Information Technology and The Character of Contemporary Life

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INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY AND
THE CHARACTER OF
CONTEMPORARY LIFE
Mario Radovan
Published online: 07 Dec 2010.
To cite this article: Mario Radovan (2001) INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY

AND THE CHARACTER OF CONTEMPORARY LIFE, Information,
Communication & Society, 4:2, 230-246
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Information, Communication & Society 4:2 2001 230–246
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND

THE CHARACTER OF
CONTEMPORARY LIFE
Mario Radovan
University of Rijeka, Croatia
Whoever lives in the present lives without fear and hope.

(Wittgenstein, Notebooks 1914–1916: 6.7.17)
Abstract
The paper deals with the basic features of the life-space created by the
contemporary information industry, and with the dominant attitudes towards the
opportunities and limitations information technology offers and imposes. We
consider the problem of information glut, the quality of public discourse, the
question of privacy and technological alienation. Concerning the basic attitudes,
we discuss the aesthetic, the moral and the religious views, considered in the
context of the present life-space pervaded and shaped by information technology.
The paper concludes with a discussion of the possible consequences of global
homogenization and of the cultural ahistoricity that are being created by the
massive use of information technology. Among the positive aspects of this new
‘global culture of the present’ we point out the possible increase of global human
solidarity; among the negative ones, we point out the attening and shrinking of
the space of human experience, which this uniform culture of the present
imposes.
Keywords
information technology, public discourse, alienation, time,

homogenization, solidarity
INTRODUCTION
The technological age opened an immense new space of possibilities for human
self-understanding and self-realization. This paper deals with a few basic features
of the life-space created by contemporary information technology, as well as with
the possible attitudes towards the opportunities and limitations this life-space
offers and imposes. The section ‘Master and Slave’ discusses some of the pragmatic
aspects of life in the world pervaded and shaped by information technology. We
speak of the noise that dominates contemporary communication space, of the
Information, Communication & Society
ISSN 1369-118X print/ISSN 1468-4462 online © 2001 Taylor & Francis Ltd
http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals
DOI: 10.1080/13691180110044498
IT AND CONTEMPORARY LIFE
quality of public discourse, of the possibilities of new freedom, as well as of the

