BOOK REVIEW

PART I:

CHAPTER 1:

The dominant thesis of most analyses of State politics in India seems to revolve around plurality
and diversity. The second dominant factor, that of development, stresses uniformity and
homogenization. In the post-World War II literature, development is seen as being initiated in
1945 with the establishment of Bretton Woods institutions.

Three features marked this paradigm of development:

1. essentialization of developing countries and their populations as homogenous;
2. unconditional belief in the concept of progress and in the ‘marketability’ of society; and
3. importance of the (nation) state as an analytical frame of reference along with political and
scientific confidence posed in its role for achieving such progress.

In the 1970s and 80s there was a discourse of development which viewed inequity, adverse
environmental + social impacts, and homogenization as costs of growth-led development. Post-
development theory is often seen as 'a radical reaction to the dilemmas of development' and
offers a wider vision of development. The case of tribals in Jharkhand links up to offer an
alternative meaning to 'region'.

Such rethinking of the ‘region’ must be premised on the following concerns:

1. The idea that 'development' is merely a matter of correct modelling and can be seen in terms
of imbalances between geographical or spatial regions is evocative of the modernization
theory-led paradigm put forward by the Princeton school theorists.

2. Mainstream development literature often locates such developmental imbalances as the

'root cause' of identity mobilization in the mainstream development literature. The kernel of
identity, however, is located in the socio-political and cultural processes of the relevant societal
group.

3. There seems to be almost no serious contestation of the political space that is not rooted in
(and often articulated through) the lens of politics of identity. ‘Development' is often used as an
additional ground for such politics — another imperative for redefining the region in socio-
political terms rather than the spatial.

4. In the post-development theory of development, the main issues are not merely those of
economic growth and development but of ensuring equity and justice. This concern becomes
even more important when a historically marginalized section of the population such as the
tribal communities are analyzed in this context.
The emergence of ethnicity and minority rights on the political theory mainstream agenda can
be traced back to John Rawls writings on pluralism and consensus. The state has responded in
ad hoc fashion with responses which cover the entire spectrum, ranging from conceding
minority cultural rights to outright denial of all such claims. The attention of scholars has been
focused on the claims that ethnic identities (such as tribes) lay on the state and the political
process. These claims may be classified into three sets:

1. claims of special rights from the government: special representation rights, devolution and
national self-determination;

2. claims of special rights to seek accommodation of a variety of cultural practices: exemption

rights and cultural rights leading to special status to disadvantaged communities including
affirmative action programmes; and

3. demands that are not claims to rights but to collective esteem: symbolism of flags, names,
public holidays, national anthems, educational curricula, and public funds for cultural activities,
among others.

The political process must grapple with a wide variety of demands on the liberal state, many of
which militate against the liberal State. Ethnicity remains an important source of identity for
millions of people in post-colonial and post-soviet societies around the world.

To evaluate the efficacy of such redefinition of the 'region', the substantive content of the rights
of the tribal population in Jharkhand may be operationalized as follows:

1. Right to preservation of their socio-cultural distinctiveness.

2. Right to socio-economic development

Tribal rights claim a range of human rights, including right to self-determination, right to special
representation and right to culturally oriented affirmative programmes.

The second set of rights lays a claim on the state for adequate public policy mechanisms for
ensuring that the members of the tribal societal groups are able to claim the same level of
socio-economic development as the rest of the population.

The two sets of rights enumerated above are not exclusive to each other. It can be argued that
one set of tribal rights is meaningless without the other. In fact, two are closely linked with the
help of:

1. politics of development and identity; and

2. claims for structures for participation in decision-making (e.g., local governance).
The state's exploitation of natural resources in which large-scale displacement happens has led
to a gross violation of the rights of the tribesmen. Benefits that are purported to flow to the
displaced populations are often doubtful and accrue only to the elite in the local communities.
Much of the tribal livelihood, economy and socio-cultural system is rooted in their traditional
habitat, forests, and land.

Minz shows that as far as the Koel Karo hydel project is concerned, only a small proportion of
displaced persons have actually received compensation. There was no prior informed consent
of the affected tribal population and process utilized amounted to 'cheating/ betraying/ luring
the tribals'.

The mainstream development theory considers violations of rights to land, water, forests, and
displacement as the costs of 'development'. Part of the reason behind such abysmal levels of
development is the spatial definition of the region. Despite 'Constitutional safeguards and
affirmed powers under PESA and SPTA of tribal people to veto the land transfer, the
government did not attempt to invite "participation" of the people while leasing out raiyat
lands.

CHAPTER 2

Despite all the claims of virtual and real unification or the so-called borderlessness of the world
by globalisation processes, the socio-geographical reality is still unevenly structured. By being
such a unit, a region contributes significantly to the whole process of social struggle or
transformative politics.

Understanding this role requires an understanding of the historical and geographical

specificities of that region. These specificities have generated specific processes which have
constantly constituted and reconstituted this region. Here, these processes of constitution-
constitution are understood with reference to the capital formation and resistance against it.
But before coming to the process of constitution of region it is necessary to have a working
definition of region.

A region represents some specific social and anthropological characteristics and thus has a
specific identity. It would be argued that a region is not static but a dynamic entity which passes
through a process of constant evolution. In order to understand a region, it is necessary to
reckon with the processes of human interactions as well as its natural specificities. Hence, a
region is a material form developed out of a dialectical relationship between nature and human
beings. Further, its meaning transforms with the development of industrialization.

In a capitalist society, a region becomes a part of the unevenly developed world market with its
own locational specificities. This process of integration is mediated by certain institutions such
as the state. A region's spatiality is determined by the changes from within as its form may
change, or through the process of capital accumulation in the given region and changes from
without.

The significance of the Chhattisgarh region has changed substantially with reference to the
world market and the global cycle of struggle have altered substantially in different phases of
history. That is to say, its significance both with respect to the Indian economy and the
international community as well as its role in the global struggle for freedom has also changed.

Chhattisgarh came into being on 1 November 2000. It was carved out as a separate state from
the map of Indian union by the Madhya Pradesh Reorganization Act 2000 comprising 16
districts of Madhya Pradesh.

This area is constituted of both hilly & plain landscapes. The northern part, constituted of the
districts such as Surguja, Korba and Raigarh, is mainly an extension of the Chhota Nagpur
plateau while the southern part, constituted of Dantewada, Bastar and Kanker, is associated
with the Deccan Plateau. Sandwiched between these two hilly regions are the fertile plains, the
rice bowl of central Chhattisgarh also known as the Khalsa region.

44 percent of Chhattisgarh is covered by forests rich in resources like teak, sal, and other useful
timber trees. The hilly regions are rich in mineral wealth, with 28 varieties of the major minerals
including coal, iron, limestone, and bauxite.

The plains of Chhattisgarh are fertile and rich in water resources. The region is largely
dependent upon the monsoon for its irrigation, and is rich in crops such as wheat, maize, jowar,
and groundnut. It has rivers like the Mahanadi and Godavari.

In inscriptions, literary works and foreigners' travelogues, Chhattisgarh is referred to as Dakshin

(South) Kosal. Modernity was introduced into the region through the colonial regime in the
region. The introduction of modernity prepared the groundwork for capitalism.

Before the advent of the British, Chhattisgarh passed through the hands of various dynasties
and rulers. There was complete disorder as there was no court of appeal and mass contempt
against the Marathas. The region suffered from frequent droughts and monsoon-based
agriculture.

Chhattisgarh, particularly Bastar region, has witnessed protests by tribals against the British rule
from the late 18th century to the first few decades of the 20th century. The key rebellions
were: the Halba rebellion (1774–79), Bhopalpatnam Struggle (1795), Paralkot rebellion (1825),
Tarapur rebellion (1842–43), Koi revolt (1859), Muria rebellion (1876) and Bhumkal (1910).

