NEW CIVIL CODE

ARTICLE 2- EFFECTIVITY OF LAWS

TANADA v. TUVERA ESCOLIN Facts: Petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to compel public officials to publish and/or cause to publish various PDs

Issue: WoN publication is indispensable

Held: Article 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself
provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various
laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for
the application of the maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a
citizen for the transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of
law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. It is also the
constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter of public concern. The Court declared that presidential issuances of
general application which have not been published have no force and effect.

DE ROY v. CA CORTES Facts:

 The firewall of a burned-out building owned by petitioner, De Roy, collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop of private
respondents, Bernal, Sr., et al., resulting in injuries to their family and death their daughter.
 Petitioners were found guilty of gross negligence and damages were awarded to private respondents.
 Failure to file a motion for reconsideration within the reglementary period

Issue: WoN the rule in the Habaluyas decision is applicable notwithstanding its non-publication in the Official Gazette. YES.

Held: There is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette before they can be binding and as
a condition to their becoming effective. It is the duty of the counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of
the Supreme Court, which are published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions (G.R.’s) and in publications as the
Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.

ARTICLE 3 - IGNORANCE of LAW cf. Article 15, Civil Code and Article 26, Family Code
CARANTO v. CARANTO HERNANDO Question of fact vs. Question of law

A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when
the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the question must not involve an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law
provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question
 posed is one of fact.

Thus, the test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without
reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise it is a question of fact.
ARTICLE 4 — OPERATION of LAWS; Prospective application
CHENG v. SY  NACHURA Facts:
 Cheng filed two(2) estafa cases against spouses Sy for issuing to her 2 checks for P300,000.00 each in payment of their
loan, both of which were dishonored upon presentment for having been drawn against a closed account. DISMISSED for
failure of the prosecution to prove the elements of the crime.
 Petitioner then filed against respondents two(2) cases for violation of BP 22. DISMISSED on account of the failure of
petitioner to identify the accused respondents in open court
 Petitioner filed a civil action for collection for sum of money with damages based on the same loaned amount of
P600,000.00 covered by the two PBC checks previously subject of the estafa and BP 22 cases. DISMISSED for lack of
jurisdiction, ratiocinating that the civil action to collect the amount of P600,000.00 with damages was already impliedly
instituted in the BP Blg 22 cases.

Issue: WoN 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure provision regarding the filing and prosecution of criminal cases under BP Blg. 22
should be given retroactive effect. YES

Held: It is now settled that rules of procedure apply even to cases already pending at the time of their promulgation. The fact that
procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants’ rights does not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. It is
axiomatic that the retroactive application of procedural laws does not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is
adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason is that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor
arise from, procedural laws.

Side note on unjust enrichment: The Court digressed from the rule above and the civil action for collection of sum was reinstated.
This was due to the gross mistake of the prosecutor in the BP Blg. 22 when he failed to appeal the civil action impliedly instituted.

If the loan be proven true, the inability of petitioner to recover the loaned amount would be tantamount to unjust enrichment of
respondents, as they may now conveniently evade payment of their obligation merely on account of a technicality applied against
petitioner. There is unjust enrichment when (1) a person is unjustly benefited, and (2) such benefit is derived at the expense of or
with damages to another. This doctrine simply means that a person shall not be allowed to profit or enrich himself inequitably at
another’s expense. One condition for invoking this principle of unjust enrichment is that the aggrieved party has no other recourse
based on contract, quasi-contract, crime, quasi-delict or any other provision of law.

CAROLINO v. SENGA  PERALTA FACTS: Carolino retired from the AFP in 1976 pursuant to RA 340 and started receiving his pension but was stopped in March 2005.
Presidential Decree No. 1638 was passed whereby it provides that the name of a retiree who loses his Filipino citizenship shall be
removed from the retired list and his retirement benefits terminated upon such loss. He was informed that his loss of Philippine
 citizenship caused the deletion of his name in the list of the AFP pensioners’ payroll effective March 5, 2005.

ISSUE: WoN PD 1638 should be given retroactive effect. NO.

HELD: Under Article 4 of the Civil Code, it is provided that laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. It is
said that law looks to the future only and has no retroactive effect unless the legislator may have formally given that effect to some
legal provisions, that all statutes are to be construed as having only prospective operation, unless the purpose and intention of the
legislature to give retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used; and that every doubt
must be resolved against retrospective effect. These principles also apply to amendments of statutes.

PD No. 1638 does not contain any provision regarding its retroactive application, nor the same may be implied from its language.
In fact, Section 36 of PD No. 1638 clearly provides that the decree shall take effect upon its approval. However, the rule is familiar
that after an act is amended, the original act continues to be in force with regard to all the rights that had accrued prior to its
amendment. Therefore, it cannot be given retroactive effect since it will impair Carolino’s vested right to the benefits that is
protected by the due process clause.

ESTHER ABALOS v. PEOPLE  REYES Facts: Petitioner issued two checks in the total amount of P267,500.00 in payment for an obligation. Petitioner also knowingly and
intelligently misrepresented herself as "Vicenta Abalos" before Sembrano by presenting pieces of evidence that assured Sembrano
that petitioner can make good the checks she issued. However, the issued checks have insufficient funds as proven by the fact that
they were dishonored for the reason "account closed." Petitioner was subsequently convicted of estafa by the CA and a penalty
was imposed pursuant to the RPC. However, RA 10951 modifies the penalty in estafa and swindling cases.

Issue: WoN RA 10951 be given retroactive effect. NO.

Held: The Court affirmed the conviction of estafa. As to the penalty imposed, the Court took into consideration the amendment
embodied in R.A. No. 1095140 which modifies the penalty in swindling and estafa cases. Section 100 of the said law, however,
provides that it shall have retroactive effect only insofar as it is favorable to the accused. This necessitates a comparison of the
corresponding penalties imposable under the RPC and R.A. No. 10951.

The Court finds that even if the maximum period imposable upon the petitioner under the RPC in this case is higher than that
under R.A. No. 10951, the Court finds that the benefits that would accrue to the petitioner with the imposition of a lower
minimum sentence outweighs the longer prison sentence and is more in keeping with the spirit of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law. Therefore, RA 10951 cannot be given retroactive effect in this case since it will prejudice the petitioner.

ARTICLE 6 -WAIVER OF RIGHTS

FAMANILA V. CA  YNARES-SANTIAGO FACTS: Famanila was working as a Messman in an international crew ship. While in California, he was operated on because he
suffered from aneurysm. Due to his condition, he was repatriated to the Philippine. He was then offered by his previous employer
$13,200 and was asked to sign a “Release and Waiver”. He signed it in the presence of the wife and another relative.
 Subsequently, he had a change of mind. He filed before the court an action seeking nullity of that document claiming that it is void
and unenforceable because at the time that he signed it, his consent thereto was vitiated, he was in financial constraints and was
suffering from physical disability since the doctor told him that he could no longer go back to work.

ISSUE: WoN the waiver was valid. YES.

HELD: Contrary to Famanilla’s claim, a vitiated consent does not make a contract void and unenforceable. A vitiated consent only
gives rise to a voidable agreement. Under the Civil Code, the vices of consent are mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence
or fraud. If consent is given through any of the aforementioned vices of consent, the contract is voidable. A voidable contract is
binding unless annulled by a proper action in court.

However, disability and financial constraint are not among the factors that may vitiate consent. In addition, there is no proof on
record that his consent was vitiated on account of his disability. In the absence of such proof, the validity of the Receipt and
Release must be upheld.

To be valid and effective, waivers must be couched in clear and unequivocal terms, leaving no doubt as to the intention of those
giving up a right or a benefit that legally pertains to them. Upon review of the terms and conditions contained in the Receipt and
Release, the Court finds the same to be clear and unambiguous. The signing was even witnessed by his wife and another relative.
Therefore, the waiver was valid.

GUY v. CA  YNARES-SANTIAGO Facts: The daughters of Remedios alleged that they are the illegitimate children of the decedent, Sima Wei. His known heirs are his
surviving spouse Shirley and their children which includes the petitioner. Petitioner and his co-heirs alleged that private
respondents' claim had been paid, waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished by reason of the Release and Waiver of Claim
signed by Remedios stating that in exchange for the financial and educational assistance received from petitioner, she and her
minor children discharge the estate of Sima Wei from any and all liabilities.

Issue: WoN the waiver was valid. NO

Held: As regards Remedios' Release and Waiver of Claim, the same does not bar private respondents from claiming successional
rights. To be valid and effective, a waiver must be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention
of a party to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. A waiver may not be attributed to a person when its terms do
not explicitly and clearly evince an intent to abandon a right.

In this case, we find that there was no waiver of hereditary rights. The Release and Waiver of Claim does not state with clarity the
purpose of its execution. It merely states that Remedios received P300,000.00 and an educational plan for her minor daughters "by
way of financial assistance and in full settlement of any and all claims of whatsoever nature and kind x x x against the estate of the
late Rufino Guy Susim." Considering that the document did not specifically mention private respondents' hereditary share in the
estate of Sima Wei, it cannot be construed as a waiver of successional rights.

OTAMIAS v. REPUBLIC  
ARTICLE 9 - DUTY OF COURTS/JUDGES TO RENDER JUDGMENT
SILVERIO v. REPUBLIC
Furthermore, it must be emphasized that waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. Where one lacks knowledge of
a right, there is no basis upon which waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of a material fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot be
established by a consent given under a mistake or misapprehension of fact.
In the present case, private respondents could not have possibly waived their successional rights because they are yet to prove
their status as acknowledged illegitimate children of the deceased. Petitioner himself has consistently denied that private
respondents are his co-heirs. It would thus be inconsistent to rule that they waived their hereditary rights when petitioner claims
that they do not have such right. Hence, petitioner's invocation of waiver on the part of private respondents must fail.
LEONEN FACTS: Otamias and his wife decided to separate because Col. Otamias had an affair with another woman. Col. Prior to his
retirement, he signed a deed of assignment whereby he assigned 50% of his pension benefits in favor of the wife and the children.
When he retired from the service, the wife and the children were starting to receive the pension, but suddenly it was cut off. When
she inquired from the AFP PGMC, the latter said that there must be an order from the court that would require them to deliver the
50% of the benefits to the wife and the children.
ISSUE: WoN the waiver was valid. YES.
HELD: The SC said that the subject deed of assignment was actually a waiver by Col. Otamias with respect to the 50% of his pension
benefits. In the absence of any showing that his consent thereto was vitiated, such is a valid waiver. More so, it is in consonance of
the provisions of the Family Code on the obligation of either parent to support the child as well as the other spouse.
There is no need to include the AFP because it is not a real party in interest because the AFP is not required to give support to the
wife and to the children.
FACTS: Silverio successfully underwent sex reassignment surgery and petitioned the court that his name be changed from Rommel
Jacinto to Mely and that his sex shall also be changed from male to female to reflect the result of said surgery. The trial court
refused. So he cited now Article 9 that the courts are duty bound to render judgment.
ISSUE: May the trial court apply Article 9 of the Civil Code on the ground of equity? NO.
HELD: The SC said that there is no law on the matter, thus the court cannot decide on it. It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code
mandates that “no judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law.”
However, it is not a license for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not to
make or amend it.
In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to determine what guidelines should govern the
recognition of the effects of sex reassignment. The need for legislative guidelines becomes particularly important in this case
where the claims asserted are statute-based.
 It might be possible for the court to write a protocol with respect to the effects of giving recognition of one who has become a
female by virtue of sexual reassignment but never to write a law on the matter. It can only apply or interpret the written word of
its co-equal branch of government, Congress.
ARTICLE 14 - OBLIGATORY EFFECT of PENAL LAWS
DEL SOCORRO v. WILSEM PERALTA Facts: Del Socorro and Wilsem contracted marriage and subsequently obtained a divorce decree in Holland. Del Socorro and their
son went back to the PH and respondent never gave support. Not long thereafter, respondent came to the Philippines and
remarried in Cebu and resided there. Petitioner demanded support from Wilsem but the latter refused. Petitioner then filed a
complaint against respondent for violation of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to support his minor child.

Issue: 1. WoN a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under Philippine law. NO
2. WoN a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262. YES.

Held: Article 15 of the New Civil Code stresses the principle of nationality. In other words, insofar as Philippine laws are concerned,
specifically the provisions of the Family Code on support, the same only applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle
applies to foreigners such that they are governed by their national law with respect to family rights and duties. The obligation to
give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and duties. Since the respondent is a citizen of Holland or the
Netherlands, he is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to whether he is obliged to give support to his child,
as well as the consequences of his failure to do so.

The party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. Foreign laws
must be alleged and proved since our Courts do not take judicial notice of them. In the present case, respondent hastily concludes
that being a national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to support. While
respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never
proved the same.

In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of processual presumption
shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the
foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal law. Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the obligation to
support has not been properly pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which
enforces the obligation of parents to support their children and penalizing the non-compliance therewith.

Given that the foreign law be proven by Wilsem, it will still find no application in this case. Article 17(3) provides that prohibitive
laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs
shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign
country. Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or
residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is
obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws.

Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s obligation to support his child nor penalize
 the noncompliance therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in the Philippines because it would be of great injustice to
the child to be denied of financial support when the latter is entitled thereto. However, respondent is no longer liable to support
his former wife.

In addition, considering that respondent is currently living in the Philippines, we find strength in petitioner’s claim that the
Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in relation to Article 14 of the New Civil Code, applies to the instant case, which provides
that: "penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live and sojourn in Philippine territory,
subject to the principle of public international law and to treaty stipulations." On this score, it is indisputable that the alleged
continuing acts of respondent in refusing to support his child with petitioner is committed here in the Philippines as all of the
parties herein are residents of the Province of Cebu City. As such, our courts have territorial jurisdiction over the offense charged.
ARTICLE 15 - NATIONALITY THEORY cf. Article 26, Family Code
VAN DORN v. ROMILLO MELENCIO- Facts: After a divorce decree was obtained, private respondent filed a suit against petitioner for the accounting of her business in
HERRERA Manila claiming that it is a conjugal property.

Issue: For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal property in the Philippines

HELD: Owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the
policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens
may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In
this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which
divorce dissolves the marriage.

When marriage tie is thus severed as to one party, it ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband,
is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as
well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage.

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in
the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own
country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

PILAPIL v. IBAY-SOMERA REGALADO FACTS: The German husband had already obtained a decree of divorce, from the Federal Republic of Germany. When said divorce
decree was issued, he discovered that during their marriage, the wife was having affairs with other men. So, he sued the wife for
adultery.

ISSUE: WoN the adultery case will prosper. NO.

HELD: The law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person who can legally file the complaint
should be the offended spouse, and nobody else. In the present case, the divorce decree obtained by the alien spouse and its legal
 effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our
civil law on the matter of status of persons.

Under the same considerations and rationale in the case of Van Dorn, private respondent, being no longer the husband of
petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case.

RECIO v. RECIO (Art. 21, FC)  PANGANIBAN FACTS: Frederick (Filipino) and Editha (Australian) obtained a divorce decree in AU and the former subsequently became an
Australian citizen and remarried to Grace (Filipina). The second wife sued the husband for bigamy.

ISSUE: 1. WoN the divorce between respondent and Editha was proven. NO.
2. WoN respondent was legally capacitated to remarry. NO.
HELD: A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the
national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the
divorce must be proven. Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment; hence, like any other facts, both the
divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven according to our law on evidence.

To prove that he is capacitated to remarry if he were indeed an Australian citizen, under Article 21 of the Family Code, he simply
has to obtain a certificate of legal capacity to contract marriage from his consular or diplomatic official. That would have been
sufficient.

Instead, what he presented was his divorce decree. Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its
authenticity and due execution must be presented. Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 must be complied with: a writing or document
may be proven as public record of a foreign country by either (1) official publication of the writing or document or (2) a copy
thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be
(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in
the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

QUITA v. CA  BELLOSILLO FACTS: Fe and Arturo, both Filipinos, contracted a marriage and subsequently divorced in the US. It wasn’t however proven
whether she became a naturalized alient at the time of their divorce. Arturo dies leaving no will and respondent Blandina claimed
to be the surviving spouse

ISSUE: WoN the 2nd marriage was bigamous. YES.

HELD: The marriage to Blandina was celebrated while the prior marriage of Fe and Arturo was subsisting thereby resulting in a
bigamous marriage considered void from the beginning under Arts. 80 and 83 of the Civil Code. Consequently, she is not a
surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this status presupposes a legitimate relationship.

As regards the right of Fe, it must first be proven whether she was still a Filipino at the time the divorce decree was obtained. Once
 proved that she was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of their divorce, Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner
could very well lose her right to inherit from Arturo.

ELMAR PEREZ v. CA YNARES-SANTIAGO Facts: Tristan and Lily obtained a divorce decree from the Dominican Republic, and the former remarried Elmar. During their
cohabitation, petitioner learned that the divorce decree between Tristan and Lily was not recognized in the Philippines and that
her marriage to Tristan was deemed void under Philippine law. Tristan then filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Lily. All of them were Filipinos.

Issue: WoN the divorce was valid. NO.

Held: When petitioner and Tristan married on July 14, 1984Tristan was still lawfully married to Lily. The divorce decree that Tristan
and Lily obtained from the Dominican Republic never dissolved the marriage bond between them. It is basic that laws relating to
family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity ofpersons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even
though living abroad. Regardless of where a citizen of the Philippines might be, he or she will be governed by Philippine laws with
respect to his or her family rights and duties, or to his or her status, condition and legal capacity. Hence, if a Filipino regardless of
where married, successfully obtains an absolute divorce abroad, such will not be recognized in the PH.

SAN LUIS v. SAN LUIS YNARES-SANTIAGO FACTS: Felicisimo contracted 3 marriages during his lifetime (CC was effective). His 1st marriage was terminated when his wife died
leaving behind 6 children. Felicisimo then married Mary Lee, an American which ended in divorce. He then contracted his 3rd
marriage with Felicidad. When he died, Felicidad sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of
Felicisimo’s estate and prayed that letters of administration be issued to her. Two of the children of the 1st marriage filed a motion
to dismiss citing as ground, among others, that Felicidad has no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a
mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death was still legally married to Mary Lee.

ISSUE: WoN a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code. YES.

HELD: In resolving the issue, there is no need to retroactively apply the provisions of the FC, particularly Article 26 (2) as there is
sufficient jurisprudential basis to rule in the affirmative.

In the light of the ruling in Van Dorn, the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated in his own country if the ends of justice are to
be served. The divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested
Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse.

However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as
the marriage of Felicidad and Felicisimo under the laws of the USA. In Garcia vs. Recio, the Court laid down the specific guidelines
for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. The presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that
proof of its authenticity and due execution must be presented in accordance with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132.

With regard to Felicidad’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, USA, she merely submitted photocopies of the
 Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of the Family Law Act of California, which purportedly show that their marriage was
done in accordance with said law. Here, there was non-compliance. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial
notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved.

LAVADIA v. HEIRS of JUAN FACTS: Atty. Juan Luna obtained a decree of divorce in Dominican Republic. Prior to the issuance of the said divorce decree, Atty.
LUCES LUNA Luna and his wife Eugenia had an agreement respecting the division of their properties, a property settlement, without the
approval of the court. Remember that judicial separation of property shall only be valid if our courts approve it. But Atty. Luna
attached such settlement in his petition for divorce and as a consequence, such settlement was also approved. When Atty. Luna
died, the second wife claimed the properties.

ISSUES: WoN the 2nd marriage was bigamous. YES.

HELD: The law in force at the time of the solemnization was the Spanish Civil Code, which adopted the nationality rule. The Civil
Code continued to follow the nationality rule, to the effect that Philippine laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
condition and legal capacity were binding upon citizens of the Philippines, although living abroad. Pursuant to the nationality rule,
Philippine laws governed this case by virtue of both Atty. Luna and Eugenia having remained Filipinos until the death of Atty. Luna
on July 12, 1997 terminated their marriage.

Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the nationality rule adopted by Philippine law. Hence, any settlement of
property between the parties of the 1st marriage involving Filipinos submitted as an incident of a divorce obtained in a foreign
country lacks competent judicial approval, and cannot be enforceable against the assets of the husband who contracts a
subsequent marriage. It was void without court approval.

NOVERAS v. NOVERAS FACTS: David and Leticia resided in California, USA after their marriage on December 3, 1988 in Quezon City. Leticia was a nurse
and David was a businessman. The business of David did not prosper. They eventually acquired American citizenship. During their
marriage, they acquired properties in the Philippines and in the USA.

David returned to the Philippines to manage their properties here. Upon learning that David had an extra-marital affair, Leticia
filed for divorce that was granted by the California court plus custody of their 2 children and all their properties in California. On
August 8, 2005, Leticia came to the Philippines and filed a petition for judicial separation of conjugal property before the RTC of
Baler, Aurora.

ISSUE: WoN the divorce decree should be recognized. NO.

WoN the appellate court has jurisdiction over the properties in US. NO.

HELD: The trial court erred in immediately recognizing the divorce decree using the doctrine of processual presumption without
compliance with Rule 132 Sections 24 and 25. Based on the records, only the divorce decree was presented in evidence. The
required certificates to prove its authenticity, as well as the pertinent California law on divorce were not presented. The foreign
 judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national
law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. The recognition may be made in an action instituted
specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or
defense.

With regard to the properties in the US, Article 16 of the Civil Code clearly states that real property as well as personal property is
subject to the law of the country where it is situated. Thus, liquidation shall only be limited to the Philippine properties.

ORION SAVINGS BANK v. In order for foreign laws to be given due recognition by our courts, they must be alleged and proved. Otherwise, in the absence of
SUZUKI (Art. 16) proof as to the existence of a foreign law, or there is failure to prove the same, then we apply the “Doctrine of Processual
Presumption” or the “Presumed Identity Approach.

It is a universal principle that real or immovable property is exclusively subject to the laws of the country or state where it is
located. The reason is found in the very nature of immovable property — its immobility. Immovables are part of the country and so
closely connected to it that all rights over them have their natural center of gravity there.

On the other hand, property relations between spouses are governed principally by the national law of the spouses. However, the
party invoking the application of a foreign law has the burden of proving the foreign law. The foreign law is a question of fact to be
properly pleaded and proved as the judge cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law. He is presumed to know only domestic or
the law of the forum.

To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the
Revised Rules of Court.

Accordingly, matters concerning the title and disposition of real property shall be governed by Philippine law while issues
pertaining to the conjugal nature of the property shall be governed by South Korean law, provided it is proven as a fact.

In the present case, Orion, unfortunately failed to prove the South Korean law on the conjugal ownership of property. It merely
attached a "Certification from the Embassy of the Republic of Korea" to prove the existence of Korean Law. This certification, does
not qualify as sufficient proof of the conjugal nature of the property for there is no showing that it was properly authenticated by
the seal of his office, as required under Section 24 of Rule 132.

ARTICLE 19 - PRINCIPLE OF ABUSE OF RIGHTS

FAR EAST BANK v. PACILAN, FACTS: Here, he issued four checks. When the fourth check was presented for encashment, it was dishonored. The bank closed
JR. the account of Pacilan for improper mishandling. The following day, he deposited the amount that will cover the fourth check and
tried to inquire from the bank why his account was closed. There was no answer from the bank. Pacilan sued FEBT (now BPI) for
moral damages because he suffered social humiliation, wounded feelings, insurmountable worries and sleepless nights. The
indecent haste that attended the closure of his account was patently malicious and intended to embarrass him. He claimed that he
 is a Cashier of Prudential Bank and Trust Company, whose branch office is located just across that of petitioner bank, and a
prominent and respected leader both in the civic and banking communities.

HELD: In order for an abuse of rights to arise, there must be the presence of three elements:
a. the existence of a legal right or duty
b. which is exercised in bad faith;
c. for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another

Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or simple negligence, dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious
doing of a wrong, a breach of known duty due to some motives or interest or ill-will that partakes of the nature of fraud. Malice
connotes ill-will or spite and speaks not in response to duty. It implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. Malice is
bad faith or bad motive.

Here, the 2nd and 3rd elements are wanting. It was established during the trial that it was actually Pacilan who abused his rights as
depositor of the bank. There were over withdrawing of his account hundreds of times for more or less four years. He also signed
checks with different signatures compared to that on file with the bank.

UYPITCHING v. QUIAMCO FACTS: Quiamco alleged that the motorcycle was delivered to him by Davalan et al to amicably settle the civil aspect of a criminal
case for robbery filed by Quiamco against them. He asked for the original certificate of registration but the three accused never
came to see him again. Meanwhile, the motorcycle was parked in an open space inside Quiamco’s business establishment, where
it was visible and accessible to the public.

9 years later, a lawyer together with the members of the Philippine Constabulary, descended on the establishment of Quiamco on
the allegation that the latter got hold of Uypitching’s motorcycle. Quiamco was not around at that time. While waiting for him,
Uypitching was uttering "Quiamco is a thief of a motorcycle" which was heard by the employee of Quiamco. When the latter did
not arrive, Uypitching ordered the policemen, over the clerk’s objection, to take the motorcycle. Uypitching also filed a criminal
complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing Law against Quiamco but was dismissed.

Quiamco sued Uypitching for damages pursuant to Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of the Civil Code.

HELD: While he exercised his right as an owner of the motorcycle, there was an abuse of right committed by Uypitching. Being the
owner as an unpaid seller, he could have properly applied for the appropriate proceedings – in this case, foreclosure of the
motorcycle. Also, he should have been armed by a search warrant which, in this case, was not complied with. And because
Uypitching is a lawyer, triple costs against him.

CEBU COUNTRY CLUB v. FACTS: Elizagaque bought a share in Cebu Country Club and applied for membership. But, he never received any communication
ELIZAGAQUE from the Country Club. He only found out that his application was denied. His appeal and motion for reconsideration was left
unanswered by the Country Club.

HELD: There is an abuse of rights on the part of the Cebu Country Club. It was reasoned by the Club that they have a new rule on
 admission of new members that there must be unanimous vote from the board of directors. This was not stated in the application
form submitted byElizagaque but such rule already have taken effect 13 years after the application. The Court said that there was
bad faith on the part of Cebu Country Club. The Club explained that the amendment was not printed on the application form due
to economic reasons cannot be given appreciation. The Court cannot fathom why such a prestigious and exclusive golf country club
whose members are all affluent, did not have enough money to cause the printing of an updated application form.

CALATAGAN GOLF CLUB v FACTS: Clemente incurred delinquency in his payments of his dues. Calatagan Golf Club tried to collect Clemente’s back accounts.
CLEMENTE, JR Both letters were sent back to sender with the postal note that the address had been closed. Despite knowledge of closure, it still
proceeded to send the third demand letter in the same address. Since there was no payment, the Club sold the share of Clemente
through public auction.

HELD: There is abuse of rights on the part of the Club. It should have looked into the personal records on file with the Club, he
being a member. They could have merely address the demand letter to his residential address for him or call him up through the
phone. This was not done by the Club.

Calatagans bad faith and failure to observe its own By-Laws had resulted not merely in the loss of Clementes privilege to play golf
at its golf course and avail of its amenities, but also in significant pecuniary damage to him. For that loss, the only blame that could
be thrown Clementes way was his failure to notify Calatagan of the closure of the P.O. Box. That lapse, if we uphold Calatagan
would cost Clemente a lot. But, in the first place, does he deserve answerability for failing to notify the club of the closure of the
postal box? Indeed, knowing as he did that Calatagan was in possession of his home address as well as residence and office
telephone numbers, he had every reason to assume that the club would not be at a loss should it need to contact him. In addition,
according to Clemente, he was not even aware of the closure of the postal box, the maintenance of which was not his
responsibility but his employer Phimcos.

The utter bad faith exhibited by Calatagan brings into operation Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code, under the Chapter on
Human Relations. These provisions, which the Court of Appeals did apply, enunciate a general obligation under law for every
person to act fairly and in good faith towards one another. A non-stock corporation like Calatagan is not exempt from that
obligation in its treatment of its members. The obligation of a corporation to treat every person honestly and in good faith extends
even to its shareholders or members, even if the latter find themselves contractually bound to perform certain obligations to the
corporation. A certificate of stock cannot be a charter of dehumanization.

ARDIENTE v. JAVIER, et. al. FACTS: Ardiente sold his house and lot to Pastorfide. The MOA stipulates that Pastorfide is responsible for the transfer of the
utilities from his name to Ardiente, including the water connection. This was not complied with. Instead, he incurred delinquency
in the payment of the waterbills. Thus, the Cagayan de Oro Water District went to Ardiente and informed him about the
delinquency. The latter told the water district employee to immediately disconnect the water connection of Pastorfide.

HELD: Both are solidarily liable for damages, Ardiente and the water district. It should have first informed Pastorfide of the
delinquency, instead of immediately disconnecting the water connection.
SESBRENO v. CA & VECO
SALADAGA v. ASTORGA
COCA COLA BOTTLERS v.
BERNARDO (SC applied
ARTICLES 20, 21 and 28, Civil
Code)
FACTS: Sesbreno is one of the customers of VECO. Under the contract agreed upon, in case of violations, VOC inspectors may
inspect the houses of the clients at reasonable time without being liable for trespass to dwelling. In one of their inspections,
together with the Philippine Constabulary, they went to the house of Sesbreno and were allowed to enter the premises by the
househelper, and another named Chuchie Garcia and Peter Sesbreno. They found the meter at the garage and found out that it is
not working, in fact it was turned upside down. They sought permission to replace the meter, and they did. To determine the
actual electrical load and consumption of Sesbreno, they sought permission to enter the house. They were given permission by
Garcia. The maid made
the report signed by Garcia herself. When Sesbreno learned of what had happened, he sued VECO and the VOC inspectors for
violation of Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of the Civil Code that there was bad faith exercised because at the time of inspection,
they were not armed with a search warrant.
HELD: Search warrant is only required when it is the government or any of the agents of the state would make the search, not in
this case since VECO is a private establishment. The presence of the member of the Philippine Constabulary is merely for
assistance. It did not do the job of the VOC inspectors. There was no basis for the award of damages.
FACTS: The lawyer sold his lot though pacto de rectro. But, despite the passage of two years, there was no redemption made by
the owner of the property. The buyer subsequently received a notice from the Rural Bank that it is foreclosing the property since
the lawyer mortgaged the same property to it.
HELD: This is an administrative case. Nevertheless, the Court made mention of Article 19. The lawyer argued that the transaction
was not a deed of sale with a right of repurchase but actually an equitable mortgage. According to the Court, if such is true, since
he is a lawyer, he could have just executed a deed of REM instead of a deed of sale with right to repurchase.
More significantly, respondent transgressed the laws and the fundamental tenet of human relations as embodied in Article 19 of
the Civil Code:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due,
and observe honesty and good faith.
Respondent, as owner of the property, had the right to mortgage it to complainant but, as a lawyer, he should have seen to it that
his agreement with complainant is embodied in an instrument that clearly expresses the intent of the contracting parties. A lawyer
who drafts a contract must see to it that the agreement faithfully and clearly reflects the intention of the contracting parties.
Otherwise, the respective rights and obligations of the contracting parties will be uncertain, which opens the door to legal disputes
between the said parties. Indeed, the uncertainty caused by respondent’s poor formulation of the "Deed of Sale with Right to
Repurchase" was a significant factor in the legal controversy between respondent and complainant. Such poor formulation reflects
at the very least negatively on the legal competence of respondent.
Sps. Bernardo became the exclusive dealers of Coca-cola products. Initially, they were merely dealers in 1987. Subsequently, Coca-
cola offered them to become an exclusive dealer of Coca-cola products. This went on for about 13 years. Before the expiration of
the contract, Coca-cola requested them to submit a list of their clients for the purpose of defining the territorial jurisdiction of the
dealership, and if they would comply with the requirement, Coca-cola will extend the contract to a longer period plus the other
incentives. They complied. However, Coca-cola did not renew the contract. Sps. Bernardo found out that Coca-cola talked with
the clients and also, whenever they deliver to their clients, a Coca-cola employee would trail them and offer the client lower price
and eventually offered a sari-sari store with coca-cola products for a much lower price. Sps. Bernardo sued Coca-cola for violation
of Article 19, 20, 21 and 28 of the Civil Code. Coca-Cola denied the allegation and said that they approached the clients only after
the expiration of the contract.

Coca-Cola is liable for damages for abuse of rights and unfair competition under the Civil Code. Both the RTC and the CA found
that Coca-Cola had employed oppressive and high-handed schemes to unjustly limit the market coverage and diminish the
investment returns of respondents. The CA summarized its findings as follows:

This [cut-throat competition] is precisely what appellant did in order to take over the market: directly sell its products to or deal
them off to competing stores at a price substantially lower than those imposed on its wholesalers. As a result, the wholesalers
suffered losses, and in Bernardo’s case, laid of a number of employees and alienated the patronage of its major customers
including small-scale stores.

It must be emphasized that Coca-Cola is not only a beverage giant, but also the manufacturer of the products; hence, it sets the
price. In addition, it took advantage of the information provided by Bernardo to facilitate its takeover of the latter's usual business
area. Distributors like Bernardo, who had assisted Coca-Cola in its marketing efforts, suddenly found themselves with fewer
customers. Other distributors were left with no choice but to fold.

Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code provide the legal bedrock for the award of damages to a party who suffers damage
whenever another person commits an act in violation of some legal provision; or an act which, though not constituting a
transgression of positive law, nevertheless violates certain rudimentary rights of the party aggrieved

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due,
and observe honesty and good faith.

Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the
same.

Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

In Albenson Enterprises Corp. v. CA, this Court held that under any of the above provisions of law, an act that causes injury to
another may be made the basis for an award of damages. As explained by this Court in GF Equity, Inc. v. Valenzona:

The exercise of a right ends when the right disappears; and it disappears when it is abused, especially to the prejudice of others.
The mask of a right without the spirit of justice which gives it life is repugnant to the modern concept of social law. It cannot be
said that a person exercises a right when he unnecessarily prejudices another or offends morals or good customs. Over and above
the specific precepts of positive law are the supreme norms of justice which the law develops and which are expressed in three
principles: honeste vivere, alterum non laedere and jus suum quique tribuere; and he who violates them violates the law. For this
 reason, it is not permissible to abuse our rights to prejudice others.

Meanwhile, the use of unjust, oppressive, or high-handed business methods resulting in unfair competition also gives a right of
action to the injured party. Article 28 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 28. Unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial enterprises or in labor through the use of force, intimidation,
deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or highhanded method shall give rise to a right of action by the person who
thereby sutlers damage.

COCA-COLA: The act of "a merchant [who] puts up a store near the store of another and in this way attracts some of the latter's
patrons" is not an abuse of a right.

The scenario in the present case is vastly different: the merchant was also the producer who, with the use of a list provided by its
distributor, knocked on the doors of the latter's customers and offered the products at a substantially lower price. Unsatisfied, the
merchant even sold its products at a preferential rate to another store within the vicinity. Jurisprudence holds that when a person
starts an opposing place of business, not for the sake of profit, but regardless of Joss and for the sole purpose of driving a
competitor out of business, in order to take advantage of the effects of a malevolent purpose, that person is guilty of a wanton
wrong.

ST. MARTIN POLYCLINIC, Facts: On January 10, 2008, respondent referred prospective applicant xxx (xxx) to petitioner for a pre-deployment medical
INC. v. LWV CONSTRUCTION examination in accordance with the instructions from GAMCA. After undergoing the required examinations, petitioner cleared xxx
and found him "fit for employment," as evidenced by a Medical Report dated January 11, 2008 (Medical Report).

Based on the foregoing, respondent deployed xxx to Saudi Arabia, allegedly incurring expenses in the amount of P84,373.41.
Unfortunately, when xxx underwent another medical examination with the General Care Dispensary of Saudi Arabia (General Care
Dispensary) on March 24, 2008, he purportedly tested positive for HCV or the hepatitis C virus. The Ministry of Health of the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Ministry of Health) required a re-examination of xxx, which the General Care Dispensary conducted on
April 28, 2008. However, the results of the re-examination remained the same, i.e., xxx was positive for HCV, which results were
reflected in a Certification dated April 28, 2008 (Certification). An undated HCV Confirmatory Test Report likewise conducted by
the Ministry of Health affirmed such finding, thereby leading to Raguindin's repatriation to the Philippines.

Issue: whether or not petitioner was negligent in issuing the Medical Report declaring xxx "fit for employment" and hence, should
be held liable for damages.

Held: Art 19 would not be applicable in this case since no law was violated and no contract was also breached. The rules on quasi-
delict would apply.

ARTICLE 21 - ACTS CONTRARY MORALS

BUENAVENTURA v. CA Isabelle alleged that whenever they quarrel, she would be the one to woo Noel back to the house. By reason of the acts of Noel,
she suffered sleepless nights, humiliation, etc. The marriage was terminated because of psychological incapacity of Noel. Can you
hold the psychological incapacity of the spouse liable for damages?

HELD: No. For Article 21 of the Civil Code to apply, the act must be willful, which is not true when the person is psychologically
incapacitated. There is an innate disability on the part of the psychologically incapacitated spouse to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage. It would be contrary to make Noel liable for damages when there is that innate inability to comply.

A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.

Psychological incapacity has been defined, thus: . . . no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage
which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. . . .

The Court of Appeals and the trial court considered the acts of the Noel after the marriage as proof of his psychological incapacity,
and therefore a product of his incapacity or inability to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. Nevertheless, said courts
considered these acts as willful and hence as grounds for granting moral damages. It is contradictory to characterize acts as a
product of psychological incapacity, and hence beyond the control of the party because of an innate inability, while at the same
time considering the same set of acts as willful. By declaring Noel as psychologically incapacitated, the possibility of awarding
moral damages on the same set of facts was negated. The award of moral damages should be predicated, not on the mere act of
entering into the marriage, but on specific evidence that it was done deliberately and with malice by a party who had knowledge of
his or her disability and yet willfully concealed the same. No such evidence appears to have been adduced in this case.

For the same reason, since psychological incapacity means that one is truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that one
must assume and discharge as a consequence of marriage, it removes the basis for the contention that the petitioner purposely
deceived the private respondent. If the Isabelle was deceived, it was not due to a willful act on the part of Noel. Therefore, the
award of moral damages was without basis in law and in fact.

ARTICLE 22 - UNJUST ENRICHMENT

FILINVEST V. NGILAY Nevertheless, Filinvest does not err in seeking the return of the down payment as a consequence of the sale having been declared
void. The rule is settled that the declaration of nullity of a contract which is void ab initio operates to restore things to the state
and condition in which they were found before the execution thereof. Filinvest is correct in its argument that allowing Ngilay to
keep the amount received from Filinvest is tantamount to judicial acquiescence to unjust enrichment.
 Unjust enrichment exists "when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a person retains money or
property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience." There is unjust enrichment under
Article 22 of the Civil Code when:

1. a person is unjustly benefited, and

2. such benefit is derived at the expense of or with damages to another.
Thus, the sale which created the obligation of Filinvest to pay the agreed amount having been declared void, Ngilay have the duty
to return the down payment as they no longer have the right to keep it. The principle of unjust enrichment essentially
contemplates payment when there is no duty to pay, and the person who receives the payment has no right to receive it.

GONZALO v. TERNATE, JR. Gonzalo was awarded a project by the DPWH and he subcontracted it to Tarnate. In furtherance of their agreement, a deed of
assignment was executed by Gonzalo assigning 10% of the total collection from DPWH to Tarnate for the rent of the latter’s
equipment which had been utilized for the project. Tarnate learned that Gonzalo had unilaterally rescinded the deed of
assignment and that he collected the proceeds due to Tarnate. Tarnate sued Gonzalo for the collection of the retention fee.
Gonzalo insisted that they are in pari delicto so neither can come to the Court for aid.

HELD: An accepted exception to the application of the principle of in pari delicto is when it contravenes with well-established
public policy. The principle of unjust enrichment is an exception to the effect where parties are in pari delicto. If Gonzalo will be
allowed, then he would be unjustly enriched at the expense of Tarnate. It was shown that, indeed, he provided for the equipment
and the labor. Tarnate is allowed to recover. But because both were in pari delicto, there can be dagames but only the amount
due him by reason of the contract.

Nonetheless, the application of the doctrine of in pari delicto is not always rigid. An accepted exception arises when its application
contravenes well-established public policy.

Unjust enrichment exists, according to Hulst v. PR Builders, Inc., "when a person unjustly retains a benefit at the loss of another, or
when a person retains money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience."
The prevention of unjust enrichment is a recognized public policy of the State, for Article 22 of the Civil Code explicitly provides
that "[e]very person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of
something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him." It is well to note that Article 22
"is part of the chapter of the Civil Code on Human Relations, the provisions of which were formulated as basic principles to be
observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the stability of the social order; designed to indicate certain
norms that spring from the fountain of good conscience; guides for human conduct that should run as golden threads through
society to the end that law may approach its supreme ideal which is the sway and dominance of justice."

There is no question that Tarnate provided the equipment, labor and materials for the project in compliance with his obligations
under the subcontract and the deed of assignment; and that it was Gonzalo as the contractor who received the payment for his
contract with the DPWH as well as the 10% retention fee that should have been paid to Tarnate pursuant to the deed of
 assignment. Considering that Gonzalo refused despite demands to deliver to Tarnate the stipulated 10% retention fee that would
have compensated the latter for the use of his equipment in the project, Gonzalo would be unjustly enriched at the expense of
Tarnate if the latter was to be barred from recovering because of the rigid application of the doctrine of in pari delicto. The
prevention of unjust enrichment called for the exception to apply in Tarnate’s favor. Consequently, the RTC and the CA properly
adjudged Gonzalo liable to pay Tarnate the equivalent amount of the 10% retention fee.

BLISS DEVELOPMENT v. DIAZ

ARTICLE 26 - ACTS NOT CONSTITUTING A CRIMINAL OFFENSE BUT SHALL PRODUCE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR DAMAGES
CASTRO v. PEOPLE The Court, it held that utmost, he would only be liable for damages under Article 26, (3) rather than the crime of grave oral
slander. What he said to the caller was to be careful of Mr. Tan because that would be dangerous. According to the Court, it does
not constitute slander, but merely constitutes a violation of the said provision, so only for damages.

ARTICLE 27 — LIABILITY OF PUBLIC SERVANT OR EMPLOYEE

LEDESMA v. CA and DELMO An organization named Student Leadership Club was formed by some students of the West Visayas College. They elected the late
Violets Delmo as the treasurer. In that capacity, Delmo extended loans from the funds of the club to some of the students of the
school. "the petitioner claims that the said act of extending loans was against school rules and regulations. Thus, the petitioner, as
President of the School, sent a letter to Delmo informing her that she was being dropped from the membership of the club and
that she would not be a candidate for any award or citation from the school. Delmo asked for a reconsideration of the decision but
the petitioner denied it. Delmo, thus, appealed to the Office of the Director of the Bureau of Public Schools. A case was filed where
petitioner, who was then the President of the West Visayas College was found liable for damages under Article 27 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines for failure to graduate a student with honors.

HELD: We find no reason why the findings of the trial and appellate courts should be reversed. It cannot be disputed that Violeta
Delmo went through a painful ordeal which was brought about by the petitioner's neglect of duty and callousness. Thus, moral
damages are but proper.

However, in the case of CAPUGAN VS TOLENTINO, JR. This is where the Supreme Court defined what is a purely ministerial act. A
purely ministerial act or duty is one that an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in
obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or
impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty
shall be performed, such duty is discretionary, not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when its discharge requires neither the
exercise of official discretion nor the exercise of judgment.

CAMPUGAN v. TOLENTINO, immediately cancelled the adverse claim that was annotated at the back of the title. Consequently, a complaint was filed against
JR. the ROD, because according to them, there was no basis for the cancellation in as much as there is no court order.

HELD: The court found no abuse of authority or irregularity committed by ROD with respect to the cancellation of the notice of

ARTICLES 29 - 35 CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM CRIMINAL OFFENSES (Basis: Article 100, RPC)
PEOPLE v. BAYOTAS
DALURAYA v. OLIVIA
PEOPLE V. DIONALDO
DY v. PEOPLE
adverse claim and the notice of lis pendens annotated on TCT No. N-290546. Whether or not the RTC order dated May 16, 2008 or
the letter-request dated June 30, 2008 had been falsified, fraudulent or invalid was not for them to determine inasmuch as their
duty to examine documents presented for registration was limited only to what appears on the face of the documents. If, upon
their evaluation of the letter-request and the RTC order, they found the same to be sufficient in law and t]o be in conformity with
existing requirements, it became obligatory for them to perform their ministerial duty without unnecessary delay.
FACTS: Rogelio Bayotas, accused and charged with Rape, died on February 4, 1992 due to cardio respiratory arrest. The Solicitor
General then submitted a comment stating that the death of the accused does not excuse him from his civil liability (supported by
the Supreme Court’s decision in People vs Sendaydiego). On the other hand, the counsel of the accused claimed that in the
Supreme Court’s decision in People vs Castillo, civil liability is extinguished if accused should die before the final judgement is
rendered.
ISSUE: WoN the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil liability.
RULING: The Court decided on this case through stating the cases of Castillo and Sendaydiego. In the Castillo case, the Court said
that civil liability is extinguished only when death of the accused occurred before the final judgement. Judge Kapunan further
stated that civil liability is extinguished because there will be “no party defendant” in the case. There will be no civil liability if
criminal liability does not exist. Further, the Court stated “it is, thus, evident that… the rule established was that the survival of the
civil liability depends on whether the same can be predicated on the sources of obligations other than delict.
In the Sendaydiego case, the Court issued Resolution of July 8, 1977 where it states that civil liability will only survive if death came
after the final judgement of the CFI of Pangasinan. However, Article 30 of the Civil Code could not possibly lend support to the
ruling in Sendaydiego. Civil liability ex delicto is extinguished by the death of the accused while his conviction is on appeal. The
Court also gave a summary on which cases should civil liability be extinguished, to wit:
Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely
thereon. Therefore, Bayotas’s death extinguished his criminal and civil liability based solely on the act complained of.
To read correct full
text
Facts: John Dy has been the distributor of W.L. Food Products (W.L. Foods) in Naga City, Bicol, under the business name Dyna
Marketing. Dy would pay W.L. Foods in either cash or check upon pick up of stocks of snack foods at the latters branch or main
office in Quezon City.
On June 24, 1992, Dys driver went to the branch office of W.L. Foods to pick up stocks of snack foods. He picked up merchandise
worth P106,579.60. In return, the driver handed checker Maraca a blank Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC) Check
postdated July 22, 1992. The check was signed by Dy though it did not indicate a specific amount.
Yet again, on July 1, 1992, the same driver obtained snack foods from Maraca in the amount of P226,794.36 in exchange for a
blank FEBTC Check July 31, 1992.

In both instances, the driver was issued an unsigned delivery receipt. The amounts for the purchases were filled in later by Evelyn
Ong, accountant of W.L. Foods, based on the value of the goods delivered. When presented for payment, FEBTC dishonored the
checks for insufficiency of funds.

Later, the bank sent another letter to the WL Foods counsel advising her check was returned to the drawee bank for the reasons
stop payment order and drawn against uncollected deposit (DAUD), and not because it was drawn against insufficient funds as
stated in the first letter.

Dys savings deposit account ledger reflected a balance of P160,659.39 as of July 22, 1992.
When William Lim, owner of W.L. Foods, phoned Dy about the matter, the latter explained that he could not pay since he had no
funds yet. This prompted the former to send petitioner a demand letter, which the latter ignored.
On July 16, 1993, Lim charged Dy with two counts of estafa. He was also charged violation of B.P. 122. He was convicted by the
RTC. CA upheld the RTC ruling.

Issue:
(1) WON the issuances of checks were valid, provided that the checks, with no specified amount, were delivered
(2) WON Dy must be acquitted

Held: (1) Yes.

Section 191 of the Negotiable Instruments Law[14] defines issue as the first delivery of an instrument, complete in form, to a
person who takes it as a holder. Significantly, delivery is the final act essential to the negotiability of an instrument. Delivery
denotes physical transfer of the instrument by the maker or drawer coupled with an intention to convey title to the payee and
recognize him as a holder.[15] It means more than handing over to another; it imports such transfer of the instrument to another
as to enable the latter to hold it for himself.

In this case, even if the checks were given to W.L. Foods in blank, this alone did not make its issuance invalid. When the checks
were delivered to Lim, through his employee, he became a holder with prima facie authority to fill the blanks. This was, in fact,
accomplished by Lims accountant.

The pertinent provisions of Section 14 of the Negotiable Instruments Law are instructive:
SEC. 14. Blanks; when may be filled.Where the instrument is wanting in any material particular, the person in possession thereof
has a prima facie authority to complete it by filling up the blanks therein. And a signature on a blank paper delivered by the person
making the signature in order that the paper may be converted into a negotiable instrument operates as a prima facie authority to
fill it up as such for any amount. . (Emphasis supplied.)

