm from the runway.
The pilot should maximise the use of the AFDS.
Visual Approach with an existing FMC straight-in procedural approach for the runway:
The crew can adapt any FMC arrival in order to give them lateral and vertical guidance for the visual approach.
This will also ensure that any missed approach procedure available in the FMC can be used in case of a go-around.
PF shall identify and agree a point on the approach that equates to not less than 4nm from the runway and plan
to be established at or before this point with landing gear down and flap 15 extended. Once the ‘Direct to’ has
been selected to this point, the PF shall review the path and shall not turn final unless on path +/- 400’.
Other than in the circumstances described above crews should use the runway extension option in the FMC.
Other Visual Approaches:

1. Without an existing procedural approach for the runway.
2. With an offset existing procedural approach for the runway.
Crews must exercise caution before accepting a visual approach to either of the above types of runway.
If no procedural approach exists there could be a terrain issue which precludes the use of normal PANS OPS
criteria for constructing an approach. This could make that runway unsuitable for a straight in visual approach. If
any doubt about terrain clearance exists, the visual approach must be refused.
A significant offset to the front course of a published approach will almost always be the result of a terrain issue
that affects the straight in track. The Commander must decide whether the offset, and the reason for it, allows
complete clearance from terrain during any visual approach. If any doubt about terrain clearance exists, the visual
approach must be refused.
Go-around instructions must be agreed with ATC (if none are published) and followed using TOGA, HDG SEL,
VOR/LOC and MCP altitude.

Windshear
General
Windshear is a change of wind speed and/or direction over a short distance along the flight path.
Improper or ineffective vertical flight path control has been one of the primary factors in many cases of flight into
terrain. Low altitude windshear encounters are especially significant because windshear can place the crew in a
situation which requires the maximum performance capability of the airplane. Windshear encounters near the
ground are the most threatening because there is very little time or altitude to respond to and recover from an
encounter.
Airplane Performance in Windshear

Knowledge of how windshear affects airplane performance can be essential to the successful application of the
proper vertical flight path control techniques during a windshear encounter. The wind component is mostly
horizontal at altitudes below 500 feet. Horizontal windshear may improve or degrade vertical flight path
performance. Windshear that improves performance is first indicated in the flight deck by an increasing airspeed.
This type of windshear may be a precursor of a shear that decreases airspeed and degrades vertical flight path
performance. Airspeed decreases if the tailwind increases, or headwind decreases, faster than the airplane is
accelerating. As the airspeed decreases, the airplane normally tends to pitch down to maintain or regain the in-
trim speed. The magnitude of pitch change is a function of the encountered airspeed change. If the pilot attempts
to regain lost airspeed by lowering the nose, the combination of decreasing airspeed and decreasing pitch attitude
produces a high rate of descent. Unless this is countered by the pilot, a critical flight path control situation may
develop very rapidly. As little as 5 seconds may be available to recognize and react to a degrading vertical flight
path. In critical low altitude situations, trade airspeed for altitude, if possible. An increase in pitch attitude, even
though the airspeed may be decreasing, increases the lifting force and improves the flight path angle. Proper pitch
control, combined with maximum available thrust, utilizes the total airplane performance capability. The crew
must be aware of the normal values of airspeed, altitude, rate of climb, pitch attitude and control column forces.
Unusual control column force may be required to maintain or increase pitch attitude when airspeed is below the
in-trim speed. If significant changes in airspeed occur and unusual control forces are required, the crew should
be alerted to a possible windshear encounter and be prepared to take action.
Avoidance
The flight crew should search for any clues to the presence of windshear along the intended flight path. Presence
of windshear may be indicated by:
• Thunderstorm activity
• Virga (rain that evaporates before reaching the ground)
• Pilot reports
• Low level windshear alerting system (LLWAS) warnings.
Stay clear of thunderstorm cells and heavy precipitation and areas of known windshear. If the presence of
windshear is confirmed, delay takeoff or do not continue an approach.
Precautions
If windshear is suspected, be especially alert to any of the danger signals and be prepared for the possibility of an
inadvertent encounter. The following precautionary actions are recommended if windshear is suspected:

-Takeoff
• Takeoff with full rated takeoff thrust is recommended, unless the use of a fixed derate is required to
meet a dispatch performance requirement
• For optimum takeoff performance, use flaps 5, 10 or 15 unless limited by obstacle clearance and/or climb
gradient
• Use the longest suitable runway provided it is clear of areas of known windshear
• Consider increasing Vr speed to the performance limited gross weight rotation speed, not to exceed
actual gross weight Vr + 20 knots. Set V speeds for the actual gross weight. Rotate at the adjusted
(higher) rotation speed. This increased rotation speed results in an increased stall margin and meets
takeoff performance requirements. If windshear is encountered at or beyond the actual gross weight Vr,
do not attempt to accelerate to the increased Vr but rotate without hesitation
• Be alert for any airspeed fluctuations during takeoff and initial climb. Such fluctuations may be the first
indication of windshear
• Know the all–engine initial climb pitch attitude. Rotate at the normal rate to this attitude for all non–
engine failure takeoffs. Minimize reductions from the initial climb pitch attitude until terrain and
obstruction clearance is assured, unless stick shaker activates
• Crew coordination and awareness are very important. Develop an awareness of normal values of
airspeed, attitude, vertical speed, and airspeed build-up. Closely monitor vertical flight path instruments
such as vertical speed and altimeters. The pilot monitoring should be especially aware of vertical flight
path instruments and call out any deviations from normal
• Should airspeed fall below the trim airspeed; unusual control column forces may be required to maintain
the desired pitch attitude. If stick shaker is encountered, reduce pitch attitude. Do not exceed the Pitch
Limit Indication.
-Approach and Landing