Nevertheless, the British ultimately became successful in establishing their rule over this area.
The colonial situation meant that the primary impulse for the extension of administrative did
not come from the changing exigencies of local society but from the colonial authorities'
perception of the necessary to govern.
Chhattisgarh was integrated under the framework of colonial capitalism. This included the
reservation of forests and the introduction of a market system. The prices of forest produce in
the colonial period were linked to London prices.

Explaining the conditions of forest produce in Bastar region in the colonial period, it can be said
that despite the overall subsistence character of the economy, the existence of a capitalist
frameworks evident in the purchase of NTFPs (non-timber forest produce).

Capitalism in Chhattisgarh has been crafted by the development planning of the Indian state.
The only industry based on the indigenous cotton production was BNC Cotton Mill set up in
1862 in Raj Nandgaon. Despite these two industries, the region was based on agrarian relations
and its capitalist development was yet to start in the post-independence period.

On the other hand, the leftist groups which Nehru called the 'communist and near communist
left', also focused upon state interventionist policies which they perceived as essential for the
struggle against imperialism. This is in concordance with the Keynesian–Fordist policies of the
Left. At the same time, the model also argued that 'more and more their output should be used
to produce capital goods for the capital goods sector, i.e., for heavy industries'.

The Indian state decided to set up enterprises spatially in those areas where raw materials and
workforce were abundantly available. In Chhattisgarh, this resulted in the setting up of an iron
and steel plant in 1957 in Bhilai. Another plant was a thermal power plant in Korba in 1954. At
the level of capitalist development, it induces the development of industries directly or
indirectly based on the major plant.

The setting up of a major plant in a region develops an industrial hub or an industrial

conurbation. The increased employment and purchasing power generate demands for new
goods, which lead to the opening up of new production units. This conglomeration of industry
remains more or less dependent over the major plant (steel plant and thermal power plant in
this region).

In Chhattisgarh, there developed two industrial hubs: one, the Bhilai–Raipur conurbation and
two, the Korba–Bilaspur conurbation. Other industries such as the cement industry also
flourished as this region had a good stock of limestone.

In 1965, an aluminium factory, BALCO, was set up nearby Bilaspur. However, the development
of these industries was not directly dependent over the two big industries of iron and steel.

India is the tenth largest producer of crude steel in the world with a production of 24 million
tonnes and investment of 1,000 billion. The first steel plant was set up by the Iron Work
Company at Kulti in 1870 and the first unit in the public sector began production at Bhadravati
in 1923. Bhilai has its own captive mines which are spread over 10,929.80 acres — the Rajhara
group of mines — situated 85 km south-west of Bhirampore.
The reserves of coal found in this area are responsible for the establishment of world-renowned
collieries and power stations. Coal production started in the 1950s and became the base for the
development of the Korba–Bilaspur conurbation, in India.

Bharat Aluminium Co. Ltd., BALCO, was the first public sector company in the country
producing aluminium. NTPC Korba Super (thermal power plant of the Chhattisgarh State
Electricity Board) has capacity — 2,100 MW.

The creation of the new state of Chhattisgarh by the Indian state in November 2000 led to the
reconstitution of the capital–labour relationship. The colonial era provided a base for the
development of this phase of capitalism. Modernity was introduced by the institutions of the
colonial state.

The demand for a separate Chhattisgarh state was periodically raised from the first quarter of
the 20th century. The politics of the separate state were dominated by the petty interests of
the elite and the electoral arithmetic of the two major parties — the Congress and the BJP.

The demand for recognition of Chhattisgarh as a separate state was first brought up in the early
1920s by the Raipur Congress unit. A similar demand was brought up after independence in the
Nagpur Assembly of the then Madhya Bharat. In the mid-1960s, Khubchand Baghel, a Congress
(I) Rajya Sabha member, launched the Chhattasgarh Bhratri (brotherhood) Sangh. Ravishankar
Shukla, who became Chief Minister of Madhya Pradesh, was a leader of the opposition in the
erstwhile CP and Berar Assembly.

What ultimately mattered was the political arithmetic in Indian parliamentary politics. State
governments, both the Congress government of Ajit Jogi and the BJP government of Raman
Singh, worked in consonance with the general character of Chhattisgarh as an upper-caste
state.

Chhattisgarh is an area in India where capitalism has developed under the direct surveillance of
the state. There has been a clear shift from Keynesian demand side economics to supply side
economics. The result is that the drive to reduce the production cost has prompted a drastic
reduction in workforce.

India's experiment with globalisation started with the official acceptance of the policies of
structural adjustment after 1991. In 1991, the Indian economy faced a serious balance of
payment crisis. Foreign debt reached a figure of 100 billion and the existing foreign exchange
reserve appeared incapable of repayment of 1981 IMF loan.

The crisis was not because of the structure of the Indian economy but because of specific
policies by the Indian state. The years immediately preceding this crisis exhibited a higher rate
of growth of around 5.5 per cent, which was far better in comparison with the Hindu rate of
growth of around 3.5 per cent.
India had no option but to introduce the New Economic Reform (NEP) in 1991. The government
tried to maintain the fiction that the NEP was an indigenous reform, prompted by the economic
understanding of the government of the day, and not brought about by external pressure.

Chhattisgarh was one of the poorest and least developed parts of India in terms of foreign
direct investment. Despite this, it was clearly included in the world market, if indirectly, through
its adoption of neoliberal policies such as privatization and reduction in state intervention in
agriculture.

In the first year of its implementation, SAIL could reduce its workforce by 5,975. The biggest
reduction, of 13,670 persons, was made in 1999, in the VRS plant. In Bhilai Steel Plant, by June
2002, 5,800 persons had left. Against this target of shedding 10,000 employees in 2001–2002,
the company separated 6,510 employees and the figure for the current financial year stood at
about 3,850 till October.

Chhattisgarh was on the lookout for massive inflow of capital. SAIL could reduce its workforce
by 5,975 in the first year of its workforce-reduction scheme (VRS). However, against this target,
the company separated 6,510 workers in 2001-2002.

There has been a general trend towards contractualization and casualization in the period after
globalisation. These contractors employ workers on daily wage or as casual workers. They are
largely unorganized and do not demand protection of labour laws, making them subject to little
legal protection.

Bharat Aluminium Company Ltd. sold 51 per cent of its shares to Sterlite Industries in 2001. The
company was accused of involvement in several malpractices. BALCO's aluminium rods and
semi-fabricated products are crucial for defence and space applications.

Rail roko agitation, mass rallies and meetings were held in various parts of Chhattisgarh.
Chhattisgarh Chief Minister Ajit Jogi also attended one such meeting on 5 March 2001 and
declared his all-out support to the anti-privatization struggle.

On 19 April 2001, various unions working among the 20,000 coal workers struck work in
support of the BALCO struggle.

Women workers of BALCO staged a dharna in front of the office of Disinvestment Minister Arun
Shourie on 10 April 2001 in New Delhi.67 days later, on 8 May, the BALCO Bachao Sanyukta
Abhiyan Samiti leadership abandoned opposition to the sale and pushed through a return to
work.
Bhilai and Urla (Veergaon) are the worst affected areas. Half of the re-rolling mills are closed
and most of the ferro labs are closed. This has taken place because of cheap supply of goods by
foreign companies and changes in focus of industrial policies.

As with such projects, the state-owned Chhattisgarh State Industrial Development Corporation
(CSIDC) signed a 'take-or-pay' contract, under which full payment of 4 MLD is guaranteed to the
company even if the off-take of water is below this.

The irony is that the availability of water at the Radius anicut has been guaranteed by the state
government by way of assured release from an upstream dam. Industry's needs for water are
becoming a priority over people's needs.'

As a result, the Chhattisgarh Government decided to cancel the contract in April 2003.

Almost 40 percent of Chhattisgarh's tribals have been displaced by mining and industrial
projects.' The committee's observations are based on the move to displace 350,000 tribals from
these districts for setting up steel and power plants with a total investment of ' 20,000 crore.

Tata Steel and Essar Steel are set to mine iron ore in the region to feed their upcoming
integrated steel plants in the tribal-dominated Bastar, which is spread over 40,000 sq. In all,
1,707 families from 10 villages would be affected from the project that would pull an
investment of about Rs 20,000 crore in the state.