new enslavement that information technology may impose on us. The section
‘Aims and Means’ discusses the three traditional attitudes towards life – the
aesthetic, the moral, and the religious – considered in the context of the oppor-
tunities and limitations created by information technology. The aesthetic attitude
considers the world an ‘empty stage’ on which humans should express all
their abilities in an endless game of creation of their own meanings and truths.
The religious attitude stresses the human need for an absolute (‘focal’) entity
worth of absolute commitment. In this context we consider the question whether
technology itself could (or should) become such an unquestionable focal entity.
We argue that despite the values the aesthetic and the religious attitude may
have, the information age needs – and should promote – primarily a new moral
sensibility . The section ‘Homogenization and Solidarity’ deals with the global
homogenization of the space of human thoughts and behaviour, as well as with the
new culture of the present, created and promoted by information technology.
Among the positive tendencies that the homogeneous culture of the present could
engender and promote we point out the possible increase of global human
solidarity. The basic drawback of such a global culture could be precisely its
globality; namely, the new technological culture overpowers all other cultural
visions in relation to which it could evaluate its own state and results, as well as
shape new visions of the possible human future.
The issues discussed in the paper were also the subject of a survey carried out
among a group of students of the University of Rijeka (Croatia). The issues were
presented as short theses, each followed by a few questions. The theses and
questions were arranged into a questionnaire, and put on an interactive web page.
A hundred randomly chosen students from the departments of Information
Science, Pedagogy and Mathematics were directly invited (by e-mail) to visit the
web page and take part in the survey. During the next fteen days, forty-three of
the invited (100) students answered the questionnaire. Taking into account that
the invited students could be expected to be personally interested in the issues
the survey dealt with, the response was slightly lower than we expected. We think
– and a later talk with the students con rmed – that the relatively low response
to the survey is primarily a consequence of the saturation with ‘invitations’ and
‘offers’ by which we are permanently targeted from all sides; this saturation
creates not only a sort of indifference but also active resistance on the part of the
recipients. The section ‘Master and Slave’ also deals with this problem. The results
obtained by the survey are not presented here in detail, but are used primarily as
(partial) conrmation or rejection of the specic positions presented and discussed
in the paper.
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M ARIO RADOVAN
MASTER AND SLAVE
The present computers ‘will evolve,’ says E. Fredkin from the MIT AI Laboratory,
‘intelligent computers will design others, and they’ll get to be smarter and
smarter’. With such a progressive increase of computer intelligence, it becomes
‘difcult to imagine’ how ‘a machine that’s millions of times smarter than the
smartest person’ could still be ‘our slave, doing what we want’. The most we
could hope for the future, says Fredkin, is that such machines ‘may condescend
to talk to us’, or perhaps that ‘they might keep us as pets’ (Copeland 1993: 1).
We consider Fredkin’s prophecy a sort of free play with concepts (such as ‘smart’
and ‘slave’) rather than a grounded prediction (or plausible speculation) based on
the present state of the art in computer science. A criticism of such prophecies is
given in Radovan (1998); we will not deal with this issue here. However, we
take Fredkin’s statement here as a sort of invitation to discuss the basic features
of the technological age, as well as the opportunities and dangers it brings. In this
context the question of ‘slavery’ does deserve our attention; however, not because
machines could become ‘millions of times smarter’ than humans (and by this, also
our masters), but because they already are millions of times faster and more
productive than humans are. Hence, unless we find a way to limit the current
absolute dominance of information industry, we could indeed gradually slide away
into a new ‘slavery’ under the rather dull but omnipotent and omnipresent master
created by ourselves. Let us consider some speci c issues that point to the present
situation and to the current tendencies.
COMMUNICATION IN NOISE
The concept signal-to-noise ratio designates the ratio between the magnitude of a
useful signal and the magnitude of the unwanted noise generated by the system
that produces and emits the signal. The development of information technology
has been accompanied by the steady diminishing of the signal-to-noise ratio in
our communication space. In other words, our life-space is becoming more and
more noisy, in the gurative and in the literal sense. The noise causes a stimulus
overload, to which humans react by ‘blocking’ the reception whenever possible,
and by paying less and less attention to those signals that manage to get through
their defensive barriers. On the other hand, to overpower the noise that domi-
nates in the communication space, and to penetrate the defensive barriers of the
targeted subjects, senders of messages are compelled to make their messages
louder and louder, and more provocative. In their attempts to ‘raise the voice’
above the global noise, they create greater and greater noise; and aggressiveness
232
and vulgarity increase alongside the noise, so that our life-space is becoming more
and more ‘crass’ (Shenk 1997: 103). Let us say here that among the participants
in our survey, 37 per cent hold the above description of contemporary commu-
nication space to be completely accurate; the next 51 per cent nd it partially
accurate, while 12 per cent do not think there is anything wrong with the present
communication space.
As one of the speci c problems of the information age, an increase of Attention
De cit Disorder (ADD) has been reported; ADD manifests itself as the lack/
loss of the ability to remain concentrated on any speci c subject for more than
a few moments. E. Schwartz calls ADD ‘the official brain syndrome of the
information age’, and according to Shenk, ‘we may be on the verge of an ADD
epidemic’ (Shenk 1997: 36). Kearney reports that since the appearance of multi-
channel press-button television ‘less than 50 per cent of American children under
the age of 15 have ever watched a single programme from start to nish’ (Kearney
1994: 1). Therefore, the spread of ADD was probably not started by the massive
use of computers; however, the Internet’s hypertext style of organizing and
approaching information seems to be just the thing to make the situation worse.
Among the participants in our survey, 88 per cent notice the symptoms of ADD
in their environment, and 16 per cent of them feel such problems personally.
ADD could be closely related to the ecstasy of the immediate, as we designated
a new form of captivity into which we are being lured by information technology,
and with which we deal in the section ‘Time and the Timeless’.
QUALITY OF PUBLIC DISCOURSE
On the basis of the amount of news we are permanently offered by the information
industry, one could think that people today are well informed about relevant local
and global events. Indeed, more than half a century ago, it was announced that
television would provide ‘truer perception of the meaning of current events,
. . . and a broader understanding of the needs and aspirations of our fellow human
beings’. However, it seems obvious that television has been used mainly in
‘promoting voracious consumerism, political apathy, and social isolation’ Shenk
(1997: 60). The history of television offers an example of the radical discrepancy
between the opportunities created by the technology and the ways these
opportunities are being used. Hence, despite the huge advances of information
technology, it seems that the present ‘citizenry’ is ‘no more interested or capable
of supporting a healthy representative democracy than it was fty years ago, and
may well be less capable’ (Shenk 1997: 68). There are probably far more reasons
for such a state of affairs than can be mentioned here; let us mention only one of
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M ARIO RADOVAN
them which is directly connected with the information industry. The news
industry is compelled to compete with the entertainment industry; consequently,
it tends to produce a mixture of news and entertainment, rather than offer
complete information about the events that are really relevant for a local or for
the global society. Classical news reporting is gradually being replaced by news
making: the attractiveness of an event becomes more important than its real
relevance, and perhaps also more important than its objective presentation. The
information is given in a short form, so that it does not increase the understanding
of the related issue. To understand an issue, one requires a coherent and complete
presentation of the issue, and not only short ‘information updates’, as we are
currently offered (each hour) by the electronic media. Consequently, there are
claims that the news industry, rather than promoting a general understanding of
relevant events, increases the general distraction of the people, and with that
contributes to the degradation of political and social discourse (cf. Taylor and
Saarinen 1994; Graham 1999).
Let us mention that the positions of the participants in our survey are not as
pessimistic. Namely, all participants hold that – despite its drawbacks – the
information industry does increase the general level of being informed. However,
only 23 per cent think this increase is essential, while 77 per cent think it is only
slight, because information has become a commodity whose basic aim is not to
increase understanding, but to be attractive and entertaining so that it can be sold
successfully. Concerning the issue of ‘slavery’, let us note here that for the news
industry to sell its products successfully means to attract a large enough audience,
and to ‘sell’ this audience to the advertisers. Therefore, we are the ones who are
ultimately offered for sale here.
THE PROBLEM OF PRIVACY
One of the outstanding problems brought about by the information industry is