• Use flaps 30 for landing
• Establish a stabilized approach no lower than 1000 feet above the airport to improve windshear
recognition capability
• Use the most suitable runway that avoids the areas of suspected windshear and is compatible with
crosswind or tailwind limitations. Use ILS G/S, VNAV path or VASI/PAPI indications to detect flight path
deviations and help with timely detection of windshear
• If the autothrottle is disengaged, or is planned to be disengaged prior to landing, add an appropriate
airspeed correction (correction applied in the same manner as gust), up to a maximum of 20 knots
• Avoid large thrust reductions or trim changes in response to sudden airspeed increases as these may be
followed by airspeed decreases
• Crosscheck flight director commands using vertical flight path instruments
• Crew coordination and awareness are very important, particularly at night or in marginal weather
conditions. Closely monitor the vertical flight path instruments such as vertical speed, altimeters, and
glideslope displacement. The pilot monitoring should call out any deviations from normal. Use of the
autopilot and autothrottle for the approach may provide more monitoring and recognition time.
Recovery
It is important to understand the difference between a windshear warning and a predictive windshear warning, a
windshear warning is produced by the GPWS system and is an indication that the aircraft is actually in windshear,
in all circumstances the Windshear Escape Maneuver must be completed. A windshear warning can be identified
by the two-tone siren followed by “WINDSHEAR, WINDSHEAR, WINDSHEAR”. However Predictive Windshear
Warnings are produced by the weather radar and indicate windshear ahead of the aircraft. There is no two tone
siren associated with a predictive windshear warning. Boeing state that if you receive a predictive windshear
warning during the takeoff roll, before v1 you should reject the takeoff, after v1 you should perform the
Windshear Escape Maneuver. If you receive a predictive windshear warning on approach, you should perform
the windshear escape maneuver or, at pilot’s discretion a normal go around.
If windshear is encountered before V1, there may not be sufficient runway remaining to stop if an RTO is initiated
at V1. At VR, rotate at a normal rate toward a 15 degree pitch attitude. Once airborne, perform the Windshear
Escape Maneuver. If windshear is encountered near the normal rotation speed and airspeed suddenly decreases,
there may not be sufficient runway left to accelerate back to normal takeoff speed. If there is insufficient runway
left to stop, initiate a normal rotation at least 2,000 feet before the end of the runway, even if airspeed is low.
Higher than normal attitudes may be needed to lift off in the remaining runway. Ensure maximum thrust is set.
Aside from the two tone siren and “WINDSHEAR, WINDSHEAR, WINDSHEAR”, Windshear can be identified by
unacceptable flight-path deviations which would include uncontrolled changes from normal steady flight
conditions below 1000ft AGL, in excess of any of the following:
• 15kts indicated airspeed

• 500ft/min vertical speed
• 5-degree pitch attitude
• 1 dot displacement from the glideslope
• Unusual thrust lever position for a significant period of time.
The recovery maneuver includes the following:
*Maximum thrust can be obtained by advancing the thrust levers full forward if the EECs are in the normal mode.
If terrain contact is imminent, advance thrust levers full forward.
**Do not exceed the Pitch Limit Indication

Aft control column force increases as the airspeed decreases. In all cases, the pitch attitude that results in
intermittent stick shaker or initial buffet is the upper pitch attitude limit. Flight at intermittent stick shaker may
be needed to obtain a positive terrain separation. Use smooth, steady controls to avoid a pitch attitude overshoot
and stall.
Return to Normal Flight

After windshear is cleared, the aircraft will be in a situation with high thrust and increasing performance capability.
Evidence from training shows that the recovery from this situation is very challenging and careful consideration
should be given to a transition back onto the takeoff profile or into the go around depending on the stage of flight
in which the windshear was encountered.
Once clear of windshear after takeoff, a return to the SID should be made as promptly as possible. One problem
that can be encountered is that with the high thrust setting from the windshear escape manoeuvre combined
with an increasing headwind component, an excessive pitch attitude might be commanded by the FD’s in order
to achieve the commanded speed of V2 on the MCP. In order to avoid this, takeoff thrust should be set, which
will lead to a reduction in thrust, combined with a maximum of 20 degree’s pitch attitude. Once the aircraft has
stabilised the normal callouts for the departure should be continued with focus on the gear, roll mode and the
bug up call. Once the bug up call is made the FD’s should then give sensible pitch command information.
Once clear of windshear on an approach, a transition should be made into the go around. Again, a challenge here
is that the aircraft will have a high thrust setting and an increasing headwind component. Therefore, very prompt
action is required in order to avoid a flap overspeed. Once the windshear is clear, a call of “GA, FLAP 15, set GA
thrust” should be made by PF. It is then imperative that flap 15 is promptly set, followed by reducing the thrust
from maximum to the required go around thrust. Further flap retraction will be made as per the standard go
around procedure after 400ft.
Good crew communication and coordination alongside effective task management will be especially important
with managing this manoeuvre and recovery.

Weather Radar
Weather radar can show precipitation in clouds and by relating the strength of the return signal received can
show thunderstorm activity. Airborne weather radar equipment is utilised on board by flight crew members to
provide information with reference to the aircraft flight path and is provided for avoidance of thunderstorms and
not for penetration of areas of storm activity. Negligently penetrating a red zone on a line check is a FAIL item.
The Commander shall have weather radar selected for take-off, climb, cruise and descent/approach in IMC and
at night. Permission should be requested from ATC to detour around thunderstorm activity, preferably to
windward rather than leeward. If the thunderstorm activity appears to be exceptionally severe and there is no
apparent path through or around the storm area/line, then consideration should be given to diverting the flight.
Because storm cells build and dissipate rapidly, flying between two close echoes within the same storm area must
not be attempted. Recommended avoidance distances from storm cell are given above but it should be noted
that airborne radar can and should be backed up where possible by visual sighting.
The type of radar fitted to the Ryanair fleet of Boeing 737-800s is the Bendix RDR – 4A/B and it operates in the C
band frequency. Each aircraft is fitted with one weather radar and the Minimum Equipment List (MEL) classes it
as a Category C item (10 days to repair). The number required for dispatch is zero provided the airplane is not
operated at night or in instrument meteorological conditions in areas of where thunderstorm or other potentially
hazardous weather conditions, detectable with the weather radar system may be expected to exist along the
route (MEL 34 Navigation 15 page 34-2 & DDPG 34-15 &Air Operations, CAT.IDE.A.160).
Detection
The weather radar system detects and locates various types of precipitation bearing clouds along the flight path
of the aeroplane and gives the pilot a visual indication in colour of the clouds intensity. The radar antenna sweeps
a forward arc of 180 degrees. Weather radar detects droplets of precipitation size. The strength of the return
signal (echo) depends on drop size and number. NB. the greater the water concentration, the stronger the echo.
Drop size determines echo intensity to a much greater extent than number of drops. Hailstones usually are
covered with a film of water and therefore act as large water droplets giving the strongest of all echoes. Water
concentration is greatest within the updrafts and downdrafts of a thunderstorm cell which thus shows up as an
area of higher echo intensity. These weather radar returns will be displayed in MAP, MAP CTR, VOR and APP. The
radar returns are presented in four colours representing different levels of precipitation or reflectivity:
MAGENTA Turbulence horizontal flow precipitation with velocities of 5 or more metres per second
RED Most intense area high density precipitation
AMBER Less intensity low density precipitation
GREEN Lowest intensity light precipitation
The most intense contouring echo should be considered as severe thunderstorms which by inference have the
potential to contain severe turbulence. Hazardous turbulence may extend as much as 20 miles from the echo
edge.
Range and Tilt

Initially and periodically select the longest range to detect thunderstorm activity as far ahead as possible and allow
timely circumnavigation around large storm areas or frontal lines of storms. Echo returns from a long distance
ahead particularly if they are seen to contour at these distances are indicative of severe storms.