The Maoist movement has had a presence in the southernmost district of Chhattisgarh,
Dantewada, since the 1980s.

The state government describes it as a spontaneous people's movement against the Naxalites.
What is clear is that from June 2005, the state government, encouraged by Mahendra Karma,
began to sponsor the Salwa Judum movement against Naxalism by training and arming tribal
youth who are known as 'special police officers'.

On the other hand, civil society and human right activists blame it as an organization backed
and funded by Chhattisgarh state.

Whatever may be the origin of the SJ, it is increasing difficulties for the tribals.
In the midst of terror created by the SJ, paramilitary forces and Naxal outfits, the tribals are
forced to leave this area and take shelter in the refugee camps of the neighboring states of
Andhra Pradesh and Orissa.

The Government of Chhattisgarh admits that since the start of the SJ in 2005, 644 villages of
district Dantewada, whose overwhelmingly adivasi population is about 350,000, have been
emptied out.
According to Shaswati Das, a civil liberty activist, 'Tribals in the Khammam district along the
Andhra Pradesh–Chhattisgarh border have set up temporary shelters in the forests but they live
in constant fear that Salwa Judum activists would find them and attack or that the state police
or forest officials would evict them from their settlements.

Thus, a region is always in process, a process of constitution and reconstitution. This process of
constitution is not only determined by the factors internal to it but also by the politics and
processes of capital.

These processes, particularly in the period after the emergence of capitalism, have been
discussed above in three different historical phases.

Capitalism and the working-class struggle determine the structures and shapes of each other
differently in different phases of history; these structures and shapes are also influenced by the
natural and social geography of a particular region.

CHAPTER 3:

There is an upsurge in studies of regionalism and regional movements in India. The year 2000
witnessed the creation of three new states - Uttarakhand, Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh. This was
a culmination of the negation of regional exploitation by the parent state of Uttar Pradesh. The
article traces its formation to its administrative and developmental neglect by the Punjab
government.

The major cause of discontentment with the parent state of Uttar Pradesh was regarding the
nature of development policies that were implemented in the hills, meant primarily for the
plain areas, and leading to uneven regional development. It has two administrative divisions -
Kumaon and Garhwal - and at present there are 13 districts in the new state. Nainital, Haridwar,
Dehradun and Udham Singh Nagar have large areas in the plains, whereas the other nine
districts comprise the hill region of the state. 98 per cent of the landholdings belong to sub-
marginal/marginal categories of farmers (avg. 0.37 ha. of land in each category). Cases of land
holdings of over 2 ha. are relatively rare.

The level of urbanization is extremely low in most hill districts. The region of Himalayas in
northern India experienced a trajectory of neglect, which one can trace back to the early years
of independence. Uttarakhand has a relatively higher percentage of urban population than its
neighboring states like Jammu & Kashmir and Himachal Pradesh. It is predominantly dominated
by the Hindu upper castes (Brahmins and Rajputs) Other Backward Castes (OBCs) constitute
only a small percentage of the total population (2–4 per cent).

In the 1960s, Uttarakhand was earmarked for rapid development as part of India's Third Five
Year Plan. People in the region did not benefit much from this development as they were hired
only for manual jobs at a paltry wage. The impact of the Indo-Tibetan war on the Himalayan
region was felt by the local communities. A series of natural disasters witnessed between 1971
and 1972 furthered losses. Heavy monsoons during this period caused floods and landslides &
damaged terraced cultivation extensively; the situation was further worsened due to lack of
financial assistance from the state and central governments.

The demand for a separate state for the hill region of Uttar Pradesh, now known as
Uttarakhand, is not merely a postcolonial phenomena and can be traced back to the colonial
period.

It was first sharply articulated by Badridutt Pande at a public meeting at Haldwani in the
summer of 1946. However, these demands were sidelined & eventually Kumaon and British
Garhwal were merged with the new state of Uttar Pradesh in 1947, followed by Tehri Garhalia
in 1949.

The debate and discussion regarding a separate hill state continued for decades. It was with the
formation of the Uttarakhand Kranti Dal (UKD) that the popular mobilization in support of the
idea for a separate state started gaining some stray visibility.

The government has tried to address the gaps in the previous policies by classifying the remote
and hilly areas of the state of Uttarakhand into Group A and Group B. There are major regional
disparities with most development occurring in the plains while the hill regions remain
underdeveloped.

The impact of this on the regional identities of the Kumaonis and Garhwalis needs to be
investigated as well as the implications for the proposed capital of Gairsain. The struggle for a
separate state of Uttarakhand began with the imposition of the Mandal Commission in the
region in the mid-1970s, reports BBC Hindi's Jagmohan Basu and Rangam Prakash Singh
Bhattacharjee from Dehradun.

PART II:

CHAPTER 4:

The demand for separate statehood/autonomous region in Karnataka dates back to the year
1927 when the Kodagu Ekikarana Samiti put forward this demand, which is now coming from
the Coorg or Kodagu region.

The movement cannot simply be explained in terms of the binary oppositions of

prosperity/deprivation but also as part of the contradictions prompted by changes in the
economy on the one hand and the definition of Coorgis as a culturally dislocated and
deethnicized category on the other.
 A recent theory tries to link the Coorgis to the foot-soldiers of Alexander the Great;
descendants of pre-Christian Greeks; or pre-Muslim Kurds. Other theories treat them as
outsiders belonging to northwest India. These theories provide spaces for a larger debate on
'self-definition' & 'origin'. The Coorg National Council (CNC), which is now spearheading the
movement, was formed in the year 1991.

The Coorg Autonomous Movement argues that the Lingayats, Vokkaligas, Tulu Gowdas,
Christians, Mopillas, Mali, and Chettiars do not qualify as Coorgis despite living in Coorg for
generations together. Some of these arguments are genuine, especially that of lack of
infrastructure facilities in the midst of prosperity. But when a reference was/is made to
multinationals or western capital entering in the forms of resorts the arguments filter down to
ecology, environment, and land grabbing rather than culture.

Migration of a large chunk of Coorgis to cities like Bangalore, Chennai, Mysore, Mumbai, and
Mangalore brought great changes in their cultural framework. A kind of 'cultural implosion' can
be seen with modernity, globalisation and the larger market operating in Coorg. The argument
of 'de-culturalization' from within has also created one more narrative, that of de-ethnicization.
This has emerged due to the amendment to the Land Reforms Act 1995 on the one hand, and
'alienation' of hereditary Jamma lands on the other.

The demand for a separate state is not made on the basis of cultural identities or practices.
Instead, it is based on constructing its exclusive identity vis-à-vis the 'other'. North Karnataka is
the first region that saw the emancipation of the Dalits as well as the backward classes through
the Lingayat Movement. The separatist movement derived its argument from the nationalist
movement too, particularly using the idiom of non-violence.

In northern Karnataka, which is comprised of eight districts, there are multiple forms of
separatist movements. Although economic backwardness and the marginalization of the region
have been taken up as the larger issues for a separate state, there are differences within each
region. The separatist movement derived its argument from the nationalist movement too,
particularly using the idiom of non-violence.

Their demands include 'setting aside 50 per cent of the budget every year till the formation of a
new state, creating job opportunities for youths and taking action against those who use their
language and culture in films and TV serials in a funny way'.

Belgaum is a district that once belonged to the Bombay Presidency area. Karnataka claims that
the 'border or region' issue is a dead one. The Mahajan Committee which was constituted in
1967 rejected the claims of Maharashtra.

Even in Karwar region of Karnataka, a low but steady demand is growing to merge Konkani-
speaking areas with Goa. More than cultural arguments, the argument about the language has
been dominating the movement. The third region, which has created the contestation
between Karnataka and Goa is Kasaragod district in Kerala. In this case, the Mahajan
Commission had recommended that 71 villages to 'the north of the Payaswini and Chandragiri
rivers' be given to Karnataka. These two have remained a flash point between the two states.