Hence, the law merely requires that the instrument be in the possession of a person other than the drawer or maker. From such
 possession, together with the fact that the instrument is wanting in a material particular, the law presumes agency to fill up the
blanks.[17] Because of this, the burden of proving want of authority or that the authority granted was exceeded, is placed on the
person questioning such authority.[18]

(2) Yes. The circumstances prove that the said checks were issued in good faith, therefore negating the element of deceit.
PEOPLE v. CALOMIA  Facts: Accused-appellant Ruben Calomia was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Loay, Bohol, Branch 50, with two counts
of qualified rape of his minor daughter, AAA which he allegedly committed sometime in August 2007 and April 2008.
After trial on the merits, the RTC promulgated its Decision accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of both counts of
qualified rape. Accused-appellant filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals. In its Decision, the appellate court upheld accused-
appellant's conviction, but modified the award of damages to AAA.

During its pendency, the Court was informed that the said appellant has died while in the confinement of Bohol District Jail due to
Strangulation, Self-Inflicted, Hanging and declared dead by the medical officer.

Issue: Whether or not the death of an accused pending his appeal extinguishes all his liability.

Ruling: No. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based
solely thereon. On the contrary, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be
predicated on a source of obligation other than delict such as law, contracts, quasi-contracts, and quasi-delict.

In the instant case, accused-appellant's death occurred prior to the finality of the judgment of conviction rendered against him. In
fact, accused-appellant died way back on September 29, 2015, during the pendency of his appeal before the Court of Appeals.
Unfortunately, the appellate court was not timely informed of accused-appellant's death prior to the promulgation of its Decision.
Ratio Decidendi: The death of an accused pending the appeal of his conviction extinguishes the criminal action, as there is no
longer a defendant to stand as the accused; and the civil action instituted therein for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto is
likewise ipso facto extinguished, as it is grounded on the criminal action.

Gist: This is an appeal from the Decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the Decision of the RTC of Bohol which found
accused guilty for the crime of rape.
ARTICLE 36 - PREJUDICIAL QUESTION
TUANDA v. Facts:
SANDIGANBAYAN Petitioners institute this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to set aside
the resolution of Sandiganbayan and its orders denying petitioners' motion for suspension of their arraignment.
Fabruary 9, 1989 Delia Estrellanes and Bartolome Binaohan were designated as industrial labor sectoral representative and
agricultural labor sectoral representative for the Sangguniang Bayan of Jimalalud, Negros Oriental by DILG Secretary Santos. They
both took their oath of office on February 16 and 17, 1989.

Then, petitioners filed a petition with the Office of the President for review and recall of said designations. This was denied and
enjoined Tuanda to recognize private sectoral representatives. Estrallanes and Binaohan then filed a petition for mandamus with
RTC Negros Oriental for recognition as members of the Sangguniang Bayan. It was dismissed.

The matter was then brought to RTC Dumaguete City accusing Tuanda and others of taking advantage of their official functions and
unlawfully causing undue injury to Estrellanes and Binaohan.

Petitioners filed a motion with Sandiganbayan for suspension of the Criminal Case on the ground that a prejudicial question exists.
The RTC rendered a decision declaring null and void ab initio the designations issued by DILG for violation of the provisions saying
that the Sanggunian itself must make a determination first of the number of sectors in the city/municipality to warrant
representation.

Meanwhile, the Sandiganbayan has issued a resolution saying that the private respondents have rendered such services and the
said appointments enjoy the presumption of regularity; for these reasons, the private respondents were entitled to the slaries
attached to their office. Even if the RTC later declare the appointments null and void, they would still be given salaries because of
the period they acted as representatives has made them a de facto officers.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution in view of the RTC nullification of the appointments. But it was
likewise denied along with the cancellation of their arraignment, instead Sandiganbayan required Tuanda and the others to submit
a written show cause why they should not be cited for contempt of court for their failure to appear in court today for the
arraignment.

Hence, this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition where petitioners attribute to respondent Sandiganbayan the following
errors:

A. The Respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners' motions for the suspension of the
proceedings in Criminal Case
B. The Respondent Court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in refusing to suspend the proceedings that would entail a
retrial and rehearing by it of the basic issue involved
C. The Respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion and/or acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in effectively
allowing petitioners to be prosecuted under two alternative theories that private respondents are de jure and/or de facto officers
in violation of petitioners' right to due process.

Issue: The legality of private respondents' designation as sectoral representatives.

Held: The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. 14 It has two essential
elements:
(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and
(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. 15

Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bench, we find that the issue in the civil case, CA-G.R. CV No. 36769, constitutes a
valid prejudicial question to warrant suspension of the arraignment and further proceedings in the criminal case against
 petitioners.

All the elements of a prejudicial question are clearly and unmistakably present in this case. There is no doubt that the facts and
issues involved in the civil action (No. 36769) and the criminal case (No. 16936) are closely related. The filing of the criminal case
was premised on petitioners' alleged partiality and evident bad faith in not paying private respondents' salaries and per diems as
sectoral representatives, while the civil action was instituted precisely to resolve whether or not the designations of private
respondents as sectoral representatives were made in accordance with law.

Private respondents insist that even if their designations are nullified, they are entitled to compensation for actual services
rendered. We disagree. As found by the trial court and as borne out by the records, from the start, private respondents'
designations as sectoral representatives have been challenged by petitioners. They began with a petition filed with the Office of
the President copies of which were received by private respondents on 26 February 1989, barely eight (8) days after they took
their oath of office. Hence, private respondents' claim that they have actually rendered services as sectoral representatives has not
been established.

Finally, we find unmeritorious respondent Sandiganbayan's thesis that even in the event that private respondents' designations are
finally declared invalid, they may still be considered de facto public officers entitled to compensation for services actually
rendered.

The conditions and elements of de facto officership are the following:

1) There must be a de jure office;
2) There must be color of right or general acquiescence by the public; and
3) There must be actual physical possession of the office in good faith.
BELTRAN v. PEOPLE FACTS: Meynardo filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with Charmaine on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Alleging that it was Meynardo who left the conjugal home and is now living with his paramour, Charmaine filed a complaint for
concubinage against Meynardo and his paramour. Meynardo then filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings arguing that the pendency
of the petition for nullity of his marriage with Charmaine poses a prejudicial question to the criminal case.

Held: The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage is not a prejudicial question to the concubinage
case. For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the final
determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that the said civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal
prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or
innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. With regard to petitioner's argument that he could be acquitted of the
charge of concubinage should his marriage be declared null and void, suffice it to state that even a subsequent pronouncement
that his marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense.
PHILIPPINE AGUILA  FACTS: Petitioners are Philippine Agila Satellite Inc. (PASI) and its President and Chief Executive Officer Michael De Guzman. PASI
SATELLITE, INC. (PASI) v. was established by a consortium of private telecommunications carriers which in 1994 had entered into a Memorandum of
LICHAUCO Understanding (MOU) with the DOTC, through its then Secretary Jesus Garcia, concerning the planned launch of a Philippine-
owned satellite into outer space. Under the MOU, the launch of the satellite was to be an endeavor of the private sector, and the
satellite itself to be owned by the Filipino-owned consortium (subsequently organized as PASI). Petitioners filed an action against
 the new DOTC Secretary Lichauco for allegedly having awarded the orbital slot to an unknown awardee.

The first cause of action, for injunction, sought to establish that the award of orbital slot 153º East Longitude should be enjoined
since the DOTC had previously assigned the same orbital slot to PASI. The second cause of action, for declaration of nullity of
award, averred that the award to the unknown bidder is null and void, as it was rendered by Lichauco beyond her authority.

ISSUE:Would the doctrine of non-suability of the State find application in this case?

HELD: NO. The Court rules that the defense of state immunity from suit do not apply since said causes of action cannot be properly
considered as suits against the State in constitutional contemplation. These causes of action do not seek to impose a charge or
financial liability against the State, but merely the nullification of state action. The prayers attached to these two causes of action
are for the revocation of the Notice of Bid and the nullification of the purported award, nothing more. Had it been so that
petitioner additionally sought damages in relation to said causes of action, the suit would have been considered as one against the
State. Had the petitioner impleaded the DOTC itself, an unincorporated government agency, and not Lichauco herself, the suit
would have been considered as one against the State. But neither circumstance obtains in this case.
YAP v. CABALES  FACTS: Jesse Yap issued checks to Evelyn Te which were later rediscounted by Orlando Mirabueno. When the checks were
dishonored, Orlando filed civil actions to collect sums of money and criminal complaints for BP 22 against the Jesse. Jesse then
filed separate motions to suspend proceedings on account of the existence of a prejudicial question. He argued that, in the
pending civil cases, the issue as to whether Orlando is entitled to collect from him despite the lack of consideration, is an issue that
is a logical antecedent to the criminal cases for violation of BP 22. For if the court rules that there is no valid consideration for the
check's issuance, then it necessarily follows that he could not also be held liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.

Held: The issue in the criminal cases is whether the petitioner is guilty of violating B.P. Blg. 22, while in the civil case, it is whether
the private respondents are entitled to collect from the petitioner the sum or the value of the checks that they have rediscounted
from Evelyn. The resolution of the issue raised in the civil action is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the
criminal cases against him, and there is no necessity that the civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal cases.
In the aforementioned civil actions, even if petitioner is declared not liable for the payment of the value of the checks and
damages, he cannot be adjudged free from criminal liability for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The mere issuance of worthless checks
with knowledge of the insufficiency of funds to support the checks is in itself an offense.

In Jose v. Suarez, the prejudicial question under determination was whether the daily interest rate of 5% was void, such that the
checks issued by respondents to cover said interest were likewise void for being contra bonos mores, and thus the cases for B.P.
Blg. 22 will no longer prosper. In resolving the issue, We ruled that "whether or not the interest rate imposed by petitioners is
eventually declared void for being contra bonos mores will not affect the outcome of the BP Blg. 22 cases because what will
ultimately be penalized is the mere issuance of bouncing checks. In fact, the primordial question posed before the court hearing
the B.P. Blg. 22 cases is whether the law has been breached; that is, if a bouncing check has been issued."
DREAMWORK v. JANIOLA FACTS:
This case is a petition for the reversal of the decision on the suspension of the criminal proceeding filed by the petitioner in the
MTC for the ground that there is a presence of prejudicial question with respect to the civil case belatedly filed by the respondent.
The petitioner appealed to RTC but denied Dreamwork, through its President, and Vice-President, filed a Complaint Affidavit
 against Janiola for violation of BP 22 at the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas City.

Correspondingly, the former also filed a criminal information for violation of BP 22 against private respondent with the MTC,
entitled People of the Philippines v. Cleofe S. Janiola. On September 20, 2006, Janiola instituted a civil complaint against petitioner
for the rescission of an alleged construction agreement between the parties, as well as for damages.
Thereafter, respondent filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings in the Criminal Case for the ground that private respondent claim
that the civil case posed a prejudicial question against the criminal case. Petitioner opposed the Respondent’s Motion to Suspend
criminal proceeding based on juridical question for the following grounds:
(1) there is no prejudicial question in this case as the rescission of the contract upon which the bouncing checks were issued is a
separate and distinct issue from the issue of whether private respondent violated BP 22; and
(2) Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states that one of the elements of a prejudicial question is that “the previously
instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action”; thus, this
element is missing in this case, the criminal case having preceded the civil case.

The MTC granted the Respondents Motion to Suspend Proceedings. Petitioner appealed the Orders to the RTC but denied the
petition. Hence, this petition raised.

ISSUE: Whether or not the MTC or RTC Court erred in its discretion to suspend proceedings in Criminal Case on the basis of
“Prejudicial Question “, with respect to the Civil Case belatedly filed.

HELD: This petition must be granted, pursuant to SEC. 7.Elements of prejudicial question.
The elements of a prejudicial question are:
(a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal
action; and
(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

Under the amendment, a prejudicial question is understood in law as that which must precede the criminal action and which
requires a decision before a final judgment can be rendered in the criminal action. The civil action must be instituted prior to the
institution of the criminal action.

In this case, the Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan ahead of the complaint in Civil Case filed by the State with the RTC.
Thus, no prejudicial question exists. The Resolution of the Civil Case Is Not Determinative of the Prosecution of the Criminal Action.
Even if the trial court in the civil case declares that the construction agreement between the parties is void for lack of
consideration, this would not affect the prosecution of private respondent in the criminal case. The fact of the matter is that
private respondent issued checks that were subsequently dishonored for insufficient funds. It is this fact that is subject of
prosecution under BP 22. Therefore, it is clear that the second element required for the existence of a prejudicial question, is
absent. Thus, no prejudicial question exists.
PIMENTEL v. PIMENTEL Facts: Maria filed an action for frustrated parricide against Joselito. Several months after, the Joselito filed an action for the
declaration of the nullity of their marriage. He then filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings in the court where the
criminal case was pending on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. He asserted that since the relationship between
 the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of the civil case would have a bearing in the criminal case
filed against him. The RTC denied the motion. Joselito went to the CA. The CA ruled that even if the marriage between petitioner
and respondent would be declared void, it would be immaterial to the criminal case because prior to the declaration of nullity, the
alleged acts constituting the crime of frustrated parricide had already been committed. The Court of Appeals ruled that all that is
required for the charge of frustrated parricide is that at the time of the commission of the crime, the marriage is still subsisting.
Held: The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is whether petitioner is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the accused killed
the victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the acts of
execution which would have killed respondent as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of petitioners will. At the time of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and respondent were married. The
subsequent dissolution of their marriage, in case the petition in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is granted, will have no effect on the alleged
crime that was committed at the time of the subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the marriage between petitioner and
respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he
was still married to respondent.
CONSING, JR. V. PEOPLE Facts:
Petitioner negotiated with and obtained for himself and his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz (de la Cruz) various loans totaling
P18,000,000.00 from Unicapital Inc. (Unicapital). The loans were secured by a real estate mortgage constituted on a parcel of land
(property) covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-687599

In accordance with its option to purchase the mortgaged property, Unicapital agreed to purchase one-half of the... property for a
total consideration of P21,221,500.00. Payment was effected by off-setting the amounts due to Unicapital under the promissory
notes of de la Cruz and Consing in the amount of P18,000,000.00 and paying an additional amount of P3,145,946.50.

The other half of the... property was purchased by Plus Builders, Inc. (Plus Builders), a joint venture partner of Unicapital
Before Unicapital and Plus Builders could develop the property, they learned that the title to the property was really TCT No.
114708 in the names of Po Willie Yu and Juanito Tan Teng

On its part, Unicapital demanded the return of the total amount of P41,377,851.48 as of April 19, 1999 that had been paid to and
received by de la Cruz and Consing, but the latter ignored the demands

On July 22, 1999, Consing filed Civil Case No. 1759 in the Pasig City Regional Trial Court (RTC) (Pasig civil case) for injunctive relief...
on the ground that he had acted as... a mere agent of his mother

On the same date, Unicapital initiated a criminal complaint for estafa through falsification of public document against Consing and
de la Cruz in the Makati City Prosecutor's Office.

separate civil case from criminal case

On August 6, 1999, Unicapital sued Consing in the RTC in Makati City (Civil Case No. 99-1418) for the recovery of a sum of money
and damages, with an application for a writ of preliminary attachment (Makati civil case).
On February 15, 2001, Consing moved to defer his arraignment in the Makati criminal case on the ground of existence of a
 prejudicial question due to the pendency of the Pasig and Makati civil cases
criminal case filed by Plus Builders
On January 21, 2000, an information for estafa through falsification of public document was filed against Consing and De la Cruz in
the RTC in Imus, Cavite

Issues: CA did not consider the pendency of the Makati civil case (Civil Case No. 99-1418), which raised a prejudicial question,
considering that the resolution of such civil action would include the issue of whether he had falsified a certificate of title or had
willfully defrauded Unicapital, the resolution of either of which would determine his guilt or innocence in Criminal Case No. 00-120

Ruling: On November 26, 2001, the RTC issued an order suspending the proceedings in the Makati criminal case on the ground of
the existence of a prejudicial question
On May 20, 2003, the CA promulgated its decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 71252,[11] dismissing the petition for certiorari and
upholding the RTC's questioned orders,... January 27, 2000, however, the RTC handling the Cavite criminal case denied Consing's
motion
The CA granted the TRO on March 19, 2001, and later promulgated its decision on May 31, 2001, granting Consing' petition for
certiorari and setting aside the January 27, 2000 order of the RTC... praying for the reversal of the May 31, 2001 decision of the CA.
On January 16, 2003, the Court granted the petition for review in G.R. No. 148193, and reversed and set aside the May 31,... 2001
decision of the CA in regards to the criminal case of Unicapital which petition was originally deniedOn August 18, 2003, the CA
amended its decision, reversing itself
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the amended decision promulgated on August 18, 2003; and ORDERS petitioner to pay the costs
of suit.

Principles:
Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution,
and... shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, in the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the Civil Code, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the
criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages
twice for the same act... or omission charged in the criminal action
Even if respondent is declared merely an agent of his mother in the transaction involving the sale of the questioned lot, he cannot
be adjudged free from criminal liability. An agent or any person may be held liable for conspiring to falsify... public documents.
CATERPILLAR, INC. v.  FACTS: Two informations for unfair competition were filed against Samson, the registered owner of ITTI shoes. The infomations
SAMSON state that Samson did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously distribute, sell and/or offer for sale CATERPILLAR
products such as footwear, garments, clothing, bags, accessories and paraphernalia which are closely identical to and/or colorable
imitations of the authentic Caterpillar products and likewise using trademarks, symbols and/or designs as would cause confusion,
mistake or deception on the part of the buying public to the damage and prejudice of CATERPILLAR, INC., the prior adopter, user
and owner of the following internationally: “CATERPILLAR,” “CAT,” “CATERPILLAR & DESIGN,” “CAT AND DESIGN,” “WALKING
MACHINES” and “TRACK-TYPE TRACTOR & DESIGN.”
Samson filed a motion to suspend the arraignment and other proceedings in view of the existence of an alleged prejudicial
question involving a civil case for unfair competition pending with the same branch, and also in view of the pendency of a petition
for review filed with the Secretary of Justice assailing the Chief State Prosecutor’s resolution finding probable cause to charge
petitioner with unfair competition.

The TC judge denied the motion and arraignment ensued. Thereafter, Samson filed a motion to quash the informations
contending that since under Section 170 of R.A. No. 8293, the penalty of imprisonment for unfair competition does not exceed six
years, the offense is cognizable by the Municipal Trial Courts and not by the Regional Trial Court, per R.A. No. 7691. The TC judge
denied the motion. Hence, this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE/S:
1. Which court has jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases for violation of intellectual property rights?
2. Did the TC judge commit grave abuse of discretion when he refused to suspend the proceedings on the ground of existence of
prejudicial question and a pending petition for review before the Sec. of Justice on the finding of probable cause for unfair
competition?

RULING:
1. RTC. Under Section 170 of R.A. No. 8293, which took effect on January 1, 1998, the criminal penalty for infringement of
registered marks, unfair competition, false designation of origin and false description or representation, is imprisonment from 2 to
5 years and a fine ranging from Fifty Thousand Pesos to Two Hundred Thousand Pesos. Corollarily, Section 163 of the same Code
states that actions (including criminal and civil) under Sections 150, 155, 164, 166, 167, 168 and 169 shall be brought before the
proper courts with appropriate jurisdiction under existing laws.

The existing law referred to in the foregoing provision is Section 27 of R.A. No. 166 (The Trademark Law) which provides that
jurisdiction over cases for infringement of registered marks, unfair competition, false designation of origin and false description or
representation, is lodged with the CFI (now RTC). We find no merit in the claim of Samson that R.A. No. 166 was expressly repealed
by R.A. No. 8293. The use of the phrases “parts of Acts” and “inconsistent herewith” only means that the repeal pertains only to
provisions which are repugnant or not susceptible of harmonization with R.A. No. 8293.7 Section 27 of R.A. No. 166, however, is
consistent and in harmony with Section 163 of R.A. No. 8293. Had R.A. No. 8293 intended to vest jurisdiction over violations of
intellectual property rights with the Metropolitan Trial Courts, it would have expressly stated so under Section 163 thereof.
Moreover, the settled rule in statutory construction is that in case of conflict between a general law and a special law, the latter
must prevail. Jurisdiction conferred by a special law to Regional Trial Courts must prevail over that granted by a general law to
Municipal Trial Courts. In the case at bar, R.A. No. 8293 and R.A. No. 166 are special laws conferring jurisdiction over violations of
intellectual property rights to the Regional Trial Court. They should therefore prevail over R.A. No. 7691, which is a general law.
Hence, jurisdiction over the instant criminal case for unfair competition is properly lodged with the Regional Trial Court even if the
penalty therefor is imprisonment of less than 6 years, or from 2 to 5 years and a fine ranging from P50,000.00 to P200,000.00.
In fact, to implement and ensure the speedy disposition of cases involving violations of intellectual property rights under R.A. No.
8293, the Court issued A.M. No. 02-1-11-SC dated February 19, 2002 designating certain Regional Trial Courts as Intellectual
Property Courts. On June 17, 2003, the Court further issued a Resolution consolidating jurisdiction to hear and decide Intellectual
Property Code and Securities and Exchange Commission cases in specific Regional Trial Courts designated as Special Commercial
 Courts.

2. NO. Samson failed to substantiate his claim that there was a prejudicial question. He made no discussion in support of said
prayer in his petition and reply to comment. Neither did he attach a copy of the complaint in Civil Case nor quote the pertinent
portion thereof to prove the existence of a prejudicial question. At any rate, there is no prejudicial question if the civil and the
criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently of each other.

In the case at bar, the common element in the acts constituting unfair competition under Section 168 of R.A. No. 8293 is fraud.
Pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, in cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Hence, Civil Case No. Q-00-41446, which as
admitted by Caterpilar also relate to unfair competition, is an independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. As such, it
will not operate as a prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of the criminal cases at bar.

While the pendency of a petition for review is a ground for suspension of the arraignment, the aforecited provision limits the
deferment of the arraignment to a period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. It follows,
therefore, that after the expiration of said period, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer
arraignment.

In the instant case, Samson failed to establish that respondent Judge abused his discretion in denying his motion to suspend. His
pleadings and annexes submitted before the Court do not show the date of filing of the petition for review with the Secretary of
Justice.15Moreover, the Order dated August 9, 2002 denying his motion to suspend was not appended to the petition. He thus
failed to discharge the burden of proving that he was entitled to a suspension of his arraignment and that the questioned orders
are contrary to Section 11 (c), Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. Indeed, the age-old but familiar rule is that he
who alleges must prove his allegations.
NATURAL PERSONS: ARTICLES 40 - 42 PERSONALITY SPRINGS FROM BIRTH
QUIMIGUING v. ICAO FACTS: Carmen Quimiguing (petitioner) and Felix Icao (defendant) were neighbors, and had close and confidential relations. The
defendant, although married, succeeded in having carnal intercourse with petitioner several times by force and intimidation, and
without her consent. As a result she became pregnant, despite efforts and drugs supplied by defendant, and petitioner had to stop
studying. Hence, she claimed support at P120.00 per month, damages and attorney’s fees.

The defendant contended that the case be dismissed since it did not allege that the child had been born. After hearing arguments,
the trial judge sustained defendant’s motion and dismissed the complaint. Petitioner moved to amend the complaint that as a
result of the intercourse, she gave birth to a baby girl but the court ruled that “no amendment was allowable since the original
complaint averred no cause of action”.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner has the right to claim for support and damages.

RULING: A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to
it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The unborn child, therefore, has a right to support from its
 progenitors.

It is thus clear that the lower court’s theory that Article 291 of the Civil Code declaring that support is an obligation of parents and
illegitimate children “does not contemplate support to children as yet unborn,” violates Article 40 aforesaid, besides imposing a
condition that nowhere appears in the text of Article 291. It is true that Article 40 prescribing that “the conceived child shall be
considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it” adds further “provided it be born later with the conditions specified in
the following article” (i.e., that the foetus be alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mother’s womb).

Auxiliary reason: A second reason for reversing the orders appealed from is that for a married man to force a woman not his wife
to yield to his lust constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his victim that entitles her to claim compensation for the damage
caused. Says Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines:

ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

The rule of Article 21 is supported by Article 2219 of the same Code:

ART 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts

Hence, the girl has a cause of action.

CONTINENTAL STEEL  Chico-Nazario FACTS: Hortillano, an employee of petitioner CSMC and a member a union was granted by Atty. Montano the ff: Paternity Leave,
MANUFACTURING Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)
CORPORATION v. concluded between CSMC and the union. This, after his wife, Marife, had a pre-mature delivery which resulted to the death of
MONTAÑO their unborn child.

CSMC granted the paternity leave but denied his claims for bereavement leave, and death and accident insurance. It posited that
the express provision of the CBA did not contemplate the death of an unborn child, a fetus, without legal personality.

ISSUE: Whether or not Hortillano is entitled to bereavement and other death benefits on the death of his unborn child.

RULING: Yes, he is entitled.

The Court emphasize that bereavement leave and other death benefits are granted to an employee to give aid to, and if possible,
lessen the grief of, the said employee and his family who suffered the loss of a loved one. It cannot be said that the parents’ grief
and sense of loss arising from the death of their unborn child, who, in this case, had a gestational life of 38-39 weeks but died
during delivery, is any less than that of parents whose child was born alive but died subsequently.

The court also emphasized that life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before
he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn
from conception, that the State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation
 thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death.
JURIDICAL PERSONS: ARTICLES 44 - 47
MAYOR v. TIU
FAMILY CODE
ARTICLE 1. MARRIAGE DEFINED
REPUBLIC V. CA and CASTRO Facts: Husband personally attended to the processing of the documents relating to their application for a marriage license. The
marriage lasted only 4 months. It was discovered by the wife that no marriage license was issued by the LCR of Pasig City who
certified to that effect. In her petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, the wife presented as evidence the certification issued
by the LCR of Pasig City.

The SC held that:

-A certificate of “due search and inability to find” unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion issued by the local civil registrar
is sufficient proof that no marriage license is issued to the contracting parties.
-“Secret marriage” – a legally non-existent phrase but ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage celebrated without the knowledge
of the relatives and/or friends of either of both of the contracting parties.
SY v. CA

SEVILLA v. CARDENAS San Juan stating that no Marriage License No. 2770792 as appearing in the marriage contract of the parties was issued, are
sufficient to declare their marriage null and void ab initio.

Facts: Jaime Sevilla filed a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage with Carmelita Cardenas on the ground that he never
applied for a marriage license from any Civil Registry, consequently, no marriage license was presented to the solemnizing officer.
That although marriage license no. 2770792 allegedly issued in San Juan, Rizal on May 19, 1969 was indicated in the marriage
contract, the same was fictitious for he never applied for any marriage license. As proof, he presented 3 certifications that have,
more or less, the same contents as the first, issued by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Rizal that reads: “TO WHOM IT MAY
CONCERN: No Marriage License Number 2770792 were (sic) ever issued by this Office. With regards (sic) to Marriage License
Number 2990792, we exert all effort but we cannot find the said number. Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you
our force locating the above problem. San Juan, Metro Manila March 11, 1994

(SGD) RAFAEL ALISCAD, JR.

“Local Civil Registrar”

SC: The certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar must categorically state that the document does not exist in his office or the
particular entry could not be found in the register despite diligent search.

Note that the first 2 certifications bear the statement that “hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our full force
locating the above problem.” It could easily be implied from the said statement that the Office of the Civil Registrar could not exert
its best efforts to locate and determine the existence of Marriage License No. 2770792 due to its “loaded work.” Likewise, both
 certifications failed to state with absolute certainty whether or not suchlicense was issued. This implication is confirmed by the
testimony of the representative from the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, who stated that they could not locate the
logbook due to the fact that the person in charge of the said logbook had already retired. Further, the testimony of the said person
was not presented in evidence. It does not appear on record that the former custodian of the logbook was deceased or missing, or
that his testimony could not be secured. Given the documentary and testimonial evidence to the effect that utmost efforts were
not exerted to locate the logbook where Marriage License No. 2770792 may have been entered, the presumption of regularity of
performance of official functions by the LCR in issuing certifications is effectively rebutted.

Moreover, the absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof of non-issuance of Marriage License No. 2770792. It can also mean,
as we believed true in the case at bar, that the logbook just cannot be found. In the absence of showing of diligent efforts to search
for the said logbook, we cannot easily accept that the absence of the same also means non-existence or falsity of entries therein.

Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage, the indissolubility of
the marriage bonds. Semper praesumitor pro matrimonio – Always presume marriage.
ARTICLE 4—EFFECT RE. ABSENCE, EEFECT OR IRREGULARITY OF ESSENTIAL/FORMAL REQUISITES
COSCA v. PALAYPAYON Facts:
Complainants Juvy n. Cosca, Edmund B. Eralta, Ramon C. Sambo, and Apollo Villamora, are Stenographer I, Interpreter I, Cler II, and
Process Server, respectively, of the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur. Respondents Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon, Jr.
and Nelia B. Esmeralda-Baroy are respectively the Presiding Judge and Clerk of Court II of the same court.

In administrative complaint filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on October 5, 1992, herein respondents were charged
with the following offenses, to wit: (1) illegal solemnization of marriage; (2) falsification of the monthly reports of cases; (3) bribery
in consideration of an appointment in the court; (4) non-issuance of receipt for cash bond received; (5) infidelity in the custody of
detained prisoners; and (6) requiring payment of filing fees from exempted entities.

Complainants alleged that respondent judge solemnized marriages even without the requisite marriage licenses. Thus, the
following couples were able o get married by the simple expedient of paying the marriage fees to respondent Baroy, despite the
absence of a marriage license. In addition, respondent judge did not sign their marriage contracts and did not indicate the date of
solemnization, the reason being that he allegedly had to wait for the marriage license to be submitted by the parties which was
usually several days after the ceremony. The marriage contracts were not filed with the local civil registrar.

It is alleged that respondent judge made it appear that he solemnized seven (7) marriages in the month of July, 1992, when in
truth he did not do so or at most those marriages were null and void; that respondents likewise made it appear that they have
notarized only six (6) documents for July, 1992, but the Notarial Registrar will show that there were notarized during that month;
and that respondents reported a notarial fee of only P 18.50 for each document, although in fact they collected P 20.00 therefore
and failed to account for the difference.

Issue: Whether or not private respondent are guilty of violating the provision of Article 4 of the Family Code.
 Held:
On the charge regarding illegal marriages, the Family Code patiently provides that the formal requisites of marriage are, inter alia,
a valid marriage license except in the cases provided for therein. Complementarily, it declares that the absence of any of the
essential requisites shall generally render the marriage void ab initio and that, while and irregularity in the formal requisites shall
not affect the validity of the marriage, the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and
administratively liable.

The civil aspect is addressed to the contracting parties and those affected by the illegal marriages, and what the court provides for
pertains to the administrative liability of respondents, all without prejudice to their criminal responsibility. The Revised Penal Code
provides that priests or ministers of any religious denomination or sect, or civil authorities who shall perform or authorize any
illegal marriage ceremony shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the Marriage Law.This is of course, within the
province of the prosecutorial agencies of the Government.
ARANES v. OCCIANO FACTS: Petitioner Mercedita Mata charged respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of the Law for solemnizing the marriage
between her and Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage license. Because their marriage was nulled, her right to
inherit the vast properties left by Orobia and her entitlement for a pension was not granted. Judge Occiano averred that before
starting the ceremony, he examined the documents submitted to him by the petitioner and he discovered that the parties did not
possess a marriage license so he refused to solemnize the marriage. However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, he
proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of human compassion. After the solemnization, respondent reiterated the need for the
marriage license and admonished the parties that their failure to give it would render the marriage void. Petitioner and Orobia
assured the respondent that they would give the license to him, but they never did.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent’s guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a marriage license and outside his territorial
jurisdiction.

HELD: Yes. Respondent judge did not possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage of the petitioner because he
officiated the marriage outside his jurisdiction and knowing that the documents submitted to him lacked marriage license.
MORIGO v. PEOPLE FACTS:
Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates for 4 years, after which they lost contact with each other. They
reconnected again in 1984 and became sweethearts when Lucia was in Singapore until she went to Canada in 1986.

They got married in Aug.1990, the following month Lucia went back to Canada leaving Lucio behind. Lucia filed for divorce in
Canada which was granted by the court to take effect on Feb 17, 1992. On Oct. 4, 1992, Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha
Lumbago.

September 21, 1993, Lucio filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage with Lucia, on the ground that no
marriage ceremony actually took place. Lucio was charged with Bigamy in information filed by the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran
City, with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol.

Lucio filed a petition for certiorari seeking a reversal of his conviction. He should not be faulted for relying in good faith upon the
divorce decree of the Ontario court. The OSG counters that petitioner’s contention that he was in good faith in relying on the
 divorce decree is negated by his act of filing a petition for a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lucia.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner committed bigamy and if so, whether his defense of good faith is valid.

HELD:
The elements of bigamy are: (1) the offender has been legally married; (2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in
case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively dead; (3) he contracts a
subsequent marriage; and (4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the first.

The trial court held that the marriage of Lucio and Lucia is void ab initio, in accordance with the Family Code. What transpired was
a mere signing of the marriage contract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer.

The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally married. But in this case, legally speaking,
the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete.

Petitioner has not committed bigamy. His defense of good faith or lack of criminal intent is now moot and academic.
ALCANTARA v. ALCANTARA FACTS: On 8 December 1982 he and respondent, without securing the required marriage license, went to the Manila City Hall for
the purpose of looking for a person who could arrange a marriage for them. They met a person who, for a fee, arranged their
wedding. They got married on the same day. Another marriage was held in a church in Tondo. The marriage was likewise
celebrated without the parties securing a marriage license. The alleged marriage license, procured in Carmona, Cavite, appearing
on the marriage contract, is a sham, as neither party was a resident of Carmona, and they never went to Carmona to apply for a
license with the local civil registrar of the said place. A petition for annulment of marriage was filed by petitioner against
respondent. Rosita however asserts the validity of their marriage and maintains that there was a marriage license issued as
evidenced by a certification from the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite. Restituto has a mistress with whom he has
three children. Restituto only filed the annulment of their marriage to evade prosecution for concubinage. Rosita, in fact, has filed
a case for concubinage against Restituto.

ISSUE: Whether or not their marriage is valid.

HELD: A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Art 53 of NCC. Their marriage contract reflects a marriage license
number. A certification was also issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite. The certification is precise since it specifically
identified the parties to whom the marriage license was issued. Issuance of a marriage license where none of the parties is
resident, is just an irregularity. Marriage is still valid even if the marriage license is issued in a place not the domicile of the parties.
NOLLORA JR. v. PEOPLE Facts: Nollora first contracted marriage with Jesusa in 1999 then in 2001 he contracted another marriage with Rowena whom he
married twice- first in accordance with Catholic rites and the second, in accordance with Muslim rites. Sued for bigamy, he claimed
that he was a Muslim convert way back on January 10, 1992, even before he contracted he first marriage with Jesusa. As a convert,
he is entitled to marry 4 wives as allowed under the Muslim or Islam belief. He presented as proofs a Certificate of Conversion
where it stated that Nollora allegedly converted as a Muslim since January 19, 1992 and a duly approved Pledge of Conversion
dated January 10, 1992.
 He was not aware why in his marriage contract with Jesusa it was indicated he was ‘Catholic Pentecostal’ when she was aware that
he was already a Muslim convert at the time of their marriage. While in his marriage contract with Rowena, the religion indicated
was ‘Catholic’ because he was keeping as a secret his being a Muslim since the society does not approve of marrying a Muslim. He
also indicated that he was ‘single’ despite his first marriage to keep said first marriage secret.

HELD: Article 13 (2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws states that “in case of a marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim,
solemnized not in accordance with Muslim Law or this Code, the Family Code or Executive Order No. 209, in lieu of the Civil Code
shall apply.” Nollora’s religious affiliation is not an issue. Neither is the claim that Nollora’s marriages were solemnized according to
Muslim law. Regardless of his professed religion, Nollora cannot claim exemption from liability for bigamy.

Nollora asserted in his marriage certificate with Rowena that his civil status is “single”. Both of Nollora’s marriage contracts do not
state that he is a Muslim. Although the truth or falsehood of the declaration of one’s religion in the marriage certificate is not an
essential for marriage, such omissions are sufficient proofs of Nollora’s liability for bigamy. His false declaration about his civil
status is thus further compounded by these omissions.
REPUBLIC v. ALBIOS Facts:Albios married American Fringer in October 2004 in Mandaluyong City. On December 6, 2006, Albios filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of her marriage with Fringer. She alleged that immediately after their marriage, they separated and never
lived as husband and wife because they never really had any intention of entering into a married state or complying with any of
their essential marital obligations. Her marriage is one in jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio. She contracted Fringer to enter
into a marriage to enable her to acquire American citizenship and paid Fringer US$2,000.00.

ISSUE: IS A MARRIAGE, CONTRACTED FOR THE SOLE PURPOSE OF ACQURING AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP IN CONSIDERATION OF
US$2,000.00, VOID AB INITIO ON THE GROUND OF LACK OF CONSENT?

SC: The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant benefits. This has led to the development of marriage fraud for the sole
purpose of availing particular benefits. In the US, marriages where a couple marries only to achieve a particular purpose or acquire
specific benefits, have been referred to as “limited purpose” marriages. A common limited purpose marriage is one entered solely
for the legitimization of a child. Another, which is the subject of the present case, is for immigration purposes. But is a marriage
declared as a sham or fraudulent for the limited purpose of immigration is also legally void and inexistent.

Under Article 2 of the FC (consent being an essential requisite of marriage), for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and
(2) made in the presence solemnizing officer. A “freely given” consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and
deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the
vices of consent under Articles 45 and 46 of the FC. Consent must also be conscious and intelligent, in that the parties must be
capable of intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act. Their
understanding should not be affected by insanity, intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism.

Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real consent because it was not
vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the
nature and the beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That their
 consent was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through marriage.

The marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest. They have an undeniable intention to be bound in order to create the
very bond necessary to allowing Albios to acquire American citizenship.

The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the FC is to establish a conjugal and family life. The possibility that the parties
might have no real intention to establish a life together is, however, insufficient to nullify a marriage freely entered into in
accordance with law. There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than what the
Constitution or law declares, such as
ABBAS v. ABBAS Syed, a Pakistani, married to Gloria, a Filipino, was sued by the latter for bigamy as he allegedly contracted another marriage with a
certain Maria Corazon Buenaventura during the existence of the previous marriage. He subsequently filed a petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage due to absence of a marriage license.

Syed presented as proof a certification issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite that reads in part: “Marriage
License No. 9969967 was issued in favor of Mr. Arlindo Gelatado and Miss Myrna Mabilangan on January 19, 1993.

“No Marriage License was appear (sic) to have been issued to MR. SYED AZHAR ABBAS and MISS GLORIA GOO on January 8, 1993.
xxx.”

On appeal, the CA give credence to Gloria’s argument that the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar failed to categorically
state that a diligent search for the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was conducted and thus, the said certification could not be
accorded probative value. It further ruled that there was sufficient testimonial and documentary evidence that Gloria and Syed had
been validly married and there was compliance with all the requisites laid down by law. Syed had admitted to having signed the
marriage contract and that the parties comported themselves as husband and wife. That Syed only instituted the petition after
Gloria filed a case against him for bigamy.

SC: In the case of Carino v. Carino, following the case of Republic v. CA, it was held that the certification of the Local Civil Registrar
that their office had no record of a marriage license was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license. The case of Carino
further held that the presumed validity of the marriage of the parties had been overcome, and that it became the burden of the
party alleging a valid marriage to prove that the marriage was valid, and that the required marriage license had been secured.
Gloria had failed to discharge the burden, and the only conclusion that can be reached is no valid marriage license was issued. It
cannot be said that there was simple irregularity in the marriage that would not affect the validity of the marriage, as no license
was presented by the respondent. No marriage license was proven to have been issued to Gloria and Syed, based on the
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite and Gloria’s failure to produce a copy of the alleged marriage
license.

All the evidenced cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was conducted and a marriage contract was signed does not
operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage license.
GO—BANGAYAN v. Sally, to appease her father who is against her relationship with Bangayan, brought the latter to an office in Santolan, Pasig City
BANGAYAN where they signed a purported contract. When the relationship ended, Bangayan brought an action for the declaration of nullity of
 his marriage on the ground that his marriage with Sally was bigamous as he has a prior subsisting marriage with Azucena.

SC: The marriage between Sally and Benjamin “was made only in jest” and a “simulated marriage, at the instance of Sally, intended
to cover her up from expected social humiliation coming from relatives, friends and the society especially from her parents seen as
Chinese conservatives.” In short, it was a fictitious marriage.

As it was established that no marriage license was issued to them, the marriage was also non-existent. Applying the general rules
on void or inexistent contracts under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts which are absolutely simulated or fictitious are
“inexistent and void from the beginning.”

KHO v. REPUBLIC and KHO
For bigamy to exist, the 2nd or subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity except for the existence of a
prior marriage. In this case, there was really no subsequent marriage. Benjamin and Sally just signed the purported marriage
contract without a marriage license. The supposed marriage was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the NSO. In short,
the marriage between the parties did not exist even if they lived together and represented themselves as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage.
Facts: Petitioner’s parents summoned a clerk to arrange necessary papers on one afternoon for the intended marriage of parties
herein at midnight so as to exclude the public from witnessing the marriage ceremony. They were only able to fulfill such
ceremony at 3AM of the following day for reason that there was a public dance held in town plaza that was adjacent to the church
and such dance only finished at 2AM. Due to the shortness of period, said clerk was not able to secure them a marriage license.
Marriage was celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code.

Issue: WoN the marriage was valid. NO

Held: Art 53 in relation to Art 58 of the Civil Code explicitly provides that no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first
issued by the LCR except in a marriage of exceptional character under Art 72 to 79 of the same Code. Marriage performed without
the corresponding marriage license is void (Art. 80 (3)).
ARTICLES 7 and 10— SOLEMNIZING OFFICERS
TILAR v. TILAR  PERALTA FACTS: Jerrysus L. Tilar filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of his wife’s (Elizabeth)
psychological incapacity based on Article 36 of the Family Code.

Elizabeth failed to file her Answer despite being served with summons. The RTC then required the Public Prosecutor to conduct an
investigation whether collusion existed. In his Manifestation and Compliance, the Public Prosecutor certified as to the absence of
collusion between the parties. Trial, thereafter, ensued with Jerrysus and his witness testifying.

The RTC issued its assailed Decision dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.

In so ruling, the RTC ratiocinated:

“Marriage is a sacrament according to the teaching of the Catholic Church. Being a sacrament, the same is purely religious.
Declaration of nullity, which is commonly called an annulment in the Catholic Church, is a judgment rendered by an ecclesiastical
tribunal determining that the sacrament of marriage was invalidly contracted. The procedure is governed by the Church’s Canon
Law not by the civil law observed by the State in nullity cases involving civil marriages. Ergo, the principle of separation of Church
and State finds application in this case.

Clearly, the State cannot encroach into the domain of the Church, thus, resolving the validity of the church marriage is outside the
province of its authority. Although the Family Code did not categorize the marriage subject of the petition for nullity or annulment,
the Constitution as the fundamental law of the State laid down the principle of separation, ergo, it is beyond cavil that nullity of a
church marriage cannot be taken out of the church jurisdiction. The court being an entity of the State is bereft of any jurisdiction to
take cognizance of the case.”

Jerrysus filed a petition for review directly to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether the courts have jurisdiction to rule on the validity of marriage pursuant to the provision of the Family Code.

RULING: Yes.

Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution the maintenance of which the public is
deeply interested. The State is mandated to protect marriage, being the foundation of the family, which in turn is the foundation
of the nation.

Our law on marriage, particularly the Family Code, restates the constitutional provision to protect the inviolability of marriage and
the family relations.

Accordingly, Article 1 of the Family Code pertinently provides:

Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the
property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.

As marriage is a special contract, their terms and conditions are not merely subject to the stipulations of the contracting parties
but are governed by law. The Family Code provides for the essential as well as formal requisites for the validity of marriage.

The contract of marriage is entered into by complying with the requirements and formalities prescribed by law. The marriage of
Jerrysus and Elizabeth which was solemnized by a Catholic priest and was held in a church was in accordance with the above-
quoted provisions. Although, marriage is considered a sacrament in the Catholic church, it has civil and legal consequences which
are governed by the Family Code. As Jerrysus correctly pointed out, the instant petition only seeks to nullify the marriage contract
between the parties as postulated in the Family Code of the Philippines; and the declaration of nullity of the parties’ marriage in
the religious and ecclesiastical aspect is another matter. Notably, the proceedings for church annulment which is in accordance
with the norms of Canon Law is not binding upon the State as the couple is still considered married to each other in the eyes of the
 civil law. Thus, the principle of separation of the church and state finds no application in this case.

As marriage is a lifetime commitment which the parties cannot just dissolve at whim, the Family Code has provided for the grounds
for the termination of marriage. These grounds may be invoked and proved in a petition for annulment of voidable marriage or in a
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, which can be decided upon only by the court exercising jurisdiction over the matter.
Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 provides:

Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:

xxxx

(15) In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations;

Hence, a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, which Jerrysus filed before the RTC falls within its exclusive jurisdiction;
thus, the RTC erred in dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction.
ARTICLE 26 (2) - MARRIAGES BETWEEN A FILIPINO AND A FOREIGNER
REPUBLIC V. IYOY CHICO-NAZARIO
REPUBLIC V. ORBECIDO III QUISUMBING Historical background and legislative intent behind paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code were discussed.

Issue: Given a valid marriage between 2 Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid
divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?

Facts: Cipriano and Lady Myros were married in 1981. They had 2 children. In 1986 Lady Myros left for the United States, obtained
American citizenship and in 2000 obtained a decree of divorce and married one Innocent Stanley. Cipriano thereafter, filed a
petition for authority to remarry invoking par. 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. The Republic thru the OSG contends that the cited
provision is not applicable to the instant case because it applies only to a valid mixed marriage; that is, between a Filipino citizen
and an alien.

Held: On its face, Article 26 does not appear to govern the situation presented by the case at hand. It seems to apply only to cases
where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner.

The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 Quita vs. Court of Appeals. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum,
that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.

Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that par. 2 of Article 26 should be
interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later
on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino should likewise be allowed to
remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to
sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to

CORPUZ V. SANTO TOMAS BRION
(Art 407(?) CC)
mischievous results or contravene the literal purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason,
disregarding as far as necessary the spirit of the law.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of par. 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce
is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
Facts: Corpuz, a former Filipino citizen acquired Canadian citizenship married Filipino Daisylyn in January 2005. He divorced
Daisylyn in December 2005 when he found out that Daisylyn was having an affair with another man. The divorce decree took effect
on January 8, 2006. Two years later, Corpuz wanted to marry another Filipino in the Philippines and had the Canadian divorce
decree registered on his and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate in the Pasig City Civil Registry. Informed by the National Statistics Office
that his marriage still subsists despite registration of the decree and to be enforceable, the foreign divorcedecree must first be
judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court.
Gerbert then filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and /or declaration of marriage as dissolved. Daisylyn
manifested that she also desires to file a similar case but was prevented by financial and personal circumstances. The RTC ruled
that Gerbert is not the proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce as he is a naturalized
Canadian citizen. Only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the 2nd paragraph of Article 26 FC, in order for him/her
to remarry under Philippine law.
HELD:
Essentially, the 2nd par. of Article 26 of the FC provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the
alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry. Without the 2nd par. of Article 26 of the FC, the judicial
recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in
another proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of
severing the marital bond. The inclusion of the 2nd par. in Article 26 provides the direct exception to this rule and serves as basis
for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse and his/her alien spouse.
Additionally, an action based on the 2nd par. of Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce
decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is
likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for the
alien spouse (other than that already established by the decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his
national law. The foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under rules on evidence together with the alien’s
applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. The recognition may be made in an
action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of
his claim or defense.
 In Gerbert’s case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a
divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This section
requires proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the
copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a)accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and
(b)authenticated by the seal of his office.

While Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as the required certificates proving its authenticity, he
failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce. It remanded to the lower court because of Daisylyn’s conformity with the
petition.
FUJIKI V. MARINAY CARPIO Facts: In 2004, Japanese national Fujiki married Filipino Marinay butinasmuch as the marriage did not sit well with Fujiki’s parents,
the latter was unable to bring Marinay to Japan. The parties then lost contact with each other. Without her first marriage
dissolved, Marinay, in 2008 married Japanese Maekara who brought Marinay to Japan. But due to alleged physical abuse
committed by Maekara, she left him and contacted Fujiki. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay in obtaining a judgment from a Japan
family court declaring her marriage with Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. On January 14, 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the
RTC for “Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage). The RTC denied the petition on the
ground that only “the husband or the wife”, in this case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to declare their marriage
void, and not Fujiki.

SC: The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages does not apply in a
petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a foreign citizen of a
foreign country. Neither would the rule that only the husband or the wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage
apply “if the reason behind the petition is bigamy” (Juliano-Llave v. Republic).