the loss of privacy. There are many companies that deal with collecting all available
data about individuals and social groups; on the basis of these data they form a
consumer profile for each individual and for each specific social group. The
Internet created new possibilities for data collection; for example, there are
pro le-making companies which register and process every message posted to any
of the Usenet groups, and on the basis of the content of these messages, they
form consumer pro les of their authors. On the basis of such consumer pro les,
marketing companies can directly address possible consumers (individuals and
groups), with precise offers shaped in accordance with their consumer pro les.
Such pro les are (allegedly) being made and used only for marketing purposes;
234
however, the same or similar profiles can be used in political or personal

contention of any sort, and against anybody. Such data collecting is – or can easily
lead to – a serious violation of privacy.
There are various proposals for resolving the problem of protecting privacy.
In essence, these proposals could be reduced to the following basic request: all
companies and agencies should be prohibited by law from using information they
arrive at in the framework of their speci c activities for any other (unauthorized)
purposes. In other words, ‘information collected for one purpose should not be
used for another purpose, unless and until specic permission is granted by the
individual involved’ (Shenk 1997: 209). Whether one buys something or pays a
visit to the physician, one should be sure that the personal data he or she turns
over on that occasion will go no further than that particular institution. However,
it would be dif cult to implement such or similar requests, and it is not clear who
could have enough power and interest to do so. In the meantime, by threatening
our privacy, the information industry will continue to threaten our basic human
rights.
Among the participants of the survey, 7 per cent hold that current data
collecting does not threaten their privacy; 54 per cent hold that it does, but not
essentially; 19 per cent hold that it threatens their privacy essentially; finally,
20 per cent do not have a precise position concerning this problem because they
do not have insight into the scope and ways of data collecting, nor the (possible)
ways of their use. Concerning the use of consumer pro les, as well as of various
mailing lists containing addresses obtained by data collecting, we hold that
automated sending of messages (‘offers’) to individual citizens should be
forbidden. In this regard, there are proposals that legislation should establish
a mandatory do-not-disturb registry of names (and addresses) of those people
who do not want to be disturbed by any sort of commercial or political offers or
solicitations. Most of the participants in our survey (72 per cent) do not hold it
acceptable that companies and agencies send emails to persons who did not ask
to be included in their mailing lists; 12 per cent find this sort of advertising
acceptable (if messages are short); 16 per cent do not have a precise position
concerning this question.
UPGRADING AND ALIENATION
Another major problem of our age is technological alienation, which manifests

itself in two opposite forms. On the one hand, an increasing number of people
are becoming ‘addicted’ to information technology; on the other hand, it seems
that the number of people who do not feel able (or do not like) to cope with the
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M ARIO RADOVAN
highly technologized environment also increases. ‘Computer work is like a drug,