The crux of this region lies in the 'homeland doctrine'. Justice Mahajan cited this approvingly in
his report. If any section of people living in one State is encouraged to look upon another State
as its true homeland and protector on the sole ground of language, then this would cut at the
very root of the national idea.'

The demand for a separate Tulu Nadu or Tulu Rajya is gaining momentum, particularly after the
1990s. The movement is trying to construct an identity through Tulu language and culture. 'Tulu
language had a history of 2,500 years. Though Tulu had its own script, the Kannada rulers had
suppressed it'.

The separatist movement has made note of the differences growing between Dakshina
Kannada and Bangalore centric development. It wants 80 per cent jobs/posts for Tulu-speaking
people being provided by companies setting up units in the district. The separatist movement is
also opposed to the influx of global capital mediating through different industrial sectors on the
grounds that this will dislocate or deterritorialize the local population.

Unlike the Coorg, the separatist movement is yet to construct the larger argument about the
'other'. This is due to the fact that globalisation is being threatened as a larger threat to the
identity of the local population. The social bases of the Separatist movement have not come
from Hindutva, although there are differences in their approach. The separatist movement
opposes the global capital as it has the potentiality to erase the identities of subalterns. On the
other hand, Hindutva opposes it as it poses the danger of eliminating indigenous capitalism.

This is why state politics is indifferent to the ongoing struggle. This is argued on the ground that
Tulu is a spoken language of the region and that 'Tulu was one of the languages cited in the list
of official languages of several universities in Canada, United States, Australia and some
countries in Europe'.

Madras is now a salad of Tamil culture, Telugu culture and jazz culture. Bangalore region is now
gradually becoming the centre of contention. The state capital was once contested on the
grounds that it represents the exclusive interest of Kannadigas. This echoes the demand once
made by the Andhraites in Tamil Nadu about the then Madras.

The main grievance of the Dalit movement in Karnataka is that successive governments have
failed to address the constitutional rights of Dalits. The Kodagu Praja Vedike contested for a
separate state on the grounds that the separatist movement represents the 'voice of one
particular community'. This is why it justified the resolution adopted by the popular institutions
such as zilla panchayat as genuine.
However, the state reacted differently: One, it did not respond to the separatist movement
initially for the reason that movement was not strong enough to alter the political landscape of
Karnataka and two, the movement had no effect on the state politics, and it was not militant
either.

The ultra-rightist Hindutva movement has grown in some parts of the region, particularly in
Coorg and Old/Hyderabad/Old Bombay Presidency. This has led to an increasing number of
communal riots.

In north Karnataka, the dominant caste, the Lingayats, have joined hands with the upper caste
Brahmins to form a political coalition of social groups, although this social/political coalition is
transitory. This has a larger implication on state politics too. Regionalism, expressed through
the movement for separate statehood, has created new demands: demands for recognizing
rights of the indigenous and providing primacy to issues of culture and land relations.

CHAPTER 5:

Studies on West Bengal can be broadly classified into two categories - one deals with the nature
and pattern of domination of the CPI (M) in the state since 1977 and the other examines the
policies pursued by the Left Front-led government. Performance and non-performance of the
left-of-centre government have become more important since the question of substantive
democracy has assumed importance.

The policies of the CPI (M)-led government in West Bengal have met with success, though the
Left Front's record in the urban and industrial sector has been far less satisfactory.

Compared to other states in India, West Bengal’s record of implementation of land reforms
programme (LRP) has been the most impressive.

Backwardness in North Bengal had affected different ethnic groups adversely in the region in
varying degrees, which is the cause of resentment among them. The prominent forces that
articulate backwardness in the form of identity politics are: the Gorkha Jana Mukti Morcha
(GJMM) and the two factions of the Kamtapur People's Party (KPP).

The resentment against backwardness takes the form of ethnic politics principally because of
the presence of ethnic groups that are linguistically and culturally different from the dominant
one. It is also related to the practices of the CPI (M) and the Left Front, which to a certain extent
stems from its domination in the state and in the region. Third, in the absence of a sensible and
organized opposition at the state level, the demand of the principal ethnic groups for separate
states emerges.

In the 1970s, there was an attempt to mobilize the tribals on ethnic lines and create a
Jharkhandi identity in the region in support of a separate state. Ethnic mobilization, however,
was not very successful due to class mobilization by the left that included the CPI, the CPI (M)
and, to some extent, the Forward Bloc. Class-based mobilization in the region prevailed, hence
ethnic mobilization could not gain much currency. The Jharkhand Party secured only 7.09 per
cent of the votes in the two seats that it contested in 1977 for the State Legislative Assembly. In
2001, however, the factions of the movement contested only 10 seats, managing to secure only
0.4% of the vote in the state as a whole. This is largely due to the fact that in 2000 the state of
Jharkhand was formed by redrawing the boundaries of Bihar.

North Bengal consists of six districts and covers an area of 21,000 sq. km, which is about 24 per
cent of the state area. The decennial growth rate of population is higher than the state average
and this is alarming considering that there is an influx of immigrants from Bangladesh and
Nepal into the bordering districts. There is also a high percentage of Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes in the region.

The Planning Commission commissioned a study in 2002 to assess the relative backwardness of
the region and provide policy support for its development. It identified three out of six districts
in North Bengal as backward for its 'Backward Districts Initiative-Rashtriya Sam Vikas Yojana'
scheme. Malda was added later to the list, increasing the number of backward districts to four.
None of the districts are favorably placed except for Darjeeling, which ranks fourth in terms of
human development in the state.

Backwardness is manifested in several forms ranging from agricultural backwardness in terms

of land distribution and productivity to high incidence of poverty and poor infrastructure
facilities such as health and education. The literacy rate in this region is low except that in
Darjeeling district it is only 50.13 whereas in the rest of the state it is 61.7 per cent. The per
capita income is low in all the districts of the North Bengal region, much below the state
average.

Industry plays a minor role in the economy of North Bengal with only 2 per cent of its workers
working in the household sector and 5 per cent in the same sector. The region is marked by the
presence of several smaller industrial establishments under the Small Sector Industries out of
which 32.2 per cent are located in Jalpaiguri district, 21.3 per cent Darjeeling, 19.01 per cent
Malda, 16.3% in Uttar (North) Dinajpur and 11.2% Cooch Behar.

Tea plantations are spread not throughout the region but are located mainly in the hills and
plains of Darjeeling and in Jalpaiguri district. The first tea plantation came up in 1856, but within
a decade 38 more tea gardens were added. By 1874 the number rose to 113 and by 1885 there
were 186 gardens in the district. There was a noticeable decline in the two decades that
followed even though the area under tea cultivation increased significantly. In the post-
independence period, there was no significant increase in the number of tea gardens or in the
area under cultivation.
The only growth that took place was in the small plantations sector that mushroomed in the
Dinajpur district for some time, but it employs very little labour. In 1997 the average daily
number of labour employed in the plantations was 159,378 and it increased only marginally to
161,176 in 1998.

The crisis in the industry, it is commonly believed, started from the second half of the 1990s
due to policy of liberalization that had an effect on the profit earned by tea. The most
important effect of the crisis had been that many big and established tea gardens closed down
due to a number of reasons. At present, around 15 big tea gardens are in a state of lockout.

The per capita income of all the districts of North Bengal is far below the state average except
Darjeeling where it is just below the average. Landlessness is the prime cause of rural poverty in
the region. The demand for a separate state of Gorkhaland by the Gorkha National Liberation
Front (GNLF) appeared first in the 1980s and till recently had been the most powerful one.

Unlike that of Jalpaiguri, Cooch Behar is industrially a backward district though a few small tea
plantations and a sizeable number of industries have come up in the recent past. It is primarily
a rural area with a rural population of about 22,53,537, which is 90.9 per cent of the total
population. This population primarily consists of the Scheduled Castes who are concentrated
mainly in the rural sector and are primarily landless laborers.