A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal capacity of its parties. Philippine
courts must determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory laws. Citing Article 15
of the Civil Code, the SC held that “this is the rule of lex nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine State may
require, for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of foreign judgment affecting ist citizens, over whom it
exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal capacity of such citizen.”

There is no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is
fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article 35 (4) of
the FC. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25
in relation to Rule 39, Section 48 (b) of the Rules.

Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
 Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay.

Article 35 (4) of the FC, which declares bigamous marriages void from the beginning, is the civil aspect of Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code, which penalizes bigamy.
KOIKE V. KOIKE PERLAS-BERNABE Doreen is married to a Japanese national and they got a divorce. The divorce was issued by the mayor of the City of Ichinomiya. All
those documents related to the divorce were all properly certified by the Mayor. When Doreen returned to the Philippines, she
filed a petition for judicial recognition of the decree of divorce pursuant to Article 26 p. 2 of the Family Code.

HELD: Although Doreen submitted photocopies of the Civil Code of Japan and that there is such a law that allows divorce as a
means of terminating the marriage and that the mayor has the authority. All these are not properly authenticated. It was
remanded to the lower court.
REPUBLIC v. MARELYN PERALTA Facts: Marelyn Tanedo Manalo was married to a Japanese national, Yoshino Minoro. Manalo filed a case for divorce in Japan and
TANEDO MANALO after due proceedings, a divorce decree dated December 6, 2011, was granted. Manalo now wants to cancel the entry of marriage
between her and Minoro from the Civil Registry and to be allowed to reuse her maiden surname, Manalo.

According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code,Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse incapacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law

Issues:
1. Under Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code, can the Filipino spouse initiate the divorce instead of the foreign spouse?

2. Was the divorce obtained by Marelyn Manalo from Japan valid here in the Philippines?

Ruling:
1. Yes. The Court ruled that in interpreting the law, the intent should be taken into consideration. According to Justice Alicia
Sempio-Dy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, the aim of the amendment is to avoid the absurd situation of having
the Filipino deemed still married to a foreign spouse even though the latter is no longer married to the former. According to the
Supreme Court, the wording of Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code requires only that there be a valid divorce obtained
abroad and does not discriminate as to who should file the divorce, i.e., whether it is the Filipino spouse or the foreign spouse.
Also, even if assuming arguendo that the provision should be interpreted that the divorce proceeding should be initiated by the
foreign spouse, the Court will not follow such interpretation since doing so would be contrary to the legislative intent of the law.

In the issue of the application of Article 15 of the Civil Code in this case, the Court ruled that even if Manalo should be bound by
the nationality principle, blind adherence to it should not be allowed if it will cause unjust discrimination and oppression to certain
classes of individuals whose rights are equally protected by the law.

The Court also ruled that Article 26 of the Family Code is in violation of the equal protection clause. They said that the limitation
provided by Article 26 is based on a superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical classification. The violation of the equal protection clause
 in this case is shown by the discrimination against Filipino spouses who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding and Filipinos who
obtained a divorce decree because the foreign spouse had initiated the divorce proceedings. Their circumstances are alike, and
making a distinction between them as regards to the validity of the divorce decree obtained would give one undue favor and
unjustly discriminate against the other.

The Court also said that it is the State’s duty not only to strengthen the solidarity of the Filipino family but also to defend, among
others, the right of children to special protection from all forms of neglect abuse, cruelty, and other conditions prejudicial to their
development. The State cannot do this if the application of paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is limited to only those
foreign divorces initiated by the foreign spouse.

2. The Court cannot determine due to insufficient evidence.

It has been ruled that foreign laws must be proven. There are two basic types of divorces: (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo
matrimonii, which terminates the marriage, and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro, which suspends it and leaves the bond in
full force.

The presentation solely of the divorce decree will not suffice to lead the Court to believe that the decree is valid or constitutes
absolute divorce. The fact of divorce must still be proven. Therefore, the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved.

In this case, the Court remanded the case to the court of origin for further proceedings and reception of evidence as to the
relevant Japanese law on divorce.
REPUBLIC V. FLORIE GRACE REYES, JR.
COTE
DE LA CRUZ-MORISONO V. PERLAS-BERNABE
RYOJ I MORISONO
STEPHEN JUEGO—SAKAI V. PERALTA
REPUBLIC
RACHO v. TANAKA LEONEN
IN RE: PETITION FOR
JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF
DIVORCE BETWEEN
MINURO TAKAHASHI AND
JULIET RENDORA MORANA
JULIET RENDORA MINURO
TAKAHASHI AND JULIET
RENDORA MORANA JULIET
RENDORA MORANA V.
REPUBLIC
ARTICLE 34- MARRIAGES EXEMPT FROM MARRIAGE LICENSE REQUIREMENT/EFFECT ON FALSITY OF AFFIDAVIT OF COHABITATION
NINAL V. BADAYOG FACTS:
Pepito Ninal was married with Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. They had 3 children namely Babyline, Ingrid and Archie,
petitioners. Due to the shot inflicted by Pepito to Teodulfa, the latter died on April 24, 1985 leaving the children under the
guardianship of EngraceNinal. 1 year and 8 months later, Pepito and Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license.
They instituted an affidavit stating that they had lived together for at least 5 years exempting from securing the marriage license.
Pepito died in a car accident on February 19, 1977. After his death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the
marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that said marriage was void for lack of marriage license. The case was filed under the
assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioner’s successional rights.Norma filed a motion
to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the persons who could file an action for
“annulment of marriage” under Article 47 of the Family Code.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito was void?
2. Whether or not the heirs of the deceased may file for the declaration of the nullity of Pepito’s marriage after his death?

RULING:
1. The marriage of Pepito and Norma is void for absence of the marriage license. The two marriages involved herein having been
solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code (FC), the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was
the law in effect at the time of their celebration. A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil
Code, the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio. However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code
wherein a marriage license is dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article 76, referring to the marriage of a man and a
woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at
least five years before the marriage.

In this case, they cannot be exempted even though they instituted an affidavit and claimed that they cohabit for at least 5 years
because from the time of Pepito’s first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with Norma, only about 20 months had
elapsed. Albeit, Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and Norma had started living with each
other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation
contemplated by law. Hence, his marriage to Norma is still void.

2. No. Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage.
“A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their original rights or to make the marriage void but
though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of society as for the peace of mind
of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of
competent jurisdiction. Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal
rights upon the parties is as though no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity
can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court
between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere
proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts.” It is not like a
voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so
 that on the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio. But Article 40 of the Family Code
expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can
enter into a second marriage and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that effect.

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other
purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heir ship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate,
dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit
not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to
any issue that may arise in the case.
MANZANO V. SANCHEZ DAVIDE JR. FACTS:
Petitioner was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization. He was married to the
respondent but was shocked of the infidelity on the part of his wife. He went back to Canada and filed a petition for divorce and
was granted. Desirous to marry another woman he now loved, he registered the divorce decree in the Civil Registry Office and was
informed that the foreign decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court. Petitioner filed for judicial
recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of marriage as dissolved with the RTC where respondent failed to submit any
response. The RTC denied the petition on the basis that the petitioner lacked locus standi. Thus, this case was filed before the
Court.

ISSUE:
WON the second paragraph of Art 26 of the FC extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction from the
recognition of a foreign divorce decree.

RULING: No. Not all of the requirements are met by the couple making the said marriage null and void.

Article 34 of the Family Code provides:

No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit
before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained
the qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the marriage.

For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following requisites must concur:

1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage;
2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;
3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time of marriage;
4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five years [and are without legal
impediment to marry each other]; and
5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the qualifications of the parties and that he
had found no legal impediment to their marriage.
 Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. Making the decision of the solemnizing officer questionable.

Among the requisites of Article 34 is that parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other. Considering that both
parties has a subsisting marriage, as indicated in their marriage contract that they are both “separated” is an impediment that
would make their subsequent marriage null and void. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for
at least 5 years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Clearly, respondent Judge Sanchez demonstrated gross
ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage.
DE CASTRO V. DE CASTRO TINGA  FACTS: Reinel and Annabelle met became a couple in 1991. They applied for a marriage license in September 1994. When the
couple went back to the Office of the Civil Registrar, the marriage license had already expired. Thus, in order to push through with
the wedding despite of absence of marriage license, they executed an affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating that they had been
living together as husband and wife for at least five years. They got married on the same day. However, they did not live together
as husband and wife. In November 1995, Annabelle gave birth to a daughter, and supported the child on her own. Annabelle then
filed a complaint for support against petitioner before the RTC Pasig. In her complaint, respondent alleged that she is married to
petitioner and that the latter has a responsibility or obligation to financially support her as his wife and their child. Reinel denied
that they are married and claimed that the marriage is void ab initio because the affidavit they jointly executed is a fake. And that
he was only forced by Annabelle to marry her to avoid the humiliation that the pregnancy without marriage may bring her. The
trial court ruled that the marriage is not valid because it was solemnized without a marriage license. However, it declared
petitioner as the natural father of the child, and thus obliged to give her support.

ISSUE: Whether or not their marriage is valid.

HELD: The false affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed so they could push through with the marriage has no value
whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They were not exempt from the marriage license requirement. Their failure to obtain and
present a marriage license renders their marriage void ab initio.
DAYOT V. DAYOT  FACTS: Jose was introduced to Felisa in 1986. He later came to live as a boarder in Felisa’s house, the latter being his landlady.
Later, Felisa requested him to accompany her to the Pasay City Hall, so she could claim a package sent to her by her brother from
Saudi. There, a man bearing three folded pieces of paper approached them. They were told that Jose needed to sign the papers
so that the package could be released to Felisa. He initially refused to do so. However, Felisa cajoled him, and told him that his
refusal could get both of them killed by her brother who had learned about their relationship. He signed the papers and gave them
to the man. It was in February 1987 when he discovered that he had contracted marriage with Felisa. When he confronted Felisa,
she said she does not know of such. Jose claimed that their marriage was contracted with fraud. Felisa denied Jose’s allegations
and defended the validity of their marriage. Felisa expounded that while her marriage to Jose was subsisting, the latter contracted
marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual on August 31, 1990. On 3 June 1993, Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose.
Subsequently, she filed an administrative complaint against Jose with the Office of the Ombudsman, since Jose and Rufina were
both employees of the National Statistics and Coordinating Board. The Ombudsman found Jose administratively liable for
disgraceful and immoral conduct ans suspended him for one year without emolument. The RTC ruled against Jose claiming that his
story is impossible. RTC cited Article 87 of the New Civil Code which requires that the action for annulment of marriage must be
commenced by the injured party within four years after the discovery of the fraud.
 ISSUE: W/N the issue of validity of marriage due to fraud is prescriptible

HELD: SC held that an action for nullifying a marriage is imprescriptible. It may be raised anytime. Jose and Felisa’s marriage was
celebrated without a marriage license. No other conclusion can be reached except that it is void ab initio.
CARLOS V. SANDOVAL REYES, R.T. Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos were brothers who each had three parcels of land by virtue of inheritance. Later
Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by his wife Felicidad Sandoval and their son, Teofilo Carlos II. Upon Teofilo’s death, two
parcels of land were registered in the name of Felicidad and Teofilo II. In August 1995, Carlos commenced an action for the
annulment of the marriage between Teofilo and Felicidad. In his complaint, Carlos asserted that the marriage between his late
brother and Felicidad was a nullity in view of the absence of the required marriage license. He likewise maintained that his
deceased brother was neither the natural nor the adoptive father of Teofilo Carlos II. He argued that the properties covered by
such certificates of title, including the sums received by respondents as proceeds, should be reconveyed to him.

ISSUE: Who may file an action for annulment of marriage?

HELD: A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife. Exceptions: (1)
Nullity of marriage cases commenced before the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and (2) Marriages celebrated during the
effectivity of the Civil Code. Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may not be filed by any party outside of the marriage. A
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. Only an aggrieved or
injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such
petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the belief that they do
not have a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their
predecessor, and, hence, can only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding
for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to
preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution. The Rule extends only to marriages entered into during the effectivity of the
Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988.

The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages marks the beginning of the end of the right of the heirs
of the deceased spouse to bring a nullity of marriage case against the surviving spouse. But the Rule never intended to deprive the
compulsory or intestate heirs of their successional rights.

While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or the wife, it does not mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are without any recourse under the law. They can still
protect their successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not
in a proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.

It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to cases already commenced before March 15, 2003 although the
marriage involved is within the coverage of the Family Code. This is so, as the new Rule which became effective on March 15, 2003
 is prospective in its application.

Carlos commenced the nullity of marriage case against Felicidad in 1995. The marriage in controversy was celebrated on May 14,
1962. Which law would govern depends upon when the marriage took place.

The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law is the Civil Code which was the
law in effect at the time of its celebration. But the Civil Code is silent as to who may bring an action to declare the marriage void.
Does this mean that any person can bring an action for the declaration of nullity of marriage?

True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the respondents were married, or even in the Family Code,
there is no specific provision as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage; however, only a party who can
demonstrate “proper interest” can file the same. A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest and must be based on a cause of action. Thus, in Ninal v.
Badayog, the Court held that the children have the personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage of their
deceased father to their stepmother as it affects their successional rights.

On prospective application: law or rule expressly

provides for prospective application although it is a procedural or a
remedial law.
SANTIAGO v. PEOPLE SERENO Facts: 4 months after solemnization of marriage, Leonila (petitioner) and Nicanor Santiago were served an information for Bigamy
for the prosecution adduced that Nicaonor was still married to Estela when he entered into the 2nd marriage; he was able to
escape while petitioner pleaded ‘not guilty’ relying on the fact that when she married him, she thought he was single. She soon
averred that their marriage was void due to lack of marriage license, wherein she should not then be charged with bigamy. 11
years after inception if criminal case, Estela Galang, the first wife, testified for the prosecution. She alleged that she had met
petitioner and introduced herself as the legal wife. Petitioner denied allegation and stated that she met Estela only after she had
already married Nicanor.

Issue: W/N petitioner is co-accused in the instant case of Bigamy.

W/N marriage between Leonila and Nicanor is valid

Held: Lower courts consistently found that petitioner indeed knew of the first marriage as shown by the totality of the following
circumstances: (1) when Nicanor was courting and visiting petitioner in the house of her in-laws, they openly showed their
disapproval of him (2) it was incredible for a learned person like petitioner to not know of his true civil status (3) Estela, who was
the more credible witness, compared to petitioner who had various inconsistent testimonies, straightforwardly testified that she
had already told petitioner on two occasions that the former was the legal wife of Nicanor. In People v. Archilla, knowledge of the
second wife of the fact of her spouse’s existing prior marriage, constitutes an indispensable cooperation in the commission of
Bigamy, which makes her responsible as an accomplice. She is not co-accused. She is guilty of Bigamy as an accomplice thereby
sentenced to 6m arresto mayor to 4y prision correccional.
ARTICLE 36 - PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
SANTOS V. CA VITUG FACTS:
Leouel, a First Lieutenant of the Philippine Army, married Julia in a municipal trial court and thereafter, in a church. She gave birth
to a baby boy and was named Leouel Jr. Occasionally, the couple quarreled over a lot of things including the interference of Julia’s
parents into their family affairs.

Julia went to US to work as a nurse and promised husband that she will return once her contract will have expired. She never did.
Leouel tried to find her in the US but somehow failed to contact her or get in touch with her.

Leouel filed a petition to have their marriage declared null and void, citing Article 36 of the Family Code. He argued that Julia’s
failure to return home and communicating with him for more than 5 years constitute psychological incapacity.

ISSUE: Whether or not their marriage can be considered void under Article 36 of the Family Code.

RULING: No. Julia’s failure to return to her husband and communication with him do not constitute psychological incapacity.

Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) juridical antecedence, (b) gravity and (c) incurability.

The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This
psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. In the case at bar, although Leouel stands aggrieved, his
petition must be dismissed because the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife is not clearly shown by the factual settings
presented. The factual settings do not come close to the standard required to decree a nullity of marriage.
CH1 MING TSOI V. CA TORRES, JR. FACTS:
Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao Tsoi was married in 1988. After the celebration of their wedding, they proceed to the house of
defendant’s mother. There was no sexual intercourse between them during their first night and same thing happened until their
fourth night. In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place, they went to Baguio but Gina’s relatives went with them.
Again, there was no sexual intercourse since the defendant avoided by taking a long walk during siesta or sleeping on a rocking
chair at the living room. Since May 1988 until March 1989 they slept together in the same bed but no attempt of sexual
intercourse between them. Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examination to a urologist in Chinese General
Hospital in 1989. The result of the physical examination of Gina was disclosed, while that of the husband was kept confidential
even the medicine prescribed. There were allegations that the reason why Chi Ming Tsoi married her is to maintain his residency
status here in the country. Gina does not want to reconcile with Chi Ming Tsoi and want their marriage declared void on the
ground of psychological incapacity. On the other hand, the latter does not want to have their marriage annulled because he loves
her very much, he has no defect on his part and is physically and psychologically capable and since their relationship is still young,
they can still overcome their differences. Chi Ming Tsoi submitted himself to another physical examination and the result was
there is not evidence of impotency and he is capable of erection.

ISSUE: Whether Chi Ming Tsoi’s refusal to have sexual intercourse with his wife constitutes psychological incapacity.

HELD: The abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder
 which to the mind of the Supreme Court clearly demonstrates an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance tot
the marriage within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code.

If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marital obligations and the refusal is
senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal.
Furthermore, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is to procreate children thus constant non-fulfillment
of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity and wholeness of the marriage.
REPUBLIC V. CA and PANGANIBAN Facts : On April 14, 1985, plaintiff Roridel O Molina married Reynaldo Molina which union bore a son. After a year of marriage,
MOLINA Reynaldo show signs of immaturity and irresponsibility as a husband and father as he preferred to spend more time with his
friends, depended on his parents for assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances resulting in frequent
quarrels between them. The RTC granted Roridel petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage which was affirmed by CA.

Issue : Do irreconcilable differences and conflicting personality constitute psychological incapacity?

Ruling : There is no clear showing that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to be more of a “difficulty” if
not outright “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of some marital obligations.

Mere showing of “irreconcilable differences” and “conflicting personalities” in no wise constitute psychological incapacity. It is not
enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be
shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness.

The evidence merely adduced that Roridel and her husband could not get along with each other. There had been no showing of
the gravity of the problem, neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability.

The following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the
guidance of the bench and the bar:

The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity
must be psychological – not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.
The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of the marriage.
Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically of clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus,
“mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts” cannot be accepted as root causes.
The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Article 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and
wife as well as Articles 220,221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven be evidence and included in the text of the decision.
 Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision
Committee from the 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983.
The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision
shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein
his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.
MARCOS V. MARCOS PANGANIBAN FACTS: Brenda and Wilson first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were assigned at the Malacañang Palace, she as an
escort of Imee Marcos and he as a Presidential Guard of President Ferdinand Marcos. They later on became sweethearts and got
married and had 5 children. After the EDSA revolution, both of them sought a discharge from the military service. He engaged to
different business ventures but failed. She always urged him to look for work so that their children would see him, instead of her,
as the head of the family and a good provider. Due to his failure to engage in any gainful employment, they would often quarrel
and as a consequence, he would hit and beat her. He would even force her to have sex with him despite her weariness. He would
also inflict physical harm on their children for a slight mistake and was so severe in the way he chastised them. Thus, for several
times during their cohabitation, he would leave their house. In 1992, they were already living separately. She did not want him to
stay in their house anymore so when she saw him in their house, she was so angry that she lambasted him. He then turned violent,
inflicting physical harm on her and even on her mother who came to her aid. She sought for nullity of their marriage on the ground
of psychological incapacity. The Brenda submitted herself to psychologist Natividad A. Dayan, Ph.D., for psychological evaluation.
The court a quo found Wilson to be psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations mainly because of his failure to
find work to support his family and his violent attitude towards Brenda and their children. RTC granted the petition. CA reversed.
Hence, this case.

ISSUE: W/N there is a need for personal medical examination of respondent to prove psychological incapacity? Whether the
totality of evidence presented in this case show psychological incapacity

HELD: Personal medical or psychological examination of respondent is not a requirement for a declaration of psychological
incapacity. Nevertheless, the totality of the evidence she presented does not show such incapacity. Although SC is convinced that
respondent failed to provide material support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the
totality of these acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his
“defects” were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.
DEDEL v. CA YNARES-SANTIAGO  FACTS:

Petitioner David B. Dedel married respondent Sharon L. Corpuz Dedel wedding on May 20, 1967. The union produced four
children. The conjugal partnership, nonetheless, acquired neither property nor debt.

Sharon turned out to be an irresponsible and immature wife and mother and had extra-marital affairs with several men. Sharon
once underwent treatment with a clinical psychologist but it did not stop Sharon in her illicit affairs where she even had two
children out of wedlock.

Sharon returned to petitioner bringing along her two children. Petitioner accepted her back and even considered the two
 illegitimate children as his own. December 9, 1995, Sharon abandoned petitioner to join Ibrahim in Jordan with their two children.

Petitioner filed a petition seeking the declaration of nullity of his marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Dr. Dayan
declared that Sharon was suffering from Anti-Social Personality Disorder exhibited by her blatant display of infidelity and had no
capacity for remorse. Her repeated acts of infidelity and abandonment of her family are indications of Anti-Social Personality
Disorder amounting to psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage.

ISSUES:
Does the totality of the evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding that respondent is psychologically incapacitated?
Does the aberrant sexual behavior of respondent adverted to by petitioner fall within the term “psychological incapacity?”

HELD:
Respondent’s sexual infidelity can hardly qualify as being mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that she could not have
known the obligations she was assuming. Neither could her emotional immaturity, irresponsibility and abandonment constitute
psychological incapacity. It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make respondent
completely unable to discharge the essential marital obligations. The manifestations presented refers only to grounds for legal
separation, not for declaring a marriage void.

The grief, frustration and even desperation of petitioner in his present situation cannot be denied. While sympathy is warranted in
the petitioner’s marital predicament, the law must be applied no matter how harsh it may be.
TENEBRO V. CA YNARES-SANTIAGO  FACTS: Veronico Tenebro contracted marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. Tenebro and Ancajas
lived together continuously and without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had
been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage
contract between him and Villareyes. Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he
shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes. On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another
marriage, this one with a certain Nilda Villegas. When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes whether
the latter was indeed married to petitioner. In a handwritten letter, Villareyes confirmed that petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, was
indeed her husband. Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. Villegas countered that his marriage with
Villareyes cannot be proven as a fact there being no record of such. He further argued that his second marriage, with Ancajas, has
been declared void ab initio due to psychological incapacity. Hence he cannot be charged for bigamy.

ISSUE: Whether or not Tenebro is guilty of bigamy.

HELD: Individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage is criminally liable for
bigamy notwithstanding the declaration of the second marriage as void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.
JARILLO V. PEOPLE DEL CASTILLO FACTS:
On November 1979, the accused Victoria S. Jarillo,being previously united in lawful marriage with Rafael M. Alocillo in 1974, and
without the said marriage having been legally dissolved, contracted a second marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy which
marriage was only discovered in 1999.
 On the same year, Emmanuel Uy (2nd husband) filed against the appellant a civil case for annulment of marriage before the RTC.
Parenthetically, Jarillo filed for declaration of nullity of their marriage against Alocillo in 2000.

For her defense, petitioner insisted that (1) her marriage to Alocillo was null and void because Alocillo was allegedly still married to
a certain Loretta Tillman at the time of the celebration of their marriage; (2) her marriages to both Alocillo and Uy were null and
void for lack of a valid marriage license; and (3) the action had prescribed, since Uy knew about her marriage to Alocillo as far back
as 1978. Notwithstanding her defenses, the RTC found Jarillo guilty for the crime of bigamy in 2001 and was sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of six years to ten years of prision mayor.

On appeal to the CA, petitioner’s conviction was affirmed. It held that petitioner committed bigamy when she contracted marriage
with Emmanuel Santos Uy because, at that time, her marriage to Rafael Alocillo had not yet been declared null and void by the
court. This being so, the presumption is, her previous marriage to Alocillo was still existing at the time of her marriage to Uy. The
CA also struck down, for lack of sufficient evidence, petitioner’s contentions that her marriages were celebrated without a
marriage license, and that Uy had notice of her previous marriage as far back as 1978.

In the meantime, the RTC rendered a decision in 2003, declaring petitioner’s 1974 marriage to Alocillo null and void ab initio on the
ground of Alocillo’s psychological incapacity. Said decision became final and executory. In her motion for reconsideration,
petitioner invoked said declaration of nullity as a ground for the reversal of her conviction.

ISSUE: W/N CA committed a reversible error in affirming the conviction of Jarillo for the crime of bigamy despite the supervening
proof that her marriage to Alocillo had been declared void.

HELD: No. Jarillo’s conviction of the crime of bigamy must be affirmed. The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of her
marriage to Alocillo cannot be considered a valid defense in the crime of bigamy. The moment petitioner contracted a second
marriage without the previous one having been judicially declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was already consummated.
Under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial
proceeding.

The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to [private complainant] had no bearing upon the
determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of
bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.

Without a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage, it is presumed to be subsisting. Any decision in the civil action for
nullity would not erase the fact that the guilty party entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage.
Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial
question.
REPUBLIC V. HAMANO CORONA FACTS:
Lolita Quintero and Toshio Hamano started a common-law relationship in Japan. They later lived in the Philippines for a month.
Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. They had a child and in January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were
married
 Unknown to respondent, Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities, which incapacity became
manifest only after the marriage. One month after they Toshio returned to Japan and promised to celebrate the holidays with his
family. After sending money to respondent for two months, Toshio stopped giving financial support. She wrote him several times
but he never responded. She learned from her friends that Toshio visited the Philippines but he did not bother to see her and their
child. June 1996 Lolita filed for annulment.

Exhaustive efforts were done to contact Toshio to no avail so she was allowed by the court to submit evidence ex parte. She
testified on how Toshio abandoned his family. She offered documentary evidence to support her testimony.

Court found that respondent failed to fulfill his obligations as husband of the petitioner and father to his daughter. Respondent
remained irresponsible and unconcerned over the needs and welfare of his family. Such indifference is a clear manifestation of
insensitivity and lack of respect for his wife and child which characterizes a very immature person. Certainly, such behavior could
be traced to respondent’s mental incapacity and disability of entering into marital life. Court granted her petition of nullity.

ISSUES:
Can a mixed marriage be embraced in psychological incapacity?
Is failing to meet a duty to live with, care for and support a family and abandonment constitute psychological incapacity?

HELD: In proving psychological incapacity, court finds no distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. Court cannot
be lenient in the application of the rules merely because the spouse alleged to be psychologically incapacitated happens to be a
foreign national. However, the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was psychologically incapacitated.

Abandonment is a ground for legal separation. Psychological defect cannot be presumed from the mere fact that Toshio
abandoned his family.
ANTONIO V. REYES TINGA FACTS: Leonilo Antonio and Marie Reyes met in August 1989 when 26 and 36 years old respectively. They got married a year after.
On 8 March 1993, petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to respondent declared null and void because of the latter’s
psychological incapacity. The following are his allegations: (1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an
illegitimate son and instead introduced the boy as the adopted child of her family. (2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-
law, Edwin David, attempted to rape and kill her when in fact, no such incident occurred. (3) She misrepresented herself as a
psychiatrist to her obstetrician, Dr. Consuelo Gardiner, and told some of her friends that she graduated with a degree in
psychology, when she was neither. (4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent affiliated with Blackgold Recording
Company which is not true. (5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez, and under those names, sent lengthy
letters to petitioner claiming to be from Blackgold and touting her as the "number one moneymaker" in the commercial industry
worth P2 million. Petitioner later found out that respondent herself was the one who wrote and sent the letters to him. (6) She
represented herself as a person of greater means, thus, she altered her payslip to make it appear that she earned a higher income.
She bought a sala set from a public market but told petitioner that she acquired it from a famous furniture dealer. She spent
lavishly on unnecessary items and ended up borrowing money from other people on false pretexts. (7) She exhibited insecurities
and jealousies over him to the extent of calling up his officemates to monitor his whereabouts. When he could no longer take her
unusual behavior, he separated from her in August 1991. He tried to attempt a reconciliation but since her behavior did not
 change, he finally left her for good in November 1991. Dr. Lopez, a clinical psychologist, stated based on the tests they conducted
that petitioner was essentially a normal, introspective, shy and conservative type of person. On the other hand, they observed that
respondent’s persistent and constant lying to petitioner was abnormal or pathological.
In opposing the petition, respondent claimed that she performed her marital obligations by attending to all the needs of her
husband. She asserted that there was no truth to the allegation that she fabricated stories, told lies and invented personalities.
Respondent presented Dr. Antonio Efren Reyes, a psychiatrist, to refute the allegations anent her psychological condition. Dr.
Reyes testified that the series of tests conducted by his assistants led him to conclude that respondent was not psychologically
incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations. He postulated that regressive behavior, gross neuroticism, psychotic
tendencies, and poor control of impulses, which are signs that might point to the presence of disabling trends, were not elicited
from respondent. RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner. CA reversed RTC’s judgment. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: W/N Marie Reyes is psychologically incapacitated

HELD: Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the psychological incapacity of his spouse. Apart from his own
testimony, he presented witnesses who corroborated his allegations on his wife’s behavior, and certifications from Blackgold
Records and the Philippine Village Hotel Pavillon which disputed respondent’s claims pertinent to her alleged singing career. The
root cause of respondent’s psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically identified and proven by experts. And Catholic
Church annulled their marriage. Indeed, a person unable to distinguish between fantasy and reality would similarly be unable to
comprehend the legal nature of the marital bond, much less its psychic meaning, and the corresponding obligations attached to
marriage, including parenting. One unable to adhere to reality cannot be expected to adhere as well to any legal or emotional
commitments
NAJERA V. NAJERA  FACTS:
Petitioner filed with the RTC a verified Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with Alternative Prayer for Legal separation,
with Appliction for Designation as Administrator Pendente Lite of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains. Petitioner alleged that she and
respondent are residents of Bugallon, Pangasinan, but respondent is presently living in the (United States of America). They were
married but are childless.

Petitioner claimed that at the time of the celebration of marriage, respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations of the marriage, and such incapacity became manifest only after marriage; (1) that respondent
was jobless and was not exerting effort to find a job at the time of marriage; only with the help of petitioner’s elder brother, who
was a seaman, was respondent able to land a job as a seaman; (2) that while employed as a seaman, respondent did not give
petitioner sufficient financial support); (3) that respondent would quarrel with petitioner and falsely accuse her of having an affair
with another man whenever he came home, and took to smoking marijuana and drinking; (4) that on July 1, 1994, while he was
quarreling with petitioner, without provocation, he inflicted physical violence upon her and attempted to kill her with a bolo; and
(6) after the said incident respondent left the family home, taking along all their personal belongings, and abandoned the
petitioner. Petitioner reported the incident at the police station of Bugallon, Pangasinan.

ISSUE: Whether or not the totality of petitioner’s evidence was able to prove that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential obligations of marriage warranting the annulment of their marriage under Article 1: of the Family Code.
 RULING: No. The evidence presented by petitioner in regard to the physical violence or grossly abusive conduct toward petitioner
and respondent’s abandonment of petitioner justifiable cause for more than one year are grounds for legal separation only and
not for annulment of marriage under Article 1: of the Family Code.
FERRARIS v. FERRARIS YNARES-SANTIAGO FACTS:
The RTC rendered a Decision denying the petition for declaration of nullity of petitioner’s marriage with Brix Ferraris. The trial
court noted that suffering from epilepsy does not amount to psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Civil Code and the
evidence on record were insufficient to prove infidelity. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied where the trial court
reiterated that there was no evidence that respondent is mentally or physically ill to such an extent that he could not have known
the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof.

Petitioner appealed to the CA which affirmed in toto the judgment of the trial court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage of petitioner and respondent is void ab initio on the ground of respondent’s psychological
incapacity.

RULING: It is a well-established principle that factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding
on this Court, save for the most compelling and cogent reasons, like when the findings of the appellate court go beyond the issues
of the case, run contrary to the admissions of the parties to the case, or fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly
considered, will justify a different conclusion; or when there is a misappreciation of facts, which are unavailing in the instant case.

The term “psychological incapacity” to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a
serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent
as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.

As all people may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated characteristics associated with certain personality disorders,
there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.

It is for this reason that the Court relies heavily on psychological experts for its understanding of the human personality. However,
the root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature must be fully explained, which petitioner
failed to convincingly demonstrate.

Indeed, the evidence on record did not convincingly establish that respondent was suffering from psychological incapacity. There is
absolutely no showing that his “defects” were already present at the inception of the marriage, or that those are incurable.

We find respondent’s alleged mixed personality disorder, the “leaving-the-house” attitude whenever they quarreled, the violent
tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support, and his preference to spend more
time with his band mates than his family, are not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal or
unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
 In Republic v. Court of Appeals, where therein respondent preferred to spend more time with his friends than his family on whom
he squandered his money, depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was dishonest to his wife regarding his finances,
the Court held that the psychological defects spoken of were more of a “difficulty,” if not outright “refusal” or “neglect” in the
performance of some marital obligations and that a mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no
wise constitute psychological incapacity; it is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as
married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological, not physical,
illness.

An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage. No less than the Constitution recognizes the sanctity of
marriage and the unity of the family; it decrees marriage as legally “inviolable” and protects it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be “protected” by the state.
PARAS v. PARAS SANDOVAL-
SANTIAGO
HALILI v. HALILI CORONA FACTS: Petitioner Lester Benjamin S. Halili filed a petition to declare his marriage to respondent Chona M. Santos-Halili null and
void on the basis of his psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. He alleged that he wed
respondent in civil rites thinking that it was a “joke.” After the ceremonies, they never lived together as husband and wife, but
maintained the relationship. However, they started fighting constantly a year later, at which point petitioner decided to stop
seeing respondent and started dating other women. Immediately thereafter, he received prank calls telling him to stop dating
other women as he was already a married man. It was only upon making an inquiry that he found out that the marriage was not
“fake.” Eventually, the RTC found petitioner to be suffering from a mixed personality disorder, particularly dependent and self-
defeating personality disorder, as diagnosed by his expert witness, Dr. Natividad Dayan. The court a quo held that petitioner’s
personality disorder was serious and incurable. CA reversed RTC’s decision.

ISSUE: W/N he is psychologically incapacitated

HELD: The testimony of petitioner’s expert witness revealed that petitioner was suffering from dependent personality disorder. In
her psychological report, Dr. Dayan stated that petitioner’s dependent personality disorder was evident in the fact that petitioner
was very much attached to his parents and depended on them for decisions. Petitioner’s mother even had to be the one to tell him
to seek legal help when he felt confused on what action to take upon learning that his marriage to respondent was for real. Dr.
Dayan further observed that petitioner typically acted in a self-denigrating manner and displayed a self-defeating attitude. This
submissive attitude encouraged other people to take advantage of him. This could be seen in the way petitioner allowed himself to
be dominated, first, by his father who treated his family like robots and, later, by respondent who was as domineering as his
father. When petitioner could no longer take respondent’s domineering ways, he preferred to hide from her rather than confront
her and tell her outright that he wanted to end their marriage. It has been sufficiently established that petitioner had a
psychological condition that was grave and incurable and had a deeply rooted cause.
NGO-TE v. TE NACHURA Facts:
The parties’ whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six (6) months. They met in January 1996, eloped in March, exchanged
marital vows in May, and parted ways in June. After almost four years, or on January 18, 2000, Edward filed a petition before the
 Regional Trial Court (RTC) Quezon City for the annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the basis of the latter’s psychological
incapacity. The psychologist who provided expert testimony found both parties psychologically incapacitated. Petitioner’s
behavioral pattern falls under the classification of dependent personality disorder, and the respondent’s, that of the narcissistic
and antisocial personality disorder.

The trial court, on July 30, 2001, rendered its decision declaring the marriage of the parties null and void on the ground that both
parties were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. On review, the appellate court reversed
and set aside the trial’s court ruling. It ruled that petitioner failed to prove the psychological incapacity of respondent, for the
clinical psychologist did not personally examine respondent, and relied only on the information provided by petitioner. Further, the
psychological incapacity was not shown to be attended by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. In sum, the evidence
adduced fell short of the requirements stated in the Molina case needed for the declaration of nullity of the marriage under Art. 36
of the Family Code. Dissatisfied, petitioner filed before the SC the instant petition for review on certiorari. He posited that the trial
court declared the marriage void, not only because of respondent’s psychological incapacity, but rather due to both parties’
psychological incapacity. He also pointed out that there is no requirement for the psychologist to personally examine respondent.

Issue: Whether, based on Article 36 of the Family Code, the marriage between the parties is null and void?

Held: Yes, the marriage between the parties is null and void. While petition for review for certiorari was granted. The decision of
the CA was reversed and set aside, and the decision of the trial court was reinstated. Both parties afflicted with grave, severe and
incurable psychological incapacity, the precipitous marriage is, thus, declared null and void. For the fulfillment of the obligations of
marriage depends on the strength of this interpersonal relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is
held to impair the relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential marital obligations.The root cause of the
psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts
and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological – not
physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.

In dissolving the marital bonds on account of either party’s psychological incapacity, the Court is not demolishing the foundation of
families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of marriage, because it refuses to allow a person afflicted with a psychological
disorder, who cannot comply with or assume the essential marital obligations, from remaining that sacred bond. Let it be noted
that in Art. 36, there is no marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is void from the very beginning.
TING v. VELEZ-TING NACHURA FACTS: Benjamin Ting and Carmen Velez met each other in medical school and they married each other after several years. Years
after, Benjamin became a full-fledged doctor and he practiced at the Velez Hospital owned by Carmen’s family. Benjamin and
Carmen had six children during their marriage. But after 18 years of marriage, Carmen went to court to have their marriage be
declared void on the ground that Benjamin was psychologically incapacitated. She alleged that even before she married Benjamin,
the latter was already a drunkard; that Benjamin was a gambler, he was violent, and would rather spend on his expensive hobby;
that he rarely stayed home and even neglected his children and family obligations.

Carmen presented an expert witness, Dr. Oñate, to prove Benjamin’s psychological incapacity. However, Oñate merely based her
findings on the statement submitted by Benjamin. Oñate was not able to personally examine Benjamin because at that time,
Benjamin was already working as an anaesthesiologist in South Africa. On his part, Benjamin opposed the petition. He also
 presented his own expert witness to disprove Carmen’s allegations. Obra was not able to personally examine Benjamin but he also
evaluated the same deposition evaluated by Oñate. Also, Benjamin submitted himself for evaluation to a South African doctor (Dr.
Pentz) and the transcript of said evaluation was submitted to Obra and the latter also evaluated the same. Obra found Benjamin
not to be psychologically incapacitated.

The trial court, and eventually the Court of Appeals, ruled in favor of Carmen.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Benjamin Ting’s psychological incapacity was proven.

RULING:

No, the totality of evidence presented by respondent was insufficient to prove that petitioner is psychologically unfit to discharge
the duties expected of him as a husband, and more particularly, that he suffered from such psychological incapacity as of the date
of the marriage 18 years ago.

The intendment of the law has been to confine the application of Article 36 to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an absolute insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. The psychological
illness that must have afflicted a party at the inception of the marriage should be a disorder so grave and permanent as to deprive
one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she is about to assume.

In this case, respondent failed to prove that petitioner’s defects were present at the time of the celebration of their marriage. She
merely cited that prior to their marriage, she already knew that petitioner would occasionally drink and gamble with his friends;
but such statement, by itself, is insufficient to prove any pre-existing psychological defect on the part of her husband. Neither did
the evidence presented prove such defects to be incurable. The evaluation of the two psychiatrists should have been the
significant evidence in determining whether to declare the marriage between the parties null and void. Sadly, however, the Court
was not convinced that the opinions proiced by these experts strengthened respondent’s allegation of psychological incapacity.
The two provided absolutely contradicting psychological evaluations.
AZCUETA v. REPUBLIC LEONARDO-DE  FACTS:
CASTRO
Petitioner Marietta Azcueta and Rodolfo Azcueta got married on July 24, 1993. They separated in 1997 after four years of marriage
and bore no child.

Petitioner filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, claiming
that her husband Rodolfo was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.

According to petitioner, Rodolfo was emotionally immature, irresponsible and continually failed to adapt himself to married life
and perform the essential responsibilities and duties of husband
 Petitioner also complained of physical violence.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the totality of the evidence presented is adequate to sustain a finding that Rodolfo is psychologically incapacitated
to comply with his essential marital obligations.

RULING:

Yes. After a thorough review of the records of the case, we find that there was sufficient compliance with the guidelines in the
Molina case to warrant the annulment of the parties’ marriage under Article 36.

The Court laid down in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals and Molina stringent guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Article 36 of the Family Code. In all, the Court agrees with the trial court that the declaration of nullity of the parties’
marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code is proper under the premises.
KALAW v. FERNANDEZ BERSAMIN  FACTS:

In the case at bar, Kalaw presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated. Petitioner’s experts heavily relied on petitioner’s allegations of respondent’s constant mahjong
sessions, visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of their children. Petitioner’s experts opined that
respondent’s alleged habits, when performed constantly to the detriment of quality and quantity of time devoted to her duties as
mother and wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in the form of NPD.

However, the Supreme Court in its September 19, 2011 decision dismissed the complaint for declaration of nullity of the
marriage on the ground that there was no factual basis for the conclusion of psychological incapacity.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the marriage was void on the ground of psychological incapacity.

HELD:

YES. The Court in granting the Motion for Reconsideration held that Fernandez was indeed psychologically incapacitated
as they relaxed the previously set forth guidelines with regard to this case.

Note: Molina guidelines were not abandoned, expert opinions were just given much respect in this case.
Guidelines too rigid, thus relaxed IN THIS CASE

The Court held that the guidelines set in the case of Republic v. CA have turned out to be rigid, such that their application
to every instance practically condemned the petitions for declaration of nullity to the fate of certain rejection. But Article 36 of the
Family Code must not be so strictly and too literally read and applied given the clear intendment of the drafters to adopt its
enacted version of “less specificity” obviously to enable “some resiliency in its application.” Instead, every court should approach
the issue of nullity “not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but according to its own facts” in
recognition of the verity that no case would be on “all fours” with the next one in the field of psychological incapacity as a ground
for the nullity of marriage; hence, every “trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must,
as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.

In the task of ascertaining the presence of psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage, the courts,
which are concededly not endowed with expertise in the field of psychology, must of necessity rely on the opinions of experts in
order to inform themselves on the matter, and thus enable themselves to arrive at an intelligent and judicious judgment. Indeed,
the conditions for the malady of being grave, antecedent and incurable demand the in-depth diagnosis by experts.

Personal examination by party not required; totality of evidence must be considered

We have to stress that the fulfillment of the constitutional mandate for the State to protect marriage as an inviolable
social institution only relates to a valid marriage. No protection can be accorded to a marriage that is null and void

ab initio, because such a marriage has no legal existence.

There is no requirement for one to be declared psychologically incapacitated to be personally examined by a physician,
because what is important is the presence of evidence that adequately establishes the party’s psychological incapacity. Hence, “if
the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the
person concerned need not be resorted to.”

Verily, the totality of the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological
incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. If other evidence showing that a certain condition could possibly result from an
assumed state of facts existed in the record, the expert opinion should be admissible and be weighed as an aid for the court in
interpreting such other evidence on the causation.

Indeed, an expert opinion on psychological incapacity should be considered as conjectural or speculative and without any
probative value only in the absence of other evidence to establish causation. The expert’s findings under such circumstances would
not constitute hearsay that would justify their exclusion as evidence.
Expert opinion considered as decisive evidence as to psychological and emotional temperaments

The findings and evaluation by the RTC as the trial court deserved credence because it was in the better position to view
and examine the demeanor of the witnesses while they were testifying. The position and role of the trial judge in the appreciation
of the evidence showing the psychological incapacity were not to be downplayed but should be accorded due importance and
respect.

The Court considered it improper and unwarranted to give to such expert opinions a merely generalized consideration
and treatment, least of all to dismiss their value as inadequate basis for the declaration of the nullity of the marriage. Instead, we
hold that said experts sufficiently and competently described the psychological incapacity of the respondent within the standards
of Article 36 of the Family Code. We uphold the conclusions reached by the two expert witnesses because they were largely drawn
from the case records and affidavits, and should not anymore be disputed after the RTC itself had accepted the veracity of the
petitioner’s factual premises.

The Court also held that the courts must accord weight to expert testimony on the psychological and mental state of the
parties in cases for the declaration of the nullity of marriages, for by the very nature of Article 36 of the Family Code the courts,
“despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive
evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.”

Willfully exposing children to gambling constitutes neglect of parental duties

The frequency of the respondent’s mahjong playing should not have delimited our determination of the presence or
absence of psychological incapacity. Instead, the determinant should be her obvious failure to fully appreciate the duties and
responsibilities of parenthood at the time she made her marital vows. Had she fully appreciated such duties and responsibilities,
she would have known that bringing along her children of very tender ages to her mahjong sessions would expose them to a
culture of gambling and other vices that would erode their moral fiber. Nonetheless, the long-term effects of the respondent’s
obsessive mahjong playing surely impacted on her family life, particularly on her very young children.

The fact that the respondent brought her children with her to her mahjong sessions did not only point to her neglect of
parental duties, but also manifested her tendency to expose them to a culture of gambling. Her willfully exposing her children to
the culture of gambling on every occasion of her mahjong sessions was a very grave and serious act of subordinating their needs
for parenting to the gratification of her own personal and escapist desires.

The respondent revealed her wanton disregard for her children’s moral and mental development. This disregard violated
her duty as a parent to safeguard and protect her children.
REPUBLIC v. ROMERO PERLAS-BERNABE
MATUDAN v. REPUBLIC DEL CASTILLO
CASTILLO v. REPUBLIC and PERALTA  FACTS:
IMPAS
As their parents were good friends and business partners, Mirasol and Felipe started as friends then, eventually, became
sweethearts. During their courtship, Mirasol discovered that Felipe sustained his affair with his former girlfriend. The couple's
relationship turned tumultuous after the revelation. With the intervention of their parents, they reconciled. They got married and
were blessed with two (2) children. Mirasol filed a Complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Dasmarinas, Cavite.

The RTC declared the marriage between Mirasol and Felipe null and void.

Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for reconsideration, which the RTC
denied.

On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC, ruling that Mirasol failed to present sufficient evidence to prove
that Felipe was suffering from psychological incapacity, thus, incapable of performing marital obligations due to some
psychological illness existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the totality of evidence presented warrants, as the RTC determined, the declaration of nullity of the marriage of
Mirasol and Felipe on the ground of the latter's psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code?

RULINGS:

It was held that "psychological incapacity" has been intended by law to be confined to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. Psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, i.e., it must be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying
out the ordinary duties required in a marriage, (b) juridical antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage, and (c) incurability, i.e., it must
be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.

The presentation of any form of medical or psychological evidence to show the psychological incapacity, however, did not mean
that the same would have automatically ensured the granting of the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. It bears
repeating that the trial courts, as in all the other cases they try, must always base their judgments not solely on the expert opinions
presented by the parties but on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of their proceedings.
 The Court finds that there exists insufficient factual or legal basis to conclude that Felipe's sexual infidelity and irresponsibility can
be equated with psychological incapacity as contemplated by law. Aside from the psychologist, petitioner did not present other
witnesses to substantiate her allegations on Felipe's infidelity notwithstanding the fact that she claimed that their relatives saw
him with other women. Her testimony, therefore, is considered self-serving and had no serious evidentiary value.
DEL ROSARIO v. DEL LEONEN
ROSARIO
DE LA FUENTE v. DE LA PERLAS-BERNABE  Facts:
FUENTE
On June 21, 1984, Maria Teresa Tani and Rodolfo De la Fuente Jr. got married in Mandaluyong City after being in a relationship for
five (5) years. They had two children.

While they were still sweethearts, Maria Teresa already noticed that Rodolfo was an introvert and was prone to jealousy. His
attitude worsened as they went on with their marital life. His jealousy became so severe that he even poked a gun to his 15 year
old cousin and he treated Maria Teresa like a sex slave who made the latter feel maltreated and molested. Sometime in 1986, the
couple quarreled because Rodolfo suspected that Maria Teresa was having an affair. In the heat of their quarrel, Rodolfo poked a
gun at Maria Teresa's head. She left and never saw Rodolfo again after that, and supported their children by herself.

On June 3, 1999, Maria Teresa filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity
before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. As support to her petitions, clinical psychologist, Dr. Arnulfo V. Lopez was
presented as an expert witness. However, Rodolfo did not file any responsive pleading. The trial court eventually deemed his non-
appearance as a waiver of his right to present evidence.

Before the promulgation of its decision, on June 26, 2002, the trial court directed the Office of the Solicitor General to submit its
comment on Maria Teresa's formal offer of evidence. The Office of the Solicitor General was also directed to submit its
certification. The Office of the Solicitor General, however, failed to comply with the trial court's orders; thus, the case was
submitted for decision without the certification and comment from the Office of the Solicitor General. On August 14, 2002, the trial
court promulgated its decision granting the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.

