TMS1264

Cathodic Protection System - Illaweena Street - Trunk Water Main - OM Manual
Electrical Mechanical Water Meters

5 Bunya Street Eagle Farm Q 4009
Ph. (07) 3403 1849
Fz. (07) 3403 1898
Brisbane Water 9 FEBRUARY 1996
Engineering Services
OPERATING MANUAL FOR:
ILLAWEENA STREET TRUNK MAINS
CATHODIC PROTECTION SYSTEM
CLIENT:
DEPARTMENT OF WATER SUPPLY AND SEWERAGE

WATER MAINTENANCE SECTION
Q-Pulse Id TMS1264 Active 21/07/2015 Page 1 of 55

MANUAL CONTENTS
(1.0) Introduction
(2.0) Corrosion and Cathodic Protection
(3.0) Mains Details
(4.0) Cathodic Protection
(4.1) Type of System
(4.2) Rectifier
(4.3) Cathode
(4.4) Anodes
(4.5) Test Points
(4.6) Associated Drawings
(4.7) Associated Standards
(4.8) Government Regulations
(5.0) Peformed Testing
(6.0) Conclusion
(7.0) Maintenance
DRAWINGS
486/6/25 -AA1 C0021E Standard Rectifier Wiring Diagram
(No Number) Monthly Maintenance Program

(1.0) INTRODUCTION
Steel when immersed or covered in water has a tendency to corrode (or rust) as the oxidized
form is more stable than the metal.
Because of this, precaution must be taken to stop or minimize the corrosion reaction to an
acceptable level consistent with the design life of the structure. This is normally achieved by
the use of protective coatings which control the corrosion reaction by isolating the steel from
its surrounding environment.
However, it is not practical to achieve a perfect coating and coating damage will always occur
with time. Because of this, corrosion may occur at imperfections in the paint coating, causing
further deterioration in the coating as well as loss of metal.
As a result of this, the coating defects must be rectified by periodic maintenance or an

additional method of protection used to prevent this deterioration and corrosion occurring. This
additional protection is achieved by the cathodic protection system.
(2.0) CORROSION AND CATHODIC PROTECTION
Corrosion is an electrochemical process in that it is accompanied by a flow of electrical current.
Corrosion occurs on the surface of metals at active areas known as anodes, which are
electrically continuous with less active or passive areas known as cathodes. The electric current
flows from the anode through the electrolyte to the cathode, with the circuit being completed
by the electrical continuity between the cathode and anode. In practice anodes and cathodes
are generally part of the same metallic surface and individual anodic areas may be small.
In applying cathodic protection and external current is applied to the surface so that the entire
surface to be protected acts as a cathode. This involves the use of an auxiliary anode and when
the current flow from this anode is sufficient, no part of the structure acts as an anode.
An external source of direct current such as a transformer rectifier is used in conjunction with
an anode consisting of material with a very slow corrosion rate.
While it is the flow of current which achieves the cathodic protection of the surface it is
impractical to measure these currents over individual anodic areas to determine when cathodic
protection has been achieved. However, with the flow of cathodic protection current, the
structure becomes more negative with respect to the surrounding electrolyte. Because of this,
it is possible to state values of metal /electrolyte potential at which corrosion does not occur.
This metal/electrolyte potential is generally measured against a standard reference electrode
which allows a reproducible potential at which corrosion does not occur to be quoted.

(3.0) Cathodic
MAINS Protection System - Illaweena Street - Trunk Water Main - OM Manual
DETAILS
Size: New Dia 755 mild steel cement lined. Existing 600 and 470 Dia mild
steel cement lined.
Coating: Medium Density Fusion Bonded Polyethylene
Length: Appox 4 Km ( New 755 Dia-1.72 Km )
Location: Cnr Tamarisk Way and Illaweena Street, Drewvale to Wembley Road
Reservior, Bligh Place, Drewvale.
Construction
Drawings:
486/6/6-SA1C0039E Illaweena Street C.P. System

to
486/6/6-SA1C0041E
2/13.323 Standard Flange Adapters to BCC Standard Drillings
486/4/6-W 10040LO Logan Water Supply Scheme,

to Kuraby to Illaweena Street Reservior,
486/4/6-W 10049LO Bulk Supply Main.

(4.0) Cathodic Protection
CATHODIC PROTECTIONSystem - Illaweena
DETAILS Street - Trunk Water Main - OM Manual
(4.1) Type of Cathodic Protection: Impressed Current.
(4.2) Rectifier: Special 32 Volt, 10 amp direct current output enclosed in a stainless
steel switchboard. Rectifier has a 240V supply from within the main switchboard
located opposite No 403 ,Illaweena St, Drewvale.
(4.3) Cathode: The cathode point is located on the 755 Dia and 600 Dia mains, in
their respective valve pits, behind the existing flowmeter switchboard. The
cathode point is where the cabling from the rectifier is attached to the structure
under cathodic protection.
(4.4) Anodes: Two 1500 x 75mm silicone iron anodes were installed approximately
200 metres from the trunk mains in a vertical bed. The anodes were firstly
packaged with cokebreeze thereby improving anode - ground resistance. The
anodes are identified by a marker post and label.
(4.5) Test Points: Test points are installed on cathodically protected structures to
enable testing to ensure full protection of the mains. On these mains five test
points have been installed on the new 755 Dia, five test points on the existing
600 Dia and six on the existing 470 Dia mains. In total, the system has 10 test
points which can be identified from the layout drawing.
(4.6) Associated Drawings:

Cathodic Protection Details - 2/14.213
Cathodic Protection Test Point Details - 2/14.199
Standard Rectifier Wiring Diagram - 486/6/25- AA1C0021E
Standard Vertical Groundbed Details - 486/6/25- AA1C0024E
(4.7) Associated Standards:

AS 3000 1986 Australia Wiring Rules
AS 2832.1 1985 Pipes, Cables, Ducts, Guide to Cathodic Protection,
Part One.
(4.8) Government Regulations:

Queensland Electricity Acts and Regulations.

(5.0) PERFORMED TESTING
(1) Natural Potential Survey.
(2) Testing of Insulated Flanges, Joints.
(3) Soil Resistance Testing.
(4) Current Drain Survey.
(5) Pipe Coating Anomaly Survey.
(6) Rectifier Loop Resistance.
(7) Foreign Structure Interference Survey and Mitigation.
(8) Final Potential Survey and Commissioning.
(6.0) CONCLUSION
Full Cathodic protection has been achieved on this section of trunk mains. The
cathodic protection system is registered with the Queensland Electricity
Commission and has approval to operate.
(7.0) MAINTENANCE
The cathodic protection system is maintained on a monthly basis after

commissioning. These checks involve testing rectifier operation and recording
of pipe to soil potentials.

12th OctoberCathodic
1992 Protection System - Illaweena Street - Trunk Water Main - OM Manual
Electrical Workshop
Cathodic Protection
CPS Monthly Maintenance Details.
Required:
1/ Notify plant operator and/or sign entry logs where necessary.

2/ Have appropriate keying.
Labour:
One tradesperson, one vehicle. 20 minutes per site.
Procedure:
1/ Identify installation.
2/ Check system for operation.
3/ Record voltmeter.
4/ Record ammeter.
5/ Comments.
6/ Log entry.

13th OctoberCathodic
Electrical Workshop
Cathodic Protection
CPS 6 Monthly Maintenance Details.
Required:

3/ Set of tools. (Electricians)
4/ Multimeter.
5/ DC clampmeter.
6/ Copper sulphate reference cell and leads.
7/ Cleaning equipment.
8/ Gatic cover lifters.
Labour:
One tradesperson electrical, one laborer, one vehicle.