The root of this region’s political backwardness lies in the backwardness of the region that has
affected the different ethnic groups adversely in the region. Underlying is the feeling that the
region is more backward than the rest and that successive governments are responsible for this
backwardness. The creation of a separate state(s) can be a panacea to the problem of
backwardness confronting the region, hence these forces take recourse to the politics of
identity.

The demand for autonomy had existed in some or the other form since the beginning of the
20th century. Subhash Ghishing's Gorkha National Liberation Front turned to be more militant
in the late 1980s and 1990s. It rejected the autonomy efforts of the Left Front government of
the state and concentrated primarily on the issue of identity. The root or the primary cause of
the movement was economic underdevelopment of the hills.

The size of the farms or operational holding of cultivable land was very small, most of the
farmers were small or marginal and this was a severe constraint on agricultural development
and productivity. The category of agricultural laborers, which did not exist at all till the 1940s,
also swelled over the years.

There are two movements for separate states in the North Bengal region along with the
movement for a separate state of Gorkhaland in the hills. These movements are identical in
respect of social base and also in form. the Rajbansis are the ethnic community who form the
core of these movements.
The rate of rural poverty in the central districts of Jalpaiguri and Cooch Behar is as. high as
35.73 and 25.62 per cent respectively. Incidentally, these are the two districts which have a
high concentration of Rajbansi, Namsudra and other ethnic minority groups. Poor
implementation of poverty alleviation programmes had failed to ameliorate their condition.

The demand for a separate state of Kamtapur is not a completely new one since the Koch-
Rajbansis (KPP) had existed since the 1970s. The KPP was formed in 1995 by Atul Roy and some
of his close associates to agitate peacefully in a democratic way for the creation of the
Kamtapuri state. It argues that the Kamptapuris have lost their identity because of continuous
influx of Bengalis or Bhatias from Bangladesh.

The demand for Greater Cooch Behar state erupted in the year 1998 with the formation of a
people's association but gained currency in 2005 after the KPP weakened due to a split. The
Kamtapur movement, which split from the Rajbansis in 2005, is still a cause for concern for all
since they are a politicized community unlike many other backward communities in the state.

Even the long rule of the Left Front in the state had failed to arrest its backwardness. It is this
under development and backwardness that has adversely affected the ethnic communities of
the region. These communities are largely placed under the category of SCs and STs and have
lagged behind the other communities in the area. Ethnic or identity politics in this region, as in
other regions, has taken the form of demand for independence.

CHAPTER 6:

India is a plural society with both vertical and horizontal divisions along the lines of kinship,
culture, religion, languages, tradition, economic condition and so on. The significance of
distinctive group identity cannot be overestimated in India. Regional identity emerged in the
regional state of Andhra Pradesh that has asserted itself in the form of the demand for the
creation of Telangana.

Telangana was a major part of the former princely state of Hyderabad, which was ruled by the
Nizam under British colonial rule. In 1946-47, communist guerrilla squads began overthrowing
local feudal landlords and organizing land reform in Telugu-speaking area known as Telangana.
The struggle, joined by women in large numbers, was not only aimed at evicting landlords but
also aimed at the overthrow of the Nizamshahi.

The creation of Andhra Pradesh was the result of a commission appointed by the Congress
government in 1953 to look into the lack of homogeneity between Telangana and Andhra
regions. AP as of today consists of 23 districts, which corresponds fairly accurately to the area in
which Telugu language and culture are predominant.

Education and healthcare are two key contributors to personal and social development. At the
time of the formation of AP, it was assured that education disparities would be removed within
a period of five years. The percentage of literacy, which is necessary for social and economic
development in Telangana region continues to be the lowest in the whole of the state.

As per the 2001 Census, literacy level in the Telango region was 58 per cent, while coastal
Andhra region showed 62.5 and Rayalaseema showed 60.7 percent.

The share of Telangana is less than 20 per cent in the total quantum of grant-in-aid.

Another reason for the lower level of literacy in Telangana region was the number of
educational institutions and teachers being relatively lower in comparison to the rest of coastal
Andhra and Rayalaseema.

The Government of India's proposal to establish an Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) in the
Telangana region also had become highly politicized. A majority of the middle and upper
middle-class groups. felt that the main motive of the then Congress government led by late Dr
Y. S. Rajasekhara Reddy was to serve the interests of the Andhra people. The TRS activists
alleged that the government was fulfilling Reddy's dream of establishing an IIT.

The majority of the private healthcare facilities in India are located in the state of Andhra
Pradesh and this phenomenon increased during the TDP regime. Factors such as stagnation in
expansion of public hospitals, decreased resource allocation to the health sector and lack of
government regulation on the minimum standards of medical facilities were responsible for the
rapid expansion of private sector.

Telangana is the most populous region of the southern Indian state of Andhra Pradesh (also
known as Telangana) and contributes more than 50 per cent to its economy, according to the
state government. It has the highest proportion of people living in India's fastest growing
region, covering 41.47 per cent of the state area and more than half of its population.

However, Telangana remains a victim of regional discrimination.

In Telangana, industrialization has occurred only around the twin cities of Hyderabad and
Secunderabad; the IT revolution has also come to the neighboring satellite city of Cyberabad.
Canal irrigation still dominates the coastal Andhra region. Well irrigation has, however, replaced
tank irrigation as the second most important used form in all the three subregions.

Telangana intellectuals and middle- and upper-class. Telangana wadis resent domination of a
particular form of hegemonic culture of coastal Andhra on marginalized Telanganas. They
resent domination in terms of music, language usage, movies, newspapers, TV, books and
festivals, and the appropriation and absorption by the dominant cultural tradition from coast
Andhra. They desperately want a Telugu language whose pronunciation differs from the coastal
Andha's (Vishalandhra). Telangana intellectuals feel that there is a cultural distinctiveness
related to festivals.
The celebration of the festivals of Bonalu, Bathukamma, Yellamma (goddess), Pochamma and
Mallanna can be found mainly in the Telangana region. Makara Sankranti is widely celebrated in
the Andhra region along with other Indian festivals. In recent years, audio songs have been
used as a tool to highlight the themes of Telugu language, culture, customs, and economic
backwardness of the region and to create awareness among the masses.

It is important to understand as to what extent the political leadership been responsible for
suppressing or undermining the Telangana demand, and finally, what is the politics behind this
demand.

There was an agitation against the formation in 1956 of the Telangana state, led by Chenna
Reddy, because of fears of domination by the Andhra region. The situation was improved with
the announcement of safeguards agreed upon by senior Congress leaders and signed in 1956,
called the Gentleman's Agreement. Most of the agreements reached at the time, however,
were never fulfilled and now there is a widespread feeling of being a victim of internal
colonialism.

After the Gentlemen's Agreement, many government personnel and various young men from
the Andhra region migrated to Telangana. In the old Hyderabad state, it was essential to obtain
a mulki certificate to apply for any job. Without abiding to mulki rules, a significant number of
qualified teachers from the coastal regions were appointed in the Telangana region. This
became an eyesore to the aspirants for teaching positions. As a result, many students, teachers,
lawyers, white-collar workers, and businessmen revived the movement, which received strong
urban support. Later, political leaders, especially Konda Lakshman and Khenna Reddy, joined
the TPS, demanding the creation of a separate Telanga.

The Telangana agitation of 1969–71 erupted in the coastal Andhra region, as a result of the
changed balance of power between the regions. The Telugu Desam Party (TDP), under the
leadership of N. T. Rama Rao (NTR), came to power in AP in January 1983. NTR exposed the
prevailing corrupted political culture and argued against repeated intervention from Delhi in
the name of Telugu people's pride.

The BJP, trying to get a foothold in the region, had supported the creation of Telangana by
adopting a resolution at Kakinada in 1997. It fought the 1998 elections based on the slogan of
'One Vote–Two States'. However, the TDP, led by Naidu, continued opposition to the demand
for separate state of Telangana, thus constraining the BJP, which needed its support for the
NDA government it had led since 1998. The TDP government had to appoint a none-man
commission, headed by a retired IAS officer J. M. Girglani, to look into the implementation of
G.O. 610 but its recommendations and recommendations have not been implemented so far.