Shorter ranges are selected to get a better larger scale picture of individual storm and cell activity on the radar
screen. The return signal suffers less attenuation at medium and shorter ranges so that storm activity not visible
on the radar at the longest ranges may well show up as the aircraft gets closer to them.
Use the antenna tilt function to identify the strongest echoes. Interpret this in the context of the aircraft altitude
and phase of flight, whether in the climb out, cruise and descent or intended descent. Adjust the tilt to assess
whether the cell top is above or below the aircraft. This will obviously determine what evasive action must be
taken. Remember the cloud tops will normally exceed the height which gives a return echo.
Where echoes are returned for clouds and cells at high altitude, the potential for turbulence and hail should be
considered as greater than an echo of similar intensity at lower altitude. This is because of the generally lower
liquid water content at higher altitudes and an increasing conversion of water vapour into dry ice crystals. Strong
high altitude echoes must therefore be avoided because of the potential severity of such cells.
Tilt Control
Rotate clockwise – antenna tilts up to selected degrees above horizon max 15°.
Rotate counter clockwise – antenna tilts down to selected degrees below the horizon max -15°.
Take off & Landings

Below FL100 4 - 5° up tilt
Climb
Gradually decrease the tilt from 4-5 degrees after take-off. The tilt is controlled by the aircraft Inertial Referencing
Unit with reference to the horizon and not the axis of the a/c, therefore the FPV will give a good indication of
what tilt is to be used.
Cruise Altitudes: FL100 – FL350

0° or slightly down until a small amount of ground return appears. Generally, the tilt should be adjusted so that
ground returns are barely visible at the outer edge of the screen.
Cruise Altitudes: Above FL350

1° - 2° down tilt.
Descent
Increase the Tilt up by approximately one (1) degree per 10000ft of descent down to 15000ft. After the aircraft
has descended through 15000 feet, the weather radar should be tilted up at an increased rate of approximately
one (1) degree per 5000ft in order to reduce ground returns. The weather radar should be at approximately 4-5
degrees up for final approach and landing. Use the Range as necessary to scan the arrival route during the descent.
Weather radar will also show ground returns which can confuse the picture on the screen. These should be
screened out by careful adjustment of the tilt control which will vary with change in aircraft altitude.
While the radar antenna is stabilised in pitch, the radar picture is affected while the aircraft is turning. Weather
radar echoes do not differentiate between heavy rain precipitation and hail and although echoes which have
“scalloped' edges or “hooked” fingers are reported to be indicative of hail this does require skilled interpretation
and reinforces the need to adopt a conservative approach with avoidance distances.

Wheel Well Fire
Reference FCTM – Chapter 8 – Wheel Weill Fire

There is a common misconception amongst crews that wheel well fire warnings are caused solely by overheated
brakes. Overheated brakes can contribute to wheel well fires if they become hot enough to ignite the tires,
hydraulic fluid or other flammable substances.
However, Boeing engineering analysis of the fire detection system indicates that the brakes alone cannot generate
enough heat to trigger the fire detector system.
Experience has shown that in most cases, extending the gear to cool the brakes as well as the wheel well area
produced good results in coping with wheel well fires. However, there have been incidents where extending the
gear did not resolve the problem.
Example
An incident where the electrical lead to a hydraulic pump in the wheel well shorted and burned a small hole
through the hydraulic pressure line and ignited the spraying hydraulic fluid. After the gear was extended, the fire
warning light extinguished but the fluid from the ruptured line continued to burn. In this incident flames actually
reached the cabin floor area.
Incidents like this are very rare but cannot be disregarded.
The wheel well fire NNC require the crew to land at nearest suitable airport regardless of whether or not the wheel
well fire warning extinguishes.
Wheel well fires should be treated with the same serious consideration as other fire indications. A MAYDAY call
to ATC is the appropriate declaration of emergency.
If the wheel well fire warning extinguishes it does not guarantee that the fire is extinguished. It is difficult or
impossible to know the extent of the damage to the wheel well or landing gear. Crews should treat a wheel well
fire warning with the same respect as any other fire warning; land at the nearest suitable airport and if conditions
permit, leave the landing gear extended while enroute to that airport.
FCTM Guidance
Prompt execution of the Wheel Well Fire NNC following a wheel well fire warning is important for timely gear
extension. Landing gear speed limitations should be observed during this checklist.
Note: To avoid unintended deceleration below the new target airspeed, the autothrottle should remain engaged.
If airspeed is above 270 knots/.82 Mach, the airspeed must be reduced before extending the landing gear. Either
of the following techniques results in the autothrottle reverting to the SPD mode and provides a more rapid speed
reduction than using VNAV speed intervention or LVL CHG.
• select altitude hold and set approximately 250 knots
• for airplanes equipped with speed intervention, set the MCP altitude to a desired level off altitude and use
speed intervention to reduce airspeed.
Note: Additionally, the thrust levers may be reduced to idle and/or the speedbrakes may be used to expedite
deceleration.
If the pitch mode is VNAV and the crew wishes to remain in that mode, select speed intervention (as installed) to
open the MCP command speed window and then set approximately 250 knots. If the pitch mode is LVL CHG and
the crew wishes to remain in that mode, simply set approximately 250 knots. These techniques do not result in
as rapid a speed reduction as reverting to the SPD mode, but allows the crew to remain in the pitch mode in use.
Wing Body Overheat
Objectives
• Correct recognition of condition (MCWS)
• Understanding of system, implications of failure and considerations.
Description
A pneumatic leak in the wing leading edge (loose pneumatic duct clamp in the wing leading edge).
Flight Deck Effects

• WING-BODY OVERHEAT light illuminates
• MASTER CAUTION lights illuminate
• AIR COND annunciator illuminates
• Duct pressure indicator decreases
• Failure is reset within 60s when the affected manifold duct is isolated and depressurized
A Wing Body Overheat is condition is caused by a leak in the bleed air duct. It is considered a serious condition
that requires the bleed air duct on the associated side of the bleed system to be isolated.
A wing body overheat is sensed by overheat sensors on the left and right bleed air ducts.
Sensors are located at regular intervals along each duct.
The left hand duct includes sensors located at:

• Left Engine Strut
• Left Inboard Wing Leading Edge
• Left Hand Air-Conditioning Bay
• Keel Beam
• Bleed Duct From APU
The right hand duct includes sensors located at:

• Right Engine Strut
• Right Inboard Wing Leading Edge
• Right Hand Air-conditioning Bay
The warning light for the wing body overheat will remain illuminated as long as the temperature at the sensor
location remains above a set limit. Once a duct is isolated it may take some minutes for the sensor to cool to a
level below limits and for the light to extinguish. When the light extinguishes the duct will remain isolated or the
condition will simply return.
Caution
Any time a duct is isolated the crew must be monitor the pressurisation panel for correct indications, especially
during thrust reduction for descent. Increased thrust may be required to maintain pressurisation.

Icing conditions where wing anti ice is required must be avoided to prevent possible asymmetrical ice build-up on
the wings. Engine anti-ice remains unaffected.
Refer to the QRH Wing Body Overheat Checklist.