Two hours per site.
Procedure:
1/ Identify system.
4/ Record ammeter.
5/ Record "on" potentials for all test points.
6/ Record "instant off" potentials for all test points.
7/ Record "off" potentials for all test points.
8/ Perform loop resistance and record.
9/ Check and record anode string currents.
10/ Comments.
11/ Log entry.

13th October 1992
Electrical Workshop
Cathodic Protection
CPS 60 Monthly Maintenance Details.
Required:

3/ Set of tools. (Electricians)
4/ Multimeter.
5/ DC clampmeter.
6/ Copper sulphate reference cell and leads.
7/ Cleaning equipment.
8/ Gatic cover lifters.
9/ Rectifier load bank.
10/ PCS2000 Detection Equipment.
Labour:
One tradesperson electrical, one laborer, one vehicle.

Eight hours per site.
Procedure:
1/ Identify system.
4/ Record ammeter.
5/ Record "on" potentials for all test points.
6/ Record "instant off" potentials for all test points.
7/ Record "off" potentials for all test points.
8/ Perform loop resistance and record.
9/ Check and record anode string currents.
10/ Load test rectifier for 10 minutes.
11/ Check all switchboard and testpoint terminals for tightness.
12/ Check all switchboard and testpoints are labelled and I.D. tags attached.
13/ Check plans are correctly drawn and modify if necessary.
14/ Remove and inspect anodes.
15/ Recheck all interference (CPS) bleeds.
16/ Pipecamp structure if applicable.
17/ Apply for "continue to operate" permit if applicable.

Brisbane Water Engineering Services

Electrical Engineering Unit
Date: 12th February 1996
System: Illaweena Street Trunk Mains

Cathodic Protection System reference potential and earth resistivity graph.(755 Dia only )
Test Point Distances Potentials to CuSO4 Resistivities

number to T.P. Natural Off On at 2 metres
(metres) (mV) (mV) (mV) (ohm.metres)
1 0 -729 -885 -1114 5.53
2 579 -780 -756 -1320 55.29
3 947 -715 -740 -1178 41.47
4 1027 -1085 -811 -1189 41.97
5 1720 -306 -523 -645 81.68
Graph of potentials and resistivity vs pipelength
0 579 947 1027 1720

Distance (metres)

Brisbane Water Engineering Services Ph. 34031838 Fx. 34031839
5 BunyaStreet
Electrical Engineering Unit Eagle Farm Q 4009
Cathodic Protection System Loop Resistance
Date 12th February 1996

Cathodic Protection System: Illaweena Street Trunk Mains.
System Operating Volts: 2 System Operating amps 1
Test Voltage: Test Current:

(volts) (amps)
0.9 %
4 1.5
6 2.1
,;
e=
8 *`
2.9 , '
` "o4°:
;Ke.t°.;
<,
10 3.2
Loop Resistance
(ohms)
3.478261
Graph of System voltage vs current.

12
10
o
0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5
Current (amps)
TESTED BY M.McCORMICK
03/22/96 LOOPI LLA. WK4

Page 12 of 55
INDUCTION TESTS
PROJECT:- Illaweena Street DATE:- 22 February 1996
LENGTH OF MAIN Appox 1 Km
DIAMETER OF MAIN 755
LOCATION OF MAIN Illaweena Street ,Drewvale
Active 21/07/2015
D.C. OUTPUT
Nominated Actual Forward Actual Reverse
Voltage Voltage Current Voltage Current
6 6.3 0.031 6 0.03
9 9.49 0.027 9.52 0.0287
12 12.62 0.025 12.67 0.0249
A.C. OUTPUT
Nominated Actual Forward Actual Reverse
Voltage Voltage Current Voltage Current
6 6.05 2.7 6.5 0.6
9 8.5 3.65 9.29 0.96
12 12.02 4.8 13.46 1.4
Q-Pulse Id TMS1264
PERFORMED BY :- M. McCormick
Brisbane Water Engineering Services CP Form No. 28
Cathodic Protection Bleed Point Details Form
Project .117(Àk)¿EEJÜi t Date L-4- t? '9 `

Bleed Location cl E e- -ro W <- &. CPB No. 1-1(-
FOREIGN STRUCTURE OWNER: O. E.- c

F.S. LOCATION: / L i- AL% a N ft 't- EL TC'LJ e" 1-'7'6-
F.S. IDENTIFICATION:
REFERENCE POTENTIALS TO F.S. PRIOR TO BLEED CONNECTION:
REFERENCE TYPE: -- - --C.,1,0 o -i.
POTENTIAL OFF: -S-S-- my' ON: 5 5g- h v SW: 4- 24

BLEED TYPE: S - G, cd .- (,E o o de_ 2p9 ,:t --to ç1 rc L:o-, K.
BLEED MATERIAL: *7 iv ("?.,n, (X, i S c"--o
BLEED WEIGHT:
BLEED 0/C POTENTIAL: .1 7q 0, y

BLEED CURRENT OFF: (9 ; -, ,; ON: Cí; ;M .j
REFERENCE POTENTIALS AFTER CONNECTION TO FOREIGN STRUCTURE:
Bond Off Bleed On Resultant

(Rectifier Off) Swing
Bleed Off Bleed On Swing Bond Off Bond On Swing
.S' S --7 L - `,c > î % `. - - 14-
FOREIGN STRUCTURE OWNER AGREEABLE WITH MITIGATION? (Y/N) '/ ;\?._ "i
IDENTIFICATION TAG INSTALLED? (Y /N) Ni - :+

.
COMMENTS:
ll J
INSTALLED / TESTED BY i N -n
Revision 09/28/95

REFER NOTE S
TYPICAL/ TOWER CONNECTION
NOTES
L ANODE CABLE TO SE BURIED AT A DEPTH OF BOO= TO A DISTANCE
OF ]500801 FROM TOYFii LEG MC 6000a THEREAFTER
Z ANODE CABLE TO BE PROTECTED BY A FLEOBLE CONDUIT Fià9LT
ATTACHED TO MICR STUB AND CONCRETE FOUNOATWIN RUNNING OH
ostZ OF TOYER LEG.
3_ To ALLOY 1P DEFERENTIAL T0116í SOLL MOVEMENT ALL

RISES SHALL COATAIN APPROXPIATELT 300s aACK
CABLE TO ANODE CONNECTION To BE HARE BY BOLTED LUG oR
CADWELD AND &CAPSULATED BY A SUITABLE WO PACK EPDXY
REM ANO ATM WITH A MASTIC LINED POL7ETHYLEN HEAT
SHRIII CAP.
SACRIROAL ANODE TO BE INSTALLED AT A MINIMUM DEPTH OF 'am=
1N CARBONACEOUS BAQ B.L WIN THE FOLLOWING ?YtZoIAL
COpçOSITIO,
CARBON 71
SULPHUR 14Z
ASH 2.DZ
DIXON 0.12
L
t#.
Ei 5 Ft.E7c>sLE CONDUIT AS RE00 , max PREFEFäED
r< < Ci#OUNQIG CLAttP AS RE00 ALM TYPE STD-15 OR EOMYALENT
I
1_ 1
1,1 3 HEX BOLT Z NUT HQ x LG TO SUR AS MOD FAT AND SPAM WASHER SS
(
i WNTH
2 SACRIRCIAL ANOOE As REDO ZINC ROO 1500::$:35 OR SMLAR - TO As 2239

s 1 ANOOE CABLE AS REM! so..2PvC atsLU.ATED UPPER
FT N0 DESCRIPTION I NO OFF ERG NO REMARKS I STORES CAT NO j
MATERIAL LIST
pbiie/lAIiAC LOCATION coNTARDER$ PPOJECT IDRG CLASS
I
IQ ch..,(¡I REXOCItU 40- T(,DS
1 1- I
Al F
;;711/8 Ltt APPROYFD ileac SACRIFICIAL ANODE CONNECTI04
TO LATTICE STEEL TOWERS