The Telangana Rashtriya Samithi (TRS) was formed on 27 April 2001 under the leadership of K.
Chandrasekhar Rao. The big question at the time was whether the TRS chief KCR was really
looking forward to the development of the region given his past record as a TDP minister and
deputy speaker. It was thought that he could be co-opted by parties not keen to create a
separate Telangana.

Consequently, the TRS withdrew support from the Congress at the centre. Later, K. C. Rao also
resigned from his Karimnagar constituency due to a provocative statement made by his rival
Congressman Rama Rao Bonagani M. Satyanarayan. In the subsequently held by-elections on
the Karimnagar constituency seat, the TRS chief won a landslide victory. This election was taken
as a referendum by the TRS and crucial for other parties for their survival in the region

Vidhyavanthula Vedika led by schoolteachers, lecturers, and lawyers mobilized people, raising
the issue of the region's economic backwardness. They sensitized the masses through a door-
to-door campaign regarding lack of jobs, irrigation projects and lack of sufficient power supply
to their region. The Telangana Development Forum was established by a group of NRIs for the
cause of Telangana state. The people of Karimnagar in Telangana region voted overwhelmingly
for the Congress to win the assembly election, defeating the TRS and the rival TDP. Despite this,
the Congress party still opposed the demand for a separate state and recommended for a
second State Reorganization Commission (SRCC) to look into the issue. The regional sentiment
remains fairly strong in terms of socio-economic, cultural, and political backwardness,
articulated in the form of a separate Telanga state.

In 2009, the then Congress Chief Minister Y. S. Rajasekhara Reddy opposed the demand for the
bifurcation of the state despite the Congress high command still being undecided. In 2014, the
TDP shed its ambivalence and came out openly in support of the demand. This enabled the
party to form an electoral alliance with the TRS.

The TRS may also at times threaten to repeat a desperate act like the fast unto death
undertaken by K. C. Rao to pressurise the centre. There is also a need for the pro-Telangana
forces to convince the left parties, especially CPM, as their opposition to the and has been fairly
well known. The BJP has consistently supported the creation of smaller and newer states to
reap electoral dividends. The BJP stands to gain with the formation of a separate Telangana,
and it was only due to the constraint of alliance politics (with the TDP) that it underplayed the
issue during the 2009 Lok Sabha elections. Now when the alliance is broken, the BJP can hope
to gain in electoral terms, even if for a short period.

The demand for a separate Telangana state is justified given the aspirations of the people of the
region. What holds back the fulfilment of the demand is the presence of factions and thirst for
power within the parties, especially within the Congress. The present Congress government
should immediately implement G.O. 610; provide equal distribution of water through irrigation
projects; and invest in other financial incentives through budget allocations. Telangana as of
today suffers from rampant unplanned urbanization that goes in the name of unabashed
modernization being carried out by the land mafia and corporate lobby.
This has resulted in spiraling cost of housing, widespread pollution, and a drinking water crisis.
The failure of the current leadership of the Telangana movement to meet the grave challenges
this impoverished region presents would be a betrayal of the aspirations of the ordinary
masses.

CHAPTER 7:

The creation of Uttarakhand has given a boost to the demand of further reorganization of the
parent state of Uttar Pradesh into four more states. The politics of the separate states in UP in
the postcolonial period can be divided into three phases: one, from the 1950s to 1993; from
1994 to 2007; and from 2007 onwards. It asks whether the stances of different political parties
are determined by principled considerations or political opportunism for electoral gains.

The proposed state would be made up of 23 districts, including Agra, Mainpuri, Mathura,
Meerut, Ghaziabad, Muzaffarnagar, Gautambudha Nagar and Jyotiba Phule Nagar, among
others. The name Harit Pradesh (meaning 'green province' or 'province' in Hindi) has been given
many names over the years, e.g., Doab Pradesh, Ganna Pradesh, Pashchimanchal and Panchal,
among others.

The name of the province was changed from Agra & Oudh to Uttar Pradesh after the British
annexed the two regions of the region in 1815 & 1818. These provinces were brought under the
unified colonial administration, later renamed as the United Provinces.

The districts of the present UP can be categorized into six regions:

1. Rohilkhand;
2. Upper Doab;
3. Lower Doab;
4. Oudh;
5. eastern and
6. Bundelkhand.

As mentioned earlier, the proposed state of Harit Pradesh is supposed to cover 23 districts of
western UP falling under Rohililkhand, Upper Doal and Lower Doal.

HPNS was approved by the NDA government at the centre and got assent of the President in
November 2000. The bill was passed after making some amendments to the original bill which
had been passed by the Kalyan Singh government. MP Ajit Singh, son of prominent Jat leader
Chaudhary Charan Singh, was instrumental in forming organizations like the Pashchimi Uttar
Pradesh Rajya Nirman Morcha and Harit Pradesh Nirman Samiti.

The demand for Harit Pradesh is linked to the politics of the Jat community and the
marginalization of Jats in the politics of Uttar Pradesh (UP). The emergence of the non-Jats,
especially the Yadavs, has led to an erosion of Jat political influence in the state. If western UP,
where Jats have substantial numerical strength, becomes a separate state they may be able to
play a much more significant political role.

The demand for separate statehood for the northern part of India's largest province, Uttar
Pradesh, has been raised periodically by political class but with little substance behind it. This
may explain the lack of local popular support for the demand in the recent years. Unlike the
Uttarakhand movement, the Harit Pradesh movement has lacked in terms of popular
participation.

CHAPTER 8:

The challenge that the actually existing democracies face today is to incorporate particularly the
poor and marginalized sections, including the minorities, into the democratic body and subject
them to the same rules and institutions of the grand democratic game. The democratic game is
supposed to be neutral to the actors who are called upon to play it - it cannot be corrupted or
vitiated by them. There has been much written about the fragility of India's unity and the
possibility of a break-up of the country. King observes that 'Gloom and doom' was part of the
literature in the early years of independence and scholars like Das Gupta, Kothari, Narain and
others predicted that India would not be able to tide over such pressures. The political
demands couched in identitarian terms have contributed at one level to the broadening of the
popular base of our democracy and, at another, to the politicization of regional and ethnic
identities.

democracy today seems to have situated itself at various other sites and locations and that
regional or subregional identities have perhaps exhausted their democratic potential. the way
out of this democratic paradox lies in redefining the democratic game itself and transcending
the limits set forth by identities and identity politics.

India's north-east consists of the states of Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram,
Nagaland, and Tripura, popularly known as the 'seven sisters' along with Sikkim. The region
accounts for one of the largest concentrations of tribal people in the country, constituting
about 30 per cent of the total population. With the only exception of Kerala outside it, three
states of the region contain an overwhelming majority of Christians (90.02, 87 and 70.03 per
cent).

The Indian National Congress committed itself to the recognition of language-based regional
and provincial identities way back in its Nagpur resolution, 1920, but gradually reneged on that
commitment as independence looked imminent. By the early 1950s, several parts of India,
including the then undivided province of Hyderabad, were bursting at the seams with the
question of linguistic reorganization of the erstwhile provinces. Such words as -'tribes' and
'tribals', are freely used in India both in popular and official circles without any of their
necessarily pejorative connotations.
Ethnic articulation within the state represents a certain coincidence between an ethnic
community and the territory it claims. Naga insurgency is usually designated as the 'mother' of
all insurgencies in the north-east region. Gradually, factional rivalry wrecked the NSCN and two
of its factions continue to be at loggerheads with each other with varying degrees of intensity.
The demand for 'sovereignty and independence' has by all accounts mellowed down now and
the NSCN seems to be poised to settle for what it calls 'special federal relationship with India'.
This 'special relationship' yet to be spelt out and accepted by all concerned would be informed
by the principle of asymmetric federalism.

The integration of all Naga-inhabited areas of the north-east under one administrative
dispensation within a radically recast federal body is a stumbling block to any successful. peace
talks.