25 Minute Turnaround

Piston to Jet Aircraft Transition
Engine Thrust To Thrust Lever Relationship

The jet engine is most efficient at high RPM, where the engine is designed to be operated most of the time, and
much more thrust is produced per increment of throttle movement near the top of the range than near the
bottom.
One thing that will seem different to the piston pilot transitioning into jet powered airplanes is the rather large
amount of thrust lever movement between the flight idle position and full power as compared to the small
amount of movement of the throttle in the piston engine. Because of this, in a situation where significantly more
thrust is needed and the jet engine is at low r.p.m., it will not do much good to merely “inch the thrust lever
forward.” Substantial thrust lever movement is in order. This is not to say that rough or abrupt thrust lever action
is standard operating procedure. If the power setting is already high, it may take only a small amount of
movement.
There are two characteristics of the jet engine that work against the normal habits of the piston engine pilot.
One is the variation of thrust with r.p.m., and the other is the relatively slow acceleration of the jet engine.
Variation of Thrust with Rpm

Whereas piston engines normally operate in the range of 40% to 75% of available r.p.m. Jets operate most
efficiently in the 85% to 100% range, with a flight idle r.p.m. of 30% to 40%.
Slow Acceleration of The Jet Engine

Acceleration of the piston engine from idle to full power is relatively rapid, whereas the acceleration of jet engines
is usually much slower.
If a jet engine is operating at approach r.p.m. and there is a sudden requirement for increased thrust, the jet
engine will respond immediately and full thrust can be achieved in about 2 seconds.
However, at a low r.p.m, with sudden full power application engine acceleration is initially very slow, but changes
to very fast after about 78% r.p.m. is reached. Total time to accelerate from idle r.p.m. to full power may take as
much as 8 seconds.
For this reason, most jets are operated at a relatively high r.p.m. during the final approach to landing or at any
other time that immediate power may be needed.
Absence of Propeller Slipstream

A propeller accelerates a large mass of air rearwards, and much of this air passes over a large area of the wing. By
increasing or decreasing the speed of the engine, therefore, it is possible to increase or decrease the total lift on
the wing without changing airspeed.
On the other hand, air accelerated from a jet engine does not pass over the wings. There is, therefore, no lift
bonus at increased power at constant airspeed, and no significant lowering of power-on stall speed.
In not having propellers, the jet powered airplane is minus two assets.
• It is not possible to produce increased lift instantly by simply increasing power.

• It is not possible to lower stall speed by simply increasing power. The 10-knot margin (roughly the difference
between power-off and power-on stall speed on a propeller driven airplane for a given configuration) is lost.
Add the poor acceleration response of the jet engine and it becomes apparent that there are three ways in which
the jet pilot is worse off than the propeller pilot.
For these reasons, there is a marked difference between the approach qualities of a piston engine airplane and a
jet.
In a jet there is little room for error. If an increasing sink rate develops in a jet, the pilot must remember two
points in the proper sequence.
1. Increased lift can be gained only by accelerating airflow over the wings, and this can be accomplished only by
accelerating the entire airplane.
2. The airplane can be accelerated, assuming altitude loss cannot be afforded, only by a rapid increase in thrust,
and here, the slow acceleration of the jet engine (possibly up to 8 seconds) becomes a factor.
Salvaging an increasing sink rate on an approach in a jet can be a very difficult manoeuvre. The lack of ability to
produce instant lift in the jet, along with the slow acceleration of the engine, necessitates a “stabilized approach”
to a landing where full landing configuration, constant airspeed, controlled rate of descent, and relatively high
power settings are maintained until over the threshold of the runway. This allows for almost immediate response
from the engine in making minor changes in the approach speed or rate of descent and makes it possible to
initiate an immediate go-around or missed approach if necessary.
Absence of Propeller Drag

When the throttles are closed on a piston powered airplane, the propellers create a vast amount of drag, and
airspeed is immediately decreased or altitude lost. The effect of reducing power to idle on the jet engine, however,
produces no such drag effect. In fact, at an idle power setting, the jet engine still produces forward thrust.
The lack of propeller drag, along with the aerodynamically clean airframe of the jet, are new to most pilots, and
slowing the airplane down is one of the initial problems encountered by pilots transitioning into jets.
Speed Margins
Maximum speeds in jet airplanes are expressed differently, and always define the maximum operating speed of
the airplane which is comparable to the VNE of the piston airplane. These maximum speeds in a jet airplane are
referred to as:
• VMO—Maximum operating speed expressed in terms of knots
• MMO—Maximum operating speed expressed in terms of a decimal of Mach speed
Drag Devices
To the pilot transitioning into jet airplanes, going faster is seldom a problem. It is getting the airplane to slow
down that seems to cause the most difficulty. This is because of the extremely clean aerodynamic design and fast
momentum of the jet airplane, and also because the jet lacks the propeller drag effects that the pilot has been
accustomed to. Additionally, even with the power reduced to flight idle, the jet engine still produces thrust, and
deceleration of the jet airplane is a slow process. Jet airplanes have a glide performance that is double that of
piston powered airplanes, and jet pilots often cannot comply with an air traffic control request to go down and
slow down at the same time. Therefore, jet airplanes are equipped with drag devices such as spoilers and speed
brakes.

The primary purpose of spoilers is to spoil lift. When deployed, spoilers deflect up against the relative wind, which
interferes with the flow of air about the wing. This both spoils lift and increases drag.
Deploying spoilers results in a substantial sink rate with little decay in airspeed. Some airplanes will exhibit a nose
up pitch tendency when the spoilers are deployed, which the pilot must anticipate. When spoilers are deployed
on landing, most of the wing’s lift is destroyed. This action transfers the airplane’s weight to the landing gear so
that the wheel brakes are more effective. Another beneficial effect of deploying spoilers on landing is that they
create considerable drag, adding to the overall aerodynamic braking. The real value of spoilers on landing,
however, is creating the best circumstances for using wheel brakes.
The primary purpose of speed brakes is to produce drag. Speed brakes are found in many sizes, shapes, and
locations on different airplanes, but they all have the same purpose—to assist in rapid deceleration.
Deploying speed brakes results in a rapid decrease in airspeed. Typically, speed brakes can be deployed at any
time during flight in order to help control airspeed, but they are most often used only when a rapid deceleration
must be accomplished to slow down to landing gear and flap speeds. There is usually a certain amount of noise
and buffeting associated with the use of speed brakes, along with an obvious penalty in fuel consumption.
Use of speedbrakes between the down detent and flight detent can result in rapid roll rates and normally
should be avoided. While using the speedbrakes in descent, allow sufficient altitude and airspeed margin to
level off smoothly. Lower the speedbrakes before adding thrust.
Thrust Reversers
Jet airplanes have high kinetic energy during the landing roll because of weight and speed. This energy is difficult
to dissipate because a jet airplane has low drag with the nose wheel on the ground and the engines continue to
produce forward thrust with the thrust levers at idle. While wheel brakes normally can cope, there is an obvious
need for another speed retarding method. This need is satisfied by the drag provided by reverse thrust.
On most installations, reverse thrust is obtained with the thrust lever at idle, by pulling up the reverse lever to a
detent. Doing so positions the reversing mechanisms for operation but leaves the engine at idle r.p.m. Further
upward and backward movement of the reverse lever increases engine power. Reverse is cancelled by closing the
reverse lever to the idle reverse position, then dropping it fully back to the forward idle position.
Reverse thrust is much more effective at high airplane speed than at low airplane speeds. To get maximum
efficiency from reverse thrust it should be used as soon as is prudent after touchdown.
Pilot Sensations in Jet Flying