I cannot give it up’, says a member of the first group (Shenk 1997: 43).
Concerning the second group, two possible approaches are being suggested: to
make an effort to familiarize oneself with the technical devices, and in that
way to overcome the feeling of alienation; and to render simpler one’s own life-
space by eliminating all unnecessary technical devices. However, with the steady
proliferation of technical devices of all sorts, and with the increase of the number
of ‘functions/capacities’ each of these devices offers, both proposals are becoming
less and less ef cient. Our life-space is getting more and more complex, so that
each of us is able to operate a lesser and lesser part of it, let alone to understand
the ways it functions ‘under the surface’. For example, a thorough mastery of any
software product is becoming more and more dif cult by the incessant upgrading
of these products. New releases are usually overloaded with capacities that hardly
anybody needs, but which make learning and using the product more demanding.
Sometimes it seems as if producers have forgotten what the real purpose of the
speci c product was; however, software upgrading proliferates primarily because
upgrading is pro table to the software producers, as well as to the information
industry in general. Namely, an upgraded software product usually also requires
additional hardware capacities, as well as new manuals and training of the
users.
As a reaction to such situations, a movement called voluntary simplicity
appeared, with the aim to explore and promote a simpler (‘sustainable’) style of
life in a world increasingly dominated by technology (Elgin 1993). The movement
advocates the use of the simplest means (devices) which can successfully perform
a function or accomplish a task. The idea of simplicity seems sound and welcome,
by itself. However, the technological age promotes and imposes the use of uniform
means and methods; to be able to ‘function’ in the technologized life-space, one
is compelled to behave in a way that is compatible with the global system (up-
graded, of course). Hence, it is nearly impossible to follow the idea of simplicity
without at least partially excluding oneself from the production and social system.
And most of the people cannot afford it; consequently, we can consider ourselves
as sort of captives of the ‘technological progress’. We hold that there are valid
psychological and economic reasons to promote the idea of simplicity; however,
it is far from clear in what way such an idea could be ef ciently promoted and
effective in the contemporary technological and social environment. Let us
mention that 95 per cent of the participants in the survey notice the resistance
towards technology in their own environment; 19 per cent of them feel such a
resistance personally; only 5 per cent do not notice any resistance towards
technology.
236
AIMS AND MEANS
Let us consider some of the basic human inclinations, and the ways they manifest
themselves in the context of the opportunities and limitations created and
imposed by information technology. Humans set forth on their historical way
when they became creators of tools, myths, and values, shaping in this way their
world(s) and themselves. It seems that at the beginning, the basic aim of the
creation was rather clear: to survive, to outlive even death itself. The basic aim
of our age does not seem so clear; some of the old goals (e.g. to survive) are not
appealing enough any more, while others (e.g. the eternal lasting) do not seem
as attainable as they used to seem. Technology emerged as the result of human

needs, as well as of authentic human creativity. On the other hand, technology
itself – as a means – opens immense new opportunities for expressing the
authentic human creativity. However, in the present age, technology is often
considered not only a means but also the supreme end itself. There are claims that
technology – besides giving an enormous power and freedom to humans – is the
embodiment of the supreme harmony and beauty that humans could ever create
or encounter. ‘The disappointment with the ends yields to a fascination with the
means’, says Borgmann (1984: 62); however, when ends are concerned, things
have long since ceased to be simple. Besides the notorious – but rather vague –
ideas of ‘happiness’ and (eternal) ‘bliss’, humans were hardly ever able to specify
(and especially to pursue) a commonly acceptable end. Let us overview some of
the typical attitudes concerning the means and ends.
TIME AND THE TIMELESS
A human is only super cially ‘a reasoning animal’, says Fraser; but in essence, a
human is primarily ‘desiring, suffering, death-conscious and hence, a time-
conscious creature’; indeed, temporal experience is ‘all-pervasive’, and more
‘intimate’ than any other aspect of human existence (Fraser 1981: xvii–xviii).
Modern technology has radically shortened the time necessary to produce some
object, to reach some place, or to create some situation/state. Taking this feature
of technology as the most important, Simpson holds that the ‘central goal of
technology is to stop the clock, to de-realise time’, and with that, to bring us ‘closer
and closer to being immortal’ (Simpson 1995: 23). But unfortunately there is no
way for a nite (material) being to ‘come closer’ to in nity. However, technology
opens new possibilities of dreaming, of creating, and of destroying – it intensely
engages and with that brings humans closer to being oblivious of their own
limitations. A human, as a nite conscious being, driven by anxieties and cravings,
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M ARIO RADOVAN
is a paradox in the heart of the indifferent, unattainable and inevitable; hence, what
humans really search for is not simply ‘more time’ but a way out from this
paradoxical state.
Searching for a relief from the tension which springs from their paradoxical
condition, humans have created various ‘opiates’, from myths and religions to
science and technology. Such opiates have various practical functions in the
organization of social life and production; however, it seems that their opiatic
effects excel their practical functions. Opiates generally create a state of ecstasy
in which the awareness of time disappears. Fraser (1987) lists a few basic kinds
of ecstasies, together with the opiates that cause them. The best known among
these ecstasies/opiates are the ecstasy of dance, the ecstasy of chalice (created by
the feeling of the presence of the sacred), and the ecstasy of the mushroom (caused
by means of drugs). It seems that we can add to this list a new kind of ecstasy –
the ecstasy of the immediate – which has been created by the products of
information industry. Namely, these products keep us permanently engaged with
the timeless present, and in that way they raise us ‘above time’. However, as with
every other kind of ecstasy, the ecstasy of the immediate also has its drawbacks.
The abandonment to the immediate weakens and tends to eliminate the authentic
human desire to discover and to understand the lasting in the transitory and
ephemeral – to discover the truth, beauty, and goodness in the transient world
and in humans themselves. For example, classical drama depicts situations in
which the ‘nal victory’ of the hero is impossible; however, by his or her attitude
toward the inexorable, the hero opens a new possibility of human sublimity. In
the information age, the charm of immediate action vanquished the re ectivity
and openness of the classical drama. By seeking refuge in the immediate, humans
narrow their horizons and deprive themselves of their most authentic and perhaps
most sublime possibilities. Should we then not consider the ecstasy of the
immediate as a new form of captivity into which we are being lured by the
information technology?
TECHNOLOGY AND THE ‘RESOLUTE