On August 20, 2002, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a motion for reconsideration. The Office of the Solicitor General
explained that it was unable to submit the required certification because it had no copies of the transcripts of stenographic notes.
It was also unable to inform the trial court of its lack of transcripts due to the volume of cases it was handling On September 13
2002, the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration..

The Office of the Solicitor General filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals. It argued that the trial court erred a) in deciding the
case without the required certification from the Office of the Solicitor General, 58 and b) in giving credence to Dr. Lopez's
conclusion of Rodolfo's severe personality disorder. It held that Dr. Lopez's finding was based on insufficient data and did not
follow the standards set forth in the Molina case. Still, Rodolfo did not file any responsive pleading.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC. In its resolution dated May 25, 2009, CA denied the motion for
reconsideration filed by Maria Teresa.

On July 24, 2009, Maria Teresa filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari. This time Rodolfo filed a Comment 70 stating that he was
not opposing Maria Teresa's Petition since "[h]e firmly believes that there is in fact no more sense in adjudging him and petitioner
as married."

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in denying the petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.

Held:

Yes, the Court of Appeals erred in denying the petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage

Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, we find that there was sufficient compliance with Molina to warrant the nullity of
petitioner's marriage with respondent. Petitioner was able to discharge the burden of proof that respondent suffered from
psychological incapacity. The Court of Appeals is mistaken when it chided the lower court for giving undue weight to the testimony
of Dr. Lopez since he had no chance to personally conduct a thorough study and analysis of respondent's mental and psychological
condition.

Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes states that the non-examination of one of the parties will not automatically render as hearsay or
invalidate the findings of the examining psychiatrist or psychologist, since "marriage, by its very definition, necessarily involves only
two persons. The totality of the behavior of one spouse during the cohabitation and marriage is generally and genuinely witnessed
mainly by the other.

Article 68 of the Family Code obligates the husband and wife "to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and
render mutual help and support." In this case, petitioner and respondent may have lived together, but the facts narrated by
petitioner show that respondent failed to, or could not, comply with the obligations expected of him as a husband. He was even
apathetic that petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage.

The incurability and severity of respondent's psychological incapacity were likewise discussed by Dr. Lopez. He vouched that a
person with paranoid personality disorder would

refuse to admit that there was something wrong and that there was a need for treatment. This was corroborated by petitioner
 when she stated that respondent repeatedly refused treatment. Petitioner consulted a lawyer, a priest, and a doctor, and
suggested couples counseling to respondent; however, respondent refused all of her attempts at seeking professional help.
Respondent also refused to be examined by Dr. Lopez.

Dr. Lopez concluded that because of respondent's personality disorder, he is incapacitated to perform his marital obligations of
giving love, respect, and support to the petitioner. He recommends that the marriage be annulled.

Respondent's repeated behavior of psychological abuse by intimidating, stalking, and isolating his wife from her family and friends,
as well as his increasing acts of physical violence, are proof of his depravity, and utter lack of comprehension of what marriage and
partnership entail. It would be of utmost cruelty for this Court to decree that petitioner should remain married to respondent.
After she had exerted efforts to save their marriage and their family, respondent simply refused to believe that there was anything
wrong in their marriage. This shows that respondent truly could not comprehend and perform his marital obligations. This fact is
persuasive enough for this Court to believe that respondent's mental illness is incurable.
BAKUNAWA III v. REYES, JR.
BAKUNAWA
SINGSON v. SINGSON DEL CASTILLO  FACTS:
On February 27, 2007, Maria Concepcion N. Singson a.k.a. Concepcion N. Singson (petitioner) filed a Petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code). This was docketed as Civil Case No. 07-
0070.
It was alleged therein that on July 6, 1974, petitioner and Benjamin L. Singson (respondent) were married before the Rev. Fr.
Alfonso L. Casteig at St. Francis Church, Mandaluyong, Rizal; that said marriage produced four children, all of whom are now of
legal age; that when they started living together, petitioner noticed that respondent was "dishonest, unreasonably extravagant at
the expense of the family's welfare, extremely vain physically and spiritually," and a compulsive gambler; that respondent was
immature, and was w1ab1e to perform his paternal duties; that respondent was also irresponsible, an easy-going man, and guilty
of infidelity; that respondent's abnormal behavior made him completely unable to render any help, support, or assistance to her;
and that because she could expect no help or assistance at all from respondent she was compelled to work doubly hard to support
her family as the sole breadwinner.
Petitioner also averred that at the time she filed this Petition, respondent was confined at Metro Psych Facility, a rehabilitation
institution in Pasig City; and that respondent's attending psychiatrist, Dr. Benita Sta. Ana-Ponio (Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio), made the
following diagnosis on respondent: xx
Finally, petitioner claimed that she and respondent did not enter into any ante-nuptial agreement to govern their prope1ty
relations as husband and wife and that they had no conjugal assets or debts.
Traversing petitioner's allegations, respondent claimed that "psychological incapacity" must be characterized by gravity, juridical
antecedence, and incurability, which are not present in the instant case because petitioner's allegations are not supported by facts.
Xx
Respondent furthermore claimed that he and petitioner had conjugal assets and debts; that the land where their family home is
built came from his earnings, hence the family home is their conjugal property; that he and petitioner also have a house and lot in
Tagaytay City, as well as bank accounts that are in petitioner's name only; and he and petitioner also have investments in shares of
stocks, cars, household appliances, furniture, and jewelry; and that these are conjugal assets because they came from petitioner's
salaries and his (respondent's) own inheritance money.
Trial thereafter ensued. Petitioner's witnesses included herself, her son, Jose Angelo Singson (Jose), and Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio.
In its Decision of November 12, 2010, the RTC granted the Petition and declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent
void ab initio on the ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity.
In its Decision of August 29, 2013, the CA overturned the RTC.
Hence, this Petition wherein notably the petitioner insists that this Court can take judicial notice of the fact that personality
disorders are generally incurable and permanent, and must continuously be treated medically; that in this case the Clinical
Summary; had pointed out that respondent's understanding of his gambling problem is only at the surface level; and that in point
of fact Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio had affirmed that personality disorders are incurable.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not respondent is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.
(2) Whether or not the testimonies of Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio and son Jose are meritorious.
(3) Whether or not Court can take judicial notice of the fact that personality disorders are generally incurable and permanent, and
must continuously be treated medically.

HELD:
(1) NO.
We agree with the CA that the evidence on record does not establish that respondent's psychological incapacity was grave and
serious as defined by jurisprudential parameters since "[respondent] had a job; provided money for the family from the sale of his
property; provided the land where the family home was built on; and lived in the family home with petitioner-appellee and their
children."40
Upon the other hand, petitioner herself testified that respondent had a job as the latter "was working at a certain point."41 This is
consistent with the information in Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio's Clinical Summary and testimony, which were both included in petitioner's
formal offer of evidence, respecting the parties' relationship history that petitioner and respondent met at the bank where
petitioner was applying for a job and where respondent was employed as a credit investigator prior to their courtship and their
marriage.42
It is significant to note moreover that petitioner also submitted as part of her evidence a notarized summary dated February 18,
2010 which enumerated expenses paid for by the proceeds of respondent's share in the sale of his parents' home in Magallanes,
Makati City which amounted to around ₱2.9 million. Although petitioner was insinuating that this amount was insufficient to cover
the family expenses from 1999 to 2008, we note that she admitted under oath that the items for their family budget, such as their
children's education, the payments for association dues, and for electric bills came from this money.
(2) NO.
As heretofore mentioned, the medical basis or evidence adverted to by the RTC did not specifically identify the root cause of
respondent's alleged psychological incapacity.
Equally bereft of merit is petitioner's claim that respondent's alleged psychological incapacity could be attributed to the latter's
family or childhood, which are circumstances prior to the parties' marriage; no evidence has been adduced to substantiate this
fact. Nor is there basis for upholding petitioner's contention that respondent's family was "distraught" and that respondent's
 conduct was "dysfunctional"; again, there is no evidence to attest to this. These are very serious charges which must be
substantiated by clear evidence which, unfortunately, petitioner did not at all adduce. Indeed, Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio did not make a
specific finding that this was the origin of respondent's alleged inability to appreciate marital obligations.
Needless to say, petitioner cannot lean upon her son Jose's testimony that his father's psychological incapacity existed before or at
the time of marriage.1âwphi1 It has been held that the parties' child is not a very reliable witness in an Article 36 case as "he could
not have been there when the spouses were married and could not have been expected to know what was happening between his
parents until long after his birth."

(3) NO.
To be sure, this Court cannot take judicial notice of petitioner's assertion that "personality disorders are generally incurable" as this
is not a matter that courts are mandated to take judicial notice under Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court.
REPUBLIC v. TIONGLICO TIJAM  Facts:

Katrina and Lawrence got married on July 22, 2000 as a result of the previous’ unplanned pregnancy. However, bickering and
quarrels marred their marriage. They moved at the home of Lawrence’s parents until the birth of their child, Lanz Rafael Tabora
Tionglico (Lanz), on December 30, 2000. Lawrence was distant and did not help in rearing their child, saying he knew nothing about
children and how to run a family. Lawrence spent almost every night out for late dinners, parties and drinking sprees. Katrina
noticed that Lawrence was alarmingly dependent on his mother and suffered from a very high degree of immaturity. Lawrence
would repeatedly taunt Katrina to fight with him and they lost all intimacy between them as he insisted to have a maid sleep in
their bedroom every night to see to the needs of Lanz.

Katrina consulted with a psychiatrist, Dr. Juan Arellano (Dr. Arellano), who confirmed her beliefs on Lawrence’s psychological
incapacity. Dr. Arellano, based on the narrations of Katrina, diagnosed Lawrence with Narcissistic Personality Disorder. The CA
affirmed the ruling of the RTC that the marriage was void ab initio.

Issue: WON the totality of evidence presented by Katrina supports the findings of both the RTC and the CA that Lawrence is
psychologically incapacitated to perform his essential marital obligations, meriting the dissolution of his marriage with Katrina.

Ruling:

No.

Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability.

The case of Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (335 Phil. 665 [1997] and 268 SCRA 198) has set out the guidelines for
declaration of nullity of marriage on the basis of psychological incapacity cases:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. xxx
 (2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. xxx

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of the marriage. xxx

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. xxx

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. xxx

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband
and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. xxx

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. xxx

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly
stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.

Dr. Arellano’s findings that Lawrence is psychologically incapacitated were based solely on Katrina’s statements. It bears to stress
that Lawrence, despite notice, did not participate in the proceedings below, nor was he interviewed by Dr. Arellano despite being
invited to do so.

In Nicolas S. Matudan v. Republic of the Philippines and Marilyn B. Matudan, the Court said:

“The psychologist, using meager information coming from a directly interested party, could not have secured a complete
personality profile and could not have conclusively formed an objective opinion or diagnosis of Angelito’s psychological condition.
To make conclusions and generalizations on a spouse’s psychological condition based on the information fed by only one side, as in
the case at bar, is, to the Court’s mind, not different from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of
such evidence. Apart from the psychiatrist, Katrina did not present other witnesses to substantiate her allegations on Lawrence’s
psychological incapacity. Her testimony, therefore, is considered self-serving and had no serious evidentiary value.”
DAN v. MARCO DAN DEL CASTILLO  Facts:

Abegael is a Filipina and Marco an Italian national met on a chatroom on the internet. They tied the knot on January 23, 2006.
During their honeymoon, she noticed that he was not circumcised and he refused circumsition. When the couple lived together in
Italy, she found that he was addicted to video games and marijuana. When confronted he pushed her and hit her in the arm. He
was also dependent on his mother and he has poor hygiene. He would only give her money for food and spent most of his income
for video games.
 On 18 April 2007, Abegael flew back to the Philippines. Since then, there was no communication between them. She took this as
lack of interest on Marco’s part to save their marriage, reason why she decided to file the petition. Nedy Tayag, a clinical
psychologist was presented. With only examining the petitioner and her mother and not Marco, she made a conclusion that
Abegael was not suffering from any psychological incapacity while Marco, based on Abegael’s description, is suffering from
Dependent Personality Disorder with underlying Anti-Social Trait. Both the RTC and the CA found that petitioner was unable to
satisfy the requirements to declare the marriage null and void under Art. 36 of the Family Code.

Issue: WON there was sufficient evidence to annul the marriage.

Ruling:

No. “Psychological incapacity,” as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36of the Family Code, should refer to no less than a
mental not merely physical incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, among
others, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect

and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.

Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability.

Petitioner admitted that before and during their marriage, respondent was working and giving her money; that respondent was
even sweet and they enjoyed a harmonious relationship. This belies her claim that the respondent was psychologically unfit for
marriage. Addiction to video games and cannabis are not incurable condition and petitioner has not shown that she helped her
husband overcome them – as part of her marital obligation to render support and aid to respondent.

In addition, with the declared insufficiency if the testimonies of petitioner and her witness, the weight of proving psychological
incapacity shifts to Dr. Tayag’s expert findings. However, her determinations were not based on actual tests or interviews
conducted on respondent himself – but on personal accounts of petitioner alone. Lastly, the rulings of the trial and appellate
courts – identical in most respects – are entitled to respect and finality. The same being correct, this Court finds no need to disturb
them.
REPUBLIC v. JAVIER REYES, JR.
REPUBLIC v. LIBERATO GESMUNDO  Facts:
MOLA CRUZ
Respondent decided to file a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code against his wife Liezl.
They were married on August 30, 2002 in Bacolod City. Later on they both went to Japan for work and it was when respondent
noticed changes in Liezl. She began going out of the house without respondent’s permission and started giving respondent the cold
treatment. Liezl also started getting angry at respondent for no reason. The couple later returned to the Philippines after Liezl was
 released from detention due to overstaying in Japan. It was then that Liezl confessed to respondent her romantic affair with a
Japanese man. Despite the confession, Liezl did not end the illicit relationship, which caused respondent such stress that he was
hospitalized. Respondent would give Liezl a chance but found out that Liezl already cohabited with her lover. The RTC relied on the
psychological report and testimony of expert witness, Dr. Pacita Tudla (Dr. Tudla) a clinical psychologist. Based on the evaluation
and assessment procedure she followed, Dr. Tudla found that Liezl was afflicted by histrionic personality disorder, a pervasive
pattern of behavior characterized by excessive emotionality and attention seeking. A histrionic so afflicted tends to be perceived by
others as selfish, egotistical and unreliable; seeking immediate gratification; over-reactive to even minor provocations; suggestible;
and lacking in analytical ability.

Issue: WON Liezl’s psychological incapacity to comply with her marital obligations was sufficiently established by the totality of
evidence presented by respondent.

Ruling:

Ngo Te v. Yu-Te predicated, “as aptly stated by Justice Dante 0. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes, there is need to emphasize other
perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the risk of being
redundant, we reiterate once more the principle that each case must be judged, not 0111 the basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision
on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions
of church tribunals.”

To entitle a petitioner spouse to a declaration of the nullity of his or her marriage, the totality of the evidence must sufficiently
prove that the respondent spouse’s psychological incapacity was grave, incurable and existing prior to the time of the marriage.27
The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in
marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge
only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved.28 “There must be proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person – an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to the marriage – which must be linked with the manifestations of the psychological incapacity. “ The disorder was found
by the CA to have begun when Liezl was an adolescent and continued well into adulthood. It fully appreciated Liezl’s psychological
evaluation that revealed her unconsciousness of her disorder. The courts a quo duly connected such aberrant acts o f Liezl as
actual manifestations o f her histrionic personality disorder. A person with such a disorder was characterized as selfish and
egotistical, and demands immediate gratification. These traits were especially reflected in Liezl’s highly unusual acts of allowing her
Japanese boyfriend to stay in the marital abode, sharing the marital bed with his Japanese boyfriend and introducing her husband
as her elder brother, all done under the threat of desertion. Such blatant insensitivity and lack of regard for the sanctity of the
marital bond and home cannot be expected from a married person who reasonably understand the principle and responsibilities of
marriage.
ARTICLE 40 - NEED FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF A PREVIOUS VOID MARRIAGE FOR PURPOSES OF REMARRIAGE
DOMINGO v. CA  FACTS:
Soledad Domingo, married with Roberto Domingo in 1976, filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage and separation
of property. She did not know that Domingo had been previously married to Emerlinda dela Paz in 1969. She came to know the
previous marriage when the latter filed a suit of bigamy against her. Furthermore, when she came home from Saudi during her
one-month leave from work, she discovered that Roberto cohabited with another woman and had been disposing some of her
properties which is administered by Roberto. The latter claims that because their marriage was void ab initio, the declaration of
such voidance is unnecessary and superfluous. On the other hand, Soledad insists the declaration of the nullity of marriage not for
the purpose of remarriage, but in order to provide a basis for the separation and distribution of properties acquired during the
marriage.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration should only be filed for purposes of remarriage.

RULING:

The declaration of the nullity of marriage is indeed required for purposed of remarriage. However, it is also necessary for the
protection of the subsequent spouse who believed in good faith that his or her partner was not lawfully married marries the same.
With this, the said person is freed from being charged with bigamy.

When a marriage is declared void ab initio, law states that final judgment shall provide for the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children and the delivery of their
presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings. Other specific effects flowing
therefrom, in proper cases, are the following:

Art. 43. xxx xxx xxx

(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if
either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community property or conjugal
partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a
previous marriage or, in default of children, the innocent spouse;

(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that if the donee contracted the marriage in bad faith, such
donations made to said donee are revoked by operation of law;

(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other spouse who acted in bad faith as a beneficiary in any insurance
policy, even if such designation be stipulated as irrevocable; and

(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall be disqualified to inherit from the innocent spouse by
testate and intestate succession. (n)
 Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said marriage shall be void ab initio and all donations by
reason of marriage and testamentary disposition made by one in favor of the other are revoked by operation of law.

Soledad’s prayer for separation of property will simply be the necessary consequence of the judicial declaration of absolute nullity
of their marriage. Hence, the petitioner’s suggestion that for their properties be separated, an ordinary civil action has to be
instituted for that purpose is baseless. The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage,
one of which is the separation of property according to the regime of property relations governing them.
ATIENZA V. BRILLANTES, JR.  Brillantes’ prior marriage was celebrated in 1965 (Under the Civil Code)
(Art. 4 CC) without the requisite license. Under the Civil Code, there was no
requirement for a void marriage to be declared void by the courts. But, it
should be noted that the subsequent marriage was celebrated under the
Family Code. He married de Castro in Los Angeles, California in 1991.
Thus, there is now that requirement to obtain a decree of nullity of the
previous void marriage.

Article 40 of the Family Code is merely a rule of procedure. Declaration

of the nullity of a void marriage for purposes of remarriage will be
invoked on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void.

It applies to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family

Code regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides Article 256 of
the same Code is given retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice vested rights. Article 40 is a rule of procedure and
Brillantes has not shown any vested right that was impaired by the application of Art. 40.
CASTILLO v. CASTILLO  Facts:

On 25 May 1972, respondent Lea P. De Leon Castillo (Lea) married Benjamin Bautista (Bautista). On 6 January 1979, respondent
married herein petitioner Renato A. Castillo (Renato).

On 28 May 2001, Renato filed before the RTC a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, praying that his marriage to Lea be
declared void due to her subsisting marriage to Bautista. Respondent opposed the Petition, and contended that her marriage to
Bautista was null and void as they had not secured any license therefor, and neither of them was a member of the denomination
to which the solemnizing officer belonged.

RTC declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio on the ground that it was a bigamous
marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code. The RTC said that the fact that Lea's marriage to Bautista was subsisting when she
married Renato on 6 January 1979, makes her marriage to Renato bigamous, thus rendering it void ab initio. The lower court
dismissed Lea's argument that she need not obtain a judicial decree of nullity and could presume the nullity of a prior subsisting
marriage. The RTC stressed that so long as no judicial declaration exists, the prior marriage is valid and existing. Lastly, RTC also
said that even if respondent eventually had her first marriage judicially declared void, the fact remains that the first and second
marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled, since Lea failed to obtain a judicial decree of nullity for her first
marriage to Bautista before contracting her second marriage with Renato.

CA reversed and set aside the RTC's Decision and Order and upheld the validity of the parties' marriage. In reversing the RTC, the
CA said that since Lea's marriages were solemnized in 1972 and in 1979, or prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on 3 August
1988, the Civil Code is the applicable law since it is the law in effect at the time the marriages were celebrated, and not the Family
Code. Furthermore, the CA ruled that the Civil Code does not state that a judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the
nullity of a marriage.

Issue: W/N judicial declaration is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage.

Ruling: NO, under the Civil Code. Petition is DENIED.

The Court held that the subsequent marriage of Lea to Renato is valid in view of the invalidity of her first marriage to Bautista
because of the absence of a marriage license. That there was no judicial declaration that the first marriage was void ab initio
before the second marriage was contracted is immaterial as this is not a requirement under the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the
subsequent Decision of the RTC declaring the nullity of Lea's first marriage only serves to strengthen the conclusion that her
subsequent marriage to Renato is valid.

Ratio:

The validity of a marriage and all its incidents must be determined in accordance with the law in effect at the time of its
celebration. In this case, the law in force at the time Lea contracted both marriages was the Civil Code. The children of the parties
were also born while the Civil Code was in effect i.e. in 1979, 1981, and 1985. Hence, the Court must resolve this case using the
provisions under the Civil Code on void marriages, in particular, Articles 80, 81, 82, and 83 (first paragraph); and those on voidable
marriages are Articles 83 (second paragraph), 85 and 86.

Under the Civil Code, a void marriage differs from a voidable marriage in the following ways:
1) a void marriage is nonexistent - i.e., there was no marriage from the beginning - while in a voidable marriage, the marriage is
valid until annulled by a competent court;
2) a void marriage cannot be ratified, while a voidable marriage can be ratified by cohabitation;
3) being nonexistent, a void marriage can be collaterally attacked, while a voidable marriage cannot be collaterally attacked;
 4) in a void marriage, there is no conjugal partnership and the offspring are natural children by legal fiction, while in voidable
marriage there is conjugal partnership and the children conceived before the decree of annulment are considered legitimate; and
5) "in a void marriage no judicial decree to establish the invalidity is necessary," while in a voidable marriage there must be a
judicial decree.

Emphasizing the fifth difference, this Court has held in the cases of People v. Mendoza, People v. Aragon, and Odayat v. Amante,
that the Civil Code contains no express provision on the necessity of a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage.

It must be emphasized that the enactment of the Family Code rendered the rulings in Odayat, Mendoza, and Aragon inapplicable
to marriages celebrated after 3 August 1988. A judicial declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is now expressly required where
the nullity of a previous marriage is invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage. A second marriage contracted prior to
the issuance of this declaration of nullity is thus considered bigamous and void.
ARTICLE 41- NECES SITY RE. OBTAINING DECREE 0F PRESUMPTIVE DEATH
REPUBLIC V. NOLASCO  FACTS:

Gregorio Nolasco is a seaman. He met Janet Parker, a British, in bar in England. After that, Janet started living with Nolasco in his
ship for six months. It lasted until the contract of Nolasco expired then he brought her to his hometown in Antique. They got
married in January 1982. Due to another contract, Nolasco left the province. In 1983, Nolasco received a letter from his mother
informing him that his son had been born but 15 days after, Janet left. Nolasco went home and cut short his contract to find Janet’s
whereabouts. He did so by securing another seaman’s contract going to London. He wrote several letters to the bar where they
first met but it was all returned. Gregorio petitioned in 1988 for a declaration of presumptive death of Janet.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Nolasco had a well-founded belief that his wife, Janet, is already dead?

RULING:

There are 4 requisites for the declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code:

1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the disappearance occurred
where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code;

2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;

3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead;

4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee;
 The Supreme Court ruled that Nolasco’s efforts to locate Janet were not persistent to show that he has a well-founded belief that
his wife was already dead because instead of seeking assistance of local authorities and the British Embassy, he even secured
another contract. More so, while he was in London, he did not even try to solicit help of the authorities to find his wife.
CALISTERIO V. CALISTERIO  Facts:

On April 1992, Teodorico died intestate leaving parcel of land with an estimated value of P 604,750 Teodorico was survived by his
wife respondent Marietta Calisterio. Teodorico was second husband of Marietta who had previously been married to James
William Bounds on 13 January 1946 at Caloocan City. Teodorico and Marietta were married eleven years later without court
declaration that James presumptively dead. On October 9, 1992 petitioner Antonia Armas y Calisterio a surviving sister of
Teodorico, filed a petition entitled “In matter of Intestate Estate of the deceased Teodorico Calisterio, claiming to be inter alia, the
sole surviving heir of Teodorico Calisterio, the marriage between the latter and respondent Marietta being bigamous and thereby
null and void. On January 17 1996, the lower court handed down its decision in favor of petitioner Antonia. On appeal the Court of
Appeal rendered decision in favor of Marietta declaring her marriage to Teodorico valid and entitling her to estate of Teodorico.

Issue:

Whether the marriage of Marietta between the deceased Teodorico valid that in turn would determine her right as surviving
spouse.

Held:

The marriage of Marietta having contracted during the regime of the Civil Code should be thus deemed valid notwithstanding the
absence of judicial declaration of marriage of presumptive death of James Bounds. The conjugal property of Teodorico and
Marietta, upon its dissolution with the death of Teodorico, the property should be rightly divided one portion to the surviving
spouse and the other portion to the estate of the deceased spouse.
MANUEL V. PEOPLE  :

Eduardo Manuel married Rubylus Gaña on July 28, 1975. He met Tina Gandalera in 1996. Eduardo proposed marriage on several
occasions, assuring her that he was single. Eduardo even brought his parents to Baguio City to meet Tina’s parents, and was
assured by them that their son was still single. Tina finally agreed to marry Eduardo. They were married on April 22, 1996 before
Judge Antonio C. Reyes. It appeared in their marriage contract that Eduardo was “single”. However, starting 1999, Manuel started
making himself scarce and went to their house only twice or thrice a year. Tina was jobless, and whenever she asked money from
Eduardo, he would slap her. In January 2001, Eduardo took all his clothes, left, and did not return. Worse, he stopped giving
financial support. In August 2001, Tina became curious and made inquiries from the NSO in Manila where she learned that
Eduardo had been previously married.

For his part, Eduardo testified that he met Tina sometime in 1995 in a bar where she worked as a GRO. He fell in love with her and
married her. He informed Tina of his previous marriage to Rubylus Gaña, but she nevertheless agreed to marry him. Their marital
relationship was in order until this one time when he noticed that she had a “love-bite” on her neck. He then abandoned her.
Eduardo further testified that he declared he was “single” in his marriage contract with Tina because he believed in good faith that
his first marriage was invalid. He did not know that he had to go to court to seek for the

nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina. He insisted that he married Tina believing that his first marriage was no
longer valid because he had not heard from Rubylus for more than 20 years.

The lower court found Eduardo guilty of bigamy. He was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from six (6) years and ten (10)
months, as minimum, to ten (10) years, as maximum, and directed to indemnify the private complainant Tina Gandalera the
amount of P200,000.00 by way of moral damages, plus costs of suit. Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA. He alleged that he
was not criminally liable for bigamy because when he married the private complainant, he did so in good faith and without any
malicious intent. He maintained that at the time that he married the private complainant, he was of the honest belief that his first
marriage no longer subsisted. The CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of the RTC.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the lower court’s decision in awarding a moral damage when it has no basis in fact and in
law.

Ruling:

Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral
shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they
are the proximate result of the defendant’s wrongful act or omission. An award for moral damages requires the confluence of the
following conditions: first, there must be an injury, whether physical, mental or psychological, clearly sustained by the claimant;
second, there must be culpable act or omission factually established; third, the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the
proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and fourth, the award of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated
in Article 2219 or Article 2220 of the Civil Code. Indeed, bigamy is not one of those specifically mentioned in Article 2219 of the
Civil Code in which the offender may be ordered to pay moral damages to the private complainant/offended party. Nevertheless,
the petitioner is liable to the private complainant for moral damages under Article 2219 in relation to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the
Civil Code.

According to Article 19, “every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.” This provision contains what is commonly referred to as the principle of
abuse of rights, and sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one’s rights but also in the
performance of one’s duties. The standards are the following: act with justice; give everyone his due; and observe honesty and
good faith. The elements for abuse of rights are: (a) there is a legal right or duty; (b) exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole
intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
In the present case, the Eduardo courted Tina and proposed to marry her. He assured her that he was single. He even brought his
parents to Tina’s house where he and his parents made the same assurance – that he was single. Thus, Tina agreed to marry the
him, who even stated in the certificate of marriage that he was single. She lived with Eduardo and dutifully performed her duties as
his wife, believing all the while that he was her lawful husband. For two years or so until Eduardo heartlessly abandoned her, Tina
 had no inkling that he was already married to another before they were married.

Thus, Tina was an innocent victim of the petitioner’s chicanery and heartless deception, the fraud consisting not of a single act
alone, but a continuous series of acts. Day by day, he maintained the appearance of being a lawful husband to the private
complainant, who changed her status from a single woman to a married woman, lost the consortium, attributes and support of a
single man she could have married lawfully and endured mental pain and humiliation, being bound to a man who it turned out was
not her lawful husband.

The Court rules that the Eduardo’s collective acts of fraud and deceit before, during and after his marriage with Tina were willful,
deliberate and with malice and caused injury to the latter. That she did not sustain any physical injuries is not a bar to an award for
moral damages. The Court thus declares that the petitioner’s acts are against public policy as they undermine and subvert the
family as a social institution, good morals and the interest and general welfare of society.
REPUBLIC V. CA and ALEGRO  Facts:

On March 29, 2001, Alan B. Alegro filed a petition in the Regional Trial Courtbfor the declaration of presumptive death of his wife,
Rosalia “Lea” A. Julaton.

At the hearing, Alan adduced evidence that he and Lea were married on January 20, 1995 in Catbalogan, Samar. He testified that,
on February 6, 1995, Lea arrived home late in the evening and he berated her for being always out of their house. He told her that
if she enjoyed the life of a single person, it would be better for her to go back to her parents. Lea did not reply. Alan narrated that,
when he reported for work the following day, Lea was still in the house, but when he arrived home later in the day, Lea was
nowhere to be found. Alan thought that Lea merely went to her parents’ house in Bliss, Sto. Niño, Catbalogan, Samar. However,
Lea did not return to their house anymore.

Alan further testified that, he inquired Lea’s whereabouts but to no avail.

Sometime in June 1995, he decided to go to Manila to look for Lea, but his mother asked him to leave after the town fiesta of
Catbalogan, hoping that Lea may come home for the fiesta. Alan agreed. However, Lea did not show up. Alan then left for Manila
on August 27, 1995. He went to a house in Navotas where Janeth, Lea’s friend, was staying. When asked where Lea was, Janeth
told him that she had not seen her. He failed to find out Lea’s whereabouts despite his repeated talks with Janeth. Alan decided to
work as a part-time taxi driver. On his free time, he would look for Lea in the malls but still to no avail. He returned to Catbalogan
in 1997 and again looked for his wife but failed.

On June 20, 2001, Alan reported Lea’s disappearance to the local police station. The police authorities issued an Alarm Notice on
July 4, 2001. Alan also reported Lea’s disappearance to the National Bureau of Investigation on July 9, 2001.

On January 8, 2002, the court rendered judgment granting the petition.

The OSG appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals which rendered judgment on August 4, 2003, affirming the decision of the
trial court.
 Issue:

Whether or not the declaration of presumptive death of the wife is valid

Ruling:

No. In view of the summary nature of proceedings under Article 41 of the Family Code for the declaration of presumptive death of
one’s spouse, the degree of due diligence set by the Court in locating the whereabouts of a missing spouse must be strictly
complied with. It is the policy of the State to protect and strengthen the family as a basic social institution. Marriage is the
foundation of the family. Since marriage is an inviolable social institution that the 1987 Constitution seeks to protect from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. For respondent’s failure to prove that he had a well-founded belief that his wife is already
dead and that he exerted the required amount of diligence in searching for his missing wife, the petition for declaration of
presumptive death should have been denied by the trial court and the Honorable Court of Appeals. For the purpose of contracting
the subsequent marriage, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. The spouse present is,
thus, burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent and that he has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already
dead before the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage. The law does not define what is meant by a well-grounded
belief. Cuello Callon writes that “es menester que su creencia sea firme se funde en motivos racionales.” The Court finds and so
holds that the respondent failed to prove that he had a well-founded belief, before he filed his petition in the trial court, that his
spouse Rosalia “Lea” Julaton was already dead. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside.
SSS v. VDA. DE BAILON  FACTS:

In 1955, Clemente Bailon and Alice Diaz married in Barcelona, Sorsogon. More than 15 years later, Clemente filed an action to
declare the presumptive death of Alice, she being an absentee. The petition was granted in 1970.

In 1983, Clemente married Jarque. The two live together until Clemente’s death in 1998. Jarque then sought to claim her
husband’s SSS benefits and the same were granted her. On the other hand, a certain Cecilia Bailon-Yap who claimed that she is the
daughter of Bailon to a certain Elisa Jayona petitioned before the SSS that they be given the reimbursement for the funeral
spending for it was actually them who shouldered the burial expenses of Clemente.

They further claim that Clemente contracted three marriages; one with Alice, another with Elisa and the other with Jarque. Cecilia
also averred that Alice is alive and kicking and Alice subsequently emerged. Cecilia claimed that Clemente obtained the declaration
of Alice’s presumptive death in bad faith for he was aware of the whereabouts of Alice or if not he could have easily located her in
her parent’s place. She was in Sorsogon all along in her parents’ place. She went there upon learning that Clemente had been
having extra-marital affairs.

SSS then ruled that Jarque should reimburse what had been granted her and to return the same to Cecilia since she shouldered the
burial expenses and that the benefits should go to Alice because her reappearance had terminated Clemente’s marriage with
Harque. Further, SSS ruled that the RTC’s decision in declaring Alice to be presumptively death is erroneous. Teresita appealed the
 decision of the SSS before the Social Security Commission and the SSC affirmed SSS. The CA however ruled the contrary.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the mere appearance of the absent spouse declared presumptively dead automatically terminates the subsequent
marriage.

RULING:

No. If the absentee reappears, but no step is taken to terminate the subsequent marriage, either by affidavit or by court action,
such absentee’s mere reappearance, even if made known to the spouses in the subsequent marriage, will not terminate such
marriage.

Since the second marriage has been contracted because of a presumption that the former spouse is dead, such presumption
continues inspite of the spouse’s physical reappearance, and by fiction of law, he or she must still be regarded as legally an
absentee until the subsequent marriage is terminated as provided by law.

If the subsequent marriage is not terminated by registration of an affidavit of reappearance or by judicial declaration but by death
of either spouse as in the case at bar, the action for annulment became extinguished as provided in Article 87, paragraph 2, of the
Civil Code, requiring that the action for annulment should be brought during the lifetime of any one of the parties involved.

Voidable marriage under Article 83, paragraph 2, of the Civil Code, cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding.
Consequently, such marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after the death of either, in which case
the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid.

And furthermore, the liquidation of any conjugal partnership that might have resulted from such voidable marriage must be
carried out “in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse,” as expressly provided in Section 2 of the Revised Rule
73, and not in the annulment proceeding.

In the case at bar, as no step was taken to nullify, in accordance with law, Bailon’s and respondent’s marriage prior to the former’s
death in 1998, respondent is rightfully the dependent spouse-beneficiary of Bailon.
VALDEZ V. REPUBLIC FACTS: Angelita Valdez was married with Sofio in January 1971. She gave birth to a baby girl named Nancy. They argued constantly
because Sofio was unemployed and did not bring home any money. In March 1972, the latter left their house. Angelita and her
child waited until in May 1972, they decided to go back to her parent’s home. 3 years have passed without any word from Sofio
until in October 1975 when he showed up and they agreed to separate and executed a document to that effect. It was the last time
they saw each other and had never heard of ever since. Believing that Sofio was already dead, petitioner married Virgilio Reyes in
June 1985. Virgilio’s application for naturalization in US was denied because petitioner’s marriage with Sofio was subsisting. Hence,
in March 2007, petitioner filed a petition seeking declaration of presumptive death of Sofio.

ISSUE: WoN petitioner’s marriage with Virgilio is valid despite lack of declaration of presumptive death of Sofio (YES)
 RULING:

Pursuant to Article 83 of the Civil Code, any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse
of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:

(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or

(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse present
having news of the absentee being alive, of if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally
considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the
absentee is presumed dead according to Articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases
until declared null and void by a competent court.

Therefore, under the Civil Code, the presumption of death is established by law and no court declaration is needed for the
presumption to arise. Since death is presumed to have taken place by the seventh year of absence, Sofio is to be presumed dead
starting October 1982. Consequently, at the time of petitioner’s marriage to Virgilio, there existed no impediment to petitioner’s
capacity to marry, and the marriage is valid under paragraph 2 of Article 83 of the Civil Code.
SANTOS v. SANTOS (Art. 42)  FACTS:

On 2007, RTC declared petitioner Celerina J. Santos presumptively dead after her husband, respondent Ricardo had filed a petition
for declaration of absence or presumptive death for the purpose of remarriage. In his petition, Ricardo alleged that when they
move to Tarlac and things went wrong with their financial status, Celerina left to work abroad as Domestic Helper in Hong Kong
and was never heard from her again; He claimed that he exerted effort to locate Celerina; that it was 12 years from the date of his
RTC petition since Celerina left. He believed that she passed away. And in 2008 Ricardo remarried.

On the other hand, Celerina filed a petition that she learned about Ricardo’s petition only sometimes in 2008 when she could no
longer avail the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief, or other appropriate remedies.

On the same year, she filed a petition for annulment of judgment before the court of appeal on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and
lack of jurisdiction, Celerina claimed that she never resided in Tarlac. She also never left and worked as a domestic helper abroad.
It was not true that she had been absent for 12 years. Ricardo was aware that she left their conjugal dwelling in Quezon City. It was
he who left the conjugal dwelling in 2008 to cohabit with another woman. She was deprived of any notice of and opportunity to
oppose the petition declaring her presumptive dead.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the declaration of appearance of a presumptively dead spouse in accordance with Article 42 of the family Code is
the proper remedy for a fraudulently obtained judgement declaring presumptive death.
 RULING:

An action for Annulment of judgement is proper when the declaration of presumptive death is obtained fraudulently. It is the
remedy when RTC’s judgement, order or resolution has become final, and the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief are
no longer available through no fault of the petitioner.
REPUBLIC V. VILLANUEVA  FACTS:

Edna worked as a domestic helper in Singapore in 1992 while her husband worked as a mechanic in Valencia, Bukidnon. The two
got married on December 21, 1978, in Iligan City. While she was in Singapore(1993) , her children informed her that her husband
left their home without telling them his whereabouts. Due to this news, she was prompted to go back to the Philippines to look
and find his husband. Edna searched and made inquiries about her husband thru their common friends, and parents-in-law in Iligan
and Valencia City and even went far as to his birthplace in Negros Oriental.

15 years later she filed to the RTC a petition to declare Romeo presumptively dead under Article 41 of the Family Code. During the
trial, she was presented as the lone witness.

RTC grants her petition.

The OSG thru a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court questioned the decision of the RTC on the ground that
the conclusions reached by the RTC were in direct opposition to established jurisprudence, as ruled by the Court in Republic v.
Nolasco, and U.S. v. Biasbas.

CA dismissed the OSG’s petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the strict standard approach were followed by Edna before she filed a petition for declaration of presumptive
death of her husband.

RULING.

NO. Edna claimed that she made diligent search and inquiries to find her husband but it was found out that it was all consisted of
bare assertions without any corroborative evidence on record. Edna did not present additional witnesses (her children, their
common friends, parents-in-law) but herself alone. There was not even any attempt to seek the aid of the authorities at the time
her husband disappeared.

Therefore, The petition of respondent Edna Orcelino-Villanueva to have her husband declared presumptively dead is DENIED.
REPUBLIC v. JOSE
SARENOGON, JR.
REPUBLIC v. TAMPUS  FACTS: Respondent Nilda B. Tampus was married to Dante L. Del Mundo on November 29, 1975. Three days thereafter, or on
December 2, 1975, Dante, a member of the AFP, left respondent, and went to Jolo, Sulu where he was assigned. The couple had no
children. Since then, Nilda heard no news from Dante. She tried everything to locate him, but her efforts proved futile. On April 14,
2009, she filed before the RTC a petition to declare Dante as presumptively dead for the purpose of remarriage, alleging that after
the lapse of thirty-three (33) years without any kind of communication from him, she firmly believes that he is already dead.

ISSUE: W/N Dante should be declared presumptively dead

RULING: NO. Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be shown that the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years and the present spouse had a well-founded belief that the prior spouse was already dead. Under
Article 4119 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code), there are four (4) essential requisites for the declaration of
presumptive death: (1) that the absent spouse has been missing for four (4) consecutive years, or two (2) consecutive years if the
disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391 of the Civil Code; (2) that
the present spouse wishes to remarry; (3) that the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and (4) that
the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.

The "well-founded belief in the absentee's death requires the present spouse to prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent
and reasonable efforts to locate the absent spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the
circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It necessitates exertion of active effort, not a passive one. As such, the mere
absence of the spouse for such periods prescribed under the law, lack of any news that such absentee spouse is still alive, failure to
communicate, or general presumption of absence under the Civil Code would not suffice.

In this case, Nilda testified that after Dante's disappearance, she tried to locate him by making inquiries with his parents, relatives,
and neighbors as to his whereabouts, but unfortunately, they also did not know where to find him. Other than making said
inquiries, however, Nilda made no further efforts to find her husband. She could have called or proceeded to the AFP headquarters
to request information about her husband, but failed to do so. She did not even seek the help of the authorities or the AFP itself in
finding him. Considering her own pronouncement that Dante was sent by the AFP on a combat mission to Jolo, Sulu at the time of
his disappearance, she could have inquired from the AFP on the status of the said mission, or from the members of the AFP who
were assigned thereto. To the Court's mind, therefore, Nilda failed to actively look for her missing husband, and her purported
earnest efforts to find him by asking Dante's parents, relatives, and friends did not satisfy the strict standard and degree of
diligence required to create a "well-founded belief of his death.
REPUBLIC v. CATUBAG
MATIAS V. REPUBLIC
REPUBLIC v. REMAR CAGUIOA Facts: Four years after Lyn and Mark got married, Lyn travelled to Manila to visit some relatives. The couple constantly
QUINONEZ communicated with each other for the first three months thru their cell phone. Later Mark transferred to another city to work as a
security guard in the Hall of Justice. He told Lyn that as soon as she returns from Manila they would be living together in said city,
together with their two children. Eventually, they lost communication. Initially Mark thought that Lyn merely lost her cell phone so
he inquired from her relatives in the city where they first resided after their marriage. Someone informed him that Lyn was then
 already cohabiting with another man and would no longer come back, out of shame.

For almost ten years Mark diligently tried to locate his wife, spending his meager resources to look for her in the Visayas, Metro
Manila, and in some Southern Luzon provinces where she had been seen according to her relatives. Mark also constantly
communicated with Lyn’s relatives in their home city asking for information on her whereabouts. Eventually, he filed a Petition for
Declaration of Presumptive death of Lyn before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in order to dissolve their marriage and enable him to
marry again pursuant to Art 41 FC.

Issue: WoN Mark has a well-founded belief that Lyn is already dead. NO
Ruling: To be able to comply with this requirement, Mark must prove that his belief was the result of diligent and reasonable
efforts and inquiries to locate Lyn and that based on these efforts and inquiries he believes that under the circumstances, Lyn is
already dead. In this case Mark’s efforts fell short of the degree of diligence required by law and jurisprudence, Mark failed to
allege, much less prove, the extent of his search in the places where he claims to have gone, leaving no way for the Court to
ascertain such extent. He failed to identify Lyn’s relatives he had communicated with and disclose what he learned from these
communications. Moreover Mark never sought the help of the authorities to locate Lyn in the course of her ten-year
disappearance. And finally, Mark’s allegations that Lyn’s relatives admitted to him that she is now cohabiting with another man
and will not be going home because of shame, only proves the likelihood that she does not want to be found. So there is really no
well-founded belief that Lyn is already dead. Thus, Mark’s Petition to declare Lyn presumptively dead should really be denied
ARTICLES 45 — 47 VOIDABLE MARRIAGES/GROUNDS/PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD
VILLANUEVA V. CA  FACTS: On 13 October 1988, Eusebia Retuya filed a complaint before the trial court against her husband Nicolas Retuya, Pacita
Villanueva and Nicolas’ son with Pacita, Procopio Villanueva. Eusebia sought the reconveyance from Nicolas and Pacita of several
properties (subject properties), claiming that such are her conjugal properties with Nicolas. Plaintiff Eusebia, is the legal wife of
defendant Nicolas, having been married on October 7, 1926. Out of the lawful wedlock, they begot five (5) children. Spouses
Retuya resided at Mandaue City. During their marriage, they acquired real properties and all improvements situated in Mandaue
City, and Consolacion, Cebu. Nicolas is the co-owner of a parcel of land situated in Mandaue City which he inherited from his
parents Esteban Retuya and Balbina Solon as well as the purchasers of hereditary shares of approximately eight (8) parcels of land
in Mandaue City. Some of the properties earn income from coconuts leased to corporations

In 1945, Nicolas no longer lived with his legitimate family and cohabited with defendant, Pacita Villanueva, wherein Procopio
Villanueva, is their illegitimate son. Nicolas, then, was the only person who received the income of the properties. Pacita, from the
time she started living in concubinage with Nicolas, has no occupation. She had no properties of her own from which she could
derive income. From the time Nicolas suffered stroke until the present, his illegitimate son is already the one who has been
receiving the income of his properties

Settlement between parties was asked but not met. Trial court in favor of Eusebia Natuya. Petitioners appealed. Eusebia died, and
was then substituted by her heirs. CA upheld trial court’s decision

ISSUE: Whether or not the subject properties acquired during the marriage between Eusebia and Procopio are conjugal
 HELD: YES, they are conjugal. Petition denied; decision of CA affirmed

RATIO: The Family Code provisions on conjugal partnerships govern the property relations between Nicolas and Eusebia even if
they were married before the effectivity of Family Code.

Article 105 of the Family Code explicitly mandates that the Family Code shall apply to conjugal partnerships established before the
Family Code without prejudice to vested rights already acquired under the Civil Code or other laws. Thus, under the Family Code, if
the properties are acquired during the marriage, the presumption is that they are conjugal. The burden of proof is on the party
claiming that they are not conjugal. This is counter-balanced by the requirement that the properties must first be proven to have
been acquired during the marriage before they are presumed conjugal.

Nicolas and Eusebia were married on 7 October 1926. Nicolas and Pacita started cohabiting in 1936. Eusebia died on 23 November
1996. Pacita and Nicolas were married on 16 December 1996. Petitioners themselves admit that Lot No. 152 was purchased on 4
October 1957. The date of acquisition of Lot No. 152 is clearly during the marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia.

Since the subject properties, including Lot No. 152, were acquired during the marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia, the presumption
under Article 116 of the Family Code is that all these are conjugal properties of Nicolas and Eusebia.
ALNEELOR v. RTC OF LAS  FACTS: Petitioner Manuel G. Almelor (Manuel) and respondent Leonida Trinidad (Leonida) were married on January 29, 1989 and
PINAS CITY had three children. Manuel and Leonida are both medical practitioners, an anesthesiologist and a pediatrician, respectively. After
eleven (11) years of marriage, Leonida filed a petition with the RTC in Las Piñas City to annul their marriage on the ground that
Manuel was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations. Leonida that in the public eye, Manuel was the
picture of a perfect husband and father but this was not the case in his private life. At home, Leonida described Manuel as a harsh
disciplinarian, unreasonably meticulous, easily angered. Manuel’s unreasonable way of imposing discipline on their children was
the cause of their frequent fights as a couple. Leonida complained that this was in stark contrast to the alleged lavish affection
Manuel has for his mother. She also alleged that her husband has concealed from her his homosexuality. She caught him in an
indiscreet telephone conversation manifesting his affection for a male caller. She also found several pornographic homosexual
materials in his possession. And she saw Manuel kissed another man on the lips. The man was a certain Dr. Nogales. When she
confronted Manuel, he denied everything. At this point, Leonida took her children and left their conjugal abode. Since then,
Manuel stopped giving support to their children. Dr. Valentina del Fonso Garcia, a clinical psychologist, was presented to prove
Leonida’s claim. She testified that she conducted evaluative interviews and a battery of psychiatric tests on Leonida. She also had
a one-time interview with Manuel and face-to-face. She concluded that Manuel is psychologically incapacitated and such
incapacity is marked by antecedence; it existed even before the marriage and appeared to be incurable. Manuel countered that
the true cause of Leonida’s hostility against him was their professional rivalry. The trial court nullified the marriage, not on the
ground of Article 36, but Article 45 of the Family Code. CA denied the appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between the two can be declared as null and void due to fraud by reason of Manuel’s
concealment of his homosexuality.
 HELD: Concealment of homosexuality is the proper ground to annul a marriage, not homosexuality per se. Evidently, no sufficient
proof was presented to substantiate the allegations that Manuel is a homosexual and that he concealed this to Leonida at the time
of their marriage. The lower court considered the public perception of Manuel’s sexual preference without the corroboration of
witnesses. Also, it took cognizance of Manuel’s peculiarities and interpreted it against his sexuality. Even granting that Manuel is
indeed a homosexual, there was nothing in the complaint or anywhere in the case was it alleged and proven that Manuel hid such
sexuality from Leonida and that Leonida’s consent had been vitiated by such.
ARTICLE 48 — APPEARANCE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY - necessity
ANCHETA v. ANCHETA  FACTS:

Petitioner Marietta Ancheta and respondent Rodolfo Ancheta were married on March 5, 1959 and had eight children. After 33
years of marriage the petitioner left the respondent and their children. Their conjugal properties were later separated through a
court-sanctioned compromise agreement where the petitioner got among others a resort in Cavite. When the husband wanted to
marry again, he filed before the Regional Trial Court a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with the petitioner on
the ground of psychological incapacity on June 5, 1995. Although he knew that the petitioner was already residing at the resort in
Cavite, he alleged in his petition that the petitioner was residing at Las Piñas, Metro Manila, such that summons never reached her.
Nevertheless substituted service was rendered to their son at his residence in Cavite. Petitioner was then declared in default for
failing to answer the said petition. Just over a month after it was filed, the trial court granted the petition and declared the
marriage of the parties void ab initio.