There are usually three general sensations that the pilot transitioning into jets will immediately become aware of.
These are: inertial response differences, increased control sensitivity, and a much increased tempo of flight.
The varying of power settings from flight idle to full takeoff power has a much slower effect on the change of
airspeed in the jet airplane. This is commonly called lead and lag, and is as much a result of the extremely clean
aerodynamic design of the airplane as it is the slower response of the engine.
The lack of propeller effect is also responsible for the lower drag increment at the reduced power settings and
results in other changes that the pilot will have to become accustomed to. These include the lack of effective
slipstream over the lifting surfaces and control surfaces, and lack of propeller torque effect.

Proper power management is one of the initial problem areas encountered by the pilot transitioning into jet
airplanes. Although smooth power applications are still the rule, the pilot will be aware that a greater physical
movement of the power levers is required as compared to throttle movement in the piston engines. The pilot will
also have to learn to anticipate and lead the power changes more than in the past and must keep in mind that
the last 30 percent of engine r.p.m. represents the majority of the engine thrust, and below that the application
of power has very little effect. In slowing the airplane, power reduction must be made sooner because there is no
longer any propeller drag and the pilot should anticipate the need for drag devices.
Control sensitivity will differ between various airplanes, but in all cases, the pilot will find that they are more
sensitive to any change in control displacement, particularly pitch control, than are the conventional propeller
airplanes. Because of the higher speeds flown, the control surfaces are more effective and a variation of just a
few degrees in pitch attitude in a jet can result in over twice the rate of altitude change that would be experienced
in a slower airplane. The sensitive pitch control in jet airplanes is one of the first flight differences that the pilot
will notice. Invariably the pilot will have a tendency to over-control pitch during initial training flights.
The importance of accurate and smooth control cannot be overemphasized, however, and it is one of the first
techniques the transitioning pilot must master.
The pilot of a swept wing jet airplane will soon become adjusted to the fact that it is necessary and normal to fly
at higher angles of attack. It is not unusual to have about 3°-5° of nose up pitch on an approach to a landing.
The higher pitch angle on takeoff, which may be as high as 15°-18°, will also take some getting used to.
The greater variation of pitch attitudes flown in a jet airplane are a result of the greater thrust available and the
flight characteristics of the low aspect ratio and sweptwing. Flight at the higher pitch attitudes requires a greater
reliance on the flight instruments for airplane control since there is not much in the way of a useful horizon or
other outside reference to be seen. Because of the high rates of climb and descent, high airspeeds, high altitudes
and variety of attitudes flown, the jet airplane can only be precisely flown by applying proficient instrument flight
techniques. Proficiency in attitude instrument flying, therefore, is essential to successful transition to jet airplane
flying.
Most jet airplanes are equipped with a thumb operated pitch trim button on the control wheel which the pilot
must become familiar with as soon as possible. The jet airplane will differ regarding pitch tendencies with the
lowering of flaps, landing gear, and drag devices. With experience, the jet airplane pilot will learn to anticipate
the amount of pitch change required for a particular operation. The usual method of operating the trim button is
to apply several small, intermittent applications of trim in the direction desired rather than holding the trim button
for longer periods of time which can lead to over-controlling.
Jet Airplane Takeoff and Climb
V-Speeds
The following are speeds that will affect the jet airplane’s takeoff performance. The jet airplane pilot must be
thoroughly familiar with each of these speeds and how they are used in the planning of the takeoff.
• VS —Stall speed
• V1 —Takeoff decision speed. Engine failure below this speed should result in an aborted takeoff; above this
speed the takeoff run should be continued
• VR —Speed at which the rotation of the airplane is initiated to takeoff attitude
• VLOF —The speed at which the airplane first becomes airborne – lift-off

• V2—The takeoff safety speed which must be attained at the 35-foot height at the end of the required runway
distance. This is essentially the best single-engine angle of climb speed for the airplane and should be held
until clearing obstacles after takeoff, or at least 400 feet above the ground
Pre-Takeoff Procedures
Takeoff data, including V1/VR and V2 speeds, takeoff power settings, and required field length should be
computed prior to each takeoff and recorded on a takeoff data card. These data will be based on airplane weight,
runway length available, runway gradient, temperature, QNH, wind, icing conditions and runway condition.
A Captain’s briefing is an essential part of Crew Resource Management (CRM) procedures and should be
accomplished just prior to takeoff. The Captain’s briefing is an opportunity to review crew coordination
procedures for takeoff, which is always the most critical portion of a flight.
The takeoff and climb-out should be accomplished in accordance with a standard takeoff and departure profile.
Initiating Takeoff Roll

Autothrottle and flight director use is recommended for all takeoff’s. However, do not follow F/D commands until
after liftoff.
A rolling takeoff procedure is recommended for setting takeoff thrust. It expedites the takeoff and reduces the
risk of foreign object damage or engine surge/stall due to a tailwind or crosswind. Flight test and analysis prove
that the change in takeoff roll distance due to the rolling takeoff procedure is negligible when compared to a
standing takeoff.
Rolling takeoff’s are accomplished in two ways:

• if cleared for takeoff before or while entering the runway, maintain normal taxi speed. When the
airplane is aligned with the runway centreline ensure the nose wheel steering wheel is released and
apply takeoff thrust by advancing the thrust levers to just above idle (40%N1). Allow the engines to
stabilize momentarily then promptly advance the thrust levers to takeoff thrust (autothrottle TO/GA).
There is no need to stop the airplane before increasing thrust.
• if holding in position on the runway, ensure the nose wheel steering wheel is released, release brakes,
then apply takeoff thrust as described above.
A standing takeoff procedure may be accomplished by holding the brakes until the engines are stabilized, ensure
the nose wheel steering wheel is released, then release the brakes and promptly advance the thrust levers to
takeoff thrust (autothrottle TO/GA). Allowing the engines to stabilize provides uniform engine acceleration to
takeoff thrust and minimizes directional control problems. This is particularly important if crosswinds exist or the
runway surface is slippery. The exact initial setting is not as important as setting symmetrical thrust. If thrust is to
be set manually, smoothly advance thrust levers toward takeoff thrust. Note: Allowing the engines to stabilize for
more than approximately 2 seconds before advancing thrust levers to takeoff thrust may adversely affect
takeoff distance.
Ensure the target N1 is set by 60 knots. Minor increases in thrust may be made immediately after 60 knots to
reach the target N1. After takeoff thrust is set, a small deviation in N1 between the engines should not warrant a
decision to reject the takeoff unless this deviation is accompanied by a more serious event. (Refer to the QRH,
Maneuvers Chapter, Rejected Takeoff, for criteria.) Due to variations in thrust settings, runway conditions, etc., it
is not practical to specify a precise tolerance for N1 deviation between the engines.