COMMITMENT’
Borgmann points out the lack of ‘focal things’ and ‘focal practice’ in the
technological world reduced to mere ef cient functioning. He describes the focal
thing as a sort of psychological x-point in the transient world; a focal thing is
something ‘concrete, tangible, and deep, admitting of no functional equivalents’;
and focal practice is ‘the resolute and regular dedication to a focal thing’
(Borgmann 1984: 219). According to Borgmann, technology did not arise out of
238
a ‘founding event’ which would have ‘focal character’ (as traditional religions
did); hence, technology cannot be a true focal thing. And people do need focal
things/practices, because by taking up some thing and practice as focal, humans
obtain ‘clear and principled answers to life’s endless and distracting demands’.
By concentrating one’s own life on an ‘ultimate concern’, a human experiences
a feeling of ‘clarity and liberation’, so that he or she is ‘no longer caught in obliging
other people’s expectations’ (Borgmann 1984: 214–15). Borgmann is aware of
the danger of fanaticism and inhumanity which appears when ‘the narrowness of
the goal does violence to the breadth of human capacities’ (Borgmann 1984: 214).
However, his rather vague discourse about focal things and practice does not pay
sufficient attention to the question of the possible kinds/forms of ‘resolute

commitments’ which could be socially acceptable and desirable. Moreover, his
discussion itself looks exactly like a sort of resolute search for a ‘narrow goal’
which could lead to a ‘clarity and liberation’, but which could at the same time
lead to fanaticism and inhumanity.
Among the thinkers who deal with the problem of the human need for a
‘resolute commitment’, the most famous seems to be Kierkegaard. He considers
three possible basic attitudes towards the human existence: the aestethic, the
ethical and the religious. According to Kierkegaard, the aesthetic attitude extols
human creative imagination and passion for the possible, driven by an unbounded
desire. The ethical attitude sets limits on the freedoms and passions of the aesthetic
kind. Ethics confronts us with the responsibility towards others; it moves our
‘ultimate concern’ from unbounded freedom to universal obligation. Finally, the
religious attitude transcends both the aesthetic and the ethical attitude, by a
resolute leap of faith towards God (cf. Golomb 1995). Kierkegaard cannot offer
a positive rational justification for such a leap; the real leap of faith can be
committed only out of the overwhelming feeling of the absurd, and under the
pressure of profound anxiety and craving. Kierkegaard holds that the aesthetic and
ethical attitudes cannot satisfy the most profound need of human beings, and
hence he made (and required) the leap into faith. He takes Abraham (who
responded to God’s call to sacrice his own son) as an exemplary gure of the real
man of faith. However, it is hard to believe that a faith of Abraham’s kind could
bring much good to humanity, because this sort of faith is rather close to
fanaticism. And fanaticism seems to be especially dangerous in the technological
age, when massive ‘sacri cing’ of sons and daughters has become far easier than
it was in the time of Abraham. Hence, we hold that ‘resolute commitment’ (or
‘leap’) of this kind does not seem a promising attitude which could save humans
of the technological age from a new form of self-imposed slavery.
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M ARIO RADOVAN
TECHNOLOGY AND THE AESTHETIC VIEW
Nietzsche advocates an aesthetic attitude towards life: a human must become