A2-H-114457-01 IETT
iiCi
[t<A7TON
6 7

Brisbane Water Engineering
Cathodic Protection Services
System - Illaweena
CP
Street - Trunk Water Main - OM Manual
Form No. 27
Cathodic: Protection Interference Survey Results Form
Project L/b4toi h-/IM áT /MAIN Unit Reading (Te0 Vat 02 '5A Date .22° 24
755 MM
Reading Test Point . Location Swing

I. D.
On
//
-39b /4 I/ - QEC Tou/ER
_.
-
off -096riY 4(6 $o2 E-/4SEMEN7- lA.L

-43//K GEC, 7-04A/ER
On
Off - 4.2744 V1-66 ó04 E/4 SENtE.v¡ - 14-01V
On -a97H a EC TowE /e
Off -a90/K Lt G Soli- 81.1 GN PL,4cE + 3 MV
On - 026)5/1 C C C -ro .tJE/.
Off - 88 M.F6 g02 43 L/ G H PLACE +3 M V
On -446Mv QE C TouJe/2
-/{70 N 4E6 g0.2 /LLAwCFN/t S'î. Cow to?1j-H
C T
Off
On -11 r;7MV Q uJC R.
V
Off -i{./ 3 ,A,CF6 SO4 ¡LL, A EE/VA ST CoRivr,Z ta`f-M
On -400 mi/ Q'G TpcJER,
-3 4 Snv LE-6g02 1 LL44.4)6-ENi4 ST. opP. RtEIFíe -5m
r
Off
Q EC `rou/E2
On -34/MV' ¡
Off -35o v F6 ?0 ICR t.c/CENf a/° ! c ciF/E2. - I ( M 1%
On -//y5r1l/
Off -i/ifsigl1l 13A5 (D. C. .C/is',FMc'N7 //[_
-4C4SM1Í MEA/ S6Q6 B PoLN 02.52 54:
On
Off -36`e lLLgw[-'c=NA 5-r- '69i/
On - 0292,MV 5'L--QFB Po c. a 422247

Off -asa PIE Al lR/}NS 4a6i}N Mi.vlI ?M
On -557MV - - 8 7°_&--- .
4/06w
Off - 553 di,/ ME n/ Di+Ark.'4 S En/ Si- -4 il/
On -,337Mv SEQE ß ['De_ é'' a?7.23i
off -337M ME// /LLAu/zFEA/A Sr /VIL.
On - 358.1 Sea fr- 3 P0441-017,735

Off -358A MeV /LLftiEEAA S'r /v/4_
-34/ /4 d S'&' <=
62 L3 P°(7723(6
On
Off - 3b/ M Md` N/ LLAu/ECn!/+ Sf /v/ h.
TESTED BY COP Mici<
Revision 09/28/95

Brisbane. Water Engineering
Cathodic Protection Services.
System - Illaweena Street - Trunk Water Main - OM ManualCP Form No. 27
Cathodic Protection. Interference Survey Results. Form.
Project ILL.AvY /Vt T. Unit Reading 50 V a c2 CIA Date c2 -0 - q6
Reading Test Point Location Swing

I. D.
On -33) h;/ SEQEB POI-&-- o?: 7,2, 44.0
Off 331 ift i% M EA/ I LL Aw EEn/A Sr AML

On -337M ScQE:r3 Po Le 027.2 4.z
Off 337n y t M Ea Go k/An/ Rò. Nl L
On -47aM SEQ.Fß i'oLr' 3/39a
Off -tf72 M /"%E/1/ ILLAWEENg S'r /1ilL..
On. -?..sa M 3EQ e3 /it.. E 33,254
Off -75c2 m MEN / LL,4 w EEiVA s-r, Na..
On
Off
On
Off
On
Off
On
Off
On
Off
On
Off
On
Off
On
Off
On
Off -
On
Off
On
Off
TESTED BY /I M "CQ.R.r1.l.C- .
Revision 09/28/95

Brisbane Water Engineering Services CP Form No.18
Standard Cathodic Protection Test Point Data Gathering Form

Project ..11.i,4116.2 t,1.MIMET Date ..i :..9a-as
T P Location .. :C.....EAsEimeni T P No. 3
Mains Size T 55 + T P Type a
POTENTIAL TESTING 155 6nn
CATHODE TO CATHODE RETURN (RESISTANCE)
ZINC REFERENCE TO PIPE
0 iSt
_111+31 _.. ....._..__._._..._1_4
S
$
.1 ..ryd_
--- -
CuSo4 REFERENCE TO PIPE EL sri. _aJ
ZINC TO CuSo4 11 i,5?:1_t8Y i 11Z_1r'J
EARTH TESTING
TEST NO. 1
PIN SPACING RESISTIVITY u., l . 1 fl
MEGGER READING
TEST NO 2
PIN SPACING Srn RESISTIVITY
MEGGER READING
TEST NO 3
PIN SPACING RESISTIVITY
MEGGER READING
COMMENTS / LOCATION DRAWING

f.`33mrn1 COra:ryU:T ( P.16rnr
--c-, ,-_____J
- MrsinS'v.iF,k ( CACF.1AST
v
P
'1 SS
&3')
-.zzz; ,--1/4-7.-)
INSTALLED BY Mi(' _ Y!^:.LT

(
Revision 01/31/96

Site Plan Drawing Sheet

Project XL :N.. tai ...ú IE T
Date 1-.17sß,:. 9 i....
15(.71 rc+rr; IT
<..Lenl*,1r_ß(.i
Jc tl (s.r jr;°` r;ple::.E

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COMPILED BY
Revision 09/28/95

Site Plan Drawing Sheet

Project Lc-4 Al MoreA; WA"
"
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Date
/ 1-
A Ati-1 r /:;."-A/C
E- 5 1-1
1-1
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COMPILED BY
67
Revision 09,128/95

Brisbane City Council
Dept of Water Supply and Sewerage
Eagle Farm Pump Station
Electrical Workshop
Date: ,;.1.s-
Site Plan for:
-5
_ILLAwEEtJA S7REET
f-0G.Ail
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D:\123r3cp\siteplan

STUDY
on
ELECTRICAL HAZARDS
PERTAINING TO THE 755 dia.
M/S TRUNK WATER MAIN
FROM KURABY TO ILLAWEENA STREET
DUE TO THE PROXIMITY OF
A Q.E.C. 275KV TRANSMISSION SYSTEM
for
THE BRISBANE CITY COUNCIL

DEPARTMENT OF WATER SUPPLY
AND SEWERAGE
by B.M. BYRNE
2. 1. 1995

B.M. Byrne, B.E.E., C.Eng., R.P.E.Q., M.I.E.E.