There are two ways in which ethnic articulation can be achieved - one is by getting rid of areas
where members of one community are concentrated in numbers, and the other is by making
the political unit smaller, culturally compact, and ethnically homogeneous. The referendum
held in 1947 may be cited as an illustration of the second modality.

Assam's districts of Karbi Anglong and North Cachar have now become flashpoints of ethnic
tensions and violence. Dima Halam Daoga (DHD) — the insurgent body claiming to represent
the Dimasas — looks upon the area as their homeland and its policy of cleansing the NC Hills of
the 'outsiders' —. initially the Hindi-speaking people, dates back to its formation. Clashes
between the Hmars and the Kukis led to the displacement of thousands of Hmar people from
the NC Hills region of Nagaland and parts of Cachar and Dimapur districts of Assam. Such
organizations as Kuki Inpi of Manipur and Hmar Students' Association (HAS) have been
conducting raids apparently in a bid to cleanse these areas of the 'outsiders' and gradually
consolidate their claim to Dimaraji — a separate Dimasa homeland.

The HAS even accused the DHD of trying to change the name of the NC Hills to 'Dima Halali'
without taking the sentiments of the minorities, particularly the Hmars, into account. Many of
the Dimasas too were displaced as a result of these clashes and some of them fled to the
neighboring district of Cechar in Assam while others took shelter in neighboring Manipur.

The north-east of India has phenomenal ethnic diversity and the presence of minorities is only
inevitable. The stronger the ethnic articulation within a region, the more intense will be the
contest. Regions within regions are not emblematic of any dramatic denouement of the
process. As regions develop within regions, they both mimic and subvert the latter.

The Bodos, according to the dominant Assamese nationalist discourse, are regarded as an
indispensable part of Assam's collective self and form only one of its integral parts. The demand
for assimilation is inspired by the urge on the part of its ideologues to create 'a world after its
own image' by asking others to. adopt Assamese language and culture was so strong that Nav
Kanta Barooah argued that the immigrant 'other', whether tribal or not, should assimilate into
the Assamese culture.

The importance of multiple sites and locations makes it necessary on our part to appreciate
their contribution to the agenda of extending democracy beyond governmental rationality.
Identities are a way of conceptualizing hierarchies existing in the society by way of freezing
them off at a given point in time. One's status as majority or minority is always determined in
relation to the unit within which it forms as such.
The way people sharing cultural and physical spaces are partitioned into 'regions' and 'ethnic
spaces' speaks of how borders are created and what they do to the people. As identities fix our
ethical world, we do not have much freedom to review and review them. Divisions are not
simple means through which societies remain stratified but are the products of the modern
state's technologies of government. By casting democracy in the mould of identity, democratic
politics remains bound by the rules of the governmental game. The success of all functioning
democracies depends on our ability to negotiate our autonomy in the midst of this great
governmental game of identities. Democracies firmly embodied in ethnically well divided
regions and spaces reproduce the same governmentalizing game.

India's policy of categorizing its population into distinct ethnic and linguistic groups and
communities creates the impression that their recognition by the state should provide them
with the space for participation and representation in government, says Samir Kumar Das. Such
identities ignore the changing realities of society and people, undermine vertical and lateral
social mobility, and are undemocratic, he argues.

Politics in the north-east of India is marked by the dialectical interplay between identity and
social life. In the pursuit of identity, we often lose sight of this dialectical interplay and thereby
the democratic potential of such configurations. The NMA's anti-drug and anti-alcohol
campaign brought it to the core of ethnic and 'nationalist' agenda. The National Mother's
Association (NMA) was founded by Sano Vamuzo, Neidonuo Angami and Khesilie Chisi after the
1998 ceasefire between the Government of India and the National Socialist Council of Nagalim
(I-M) in 1998. The NMA's shift towards universal motherhood marks a departure from the
established paradigm of ethnic politics in the region. Its campaign for 'shedding no more blood'
including that of non-Nagas plays a role in mitigating the hostilities and building bridges across
the otherwise rival communities.

Concern for all victims implies transcendence of narrow ethnic boundaries and collective
concern for all people whose lives have been blighted by rape, torture, and intimidation,
regardless of ethnicity and nation. Even an aggressor's mother is bound to shed tears for the
mother of the victim and vice versa.

The challenge for carrying democracy forward must involve imagining new forms of ethical
collectives which will neither dissolve difference nor proclaim it as an obdurate essence. The
signs of these new ethical collective cutting across ethnic, regional, and subregional lines are
still unclear. This can act as feedback for the formulation of the governmental strategy.
Identitarian democracy has its limits. Our notion of threshold enables us to appreciate these
limits and highlight the importance of situating democracy in its multiple sites and locations.
For, these sites and locations have opened up new and hitherto unprecedented possibilities.

CHAPTER 9:

Punjab and Jammu & Kashmir have been witness to a series of overlapping ethno-regional
movements with a variety of aims ranging from autonomy (demand for more power and
resources) to secessionism (right to self-determination/secession). The ensuing violence in the
two states has left behind a string of hapless victims, a wounded psyche and posed a grave
challenge to the social and federal fabric of democracy in India. there has been a certain degree
of commonality in the policies/strategies pursued by the Indian state while 'dealing' with the
two autonomist movements under study - Punjab and Kashmir. This is despite the fact that
India 'provides laboratory-like conditions for the study of such movements'.

The Indian part of Punjab inherited just 36 per cent of the land, while the Pakistani part got 61
per cent. Both states share boundaries with a perennially hostile neighboring country that has
always been keen on extending active help to the autonomist forces. Privileging the rural sector
in Punjab was a deliberate attempt to undermine the Hindu upper castes who dominated the
trade, commerce, and service sectors in urban Punjab. 'Punjab tradition' was thus marked by a
'synergy of the authoritarianism of British bureaucrats and the domination of a peasant society
by indigenous landlords'. In Jammu & Kashmir, the Dogra Hindu landlords belonging to Jammu
region drew their tribute from the hapless Kashmiri Muslim tenants. The Land Alienation Act
disallowed the transfer of newly acquired land to any but a member of the agriculturalist
castes.

The complex nature of the politics of Punjab and Jammu & Kashmir can be attributed to the
presence of several sociological factors like region, religion and language that combine together
to determine the political contours of the two states. In Punjab, for instance, it was the Majha,
considered to be the 'cradle of Sikhism' region, where the autonomist movement gained
ground before spreading to the Doaba and Malwa regions. The autonomist politics backed by
the Islamist forces made their appearance in 1989 first in the valley of Kashmir before gaining
ground in the neighbouring Doda, Poonch and Rajouri subregions of Jammu.

One of the most distinctive characteristics of the post-independence period in Punjab and
Jammu & Kashmir has been the prevalence of a wide-ranging sense of alienation between the
two main political parties, the SNP, and the People's Democratic Party (PDP). The people in the
two states have suffered from what they perceive as a 'breach of trust' in the form of the non-
fulfilment of the promises made at independence/accession.

Kashmiris have always viewed their association with the Indian Union primarily in terms of a
'contractual' relation based on the notions of 'parity' and 'negotiability'. The issue of holding a
plebiscite, as per the UN Security Council's resolution adopted on 13 August 1948 to determine
the status of state, may have been sidelined by India but it has not ceased to be an emotive
issue.

The application of Article 370 implied that the Union's legislative power over Jammu and
Kashmir was to be restricted to three subjects only: defence, external affairs and
communication. It was only with the concurrence of the head of the state government, subject
to ratification by the constituent assembly, that other constitutional provisions could be
extended. The ruling National Conference argued that the 'temporary' nature of this Article
merely underlined the fact that the power to finalize the state's constitutional relationship
between the state and the Union was vested in the Constituent Assembly. It provided that the
residuary powers of the state were to continue to be vested in the state while the jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court was to be extended to the state. The state flag was not to be treated as a
rival of the national tricolor; the power to grant reprieve and commute sentences was to lie
with the President of India.