an artist who freely shapes his or her arbitrary existence in an absurd world into
a work of art. Nietzsche speaks of the Dionysian (instinctual) principle, and of its
opposite, the Apollonian (restraining) principle of life: a work of art is a result of
an Apollonian transformation of the Dionysian instincts. He holds that humans
must transform life and existence itself into an aesthetic phenomenon, and with
that render them enjoyable, despite the horrors which are inherent to life and the
world. Nietzsche acknowledges the fundamental anguish of human beings (on
which Kierkegaard bases his philosophy), but rejects a salvation-bringing ‘leap’

into a ‘faith’; to be able to reach and to express their supreme possibilities, humans
must face existence in all its terrifying and magnificent nakedness. Nietzsche
stresses the importance of freedom of the creative human imagination: only when
bounds to chimerical ‘absolutes’ are removed, can human creative imagination
show all its power and magnicence. Nietzsche reversed Kierkegaard’s evaluation
of the three basic attitudes: he holds the aesthetic attitude as the highest expression
of human existence, which radically transcends the (traditional) ethical and
religious attitude. He considers unlimited human imagination to be that power
by which humans can and must create their own world of values and truths, and
in that way experience and express an endless multiplicity of possible states and
meanings. Values and truth, for Nietzsche, are not something xed and deter-
mined, discovered once and for all; they are to be created always and always again
in an in nite process of human active self-determining (cf. Golomb 1995).
On the level of means, the technological age offers excellent opportunities
for an aesthetic way of human existence. However, technological means have
been used more often as a support of the Dionysian inclinations than of the
Apollonian ones. Nietzsche’s invitation to vigorous dance above the abyss of the
absurd (‘dance’ is one of Nietzsche’s favourite words), although admirable by
itself, should be considered one-sided because his ‘dance’ does not pay enough
attention to real human abilities and limitations. His attitude (or fantasy) neglects
the human suffering and the destruction that an ‘unbounded imagination’ can
bring about (as modern history has shown), as well as the existence of authentic
human altruism. It seems that not many people can transform their own existence
into a ‘masterpiece’ of art; on the other hand, in a world from which the very idea
of the lasting and profound (which binds and bounds) has been expelled, the
unbounded ‘dance’ of poor artists has far greater chance of taking us into a new
captivity than leading us towards a new freedom.
240
T E C H N E , ETHOS AND P O IE S IS
According to Greek mythology, the art of creating things (techne) was bestowed
upon humans by Prometheus (together with re). However, humans lacked the
art of social life, so they used this skill – and the newly gained power it brought
them – for committing crimes and injustices against each other. Therefore, techne
proved insufficient in itself. Zeus punished Prometheus for what he did; but
fearing the total destruction of the human race, he also sent Hermes ‘to impart
to men the qualities of respect for others and a sense of justice, so as to bring
order into . . . cities and create a bond of friendship and union’ (Plato, Protagoras
322c). In other words, Plato points out how perilous it may be to extol techne alone
to the level of supreme and unbounded value. The current state of affairs in
the technological age shows that even though technology delivers us from
many constraints of the given (natural) world, at the same time it tends to enslave
us into a created (artificial) world in which we face new constraints and
limitations. In the section ‘Master and Slave’ we put forward some of the adverse
aspects of the life in a world dominated by information technology. However,
there are claims that the contemporary information industry also brings with
it far more radical perils for the civilization from which it emanates. Such views
are based on the assumption that the products of the information industry are
weakening – and tend to eradicate – the subjective inwardness, referential depth,
historical time and narrative coherence, which are traditionally considered the
essential features of human experience. In the context of such tendencies,
Saul Bellow holds that ‘the expanding empire of mindless light and noise’ created
by the information industry threatens ‘the very basis of Western civilisation’
(Kearney 1994: 321).
In a world dominated by the information industry, the present surface play has
become the only thing that really matters. Such attening and shrinking of human
experience do indeed threaten the very basis of Western civilization, which
springs from the authentic human desire to discover and understand the lasting
in the supercial, transient and ephemeral. We hold that the best way to change
the present tendency is to promote ethical sensibility in a world which has given
up the search for Truth and which has lost its way in the search for Beauty. The
inclination towards unbounded play with the possible should be bounded by the
ethical feeling for the suffering and dignity of others. We must (re)discover that
beyond the play of images there are real human beings who suffer and struggle,
live and die, hope and despair. Most of us would grant, says Kearney, that there
is an essential difference between the face of the TV starlet in a commercial and
the face of a girl burnt by napalm on CBS news. Both images are created and
241
M ARIO RADOVAN
distributed by the same technological means; however, we should become able to