Registered Professional Electrical Engineer
Consulting in Plant Protection
.
..Electrical Overvoltage
Protection
Personnel /Electrical Safety
.
. Corrosion Control
118 Central Avenue

Indooroopilly QId. 4068
Telephone: (07) 870 1155
The Manager
Capital Projects Section
Mechanical & Electrical Services Branch
Brisbane City Council
GPO Box 1434
BRISBANE QLD 4001
Attention: Mr. J. Say
Dear Sir,
HIGH VOLTAGE, LOW FREQUENCY INDUCTION (L.F.I.) and EARTH POTENTIAL RISE
(E.P.R.) STUDY, KURABY TO ILLAWEENA STREET RESERVOIR BULK SUPPLY MAIN
Foreword:
This study is made on the assumption that the subject Bulk Supply Main will be
installed in the manner and in the position described in Brisbane City Council (B.C.C.)
drawings 486/4/6 - W100 LOLO and 486/4/6 - W100 4IP to 486/4/6 - W100 48GD.
Scope:
The study is prepared in response to B.C.C. letter of 2 November 1994, ref. J.S.
Illweena, requiring "identification of any hazards due to induction and EPR due to QEC
operation current, Q.E.C. fault condition or lightning strike occurrence ". The existing
trunk mains are taken into consideration accordingly, and some aspects affecting these
are covered in "Discussion" at the end of the report. The overall length of the pipeline,
scaled off the above drawings is 1380m.
The matter of precautions during construction are also addressed, and the essentials of
this matter have been advised to Mr. Say, in advance, by telephone. Comments are
offered regarding the interaction of Cathodic Protection (CP) on the older trunk water
main, and the protection earthing on both the proposed and existing mains, and its
effect on C.P. on the new main.

The findings include the specifications required for protection earthing. This is listed in
the "Discussion" at the end of the document.
Appendix 1 lists several references, and formulae required for calculations in this study.
Appendix 2 lists specific data and measurements necessary for the study, and the
origin thereof.
The Findings:
(a) The level of load current induction is of no consequence whatever.
(b) The fault current induction level, calculated at the worst case condition is severe
enough - nearly 500 volts - to require mitigation action. This action is detailed in
the L.F.I. study and referred to under "Discussion ". The effect on Cathodic
Protection is also discussed.
(c) Earth Potential Rise from L.F.I. is not of major concern, for valves, test points
and the like more than 20m from any transmission tower. A figure of 50m
tower isolation is preferred for lightning protection.
(d) Some adjustment to protective arrangements on existing trunk mains would be

to advantage. This is referred to in "Discussion ".
(e) Earthing arrangements during construction will be necessary. This is detailed in

the Study.
(f) Some aspects of lightning effects are discussed.
The L.F.I. Study:
(a) General: The exposure of the 755mm main to L.F.I. exists over the whole length
of the construction, even though it diverts from the power transmission corridor
some 160m from the Wembley Road Reservoir.
The power transmission line is actually two separate three phase feeders - one
from the Belmont Substation, and one from Mt. England Substation. Both
feeders are tied in to the Q.E.C. mesh on either end, with the result that fault
current will flow from either end of either feeder in the event of a faulted tower.
(b) Load Current Induction: The Q.E.C. has adopted a careful and well engineered
approach with the design of both its E.H.V. mesh and with the use of dual
feeders. Each route with dual feeders has the system so arranged that the rated
load current on the pair of feeders on either side of a sequence of towers is
approximately equal. In addition, the arrangement of conductors /phases are in
electromagnetic inverse in each pair of feeders. Thus the feeder on one side of
the tower string will be (e.g.) A.B.C. phases, from top to bottom, all in a vertical
plane. On the other side of the tower string, the phases would thus be C, B, A
from top to bottom. Long feeders are divided into three lengths, and the phases
are transposed at these third points (at quite some cost). One such transposition
can be viewed at about the mid point of the Illaweena Street /Wembley Road
Reservoir exposure. A similar phase balance is preserved between the two

3.
feeders after each transposition.
The result of the foregoing exercise is that an incredibly small electromagnetic

field is achieved at ground level. This has three effects: (i) a superior power
transmission efficiency result; (ii) coupling into "foreign" conductors (such as
the Water Main) is minimised; and (iii) the environmental effect is virtually nil.
In this exposure, QEC quotes the residual magnetic field at ground level as 10
milligauss, with both feeders operating at rated current. Conversion of this to
induced voltage is merely an application of Faraday's Law:
E K d II
dt
As the quoted magnetic flux is in CGS units, the formula becomes (App.1
Ref.1 1):
E (voltage, per km) = B (flux) x 105 (cms/km) x V (2 IT f flux cutting

rate) x 10.8
i.e. E = .01 x 105 x 314 x 10.8 Volts /km
= 3.14 millivolts per km.
This is trifling in the extreme. It would be difficult to test for technically, let
alone to be concerned by the possibility of its being detected by the most
sensitive staff fingers. This is fortunate as there is no Australian Standard for
this limit. Even internationally, limits vary. In various countries, and even
between States in North America, limits are variously 15 V.RMS, 30 V.RMS, and
unspecified. None of these aligns with the provisions of I.E.C. publication 479/1
(Effect of Electric Current on the human body) either.
(c) Fault Current Induction: This is the most serious part of the study. The fault
clearance time of both the 275kv feeders is stated by QEC to be 100m.sec. The
feeders are Category A, that is, the fault incidence is "a few" earth faults per
100km per annum. The significance of these aspects will be considered in
"Discussion" below.
The highest zero sequences (phase to earth) fault current on any of the four
feeder directions is 3.9 kA. (From Q.E.C. App.2.) on feeder 804. The faulted
tower would necessarily be beyond the exposure to have maximum effect.
Q.E.C. advises that the customary calculation figure of 10 ohms earth resistance
has been incorporated in this fault current calculation. An allowance for arc path
resistance (usually about 4 ohms) has not been made.
By combining this fault current figure with the deep resistivity figures provided
by B.C.C.'s Mr. Say, and the juxtaposition of the two services (power and
water) shown on the B.C.C. plan, it is possible to derive an induced voltage,
using the formulae and process listed in Appendix 1. The "deep" resistivity
figures will only' be an approximation, but on experiences in the Brisbane area,
will be a sufficiently appropriate indication of the effect of geological conditions
pertinent to the current return path.

4.
The exposure has been subdivided into four lengths, shown as (a), (b), (c), (d) in
the table below. (a), (b) and (d) are parallel sections, but (c) is a 45° divergence
between the services. A geometric mean distance "D" has been derived for the
equivalent spacing for this angled section. It is listed in Table 1, Col.4.
Distances shown are scaled from the B.C.C. plans. A shielding factor of 0.9 has
been quoted by Q.E.C. for the overhead earth wires (O.H.E.W.S.). A further
shielding factor of 0.5 has been included for the presence of the ferrous existing
water main(s). Some comments are made under "Discussion" on this matter.
The coupling factor, "C ", in the sample equation below, is derived from the
material and references in App.1, ref.7.
Section Length, Map Location Spacing Resistiv- OHEW Environ Ç

Metres D ity ohm shielding mental Derived
metres &metres shielding
20m pin
spacing
(a) 420 Illaweena St. 39 27 .9 .5 .16
(b) 670 Q.E.C. Easement 32 68 .9 .5 .21
lc) 160 Q.E.C.easement 72 353 .9 .5 .2

to foot of
Reservoir Hill
(d) 130 Up hill to 200 643 .9 .5 .17

Reservoir
Table 1. Induction Parameters for the several Exposure Sections, with the derived
coupling factors.
A sample calculation, for (a) above:
(a). E (voltage) = C.I.L.K. (Ref.7, App.1)

= Coupling Factor x Amps x Kms x Shielding factors
= .16x3900x.42x.5x.9volts
= 117 volts
Similarly (b) = 247 volts

(c) = 70 volts
(d) = 60 volts
Total = 494 volts
It will be observed that the coupling factors are fairly uniform, due to the resistivity
fortuitously increasing as the separation increases at the reservoir end.
This uniformity means that it is a simple matter to prescribe safety working length for
construction staff, as induced voltage will be in almost linear relation to the pipe length.
The induction per 100 metres is 38.6 volts. See "Discussion ".
Reduction of the extent of exposed voltage from the total of 494 volts can be achieved