Limited circumstances such as inoperative rudder pedal steering may require the use of the nose wheel steering
wheel at low speeds during takeoff when the rudder is not effective. Reference the airplane Dispatch Deviations
Guide (DDG) for more information concerning operation with rudder pedal steering inoperative. If an engine
exceedance occurs after thrust is set and the decision is made to continue the takeoff, do not retard the thrust
lever in an attempt to control the exceedance. Retarding the thrust levers after thrust is set invalidates takeoff
performance. When the PF judges that altitude (minimum 400 feet AGL) and airspeed are acceptable, the thrust
lever should be retarded until the exceedance is within limits and the appropriate NNC accomplished.
Light forward pressure is held on the control column. Keep the airplane on centreline with rudder pedal steering
and rudder. The rudder becomes effective between 40 and 60 knots. Maximum nose wheel steering effectiveness
is available when above taxi speeds by using rudder pedal steering. Regardless of which pilot is making the takeoff,
the captain should keep one hand on the thrust levers until V1 in order to respond quickly to a rejected takeoff
condition. After V1, the captain’s hand should be removed from the thrust levers.
The PM should monitor engine instruments and airspeed indications during the takeoff roll and announce any
abnormalities. The PM should announce passing 80knots and the PF should verify that his airspeed indicator is in
agreement.
Rotation and Liftoff – All Engines

Takeoff speeds are established based on minimum control speed, stall speed, and tail clearance margins. Shorter-
bodied airplanes are normally governed by stall speed margin while longer-bodied airplanes are normally limited
by tail clearance margin. When a smooth continuous rotation is initiated at VR, tail clearance margin is assured
because computed takeoff speeds depicted in the PI Chapter of the FCOM, airport analysis, or FMC, are developed
to provide adequate tail clearance.
Above 80 knots, relax the forward control column pressure to the neutral position. For optimum takeoff and initial
climb performance, initiate a smooth continuous rotation at VR toward 15° of pitch attitude. However, takeoff’s
at low thrust setting (low excess energy) will result in a lower initial pitch attitude target to achieve the desired
climb speed. The use of stabilizer trim during rotation is not recommended. After liftoff, use the attitude indicator
as the primary pitch reference. The flight director, in conjunction with indicated airspeed and other flight
instruments is used to maintain the proper vertical flight path. Note: The flight director pitch command is not
used for rotation.
With a consistent rotation technique, where the pilot uses approximately equal control forces and similar visual
cues, the resultant rotation rate differs slightly depending upon airplane body length. Note: Do not adjust takeoff
speeds or control forces to compensate for increased body length.
Using the technique above, resultant rotation rates vary from 2° to 3° per second with rates being lowest on
longer airplanes. Liftoff attitude is achieved in approximately 3 to 4 seconds depending on airplane weight and
thrust setting.
Retract the landing gear after a positive rate of climb is indicated on the altimeter. Retract flaps in accordance
with the technique described in this chapter.
Note: When operating at low gross weights, takeoff with less than full rated thrust will aid in aircraft directional
control in the event of an engine failure. The rotation should be accomplished at the normal rate, but the pitch
attitudes during the transition to initial climb may be higher than normal.

Initial Climb - All Engines

After liftoff, use the attitude indicator as the primary pitch reference. The flight director, in conjunction with
indicated airspeed and other flight instruments is used to maintain the proper vertical flight path. Pitch, airspeed,
and airspeed trends must be crosschecked whether the flight director is used or not. After liftoff, the flight director
commands pitch to maintain an airspeed of V2 +20 knots until another pitch mode is engaged.
V2 + 20 knots is the optimum climb speed with takeoff flaps. It results in the maximum altitude gain in the shortest
distance from takeoff. Acceleration to higher speeds reduces the altitude gain. If airspeed exceeds V2 + 20 knots
during the initial climb, stop the acceleration but do not attempt to reduce airspeed to V2+ 20 knots. Any speed
between V2 + 15 and V2 + 25 knots results in approximately the same takeoff profile. Crosscheck indicated
airspeed for proper initial climb speed.
Retract the landing gear after a positive rate of climb is indicated on the altimeter. Do not apply brakes after
becoming airborne. Automatic wheel braking occurs during gear retraction. After gear and flaps are retracted,
the PM should verify that the gear and flap indications are normal.
Jet Airplane Approach and Landing Requirements
Landing Speeds
As in the takeoff planning, there are certain speeds that must be taken into consideration during any landing in a
jet airplane. The speeds are as follows.
• VSO—Stall speed in the landing configuration.

• VREF—1.3 times the stall speed in the landing configuration.
• Approach climb — The speed which guarantees adequate performance in a go-around situation with an
inoperative engine. The airplane’s weight must be limited so that a twin-engine airplane will have a 2.1 per
cent climb gradient capability. These criteria are based on an airplane configured with approach flaps, landing
gear up, and takeoff thrust available from the operative engine.
The approach and landing sequence in a jet airplane should be accomplished in accordance with an approach and
landing profile developed for the particular airplane.
Significant Differences
A safe approach in any type of airplane culminates in a particular position, speed, and height over the runway
threshold. That final flight condition is the target window at which the entire approach aims. Propeller powered
airplanes are able to approach that target from wider angles, greater speed differentials, and a larger variety of
glidepath angles. Jet airplanes are not as responsive to power and course corrections, so the final approach must
be more stable, more deliberate, more constant, in order to reach the window accurately.
The transitioning pilot must understand that, in spite of their impressive performance capabilities, there are six
ways in which a jet airplane is worse than a piston engine airplane in making an approach and in correcting errors
on the approach.
• The absence of the propeller slipstream in producing immediate extra lift at constant airspeed.
There is no such thing as salvaging a misjudged glidepath with a sudden burst of immediately available power.
Added lift can only be achieved by accelerating the airframe. Not only must the pilot wait for added power but
even when the engines do respond, added lift will only be available when the airframe has responded with speed.
• The absence of the propeller slipstream in significantly lowering the power-on stall speed.
There is virtually no difference between power-on and power-off stall speed. It is not possible in a jet airplane to
jam the thrust levers forward to avoid a stall.
• Poor acceleration response in a jet engine from low r.p.m.