see and feel them as radically different. The awakening of such feelings, even if
of no direct use to those towards whom they are directed, could be the first
step towards a new consciousness that exceeds empty surface play and various
‘resolute commitments’. Understood as a basic demand to recognize and respect
human needs and dignity, ethos does not contradict techne; moreover, taken as
the supreme principle, ethos opens the possibility that techne itself attains the
splendour of its original promise. Indeed, according to the classical vision with
which we started this section, techne and ethos should join in a unique practice of
poiesis – the practice that aims towards creating the good and the beautiful.
HOMOGENIZATION AND SOLIDARITY
We have concluded that the power of technology should be limited by moral

sensibility; in this section we argue that technology by itself promotes moral
sensibility in the global human society. But such promotion may also have its
drawbacks.
PERSPECTIVES OF HOMOGENIZATION
Independently of the contents it produces or spreads, information technology

sends the same basic ‘message’ to people of different cultural traditions: how to
think and how to act. The features and capacities of technological means shape
the way people perceive their tasks and goals, problems and their possible
solutions. Indeed, technology has an enormous impact on the way people perceive
the world and themselves (cf. Johnson 1997). The increasing presence of
information technology in professional work, as well as in private life, means that
people all over the world spend an increasing amount of time in essentially the
same local environment, thinking and acting in a similar way, independently of
the differences between the speci c cultures to which they belong. For example,
to use a text editor, an operating system or a Web browser, a person working with
a computer in Guatemala and a person using the same (or similar) means in
Mongolia must think and act in essentially the same way (determined by the
means/program in question) which is independent of the differences between the
cultures they may belong to. In this way information technology promotes a
homogenization of the space of human thought and behaviour. Such homog-
enization has been especially intensified by computer-based communication
systems (the Internet), since these systems introduced not only a uniform way of
thinking and doing but also direct links, as well as a massive direct personal
242
communication between people all over the world. With the homogenization of
the global life-space, speci c cultural traditions and ideologies (usually hostile
toward each other) are gradually losing their absolute dominance over the
individuals that belong to these social traditions. In this way technology makes
people all around the world ever more similar and psychologically closer to each
other (despite all the local and global antagonisms).
Furthermore, information technology promotes the image as the dominant
form of communication. An image expresses a message almost instantly, and
crosses linguistic, cultural and political borders far more easily than the printed
word does. By promoting graphic communication, information technology has
made an essential contribution to the development of a new global culture of

the present. Concentrated on the present (and the near future), this new
global culture has dislocated itself from ‘history’ understood as a set of stories
(often partial) about the past, created by and about specific social groups,
ideologies and values. Hence, we can say that the culture of the information age
(or civilization) is essentially ahistorical. Such a cultural ahistoricity could be an
essential step towards the development of the global human community, because
it seems easier to establish co-operation and to promote solidarity between people
‘without history’ than between people strongly bound to the different (and usually
antagonistic) cultural traditions and histories.
Although the homogenization and ahistoricity created by the spread of
technology can be considered positive achievements from the aspect of promoting
human solidarity, these features of the contemporary world prompt some
concerns. A culture can be evaluated (at least in principle) by comparison with
other cultures. However, in no age was a dominant culture or ideology prepared
to accept impartial comparisons of this kind; in this regard, the global culture of
the present is not an exception: it dominates the present life-space, and pays
rather little attention to the views or voices that do not approve of the current
situation and tendencies. But in the absence of different visions – or, when
different visions are belittled and suppressed – every culture shows the tendency
to deviate towards some extreme situation. Some of the deviations of the global
culture of the present (even if not yet fatal) have been critically discussed in the
present paper. However, we must face here the following basic question: to whom
should we address such criticisms? Namely, it seems that technology itself has
become the paramount autonomous power whose stream carries us away – as
individuals and as a global society – like bubbles on its surface. Can we therefore
control the development of our life-space at all, or are we bound to follow the
autonomous course of the world of technology we created? In other words, are
we still the masters of our deeds, or have we become their slaves?
243
M ARIO RADOVAN
COMMUNICATION AND SOLIDARITY
Science and technology are not dogmatic; hence, it could be expected that they
could have a radically different impact on the global human society than traditional
religions and ideologies often had. Scientific theory is a formal description
of some class of phenomena, which makes it possible to predict the future
development of the phenomena, and (partially) control them. Every scienti c
theory is open to criticism and refutation; the same holds for technology, whose
products are transitory and of passing value. However, this modesty of the spirit
of science and technology has not made life in the modern age less violent and
destructive than it was in previous ages; on the contrary, the twentieth century
has been considered the most violent period in human history. Does this
mean that the creative and the destructive inclinations are equally authentic and
equally powerful features of human beings? It seems that we do not have a
generally accepted answer to this question; however, the question deserves special
attention here, because information technology opens immense opportunities of
creation, as well as of destruction. A closely related question concerns the impact
information technology has on creative and destructive inclinations, and the
direction in which this impact leads. Among the participants in our survey, 26 per
cent hold that information technology stimulates creativity and diminishes the
inclination towards destruction; 14 per cent hold that this technology has exactly
the opposite effect; 60 per cent hold that technology by itself does not have a
relevant impact on human inclinations: technology only intensi es the effects of
human inclinations and activities, equally of the creative and of the destructive
ones.
Finally, although values are often claimed to be relative, there is a value which
almost nobody negates: solidarity. However, solidarity has always been limited to
members of one’s own racial, national, religious, political, or some other interest
group: to some limited ‘us’, and almost always against some ‘others’. This kind
of solidarity does not lead towards minimization of destructive con icts between
social groups. Can we hope that the homogenization of the global life-space, and
the intensive (computer-based) communication between people all around the
world, could gradually enlarge the range of ‘us’ to the whole of humanity? Could
the minimization of human suffering become the basic criterion in relation to
which every other kind of ‘progress’ should be measured and evaluated? Among
the participants in the survey, 85 per cent hold that homogenization and intensive
personal communication could lead to a new global solidarity; 15 per cent do not
believe in such a possibility because homogenization and communication do not
remove the real sources of conflicts. The great majority (88 per cent) of the
244
participants holds that the minimization of human suffering should be the basic
criterion of human progress; however, 53 per cent of them hold that there is no
ef cient way to implement such a criterion; 12 per cent do not approve of such
a criterion.
CONCLUSION
In the technological age, humans are no longer mere dwellers of the world created
by god(s), but have become creators of their own (and only) world. Hence, it
has become more important than ever to evaluate the good and the bad sides of
the world we create, as well as of the worlds we destroy. Information technology