5.
by causing the electrical condition on the pipeline to change from static to dynamic
conditions. This requires the installation of and connection of a low resistance earth
electrode at each end of the pipe. When this is done, a substantial current will flow,
under the influence of the induced voltage, being limited only by the resistance of the
earth electrodes (in series) and the reactance of the pipeline. The resistance of the pipe
steel is negligible, (See App.1 Ref.10) at about .0006 ohms /km.
The reactance of a "ferrous pipe, with an existing ferrous pipe adjacent is uncertain. It
will be greater than the figure for a single pipe, and would be worth measuring (see
"Discussion ") for future calculations.
An inductance of 10 mH /km, based on earlier measurement experience, will be used to

derive approximate circuit impedance.
The reactance in ohms, of an inductive component is given by the formula RL = 2 n f.L
where L has been assigned the figure of .01 Henry
2 x 3.14 x 50 x .01 ohms /km
3.14 ohm /km
Due to the very high earth resistivity of the Reservoir hill, it will be impractical to install
a low resistance earth electrode there. The nearest location where it may be achieved
is at the foot of the hill where the Trunk Main and Power transmission lines separate.
This is about 1100m from the Illaweena Street commencement of the project. The
reactance of the pipe over this length would be 3.45 ohms. The induced voltage would
be about 434 Volts (60 V on hill section excluded).
Considering the total circuit impedance for three pairs of earth electrodes (of R ohms):
(i) 1 ohm each end

(ii) 2 ohms each end
(iii) 3 ohms each end
The impedance Z = `I R2 + R2L ohms
i.e. Zio = V22 + 3.452
= 14x 11.9
4 ohms
Similarly Zoo = 5.3 ohms
Za = 5.9 ohms
The current in each case would be

6.
434
4 Amps
108.5 A
Similarly I; = 81.9 A
I,;;;, = 73.6 A
The Voltage appearing on the pipeline Eo at.each end would be
Eo = I.R.
(i) Eo = 108.5 x 1 = 108.5 volts (1)
(ii) Eo = 81.9 x 2 = 163.8 volts (2)
(iii) Eo = 73.6 x 3 . = 220.8 volts (3)
In addition, at the reservoirs, because the proposed earth electrode is at the foot of the
hill, the 60 volts induction from the electrode site must be added to the above figures,
for the pipe at the reservoir end.
These voltages are for the period of the power line fault duration (see "Discussion" for
significance).
A further point is that these figures are "worst case" - and not the likely arc path fault
condition which would reduce the fault current to about 3.55kA. This would in turn
reduce all voltages calculated above by about 10 %. Some considerations of this matter
are made under "Discussion ".
Earth Potential Rise (EPR):
This condition occurs when a current discharge from the Transmission Line Earthing
System occurs. The common - even nearly exclusive - methanism is pursuant to a
lightning flash attachment to the O.H.E.W. of the line. The lightning current, in the
range from 10kA to 200kA, but commonly about 30kA, then proceeds to ground via
the nearest tower, or pair of towers if the flash attaches at a mid span point. The surge
does not effectively proceed further than to the nearest tower as the rise time of the
wave is very short, in the order of a microsecond. Longer paths to other towers
present too high an impedance for any significant current dispersion.
The initial effect is to cause a very high voltage to appear at the top of the discharge
tower, which voltage may or may not be sufficient to flash over the line insulators,
normally to an uppermost phase wire.
This has two possible effects:
(i) The lightning current itself discharging to ground causes an enormous

momentary E.P R. around the tower, in accordance with the formula (App. 1
Ref.9) V =
2nd

7.
V is Voltage in Volts
I is Current in Amps (Lightning)
p is Soil Resistivity in ohm metres
d is the distance from the injection point, in metres.
The tower is considered to be a point, provided d is more than 5 times the diagonal of
the tower footings. For lesser distances a more detailed analysis is necessary for
accuracy. Variation in p in the earth also leads to some inaccuracies.
(ii) The follow through current from the transmission line conductor along the
lightning generated arc path occurs. Because the 50Hz supply is far less subject
to minor reactance figures in the O.H.E.W., this current is distributed over some
dozen or more towers on each side of the fault, as well as along the O.H.E.W.
back to the substation. The maximum tower current, nearest the originating
lightning flash would be in the range 5% - 10% of the calculated total fault arc
path current. The figure reduces as the distance from the substation reduces.
For this exposure, calculations have been made on a tower current of 300 amps (8.5%
of total).
The figures for p for calculating EPR are those derived from the 4m pin spacings. These
figures give the averaged resistivity at 3m depth. This equates approximately to both
the tower footing base conditions, as well as to the pipeline current level conditions.
The main variation in EPR lightning hazard in a power line corridor over the open field
situation is that the lightning flashes in the corridor are virtually all intercepted by the
O.H.E.W's. This in turn leads to all flash current appearing at the nearest tower. Thus
the incidence of current discharges to earth per unit area adjacent to a tower is about
fifteen times that of the open country figure.
Step potential may now be calculated at the worst (highest surface earth resistivity)
tower location which is near the C.P. rectifier on the existing trunk main.
(a) Liahtninq, at a fairly nominal 30kA flash current:-
From App.1 ref 9,
V =
2
at d = 20m, V = 30,000 x 170 volts

6.28 x 20
= 40605 V (for several microseconds)
at d = 21m V = 38672 V (for several microseconds)

The step potential is thus 1933 volts per metre. This figure is unsafe, and clearly
indicates that 20m proximity from a tower during a local thunderstorm is to be avoided.

8.
It might be noted that well insulated work boots would withstand this figure. The
security of the pipeline, at 20m approx. spacing would appear to be adequate, as the
coating would have a withstand of upwards of 50kV. Also, the earth resistivity falls
away to a much lower value with depth, at the C.P. rectifier site. The probability is
that the majority of the discharge would proceed downwards, i.e. away from the pipe,
thus reducing the electrical stress on the coating.
(b) The follow through transmission line current was noted above as 300 amps per
tower, for a duration of about 100ms - protection operate time. At the worst surface
resistivity figure of 170 ohm metres near the C.P. rectifier, this results in a 20m E.P.R.
of:
V =
2rrd
= 300 x 170 Volts
6.28 x 20
= 406 Volts
This is of no consequence to the pipeline coating. However operatives engaged in C.P.

testing should be aware of the circumstances, particularly if engaged in running out test
cables to earth stakes in a radial direction from the nearest transmission tower.
Step potential at 20m would be only about 20 v /metre.
Construction staff might also exercise caution in the layout of long pipe lengths in
directions radial to any nearby tower. The matter is developed further in "Discussion.