The relationship between Sheikh Abdullah and the National Conference (NC) was strained by
the rise of the Jan Sangh and the Praja Parishad movement, which asked for the complete
merger of the state with the Union. The death of Shyama Prasad Mookerjee in a Srinagar jail on
22 June 1953 after being arrested by the Abdullah government for lending support to the
movement led to a massive demonstration in Jammu and other parts of India. The NC working
committee, under the chairmanship of Sheikh, for the first time since accession, demanded the
holding of a plebiscite on Kashmir's membership of India or Pakistan. The suspicion that
Abdullah was exploring the possibility of enlisting US support for an independent Kashmir led to
his arrest and he was replaced as chief minister by Ghulam Sultan Mohammed, who was
already close to the Centre.

Constitution (Application to Jammu & Kashmir) Order, 1954 extended the jurisdiction of the
Union Parliament from three to almost all the subjects in the Union List amounting to a reversal
of the 1950 Constitution Order. Part II and Part III of the Indian Constitution were made
applicable to the state and so were Part V and Part XI. 42 Constitution Orders issued over the
last five decades have resulted in substantially curtailing the powers of the State Legislature
while those of the Parliament have been extended. The State Autonomy Committee (SAC),
constituted by the Farooq Abdullah, led the NC government after coming to power in 1996; in
its 1999 report is recounted the whole process of erosion of state autonomy. The SAC had
recommended that 'the best course is for the President to repeal all Orders which are not in
conformity with Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order 1950 and the terms of
the Delhi-Agreement of 1952'.

The undemocratic manner in which a popularly elected government of Farooq Abdullah was
dismissed by then Governor Jagmohan, allegedly appointed for the purpose by Indira Gandhi,
did further damage to the credibility of the 'Delhi Durbar'. The fears of the Muslim majority of
the valley worsened when Indira Gandhi personally led a highly communal campaign in Jammu-
Kashmir region to mobilise the Hindu minority. The final act came in the form of the Assembly
elections in 1987, when a 'chastened' and 'pragmatic' Abdullah entered into an accord with the
Rajiv Gandhi-led Congress.

The Indian state tried in vain to contain the movement through use of excessive force by
deploying armed forces at a massive level in Kashmir. popular uprisings for 'self-determination'
have everything to do with the denial of democracy by the Indian State to its Kashmiri citizens
in the post-colonial period'.

The People Democratic Party (PDP) is the first credible 'mainstream' state level party besides
the NC in the valley. The electoral compulsion of winning seats from all the three regions and
the logic of coalition politics has also brought down ethnic stridency. Growing disillusionment
with the violence and destruction caused by nearly two decades of armed struggle, now
dominated by the 'guest' (read foreigners) mujahideen has also contributed to the  revival of
democratic process in the Kashmir valley.

On the eve of partition, a segment of the Akali leadership in Punjab, which had vehemently
opposed the partition, raised the emotive question: 'The Hindus got Hindustan, the Muslims got
Pakistan; what did the Sikhs get?'. The Sikhs were scattered between east and west Punjab and
constituted merely 15 percent of the total population of an undivided Punjab.

The refusal of the State Reorganization Commission to recognize Punjabi language as the basis
for the creation of a Punjabi Suba hurt the psyche of the Sikhs who felt their language had been
denied its rightful status. The rejection was a deliberate political act designed to undercut the
linguistic basis of the demand for community representation in the prospective national flag of
independent India.

The Akali leadership never concealed its real intention, i.e., concern for preserving an
autonomous Sikh identity despite launching the movement ostensibly on the linguistic basis.
The Punjabi Suba movement consolidated the process of religion-based linguistic differentiation
by imagining Punjab as a territorial homeland for the Sikhs.

It was based on the notion of 'Raj Karega Khalsa' or 'Khalsa Ka Bolbala' (pre-eminence of Khalsa)
and marked the growing cleavage between the two communities competing for political and
economic supremacy after the exodus of the Muslims. After partition, the Sikhs were still a
minority in the Indian Punjab but now, as a result of movement of communities across the
border in the partition holocaust, they were largely concentrated in the central districts of
Punjab. This made the demand for Punjabi Suba feasible and helped pave the way for the
formation of Hindi-speaking Haryana in the south-east of India to be assured of a 'favored
status' so that it could experience the 'glow of freedom'.

The formation of Punjabi Suba did not ensure the preeminence of the Akali Dal in electoral
terms as the party had hoped. It had to enter into a coalitional arrangement after the 1967
Assembly elections to form the government that lasted merely for eight months. The alliance
between the two ethnic parties survived due to their complementary support base.
Like the NC, the Akali Dal sought to restrict the Centre's powers. Describing the Sikhs as a
separate Qaum/Panth (religiopolitical community/nation), the Akalis looked upon themselves
as an 'embodiment of its hopes and aspirations'. The resolutions incorporated seven objectives
aimed at establishing the 'pre-eminence of the Khalsa through creation of a political set up'.

The mass thinking on the Anandpur Sahib resolutions also received communal colouring as it
was decried as communal and did not express the political aspirations of the wider masses.
Sharp Hindu hostility to the resolution provoked emotional allegiance for the resolutions among
a sizable section of the Sikh community, thereby constraining them from noticing contradictions
in it. The repeated failures in the negotiations with the Centre led to intensification of the
second phase of the Akali agitation for the right to self-determination/autonomy. Bhindranwale
and his followers were killed by the Indian army in an operation known as Operation Blue Star
while trapped inside the Golden Temple complex in Amritsar. Large-scale house-to-house
searches by security forces in rural Punjab followed.

The Akali leaders made an attempt to save Punjab from the scourge of religious
fundamentalism and militancy in the form of the Rajiv–Longowal Accord on 24 July 1985. In the
face of stiff opposition from Haryana and the assassination of Longowal, the Accord proved to
be a non-starter. These developments led to heightened acrimony between the moderate and
extremist factions within the Akali Dal. The party now stood for the right to self-determination
under the presidentship. of Simranjit Singh Mann that subsequently found expression in the
Amritsari Declaration.

Militancy in Punjab could finally be crushed by the Beant Singhled Congress government that
came to power through the 1992 Assembly elections. Mainstream politics got revived with the
1993 Panchayati Raj elections which saw participation by all parties and an impressive turnout
of the voters. The Panthic agenda, which had given an initial boost to militancy, was now
gradually replaced by an agenda for peace and Hindu–Sikh–Hindutva unity.

There is a marked shift from 'gurdwara politics' to 'developmental politics' in Punjab, with
secular politics taking precedence over identity politics that thrived on linguistic, religious and
regional aspirations. The paradigmatic shift can also be explained in terms of the coming-of-age
of a new generation of youth for whom the Operation Bluestar and anti-Sikh riots are distant
memories. Substantive economic issues like the structural crisis in the agrarian sector hardly
find space in the political discourse of the state. In the radical discourse, the present crisis is
attributed to a deliberate policy of the Indian state to use Punjab to act as bowl of food-grain-
deficient India while neglecting the state's industrial growth.

The growing assertion of the Dalits and caste-related rural violence, the continued Akali
backlash against the followers of Dera Sacha Sauda and the ongoing politics of vendetta are
ominous signs for the state. Not long ago militancy was brutally crushed without any demand of
the Anandpur Sahib’s (Resolutions) being met.
The Indian state has taken recourse to a kind of lopsided politics that has been based on
coercion (deployment of armed forces and. repression of the movement with the help of
extraordinary laws) in order to deal with the separatist movements in Punjab and Kashmir. The
return of 'normalcy' to Punjab as opposed to the continued turmoil in Kashmir can be
attributed to the following five factors. The different trajectories of the two separatist
movements in Punjab and Kashmir have to do with the level of institutionalisation in the two
states. In Punjab, representative democratic institutions did exist in post-partition Punjab while
in Kashmir elections were manipulated and rights were never respected. The close cultural and
social affinity between the Hindus and Sikhs has also contributed to the return to peace as
Punjabiat got strengthened.