Five years later, petitioner challenged the trial court’s order declaring as void ab initio her marriage with respondent Rodolfo, citing
extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction over her person, among others. She alleged that the respondent lied on her real address in
his petition so she never received summons on the case, hence depriving her of her right to be heard. The Court of Appeals
dismissed her petition so she now comes to the Supreme Court for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the declaration of nullity of marriage was valid.

HELD:

NO. The trial court and the public prosecutor defied Article 48 of the Family Code and Rule 18, Section 6 of the 1985 Rules of Court
(now Rule 9, Section 3[e] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure). A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is
fraught with the danger of collusion, says the Court. “Hence, in all cases for annulment, declaration of nullity of marriage and legal
separation, the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered to appear on behalf of the State for the purpose of preventing any
collusion between the parties and to take care that their evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.”

“If the defendant-spouse fails to answer the complaint, the court cannot declare him or her in default but instead, should order
the prosecuting attorney to determine if collusion exists between the parties. The prosecuting attorney or fiscal may oppose the
application for legal separation or annulment through the presentation of his own evidence, if in his opinion, the proof adduced is
 dubious and fabricated.”

Here, the trial court immediately received the evidence of the respondent ex-parte and rendered judgment against the petitioner
“without a whimper of protest from the public prosecutor who even did not challenge the motion to declare petitioner in default.”

The Supreme Court reiterates: “The task of protecting marriage as an inviolable social institution requires vigilant and zealous
participation and not mere pro-forma compliance. The protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the defense
of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well.”

Petition is GRANTED.
ARTICLES 55-67 LEGAL SEPARATION/GROUNDS/DENIAL/EFFECTS
SIOCHIv. GOZON  Facts:

Elvira Gozon filed with the RTC Cavite a petition for legal separation against her husband Alfredo Gozon.

Then, while the pending case of Legal Separation of both parties, Alfredo and Mario entered into Agreement of Buy and Sell
involving their conjugal property for the price of 18 million pesos. Mario pays the partial payment of the said price and he took the
possession of the property.

When the Court granted the legal separation of Elvira and Mario, their property was dissolved and liquidated. Being the offending
spouse, Alfredo is deprived of his share in the net profits and the same is awarded to their child Winifred R. Gozon whose custody
is awarded to Elvira.

On Oct, 26, 1994 Alfredo sold that property into Inter Dimensional Realty Inc. for 18 million pesos in his favor by Winnifred. And
the IDRI paid it in full payment.

Because of that Mario, filed a complaint with RTC Malabon for specific performance and damages, annulment of donation and
sale, with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction and/or temporary restraining order.

The Court held, the agreement between Alfredo and IDRI is null and void for their attempt of commission or continuance of their
wrongful acts, further alienating or disposing of the subject property. Also the agreement of Alfredo and Mario is null and void, for
the absence of written consent of Elvira Gozon for her property rights to the undivided one-half share in the conjugal property of
this case.

Issue:

Whether or not the offending spouse, Alfredo Gozon has right to sell their conjugal partnership without the consent of the other
spouse, and share of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership.
 Held:

No,

The absence of the consent of one of the spouse renders the entire sale void, including the portion of the conjugal property
pertaining to the spouse who contracted the sale. Even if the other spouse actively participated in negotiating for the sale of the
property, that other spouse’s written consent to the sale is still required by law for its validity. And the offending spouse in an
action for legal separation is deprived of his share in the net profits of the conjugal properties.

Under Article 63 (2) of the Family Code, the absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be dissolved and liquidated but
the offending spouse shall have no right to any share of the net profits earned by the absolute community or the conjugal
partnership, which shall be forfeited in accordance with the provisions of article
QUIAO v. QUIAO  :

Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal separation against petitioner Brigido B. Quiao (Brigido). RTC rendered a decision
declaring the legal separation thereby awarding the custody of their 3 minor children in favor of Rita and all remaining properties
shall be divided equally between the spouses subject to the respective legitimes of the children and the payment of the unpaid
conjugal liabilities.

Brigido’s share, however, of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children
because Brigido is the offending spouse.

Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration and appeal within the period 270 days later or after more than nine months from
the promulgation of the Decision, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Clarification, asking the RTC to define the term
“Net Profits Earned.”

RTC held that the phrase “NET PROFIT EARNED” denotes “the remainder of the properties of the parties after deducting the
separate properties of each [of the] spouse and the debts.” It further held that after determining the remainder of the properties,
it shall be forfeited in favor of the common children because the offending spouse does not have any right to any share of the net
profits earned, pursuant to Articles 63, No. (2) and 43, No. (2) of the Family Code.

The petitioner claims that the court a quo is wrong when it applied Article 129 of the Family Code, instead of Article 102. He
confusingly argues that Article 102 applies because there is no other provision under the Family Code which defines net profits
earned subject of forfeiture as a result of legal separation.

ISSUES:

1. Whether Art 102 on dissolution of absolute community or Art 129 on dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains is applicable in
this case. – Art 129 will govern.
2. Whether the offending spouse acquired vested rights over½of the properties in the conjugal partnership– NO.

3. Is the computation of “net profits” earned in the conjugal partnership of gains the same with the computation of “net profits”
earned in the absolute community? NO.

RATIO:

1. First, since the spouses were married prior to the promulgation of the current family code, the default rule is that In the absence
of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as
established in this Code, shall govern the property relations between husband and wife.

Second, since at the time of the dissolution of the spouses’ marriage the operative law is already the Family Code, the same applies
in the instant case and the applicable law in so far as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and liabilities is concerned is
Article 129 of the Family Code in relation to Article 63(2) of the Family Code.

2. The petitioner is saying that since the property relations between the spouses is governed by the regime of Conjugal Partnership
of Gains under the Civil Code, the petitioner acquired vested rights over half of the properties of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains,
pursuant to Article 143 of the Civil Code, which provides: “All property of the conjugal partnership of gains is owned in common by
the husband and wife.”

While one may not be deprived of his “vested right,” he may lose the same if there is due process and such deprivation is founded
in law and jurisprudence.

In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to due process. First, he was well-aware that the respondent prayed in
her complaint that all of the conjugal properties be awarded to her. In fact, in his Answer, the petitioner prayed that the trial court
divide the community assets between the petitioner and the respondent as circumstances and evidence warrant after the
accounting and inventory of all the community properties of the parties. Second, when the decision for legal separation was
promulgated, the petitioner never questioned the trial court’s ruling forfeiting what the trial court termed as “net profits,”
pursuant to Article 129(7) of the Family Code. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim being deprived of his right to due process.

3. When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the husband and the wife become joint owners of all the properties
of the marriage. Whatever property each spouse brings into the marriage, and those acquired during the marriage (except those
excluded under Article 92 of the Family Code) form the common mass of the couple’s properties. And when the couple’s marriage
or community is dissolved, that common mass is divided between the spouses, or their respective heirs, equally or in the
proportion the parties have established, irrespective of the value each one may have originally owned.

In this case, assuming arguendo that Art 102 is applicable, since it has been established that the spouses have no separate
properties, what will be divided equally between them is simply the “net profits.” And since the legal separation½share decision of
Brigido states that the in the net profits shall be awarded to the children, Brigido will still be left with nothing.
 On the other hand, when a couple enters into a regime of conjugal partnership of gains under Article142 of the Civil Code, “the
husband and the wife place in common fund the fruits of their separate property and income from their work or industry, and
divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by
either spouse during the marriage.” From the foregoing provision, each of the couple has his and her own property and debts. The
law does not intend to effect a mixture or merger of those debts or properties between the spouses. Rather, it establishes a
complete separation of capitals.

In the instant case, since it was already established by the trial court that the spouses have no separate properties, there is nothing
to return to any of them. The listed properties above are considered part of the conjugal partnership. Thus, ordinarily, what
remains in the above-listed properties should be divided equally between the spouses and/or their respective heirs. However,
since the trial court found the petitioner the guilty party, his share from the net profits of the conjugal partnership is forfeited in
favor of the common children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. Again, lest we be confused, like in the absolute
community regime, nothing will be returned to the guilty party in the conjugal partnership regime, because there is no separate
property which may be accounted for in the guilty party’s favor.
ARTICLES 68—73 RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE
ILUSORIO v. BILDNER  FACTS:

Potenciano Ilusorio, a lawyer, 86 year old of age, possessed extensive property valued at millions of pesos. For many years, he was
the Chairman of the Board and President of Baguio Country Club. He was married with Erlinda Ilusorio, herein petitioner, for 30
years and begotten 6 children namely Ramon, Lin Illusorio-Bildner (defendant), Maximo, Sylvia, Marietta and Shereen. They
separated from bed and board in 1972. Potenciano lived at Makati every time he was in Manila and at Illusorio Penthouse, Baguio
Country Club when he was in Baguio City. On the other hand, the petitioner lived in Antipolo City.

In 1997, upon Potenciano’s arrival from US, he stayed with her wife for about 5 months in Antipolo city. The children, Sylvia and
Lin, alleged that during this time their mother overdose Potenciano which caused the latter’s health to deteriorate. In February
1998, Erlinda filed with RTC petition for guardianship over the person and property of Potenciano due to the latter’s advanced age,
frail health, poor eyesight and impaired judgment. In May 1998, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio, Potenciano did not
return to Antipolo instead lived at Cleveland Condominium in Makati. In March 1999, petitioner filed with CA petition for habeas
corpus to have the custody of his husband alleging that the respondents refused her demands to see and visit her husband and
prohibited Potenciano from returning to Antipolo.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioned writ of habeas corpus should be issued.

RULING:

A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or by which the rightful custody of a person is
withheld from the one entitled thereto. It is available where a person continues to be unlawfully denied of one or more of his
 constitutional freedoms, where there is denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary but are
unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has later become arbitrary.It is devised as a speedy and effectual
remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom.The essential object
and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint, and to relieve a person therefrom if
such restraint is illegal.

Evidence showed that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of Potenciano’s liberty that would justify issuance
of the writ. The fact that the latter was 86 years of age and under medication does not necessarily render him mentally
incapacitated. He still has the capacity to discern his actions. With his full mental capacity having the right of choice, he may not be
the subject of visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, he will be deprived of his right to privacy.

The case at bar does not involve the right of a parent to visit a minor child but the right of a wife to visit a husband. In any event,
that the husband refuses to see his wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to do so without threat or any penalty attached to the
exercise of his right. Coverture is a matter beyond judicial authority and cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas
corpus carried out by the sheriffs or by any other process.
ARTICLE 87 — DONATION BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE DURING MARRIAGE/PROHIBITION/INCLUSION OF COMMON LAW RELATIONSHIP
ARCABA v. TABANCURA  Facts:
Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the registered owners of two lots in Zamboanga del Norte. After the
death of Zosima, Francisco and his mother-in-law executed a deed of extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights, in which the
latter waived her ¼ share of the property. Thereafter, Francisco registered the lot in his name. Having no children to take care of
him after his retirement, Francisco asked his niece Leticia, the latter’s cousin Luzviminda and petitioner Cirila Arcaba, to take care
of his house and store.

Conflicting testimonies were offered as to the nature of the relationship between Cirila and Francisco. Leticia said that the previous
party was lovers since they slept in the same room while Erlinda claimed that Francisco told her that Cirila was his mistress. On the
other hand, Cirila said she was mere helper and that Francisco was too old for her.

A few months before Francisco’s death, he executed an instrument denominated “Deed of Donation Inter Vivos” in which he
ceded a portion of the lot together with is house to Cirila, who accepted the donation in the same instrument. The deed stated
that the donation was being made in consideration of the “faithful services she had rendered over the past ten years.” Thereafter,
Francisco died and the respondents filed a complaint against Cirila for declaration of nullity of a deed of donation inter vivos,
recovery of possession and damages. Respondents, who are nieces, nephews and heirs by intestate succession of Francisco,
alleged that Cirila was the common-law wife of Francisco and the donation inert vivos is void under Article 87 of the Family Code.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the deed of donation inter vivos executed by the late Francisco Comille be declared void under Article 87 of the
Family Code.
 HELD:

Yes. The donation made was void under Article 87 of theFamily Code. he court in this case considered a sufficient proof of common
law relationship wherein donation is not valid. The conclusion was based on the testimony of Tabancura and certain documents
bearing the signature of “Cirila Comille” such as application for business permit, sanitary permit and the death certificate of
Francisco. Also, the fact that Cirila did not demand her wages is an indication that she was not simply a caregiver –employee.

Cohabitation means more than sexual intercourse, especially when one of the parties is already old and may no longer be
interested in sex at the very least, cohabitation is a public assumption of men and women holding themselves out to the public as
such.

Hence, the deed of donation by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the Family Code.
ARTICLES 88 - 104 ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY OF PROPERTY
NOBLEZA v. NUEGA FACTS: Shirley sent Rogelio money for the purchase of a residential lot where they had planned to eventually build their home.
Rogelio purchased the subject house and lot for P102,000.00. They then got married and lived there. The following year, Shirley
returned to Israel for work. While overseas, she received information that Rogelio had brought home another woman, Monica
Escobar, into the family home. She also learned and was able to confirm upon her return to the Philippines thereafter, that Rogelio
had been introducing Escobar as his wife.

Shirley filed two cases against Rogelio: one for Concubinage, and another for Legal Separation and Liquidation of Property. In
between the filing of these cases, Shirley learned that Rogelio had the intention of selling the subject property. She then advised
the interested buyers, one of whom was their neighbor and petitioner Nobleza, of the existence of the cases that she filed against
Rogelio and cautioned them against buying the subject property until the cases are closed and terminated. Nonetheless, under a
Deed of Absolute Sale, Rogelio sold the subject property to petitioner without Shirley’s consent in the amount of P380,000.00,
including petitioner’s undertaking to assume the existing mortgage on the property and to pay the real property taxes due
thereon.

ISSUE: Is the Deed of Sale null and void for lack of the consent of the wife?

HELD: Yes. The petitioner is not a buyer in good faith. A buyer cannot claim to be an innocent purchaser for value by merely relying
on the TCT of the seller while ignoring all the other surrounding circumstances relevant to the sale.

The nullity of the sale made by Rogelio is not premised on proof of respondent’s financial contribution in the purchase of the
subject property. Actual contribution is not relevant in determining whether a piece of property is community property for the law
itself defines what constitutes community property. Article 91 of the Family Code thus provides:

Art. 91. Unless otherwise provided in this Chapter or in the marriage settlements, the community property shall consist of all the
property owned by the spouses at the time of the celebration of the marriage or acquired thereafter.
 The only exceptions from the above rule are: (1) those excluded from the absolute community by the Family Code; and (2) those
excluded by the marriage settlement.

Under the first exception are properties enumerated in Article 92 of the Family Code, which states:

Art. 92. The following shall be excluded from the community property:
(1) Property acquired during the marriage by gratuitous title by either spouse and the fruits as well as the income thereof, if any,
unless it is expressly provided by the donor, testator or grantor that they shall form part of the community property;
(2) Property for personal and exclusive use of either spouse; however, jewelry shall form part of the community property;
(3) Property acquired before the marriage by either spouse who has legitimate descendants by a former marriage, and the fruits as
well as the income, if any, of such property.

Since the subject property does not fall under any of the exclusions provided in Article 92, it, therefore, forms part of the absolute
community property of Shirley and Rogelio. Regardless of their respective contribution to its acquisition before their marriage, and
despite the fact that only Rogelio’s name appears in the TCT as owner, the property is owned jointly by the spouses.
ARTICLES 105—133 CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS
MUNOZ, JR. v. CARLOS DOCTRINE: Property acquired during marriage by gratuitous title by either spouse is excluded from the community property; When
the value of the paraphernal property is considerably more than the conjugal improvement, said paraphernal property does not
become conjugal property.

FACTS: The residential lot in the subject property was registered in the name of Erlinda Ramirez, married to Eliseo Carlos
(respondents). On April 6, 1989, Eliseo, a Bureau of Internal Revenue employee, mortgaged said lot, with Erlinda’s consent, to the
GSIS to secure a P136,500.00 housing loan, payable within twenty (20) years, through monthly salary deductions of P1,687.66. The
respondents then constructed a thirty-six (36)-square meter, two-story residential house on the lot. On July 14, 1993, the title to
the subject property was transferred to the petitioner by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale, dated April 30, 1992, executed by
Erlinda, for herself and as attorney-in-fact of Eliseo, for a stated consideration of P602,000.00.

On September 24, 1993, the respondents filed a complaint with the RTC for the nullification of the deed of absolute sale, claiming
that there was no sale but only a mortgage transaction, and the documents transferring the title to the petitioner’s name were
falsified. The respondents presented the results of the scientific examination conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation of
Eliseo’s purported signatures in the Special Power of Attorney dated April 29, 1992 and the Affidavit of waiver of rights dated April
29, 1992, showing that they were forgeries. The petitioner, on the other hand, introduced evidence on the paraphernal nature of
the subject property since it was registered in Erlinda’s name.

The RTC ruled for petitioner finding that the property is paraphernal and consequently, the NBI finding that Eliseo’s signatures in
the special power of attorney and in the affidavit were forgeries was immaterial because Eliseo’s consent to the sale was not
necessary. The CA reversed and held that pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 158 of the Civil Code and Calimlim-Canullas
v. Hon. Fortun, the subject property, originally Erlinda’s exclusive paraphernal property, became conjugal property when it was
used as collateral for a housing loan that was paid through conjugal funds – Eliseo’s monthly salary deductions.
 ISSUE: Whether the subject property is paraphernal (exclusive property of the wife) or conjugal

HELD: The property is paraphernal property of Erlinda.

RATIO: As a general rule, all property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made,
contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved. In the
present case, clear evidence that Erlinda inherited the residential lot from her father has sufficiently rebutted this presumption of
conjugal ownership pursuant to Articles 92 and 109 of the Family Code. The residential lot, therefore, is Erlinda’s exclusive
paraphernal property.

Moreover, we cannot subscribe to the CA’s misplaced reliance on Article 158 of the Civil Code and Calimlim-Canullas. As the
respondents were married during the effectivity of the Civil Code, its provisions on conjugal partnership of gains (Articles 142 to
189) should have governed their property relations. However, with the enactment of the Family Code on August 3, 1989, the Civil
Code provisions on conjugal partnership of gains, including Article 158, have been superseded by those found in the Family Code
(Articles 105 to 133).

Article 120 of the Family Code, which supersedes Article 158 of the Civil Code, provides the solution in determining the ownership
of the improvements that are made on the separate property of the spouses, at the expense of the partnership or through the acts
or efforts of either or both spouses. Applying the said provision to the present case, we find that Eliseo paid a portion only of the
GSIS loan through monthly salary deductions. From April 6, 1989 to April 30, 1992, Eliseo paid about P60,755.76, not the entire
amount of the GSIS housing loan plus interest, since the petitioner advanced the P176,445.27 paid by Erlinda to cancel the
mortgage in 1992. Considering the P136,500.00 amount of the GSIS housing loan, it is fairly reasonable to assume that the value of
the residential lot is considerably more than the P60,755.76 amount paid by Eliseo through monthly salary deductions. Thus, the
subject property remained the exclusive paraphernal property of Erlinda at the time she contracted marriage with the petitioner;
the written consent of Eliseo to the transaction was not necessary. The NBI finding that Eliseo’s signatures in the special power of
attorney and affidavit were forgeries was immaterial.

Nonetheless, the RTC and the CA apparently failed to consider the real nature of the contract between the parties (where the SC
found that the contract is an equitable mortgage and not one of sale).
AYALA INVESTMENTS v. CA FACTS: Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained a P50,300,000 loan from petitioner Ayala Investment and Development
Corporation (AIDC). Respondent Alfredo Ching made himself jointly answerable to the debt as added security. Upon PBM’s failure
to pay the loan, AIDC filed a case for sum of money against PBM and respondent Ching.

After trial, the court rendered decision in favor of AIDC ordering PBM and Alfredo Ching to jointly and severally pay AIDC the
principal amount of the loan with interests. Pending the appeal of the judgment, RTC issued a writ of execution and thereafter, the
deputy sheriff caused the issuance and service upon respondent spouses of the notice of sheriff sale on three of their conjugal
properties.

Respondent spouses then filed an injunction contending that subject loan did not redound to the benefit of the conjugal
 partnership. Nevertheless, a certificate of sale was issued to AIDC, being the only bidder for the property.

ISSUE: WON the debts and obligations contracted by the husband alone is considered “for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.”

HELD: No. Petition is DENIED.

RATIO: The loan obtained by the husband from AIDC was for the benefit of PBM and not for the benefit of the conjugal partnership
of Ching.

PBM has a personality which is distinct from that of Ching’s family despite their being stockholders of the said company. The debt
incurred by Ching is a corporate debt and the right of recourse to respondent as surety is only to the extent of his corporate stocks.
If the money or services are given to another person or entity, and the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, that contract
cannot, by itself, alone be categorized as falling within the context of “obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.”

The contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for the surety or his family. No
presumption can be inferred that, when a husband enters into a contract of surety or accommodation agreement, it is “for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership.” Proof must be presented to establish benefit redounding to the conjugal partnership.

CHING V. CA FACTS: Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc. (PBMCI) obtained two loans from the Allied Banking Corporation (ABC). PBMCI
Executive Vice-President Alfredo Ching executed a continuing guaranty with the ABC for the payment of the said loan. The PBMCI
defaulted in the payment of all its loans so ABC filed a complaint for sum of money against the PBMCI. Trial court issued a writ of
preliminary attachment against Alfredo Ching requiring the sheriff of to attach all the properties of said Alfredo Ching to answer for
the payment of the loans. Encarnacion T. Ching, wife of Alfredo Ching, filed a Motion to Set Aside the levy on attachment alleging
inter alia that the 100,000 shares of stocks levied on by the sheriff were acquired by her and her husband during their marriage out
of conjugal funds. Petitioner spouses aver that the source of funds in the acquisition of the levied shares of stocks is not the
controlling factor when invoking the presumption of the conjugal nature of stocks under Art. 121 and that such presumption
subsists even if the property is registered only in the name of one of the spouses, in this case, petitioner Alfredo Ching. According
to the petitioners, the suretyship obligation was not contracted in the pursuit of the petitioner-husband’s profession or business.

ISSUE: WON 100,000 shares of stocks may be levied on by the sheriff to answer for the loans guaranteed by petitioner Ching

HELD: No. Article 160 of the New Civil Code (Art 116 of FC) provides that all the properties acquired during the marriage are
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband, or to the wife. The
private respondent failed to adduce evidence that the petitioner-husband acquired the stocks with his exclusive money. The
barefaced fact that the shares of stocks were registered in the corporate books of Citycorp Investment Philippines solely in the
name of the petitioner-husband does not constitute proof that the petitioner-husband, not the conjugal partnership, owned the
same. The shares of stocks are, thus, presumed to be the conjugal partnership property of the petitioners.

The CA erred in holding that by executing a continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement with the private respondent for the
 payment of the PBMCI loans, the petitioner-husband was in the exercise of his profession, pursuing a legitimate business. The
appellate court erred in concluding that the conjugal partnership is liable for the said account of PBMCI.

Article 121 provides: The conjugal partnership shall be liable for: (1) All debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the same purpose, in the cases where she may
legally bind the partnership.

For the conjugal partnership to be liable for a liability that should appertain to the husband alone, there must be a showing that
some advantages accrued to the spouses.

In this case, the private respondent failed to prove that the conjugal partnership of the petitioners was benefited by the petitioner-
husband’s act of executing a continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement with the private respondent for and in behalf of
PBMCI. The contract of loan was between the private respondent and the PBMCI, solely for the benefit of the latter. No
presumption can be inferred from the fact that when the petitioner-husband entered into an accommodation agreement or a
contract of surety, the conjugal partnership would thereby be benefited. The private respondent was burdened to establish that
such benefit redounded to the conjugal partnership.

FRANCISCO GONZALES v. Facts: Erminda filed a complaint for annulment of marriage, alleging that Francisco is psychological incapacitated to comply with
ERMINDA GONZALES the obligations of marriage.

During the times they lived together they acquired properties. Erminda managed their pizza business and work hard for its
development. She prays for the declaration of the nullity of their marriage and for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of
gains. Francisco denied that allegations and claimed that he exclusively owns the properties existing during their marriage.

The court rendered its decision, ordering the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains and dividing the conjugal properties
equally between Francisco and Erminda. Francisco was not satisfied with the manner of dividing their properties, but he did not
contest the part of the decision which declared his marriage to respondent void ab initio, so he appealed to the Court of Appeals,
but Court of Appeals affirmed the assailed decision of the trial court.

Issue: WON Fransisco exclusively owned the properties existing during their marriage.

Holding: No, since the marriage of Francisco and Erminda is declared null and void, consequently, their property relation shall be
governed by the provisions of Article 147.

These provisions enumerate the two instances when the property relations between spouses shall be governed by the rules on co-
ownership. These are: (1) when a man and woman capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each other as husband
and wife without the benefit of marriage; and (2) when a man and woman live together under a void marriage. Under this property
regime of co-ownership, properties acquired by both parties during their union, in the absence of proof to the contrary, are
presumed to have been obtained through the joint efforts of the parties and will be owned by them in equal shares.
BUADO v. NICOL FACTS: Spouses Buado, petitioners, filed a complaint for damages against Erlinda Nicol for her civil liability arising from criminal
offense of slander. Trial court rendered a decision to let her pay for damages. Finding her personal properties insufficient to satisfy
the judgment, the sheriff levied and auctioned her property. An auction sale was held with the petitioners as the highest bidder. A
certificate of sale was issued in favor of Mr. and Mrs. Buado. After almost one year, the husband of Erlinda, Romulo Nicol, filed a
complaint for the annulment of certificate of sale and damages with preliminary injunction against petitioners and deputy sheriff.

ISSUE: WON the obligation of Nicol arising from her criminal liability is chargeable to the conjugal partnership

RULING: NO. Erlinda Nicol’s liability is not chargeable to the conjugal partnership.

There is no dispute that contested property is conjugal in nature. Article 122 of the Family Code explicitly provides that payment of
personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal
partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family. Unlike in the system of absolute community where
liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of a crime or quasi-delict is chargeable to the absolute community of property, in the
absence or insufficiency of the exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the same advantage is not accorded in the system of
conjugal partnership of gains. The conjugal partnership of gains has no duty to make advance payments for the liability of the
debtor-spouse.

PANA v. HEIRS OF JUANITE FACTS: Petitioner Efren Pana (Efren), his wife Melecia, and others were accused of murder. Efren was acquitted but Melecia and
another person was found guilty and was sentenced to the penalty of death and to pay each of the heirs of the victims, jointly and
severally for civil indemnity and damages. Upon motion for execution by the heirs of the deceased, the RTC ordered the issuance
of the writ, resulting in the levy of real properties registered in the names of Efren and Melecia. Subsequently, a notice of levy and
a notice of sale on execution were issued. Efren and Melecia filed a motion to quash the writ of execution, claiming that the levied
properties were conjugal assets, not paraphernal assets of Melecia.

ISSUE: WON the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Melecia can be levied and executed upon for the satisfaction of
Melecia’s civil liability in the murder case

HELD: Art. 122. The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be
charged to the conjugal properties partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family.

Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them be charged to the partnership. The payment of fines and
indemnities imposed upon the spouses may be enforced against the partnership assets if the spouse who is bound should have no
exclusive property or if it should be insufficient.

Since Efren did not dispute the RTC’s finding that Melecia has no exclusive property of her own, the above applies. The civil
indemnity that the decision in the murder case imposed on her may be enforced against their conjugal assets after the
 responsibilities enumerated in Article 121 of the Family Code have been covered.

Administration, enjoyment and disposition/encumbrance of the conjugal property

CASES UNDER THE NEW CIVIL CODE:
BA FINANCE v. CA FACTS: Augusto Yulo secured a loan from the petitioner in the amount of P591,003.59 as evidenced by a promissory note he signed
in his own behalf and as a representative of A&L Industries. Augusto presented an alleged special power of attorney executed by
his wife, Lily Yulo, who managed the business and under whose name the said business was registered, purportedly authorizing the
husband to procure the loan and sign the promissory note. 2 months prior the procurement of the loan, Augusto left Lily and their
children which in turn abandoned their conjugal home. When the obligation became due and demandable, Augusto failed to pay
the same.

The petitioner prayed for the issuance of a writ of attachment alleging that said spouses were guilty of fraud consisting of the
execution of Deed of Assignment assigning the rights, titles and interests over a construction contract executed by and between
the spouses and A. Soriano Corporation. The writ hereby prayed for was issued by the trial court and not contented with the order;
petitioner filed a motion for the examination of attachment debtor alleging that the properties attached by the sheriff were not
sufficient to secure the satisfaction of any judgment which was likewise granted by the court.

ISSUE: WON the A&L Industries can be held liable for the obligations contracted by the husband.

RULING: Yes. A&L Industries is a single proprietorship, whose registered owner is Lily Yulo. The said proprietorship was established
during the marriage and assets were also acquired during the same. Hence, it is presumed that the property forms part of the
conjugal partnership of the spouses and be held liable for the obligations contracted by the husband. However, for the property to
be liable, the obligation contracted by the husband must have redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. The obligation
was contracted by Augusto for his own benefit because at the time he incurred such obligation, he had already abandoned his
family and left their conjugal home. He likewise made it appear that he was duly authorized by his wife on behalf of the company
to procure such loan from the petitioner. Clearly, there must be the requisite showing that some advantage accrued to the welfare
of the spouses.

Art. 122. The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged
to the conjugal properties partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family.

Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them be charged to the partnership.

However, the payment of personal debts contracted by either spouse before the marriage, that of fines and indemnities imposed
upon them, as well as the support of illegitimate children of either spouse, may be enforced against the partnership assets after the
responsibilities enumerated in the preceding Article have been covered, if the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive
property or if it should be insufficient; but at the time of the liquidation of the partnership, such spouse shall be charged for what
has been paid for the purpose above-mentioned.
 Thus, the Court ruled that petitioner cannot enforce the obligation contracted by Augusto against his conjugal properties with Lily.
Furthermore, the writ of attachment cannot be issued against the said properties and that the petitioner is ordered to pay Lily
actual damages amounting to P660,000.00.

HEIRS OF AYUSTE v. CA Facts: Christina and Rafael Ayuste bought a house and lot, the title to which was in the name of Rafael Ayuste married to Christina
Ayuste. Rafael sold the property to Viena Malabonga in 1987 without the consent of his wife. The deed of sale was registered and
a TCT was issued in the name of the buyer during the same year. After her husband’s death in 1989, Christina discovered the
unauthorized sale. In 1990, she filed a complaint seeking the annulment of the sale against the buyer. The TC annulled the sale.
The CA however, reversed the decision invoking Art. 172 CC, holding that the right of Christina to bring an action for the annulment
of the sale is barred for failure to file the same during the existence of the marriage.

Issue: Is the action of Christina barred for having been filed out of time?

Held: Yes. Art. 173 is clear. The wife may during the marriage and within 10 years from the transaction ask the courts for the
annulment of any contract entered into by the husband without her consent. Although the action was filed within 10 years from
the questioned transaction, it was not brought during the existence of the marriage which was dissolved upon the death of Rafael
in 1989.

The fact that Christina Ayuste only learned of the sale after the death of her husband is not material. We affirm public
respondent’s ruling that registration of the sale with the Register of Deeds constitutes a notice to the whole world. Since the deed
of sale was registered on March 5, 1987, Christina Ayuste is presumed to have constructive notice of the sale from such date.

HEIRS OF REYES v. MIJARES Facts: Reyes and Aguilar had been separated de facto. Reyes filed for administration and appointment of guardian for a conjugal
lot (w/ an apartment), misrepresenting that Aguilar died and that he and their minor children were her only heirs. The court
appointed Reyes as guardian of their minor children and subsequently authorized him to sell the estate of Aguilar. The said
property was sold to Sps. Mijares. When Aguilar discovered this, she demanded the return of her ½ share in the lot. Failing to settle
amicably, she instituted a complaint for annulment of sale. RTC declared the sale void with respect to Aguilar’s share. She then
filed a motion for modification of the decision praying that the sale be declared void in its entirety and that the respondents be
ordered to reimburse the rentals collected on the apartments. This was granted by the RTC. Pending appeal, Aguilar died and was
substituted by her compulsory heirs. CA reversed the ruling and upheld the validity of the sale.
Issue: WoN the sale of the conjugal real property if annullable; if yes, WoN it is annullable in its entirety of only with respect to the
share of the spouse who did not give consent

Ruling: In the case at bar, there is no dispute that the subject lot is a conjugal property having been purchased using the conjugal
funds of the spouses during the subsistence of their marriage. Articles 166 and 173 of the Civil Code, the governing laws at the
time the assailed sale was contracted, provide:

Art.166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis or a spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction or is confined in a
leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wife’s consent. If
 she refuses unreasonably to give her consent, the court may compel her to grant the same

Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage and within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the
annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such consent is required, or any act or contract
of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to
exercise this right, she or her heirs after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of property fraudulently alienated
by the husband.

Pursuant to the foregoing provisions, the husband could not alienate or encumber any conjugal real property without the consent,
express or implied, of the wife otherwise, the contract is voidable. Indeed, in several cases the Court had ruled that such alienation
or encumbrance by the husband is void. The better view, however, is to consider the transaction as merely voidable and not void.
This is consistent with Article 173 of the Civil Code pursuant to which the wife could, during the marriage and within 10 years from
the questioned transaction, seek its annulment.

PELAYO V. PEREZ Facts: David Pelayo, by a Deed of Absolute Sale, conveyed to Perez two parcels of agricultural land (the lots). Loreza, wife of David,
and another one whose signature is illegible witnessed the execution of the deed. Loreza, however, signed only on the third page
in the space provided for witnesses on account of which Perez' application for registration of the deed with the Office of the
Register of Deeds was denied. Perez thereupon asked Loreza to sign on the first and second pages of the deed but she refused,
hence, he instituted a complaint for specific performance against Sps. Pelayo.

Issues: WoN consent was given by the wife

Ruling: We agree with the CA ruling that petitioner Lorenza, by affixing her signature to the Deed of Sale on the space provided for
witnesses, is deemed to have given her implied consent to the contract of sale. Sale is a consensual contract that is perfected by
mere consent, which may either be express or implied. A wife's consent to the husband's disposition of conjugal property does not
always have to be explicit or set forth in any particular document, so long as it is shown by acts of the wife that such consent or
approval was indeed given.

In the present case, although it appears on the face of the deed of sale that Lorenza signed only as an instrumental witness,
circumstances leading to the execution of said document point to the fact that Lorenza was fully aware of the sale of their conjugal
property and consented to the sale.
It has been held that the contract is valid until the court annuls the same and only upon an action brought by the wife whose
consent was not obtained.

In the present case, despite respondent's repeated demands for Lorenza to affix her... signature on all the pages of the deed of
sale, showing respondent's insistence on enforcing said contract, Lorenza still did not file a case for annulment of the deed of sale.
It was only when respondent filed a complaint for specific performance on August 8, 1991 when... petitioners brought up Lorenza's
alleged lack of consent as an affirmative defense. Thus, if the transaction was indeed entered into without Lorenza's consent, we
find it quite puzzling why for more than three and a half years, Lorenza did absolutely nothing to seek the nullification of the
 assailed contract.

The foregoing circumstances lead the Court to believe that Lorenza knew of the full import of the transaction between
respondent and her husband; and, by affixing her signature on the deed of sale, she, in effect, signified her consent to the
disposition of their conjugal property.

AGUETE v. PNB FACTS: Spouses Jose Ros and Estrella Aguete filed a complaint for the annulment of the Real Estate Mortgage and all legal
proceedings taken thereunder against PNB, Laoag Branch before the CFI of Ilocos Norte.

The information disclosed that Jose Ros (petitioner) obtained a loan of P115,000 from ONB and executed a real estate mortgage
involving a parcel of land as security thereof. Upon maturity, the loan remained unpaid and as a result, PNB initiated extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings on the said property. After which, the lot was sold to PNB as the highest bidder. Petitioner claims that she
had no knowledge of the loan incurred by her husband nor did she consent to the mortgage instituted on their conjugal property.
She then filed a complaint to annul the proceedings pertaining to the mortgage, sale and consolidation of the property (after the
lapse of 1 year). The trial court rendered its decision in favor of petitioners but was later reversed by the appellate court upon
appeal.

ISSUE: WON the property is considered as redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.

HELD: Yes. Petition denied. The husband cannot alienate or encumber any conjugal real property without the consent, express or
implied, of the wife. Should the husband do so, then the contract is voidable. Article 173 of the Civil Code allows Aguete to
question Ros’ encumbrance of the subject property. However, the same article does not guarantee that the courts will declare the
annulment of the contract. Annulment will be declared only upon a finding that the wife did not give her consent.

It is enough that the benefit to the family is apparent at the signing of the contract. From the very nature of the contract of loan or
services, the family stands to benefit from the loan facility or services to be rendered to the business or profession of the husband.
It is immaterial, if in the end, his business or profession fails or does not succeed. Simply stated, where the husband contracts
obligations on behalf of the family business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will redound to the benefit of
the conjugal partnership. Ros’ loan from PNB redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Hence, the debt is chargeable
to the conjugal partnership.

HEIRS OF HERNANDEZ v. Facts: Hernandez was awarded with a property which was later sold to Mingoa. The SPA issued was in effect an alienation of the
MIN GOA subject property. Petitioners question the validity of the sale since the property, being conjugal in nature, the consent of the wife
must be obtained first. It was proven during trial that the wife’s signature on the SPA was falsified.

Issues: WoN there was a valid alienation involving the subject property
WoN the action for impugning the validity of such alienation has prescribed

Ruling: Article 173 of the Civil Code provides that the disposition of conjugal property without the wife's consent is not void but
 merely voidable.

The rights and interests of the spouses Hernandez over the subject property were validly transferred to respondent Dolores
Camisura. Since the sale of the conjugal property by Hernandez, Sr. was without the consent of his wife, Sergia, the same is
voidable; thus, binding unless annulled. Considering that Sergia failed to exercise her right to ask for the annulment of the sale
within the prescribed period, she is now barred from questioning the validity thereof. And more so, she is precluded from assailing
the validity of the subsequent transfers from Camisura to Plaridel Mingoa and from the latter to Melanie Mingoa. Therefore, title
to the subject property cannot anymore be reconveyed to the petitioners by reason of prescription and laches.

KO V. ARAMBURO FACTS: Corazon is the sister of Virginia’s husband Simeon. Corazon and Simeon have another sibling, Augusto, who predeceased
them. Virginia and the heirs of Augusto filed a Complaint for Recovery of Ownership with Declaration of Nullity and/or
Alternatively Reconveyance and Damages with Preliminary Injunction against Corazon. The complaint alleged that Virginia and
Simeon, together with Corazon and her husband Felix, acquired the subject properties through a Deed of Cession. They executed a
Deed of Cession in favor of Augusto’s heirs, subject of which is the one-third pro-indiviso portion of the subject properties.

However, allegedly with the use of falsified documents, Corazon was able to have the entire subject properties transferred
exclusively to her name, depriving her co-owners Virginia and Augusto’s heirs of their pro-indiviso share, as well as in the produce
of the same. Corazon insisted that only she and Simeon share one-half portion each of the subject properties. She alleged that
Simeon sold and conveyed his entire one-half share in the co-owned properties in her favor. Hence, Corazon became the sole
owner thereof and consequently, was able to transfer the titles of the same to her name.

During trial, it was established that Simeon and Virginia’s marriage had been on bad terms and they’ve been living separately. The
trial court was highly suspicious that Virginia would sign a deed of sale, consenting to her husband’s decision to sell their conjugal
assets to Corazon. Virginia vehemently disowned the signature appearing in the Deed of Absolute Sale.

Without the conformity of Virginia, according to the trial court, Simeon cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the
conjugal partnership. The trial court concluded, thus, that the Deed of Absolute Sale, being falsified, is not a valid instrument to
transfer the one third share of the subject properties.

The trial court rendered a Decision (1) declaring the plaintiffs Virginia as owner of ONE-THIRD (1/3) portion of the subject property,
and the heirs of Augusto as owners of ONE-THIRD (1/3) portion of the subject property, (2) cancelling the TCT’s in the name of
Corazon, (3) that Corazon reimburse the plaintiffs TWO-THIRDS (2/3) of the produce of the properties, subject matter of this case
from the time she appropriated it to herself in 1974 until such time as the 2/3 share are duly delivered to them, and (4) to pay
damages in favor of the plaintiffs. The trial court’s Decision was affirmed in toto by the CA.

ISSUE: WoN the parties are co-owners of the subject properties.

WoN there was a valid sale between Corazon and Simeon.
If co-ownership of the subject properties exist, WoN the co-owners are entitled to the recovery of their share

RULING: The petition is partly meritorious.

(1) The law which governs the instant case is the Old Civil Code, not the Family Code. Proceeding, thus, to the issue of ownership,
We find no reason to depart from the RTC’s ruling as affirmed by the CA.

Augusto’s heirs own one-third pro-indiviso share in the subject properties. We find no cogent reason to depart from the courts a
quo‘s findings as to the existence and effectivity of the Deed of Cession giving rights to Augusto’s children over the one-third
portion of the subject property.

Simeon’s heirs, which include Virginia, also own one-third pro-indiviso share in the subject properties. We uphold the courts a
quo‘s conclusion that one-third portion of the subject properties is indeed part of Simeon and Virginia’s conjugal properties. In this
case, the subject properties, having been acquired during the marriage, are still presumed to belong to Simeon and Virginia’s
conjugal properties.

(2) We now proceed to determine the validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Simeon in favor of Corazon, covering one-
half of the subject properties which was his purported share.

As for the one-third portion of the subject properties pertaining to Augusto’s heirs, we are one with the CA in ruling that the Deed
of Absolute Sale is void as the said portion is owned by Augusto’s heirs as above-discussed and thus, Simeon had no right to sell
the same.

It is basic that the object of a valid sales contract must be owned by the seller. Nemo dat quod non habet, as an ancient Latin
maxim says. One cannot give what one does not have.

However, as to the one-third portion commonly-owned by Spouses Simeon and Virginia, Simeon’s alienation of the same through
sale without Virginia’s conformity is merely voidable.

Article 166 of the Old Civil Code explicitly requires the consent of the wife before the husband may alienate or encumber any real
property of the conjugal partnership except when there is a showing that the wife is incapacitated, under civil interdiction, or in
like situations. Accordingly, without Virginia’s conformity, the Deed of Absolute Sale between Simeon and Corazon purportedly
covering one-half of the subject properties is voidable.

(3) For the share of Augusto’s heirs, the sale of the same is void as the object of such sale, not being owned by the seller, did not
exist at the time of the transaction. Being a void contract, thus, the CA correctly ruled that the action to impugn the sale of the
same is imprescriptible.

As for the share pertaining to Simeon and Virginia, we must emphasize that the governing law in this case is the Old Civil Code.
Under the said law, while the husband is prohibited from selling the commonly-owned real property without his wife’s consent,
still, such sale is not void but merely voidable. Article 173 thereof gave Virginia the right to have the sale annulled during the
marriage within ten years from the date of the sale. Failing in that, she or her heirs may demand, after dissolution of the marriage,
only the value of the property that Simeon erroneously sold.

CASES UNDER THE FAMILY CODE:
GUIANG v. CA
As far as Virginia is concerned, the Old Civil Code applies, and the CA erred in ruling that the subject Deed of Absolute Sale is void
for the lack of the wife’s conformity thereto. The 10-year prescriptive period under Article 173 of the Old Civil Code should be
applied in this case.
SUMMARY OF THE RULING:
In fine, while We uphold the courts a quo‘s findings that the parties herein are co-owners of the subject properties.
We reverse and set aside the said courts’ ruling, ordering the cancellation of titles of the entire subject properties and the transfer
of the two-thirds portion of the same to the respondents.
While Augusto’s heirs are entitled to the recovery of their share in the subject properties, Virginia is only entitled to demand the
value of her share therefrom pursuant to Article 173 of the Old Civil Code.
Facts: Spouses Gilda Corpuz and Judie Corpuz bought a lot located in South Cotabato. Later, they sold one-half portion of their lot
to spouses Guiang. The latter had since then occupied the one-half portion and built their house thereon. They were, thus
adjoining neighbors of the Corpuzes.
Gilda left for Manila trying to look for work abroad and her departure was with the consent of her husband but was not able to go
abroad though. She stayed for some time in Manila. After his wife’s departure for Manila, defendant Judie seldom went home to
the conjugal dwelling.
Sometime in 1990, Harriet Corpuz learned that her father intended to sell the remaining one-half portion including their house, of
their home lot to defendants Guiangs. She wrote a letter to her mother informing her. She replied that she was objecting to the
sale. Harriet, however, did not inform her father about this; but instead gave the letter to Mrs. Luzviminda Guiang so that she
would advise her father.
However, over the objection of private respondent Gilda, her husband sold to the Guiangs one half of their conjugal property,
consisting of their residence and the lot on which it stood. Upon her return to Cotabato, respondent gathered her children and
went back to the subject property. Petitioners filed a complaint for trespassing. Later, there was an amicable settlement between
the parties. Feeling that she had the shorter end of the bargain, Gilda filed an Amended Complaint against her husband and
petitioners. The said Complaint sought the declaration of a certain deed of sale, which involved the conjugal property of private
respondent and her husband, null and void.
Issue: WoN the contract without the consent of wife was void.
Held: Yes, the said contract which was without the consent of the wife was void (VOIDABLE only under Art 173 of the CC).
Disposition occurred during the effectivity of the FC, therefore it applies regardless if the marriage was celebrated during the
effectivity of the CC.
 It properly falls within the ambit of Article 124 of the Family Code, which was correctly applied by the lower court:

Art. 124 FC. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of
disagreement, the husband’s decision shall prevail, subject recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be
availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.

In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the
other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance
which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent,
the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the
consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or
authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.

The respondent’s consent to the contract of sale of their conjugal property was totally absent. To constitute a valid contract, the
Civil Code requires the concurrence of the following elements: (1) cause, (2) object, and (3) consent, the last element being
indubitably absent in the case at bar. Thus, the entire sale is null and void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining
to the husband who contracted the sale.

MANALO v. CAMAISA FACTS: Petitioner, Thelma A. Jader-Manalo made an offer to buy the properties of the respondents from the husband of Norma
Fernandez C. Camaisa, respondent Edilberto Camaisa. After some bargaining, petitioner and Edilberto agreed upon the purchase
price and terms of payment. The agreement handwritten by the petitioner was signed by Edilberto, with assurance from him that
he would secure his wife’s consent. Petitioner was later on surprised when she was informed that respondent spouses were
backing out of the agreement. Hence, she filed a complaint for specific performance and damages.

ISSUE: WoN the husband may validly dispose of a conjugal property without the wife's written consent

HELD: Under Art. 124 of the Family Code: “In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not
include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other
spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.”

The properties subject to the contract in this case were conjugal; hence, for the contracts to sell to be effective, the consent of
both husband and wife must be obtained. Respondent Norma Camaisa did not give her written consent to the sale. Even granting
that respondent Norma actively participated in negotiating for the sale of the subject properties, which she denied, her written
consent to the sale is required by law for its validity. She may have been aware of the negotiations for the sale of their conjugal
properties, however that is not sufficient to demonstrate consent.

It must be noted that Article 124 of the Family Code on obtaining judicial authorization is only resorted to in cases where the
 spouse who does not give consent is incapacitated. The petitioner failed to allege and prove that respondent Norma was
incapacitated to give her consent to the contracts.

HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS FACTS: Respondent Miguela C. Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr. were married on August 8, 1967. During their marriage, the spouses
BANK v. DAILO purchased a house and lot in San Pablo City, registered in the name of Marcelino Dailo to the exclusion of his wife.

In 1993, through a grant of Special Power of Attorney to Lilibeth Osmundo, Marcelino obtained a loan from petitioner
Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank, secured by the property in San Pablo. Gesmundo also executed a Real Estate Mortgage
constituted on the subject property in favor of petitioner without the knowledge and consent of respondent. The loan matured
and remained outstanding which led to the foreclosure of the mortgage. Subsequently, Marcelino died.

Respondent found out later about the mortgage and claimed that she had no knowledge of it. She further claims that the property
was conjugal in nature and so she consequently filed for the Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage and Certificate of Sale, Affidavit of
Consolidation of Ownership, Deed of Sale, Reconveyance with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Damages against petitioner. In
the latter’s Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the property in
question was the exclusive property of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. The Court of appeals favored Miguela. Hence this petition.

ISSUE: WoN the mortgage entered into by respondent’s husband without her knowledge was valid.
WoN the property may be held liable for the obligation obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo.

HELD: The court held that the property relations of respondent and her late husband shall be governed, foremost, by Chapter 4 on
Conjugal Partnership of Gains of the Family Code and, suppletorily, by the rules on partnership under the Civil Code. In case of
conflict, the former prevails because the Civil Code provisions on partnership apply only when the Family Code is silent on the
matter.

Marcelino and Miguela Dailo were married before the effectivity of the Family Code. In the absence of a marriage settlement, their
properties were governed by the system of Conjugal Partnership of gains, which was made also made applicable after the
effectivity of the Code.

The subject property was conjugal in nature, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption that the
subject property acquired during the marriage of spouses Dailo belongs to their conjugal partnership

Article 124 of the Family Code, in the absence of (court) authority or written consent of the other spouse, any disposition or
encumbrance of the conjugal property shall be void. The Court ruled that the mortgage entered into by Marcelino without his
wife’s consent and, thus, was void.

As to the issue of liability of the property for the obligation obtained by Marcelino, the court held that for failure to present clear
proof that the said obligation redounded to the benefit of the family which under Article 121 of the Family Code, the subject
property could not be held liable.
TAN v. HOSANA FACTS: During their marriage, Spouses Jose and Milagros Hosana bought a house and lot. Milagros sold to the petitioner Tan the
subject property, as evidenced by a deed of sale executed by Milagros herself and as attorney-in-fact of Jose, by virtue of a Special
Power of Attorney (SPA) executed by Jose in her favor. The Deed of Sale stated that the purchase price for the lot was
P200,000.00.

With the assurance that all the documents were in order, Tomas made a partial payment of P350,000.00 and another P350,000.00
upon the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale (Deed of Sale). Tomas noticed that the consideration written by Milagros on the
Deed of Sale was only P200,000.00; he inquired why the written consideration was lower than the actual consideration paid
(700k). Milagros explained that it was done to save on taxes.

Jose filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale/Cancellation of Title/Reconveyance and Damages against Milagros and Tan. Jose
averred that while he was working in Japan, Milagros, without his consent and knowledge, conspired with Tan to execute the SPA
by forging Jose's signature making it appear that Jose had authorized Milagros to sell the subject property to Tomas.

Tan maintained that he was a buyer in good faith and for value. Before he paid the full consideration of the sale, he claimed he
sought advice from his lawyer-friend who told him that the title of the subject lot was authentic and in order. Furthermore, he
alleged that the SPA authorizing Milagros to sell the property was annotated at the back of the title.

ISSUE: WoN the sale was void

RULING: The deed of sale and the SPA were void. Jose and Milagros to reimburse Tomas the purchase price of P200,000.00, with
interest, under the principle of unjust enrichment. This principle springs from Article 22 of the New Civil Code which states that
"every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of
something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same." Hence, the restitution of what each
party has given is a consequence of a void and inexistent contract.

Despite Tomas' allegation that he paid P700,000.00 for the subject lot, the CA found that there was no convincing evidence that
established this claim. While the terms and provisions of a void contract cannot be enforced since it is deemed inexistent, it does
not preclude the admissibility of the contract as evidence to prove matters that occurred in the course of executing the contract,
i.e., what each party has given in the execution of the contract. The consideration stated in the notarized Deed of Sale is prima
facie evidence of the amount paid by the petitioner.

FUENTES v. ROCA FACTS: Roca spouses no longer live together. Tarciano Roca sold a conjugal property without Rosario’s consent as the affidavit of
consent was forged. After their death, their children questioned the sale. It must be emphasized that their marriage was
contracted under the Civil Code, but the sale was executed under the Family Code.

ISSUES: WoN the Rocas’ action for the declaration of nullity of that sale to the spouses already prescribed
 HELD: No. The law that applies to this case is the Family Code, not the Civil Code. Although Tarciano and Rosario got married in
1950, Tarciano sold the conjugal property to the Fuentes spouses on January 11, 1989, a few months after the Family Code took
effect on August 3, 1988.

Art. 105 FC. x x x The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of gains already established between
spouses before the effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or
other laws, as provided in Article 256.

When the spouses got married, the Civil Code put in place the system of conjugal partnership of gains on their property relations.
While its Article 165 made the husband the sole administrator of the conjugal partnership, Article 166 prohibited him from selling
commonly owned real property without his wife’s consent. Still, if he sold the same without his wife’s consent, the sale is not void
but merely voidable. Article 173 gave the wife the right to have the sale annulled during the marriage within ten years from the
date of the sale. Failing in that, she or her heirs may demand, after dissolution of the marriage, only the value of the property that
the husband fraudulently sold.

In contrast to Article 173 of the Civil Code, Article 124 of the Family Code does not provide a period within which the wife who
gave no consent may assail her husband’s sale of the real property. It simply provides that without the other spouse’s written
consent or a court order allowing the sale, the same would be void. The sale of conjugal property done by Tarciano without the
consent of Rosario is completely void under Art 124 of the Family Code.

As stated above, that sale was void from the beginning. Consequently, the land remained the property of Tarciano and Rosario
despite that sale. When the two died, they passed on the ownership of the property to their heirs. In fairness to the Fuentes
spouses, however, they should be entitled, among other things, to recover from Tarciano's heirs, the Rocas, the P200,000.00 that
they paid him, with legal interest until fully paid, chargeable against his estate.

ALEJO v. CORTEZ Facts: A parcel of land belonged to the conjugal property/absolute community of property of the respondent Spouses Jorge and
Jacinta Leonardo (Spouses Leonardo) and upon which their residential house was built. Jacinta executed a Kasunduan with Dolores
for the sale of the property. Jorge, however, did not sign the agreement.

Jorge wrote a letter to Dolores denying knowledge and consent to the Kasunduan. Jorge further informed Dolores that Jacinta was
retracting her consent to the Kasunduan due to Dolores' failure to comply with her obligations. This was followed by another letter
from Jorge to Dolores demanding that the latter pay the balance, otherwise the purchase price shall be increased. According to
Dolores, she was being compelled by Jorge to sign the agreement but that she refused to do so. As a result, Jorge went to her
house, destroyed its water pump and disconnected the electricity. Before· the officials of the Barangay, Dolores tendered the
balance but Jorge refused to accept the same. Instead, Jorge filed cases for ejectment and annulment of sale, reconveyance and
recovery of possession against her.

During the pendency of said cases, the subject property was sold by Jorge and Jacinta to respondents Spouses Cortez under a Deed
 of Absolute Sale. At the time of said sale, Dolores was in possession of the subject property.

Issue: WoN the sale was void – YES.

WoN there was a perfected contract – NO.

Held: Any alienation or encumbrance of conjugal property made during the effectivity of the Family Code is governed by Article
124. The law is therefore unequivocal when it states that the disposition of conjugal property of one spouse sans the written
consent of the other is void. Here, it is an established fact that the Kasunduan was entered into solely by Jacinta and signed by her
alone. By plain terms of the law therefore, the Kasunduan is void.

Nevertheless, the void Kasunduan constitutes a continuing offer from Jacinta and Dolores and that Jorge had the option of either
accepting or rejecting the offer before it was withdrawn by either, or both, Jacinta and Dolores. The point of contention is whether
Jorge accepted such continuing offer. If so, then the Kasunduan is perfected as a binding contract; otherwise, the Kasunduan
remains void.

Clearly, Jorge's first letter was an outright and express repudiation of the Kasunduan. The second letter, while ostensibly a demand
for compliance with Dolores' obligation under the Kasunduan, varied its terms on material points, i.e., the date of payment of the
balance and the purchase price. Consequently, such counter-offer cannot be construed as evidencing Jorge's consent to or
acceptance of the Kasunduan for it is settled that where the other spouse's putative consent to the sale of the conjugal property
appears in a separate document which does not contain the same terms and conditions as in the first document signed by the
other spouse, a valid transaction could not have arisen.

Neither can Jorge's subsequent letters to Dolores be treated as a ratification of the Kasunduan for the basic reason that a void
contract is not susceptible to ratification. Nor can Jorge's alleged participation in the negotiation for the sale of the property or his
acquiescence to Dolores' transfer to and possession of the subject property be treated as converting· such continuing offer into a
binding contract as the law distinctly requires nothing less than a written consent to the sale for its validity. Suffice to say that
participation in or awareness of the negotiations is not consent.

Reimbursements of Conjugal Partnership funds

FERRER v. FERRER FACTS: H, while he was unmarried, acquired a piece of lot, applied for a loan to build improvement, and built such improvements.
Subsequently, H married W. It was during their marriage that the loan was paid using conjugal funds. Before H died, H sold the
entire property to X. After H died, W claimed that she had the right to be reimbursed for the cost of the improvements on H’s lot.
She alleged that ½ thereof should be reimbursed and paid by X as X was now the registered owner of the lot.

ISSUE: WoN W has the right to be reimbursed by X. – NO

RULING: Article 120 FC provides the solution in determining the ownership of the improvements that are made on the separate
property of the spouses at the expense of the partnership or through the acts or efforts of either or both spouses. Thus, when the
 cost of the improvement and any resulting increase in value are more than the value of the property at the time of the
improvement, the entire property of one of the spouses shall belong to the conjugal partnership, subject to reimbursement of the
value of the property of the owner-spouse at the time of the improvement; otherwise, said property shall be retained in ownership
by the owner-spouse, likewise subject to reimbursement of the cost of the improvement. The subject property was precisely
declared as the exclusive property of Alfredo on the basis of Article 120 of the Family Code.

It is the owner-spouse who has the obligation to reimburse the conjugal partnership or the spouse who expended the acts or
efforts, as the case may be. The obligation to reimburse rests upon the spouse upon whom ownership of the entire property is
vested. There is no obligation on the part of the purchaser of the property, in case the property is sold by the owner-spouse. It is
the estate of H that is liable.

MULLER v. MULLER Doctrine: He who seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes into equity must come with clean hands.

Facts: Petitioner Elena and respondent Helmut were married and they resided in Germany at a house owned by respondent’s
parents but decided to move and reside permanently in the Philippines. By this time, respondent had inherited the house in
Germany from his parents which he sold and used the proceeds for the purchase of a parcel of land in Antipolo, Rizal at the cost of
P528,000.00 and the construction of a house amounting to P2,300,000.00. The Antipolo property was registered in the name of
petitioner, Elena.

Due to incompatibilities and respondents alleged womanizing, drinking, and maltreatment, the spouses eventually separated.

Helmut filed a petition for separation of properties. RTC granted the petition and decreed the separation of properties between
them and ordered the equal partition of personal properties located within the country, excluding those acquired by gratuitous
title during the marriage. With regard to the Antipolo property, the court held that it was acquired using paraphernal funds of the
respondent. However, it ruled that respondent cannot recover his funds because the property was purchased in violation of
Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution.

The respondent elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the decision of the RTC. It held that respondent merely
prayed for reimbursement for the purchase of the Antipolo property, and not acquisition or transfer of ownership to him. It
ordered the respondent to REIMBURSE the petitioner the amount of P528,000.00 for the acquisition of the land and the amount of
P2,300,000.00 for the construction of the house situated in Antipolo, Rizal.

Issue: WoN respondent Helmut Muller is entitled to reimbursement.

Ruling: No, respondent Helmut Muller is not entitled to reimbursement. There is an express prohibition against foreigners owning
land in the Philippines.

Art. XII, Sec. 7 of the 1987 Constitution provides: “Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or
conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.”
 In the case at bar, the respondent willingly and knowingly bought the property despite a constitutional prohibition. To get away
with that constitutional prohibition, he put the property under the name of his Filipina wife. He tried to do indirectly what the
fundamental law bars him to do directly. With this, the Supreme Court ruled that respondent cannot seek reimbursement on the
ground of equity. It has been held that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be done indirectly which,
because of public policy, cannot be done directly.

Even if it were a fact that said wife had used conjugal funds to make the acquisition, the considerations just set out to militate, on
high constitutional grounds, against his recovering and holding the property so acquired, or any part thereof.

ARTICLE 130 - NATURE OF DISPOSITION OF CONJUASSETS AFTER DEATH OF ONE OF THE SPOUSES WITHOUT LIQUIDATION
GO, SR. v. SERVACIO FACTS: Gaviola and Protacio, Jr. entered into a contract ofsale of a parcel of land. 23 years later, Protacio, Jr executed an Affidavit
of Renunciation and Waiver affirming under oath that it was his father Protacio Go, Sr. (Married to Marta Go) who purchased the
said property. Subsequently, Protacio Go together with his son Rito Go sold a portion of the property to herein respondent Ester
Servacio. On March 2, 2001, the petitioners demanded the return of the property, but Servacio refused to heed their demand;
hence this case for the annulment of sale of the property. The contention of the petitioner was that following Protacio, Jr.’s
renunciation, the property became conjugal property; and that the sale of the property to Servacio without the prior liquidation of
the community property between Protacio, Sr. and Marta was null and void pursuant to Article 130 of the Family Code. Servacio
and Rito countered that Article 130 of the Family Code was inapplicable; that the want of the liquidation prior to the sale did not
render the sale invalid, because the sale was valid to the extent of the portion that was finally allotted to the vendors as his share;
and that the sale did not also prejudice any rights of the petitioners as heirs, considering that what the sale disposed of was within
the aliquot portion of the property that the vendors were entitled to as heirs.

The RTC declared that the property was the conjugal property of Protacio, Sr. and Marta, not the exclusive property of Protacio, Sr.
Nonetheless, the RTC affirmed the validity of the sale of the property. Aggrieved, the petitioners went all the way up to the
Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether Article 130 of the Family Code was applicable.

HELD: The appeal lacks merit. Under Article 130 in relation to Article 105 of the Family Code, any disposition of the conjugal
property after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership must be made only after the liquidation; otherwise, the disposition is
void. Upon Marta’s death in 1987, the conjugal partnership was dissolved, pursuant to Article 175 (1) of the Civil Code, and an
implied ordinary co-ownership ensued among Protacio, Sr. and the other heirs of Marta with respect to her share in the assets of
the conjugal partnership pending a liquidation following its liquidation.

Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-owner with his children in respect of Marta’s share in the conjugal partnership, could not yet
assert or claim title to any specific portion of Marta’s share without an actual partition of the property being first done either by
agreement or by judicial decree. Until then, all that he had was an ideal or abstract quota in Marta’s share. Nonetheless, a co-
 owner could sell his undivided share; hence, Protacio, Sr. had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest, but not
the interest of his co-owners. Consequently, the sale by Protacio, Sr. and Rito as co-owners without the consent of the other co-
owners was not necessarily void, for the rights of the selling co-owners were thereby effectively transferred, making the buyer
(Servacio) a co-owner of Marta’s share. Article 105 of the Family Code, supra, expressly provides that the applicability of the rules
on dissolution of the conjugal partnership is “without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code
or other laws.”

The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of the sale or for the recovery of possession of the thing owned in
common from the third person who substituted the co-owner or co-owners who alienated their shares, but the DIVISION of the
common property as if it continued to remain in the possession of the co-owners who possessed and administered it [Mainit v.
Bandoy, supra] In the meanwhile, Servacio would be a trustee for the benefit of the co-heirs of her vendors in respect of any
portion that might not be validly sold to her.

DOMINGO v. MOLINA FACTS: The spouses Anastacio and Flora Domingo bought a property in Tarlac, consisting of a one-half undivided portion over a
parcel of land. During his lifetime, Anastacio borrowed money from the spouses Molina. 10 years after Flora’s death, Anastacio
sold his interest over the land to the spouses Molina to answer for his debts.

The sale of Anastacio’s interest was registered and transferred the entire one-half undivided portion of the land to the spouses
Molina. Melecio, one of the children of Anastacio and Flora, learned of the transfer and filed a Complaint for Annulment of Title
and Recovery of Ownership (Complaint) against the spouses Molina.

Melecio claims that Anastacio gave the subject property to the spouses Molina to serve as collateral for the money that Anastacio
borrowed. Anastacio could not have validly sold the interest over the subject property without Flora’s consent, as Flora was
already dead at the time of the sale.

ISSUE: Whether the sale of a conjugal property to the spouses Molina without Flora’s consent is valid and legal – NO.

RULING: Anastacio and Flora’s conjugal partnership was dissolved upon Flora’s death. There is no dispute that Anastacio and Flora
Domingo married before the Family Code’s effectivity on August 3, 1988 and their property relation is a conjugal partnership. This
is clear from Article 105 of the Family Code which states:

x x x The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of gains already established between spouses before
the effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws, as
provided in Article 256.

The conjugal partnership of Anastacio and Flora was dissolved when Flora died in 1968, pursuant to Article 175 (1) of the Civil Code
(now Article 126 (1) of the Family Code). Article 130 of the Family Code requires the liquidation of the conjugal partnership upon
death of a spouse and prohibits any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property prior to the conjugal partnership
liquidation. While Article 130 of the Family Code provides that any disposition involving the conjugal property without prior
liquidation of the partnership shall be void, this rule does not apply since the provisions of the Family Code shall be “without
 prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.”

The heirs of Flora were governed by an implied co-ownership among the conjugal properties pending liquidation and partition. This
will also include Anastacio with respect to Flora’s share of the conjugal partnership. Anastacio being a co-owner, cannot claim title
to any specific portion of the conjugal properties without having done an actual partition first, either by agreement or by judicial
decree. On the other hand, Anastacio owns ½ of the original conjugal partnership properties as his share, but this is an undivided
interest. As a consequence, he had the right to freely sell and dispose his undivided interest in the subject property.

Anastacio’s sale to the Sps Molina without the consent of the other co-owners was not totally void, for his rights thereby were
effectively transferred. The Sps Molina became co-owners fo the subject property to the extent of Anastacio’s interest. They
became a trustee for the benefit of the co-heirs of Anastacio in respect to any portion that might belong to the co-heirs after
liquidation and partition. Melecio’s recourse as a co-owner is an action for partition under the Revised Rules of Court.

UY v. ESTATE OF Facts: Vipa Fernandez Lahaylahay is the registered owner of a parcel of land situated in Jaro, Iloilo City. Vipa and her husband Levi
FERNANDEZ Lahaylahay have two children, Grace Joy and Jill Frances.

In 1990, a contract of lease was executed between Vipa and Rafael Uy over the subject property and the improvements thereon to
which Rafael bound himself to pay the amount of P 3,000/mo with provision for a 10% every year thereafter.

On 1995, Vipa died leaving no will or testament whatsoever, Grace Joy became the de facto administrator of the estate of Vipa. In
1998, Rafael stopped paying the monthly rents. Consequently, the estate of Vipa filed a complaint for unlawful detainer with MTCC
against Rafael. Accordingly, at the time of the filing of the complaint, unpaid rents amounted to P271,150.00. MTCC rendered a
decision ordering Rafael to vacate the premises and to pay the amount of unpaid rents with 12% interest per annum.

On appeal, RTC reversed the decision of MTCC and dismissed the complaint for unlawful detainer. According the RTC, Grace was
the plaintiff not the estate and it had failed to the bring the dispute to the barangay conciliation; that the property is part of
conjugal property and after Vipa’s death the conjugal partnership was terminated. Levi sold his property to Rafael, thus making
him co-owner of the property.

Issue: WoN the property is conjugal

WoN Rafael can be considered as a co-owner of the property

Ruling: Levi and Vipa were married on March 24, 1961 and, in the absence of a marriage settlement, the system of conjugal
partnership of gains governs their property relations. It is presumed that the subject property is part of the conjugal properties of
Vipa and Levi considering that the same was acquired during the subsistence of their marriage and there being no proof to the
contrary.

When Vipa died, the conjugal partnership was automatically terminated. Under Article 130 of the Family Code (in relation to
Article 105), the conjugal partnership property, upon its dissolution due to the death of either spouse, should be liquidated either
 in the same proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased or, in the absence thereof, by the surviving spouse within
one year from the death of the deceased spouse. That absent any liquidation, any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal
partnership property is void.

Rafael bought Levi's 1/2 share in the subject property in consideration of P500,000.00 as evidenced by the Deed of Sale. At that
time, the conjugal partnership properties of Levi and Vipa were not yet liquidated. However, such disposition, notwithstanding the
absence of liquidation of the conjugal partnership properties, is not necessarily void.

It bears stressing that under the regime of CPG, the spouses are co-owners of all the property of the conjugal partnership. Thus,
upon termination of the CPG due to the death of either spouse, the surviving spouse has an actual and vested ½ undivided share of
the properties, which does not consist of determinate and segregated properties until liquidation and partition of the conjugal
partnership. With respect however to the deceased spouse’s share in the conjugal partnership properties, an implied co-ownership
ensues among the surviving spouse and the heirs of the deceased.

Although Levi became a co-owner of the conjugal partnership properties with Grace Joy and Jill Frances, he could not yet assert or
claim title to any specific portion thereof without an actual partition of the property being first done either by agreement or by
judicial decree. Nevertheless, a co-owner could sell his undivided share; hence, Levi had the right to freely sell and dispose of his
undivided interest. Thus, the sale by Levi of his one-half undivided share in the subject property was not necessarily void, for his
right as a co-owner thereof was effectively transferred, making the buyer, Rafael, a co-owner of the subject property.

Accordingly, Rafael could no longer be directed to vacate the subject property since he is already a co-owner thereof.
Nevertheless, Rafael is still bound to pay the unpaid rentals from June 1998 until April 2003 in the amount of P271,150.00.

CARLOS v. TOLENTINO Facts: A parcel of land and all the improvements thereon was registered in the name of Juan C. Tolentino, married to Mercedes
Tolentino (the subject property). Without Juan's knowledge and consent, Mercedes and Kristoff (their grandson), who were then
residing in the subject property, forged a Deed of Donation, thereby making it appear that Juan and Mercedes donated the subject
property to Kristoff.

A Deed of Absolute Sale was executed between Kristoff and Julieta. Upon learning of the foregoing events, Juan executed an
Affidavit of Adverse Claim. Juan also filed a criminal complaint for Falsification of Public Document before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City against Kristoff.

Meanwhile, Kristoff and Julieta executed another Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Spouses Carlos. The affidavit of adverse claim
executed by Juan was duly carried over to the title of Spouses Carlos.

CA found that Spouses Carlos were negligent in not taking the necessary steps to determine the status of the subject property
prior to their purchase thereof. It stressed that Julieta failed to examine Kristoff s title and other documents before the sale as she
merely relied on her brother, Felix. Accordingly, the CA ruled that Juan has a better right over the subject property.
ISSUE: WoN Sps Carlos have the better right over the subject property than Juan. (NO)

RULING: Juan and Mercedes appear to have been married before the effectivity of the FC. There being no indication that they have
adopted a different property regime, the presumption is that their property relations is governed by the regime of conjugal
partnership of gains. Likewise, the Family Code contains terms governing conjugal partnership of gains that supersede the terms of
the conjugal partnership of gains under the Civil Code. Article 105 of the Family Code states:
Article 105. In case the future spouses agree in the marriage settlements that the regime of conjugal partnership of gains shall
govern their property relations during marriage, the provisions in this Chapter shall be of supplementary application.

The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of gains already established between spouses before the
effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws, as
provided in Article

Since the subject property was acquired on March 17, 1967 during the marriage of Juan and Mercedes, it formed part of their
conjugal partnership. It follows then that Juan and Mercedes are the absolute owners of their undivided one-half interest,
respectively, over the subject property. In retrospect, as absolute owners of the subject property Juan and Mercedes may validly
exercise rights of ownership by executing deeds which transfer title thereto such as, in this case, the Deed of Donation in favor of
Kristoff. Juan’s signature was found to be forged but the signature of Mercedes in the Deed of Donation was never contested and
is, therefore, deemed admitted.

In the present case, while it has been settled that the congruence of the wills of the spouses is essential for the valid disposition of
conjugal property, it cannot be ignored that Mercedes' consent to the disposition of her one-half interest in the subject property
remained undisputed. It is apparent that Mercedes, during her lifetime, relinquished all her rights thereon in favor of her
grandson, Kristoff.

Furthermore, Mercedes' knowledge of and acquiescence to the subsequent sale of the subject property to Spouses Carlos is
evidenced by her signature appearing in the MOA and the Deed of Absolute Sale. We are also mindful of the fact that Spouses
Carlos had already paid a valuable consideration in the amount of P2,300,000.00 for the subject property before Juan's adverse
claim was annotated on Kristoff’s title. The said purchase and acquisition for valuable consideration deserves a certain degree of
legal protection.

The Court rules that it deemed proper to uphold the validity of the Deed of Donation but only to the extent of Mercedes' one- half
share in the subject property. And rightly so, because why invalidate Mercedes' disposition of her one-half portion of the conjugal
property that will eventually be her share after the termination of the conjugal partnership? It will practically be absurd, especially
in the instant case, since the conjugal partnership had already been terminated upon Mercedes' death.

Accordingly, the right of Kristoff, as donee, is limited only to the one- half undivided portion that Mercedes owned. The Deed of
Donation insofar as it covered the remaining one-half undivided portion of the subject property is null and void, Juan not having
consented to the donation of his undivided half.
 Upon the foregoing perspective, Spouses Carlos' right, as vendees in the subsequent sale of the subject property, is confined only
to the one-half undivided portion thereof. The other undivided half still belongs to Juan. As owners pro indiviso of a portion of the
lot in question, either Spouses Carlos or Juan may ask for the partition of the lot and their property rights shall be limited to the
portion which may be allotted to them in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. Lastly, as a matter of fairness and
in line with the principle that no person should unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another, Kristoff should be liable to
reimburse Spouses Carlos of the amount corresponding to one-half of the purchase price of the subject property.
ARTICLES 134-141 JUDICIAL SEPARATION OF PROPERTY DURING THE MARRIAGE
MAQUILAN v. MAQUILAN Facts: Virgilio discovered that Dita had a paramour. Virgilio filed a case of adultery against Dita and her paramour. The two were
convicted of the crime charged. Subsequently, Virgilio filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, Dissolution and
Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and Damages before the RTC, imputing psychological incapacity on Dita. During the
pre-trial, Virgilio and Dita entered into a Compromise Agreement wherein they agreed to partially separate their conjugal
properties without prejudice to the outcome of the pending case of declaration of nullity of marriage. The RTC approved the
compromise agreement.

Virgilio, however, later filed an Omnibus Motion, praying for the repudiation of the Compromise Agreement and the
reconsideration of the Judgment on Compromise Agreement by the respondent judge on the grounds that his previous lawyer did
not intelligently and judiciously apprise him of the consequential effects of the Compromise Agreement. The respondent Judge
denied the motion.

Virgilio appealed, contending that the Compromise Agreement is void because it circumvents the law that prohibits the guilty
spouse, who was convicted of either adultery or concubinage, from sharing in the conjugal property. Since the respondent was
convicted of adultery, the petitioner argues that her share should be forfeited in favor of the common child under Articles 43(2)
and 63 of the Family Code.

Issue: WoN the C.A. circumvent the law prohibiting the guilty spouse from sharing in the conjugal properties (NO)
WoN the absence of the public prosecutor nullifies the compromise agreement (NO)

Held: The contention that the Compromise Agreement is tantamount to a circumvention of the law prohibiting the guilty spouse
from sharing in the conjugal properties is misplaced. Existing law and jurisprudence do not impose such disqualification.

Under Article 143 of the Family Code, separation of property may be effected voluntarily or for sufficient cause, subject to judicial
approval. The questioned Compromise Agreement which was judicially approved is exactly such a separation of property allowed
under the law. This conclusion holds true even if the proceedings for the declaration of nullity of marriage was still pending.
However, the Court must stress that this voluntary separation of property is subject to the rights of all creditors of the conjugal
partnership of gains and other persons with pecuniary interest pursuant to Article 136 of the Family Code.

It bears emphasizing that the intendment of the law in requiring the presence of the Solicitor General and/or State prosecutor in
all proceedings of legal separation and annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage is to curtail or prevent any possibility of
collusion between the parties and to see to it that their evidence respecting the case is not fabricated. In the instant case, there is
 no exigency for the presence of the Solicitor General and/or the State prosecutor because as already stated, nothing in the subject
compromise agreement touched into the very merits of the case of declaration of nullity of marriage for the court to be wary of
any possible collusion between the parties. At the risk of being repetitive, the compromise agreement pertains merely to an
agreement between the petitioner and the private respondent to separate their conjugal properties partially without prejudice to
the outcome of the pending case of declaration of nullity of marriage.

ARTICLES 147-148 REGIMES OF UNIONS WITHOUT MARRIAGE OR UNDER A VOID MARRIAGE

ARTICLE 147 CASES
VALDEZ v. RTC BRANCH 102 Facts: Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971 (CC). In 1992 (FC), Valdez filed a petition for declaration of nullity
OF QUEZON CITY of their marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity which was granted by RTC. Parties were also directed to start
proceedings on the liquidation of their common properties as defined by Article 147 of the Family Code. Gomez sought a
clarification of that portion in the decision. She asserted that the Family Code contained no provisions on the procedure for the
liquidation of common property in unions without marriage.

Issues: WoN Art 147 FC is the correct law governing the disposition of property in the case at bar (YES)

Held: In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is
governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code.

Article 147 applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal impediment to marry each other, so exclusively live together as
husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. Under this property regime, property acquired by
both spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during
the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the
acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family household." Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple's separate property are
not included in the co-ownership.

When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or when they do not live exclusively with each other (as
husband and wife), only the property acquired by both of them through their actual joint contribution of money, property or
industry shall be owned in common and in proportion to their respective contributions. Such contributions and corresponding
shares, however, are prima facie presumed to be equal. The share of any party who is married to another shall accrue to the
absolute community or conjugal partnership, as the case may be, if so existing under a valid marriage. If the party who has acted in
bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner already heretofore expressed.

The first paragraph of Articles 50 of the Family Code, applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43, relates only, by its
explicit terms, to voidable marriages and, exceptionally, to void marriages under Article 40 of the Code, i.e., the declaration of
nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage before the latter is judicially declared void.
 ** likewise Art 52 need not be followed; no need for partition before the declaration can be issued

ABING v. WAEYAN FACTS: In 1986, John Abing and Juliet Waeyan cohabited as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. Together, they
bought a 2-storey residential house. In December 1991, Juliet left for Korea and worked thereat, sending money to John which the
latter deposited in their joint account. In 1992, their house was renovated and to it was annex a structure which housed a sari-sari
store. In 1994, Juliet returned.

In 1995, they decided to partition their properties as their relationship soured. They executed a Memorandum of Agreement.
Unfortunately, the document was left unsigned by the parties although signed by the witnesses thereto. Under their unsigned
agreement, John shall leave the dwelling with Juliet paying him the amount of P428,870.00 representing John’s share in all their
properties. Juliet paid John the sum of P232,397.66 by way of partial payment of his share, with the balance of P196,472.34 to be
paid by Juliet in twelve monthly installments.

Juliet, however, failed to make good the balance. John demanded Juliet to vacate the annex structure. Juliet refused, prompting
John to file an ejectment suit against her. John alleged that he alone spent for the construction of the annex structure with his own
funds and thru the money he borrowed from his relatives. He added that the tax declaration for the structure was under his name.

ISSUE: WoN John exclusively own the subject property (NO)

RULING: Other than John’s bare allegation that he alone, thru his own funds and money he borrowed from his relatives, spent for
the construction of the annex structure, evidence wants to support such naked claim.

Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the
property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by
their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not
participate in the acquisition by other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if
the former’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.

The law is clear. In the absence of proofs to the contrary, any property acquired by common-law spouses during their period of
cohabitation is presumed to have been obtained thru their joint efforts and is owned by them in equal shares. Their property
relationship is governed by the rules on co-ownership. And under this regime, they owned their properties in common “in equal
shares.”

Being herself a co-owner, Juliet may not be ejected from the structure in question. She is as much entitled to enjoy its possession
and ownership as John. Juliet’s failure to pay John the balance of the latter’s share in their common properties could at best give
rise to an action for a sum of money against Juliet, or for rescission of the said agreement and not for ejectment.
METROBANK v. PASCUAL Facts: Respondent Nicholson Pascual and Florencia Nevalga were married. During the union, Florencia bought a lot with a three-
door apartment standing thereon. Florencia filed a suit for the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code. RTC rendered a Decision declaring their marriage null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of
Nicholson. In the same decision, the RTC, inter alia, ordered the dissolution and liquidation of the ex-spouses' conjugal partnership
of gains. Subsequent events saw the couple going their separate ways without liquidating their conjugal partnership.

Florencia, together with Sps Oliveros, obtained a PhP 58 million loan from Metrobank. To secure the obligation, Florencia and the
spouses Oliveros executed several real estate mortgages (REMs) on their properties including one involving the subject lot. Among
the documents Florencia submitted to procure the loan were a copy of TCT No. 156283, a photocopy of the marriage-nullifying RTC
decision, and a document denominated as "Waiver" that Nicholson purportedly executed. The waiver, made in favor of Florencia,
covered the conjugal properties of the ex-spouses listed therein, but did not incidentally include the lot in question. Due to the
failure of Florencia and the spouses Oliveros to pay their loan obligation when it fell due, Metrobank, initiated foreclosure
proceedings. At the auction sale, Metrobank emerged as the highest bidder.

Getting wind of the foreclosure proceedings, Nicholson filed a Complaint to declare the nullity of the mortgage of the disputed
property, Nicholson alleged that the property, which is still conjugal property, was mortgaged without his consent. Metrobank, in
its Answer with Counterclaim and Cross-Claim, alleged that the disputed lot, being registered in Florencia's name, was
paraphernal. Metrobank also asserted having approved the mortgage in good faith.

Issues: WoN the subject property is conjugal (YES)

WoN the declaration of nullity of marriage ipso facto dissolved the regime of community of property of the spouses (NO)

Ruling: Metrobank is correct in saying that Art. 160 of the Civil Code, not Art. 116 of the Family Code, is the applicable legal
provision since the property was acquired prior to the enactment of the Family Code. Only proof of acquisition during the marriage
is needed to raise the presumption that the property is conjugal. The said article provides that "all property of the marriage is
presumed to be conjugal partnership, unless it be proven that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife." This article
does not require proof that the property was acquired with funds of the partnership.

While the declared nullity of marriage of Nicholson and Florencia severed their marital bond and dissolved the conjugal
partnership, the character of the properties acquired before such declaration continues to subsist as conjugal properties until and
after the liquidation and partition of the partnership.

For, the relevant provisions of both Codes first require the liquidation of the conjugal properties before a regime of separation of
property reigns. In this pre-liquidation scenario, Art. 493 of the Civil Code shall govern the property relationship between the
former spouses. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he
may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights
are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which
may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
 Florencia has the right to mortgage or even sell her one-half (1/2) undivided interest in the disputed property even without the
consent of Nicholson. However, the rights of Metrobank, as mortgagee, are limited only to the 1/2 undivided portion that
Florencia owned.

**upon dissolution of marriage, property regime ceases to exist and properties will now be governed by rules on co-ownership; no
prohibition on the requirement of consent;

DINO v. DINO Case doctrine: Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the
Family Code, which should be declared void without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties. In this case,
petitioner’s marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus,
what governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-ownership.

FACTS: Alain filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Caridad, citing psychological incapacity under Article 36 of
the Family Code.
The trial court granted the petition on the ground that Caridad was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations at the time of the celebration of the marriage and declared their marriage void ab initio. It ordered that a
decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued upon compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code.

Trial court, upon motion for partial reconsideration of Alain, modified its decision holding that a decree of absolute nullity of
marriage shall be issued after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.

ISSUE: WoN the trial court err when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation,
partition, and distribution of parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code (YES)

HELD: The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC that in a void marriage, regardless of its cause, the property relations of the parties
during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. Article 147 of the Family Code
applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose
marriage is nonetheless void, such as petitioner and respondent in the case before the Court.

For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present:

1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;
2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void.

All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the property
relations between petitioner and respondent but RTC erred in ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued
only after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. The ruling has no
basis because Section 19(1) of the Rule does not apply to cases governed under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code.
 In this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or
45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-
ownership. It is not necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of
marriage.

SALAS, JR. v. AGUILA Facts: Salas Jr. and Aguila were married. Five months later, Salas left their conjugal dwelling. Since then, he no longer
communicated with Aguila or their child. Aguila filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage citing psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the Family Code. The petition states that they “have no conjugal properties whatsoever”.

RTC nullified their marriage and further provided the dissolution of their conjugal property, if any. Aguila filed a manifestation and
motion stating that she discovered 3 properties registered to Juan S. Salas, married to Rubina C. Salas.

However, Salas alleged that Aguila waived her rights to the Discovered Properties in consideration of other properties waived by
Salas in favour of Aguila. Thus, he contends that conjugal properties were deemed partitioned.

Issue: WoN the discovered properties should be partitioned on the basis of co-ownership (YES)

Ruling: Aguila proved that the Discovered Properties were acquired by Salas during the validity of their marriage. Article 147 of the
Family Code applies to the union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage,
but whose marriage is declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code. Under this property regime, property acquired during
marriage is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through the couple’s joint efforts and governed by the rules of co-
ownership. Thus, the Discovered Properties should be partitioned on the basis of co-ownership.

VENTURA v. ABUDA Facts: Socorro Torres (Socorro) and Esteban Abletes (Esteban) were married on 9 June 1980. Although Socorro and Esteban never
had common children, both of them had children from prior marriages: Esteban had a daughter named Evangeline Abuda
(Evangeline),and Socorro had a son, who was the father of Edilberto U. Ventura, Jr. (Edilberto), the petitioner in this case. Evidence
shows that Socorro had a prior subsisting marriage to Crispin Roxas (Crispin) when she married Esteban. This marriage was not
annulled, and Crispin was alive at the time of Socorro's marriage to Esteban. Esteban's prior marriage, on the other hand, was
dissolved by virtue of his wife's death in 1960. According to Edilberto, sometime in 1968, Esteban purchased a portion of a lot, the
remaining was thereafter purchased by Evangeline on her father's behalf sometime in 1970. On 6 September 1997, Esteban sold
the Vitas and Delpan properties to Evangeline and her husband, Paulino Abuda (Paulino).

Sometime in 2000, Leonora Urquila (Leonora), the mother of Edilberto, discovered the sale. Thus, Edilberto, represented by
Leonora, filed a Petition for Annulment of Deeds of Sale before the RTC-Manila. Edilberto alleged that the sale of the properties
was fraudulent because Esteban's signature on the deeds of sale was forged. Respondents, on the other hand, argued that because
of Socorro's prior marriage to Crispin, her subsequent marriage to Esteban was null and void. Thus, neither Socorro nor her heirs
can claim any right or interest over the properties purchased by Esteban and respondents.
 Issue: WoN the properties were conjugal (NO)

Ruling: Edilberto admitted that in unions between a man and a woman who are incapacitated to marry each other, the ownership
over the properties acquired during the subsistence of that relationship shall be based on the actual contribution of the parties. It
is necessary for each of the partners to prove his or her actual contribution to the acquisition of property in order to be able to lay
claim to any portion of it. Presumptions of co-ownership and equal contribution do not apply.

Art 148 of the Family Code states that: “In cases of cohabitation [wherein the parties are incapacitated to marry each other],only
the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned
by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and
corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and
evidences of credit. If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the
absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly
married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article. The
foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.”

Applying the foregoing provision, the properties can be considered common if: (1) these were acquired during the cohabitation of
Esteban and Socorro; and (2) there is evidence that the properties were acquired through the parties' actual joint contribution of
money, property, or industry. Edilberto argues that the certificate of title covering the properties show that the parcel of land is co-
owned by Esteban and Socorro, however, the Court did not agree. The title itself shows that the Vitas property is owned by
Esteban alone. The phrase "married to Socorro Torres" is merely descriptive of his civil status and does not show that Socorro co-
owned the property. The evidence on record also shows that Esteban acquired ownership over the Vitas property prior to his
marriage to Socorro, even if the certificate of title was issued after the celebration of the marriage. Registration under the Torrens
title system merely confirms and does not vest title.

BEUMER v. BEUMER FACTS: Willem (Beumer), a Dutch national, married Avelina (Amores) on March 29, 1980. Their marriage was declared null by the
RTC by reason of psychological incapacity, thus Willem filed a petition for dissolution of conjugal partnership and distribution of
properties which he claimed were acquired during their marriage.

BY PURCHASE:
a. Lot 1 w/ a residential house constructed thereon
b. Lot 2142 w/ a residential house constructed thereon
c. Lot 5845
d. Lot 4

BY INHERITANCE:
a. 1/7 of Lot 2055-A
b. 1/15 of Lot 2055-I
 During trial, petitioner testified that while Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 were registered in the name of respondent, these properties
were acquired with the money he received from the Dutch government as his disability benefit since respondent did not have
sufficient income to pay for their acquisition.

ISSUE: WoN petitioner is entitled to reimbursement (NO)

HELD: In the Muller case, the Court had already denied a claim for reimbursement of the value of purchased parcels of Philippine
land instituted by a foreigner against his former Filipina spouse. It held that Helmut Muller cannot seek reimbursement on the
ground of equity where it is clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the prohibition against foreign
ownership of Philippine land24 enshrined under Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which reads:

Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.

Undeniably, petitioner openly admitted that he "is well aware of the above-cited constitutional prohibition" and even asseverated
that, because of such prohibition, he and respondent registered the subject properties in the latter’s name. Clearly, petitioner’s
actuations showed his palpable intent to skirt the constitutional prohibition. On the basis of such admission, the Court finds no
reason why it should not apply the Muller ruling and accordingly, deny petitioner’s claim for reimbursement.

Neither can the Court grant petitioner’s claim for reimbursement on the basis of unjust enrichment. In a case involving a foreigner
seeking monetary reimbursement for money spent on purchase of Philippine land, the provision on unjust enrichment does not
apply if the action is proscribed by the Constitution. A contract that violates the Constitution and the law is null and void, vests no
rights, creates no obligations and produces no legal effect at all.

However, the constitutional ban against foreigners applies only to ownership of Philippine land and not to the improvements built
thereon, such as the two (2) houses standing on Lots 1 and 2142 are declared to be co-owned by the parties subject to partition.

OCAMPO v. OCAMPO Facts: RTC declared the marriage between Virginia and Deogracio as null and void from the beginning under Article 36 of the
Family Code. The parties were directed to submit a project of partition of their inventoried properties. Having failed to agree on it,
hearing ensued and RTC declared that the properties be divided equally between them.

Issue: WoN Deogracio should be deprived of his share in the CPG by reason of bad faith and psychological perversity

Ruling: The Court held that in a void marriage, those declared void under Article 36 of the FC, the property relations of the parties
during the cohabitation is governed by either Article 147 or 148. Article 147 applies to the present case.

The former spouses both substantially agree that they acquired the subject properties during the subsistence of their marriage.
The certificates of titles and tax declarations are not sufficient proof to overcome the presumption under Article 116 of the Family
 Code. All properties acquired by the spouses during the marriage, regardless in whose name the properties are registered, are
presumed conjugal unless proved otherwise.

The presumption is not rebutted by the mere fact that the certificate of title of the property or the tax declaration is in the name of
one of the spouses only. Article 116 expressly provides that the presumption remains even if the property is ‘registered in the
name of one or both of the spouses.’ Thus, the failure of Virginia to rebut this presumption, said properties were obtained by the
spouses’ joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be jointly owned by them in equal shares. Accordingly, the partition of the former
spouses’ properties on the basis of co-ownership, as ordered by the RTC and the appellate court, should be affirmed, and not on
the regime of conjugal partnership of gains.

***read full text

CPG dissolution – include net income and fruits of separate prop; excluded prop exclusively owned
Art 102 applies if marriage was celebrated during the FC
Art 129 applies if marriage was celebrated during the CC
But dissolution will be based on Art 147
W failed to prove BF on the part of the H therefore H is still entitled to ½, it is not forfeited

PATERNO v. PATERNO ** H left the conjugal home. Dispute over propertiesAyala house, Alabang condo unit. Marriage declared void under Art 36. During
the filing of the case and declaration, H was no longer living with the W. H alleged that he was the one paying for the properties.
Acquired subsequently after leaving conjugal home, presumed to belong to him exclusively since there was no more household to
maintain. All children also left the conjugal home. No more contribution to the maintenance of the household. Marital bond was
severed from the time that the marriage was celebrated.
BUENAVENTURA v. CA
ARTICLE 148 CASES  148 there must be ACTUAL contribution
AGAPAY V. PALANG FACTS: Miguel Palang married his first wife Carlina in 1949. In 1972, Miguel returned to the Philippines for good but did not choose
to live with his wife and daughter Herminia. In July 1973, then 63 years old Miguel contracted his second marriage with 19 years
old Erlinda Agapay.

In May 1973 or two months prior to their marriage, Miguel and Erlinda jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural land located at San
Felipe, Binalonan, Pangasinan. Upon the death of Miguel in 1981, Carlina and Herminia filed a case to recover the ownership and
possession of the Agricultural land in Pangasinan.

ISSUE: WoN the property acquired during the illicit cohabitation or subsequent void marriage (Erlinda and Miguel) belongs to
conjugal property of the first and valid marriage (Carlina and Miguel) – YES

RULING: The provision of law applicable here is Article 148 of the Family Code providing for cases of cohabitation when a man and
woman who are not capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage or under a void marriage. While Miguel and Erlinda contracted marriage, said union was patently void because earlier
marriage of Miguel and Carlina was still subsisting and unaffected by the latter’s de facto separation.
 Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property or
industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. It must be stressed that actual
contribution is required by this provision, in contrast to Article 147 which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of the
family and household, are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common property by one who has no salary or income or
work or industry. If the actual contribution of the party is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal
shares.

Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she is engaged in the business of buy-and-sell and had a sari-sari store but failed to
persuade the SC that she actually contributed money to buy the riceland. Since petitioner failed to prove that she contributed
money to the purchase price of the riceland, SC finds no basis to justify her co-ownership with Miguel over the same.

Note: If party to a bigamouse marriage is validly married, regardless of bad faith or good faith, property belongs to the regime of
the previous valid marriage. If a party is legally separated, properties will not pertain to the regime of the previous marriage since
the same is already dissolved. Hence, properties would pertain exclusively to the said party.

MALILLIN JR. V. CASTILLO FACTS: Mallilin and Castillo cohabited together while their respective marriage still subsisted. During their union, they set up
Superfreight Customs Brokerage Corporation. The business flourished and the couple acquired real and personal properties which
were registered solely in Castillo's name. Due to irreconcilable differences, the couple separated. Mallilin filed a complaint for
partition and/or payment of co-ownership share, accounting, and damages against Castillo. Castillo, in her answer, alleged that co-
ownership could not exist between them because according to Article 144 of the Civil Code, rules on co-ownership shall govern the
properties acquired by a man and a woman living together as husband and wife but not married will not apply to them since they
are not capacitated to marry each other because of their valid subsisting marriage. She claimed to be the exclusive owner of all
real and personal properties involved in Mallilin's action of partition on the ground that they were acquired entirely out of her own
money and registered solely in her name.

ISSUE: Whether or not co-ownership exists between them. (YES)

RULING: Yes. Co-ownership exists between Mallilin and Castillo even though they are incapacitated to marry each other. Article
144 of the Civil Code does not cover parties living in an adulterous relationship. Their property regime falls under Article 148 of the
Family Code where co-ownership is limited, properties acquired by them through their joint contribution of money, property or
industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their contributions which, in the absence of proof to the contrary, is
presumed to be equal.

Note: If property was acquired during FC effectivity, proof of actual contribution is necessary for the partition. If property is
acquired during effectivity of CC, ____________________

SAGUID V. CA FACTS: Seventeen-year old Gina S. Rey was married, but separated de facto from her husband, when she met and cohabited with
petitioner Jacinto Saguid. In 1996, the couple decided to separate and end up their 9-year cohabitation. private respondent filed a
 complaint for Partition and Recovery of Personal Property with Receivership against the petitioner. She prayed that she be
declared the sole owner of these personal properties and that the amount of P70,000.00, representing her contribution to the
construction of their house, be reimbursed to her.