This characteristic requires that the approach be flown in a high drag/high power configuration so that sufficient
power will be available quickly if needed.
• The increased momentum of the jet airplane making sudden changes in the flight path impossible.
Jet airplanes are consistently heavier than comparable sized propeller airplanes. The jet airplane, therefore, will
require more indicated airspeed during the final approach due to a wing design that is optimized for higher
speeds.
These two factors combine to produce higher momentum for the jet airplane. Since force is required to overcome
momentum for speed changes or course corrections, the jet will be far less responsive than the propeller airplane
and require careful planning and stable conditions throughout the approach.
• The lack of good speed stability being an inducement to a low speed condition.
The drag curve for many jet airplanes is much flatter than for propeller airplanes, so speed changes do not produce
nearly as much drag change. Further, jet thrust remains nearly constant with small speed changes. The result is
far less speed stability. When the speed does increase or decrease, there is little tendency for the jet airplane to
re-acquire the original speed. The pilot must therefore remain alert to the necessity of making speed adjustments.
• Drag increasing faster than lift producing a high sink rate at low speeds.
Jet airplane wings typically have a large increase in drag in the approach configuration. When a sink rate does
develop, the only immediate remedy is to increase pitch attitude (angle of attack). Drag increases faster than lift,
that pitch change will rapidly contribute to an even greater sink rate unless thrust is applied.
These flying characteristics of jet airplanes make a stabilized approach an absolute necessity.
Recommended Elements of a Stabilized Approach

The following recommendations are consistent with criteria developed by the Flight Safety Foundation.
All approaches should be stabilized by 1,000 feet AFE in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) and by 500
feet AFE in visual meteorological conditions (VMC). An approach is considered stabilized when all of the following
criteria are met:
• the airplane is on the correct flight path
• only small changes in heading and pitch are required to maintain the correct flight path
• the airplane should be at approach speed. Deviations of +10 knots to – 5knots are acceptable if the
airspeed is trending toward approach speed
• the airplane is in the correct landing configuration
• sink rate is no greater than 1,000 fpm; if an approach requires a sink rate greater than 1,000 fpm, a
special briefing should be conducted
• thrust setting is appropriate for the airplane configuration
• all briefings and checklists have been conducted.
Specific types of approaches are stabilized if they also fulfil the following:
• ILS and GLS approaches should be flown within one dot of the glideslope and localizer, or within the
expanded localizer scale

• during a circling approach, wings should be level on final when the airplane reaches 300 feet AFE.
Unique approach procedures or abnormal conditions requiring a deviation from the above elements of a stabilized
approach require a special briefing.
Note: An approach that becomes unstabilised below 1,000 feet AFE in IMC or below 500 feet AFE in VMC requires
an immediate go-around. These conditions should be maintained throughout the rest of the approach for it to be
considered a stabilized approach. If the above criteria cannot be established and maintained until approaching
the flare, initiate a go-around.
As the airplane crosses the runway threshold it should be:

• stabilized on approach airspeed until arresting descent rate at flare
• on a stabilized flight path using normal maneuvering
• positioned to make a normal landing in the touchdown zone
Initiate a go-around if the above criteria cannot be maintained.
Approach Speed
On final approach, the airspeed is controlled with thrust. With experience the pilot will be able to detect the very
first tendency of an increasing or decreasing airspeed trend, which normally can be corrected with a small
adjustment in thrust. The pilot must be attentive to poor speed stability leading to a low speed condition with its
attendant risk of high drag increasing the sink rate. If an increasing sink rate is detected, it must be countered by
increasing the angle of attack and simultaneously increasing thrust to counter the extra drag. The degree of
correction required will depend on how much the sink rate needs to be reduced. For small amounts, smooth and
gentle, almost anticipatory corrections will be sufficient.
A common error in the performance of approaches in jet airplanes is excess approach speed. Excess approach
speed carried through the threshold window and onto the runway will increase the minimum stopping distance
required by 20 – 30 feet per knot of excess speed for a dry runway and 40 – 50 feet for a wet runway. Worse yet,
the excess speed will increase the chances of an extended flare, which will increase the distance to touchdown
by approximately 250 feet for each excess knot in speed.
The pilot must anticipate the need for speed adjustment so that only small adjustments are required. It is essential
that the airplane arrive at the approach threshold window exactly on speed.
Glidepath Control
On final approach, at a constant airspeed, the rate of descent is controlled with elevator. The optimum glidepath
angle is 2.5° to 3° whether or not an electronic glidepath reference is being used. On visual approaches, pilots
may have a tendency to make flat approaches. A flat approach, however, will increase landing distance and should
be avoided. For example, an approach angle of 2° instead of a recommended 3° will add 500 feet to landing
distance.
A more common error is excessive height over the threshold. This could be the result of an unstable approach, or
a stable but high approach. It also may occur during an instrument approach where the missed approach point is
close to or at the runway threshold. Regardless of the cause, excessive height over the threshold will most likely
result in a touchdown beyond the normal aiming point. An extra 50 feet of height over the threshold will add
approximately 1,000 feet to the landing distance. It is essential that the airplane arrive at the approach threshold
window exactly on altitude (50 feet above the runway).

Flare and Touchdown

The techniques discussed here are applicable to all landings including one engine inoperative landings, crosswind
landings and landings on slippery runways.
Unless an unexpected or sudden event occurs, such as windshear or collision avoidance situation, it is not
appropriate to use sudden, violent or abrupt control inputs during landing. Begin with a stabilized approach on
speed, in trim and on glide path.
Note: When a manual landing is planned from an approach with the autopilot connected, the transition to manual
flight should be planned early enough to allow the pilot time to establish airplane control before beginning the
flare. The PF should consider disengaging the autopilot and disconnecting the autothrottle 1 to 2 nm before the
threshold, or approximately 300 to 600feet above field elevation.
When the threshold passes under the airplane nose and out of sight, shift the visual sighting point to the far end
of the runway. Shifting the visual sighting point assists in controlling the pitch attitude during the flare.
Maintaining a constant airspeed and descent rate assists in determining the flare point. Initiate the flare when
the main gear is approximately 20 feet above the runway by increasing pitch attitude approximately 2° - 3°. This
slows the rate of descent.
After the flare is initiated, smoothly retard the thrust levers to idle, and make small pitch attitude adjustments to
maintain the desired descent rate to the runway. A smooth thrust reduction to idle also assists in controlling the
natural nose-down pitch change associated with thrust reduction. Hold sufficient back pressure on the control
column to keep the pitch attitude constant. A touchdown attitude is normal with an airspeed of approximately
VREF plus any gust correction. Ideally, main gear touchdown should occur simultaneously with thrust levers
reaching idle.
Avoid rapid control column movements during the flare. If the flare is too abrupt and thrust is excessive near
touchdown, the airplane tends to float in ground effect. Do not allow the airplane to float or attempt to hold it
off. Fly the airplane onto the runway at the desired touchdown point and at the desired airspeed.
Note: Do not trim during the flare. Trimming in the flare increases the possibility of a tail strike.
Prolonged flare increases airplane pitch attitude 2° to 3°. When prolonged flare is coupled with a misjudged height
above the runway, a tail strike is possible. Do not prolong the flare in an attempt to achieve a perfectly smooth
touchdown. A smooth touchdown is not the criterion for a safe landing. Typically, the pitch attitude increases
slightly during the actual landing, but avoid over-rotating. Do not increase the pitch attitude, trim, or hold the
nose wheel off the runway after landing. This could lead to a tail strike.
Landing Roll
Landing Roll Avoid touching down with thrust above idle since this may establish an airplane nose up pitch
tendency and increase landing roll.
After main gear touchdown, initiate the landing roll procedure. If the speedbrakes do not extend automatically
move the speedbrake lever to the UP position without delay. Fly the nose wheels smoothly onto the runway
without delay. Control column movement forward of neutral should not be required. Do not attempt to hold the
nose wheels off the runway. Holding the nose up after touchdown for aerodynamic braking is not an effective
braking technique and results in high nose gear sink rates upon brake application and reduced braking