9.
Discussion:
(A) LFI - Fault Current
It is always a point of concern whether to calculate worst possible induction figures -

that is, a fault current in the worst position relative to the exposure, combined with a
conductor to tower fault. This almost never happens - except perhaps in a cyclone
when a complete metal roof structure is hurled through a transmission line. As the
prospect of anyone working on a trunk main in a cyclone is virtually nil, the figures in
the L.F.I. fault study above are about 10% higher than the "worst- likely" situation.
Further, the incidence of phase to ground faults on Category A (or Category 1) high
security transmission lines is of the order of "a few" per 100km per annum - scarcely a
very high risk situation. This of course refers to the whole length of transmission
feeders - the exposure concerned will suffer the induction from a fault 10, or 50, or
more kilometres distant.
The great majority of phase to ground faults are lightning initiated, with an arc flash
over the line insulators. This provides a path for the E.H.V. supply to flow to earth. By
inference, the risk is during thunderstorms - even those over the horizon - through
which the transmission line passes.
As construction project such as this may well take a few months, the likelihood is
a
that fault surge will occur during this time, on one of the feeders concerned.
a
Consequently, a length of jointed pipeline will undergo induction and a worst case in the
study yielding 38V /100mm. There is no co- ordination Australian standard, so the limit
suggested is derived from AS3859 (The Effect of Electric Current through the Human
Body) (App.1, Ref 12).
At 50Hz, with a current duration of 100 mS max., the fibrillation danger condition
occurs for a 1000 ohm hand to hand path at about 400 mA. Adopting a factor of
safety of 2, plus the possibility of a lower resistance path - i.e. both hands to torso, the
suggested limit is around 100 -150 volts, for construction activity.
This limit will be reached on a 300m length of pipe. If the installed pipe is not jointed
to any earthed object at either end, it will have an inherent electrostatic capacity to
ground of perhaps 1 microfarad - depending on the coating type. This corresponds to a
reactance of 3000 ohms, which would materially reduce the body current to ground.
However, it would seem unwise to rely on the continued isolation of such a pipelength.
Indeed the time would arise when it had to be jointed to existing mains at one end, thus
producing a maximum hazard at the other.
Consequently, it is recommended that any jointed lengths of pipe of 300m be earthed

to temporary electrodes of 2 ohms or less at each end. These electrodes could be left
permanently if desired, but see comment on Cathodic Protection below.
All earthing cables, temporary or permanent should be 35mm2 and insulated.
The final construction would also need electrodes at each end, iri accordance with the
calculations in the study above (see equations (1), (2), (3) in the LFI Study). Whilst one
ohm electrodes would be preferred, to reduce the shock energy to personnel, two ohm
electrodes would suffice. In addition, the electrodes on the existing whole exposure
length trunk main could well be checked, and if over two ohms, be supplemented to

10.
achieve two ohms. The effect of two parallel pipelines with loop current protection is
synergistic - each lends, a measure of electric field suppression to the other. Indeed,
with two pipes thus served, the third pipe, which is only along portion of the exposure,
would be adequately protected without further action.
The matter of installing earth electrodes impinges on the cathodic protection design.
Whilst polarisation cells can be installed in series with the earth electrodes to contain
the C.P. current, yet pass thé induced fault current, there are some negatives to this
procedure. The long term performance, durability, robustness and resistance to
vandalism is a matter for maintenance concern. If on the other hand, earth electrodes
are left directly connected to the ends of the pipeline (and perhaps "temporary"
intermediate ones as well), the effect on the C.P. design will not generally be of much
concern.
The C.P. system will depress the natural pipe potential by something in the order of one
quarter of a volt. Ignoring polarisation, this will cause each one ohm electrode to pass
about a quarter of an amp (or two ohm electrode, each one eighth of an amp). If, say
four electrodes, each of 2 ohm resistance to earth are left in situ then the total drain on
the C.P. system is only half an amp. As impressed current C.P. is the norm, this is of
no consequence. Indeed two pluses occur: (i) The earth electrodes are now under
cathodic protection and (ii) The current demand on a relatively short exposure (1 .3km in
this case) of the well coated pipeline is in the order of a few milliamps, which is difficult
to regulate on the C.P. rectifier. The appearance of a holiday in the coating - for
example by excavating machinery - will place a demand of perhaps ten times the
pipeline initial current. This may well go unnoticed unless the C.P. system has a
potential alarm. However, if there is a "ballast" load of half an amp to the earth
electrodes, such extra demand will be in the order of 5% only - not enough to even
justify resetting the rectifier.
Grading Rings (Partial Faraday Cages). The only location where a grading ring would be
necessary is at the reservoir end of the pipeline. This is because the loop current
protection would cease at the foot of the hill, and the total LFI /fault voltage appearing
on the pipe would be in the order of 260 Volts (worst case). If however, the pipe is
bonded or jointed into other pipes or a metal reservoir, this grading ring would be
unnecessary.
(B) The load current induction, as noted in the survey, is of no consequence.
(C) Earth Potential Rise was calculated to be of serious note from lightning flashes,
when proximate to one or other of the transmission line towers. As the likelihood of
work proceeding on the pipeline during a local thunderstorm seems remote, this is of .
not much concern. Nevertheless, the need to take cover, e.g. in a rubber tyred vehicle,
during such local storms is emphasised. If on foot, paradoxically the lowest hazard
area will be found directly beneath the line conductors in mid span. Nowhere in an
exposed site of course is totally safe from the enormous energy levels in lightning
flashes.
The EPR level from current follow through on towers after an arc occurs across
insulators would appear to be only of concern to staff running test leads for electrical
measurements, with leads of 20m or so, radial to transmission towers. Again, this
would be only in the vicinity of a local thunderstorm, and consequently not of great
concern.

Grading rings, for E.P.R. protection, would only be required on scour valves and
associated fittings, if within 20m of any tower. It would be preferred practice to site no
metal access devices connected to the pipe within 50m if possible, to minimise
lightning E.P.R. conditions also.
Other Hazards
1. The construction aspects of handling long pipe sections adjacent to E.H.V.

electrical transmission lines has not been addressed. Obviously, construction
designers would be acutely aware of the physical hazards. Nevertheless, it is
desired to raise the statistic that over 10% of the several dozen (average) annual
electrical incident fatalities in Australia, relate to contact with overhead
conductors by metal pipes being manipulated under power lines.
2. Electrostatics
The presence of an insulated conductor i.e. on a rubber tyred vehicle) near a

power line will be sufficient to induce, capacitively, some voltage. Provided the
distance is several metres, this will not be of personnel concern. However,
contact of the charged pipe with earthed objects can give rise to a spark
sufficient to ignite spilled fuel. It can also cause secondary accidents, if such a
discharge involves personnel in precarious positions. It is assumed that
construction precautions in this environment have not been called for in this
study.

12.
Appendix 1
Written References pertinent to Induction Studies and Earth Potential Rise Calculations;
also relevant formulae and their derivation.
1. Sunde, E.D. "Earth Conduction Effects in Transmission Systems ". Van Nostrand.
New York, 1949.
2. Westinghouse Electric Corporation, U.S.A. "Electrical Transmission and Distribution

Handbook" 1950.
3. "Application Guide for the Low Frequency Induction Code" by the Central Joint
Committee for the Co- ordination of Power and Telecommunications Systems. 1981.
4. Code of Practice for the Protection of Personnel and Equipment against Earth
Potential Rise caused by High Voltage Power System.Faults - same origin as (1) above.
1984.
5. Australian Standard AS2832.1 - Guide to the Protection of Metals, Pipes, Cables

and Ducts.
6. Australian Standard AS3859 - Effect of Electric Current Through the Human Body.
7. E = CILK. This is the traditional induction earth fault current formula, from
Reference 3 page 8. It will be found in other texts, e.g. Ref. 2, page 41.
E = The induced longitudinal voltage between the ends of the exposure (volts)
C = The mutual impedance per length of exposure, without shielding, at 50Hz

- see below.
The inducing (zero sequence in this case) current, in amps
L = Length of exposure (possibly Cosine B if the paths are not parallel) in

kilometres
K = The shielding factor (0 < K < 1) due to the presence of modifying

conduction.
C is a complex quantity and is expanded to:
C = 2rrf [loge (1 + 6 x 105 p) x 10-4 henries /km

d2 f
f is frequency (50Hz)
p is soil resistivity in ohm. metres
d is spacing in metres between earth return circuits.
There are other derivations possible. However it is customary to utilise a

nomogram (e.g. Reference 3, Page 19) to derive C.