ISSUE: WON there are actual contributions from the parties

HELD: It is not disputed that Gina and Jacinto were not capacitated to marry each other because the former was validly married to
another man at the time of her cohabitation with the latter. Their property regime therefore is governed by Article 148 of the
Family Code, which applies to bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubinage, relationships
where both man and woman are married to other persons, and multiple alliances of the same married man. Under this regime, “…
only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be
owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions …” Proof of actual contribution is required.

Even if cohabitation commenced before family code, Article 148 applies because this provision was intended precisely to fill up the
hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code. The fact that the controverted property was titled in the name of the parties to an
adulterous relationship is not sufficient proof of co-ownership absent evidence of actual contribution in the acquisition of the
property.
In the case at bar, the controversy centers on the house and personal properties of the parties. Private respondent alleged in her
complaint that she contributed P70,000.00 for the completion of their house. However, nowhere in her testimony did she specify
the extent of her contribution. What appears in the record are receipts in her name for the purchase of construction materials.

While there is no question that both parties contributed in their joint account deposit, there is, however, no sufficient proof of the
exact amount of their respective shares therein. Pursuant to Article 148 of the Family Code, in the absence of proof of extent of
the parties’ respective contribution, their share shall be presumed to be equal.

ATIENZA v. DE CASTRO Facts: In 1983, despite being a married man, Lupo and Yolanda lived together in consortium. However, after their second child was
born, their relationship turned sour. In 1992, Lupo filed a complaint against Yolanda for the judicial partition of a parcel of land
registered under the name of Yolanda, alleging they owned it in common under the concept of limited co-ownership. He alleged
that Yolanda acquired the same using his exclusive funds. He did not interpose any objection to the registration because at the
time, their affair was still thriving. Yolanda contended that she alone was the owner of the property as she acquired it thru her own
savings as a businesswoman.

Issue: WoN the property is owned by them in common

Held: It is not disputed that the parties herein were not capacitated to marry each other because petitioner Lupo Atienza was
validly married to another woman at the time of his cohabitation with the respondent. Their property regime, therefore, is
governed by Article 148 of the Family Code, which applies to bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state
of concubinage, relationships where both man and woman are married to other persons, and multiple alliances of the same
married man. Under this regime, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions ... Proof of actual
contribution is required.

As it is, the regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are not legally capacitated to marry
each other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to properties acquired during said cohabitation in
proportion to their respective contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of
money, property, or industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be presumed
to be equal.

Here, although the adulterous cohabitation of the parties commenced in 1983, or way before the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1998, Article 148 thereof applies because this provision was intended precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article 144 of the
Civil Code. Before Article 148 of the Family Code was enacted, there was no provision governing property relations of couples living
in a state of adultery or concubinage. Hence, even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of the property occurred before the Family
Code took effect, Article 148 governs.

It is the petitioner’s posture that the respondent, having no financial capacity to acquire the property in question, merely
manipulated the dollar bank accounts of his two (2) corporations to raise the amount needed therefor.

In making proof of his case, it is paramount that the best and most complete evidence be formally entered. Rather than presenting
proof of his actual contribution to the purchase money used as consideration for the disputed property, Lupo diverted the burden
imposed upon him to Yolanda by painting her as a shrewd and scheming woman without the capacity to purchase any property.
Instead of proving his ownership, or the extent thereof, over the subject property, Lupo relegated his complaint to a mere attack
on the financial capacity of Yolanda. He presented documents pertaining to the ins and outs of the dollar accounts of ENRICO and
EURASIAN, which unfortunately failed to prove his actual contribution in the purchase of the said property. The fact that Yolanda
had a limited access to the funds of the said corporations and had repeatedly withdrawn money from their bank accounts for their
behalf do not prove that the money she used in buying the disputed property, or any property for that matter, came from said
withdrawals.

As we see it, petitioner's claim of co-ownership in the disputed property is without basis because not only did he fail to
substantiate his alleged contribution in the purchase thereof but likewise the very trail of documents pertaining to its purchase as
evidentiary proof redounds to the benefit of the respondent. In contrast, aside from his mere say so and voluminous records of
bank accounts, which sadly find no relevance in this case, the petitioner failed to overcome his burden of proof. Allegations must
be proven by sufficient evidence. Simply stated, he who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it; mere allegation is not evidence.
True, the mere issuance of a certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property
covered thereby may be under co-ownership with persons not named in the certificate or that the registrant may only be a trustee
or that other parties may have acquired interest subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title. However, as already stated,
petitioner's evidence in support of his claim is either insufficient or immaterial to warrant the trial courts finding that the disputed
property falls under the purview of Article 148 of the Family Code. In contrast to petitioner’s dismal failure to prove his cause,
herein respondent was able to present preponderant evidence of her sole ownership. There can clearly be no co-ownership when,
as here, the respondent sufficiently established that she derived the funds used to purchase the property from her earnings, not
only as an accountant but also as a businesswoman engaged in foreign currency trading, money lending and jewelry retail. She
 presented her clientele and the promissory notes evincing substantial dealings with her clients. She also presented her bank
account statements and bank transactions, which reflect that she had the financial capacity to pay the purchase price of the
subject property.

BORROMEO V. DESCALLAR FACTS: Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, met respondent Antonietta Opalla-Descallar. They fell in love and live together. They
bought a house and lot and an Absolute Deed of Sale was issued in their names. However, when the Deed of Absolute Sale was
presented for registration, it was refused on the ground that Jambrich was an alien and could not acquire alienable lands of the
public domain. Consequently, his name was erased but his signature remained and the property was issued on the name of the
Respondent alone. However their relationship did not last long and they found new love.

Jambrich met the petitioner who was engaged in business. Jambrich indebted the petitioner for a sum of money and to pay his
debt, he sold some of his properties to the petitioner and a Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment was issued in his favor. However,
when the Petitioner sought to register the deed of assignment it found out that said land was registered in the name of
Respondent. Petitioner filed a complaint against respondent for recovery of real property.

ISSUES: WoN Jambrich has no title to the properties and may not transfer/assign any rights/interest in favor of the petitioner
WoN the registration of the properties in the name of respondents make him the owner thereof.

RULINGS:
1. The evidence clearly shows that as between respondent and Jambrich, it was Jambrich who possesses the financial capacity to
acquire the properties in dispute. At the time of the acquisition of the properties, Jamrich was the source of funds used to
purchase the three parcels of land, and to construct the house. Jambrich was the owner of the properties in question, but his name
was deleted in the Deed of Absolute Sale because of legal constraints. Nevertheless, his signature remained in the deed of sale
where he signed as a buyer. Thus, Jambrich has all authority to transfer all his rights, interest and participation over the subject
properties to petitioner by virtue of Deed of Assignment. Furthermore, the fact that the disputed properties were acquired during
the couples cohabitation does not help the respondent. The rule of co-ownership applies to a man and a woman living exclusively
with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, but otherwise capacitated to marry each other does not
apply. At the case at bar, respondent was still legally married to another when she and Jambrich lived together. In such an
adulterous relationship and no co-ownership exists between the parties. It is necessary for each of the partners to prove his or her
actual contribution to the acquisition of property in order to able to lay claim to any portion of it.

2. It is settled rule that registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. It is only a means of confirming the existence with notice
to the world at large. The mere possession of a title does not make one the true owner of the property. Thus, the mere fact that
respondent has the titles of the disputed properties in her name does not necessarily, conclusively and absolutely make her the
owner.

LAVADIA v. HEIRS OF LUNA Facts: Atty. Juan Luna obtained a decree of divorce in Dominican Republic. Prior to the issuance of the said divorce decree, Atty.
Luna and his wife Eugenia had an agreement respecting the division of their properties, a property settlement, without the
approval of the court. But Atty. Luna attached such settlement in his petition for divorce and as a consequence, such settlement
 was also approved. When Atty. Luna died, the second wife claimed the properties.

Issues: WoN the 1st marriage subsisted up to the time of death of Atty. Luna (YES)
WoN the agreement for separation of property was void (YES)
WoN the properties acquired during the 2 nd marriage should be governed by the rules on co-ownership (YES)

Ruling: The law in force at the time of the solemnization was the Spanish Civil Code, which adopted the nationality rule. The Civil
Code continued to follow the nationality rule, to the effect that Philippine laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
condition and legal capacity were binding upon citizens of the Philippines, although living abroad. Pursuant to the nationality rule,
Philippine laws governed this case by virtue of both Atty. Luna and Eugenia having remained Filipinos until the death of Atty. Luna
on July 12, 1997 terminated their marriage. Therefore, their marriage subsisted.

The mere execution of the Agreement by Atty. Luna and Eugenia did not per se dissolve and liquidate their conjugal partnership of
gains. The approval of the Agreement by a competent court was still required under Article 190 and Article 191 of the Civil Code,
otherwise, agreement is void. The approval by the foreign court cannot also be considered. With the divorce not being itself valid
and enforceable under Philippine law for being contrary to Philippine public policy and public law, the approval of the Agreement
was not also legally valid and enforceable under Philippine law.

Due to the second marriage between Atty. Luna and the petitioner being void Ab Initio by virtue of its being bigamous, the
properties acquired during the bigamous marriage were governed by the rules on co-ownership, conformably with Article 144 of
the Civil Code. Whoever alleges co-ownership carried the burden of proof to confirm such fact. To establish co-ownership,
therefore, it became imperative for the petitioner to offer proof of her actual contributions in the acquisition of property. Her
mere allegation of co-ownership, without sufficient and competent evidence, would warrant no relief in her favor.

Indeed, the petitioner, as the party claiming the co-ownership, did not discharge her burden of proof. Her mere allegations on her
contributions, not being evidence, did not serve the purpose. In contrast, given the subsistence of the first marriage between Atty.
Luna and Eugenia, the presumption that Atty. Luna acquired the properties out of his own personal funds and effort remained. It
should then be justly concluded that the properties in litis legally pertained to their conjugal partnership of gains as of the time of
his death. Consequently, the sole ownership of the 25/100 pro indiviso share of Atty. Luna in the condominium unit, and of the
lawbooks pertained to the respondents as the lawful heirs of Atty. Luna.

ARTICLES 149 - 151 THE FAMILY AS AN INSTITUTION

ROMERO V. SINGSON  ** no longer necessary bc it may be raised in the petition or response???
MORENO V. CONSUELO DOCTRINE: Noncompliance with the earnest effort requirement under Article 151 of the Family Code is not a jurisdictional defect
MORENO-KAHN which would authorize the courts to dismiss suits filed before them motu proprio. Rather, it merely partakes of a condition
precedent such that the non-compliance therewith constitutes a ground for dismissal of a suit should the same be invoked by the
opposing party at the earliest opportunity, as in a motion to dismiss or in the answer. For Article 151 of the Family Code to apply,
the suit must be exclusively between or among "members of the same family." Once a stranger becomes a party to such suit, the
earnest effort requirement is no longer a condition precedent before the action can prosper.

FACTS: Jose alleged that since May 1998 and in their capacity as lessees, he and his family have been occupying two (2) parcels of
land co-owned by his full-blooded sister, respondent Consuelo Moreno Kahn Haire (Consuelo) and his nephews and nieces
(Consuelo's children), respondents Rene, Luis, Philippe, and Claudine. Respondents offered to sell to Jose the subject lands for the
amount of US$200,000.00 which Jose accepted. Notably, the agreement was made verbally and was not immediately reduced into
writing, but the parties had the intention to eventually memorialize the same via a written document. Over the next few years,
Jose made partial payments to respondents by paying off the shares of Rene, Luis, Philippe and Claudine, leaving a remaining
balance of US$120,000.00 payable to Consuelo.

However, in July 2010, Consuelo decided to "cancel" their agreement, and thereafter, informed Jose of her intent to convert the
earlier partial payments as rental payments instead. In response, Jose expressed his disapproval to Consuelo's plan and demanded
that respondents proceed with the sale, which the latter ignored. He then claimed that on July 26, 2011, without his consent,
Consuelo, Luis, Philippe, and Claudine sold their shares over the subject lands to Rene, thereby consolidating full ownership of the
subject lands to him. Consequently, new TCTs were issued in Rene's name. Upon learning of such sale, Jose sent a demand letter to
Rene, and later on to Consuelo, Luis, Philippe, and Claudine, asserting his right to the subject lands under the previous sale agreed
upon.

As his demands went unheeded, Jose brought the matter to the barangay lupon for conciliation proceedings between him and
Rene only, since Consuelo, Luis, Philippe, and Claudine are all living abroad. As no settlement was agreed upon, Jose was
constrained to file the subject complaint for specific performance and cancellation of titles with damages. In an Order dated
January 18, 2012, the RTC motu proprio ordered the dismissal of Jose's complaint for failure to allege compliance with the
provision of Article 151 of the Family Code which requires earnest efforts to be made first before suits may be tiled between family
members. In an Order dated October 11, 2012, the RTC denied Jose's motion, ruling, inter alia, that Article 151 of the Family Code
applies, despite the fact that Consuelo had other co-defendants (i.e., her children) in the suit, as the dispute, which led to the filing
of the case, was mainly due to the disagreement between full-blooded siblings, Jose and Consuelo. Aggrieved, Jose filed a petition
for certiorari before the CA. However, the CA affirmed.

ISSUE: WoN the CA correctly affirmed the RTC's motu proprio dismissal of Jose's complaint (NO)

RULING: The Court finds Article 151 of the Family Code inapplicable to this case. For said provision to apply, the suit must be
exclusively between or among "members of the same family." Once a stranger becomes a party to such suit, the earnest effort
requirement is no longer a condition precedent before the action can prosper.

In this relation, Article 150 of the Family Code reads: Art. 150. Family relations include those: (1)Between husband and wife; (2)
Between parents and children; (3) Among other ascendants and descendants: and (4) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the
full or half-blood.

In this light, case law states that Article 151 of the Family Code must be construed strictly, it being an exception to the general rule.
Hence, any person having a collateral familial relation with the plaintiff other than what is enumerated in Article 150 of the Family
 Code is considered a stranger who, if included in a suit between and among family members, would render unnecessary the
earnest efforts requirement under Article 151.

While it was the disagreement between Jose and Consuelo that directly resulted in the filing of the suit, the fact remains that Rene,
Luis, Philippe, and Claudine were rightfully impleaded as codefendants in Jose’s complaint as they are co-owners of the subject
lands in dispute. In view of the inclusion “strangers" to the suit between Jose and Consuelo who are full-blooded siblings, the Court
concludes that the suit is beyond the ambit of Article 151 of the Family Code. Perforce, the courts a quo gravely erred in dismissing
Jose's complaint due to non-compliance with the earnest effort requirement therein.

O'LACO v. CO CHO CHIT Facts: This involves half-sisters each claiming ownership over a parcel of land. While petitioner Emilia O'Laco asserts that she
merely left the certificate of title covering the property with private respondent O Lay Kia for safekeeping, the latter who is the
former's older sister insists that the title was in her possession because she and her husband bought the property from their
conjugal funds.

Petitioners contend that the present action should have been dismissed. They argue that the complaint fails to allege that earnest
efforts toward a compromise were exerted considering that the suit is between members of the same family.

Issue: WoN the case should be dismissed (NO)

Ruling: Admittedly, the present action is between members of the same family since the parties are half-sisters. Consequently,
there should be an averment in the complaint that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, pursuant to Art. 222 of
the New Civil Code, or a motion to dismiss could have been filed under Sec. 1, par. (j), Rule 16, of the Rules of Court. For, it is well-
settled that the attempt to compromise as well as the inability to succeed is a condition precedent to the filing of a suit between
members of the same family. Hence, the defect in the complaint is assailable at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, for
lack of cause of action.

But, plaintiff may be allowed to amend his complaint to correct the defect if the amendment does not actually confer jurisdiction
on the court in which the action is filed, i.e., if the cause of action was originally within that court's jurisdiction. In such case, the
amendment is only to cure the perceived defect in the complaint, thus may be allowed.

In the case before us, while respondent-spouses did not formally amend their complaint, they were nonetheless allowed to
introduce evidence purporting to show that earnest efforts toward a compromise had been made, that is, respondent O Lay Kia
importuned Emilia O'Laco and pressed her for the transfer of the title of the Oroquieta property in the name of spouses O Lay Kia
and Valentin Co Cho Chit, just before Emilia's marriage to Hugo Luna. But, instead of transferring the title as requested, Emilia sold
the property to the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila. This testimony was not objected to by petitioner-spouses. Hence, the
complaint was deemed accordingly amended to conform to the evidence. If the defendant permits evidence to be introduced
without objection and which supplies the necessary allegations of a defective complaint, then the evidence is deemed to have the
effect of curing the defects of the complaint. The insufficiency of the allegations in the complaint is deemed ipso facto rectified.
GUERRERO v. HERNANDO FACTS: Filed by petitioner as an accion publican against private respondent, this case assumed another dimension when it was
dismissed by respondent Judge on the ground that the parties being brother-in-law the complaint should have alleged that earnest
efforts were first exerted towards a compromise.

Admittedly, the complaint does not allege that the parties exerted earnest towards a compromise and that the same failed.
However, private respondent Pedro G. Hernando apparently overlooked this alleged defect since he did not file any motion to
dismiss nor attack the complaint on this ground in his answer. It was only on 7 December 1992, at the pre-trial conference, that the
relationship of petitioner Gaudencio Guerrero and respondent Hernando was noted by respondent Judge Luis B. Bello, Jr., they
being married to half-sisters hence are brothers-in-law, and on the basis thereof respondent Judge gave petitioner five (5) days "to
file his motion and amended complaint" to allege that the parties were very close relatives, their respective wives being sisters,
and that the complaint to be maintained should allege that earnest efforts towards a compromise were exerted but failed.
Apparently, respondent Judge considered this deficiency a jurisdictional defect.

On 11 December 1992, Guerrero moved to reconsider the 7 December 1992 Order claiming that since brothers by affinity are not
members of the same family, he was not required to exert efforts towards a compromise. Guerrero likewise argued that Hernando
was precluded from raising this issue since he did not file a motion to dismiss nor assert the same as an affirmative defense in his
answer.

On 22 December 1992, respondent Judge denied the motion for reconsideration holding that "[f]ailure to allege that earnest
efforts towards a compromise is jurisdictional such that for failure to allege same the court would be deprived of its jurisdiction to
take cognizance of the case." He warned that unless the complaint was amended within five (5) days the case would be dismissed.

On 29 January 1993, the 5-day period having expired without Guerrero amending his complaint, respondent Judge dismissed the
case, declaring the dismissal however to be without prejudice.

ISSUE: WoN Art 151 is applicable (NO)

RULING: The Constitution protects the sanctity of the family and endeavors to strengthen it as a basic autonomous social
institution. This is also embodied in Art. 149, and given flesh in Art. 151, of the Family Code, which provides:

Art. 151. No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition
that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same had failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in
fact made, the case must be dismissed.

This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil Code. It is mandatory that the
complaint or petition, which must be verified, should allege that earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made but that
the same failed, so that "[i]f it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed."

Further, Art. 151 is contemplated by Sec. 1, par. (j), Rule 16, of the Rules of Court which provides as a ground for motion to dismiss
 "(t)hat the suit is between members of the same family and no earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made."

The Code Commission, which drafted the precursor provision in the Civil Code, explains the reason for the requirement that
earnest efforts at compromise be first exerted before a complaint is given due course —

This rule is introduced because it is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle than a litigation between members of
the same family. It is necessary that every effort should be made toward a compromise before a litigation is allowed to breed hate
and passion in the family. It is known that a lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than between strangers. A
litigation in a family is to be lamented far more than a lawsuit between strangers.

But the instant case presents no occasion for the application of the above-quoted provisions. As early as two decades ago, we
already ruled in Gayon v. Gayon that the enumeration of "brothers and sisters" as members of the same family does not
comprehend "sisters-in-law". In that case, then Chief Justice Concepcion emphasized that "sisters-in-law" (hence, also "brothers-
in-law") are not listed under Art. 217 of the New Civil Code as members of the same family. Since Art. 150 of the Family Code
repeats essentially the same enumeration of "members of the family", we find no reason to alter existing jurisprudence on the
matter. Consequently, the court a quo erred in ruling that petitioner Guerrero, being a brother-in-law of private respondent
Hernando, was not required to exert earnest efforts towards a compromise before filing the present suit.

HIYAS SAVINGS BANK v. Fact: Alberto filed a case against Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank, Inc., his wife Remedios, and 3 more defendants. Hiyas filed a Motion
ACUNA to Dismiss on the ground that Alberto failed to comply with Article 151 of the Family Code wherein it is provided that no suit
between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest
efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed.

Issue: May Hiyas invoke the provisions of Article 151 of the Family Code?

Held: No. Since the requirement under Article 151 of the Family Code is applicable only in cases which are exclusively between or
among members of the same family, it necessarily follows that the same may be invoked only by a party who is a member of that
same family.

ARTICLES 152-162 THE FAMILY HOME

PATRICIO v. DARIO III FACTS: Marcelino V. Dario died intestate. He was survived by his wife, petitioner Perla G. Patricio and their two sons, Marcelino
Marc Dario and private respondent Marcelino G. Dario III. Among the properties he left was a parcel of land with a residential
house and a pre-school building built thereon.

On August 10, 1987, petitioner, Marcelino Marc and private respondent, extrajudicially settled the estate of Marcelino V. Dario.
Thereafter, petitioner and Marcelino Marc formally advised private respondent of their intention to partition the subject property
and terminate the co-ownership. Private respondent refused to partition the property claiming that the subject property, which is
the family home duly constituted by spouses Marcelino and Perla Dario, cannot be partitioned while a minor beneficiary is still
 living therein namely, his 12-year-old son, who is the grandson of the decedent.

ISSUES: WoN Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV, the minor son of private respondent, can be considered as a beneficiary under Article
154 of the Family Code (NO)

RULING: From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues
to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value
allowed by law.

However, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV can’t be considered as a beneficiary. Three requisites must concur before a minor
beneficiary is entitled to the benefits of Art. 159: (1) the relationship enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in the
family home, and (3) they are dependent for legal support upon the head of the family. In this case, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV
is dependent on legal support not from his grandmother, but from his father.

Thus, despite residing in the family home and his being a descendant of Marcelino V. Dario, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot
be considered as beneficiary contemplated under Article 154 because he did not fulfill the third requisite of being dependent on
his grandmother for legal support. It is his father whom he is dependent on legal support, and who must now establish his own
family home separate and distinct from that of his parents, being of legal age.

MODEQUILLO V. BREVA FACTS: The sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land and a parcel of agricultural land registered in the name of Mondequillo. A
motion to quash was filed by the petitioner alleging that the residential land is where the family home is built since 1969 prior the
commencement of this case and as such is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment under Article 152 and 153 except for
liabilities mentioned in Article 155 thereof, and that the judgment sought to be enforced against the family home is not one of
those enumerated. With regard to the agricultural land, it is alleged that it is still part of the public land and the transfer in his
favor by the original possessor and applicant who was a member of a cultural minority. The residential house in the present case
became a family home by operation of law under Article 153.

ISSUE: WON the subject property is deemed to be a family home in as much as it does not fall under the exemption from
execution. (NO)

RULING: The subject property is deemed to be a family home but it does not fall under the exemption from execution of the
money judgment aforecited.

Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it is provided that “the provisions of this Chapter shall also govern existing family residences
insofar as said provisions are applicable.” It does not mean that Articles 152 and 153 of said Code have a retroactive effect such
that all existing family residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the
Family Code. Article 162 simply means that all existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code, are
considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code. Article
 162 does not state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a retroactive effect.

The debt or liability which was the basis of the judgment arose or was incurred at the time of the vehicular accident on March 16,
1976 and the money judgment arising therefrom was rendered by the appellate court on January 29, 1988. Both preceded the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. Therefore, this case does not fall under the exemptions from execution provided
in the Family Code.

As to the agricultural land, trial court correctly ruled that the levy to be made shall be on whatever rights the petitioner may have
on the land.

**not given retroactive effect

Becomes family home by operation of law
Art 162

TANEO, JR. v. CA Facts: Two (2) of petitioners’ properties were levied to satisfy the judgment amount of about P5,000.00: one was a parcel of land
and the other was the family home. On February 12, 1966, the subject properties were sold to the private respondent as the
highest bidder. However, the petitioner failed to redeem the same, so a final deed of conveyance was executed on February 9,
1968, definitely selling, transferring, and conveying said properties to the private respondent. The petitioner filed an action to
declare the deed of conveyance void and to quiet title over the land with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction.

Issue: WoN Taneo’s family home is exempt from execution. (NO)

Held: The trial court found that on March 7, 1964, Pablo Taneo constituted the house in question, erected on the land of Vacalares,
as the family home. The instrument constituting the family home was registered only on January 24, 1966. The money judgment
against Pablo Taneo was rendered on January 24, 1964. Thus, at the time when the debt was incurred, the family home was not
yet constituted or even registered. The petitioners’ alleged family home, as constituted by their father is not exempt as it falls
under the exception of Article 243 (2).

** merely leased; not owned by the one who constituted it; thus, it is not exempt from attachment

CABANG v. BASAY FACTS: Simeon had established his family home over the property of registered owner Felix Odong and he had been in
continuous, open, peaceful and adverse possession of the same parcel of land since 1956 up to the present. Sps Basay bought the
subject property from the heirs of Felix Odong and upon discovery that Simeon was actually occupying the lot, they filed a
complaint for recovery of property.

ISSUE: WoN the property subject of the controversy is a duly constituted family home (NO)

HELD: Under Article 153 of the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied
as a family residence. It is likewise a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. It is likewise a given fact that
 the family home must be constructed on property owned by the persons constituting it. Since the property on which the alleged
family home stands is owned by the Odongs, the subject property is not a duly constituted family home. Their continued stay on
the subject land is by mere tolerance of the late Felix Odong.

** may be constituted party on exclusive prop and partly on exlucisve prop

EULOGIO V. BELL, SR. FACTS: Spouses Bell sold a residential house and lot for P1M to Sps. Eulogio in 1995 without the consent of their children, hence,
the latter filed a complaint for annulment of documents, reconveyance, quieting of title and damages against the Sps. Eulogio. The
trial court rendered a judgment declaring the sale void, but at the same time declared the same as an equitable mortgage which
cannot bind the children due to lack of consent. Both parties appealed to the CA which affirmed the judgment of the trial court and
which became final and executory. A writ of execution was issued by the RTC but which was enjoined by the CA considering that
there was a declaration that the property was a family home. The basis of the RTC in issuing the writ of execution was that the
present value of the family home has exceeded the statutory limit. In enjoining the sale, the CA ruled that what is determinative of
its exemption is its value at the time of its constitution and not the current/present value.

ISSUE: WoN the respondents’ family home is exempt from execution (YES)

HELD: Unquestionably, the family home is exempt from execution as expressly provided for in Article 153 of the Family Code.

It has been said that the family home is a real right that is gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment. The great controlling
purpose and policy of the Constitution is the protection or the preservation of the homestead – the dwelling place. A houseless,
homeless population is a burden upon the energy, industry and morals of the community to which it belongs. No greater calamity,
not tainted with crime, can befall a family than to be expelled from the roof under which it has been gathered and sheltered. The
family home cannot be seized by creditors except in special cases.

According to Article 157, the exemption of the family home from execution, forced sale or attachment is limited to P300,000 in
urban areas and P200,000 in rural areas, unless those maximum values are adjusted by law. If it is shown, though, that those
amounts do not match the present value of the peso because of currency fluctuations, the amount of exemption shall be based on
the value that is most favorable to the constitution of a family home. Any amount in excess of those limits can be applied to the
payment of any of the obligations specified in Articles 155 and 160.

Any subsequent improvement or enlargement of the family home by the persons constituting it, its owners, or any of its
beneficiaries will still be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment provided the following conditions obtain: (a) the actual
value of the property at the time of its constitution has been determined to fall below the statutory limit; and (b) the improvement
or enlargement does not result in an increase in its value exceeding the statutory limit. Otherwise, the family home can be the
subject of a forced sale, and any amount above the statutory limit is applicable to the obligations under Articles 155 and 160.

It was contended that the case falls under the exemption as the actual value of the family home has already increased evidenced
by the Deed of Sale for P1M. The SC brushed aside such contention and ruled that it has been judicially determined with finality
that the property is a family home and that its value at the time of its constitution was within the statutory limit. Moreover,
 respondents have timely claimed the exemption of the property from execution. On the other hand, there is no question that the
money judgment awarded to petitioners falls under the ambit of Article 160.

Notwithstanding petitioners’ right to enforce the trial court’s money judgment, however, they cannot obtain its satisfaction at the
expense of respondents’ rights over their family home. It is axiomatic that those asserting the protection of an exception from an
exemption must bring themselves clearly within the terms of the exception and satisfy any statutory requirement for its
enforcement.

To warrant the execution sale of respondents’ family home under Article 160, petitioners needed to establish these facts: (1) there
was an increase in its actual value; (2) the increase resulted from voluntary improvements on the property introduced by the
persons constituting the family home, its owners or any of its beneficiaries; and (3) the increased actual value exceeded the
maximum allowed under Article 157. During the execution proceedings, none of those facts was alleged – much less proven – by
petitioners. The sole evidence presented was the Deed of Sale, but the trial court had already determined with finality that the
contract was null, and that the actual transaction was an equitable mortgage. Evidently, when petitioners and Spouses Bell
executed the Deed of Sale in 1990, the price stated therein was not the actual value of the property in dispute.

**written consent for the alienation; Art 158

Voluntary vs. involuntary improvement; the former is not exempt from execution Art 160
Conditions to defeat the writ of execution

DE MESA v. ACERO, JR. FACTS: Sps De Mesa purchased a parcel of land and a house was constructed in the said property, which became their family
home. A year after, Arceli contracted a loan in the amount of P100,000 from Claudio Acero, which was secured by a mortgage on
the said parcel of land and house. Araceli issued a check for the payment of the loan. When Acero presented the check to the bank
it was dishonored because the checking account was already closed. Acero demanded payment. However, Spouses De Mesa still
failed to pay. Acero filed a complaint for violation of B.P. 22 in the RTC. The RTC acquitted the Spouses but ordered them to pay
Acero P100,000 plus legal interest. A writ of execution was issued to levy on the said property.

The house and lot was sold in the public auction and Acero was the highest bidder. Acero leased the property to Juanito Oliva, who
defaulted payment for several years. Oliva contends that the Acero spouses are not the owners of the property.

The MTC rendered a Decision, giving due course to Spouses Acero’s complaint and ordering the Spouses De Mesa and Oliva to
vacate the subject property. Spouses De Mesa contend that they are the rightful owners of the property. The MTC also stated that
from the time a Torrens title over the subject property was issued in Claudio Acero’s name up to the time the complaint for
ejectment was filed, the petitioners never assailed the validity of the levy made by the Sheriff, the regularity of the public sale that
was conducted thereafter and the legitimacy of Acero’s Torrens title that was resultantly issued.

Spouses De Mesa filed an action to nullify the TCT issued to Acero. Spouses De Mesa contend that the subject property is a family
home, which is exempt from execution under the Family Code and, thus, could not have been validly levied upon for purposes of
satisfying the writ of execution. RTC dismissed the complaint. CA affirmed RTC’s decision.
ISSUE: WoN the subject property, as a family home, may be subject to execution in this case (YES)

HELD: The subject property is family home but is subject to execution. In general, the family home is exempt from execution.
However, the person claiming this privilege must assert it at the time it was levied or within a reasonable time thereafter.

For the family home to be exempt from execution, distinction must be made as to what law applies based on when it was
constituted and what requirements must be complied with by the judgment debtor or his successors claiming such privilege.

The foregoing rules on constitution of family homes, for purposes of exemption from execution, could be summarized as follows:

First, family residences constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or before August 3, 1988 must be constituted as a
family home either judicially or extrajudicially in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code in order to be exempt from
execution;

Second, family residences constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 are automatically deemed to be
family homes and thus exempt from execution from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries actually
resides therein. Moreover, the family home should belong to the absolute community or conjugal partnership, or if exclusively by
one spouse, its constitution must have been with consent of the other, and its value must not exceed certain amounts depending
upon the area where it is located. Further, the debts incurred for which the exemption does not apply as provided under Art. 155
for which the family home is made answerable must have been incurred after August 3, 1988;

Third, family residences which were not judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family home prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code, but were existing thereafter, are considered as family homes by operation of law and are prospectively entitled to the
benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code.

Here, the subject property became a family residence sometime in January 1987 when Spouses De Mesa got married. There was
no showing, however, that the same was judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family home in accordance with the provisions
of the Civil Code. Still, when the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988, the subject property became a family home by
operation of law and was thus prospectively exempt from execution. The petitioners were thus correct in asserting that the subject
property was a family home.

Since the exemption under Article 153 of the Family Code is a personal right, it is incumbent upon the petitioners to invoke and
prove the same within the prescribed period and it is not the sheriff’s duty to presume or raise the status of the subject property
as a family home. Despite the fact that the subject property is a family home and, thus, should have been exempt from execution,
Spouses De Mesa should have asserted the subject property being a family home and its being exempted from execution at the
time it was levied or within a reasonable time thereafter. They are estopped from claiming the exemption of the property from
execution.

**when and who should invoke that property is a FH (it is not the sheriff’s responsibility to raise it; must be raised at the time
property is levied or a reasonable time thereafter; 1 yr period to redeem after the sale at public auction so the title was already
 consolidation in the name of Acero

SALAZAR v. FELIAS Facts: Heirs of Nivera filed a recovery of ownership against Sps Lastimosa. During the trial of the case, Romualdo, the husband,
died. Subsequently, he was substituted by his heirs. RTC declared the Heirs of Nivera as absolute owner and ordered Sps Lastimosa
to vacate the lands and surrender possession thereof. The Heirs of Lastimosa filed a motion to order the sheriff to desist from
making the demolition. RTC granted the motion for execution and demolition. Such was affirmed by the CA. Petitioner (daughter of
Romualdo Lastimosa) claims that the subject property is her family home and is exempt from execution.

Issues: WoN CA erred in ordering the execution and demolition (NO)

Ruling: The claim that the property is exempt from execution for being the movant's family home is not a magic wand that will
freeze the court's hand and forestall the execution of a final and executory ruling. It must be noted that it is not sufficient for the
claimant to merely allege that such property is a family home. Whether the claim is premised under the Old Civil Code or the
Family Code, the claim for exemption must be set up and proved.

In addition, residence in the family home must be actual. The law explicitly mandates that the occupancy of the family home,
either by the owner thereof, or by any of its beneficiaries must be actual. This occupancy must be real, or actually existing, as
opposed to something merely possible, or that which is merely presumptive or constructive.

It becomes all too apparent that Felicitas cannot conveniently claim that the subject property is her family home, sans sufficient
evidence proving her allegation. It bears emphasis that it is imperative that her claim must be backed with evidence showing that
the home was indeed
(i) duly constituted as a family home,
(ii) constituted jointly by the husband and wife or by an unmarried head of a family,
(iii) resided in by the family (or any of the family home's beneficiaries),
(iv) forms part of the properties of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, or of the exclusive properties of
either spouse with the latter's consent, or property of the unmarried head of the family, and
(v) has an actual value of Php 300,000.00 in urban areas, and Php 200,000.00 in rural areas.

Felicitas adduced no proof to substantiate her claim that the property sought to be executed is indeed her family home. Felicitas'
argument that the property subject of the writ of execution is a family home, is an unsubstantiated allegation that cannot defeat
the binding nature of a final and executory judgment.

ARTICLES 163 to 171 PATERNITY AND FILIATION

BADUA V. CA FACTS: Spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian were owners of various properties located in Laguna. Isabel died in 1982
while his husband died in 1989. Vicente’s sister and nephew filed a complaint for the issuance of letters of administration of
Vicente’s estate in favor of the nephew, herein private respondent. The petitioner, Marissa Benitez-Badua, was raised and cared
by the deceased spouses since childhood, though not related to them by blood, nor legally adopted. The latter, to prove that she is
the only legitimate child of the spouses, submitted documents such as her certificate of live birth where the spouses name were
 reflected as her parents. She even testified that said spouses continuously treated her as their legitimate daughter. On the other
hand, the relatives of Vicente declared that said spouses were unable to physically procreate hence the petitioner cannot be the
biological child. Trial court decided in favor of the petitioner as the legitimate daughter and sole heir of the spouses.

ISSUE: WON petitioner’s certificate of live birth will suffice to establish her legitimacy (NO)

HELD: The mere registration of a child in his or her birth certificate as the child of the supposed parents is not a valid adoption. It
does not confer upon the child the status of an adopted child and her legal rights. Such act amounts to simulation of the child's
birth or falsification of his or her birth certificate, which is a public document.

It is worthy to note that Vicente and brother of the deceased wife executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the
latter. In the notarized document, they stated that they were the sole heirs of the deceased because “she died without
descendants and ascendants”. In executing such deed, Vicente effectively repudiated the Certificate of Live Birth of the petitioner
where it appeared that the was the petitioner’s father.

BABIERA v. CATOTAL DOCTRINE: A birth certificate may be ordered cancelled upon adequate proof that it is fictitious. Thus, void is a certificate which
shows that the mother was already fifty-four years old at the time of the child's birth and which was signed neither by the civil
registrar nor by the supposed mother. Because her inheritance rights are adversely affected, the legitimate child of such mother is
a proper party in the proceedings for the cancellation of the said certificate.

FACTS: Presentacion B. Catotal (Presentacion) filed a petition for the cancellation of the entry of birth of Teofista Babiera (Teofista).

Presentacion alleged that she was the only child of Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariñosa; that on September 20, 1996 a baby
girl was delivered by "hilot" in the house of spouses and without their knowledge; that Flora Guinto, the mother of the child and a
housemaid of the spouses, caused the registration of birth of her child, by simulating that she was the child of the spouses
Eugenio, then 65 years old and Hermogena, then 54 years old, and made Hermogena appear as the mother by forging her
signature; that the birth certificate of Teofista was void ab initio as it contained the following false entries: a) The child is made to
appear as the legitimate child of the late spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariñosa, when she is not; b) The signature of
Hermogena Cariñosa, the mother, is falsified/forged. She was not the informant; c) The family name BABIERA is false and unlawful
and her correct family name is GUINTO, her mother being single; d) Her real mother was Flora Guinto and her status, an
illegitimate child; and that the void and simulated birth certificate of Teofista Guinto would affect the hereditary rights of
petitioner.

By way of special and affirmative defenses, defendant/respondent contended that the petition states no cause of action, it being
an attack on the legitimacy of the respondent as the child of the spouses Eugenio and Hermogena; that plaintiff has no legal
capacity to file the instant petition pursuant to Article 171 of the Family Code; and finally that the instant petition is barred by
prescription in accordance with Article 170 of the Family Code.

ISSUE: WoN Presentacion has no legal capacity to file the instant petition under Art. 171 of the Family Code (NO)
WoN the petition is barred by prescription under Art. 170 of the Family Code (NO)
 WoN Teofista was the real child of Hermogena based on the evidence presented (NO)

RULING: Art. 171 of the Family Code is not applicable. it applies to instances in which the father impugns the legitimacy of his
wife's child. The provision, however, presupposes that the child was the undisputed offspring of the mother. The present case
alleges and shows that Hermogena did not give birth to petitioner. In other words, the prayer herein is not to declare that
petitioner is an illegitimate child of Hermogena, but to establish that the former is not the latter's child at all. Verily, the present
action does not impugn petitioner's filiation to Spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera, because there is no blood relation to
impugn in the first place.

The present action involves the cancellation of petitioner's Birth Certificate; it does not impugn her legitimacy. Thus, the
prescriptive period set forth in Article 170 of the Family Code does not apply. Verily, the action to nullify the Birth Certificate does
not prescribe, because it was allegedly void ab initio.

There is no evidence of Hermogena's pregnancy, such as medical records and doctor's prescriptions, other than the Birth
Certificate itself. In fact, no witness was presented to attest to the pregnancy of Hermogena during that time. Moreover, at the
time of her supposed birth, Hermogena was already 54 years old. Even if it were possible for her to have given birth at such a late
age, it was highly suspicious that she did so in her own home, when her advanced age necessitated proper medical care normally
available only in a hospital.

DE JESUS v. HEIRS OF DIZON FACTS: Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married and it was during this marriage that Jacqueline de Jesus and Jinkie
Christie de Jesus, herein petitioners, were born. In a notarized document, a certain Juan G. Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline and
Jinkie de Jesus as being his own illegitimate children by Carolina Aves de Jesus. When Juan G. Dizon died intestate, leaving behind
considerable assets, petitioners filed a complaint for Partition with Inventory and Accounting of the Dizon estate with the RTC.

Respondents, the surviving spouse and legitimate children of late Juan Dizon sought the dismissal of the case, arguing that the
complaint would call for altering the status of petitioners from being the legitimate children of the spouses Danilo de Jesus and
Carolina de Jesus to instead be the illegitimate children of Carolina de Jesus and deceased Juan Dizon.

ISSUE: WoN Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus is Juan G. Dizon’s own illegitimate children. (NO)

RULING: The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil
register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument
and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous possession of
the status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. The due recognition of an
illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a
consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated
not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for
judicial approval. Where, instead, a claim for recognition is predicated on other evidence merely tending to prove paternity, i.e.,
outside of a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or an authentic writing, judicial action within the applicable
 statute of limitations is essential in order to establish the child's acknowledgment.

A scrutiny of the records would show that petitioners were born during the marriage of their parents. The certificates of live birth
would also identify Danilo de Jesus as being their father. There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and
founded on sounder morality and more convincing reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. This
presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there is physical impossibility of access between the spouses
during the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the
husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact that the husband and wife are living separately in such a way that
sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevents sexual intercourse. Quite
remarkably, upon the expiration of the periods set forth in Article 170, and in proper cases Article 171, of the Family Code (which
took effect on 03 August 1988), the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child would no longer be legally feasible and the status
conferred by the presumption becomes fixed and unassailable.

In an attempt to establish their legitimate filiation to the late Juan G. Dizon, petitioners, in effect, would impugn their legitimate
status as being the children of Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus. This cannot be done because the law itself establishes
the legitimacy of children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents. The presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil status
for the child born in wedlock, and only the father, or in exceptional instances the latter’s heirs, can contest in an appropriate action
the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. Thus, it is only when the legitimacy of a child has been successfully impugned that the
paternity of the husband can be rejected.

LIYAO, JR. v. TANHOTI— FACTS: William Liyao, Jr., represented by his mother Corazon, filed an action for compulsory recognition as the illegitimate
LIYAO (spurious) child of the late William Liyao against herein respondents before the RTC. Petitioner Liyao, jr. insisted that his mother,
Corazon, had been living separately for ten (10) years from her husband, Ramon Yulo. Corazon cohabited with the late William
Liyao from 1965 up to the time of William's untimely demise in 1975. On June 9, 1975, Corazon gave birth to William Liyao, Jrand
during her stay at the hospital, William Liyao visited and stayed with her and the new born baby, William, Jr. (Billy). Petitioner
alleged that since birth, he had been in continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of a recognized and acknowledged
child of William Liyao by the latter’s direct and overt acts.

Respondents, on the other hand, stated that their parents, William Liyao and Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, were legally married and that
Corazon Garcia is still married to Ramon Yulo and was not legally separated from her husband.

The trial court ruled for the petitioner, saying that it was convinced by preponderance of evidence that deceased William Liyao
sired William Liyao, Jr. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the ruling of the trial court saying that the law favors the
legitimacy rather than the illegitimacy of the child and "the presumption of legitimacy is thwarted only on ethnic ground and by
proof that marital intimacy between husband and wife was physically impossible at the period cited in Article 257 in relation to
Article 255 of the Civil Code."

ISSUE: WON the petitioner can impugn his own legitimacy to claim from the estate of his supposed father, William Liyao. (NO)
 RULING: Under the New Civil Code, a child born and conceived during a valid marriage is presumed to be legitimate. The
presumption of legitimacy of children does not only flow out from a declaration contained in the statute but is based on the broad
principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. The presumption is grounded in a policy to protect innocent
offspring from the odium of illegitimacy. The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not conclusive and consequently,
may be overthrown by evidence to the contrary. Hence, Article 255 of the New Civil Code provides: Article 255. Children born after
one hundred and eighty days following the celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days following its dissolution or
the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate. Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other
than that of the physical impossibility of the husband's having access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of
the three hundred which preceded the birth of the child. This physical impossibility may be caused: 1) By the impotence of the
husband; 2) By the fact that husband and wife were living separately in such a way that access was not possible; 3) By the serious
illness of the husband.

Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of the husband, or in exceptional cases, his heirs for the simple
reason that he is the one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces and he should
be the one to decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it in view of the moral and economic interest involved. It is only
in exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none - even his heirs - can impugn
legitimacy; that would amount to an insult to his memory.

It is therefore clear that the present petition initiated by Corazon G. Garcia as guardian of the then minor, herein petitioner, to
compel recognition by respondents of petitioner William Liyao, Jr, as the illegitimate son of the late William Liyao cannot prosper.
It is settled that a child born within a valid marriage is presumed legitimate even though the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. We cannot allow petitioner to maintain his present petition and subvert
the clear mandate of the law that only the husband, or in exceptional circumstances, his heirs, could impugn the legitimacy of a
child born in a valid and subsisting marriage. The child himself cannot choose his own filiation.

CONCEPCION v. CA FACTS: Gerardo Concepcion, the petitioner, and Ma. Theresa Almonte, private respondent, was married and begotten a child
named Jose Gerardo. The husband filed a petition to have his marriage annulled on the ground of bigamy since the wife was
married to a certain Mario Gopiao, whom according to the husband was still alive. Trial court ruled that the son was an illegitimate
child and the custody was awarded to the wife while Gerardo was granted visitation rights. Theresa argued that there was nothing
in the law granting “visitation rights in favor of the putative father of an illegitimate child”. She further wanted to have the
surname of the son changed from “Concepcion to Almonte”, her maiden name, since an illegitimate child should use his mother’s
surname. After the requested oral argument, trial court reversed its ruling and held the son to be not the son of Gerardo but of
Mario. Hence, the child was a legitimate child of Theresa and Mario.

ISSUE: Whether the child is the legitimate child of Ma.Theresa and Gopiao (YES)

RULING: The status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised. Article 164 of the Family Code is clear. A child who is conceived
or born during the marriage of his parents is legitimate. As a guaranty in favor of the child and to protect his status of legitimacy,
Article 167 of the Family Code which provides that the child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared
against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made
in favor of legitimacy.

Gerardo has no standing in law to dispute the status of Jose Gerardo. Only Ma. Theresas husband Mario or, in a proper case, his
heirs, who can contest the legitimacy of the child Jose Gerardo born to his wife. Impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly
personal right of the husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs. Since the marriage of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void from the
very beginning; he never became her husband and thus never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of her child. During the
period that Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were living together in Fairview, Quezon City, Mario was living in Loyola Heights which is also
in Quezon City. Fairview and Loyola Heights are only a scant four kilometres apart.
Considering these circumstances, the separation between Ma. Theresa and her lawful husband, Mario, was certainly not such as to
make it physically impossible for them to engage in the marital act. Sexual union between spouses is assumed. Evidence sufficient
to defeat the assumption should be presented by him who asserts the contrary. There is no such evidence here. Thus, the
presumption of legitimacy in favor of Jose Gerardo, as the issue of the marriage between Ma. Theresa and Mario, stands.

First, the import of Ma. Theres as statement is that Jose Gerardo is not her legitimate son with Mario but her illegitimate son with
Gerardo. This declaration ― an avowal by the mother that her child is illegitimate ― is the very declaration that is proscribed by
Article 167 of the Family Code. The language of the law is unmistakable. An assertion by the mother against the legitimacy of her
child cannot affect the legitimacy of a child born or conceived within a valid marriage.

Second, even assuming the truth of her statement, it does not mean that there was never an instance where Ma. Theresa could
have been together with Mario or that there occurred absolutely no intercourse between them. All she said was that she never
lived with Mario. She never claimed that nothing ever happened between them. Telling is the fact that both of them were living in
Quezon City during the time material to Jose Gerardos conception and birth. Far from foreclosing the possibility of marital
intimacy, their proximity to each other only serves to reinforce such possibility. Thus, the impossibility of physical access was never
established beyond reasonable doubt.

Third, to give credence to Ma. Theresa’s statement is to allow her to arrogate unto herself a right exclusively lodged in the
husband, or in a proper case, his heirs. A mother has no right to disavow a child because maternity is never uncertain. Hence, Ma.
Theresa is not permitted by law to question Jose Gerardos legitimacy.

Finally, for reasons of public decency and morality, a married woman cannot say that she had no intercourse with her husband and
that her offspring is illegitimate. The proscription is in consonance with the presumption in favor of family solidarity. It also
promotes the intention of the law to lean toward the legitimacy of children.