effectiveness. To avoid possible airplane structural damage, do not make large nose down control column
movements before the nose wheels are lowered to the runway.
To avoid the risk of a tail strike, do not allow the pitch attitude to increase after touchdown. However, applying
excessive nose down elevator during landing can result in substantial forward fuselage damage. Do not use full
down elevator. Use an appropriate autobrake setting or manually apply wheel brakes smoothly with steadily
increasing pedal pressure as required for runway condition and runway length available. Maintain deceleration
rate with constant or increasing brake pressure as required until stopped or desired taxi speed is reached.
Speedbrakes
The speedbrakes can be fully raised after touchdown while the nose wheels are lowered to the runway, with no
adverse pitch effects. The speedbrakes spoil the lift from the wings, which places the airplane weight on the main
landing gear providing excellent brake effectiveness.
Unless speedbrakes are raised after touchdown, braking effectiveness may be reduced initially as much as 60%,
since very little weight is on the wheels and brake application may cause rapid antiskid modulation. Normally,
speedbrakes are armed to extend automatically. Both pilots should monitor speedbrake extension after
touchdown. In the event auto extension fails, the speedbrakes should be manually extended immediately.
Pilot awareness of the position of the speedbrake lever during the landing phase is important in the prevention
of over-run. The position of the speedbrakes should be announced during the landing phase by the PM. This
improves the crew’s situation awareness of the position of the spoilers during landing and builds good habit
patterns which can prevent failure to observe a malfunctioned or disarmed spoiler system.
Directional Control and Braking during Landing Roll

If the nose wheels are not promptly lowered to the runway, braking and steering capabilities are significantly
degraded and no drag benefit is gained. Rudder control is effective to approximately 60 knots. Rudder pedal
steering is sufficient for maintaining directional control during the rollout. Do not use the nose wheel steering
wheel until reaching taxi speed. In a crosswind, displace the control wheel into the wind to maintain wings level
which aids directional control. Perform the landing roll procedure immediately after touchdown. Any delay
markedly increases the stopping distance.
Use a combination of rudder, differential braking, and control wheel input to maintain runway centreline during
strong crosswinds, gusty wind conditions or other situations. Maintain these control input(s) until reaching taxi
speeds. Stopping distance varies with wind conditions and any deviation from recommended approach speeds.

Abbreviations
Abbreviation Definition
A/P Autopilot
A/T Autothrottle
AFDS Auto Flight Director System
ALT HLD Altitude Hold
AOC Air Operators Certificate
APU Auxiliary Power Unit
ATC Air Traffic Control
CDU Computer Display Unit
FCOM Flight Crew Operations Manual
F/D Flight Director
FMA Flight Mode Annunciator
FMC Flight Management Computer
FMS Flight Management System
FTD Flight Training Device
G/A Go-Around
GPS Global Positioning System
GPWS Ground Proximity Warning System
HDG SEL Heading Select
IRS Inertial Reference System
LHS Left Hand Seat
LNAV Lateral Navigation
LVL CH Level Change
MCC Multi crew co-operation
MCP Mode Control Panel
ND Navigation Display
OAT Outside Air Temperature
OFP Operational Flight Plan
PF Pilot Flying
PFD Primary Flight Display
PM Pilot Monitoring
QRH Quick Reference Handbook
RTOW Regulated Takeoff Weight
SID Standard Instrument Departure
STAR Standard Terminal Arrival Route
V/S Vertical Speed
ZFW Zero Fuel Weight

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Flight Operations Training Department

Simulator Study Guide

SIMULATOR STUDY GUIDE

NOTE: changes are highlighted with red change bars.

Contents 2 Revision Notes

Revision Notes ......................................................................................................................................................... 2

Contents 3 Revision Notes

FMC Failure ........................................................................................................................................................... 80

Contents 5 Revision Notes

Where any conflict arises between this guidance and the

Contents 6 Revision Notes

Ryanair Corporate Safety Strategy

Safety Management System (SMS)

Key Operational Risk Areas (KORA)

Certain elements of these scenarios relate

Contents 7 Revision Notes

Abnormal Flap Operation

FSEU functions include:

Contents 8 Revision Notes

Flap Extension using the Alternate System

Contents 9 Revision Notes

Acceleration to and Deceleration from VMO

Overspeed – Background information (See FCTM Chapter 8 – Overspeed)

Contents 10 Revision Notes

Most LOS occur in:

Contents 11 Revision Notes

Contents 12 Revision Notes

Flight Deck Effects

1. An isolated failure of one airspeed indication

Crew Actions / Considerations:

2. Failure of two or all sources of airspeed information / indications

Crew Actions / Considerations:

Contents 13 Revision Notes

Unreliable Airspeed - Additional Information (Ref FCTM):

Contents 14 Revision Notes

Pitch and Thrust Reference for Airspeed Unreliable

Contents 15 Revision Notes

QRH Checklist Step 7 and 8:

Use of Ground Speed

FL100 280 kts GS

Go-Around or Missed Approach - Airspeed Unreliable (FCTM Guidance)

Contents 17 Revision Notes

The aircraft categories specified in the table below shall be used.

Contents 18 Revision Notes

Approach to Stall Recovery

Approach to Stall or Stall Recovery

Contents 19 Revision Notes

Approach to Stall or Stall Recovery Training

Initial Buffet-Stick Shaker

When is it permitted to clean up and raise gear following a stall?

What is meant by "desired flight path"?

Contents 21 Revision Notes

How much thrust should be used?

Approach to Stall Recovery Exercises

Note: If during the ILS final approach exercises

Contents 22 Revision Notes

Completion of the Recovery:

Approach to Stall or Stall Recovery

All recoveries from approach to stall should be

Note: Do not use flight director commands during the recovery.

Contents 23 Revision Notes

Contents 24 Revision Notes

Contents 25 Revision Notes

Bleed Trip Off