13.
8. Resistivity of copper at 20 °C is 1.72 x 10.8 ohm /metre (from A.E. Knowlton,

Electrical Engineers Handbook Section 4).
9. . d = IO or V = 10
2rrV 2nd
This is the traditional formula to indicate the relationship between resistivity (p) Current
(I), Voltage (V) at distance (d) from a current injection point into uniform soil. It will be
found in AS2832.1, Reference 6, and other Standards.
10. The resistivity for mild steel is 14 x 10.8 ohm /metre (from A.E. Knowlton, Electrical
Engineers Handbook Section 4).
11, Adaption from Faraday's Law for CMF induced in a conductor in an alternating
magnetic field (A.E. Knowlton, Electrical Engineers Handbook, Section 2)
e = B I V 10.8 Volts (CGS units)
B = flux level in gauss
I = length in cm
V = flux cutting rate
= w
2 rrf (frequency)
314.
12. Australian Standard AS3859 - The Effect of Electric Current in the Human Body.

14.
APPENDIX 2
Data specific to lob, and source of same
1. Resistivity of earth at various depths and locations, in ohm metres.
Pin Spacing Location 1 Location 2 Location 3 Location 4

Metres Illaweena St end Illaweena St QEC Easement at At Wembley St
of section (Drg near C.P. Rectifier foot of Reservoir Reservoir
486/4/6- Hill
W 10041 P
4m 9.5 170 75 3200

* * * *
10m 18 36 114 3397

20m 27 68 353 643
* weighted average of two readings at right angles. Weighting approx. x 2 for

pipeline direction.
Resistivity figures from Mr. J. Say, B.C.C. Dept. of W.S. & S.
2. Effect of Power Line Load Current - both feeders operating at rated level:
Electromagnetic field at ground level, under Phase wires: 10 milligauss (Line is
Dual 275 kV 3 phase part of QEC, S.E.QId. Mesh)
Data from Mr. T. Tuting, QEC
3. Power Line Zero Sequence (phase to earth) Fault Current at Illaweena Street (No
appreciable difference along exposure)
0.H.E.W. shielding factor 0.9
Feeder 802 - 5.69 kA (3.3kA from Belmont, 2.3kA from Mt. England)
Feeder 804 - 6.86 kA (3.9kA from Swanbank, 2.97kÁ from Belmont)
i.e. 3.9kA is the worst case, with the fault beyond the exposure.
From Mr. F. Tuting, QEC

1 o.
achieve two ohms. The effect of two parallel pipelines with loop current protection is
synergistic - each lends a measure of electric field suppression to the other. Indeed,
with two pipes thus served, the third pipe, which is only along portion of the exposure,
would be adequately protected without further action.
The matter of installing earth electrodes impinges on the cathodic protection design.
Whilst polarisation cells can be installed in series with the earth electrodes to contain
the C.P. current, yet pass the induced fault current, there are some negatives to this
procedure. The long term performance, durability, robustness and resistance to
vandalism is a matter for maintenance concern. If on the other hand, earth electrodes
are left directly connected to the ends of the pipeline (and perhaps "temporary"
intermediate ones as well), the effect on the C.P. design will not generally be of much
concern.
The C.P. system will depress the natural pipe potential by something in the order of one
quarter of a volt. Ignoring polarisation, this will cause each one ohm electrode to pass
about a quarter of an amp (or two ohm electrode, each one eighth of an amp). If, say
four electrodes, each of 2 ohm resistance to earth are left in situ then the total drain on
the C.P. system is only half an amp. As impressed current C.P. is the norm, this is of
no consequence. Indeed two pluses occur: (i) The earth electrodes are now under
cathodic protection and (ii) The current demand on a relatively short exposure (1 .3km in
this case) of the well coated pipeline is in the order of a few milliamps, which is difficult
to regulate on the C.P. rectifier. The appearance of a holiday in the coating - for
example by excavating machinery - will place a demand of perhaps ten times the
pipeline initial current. This may well go unnoticed unless the C.P. system has a
potential alarm. However, if there is a "ballast" load of half an amp to the earth
electrodes, such extra demand will be in the order of 5% only - not enough to even
justify resetting the rectifier.
Grading Rings (Partial Faraday Cages). The only location where a grading ring would be
necessary is at the reservoir end of the pipeline. This is because the loop current
protection would cease at the foot of the hill, and the total LFI /fault voltage appearing
on the pipe would be in the order of 260 Volts (worst case). If however, the pipe is
bonded or jointed into other pipes or a metal reservoir, this grading ring would be
unnecessary.
(B) The load current induction, as noted in the survey, is of no consequence.
(C) Earth Potential Rise was calculated to be of serious note from lightning flashes,
when proximate to one or other of the transmission line towers. As the likelihood of
work proceeding on the pipeline during a local thunderstorm seems remote, this is of
not much concern. Nevertheless, the need to take cover, e.g. in a rubber tyred vehicle,
during such local storms is emphasised. If on foot, paradoxically the lowest hazard
area will be found directly beneath the line conductors in mid span. Nowhere in an
exposed site of course is totally safe from the enormous energy levels in lightning
flashes.
The EPR level from current follow through on towers after an arc occurs across
insulators would appear to be only of concern to staff running test leads for electrical
measurements, with leads of 20m or so, radial to transmission towers. Again, this
would be only in the vicinity of a local thunderstorm, and consequently not of great
concern.

11.
Grading rings, for E.P.R. protection, would only be required on scour valves and
associated fittings, if within 20m of any tower. It would be preferred practice to site no
metal access devices connected to the pipe within 50m if possible, to minimise
lightning E.P.R. conditions also.
Other Hazards
1. The construction aspects of handling long pipe sections adjacent to E.H.V.

electrical transmission lines has not been addressed. Obviously, construction
designers would be acutely aware of the physical hazards. Nevertheless, it is
desired to raise the statistic that over 10% of the several dozen (average) annual
electrical incident fatalities in Australia, relate to contact with overhead
conductors by metal pipes being manipulated under power lines.
2. Electrostatics
The presence of an insulated conductor i.e. on a rubber tyred vehicle) near a

power line will be sufficient to induce, capacitively, some voltage. Provided the
distance is several metres, this will not be of personnel concern. However,
contact of the charged pipe with earthed objects can give rise to a spark
sufficient to ignite spilled fuel. It can also cause secondary accidents, if such a
discharge involves personnel in precarious positions. It is assumed that
construction precautions in this environment have not been called for in this
study.

12.
Appendix 1
Written References pertinent to Induction Studies and Earth Potential Rise Calculations;
also relevant formulae and their derivation.
1. Sunde, E.D. "Earth Conduction Effects in Transmission Systems ". Van Nostrand.
New York, 1949.
2. Westinghouse Electric Corporation, U.S.A. "Electrical Transmission and Distribution

Handbook" 1950.
3. "Application Guide for the Low Frequency Induction Code" by the Central Joint
Committee for the Co-ordination of Power and Telecommunications Systems. 1981.
4. Code of Practice for the Protection of Personnel and Equipment against Earth
Potential Rise caused by High Voltage Power System Faults - same origin as (1) above.
1984.
5. Australian Standard AS2832.1 - Guide to the Protection of Metals, Pipes, Cables

and Ducts.
6. Australian Standard AS3859 - Effect of Electric Current Through the Human Body.
7. E = CILK. This is the traditional induction earth fault current formula, from
Reference 3 page 8. It will be found in other texts, e.g. Ref. 2, page 41.
E = The induced longitudinal voltage between the ends of the exposure (volts)
C = The mutual impedance per length of exposure, without shielding, at 50Hz

- see below.
= The inducing (zero sequence in this case) current, in amps
L = Length of exposure (possibly Cosine (9 if the paths are not parallel) in

kilometres
K = The shielding factor (0 < K < 1) due to the presence of modifying

conduction.
C is a complex quantity and is expanded to:
C = 2irf [loge (1 + 6 x 105D) x 10-4 henries/km

d2 f
f is frequency (50Hz)
p is soil resistivity in ohm. metres
d is spacing in metres between earth return circuits.
There are other derivations possible. However it is customary to utilise a

nomogram (e.g. Reference 3, Page 19) to derive C.