The Court upholds the presumption of his legitimacy. As a legitimate child, Jose Gerardo shall have the right to bear the surnames
of his father Mario and mother Ma. Theresa, in conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code on surnames. A persons surname
or family name identifies the family to which he belongs and is passed on from parent to child. Hence, Gerardo cannot impose his
surname on Jose Gerardo who is, in the eyes of the law, not related to him in any way.
ONG v. DIAZ FACTS: Minor Diaz filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court for compulsory recognition with prayer for support against
Rogelio Ong, she was represented by her mother Jinky. Before the case, Jinky married a certain Hasegawa Katsuo, Japanese. That
same year, Jinky met Rogelio, they fell in love and subsequently cohabited. After four years, Joanne was born, Rogelio recognized
her as his, however, that same year, Rogelio abandoned them and stopped giving support. He alleged that he is not the father of
Joanna, hence this petition. RTC rendered a decision and declared the minor to be the illegitimate child of Ong with Jinky Diaz, and
ordered him to support the child until she reaches the age of majority. Ong opposed the CA’s order to directing the Estate and
Joanne for DNA analysis for determining paternity. During the pendency of the case, Rogelio Died. The Estate filed a motion for
reconsideration with the Court of Appeals. They contended that a dead person cannot be subject to testing. CA justified that “DNA
paternity testing, as current jurisprudence affirms, would be the most reliable and effective method of settling the present
paternity dispute.
ISSUE: WoN DNA analysis can still be done even if the person is whose DNA is the subject is dead (YES)

RULING: The court held that the death of Rogelio does not ipso facto negate the application of DNA analysis so long as there exist,
suitable biological samples of his DNA. The New Rules on DNA Evidence permits the manner of DNA testing by using biological
samples–organic material originating from the person’s body, for example, blood, saliva, other body fluids, tissues, hair, bones,
even inorganic materials- that is susceptible to DNA testing. In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to adequately
found or would be hard to get, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes found from body cells of the illegitimate child and any
physical remains of the long dead parent could be resorted to.

ARTICLES 172 — 176 PROOF OF FILIATION

FERNANDEZ v. CA FACTS: Violeta P. Esguerra, as mother and guardian ad litem of petitioners Claro Antonio Fernandez and John Paul Fernandez, filed
an action for recognition and support against the private respondent. To bolster their case, petitioners presented the following
documentary evidence: their certificates of live birth, identifying respondent Carlito as their father; the baptismal certificate of
petitioner Claro which also states that his father is respondent Carlito; photographs of Carlito taken during the baptism of
petitioner Claro; and pictures of respondent Carlito and Claro taken at the home of Violeta Esguerra. Petitioners likewise presented
witnesses who told the trial court that Violeta Esguerra had, at different times, introduced the private respondent to them as her
"husband". Fr. Fernandez, on the other hand, testified that Carlito was the one who presented himself as the father of petitioner
Claro during the latter's baptism.

In defense, respondent Carlito denied Violeta's allegations that he sired the two petitioners. He averred he only served as one of
the sponsors in the baptism of petitioner Claro. This claim was corroborated by the testimony of an officemate who also stood as a
sponsor during the said baptism. The Private respondent also presented as witness a waiter of the Lighthouse Restaurant who
disputed Violeta's allegation that she and respondent Carlito frequented the said restaurant during their affair. Said witness stated
he never saw Violeta Esguerra and respondent Carlito together at the said restaurant. Carlito also declared he only learned he was
named in the birth certificates of both petitioners as their father after he was sued for support.

ISSUE: WoN the evidence presented by petitioners prove the paternity and filiation of private respondent (NO)
 RULING: Petitioners cannot rely on the photographs showing the presence of the private respondent in the baptism of petitioner
Claro. They are far from proofs that private respondent is the father of petitioner Claro. As explained by the private respondent, he
was in the baptism as one of the sponsors of petitioner Claro. His testimony was corroborated by a witness. Secondly, the pictures
taken in the house of Violeta showing private respondent showering affection to Claro fall short of the evidence required to prove
paternity. Thirdly, the baptismal certificates of petitioner Claro naming private respondent as his father has scant evidentiary
value. There is no showing that private respondent participated in its preparation. While baptismal certificates may be considered
public documents, they can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacraments on the dates so specified. They are not
necessarily competent evidence of the veracity of entries therein with respect to the child's paternity. Fourth, the certificates of
live birth of the petitioners identifying private respondent as their father are not also competent evidence on the issue of their
paternity. Again, the records do no show that private respondent had a hand in the preparation of said certificates. A birth
certificate not signed by the alleged father therein indicated is not competent evidence of paternity.

FERNANDEZ v. FERNANDEZ FACTS: Dr. Jose Fernandez died intestate in 1982. An Extra- Judicial Partition of his properties was executed by his wife Generosa
and their son, Rodolfo, herein petitioner. A Deed of Sale of some properties of Generosa was also executed by her in favor of
petitioner Eddie Fernandez before she died. Respondents, Dr. Jose’s nephews and nieces, filed an action for the declaration of
absolute nullity of the 2 deeds which was granted by the RTC and affirmed by CA.

It was found that the evidence presented which consisted of a certificate of baptism stating that Rodolfo was a child of the spouses
Fernandez and the application for recognition of rights to back pay under RA 897 filed by Dr. Jose Fernandez, wherein the latter
referred to Rodolfo as his son, did not acquire evidentiary weight to prove his filiation. The appellate court concluded that while
baptismal certificates may be considered public documents, they were evidence only to prove the administration of the
sacraments on the dates therein specified, but not the veracity of the statements or declarations made therein with respect to his
kinsfolk; that while the application for back pay was a public document, it was not executed to admit the filiation of Jose K.
Fernandez with Rodolfo V. Fernandez, the herein appellant; that the public document contemplated in Article 172 of the Family
Code referred to the written admission of filiation embodied in a public document purposely executed as an admission of filiation
and not as obtaining in this case wherein the public document was executed as an application for the recognition of rights to back
pay under Republic Act No. 897.

ISSUE: WoN the court may pass upon the filiation of Rodolfo in the present action (YES)
WoN Rodolfo can inherit from the estate of Dr. Jose (NO)

HELD: It must be noted that the principal action was for the declaration of absolute nullity of the deed of extra-judicial partition
and deed of absolute sale, and not an action to impugn one’s legitimacy. The court ruled on the filiation of petitioner Rodolfo
Fernandez in order to determine Rodolfo’s right to the deed of extra-judicial partition as the alleged legitimate heir of the spouses
Fernandez. While we are aware that one’s legitimacy can be questioned only in a direct action filed by the proper party, this
doctrine has no application in the instant case considering that respondents’ claim was that petitioner Rodolfo was not born to the
deceased spouses Jose and Generosa Fernandez; we do not have a situation wherein they (respondents) deny that Rodolfo was a
child of their uncle’s wife. Thus, it is necessary to pass upon the relationship of petitioner Rodolfo Fernandez to the deceased
spouses Fernandez for the purpose of determining what legal right Rodolfo has in the property subject of the extra-judicial
partition. In fact, the issue of whether or not Rodolfo Fernandez was the son of the deceased spouses Jose Fernandez and
 Generosa de Venecia was squarely raised by petitioners in their pre-trial brief filed before the trial court, hence they are now
estopped from assailing the trial court’s ruling on Rodolfo’s status.

Since the lower courts found Rodolfo not a child by nature of the spouses Fernandez and not a legal heir of Dr. Jose, the deed of
extra- judicial settlement of Dr. Jose’s estate between him and Generosa is null and void insofar as Rodolfo is concerned pursuant
to Article 1105, NCC. However, since the property in question is conjugal, the respondents are entitled to inherit the ¼ share of the
estate while the ¾ share of the conjugal property still belong to Generosa. Respondents cannot thus possess nor demand
reconveyance of the said property since they are not related by consanguinity to Generosa. Being the owner of the realty,
Generosa can thus sell it as she did in favor of petitioner. However, considering that widow Generosa, during her lifetime, sold the
entire building to petitioner Eddie Fernandez, respondents had been deprived of their ¼ share therein, thus the deed of sale was
prejudicial to the interest of respondents as regards their ¼ share in the building. Respondents therefore, have a cause of action to
seek the annulment of said deed of sale.

LABAGALA v. SANTIAGO FACTS: Jose T. Santiago owned a parcel of land in Manila. However, his sisters sued him for recovery of 2/3 share of the land
alleging that he had fraudulently registered it in his name. The trial court decided in favor of his sisters. Jose died intestate. His
sisters then filed a complaint before the RTC for recovery of the 1/3 portion of said property which was in the possession of Ida C.
Labagala (who claimed the daughter of Jose). The trial court ruled in favor of Labagala. According to the trial court, the said deed
constitutes a valid donation. Even if it were not, petitioner would still be entitled to Jose's 1/3 portion of the property as Jose's
daughter. CA reversed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUES: WON respondents may impugn petitioner's filiation in this action for recovery of title and possession (YES)
WON Ida is entitled to 1/3 of the property he co-owned with respondents, through succession, sale, or donation (NO)

HELD: Article 263 refers to an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, to assert and prove that a person is not a man's child by
his wife and the husband (or, in proper cases, his heirs) denies the child's filiation. It does not refer to situations where a child is
alleged not to be the child at all of a particular couple. However, the present respondents are asserting not merely that petitioner
is not a legitimate child of Jose, but that she is not a child spouses at all. Moreover, the present action is one for recovery of title
and possession, and thus outside the scope of Article 263 on prescriptive periods.

At the pre-trial, petitioner's counsel admitted that petitioner did not have a birth certificate indicating that she is Ida Santiago,
though she had been using this name all her life. Petitioner opted not to present her birth certificate to prove her relationship with
Jose and instead offered in evidence her baptismal certificate. However, a baptismal certificate, a private document, is not
conclusive proof of filiation. More so are the entries made in an income tax return, which only shows that income tax has been
paid and the amount thereof. Petitioner's counsel argued that petitioner had been using Santiago all her life. However, use of a
family name certainly does not establish pedigree. Thus, she cannot inherit from him through intestate succession.

The Court ruled that there is no valid sale in this case. Jose did not have the right to transfer ownership of the entire property to
petitioner since 2/3 thereof belonged to his sisters. Petitioner could not have given her consent to the contract, being a minor at
the time. Consent of the contracting parties is among the essential requisites of a contract, including one of sale, absent which
there can be no valid contract. Moreover, petitioner admittedly did not pay any centavo for the property which makes the sale
 void. Article 1471 of the Civil Code provides that if the price is simulated, the sale is void, but the act may be shown to have been in
reality a donation, or some other act or contract. Neither may the purported deed of sale be a valid deed of donation. Even
assuming that the deed is genuine, it cannot be a valid donation. It lacks the acceptance of the donee required by Art.725 of the
Civil Code. Being a minor, the acceptance of the donation should have been made by her father or mother or her legal
representative pursuant to Art. 741 of the same Code. No one of those mentioned in the law accepted the donation for Ida.

LOCSIN v. LOCSIN FACTS: After Locsin, Sr. died, respondent Locsin, Jr. filed with the RTC a petition praying that he be appointed Administrator of the
Intestate Estate of the deceased. He alleged that he is an acknowledged natural child of the deceased and that he is the only
surviving legal heir. The opposition averred that respondent is not a child or an acknowledged natural child of the late Locsin Sr.

To support respondent’s claim that he is an acknowledged natural child of the deceased, the intestate estate, respondent
submitted a machine copy of his Certificate of Live Birth from the Local Civil Registrar. It contains the information that respondent's
father is Juan C. Locsin, Sr. Respondent also offered in evidence a photograph showing him and his mother, Amparo Escamilla, in
front of a coffin bearing Juan C. Locsin Sr.’s dead body.
Petitioners claimed that the Certificate of Live Birth is spurious. They submitted a certified true copy of Certificate of Live from the
Civil Registrar General of Metro Manila indicating that the birth of respondent was reported by his mother, Amparo Escamilla, and
that the same does not contain the signature of the late Locsin Sr.

The RTC ruled for respondent and found that the evidence presented are sufficient proofs of respondent's illegitimate filiation with
the deceased. The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision.

ISSUE: WoN respondent Juan Locsin, Jr. was able to prove his filiation with the late Juan C. Locsin, Sr. (NO)

RULING: The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil
register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument
and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous possession of
the status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. The due recognition of an
illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a
consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated
not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for
judicial approval. Where, instead, a claim for recognition is predicated on other evidence merely tending to prove paternity, i.e.,
outside of a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or an authentic writing, judicial action within the applicable
statute of limitations is essential in order to establish the child's acknowledgment.

A birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence prescribed by both the Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family Code for
purposes of recognition and filiation. However, birth certificate offers only prima facie evidence of filiation and may be refuted by
contrary evidence. Its evidentiary worth cannot be sustained where there exists strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity
or nullity. In this case, respondent's Certificate of Live Birth has all the badges of nullity. Without doubt, the authentic copy on file
in that office was removed and substituted with a falsified Certificate of Live Birth.
 The glaring discrepancies between the two Certificates of Live Birth presented by both parties have overturned the genuineness of
the one presented by Locsin Jr. What is authentic is the one presented by the petitioners.

Respondent's photograph with his mother near the coffin of the late Juan C. Locsin cannot and will not constitute proof of filiation.
Anybody can have a picture taken while standing before a coffin with others and thereafter utilize it in claiming the estate of the
deceased.

BERNABE v. ALEJO Facts: Fiscal Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary of 23 years Carolina Allejo. The son was born on September 18,
1981, Adrian Bernabe. Fiscal Bernabe died August 13, 1993 while his wife died December 3 of the same year leaving Ernestina as
sole surviving heir. Thereafter, Carolina in behalf of Adrian filed the aforesaid complaint praying that Adrian be declared as
acknowledged illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe.

Trial court’s ruling: Under the new law, an action for the recognition of an illegitimate child must be brought within the lifetime of
the alleged parent to give the latter an opportunity to either affirm or deny the child’s filiation.
CA ruling: The rights of Adrian are governed under Article 285 of the Civil Code which allows an action for recognition to be filed
within 4 years after the child has attained the age of majority and that subsequent enactment of the Family Code did not take
away his right.

Issues: WoN FC provision be given retroactive effect (NO)

Held: Applying recent jurisprudence, the Supreme Court hold that Article 285 of the Civil Code is a substantive law as it gives
Adrian the right to file his petition for recognition within 4 years from attaining majority age. Therefore, the Family Code cannot
impair or take Adrian’s right to file an action for recognition because that right had already vested prior to its enactment. The right
of children to seek recognition granted by the NCC to illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the FC took effect
cannot be impaired. NCC 185 allows an illegitimate child to file for recognition within 4 years of attaining age of majority, thus gave
child a vested right which the FC cannot impair.

DE LA ROSA v. VDA. DE Facts: Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado died intestate and without descendants. Guillermo outlived Josefa by two years.
DAMIAN Petitioners and respondents are their respective relatives claiming rights to their intestate estate.

The petition for letters of administration stated that Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia were never married. According to
petitioners, sometime in 1917, Guillermo proposed marriage to Josefa. Josefa and Guillermo eventually lived together as husband
and wife but were never married. To prove their assertion, petitioners point out that no record of the contested marriage existed
in the civil registry. Moreover, a baptismal certificate naming Josefa Delgado as one of the sponsors referred to her as "Señorita" or
unmarried woman.

Josefa was the daughter of Felisa Delgado by one Lucio Ocampo with five other children without the benefit of marriage. Felisa had
another son by way of Ramon Osorio who is Luis Delgado, one of the claimants in Josefa‘s estate. But, unlike her relationship with
Lucio Campo which was admittedly one without the benefit of marriage, the legal status of Ramon Osorio’s and Felisa Delgado’s
 union is in dispute.

The question of whether Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio ever got married is crucial to the claimants because if Ramon Osorio
and Felisa Delgado had been validly married, then their only child Luis Delgado was a legitimate half-blood brother of Josefa
Delgado and therefore excluded from the latter’s intestate estate. He and his heirs would be barred by the principle of absolute
separation between the legitimate and illegitimate families. Conversely, if the couple were never married, Luis Delgado and his
heirs would be entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado’s intestate estate, as they would all be within the illegitimate line.

Issue: WoN there was a valid marriage between Guillermo and Josefa
WoN there was a valid marriage between Felisa and Ramon.

Held: 1) Although a marriage contract is considered a primary evidence of marriage, its absence is not always proof that no
marriage in fact took place. Once the presumption of marriage arises, other evidence may be presented in support thereof. The
evidence need not necessarily or directly establish the marriage but must at least be enough to strengthen the presumption of
marriage. Here, the certificate of identity issued to Josefa Delgado as Mrs. Guillermo Rustia, the passport issued to her as Josefa D.
Rustia, the declaration under oath of no less than Guillermo Rustia that he was married to Josefa Delgado and the titles to the
properties in the name of "Guillermo Rustia married to Josefa Delgado," more than adequately support the presumption of
marriage. These are public documents which are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. No clear and convincing evidence
sufficient to overcome the presumption of the truth of the recitals therein was presented by petitioners.

The baptismal certificate was conclusive proof only of the baptism administered by the priest who baptized the child. It was no
proof of the veracity of the declarations and statements contained therein, such as the alleged single or unmarried ("Señorita")
civil status of Josefa Delgado who had no hand in its preparation.

Petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. In this jurisdiction, every
intendment of the law leans toward legitimizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together apparently in marriage are presumed to be
in fact married. This is the usual order of things in society and, if the parties are not what they hold themselves out to be, they
would be living in constant violation of the common rules of law and propriety.

2) Little was said of the cohabitation or alleged marriage of Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio. The oppositors (now respondents)
chose merely to rely on the disputable presumption of marriage even in the face of such countervailing evidence as (1) the
continued use by Felisa and Luis (her son with Ramon Osorio) of the surname Delgado and (2) Luis Delgado’s and Caridad
Concepcion’s Partida de Casamiento identifying Luis as "hijo natural de Felisa Delgado" (the natural child of Felisa Delgado).

All things considered, we rule that these factors sufficiently overcame the rebuttable presumption of marriage. Felisa Delgado and
Ramon Osorio were never married.
VERCELES v. POSADA FACTS: Posada got pregnant by Verceles who was then validly married to another. In court, she identified Verceles’ penmanship, in
a letter sent by him, which she claims she was familiar with as an employee in his office. Clarissa presented three other
handwritten letters sent to her by Verceles. She also presented the pictures Verceles gave her of his youth and as a public servant,
all bearing his handwritten notations at the back.
 Clarissa avers that Verceles, aware of her pregnancy, handed her a letter and P2,000 pocket money to go to Manila. Verceles went
to see her there and gave her another P2,000 for her delivery and subsequently gave birth to a baby girl.

The Clarissa and her parents (Clarissa et. al.) filed a Complaint for Damages coupled with Support Pendente Lite before the RTC. A
judgment was issued in their favor. Verceles appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the judgment with modification as to
the award of damages. He asserts that the issue of filiation should be resolved in a direct and not a collateral action.

ISSUE: Could paternity and filiation be resolved in an action for damages?

Whether love letters may be considered as proof of filiation.

RULING:
A. The caption is not determinative of the nature of a pleading. It is not the caption but the facts alleged which give meaning to a
pleading. Courts are called upon to pierce the form and go into the substance thereof. In determining the nature of an action, it is
not the caption, but the averments in the petition and the character of the relief sought, that are controlling.

A perusal of the Complaint before the RTC shows that although its caption states “Damages coupled with Support Pendente Lite,”
Clarissa’s averments therein, her meeting with petitioner, his offer of a job, his amorous advances, her seduction, their trysts, her
pregnancy, birth of her child, his letters, her demand for support for her child, all clearly establish a case for recognition of
paternity. We have held that the due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of
record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgement of the child, and no further court action is
required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition
that does not require a separate action for judicial approval.

The letters of Verceles are declarations that lead nowhere but to the conclusion that he sired Verna Aiza. Although he used an alias
in these letters, the similarity of the penmanship in these letters vis the annotation at the back of Verceles’ fading photograph as a
youth is unmistakable. Even an inexperienced eye will come to the conclusion that they were all written by one and the same
person. We also note that in his Memorandum, Verceles admitted his affair with Clarissa, the exchange of love letters between
them, and his giving her money during her pregnancy.

B. Articles 172 and 175 of the Family Code are the rules for establishing filiation. The letters are private handwritten instruments of
Verceles which establish Verna Aiza’s filiation under Article 172 (2) of the Family Code. In addition, the array of evidence presented
by Clarissa, the dates, letters, pictures and testimonies, to us, are convincing, and irrefutable evidence that Verna Aiza is, indeed,
Verceles’ illegitimate child.

DELA CRUZ v. GRACIA FACTS: Jenie was denied the registration of her child's birth because the document attached to the Affidavit to use the Surname of
the Father (AUSF) entitled "Autobiography," did not include the signature of the deceased father, and “because he was born out of
wedlock and the father unfortunately died prior to his birth and has no more capacity to acknowledge his paternity to the child.”
 Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint for injunction/registration of name against Gracia. The trial court held that even if
Dominique, the father, was the author of the unsigned handwritten Autobiography, the same does not contain any express
recognition of paternity.

ISSUE: WoN the unsigned handwritten instrument of the deceased father of minor Christian can be considered as a recognition of
paternity. (YES)

RULING: Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255, permits an illegitimate child to use the surname of his/her father
if the latter had previously recognized him/her as his offspring through an admission made in a pubic of private handwritten
instrument. Article 176, as amended, does not explicitly state that there must be a signature by the putative father in the private
handwritten instrument.

The following rules respecting the requirement of affixing the signature of the acknowledging parent in any private handwritten
instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child is made:

1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove filiation, there should be strict
compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed by the acknowledging parent; and
2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and competent evidence, it suffices that the claim
of filiation therein be shown to have been made and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such
other evidence.

NEPOMUCENO v. LOPEZ FACTS: Arhbencel Ann Lopez, represented by her mother Araceli Lopez, filed a complaint for recognition and support against
petitioner Nepomuceno. Arhbencel claimed that she was born out of an extramarital affair. To prove her filiation, Arhbencel
presented a handwritten note executed by petitioner regarding support. Petitioner denied that he was the father of
Arhbencel and alleged that he was only forced to execute the handwritten note on account of threats coming from the NPA. The
trial court dismissed the complaint, ruling that, among other things, Arhbencel’s Certificate of Birth was not prima facie evidence
of her filiation to petitioner as it did not bear petitioner’s signature; that petitioner’s handwritten undertaking to provide support
did not contain a categorical acknowledgment that Arhbencel is his child; and that there was no showing that petitioner
performed any overt act of acknowledgment of Arhbencel as his illegitimate child after the execution of the note. Thus,
Arhbencel appealed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the handwritten note is sufficient to establish Arhbencel’s filiation as an illegitimate child (NO)

HELD: Arhbencel’s entitlement to support from petitioner is dependent on the determination of her filiation. The
handwritten note does not contain any statement whatsoever about Arhbencel’s filiation to petitioner. It is, therefore, not within
the ambit of Article 172(2) vis-à-vis Article 175 of the Family Code which provides that the filiation of illegitimate children may be
established by a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned admitting such filiation. Here, petitioner has not
only consistently denied his filiation with Arhbencel, he has also not performed any contemporaneous acts admitting such filiation.
The only other documentary evidence submitted by Arhbencel, a copy of her Certificate of Birth, has no probative value to
establish filiation to petitioner because the latter has not signed the same.
Aguilar v. Siasat FACTS: Spouses Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar died, intestate and without debt included in their estate are two
parcels of land. In June 1996, petitioner Rodolfo S. Aguilar filed a civil case for mandatory injunction with damages against
respondent Edna G. Siasat, alleging that petitioner is the only son and sole surviving heir of the Aguilar spouses; that he (petitioner)
discovered that the subject titles were missing, and he suspected that someone from the Siasat clan could have stolen the same

To prove filiation, petitioner presented, among other documents, Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS Form E-1, a public instrument subscribed
and made under oath by Alfredo Aguilar during his employment with BMMC, which bears his signature and thumb marks and
indicates that petitioner, who was born on March 5, 1945, is his son and dependent. The RTC and CA ruled against petitioner citing
that he failed to present sufficient evidence that establish his filiation with the deceased spouses Aguilar.
ISSUE: WoN the petitioner can prove his filiation to the spouse Aguilar using SSS E-1 (acknowledged and notarized before a notary
public, executed by Alfredo Aguilar, recognizing the petitioner as his son) (YES)

RULING: The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil
register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument
and signed by the parent concerned. Filiation may be proved by an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, and such due recognition in any authentic writing is, in itself,
a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is required.

It was erroneous for the CA to treat Exhibit G as mere proof of open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child
under the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code; it is evidence of filiation under the first paragraph thereof, the same
being an express recognition in a public instrument.

Heirs of Arado v. Alcoran Facts: Raymundo Alcoran (Raymundo) was married to Joaquina Arado (Joaquina), and their marriage produced a son named
Nicolas Alcoran (Nicolas). In turn, Nicolas married Florencia Limpahan (Florencia) but their union had no offspring. During their
marriage, however, Nicolas had an extramarital affair with Francisca Sarita (Francisca), who gave birth to respondent Anacleto
Alcoran (Anacleto) on July 13, 1951 during the subsistence of Nicolas' marriage to Florencia. In 1972, Anacleto married Elenette
Sonjaco.

Joaquina had four siblings, i.e., Alejandra, Nemesio, Celedonia and Melania, all surnamed Arado. Nemesio had six children, namely:
(1) Jesusa, who was married to Victoriano Alcoriza; (2) Pedro, who was married to Tomasa Arado; (3) Teodorico; (4) Josefina; (5)
Gliceria; and (6) Felicisima. During the pendency of the case, Pedro died, and was substituted by his following heirs, to wit: (1)
Juditho and his spouse, Jennifer Ebrole; (2) Bobbie Zito and his spouse, Shirly Abad; (3) Juvenil and his spouse, Nicetas Ventula; (4)
Antonieta and her spouse, Nelson Somoza; and (5) Nila Alejandra, Jesusa, Victoriano Alcoriza, Pedro and Tomasa filed in the RTC a
complaint for recovery of property and damages (with application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction) against Anacleto
and Elenette. The aforementioned plaintiffs argue, among others, that Nicolas did not recognize Anacleto as his spurious child
during his lifetime.

The RTC opined that Anacleto established that he was really the acknowledged illegitimate son of Nicolas. It cited the certificate of
birth of Anacleto (Exhibit 4) and Page 53, Book 4, Register No. 214 of the Register of Births of the Municipality of Bacong (Exhibit
 3), which proved that Nicolas had himself caused the registration of Anacleto's birth by providing the details thereof and indicating
that he was the father of Anacleto. It observed that the name of Nicolas appeared under the column "Remarks" in the register of
births, which was the space provided for the name of the informant; that because the plaintiffs did not present evidence to refute
the entry in the register of births, the entry became conclusive with respect to the facts contained therein. The CA agreed with the
RTC.

ISSUE: WoN Anacleto is the illegitimate son of Nicolas (YES)

HELD: Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate
children. One of the ways filiation of legitimate children is established is by any of the record of birth appearing in the civil register
or a final judgment. Considering that Nicolas, the putative father, had a direct hand in the preparation of the birth certificate,
reliance on the birth certificate of Anacleto as evidence of his paternity was fully warranted.

Rightly enough, the RTC and the CA unanimously concluded that Nicolas had duly acknowledged Anacleto as his illegitimate son.
The birth certificate of Anacleto appearing in the Register of Births of the Municipality of Bacong, Negros Oriental showed that
Nicolas had himself caused the registration of the birth of Anacleto. The showing was by means of the name of Nicolas appearing
in the column "Remarks" in Page 53, Book 4, Register No. 214 of the Register of Births. Based on the certification issued by the
Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Bacong, Negros Oriental, the column in the Register of Births entitled "Remarks"
(Observaciones) was the space provided for the name of the informant of the live birth to be registered. Considering that Nicolas,
the putative father, had a direct hand in the preparation of the birth certificate, reliance on the birth certificate of Anacleto as
evidence of his paternity was fully warranted.

Geronimo v. Santos Supreme Court had occasion to answer this issue in one case involving a certain Karen, who while claiming to be the only child and
heir of deceased Rufino, filed a case against the brothers of the deceased. Karen sought to annul the document executed by the
brothers of the deceased adjudicating to themselves a property owned by the deceased Rufino and to recover the said property
from the brothers.

While Karen was indeed reared by Rufino and his wife, it was established that the birth certificate of Karen was tampered,
specifically the date of birth and the name of the informant. The Supreme Court ruled that the alterations made the birth
certificate questionable and thus, it no longer bears the presumption of regularity. The Supreme Court also found that the
secondary evidence of filiation between Karen and Rufino was not sufficiently established.

The Supreme Court declared that “the mere registration of a child in his or her birth certificate as the child of the supposed parents
is not a valid adoption, does not confer upon the child the status of an adopted child and the legal rights of such child, and even
amounts to simulation of the child’s birth or falsification of his or her birth certificate, which is a public document.”

Thus, the Supreme Court ruled to dismiss the case filed by Karen against the brothers for annulment of document and recovery of
possession of property. (Geronimo vs. Santos, G.R. 197099 [2015])

In order that a child will obtain the status of a legitimate child, a petition for adoption of the child should be filed in court. After the

Calimag v, Heirs of Macapaz
Applicability and distinctions between the Family Code, RA 8043 and RA 8552
Tamargo v. Court of Appeals
court issues the decree of adoption, the child will be considered a legitimate child of the adopter and will be entitled to all the
rights and obligations provided by law, including the right to succeed in the properties of the adopter.
Facts: Virginia co-owned a property with Silvestra under Transfer Certificate Title (TCT) No.183088 and under such title is an
annotation of an Adverse Claim of Fidela asserting rights and interests over a portion of the said property. Anastacio Jr. and Alicia
both surnamed Macapaz are children of Silvestra’s brother, Anastacio Sr. and Fidela Vda de Macapaz. Anastacio Jr. filed a criminal
complaint against the petitioner for 2 counts of falsification of documents but was dismissed. On 2006, respondents, asserting that
they are the heirs of Silvestra, instituted the action for Annulment of Deed of Sale and Cancellation of TCT 221466 with damages.
Petitioner countered that respondents have no legal capacity to institute said civil action because they are illegitimate children of
Anastacio Sr and Art. 992 of the Civil Code prohibits illegitimate children from inheriting intestate.
Issue: W/N respondents are legal heirs of Silvestra.
Held: Court favors respondents. Petition is bereft of merit. Court finds that the respondents’ certificate of live births were duly
executed with the provision of the law respecting the registration of birth of illegitimate child. The fact that only the signature of
Fidela appear on said documents is of no moment because Fidela only signed as the declarant or informant of the respondents’
fact of birth as legitimate children. Also, Anastacio Sr. and Fidela had openly cohabited as husband and wife (Trinidad v CA) for a
number of years as a result of which they had 2 children (respondents). Art 220 of the Civil Code is the governing provision herein
which states that “in case of doubt, all presumptions favor solidarity of the family. Thus, every intendment of law or facts leans
toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of the children, the community property
during marriage, the authority of parents over their children, and the validity of the defense for any member of the family in case
of unlawful aggression.”
(ADOPTION)
 Facts:
On 20 October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, a minor, 10 years old, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which
resulted in her death. The natural parents of Tamargo filed a complaint for damages against the natural parents of Adelberto with
whom he was living the time of the tragic incident.
In December 1981, spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura filed a petition to adopt Adelberto. The petition was granted in November
1982 that is after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer.
Adelberto’s parents, in their Answer, claimed that the spouses Rapisura were indispensable parties to the action since parental
authority had shifted to them from the moment the petition for adoption was decreed. Spouses Tamargo contended that since
Adelberto was then actually living with his natural parents, parental authority had not ceased by mere filing and granting of the
petition for adoption. Trial court dismissed the spouses Tamargo’s petition.
Issue:
 Whether or not the spouses Rapisura are the indispensable parties to actions committed by Adelberto.

Held:

No. In Article 221 of the Family Code states that: “Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for
the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company and under their
parental authority subject to the appropriate defences provided by law.”

In the case at bar, parental authority over Adelberto was still lodged with the natural parents at the time the shooting incident
happened. It follows that the natural parents are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages.

Supreme Court held that parental authority had not been retroactively transferred to and vested in the adopting parents, at the
time the shooting happened. It do not consider that retroactive effect may be given to the decree of the adoption so as to impose
a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at the time when adopting parents had no actual custody over the adopted child.
Retroactive affect may be essential if it permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child.
Lahom v. Sibulo  FACTS:
Isabelita Lahom, the petitioner, together with her husband, adopted Isabelita’s nephew and brought him up as their own because
they do not have children. In 1972, the trial court granted the petition for adoption, and ordered the Civil Registrar to change the
name of the child from Jose Melvin Sibulo to Jose Melvin Lahom.

Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption, in which she averred that, despite her pleas and that of her
husband, their adopted son refused to use their surname Lahom and continue to use Sibulo in all his dealing and activities.

Thus, those events revealing Jose’s callous indifference, ingratitude and lack of care and concern prompted Lahom to file a petition
in Court in December 1999 to rescind the decree of adoption previously issued way back in 1972.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject adoption may still be revoked or rescinded by an adopter.

HELD:
Jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. The controversy
should be resolved in the light of the law governing at the time the petition was filed.

Prior to the institution of the case, in 1998, RA No. 8552 also known as the Domestic Adoption Act went into effect. The new
statute deleted from the law the right of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption (Section 19 of Article VI).

When Lahom filed said petition there was already a new law on adoption, specifically R.A. 8552 also known as the Domestic
Adoption Act passed on March 22,1998, wherein it was provided that: “Adoption, being in the interest of the child, shall not be
subject to rescission by the adopter(s). However the adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in Article 919 of the
 Civil Code” (Section 19).

But an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain
benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving child, like denying his legitime, and by will and testament, may expressly exclude
him from having a share in the disposable portion of his estate.
Landingin v. Republic  FACTS:

Diwata Ramos Landingin, a citizen of the United States of America (USA), of Filipino parentage and a resident of Guam, USA, filed a
petition for the adoption of minors Elaine Dizon Ramos, Elma Dizon Ramos and Eugene Dizon Ramos who was born on. The minors
are the natural children of Manuel Ramos, petitioner’s brother (deceased), and Amelia Ramos- who went to Italy, re-married there
and now has two children by her second marriage and no longer communicated with her children.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petition for adoption is invalid for lack of consent of the biological mother?

RULING:

No. The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect the natural parental relationship
from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the child in the
manner of the proposed adoption. When she filed her petition with the trial court, Rep. Act No. 8552 was already in effect. Section
9 thereof provides that if the written consent of the biological parents cannot be obtained, the written consent of the legal
guardian of the minors will suffice. If, as claimed by petitioner, that the biological mother of the minors had indeed abandoned
them, she should, thus have adduced the written consent of their legal guardian.
In re Lim  FACTS:

Monina Lim, petitioner, who was an optometrist was married with Primo Lim but were childless. Minor children, were entrusted to
them by Lucia, whose parents were unknown as shown by a certification of DSWD. The spouses registered the children making it
appears as if they were the parents. Unfortunately, in 1998, Primo died. She then married an American Citizen, Angel Olario in
December 2000. Petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given under RA 8552 to individuals who
simulated the birth of a child. In 2002, she filed separate petitions for adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court.
Michelle was then 25 years old and already married and Michael was 18 years and seven months old. Michelle and her husband
including Michael and Olario gave their consent to the adoption executed in an affidavit.

ISSUE:

WON petitioner who has remarried can singly adopt.

RULING:
Petition was denied. The time the petitions were filed, petitioner had already remarried. Husband and wife shall jointly adopt
except in 3 instances which was not present in the case at bar. In case spouses jointly adopts, they shall jointly exercised parental
authority. The use of the word “shall” signifies that joint adoption of husband and wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with
the concept of joint parental authority since the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to
require spouses to adopt jointly. The affidavit of consent given by Olario will not suffice since there are certain requirements that
he must comply as an American Citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in Sec7 of RA8552. The requirements on
residency and certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Sec 7. Parental authority is
merely just one of the effects of legal adoption. It includes caring and rearing the children for civic consciousness and efficiency and
development of their moral mental and physical character and well-being.

SEC. 7.Who May Adopt. – The following may adopt:

(a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full civil capacity and legal rights, of good moral character, has not been
convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude, emotionally and psychologically capable of caring for children, at least sixteen
(16) years older than the adoptee, and who is in a position to support and care for his/her children in keeping with the means of
the family. The requirement of sixteen (16) year difference between the age of the adopter and adoptee may be waived when the
adopter is the biological parent of the adoptee, or is the spouse of the adoptees parent;

(b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above stated for Filipino nationals: Provided, That his/her country has
diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines, that he/she has been living in the Philippines for at least three (3)
continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption and maintains such residence until the adoption decree is
entered, that he/she has been certified by his/her diplomatic or consular office or any appropriate government agency that he/she
has the legal capacity to adopt in his/her country, and that his/her government allows the adoptee to enter his/her country as
his/her adopted son/daughter:Provided, further, That the requirements on residency and certification of the aliens qualification to
adopt in his/her country may be waived for the following:

(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity; or

(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of his/her Filipino spouse; or

(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his/her spouse a relative within the fourth (4th) degree
of consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino spouses; or

(c) The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of the guardianship and clearance of his/her financial
accountabilities.

Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:

(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or
 (ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided, however, That the other spouse has signified
his/her consent thereto; or

(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.

In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of the other, joint parental authority
shall be exercised by the spouses.
Castro v. Gregorio  Facts: This is a petition for review on Certiorari assailing the decision of the CA which denied the petition for annulment of
judgment filed by petitioners. The petition before the appellate court sought to annul the judgment of the trial court that granted
Rs’ decree of adoption.

Atty. Castro was allegedly married to Rosario Castro (Petitioner). Unfortunately, they separated later on due to their
incompatibilities and Jose’s alleged homosexual tendencies. Their marriage bore two daughters: Rose Marie, who succumbed to
death after nine days from birth due to congenital heart disease, and Joanne Benedicta Charissima Castro (Petitioner).

On August 2000, A petition for adoption of Jose Maria Jed Gregorio (Jed) and Ana Maria Regina Gregorio (Regina) was instituted by
Atty. Jose Castro. Atty. Castro alleged that Jed and Regina were his illegitimate children with Lilibeth Gregorio (Rosario’s
housekeeper). After a Home Study Report conducted by the Social Welfare Officer of the TC, the petition was granted.

A disbarment complaint was filed against Atty. Castro by Rosario. She alleged that Jose had been remiss in providing support to his
daughter Joanne for the past 36 year; that she single-handedly raised and provided financial support to Joanne while Jose had
been showering gifts to his driver and allege lover, Larry, and even went to the extent of adopting Larry’s two children, Jed and
Regina, without her and Joanne knowledge and consent. Atty. Castro denied the allegation that he had remiss his fatherly duties to
Joanne. He alleged that he always offered help but it was often declined. He also alleged that Jed and Regina were his illegitimate
children that’s why he adopted them. Later on Atty. Castro died.

Rosario and Joanne filed a petition for annulment of judgment seeking to annul the decision of the TC approving Jed and Regina’s
adoption.

Petitioner allege that Rosario’s consent was not obtained and the document purporting as Rosario’s affidavit of consent was
fraudulent. P also allege that Jed and Regina’s birth certificates shows disparity. One set shows that the father to is Jose, while
another set of NSO certificates shows the father to be Larry. P further alleged that Jed and Regina are not actually Jose’s
illegitimate children but the legitimate children of Lilibeth and Larry who were married at the time of their birth. CA denied the
petition.

CA held that while no notice was given by the TC to Rosario and Joanne of the adoption, it ruled that there is “no explicit provision
in the rules that spouses and legitimate child of the adopter. . . should be personally notified of the hearing.”

CA also ruled that the alleged fraudulent information contained in the different sets of birth certificates required the
determination of the identities of the persons stated therein and was, therefore, beyond the scope of the action for annulment of
judgment. The alleged fraud could not be classified as extrinsic fraud, which is required in an action for annulment of judgment.
 Issues:

Whether extrinsic fraud exist in the instant case?

Whether consent of the spouse and legitimate children 10 years or over of the adopter is required?
Decision:

The grant of adoption over R should be annulled as the trial court did not validly acquire jurisdiction over the proceedings, and the
favorable decision was obtained through extrinsic fraud.
When fraud is employed by a party precisely to prevent the participation of any other interested party, as in this case, then the
fraud is extrinsic, regardless of whether the fraud was committed through the use of forged documents or perjured testimony
during the trial.

Jose’s actions prevented Rosario and Joanne from having a reasonable opportunity to contest the adoption. Had Rosario and
Joanne been allowed to participate, the trial court would have hesitated to grant Jose’s petition since he failed to fulfill the
necessary requirements under the law. There can be no other conclusion than that because of Jose’s acts, the trial court granted
the decree of adoption under fraudulent circumstances.

RA 8552 requires that the adoption by the father of a child born out of wedlock obtain not only the consent of his wife but also the
consent of his legitimate children. (Art. III, Sec. 7, RA 8552)

As a rule, the husband and wife must file a joint petition for adoption. The law, however, provides for several exceptions to the
general rule, as in a situation where a spouse seeks to adopt his or her own children born out of wedlock. In this instance, joint
adoption is not necessary. But, the spouse seeking to adopt must first obtain the consent of his or her spouse.

In the absence of any decree of legal separation or annulment, Jose and Rosario remained legally married despite their de facto
separation. For Jose to be eligible to adopt Jed and Regina, Rosario must first signify her consent to the adoption. Since her consent
was not obtained, Jose was ineligible to adopt.

The law also requires the written consent of the adopter’s children if they are 10 years old or older (ART. III, Sec. 9, RA 8552).

For the adoption to be valid, petitioners’ consent was required by Republic Act No. 8552. Personal service of summons should have
been effected on the spouse and all legitimate children to ensure that their substantive rights are protected. It is not enough to
rely on constructive notice as in this case. Surreptitious use of procedural technicalities cannot be privileged over substantive
statutory rights.

Since the trial court failed to personally serve notice on Rosario and Joanne of the proceedings, it never validly acquired
jurisdiction.
Bartolome V. Social Security
System FACTS:

John Colcol was employed as electrician by Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc. He was enrolled under the government’s
Employees’ Compensation Program (ECP). He died due to an accident while on board the vessel. John was, at the time of his death,
childless and unmarried. Thus, petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome, John’s biological mother and, allegedly, sole remaining
beneficiary, filed a claim for death benefits.

SSS denied the claim on the ground that Bernardina was no longer considered as the parent of John since the latter was
legally adopted by Cornelio Colcol. As such, it is Cornelio who qualifies as John’s primary beneficiary, not petitioner.

According to the records, Cornelio died during John’s minority.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the death of the adopter during the adoptee’s minority results to the restoration of the parental authority to the
biological parents of the latter.
Whether or not Bernardina is considered as a legal beneficiary of John.

HELD:

FIRST ISSUE: Yes.

The Court ruled that John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s death is a significant factor in the case at bar. Under such
circumstance, parental authority should be deemed to have reverted in favor of the biological parents. Otherwise, taking into
account Our consistent ruling that adoption is a personal relationship and that there are no collateral relatives by virtue of
adoption, who was then left to care for the minor adopted child if the adopter passed away?

The Court also applied by analogy, insofar as the restoration of custody is concerned, the provisions of law on rescission of
adoption wherein if said petition is granted, the parental authority of the adoptee’s biological parents shall be restored if the
adoptee is still a minor or incapacitated.

The manner herein of terminating the adopter’s parental authority, unlike the grounds for rescission, justifies the retention of
vested rights and obligations between the adopter and the adoptee, while the consequent restoration of parental authority in
favor of the biological parents, simultaneously, ensures that the adoptee, who is still a minor, is not left to fend for himself at such
a tender age.

From the foregoing, it is apparent that the biological parents retain their rights of succession tothe estate of their child who was
 the subject of adoption. While the benefits arising from the death of an SSS covered employee do not form part of the estate of
the adopted child, the pertinent provision on legal or intestate succession at least reveals the policy on the rights of the biological
parents and those by adoption vis-à-vis the right to receive benefits from the adopted. In the same way that certain rights still
attach by virtue of the blood relation, so too should certain obligations, which, the Court ruled, include the exercise of parental
authority, in the event of the untimely passing of their minor offspring’s adoptive parent.

SECOND ISSUE: Yes.

The Court held that Cornelio’s adoption of John, without more, does not deprive petitioner of the right to receive the benefits
stemming from John’s death as a dependent parent given Cornelio’s untimely demise during John’s minority. Since the parent by
adoption already died, then the death benefits under the Employees’ Compensation Program shall accrue solely to herein
petitioner, John’s sole remaining beneficiary.
IN RE: PETITION FOR  Spouses Mary Jane B. Kimura, a Filipino national, and Yuichiro
ADOPTION OF JAN AUREL Kimura, a Japanese national, got married on June 12, 2004.
MAGHANOY BULAYO WITH Prior thereto, petitioner Mary Jane gave birth to her son Jan Aurel
APPLICATION FOR CHANGE on November 24, 1997. However, she was not married to her son’s ,
OF NAME OF ADOPTEE biological father, Jun Baldoza, thus making Jan Aurel her illegitimate
FROM "JAN AUREL child. Her last communication with the minor’ s father was when she was
MAGHANOY BULAYO" TO four (4) months pregnant With [Jan Aurel]. From then on, she has no
"JAN AUREL BULAYO ' knowledge of his whereabouts.
KIMURA", SPOUSES MARY ‘“ On March 15, 2009, petitioners filed a joint petition for adoption of
JANE B. KIMURA and Jan Aurel seeking, among others, to have him declared as— their legitimate ’
YUICHIRO KIMURA son, enjOying the rights and observing the duties of an adopted child as
provided by law.
During trial, petitioners presented the Department of Social
Welfare and Development Minor’s Case Study and Home Study Report
which recommended approval of said petition.

(1) Whether or not an illegitimate child is within the fourth degree of

consanguinity or affinity in the contemplation of Section 7(b)(iii) of
RA. No. 8552;
(2) Whether or not an illegitimate child is contemplated in Section 7(b)(ii)
of RA. No. 8552; and, a
(3) Whether or not the existence of diplomatic _ relations -between the
Philippines and Japan is within judicial notice of the courts.6

an illegitimate child is a relative within the

first civil degree of consanguinity of his biological mother. Unlike a nephew
and niece, an illegitimate child belongs to the direct maternal lineage, which
is never uncertain,9 and which is not as remote as the nephew and niece.
 The word “childm referred to in Article 966 of the Civil Code is used in a
general term and is without qualification. This is so because the provision
contemplates blood relation, not status. When the provision does not
. distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate relatives, we, too, must not.

GRANTS the petition for adoption; DECLARES that henceforth, JAN

AUREL MAGHANOY BULAYO, is freed from all legal obligations of
obedience and maintenance with respect to his biological father, and Shall be,
to all intents and purposes, the child of the Spouses Mary Jane B. Kimura and
Yuichiro Kimura, with his surname to be changed to KIMURA.
ARTICLES 194 — 208 SUPPORT
De Asis v. Court of Appeals
Gan v. Reyes
Mangonon v. Court of
Appeals
Spouses Lim V. Lim
Dolina v. Vallecera
Lim—Lua v. Lua
BBB v. AAA, GR. No. 193225
(Resolution)
PENSION AND GRATUITY
CENTER (PGMC) V. AAA
ARTICLES 209 — 227 PARENTAL AUTHORITY
Caravan Travel and Tours
International, Inc. v. Abejar
Masbate v. Relucio
SPECIAL PARENTAL AUTHORITY
SCHOOL OF HOLY SPIRIT OF
QC v. TAGUIAM
Liability of persons exercising parental and special parental authority for the tort or act/omission committed by a child
Espiritu v. Court of Appeals
Santos, Sr. V. Court of
Appeals
Sagala-Eslao v. Court of
Appeals
Laxamana v. Laxamana
Pablo-Gualberto v.
Gualberto
Salientes v. Abanilla
Gamboa-Hirsch v. Court of
Appeals
Dacasin V. Dacasin
RA 7610 — CHILD ABUSE, EXPLOITATION AND DISCRIMINATION
TORRES v. PEOPLE
ARTICLES 238 — 256 PROCEDURE RE: SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY CODE
Republic v. CA
REPUBLIC v. LORINO
REPUBLIC v. TANGO
NEW CIVIL CODE
ARTICLES 364 — 380 SURNAMES
Republic v. Court of Appeals
Julian Lin Wang v. Cebu City
Civil Registrar
In the Matter of the
Adoption of Stephanie
Nathy Astorga Garcia
Republic v. Capote
Remo v. Secretary of
Foreign Affairs
Grande v. Antonio
Gan v. Republic
Republic v. Sali
In re: Yuhares J an Barcelote
Tinitigan
Chua v. Republic
Republic v. Gallo
Republic v. Tipay
ARTICLES 381 — 396 ABSENCE
TADEO-MATIAS v. REPUBLIC
ARTICLES 305 — 310 FUNERALS
VALINO v. ADRIANO
ARTICLES 407 — 413 CIVIL REGISTER
Republic v. Cagandahan
Iwasawa v. Gangan
Republic v. Olaybar