seems to be the most complex and the most impressive creation in human history.
Indeed, our age created impressive means; but do the humans of our age have
anything to say that would be worthy of such means? – Or are the means the only
impressive thing our age was able to create? Humans are restless creators who are
prone to become captives of their own creations. Technology delivers us from
many constraints that are inherent in the natural world; but at the same time,
technology tends to enslave us into its own desensitised world of light and noise.
Have the people of our age irrevocably abandoned themselves to a life in the
shallow and noisy immediacy, deprived of clear aims and direction? Or are humans
still capable of sublime aims and great excitements? And of what sort of aims and
excitements? We hold that such questions deserve much more public attention
than is currently dedicated to them. However, it is dif cult to promote a critical
and coherent public discussion about the life-space dominated and shaped by the
information industry, because to reach public attention in such a life-space, one
is compelled to use those same means and methods (of the information industry)
that one is trying to criticize, which puts such a critic into a paradoxical position.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
This paper is a result of the research project ‘Time and Communication’ which
has been supported by the Research Support Scheme of the Open Society Support
Foundation (Grant No.: 129/1999). I want to express my gratitude to the
RSS/OSSF whose support made this research possible.
Mario Radovan
University of Rijeka,
Faculty of Philosophy,
Omladinska 14,
51000 Rijeka
Croatia
e-mail: mario.radovan@ri.tel.hr
245
M ARIO RADOVAN
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To cite this article: Mario Radovan (2001) INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY

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INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND

Whoever lives in the present lives without fear and hope.

(Wittgenstein, Notebooks 1914–1916: 6.7.17)

information technology, public discourse, alienation, time,

quality of public discourse, of the possibilities of new freedom, as well as of the

MASTER AND SLAVE

QUALITY OF PUBLIC DISCOURSE

THE PROBLEM OF PRIVACY

One of the outstanding problems brought about by the information industry is

however, the same or similar profiles can be used in political or personal

UPGRADING AND ALIENATION

Another major problem of our age is technological alienation, which manifests

highly technologized environment also increases. ‘Computer work is like a drug,

AIMS AND MEANS

as attainable as they used to seem. Technology emerged as the result of human

TIME AND THE TIMELESS

TECHNOLOGY AND THE ‘RESOLUTE

sufficient attention to the question of the possible kinds/forms of ‘resolute

TECHNOLOGY AND THE AESTHETIC VIEW

Nietzsche advocates an aesthetic attitude towards life: a human must become

which Kierkegaard bases his philosophy), but rejects a salvation-bringing ‘leap’

distributed by the same technological means; however, we should become able to

HOMOGENIZATION AND SOLIDARITY

We have concluded that the power of technology should be limited by moral

Independently of the contents it produces or spreads, information technology

made an essential contribution to the development of a new global culture of

COMMUNICATION AND SOLIDARITY

the world we create, as well as of the worlds we destroy. Information technology

Borgmann, A. (1984) Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life, Chicago:

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