13.
8. Resistivity of copper at 20 °C is 1.72 x 10.8 ohm /metre (from A.E. Knowlton,

Electrical Engineers Handbook Section 4).
9. d = ID or V = ID
2/TV 2rrd
This is the traditional formula to indicate the relationship between resistivity (p) Current
(I), Voltage (V) at distance (d) from a current injection point into uniform soil. It will be
found in AS2832.1, Reference 6, and other Standards.
10. The resistivity for mild steel is 14 x 10-8 ohm /metre (from A.E. Knowlton, Electrical
Engineers Handbook Section 4).
Adaption from Faraday's Law for CMF induced in a conductor in an alternating

1 1 ,
magnetic field (A.E. Knowlton, Electrical Engineers Handbook, Section 2)
e = B I V 10-8 Volts (CGS units)
B = flux level in gauss
I = length in cm
V = flux cutting rate
= w
2 rrf (frequency)
314.
12. Australian Standard AS3859 - The Effect of Electric Current in the Human Body.

14.
APPENDIX 2
Data specific to iob, and source of same
1. Resistivity of earth at various depths and locations, in ohm metres.
Pin Spacing Location 1 Location 2 Location 3 Location 4

Metres Illaweena St end Illaweena St QEC Easement at At Wembley St
of section (Drg near C.P. Rectifier foot of Reservoir Reservoir
486/4/6- Hill
W10041P
4m 9.5 170 75 3200

* * * *
10m 18 36 114 3397

20m 27 68 353 643
* weighted average of two readings at right angles. Weighting approx. x 2 for

pipeline direction.
Resistivity figures from Mr. J. Say, B.C.C. Dept. of W.S. & S.
2. Effect of Power Line Load Current - both feeders operating at rated level:
Electromagnetic field at ground level, under Phase wires: 10 milligauss (Line is
Dual 275 kV 3 phase part of QEC, S.E.QId. Mesh)
Data from Mr. T. Tuting, QEC
3. Power Line Zero Sequence (phase to earth) Fault Current at Illaweena Street (No
appreciable difference along exposure)
O.H.E.W. shielding factor 0.9
Feeder 802 - 5.69 kA (3.3kA from Belmont, 2.3kA from Mt. England)
Feeder 804 - 6.86 kA (3.9kA from Swanbank, 2.97kA from Belmont)
i.e. 3.9kA is the worst case, with the fault beyond the exposure.
From Mr. F. Tuting, QEC

ILLAWEENA STREET
RESERVOIRS
TEST POINT No.3

AND EARTHING BED (ZINC)
LOT 23 LOT 24
a LOT 2
J
m
10M EASEMENT
\G4S0
/Q TEST POINT No.4
M`/N
//
4.\
L pGg
MoTo
RWqY
LOT 4
-
MANAGER DIRECTOR OF PLANNING PROJECT
DESIGN J.SAY 11.4.95
& DESIGN BRISBANE CITY COUNCIL
ILLAWEENA ST., TRUNK MAIN x
DRAWN DEPARTMENT OF WATER SUPPLY
R.LIS TON 11.4.95 CATHODIC PROTECTION r7ñmlIllhw n
AND SEWERAGE
DATE: DATE:
CHECKED TITLE Brisbane City MECHANICAL & ELECTRICAL SERVICES
DIRECTOR OF DIRECTOR OF DIRECTOR OF SEW.
CONSTRUCTION M & E SERVICES OPERATIONS/ W.S. ILLAWEENA STREET SCALE: N.T.S. No. 3 OF 3 SHEETS
ENGINEER
DISTRIBUTION C.P. SYSTEM
IN CHARGE DRAWING No. AMEND.
O 11.4.95 ISSUED FOR CONSTRUCTION R:L.
No DATE AMENDMENT BY DATE: DATE: DATE:
SUPERVISING
ENGINEER
CADD FILE No. 66C0041- 486/6/6- SA1C0041 0

i 2 3 4 5 6 I 7 1 8
N O T E S
2
A
TP-470mm A.
TP-470mm .
<70 /NSCL 600mm

TYPE 'B' 750m
4 TEST POINT
TP EXISTING 600mm
5 TYPE 'A'
TEST POINT
TYPE 'C'
6 TEST POINT
7 \ N -
REFER TO DWG. 486/6/6- SAt0039E
FOR MORE DETAILS OF THIS AREA
N
8:
- LOJT¡AAJED
N
9
8
B.
10
N
N
N
N
12
13 N
N
14 A 8.96 MODIFIED O.L.P.
N
N 0 3.96 ISSUED FOR APPROVAL O.L.P.
15 N
No DATE AMENDMENT INITIALS
C 16 N
No. 218 TYPE 'A'
AMENDENT 8 ISSUE REGISTER C
TP - 470m N
d
TEST POINT MANAGER DIRECTOR OF
17
TYPE 'A' TP - 470mm TECHNOLOGY SERVICES
No. 282
TEST POINT TP - 470m
18 o DATE: DATE:
TYPE
S11B-ILLAMEENA DIRECTOR OF
TEST POINT DIRECTOR OF DIRECTOR OF
19 87, o PLANNING
OREMVALE & DESIGN WATER SUPPLY CONSTRUCTION
20
AT RECTIFIER
TP -600mm
21 750m
DATE DATE: DATE:
TP-600mm
ENGINEER
22 REFER TO DWG.
DESIGN J.S. 21.3.96
IN CHARGE
D 486/6/6- SAIC0040E
FOR MORE DETAILS SUPERVISING
23 DRAWN O.L.P. 21.3.96
ENGINEER
REFER TO DWG. TRACED

24 486/6/ 6- SAIC0041E
FOR MORE DETAILS
25
CHECKED A2 REDUCED
REFERENCES
COPYRIGHT © 1996
26 TP-750mm No repoduction is permitted
600mm in whole or in pert without
CADO FLE No. 66T0010A the express consent of
27
o THIS DRAWING WAS PRODUCED BRISBANE CITY COUNCIL
BRISBANE WATER
r
USING QIKDRAW
28
BRISBANE
E
29
CITY COUNCIL
30
BRISBANE WATER
31 TECHNOLOGY SERVICES BRANCH
BdWmaagab TECHNICAL SERVICES
32 PROJECT:
CATHODIC PROTECTION
33
470 DIA. TRUNK WATER MAIN
34
TITLE:
35_ A44N CATHODIC PROTECTION SYSTEM

N4 ILLAWEENA STREET
F 36
STRFcr
37 SCALE:
rF No. 1 OF 1 SHEETS
DRAWING No. AMEND.

38
486/6/6-SA1T0010E A
f 2 I 3 4 5 6 7
2 N
NOTES
A
N
TP-470mm
TP -470m A
N TYPE 'B' d70/MSCL
TEST POINT j.600mm
7r0nn
TYPE 'A'
TEST POINT
\N TP EXISTING 600rmn
ILLN4 S7 N
N TYPE 'C'
TP - 470mm N TEST POINT
\ N REFER TO DWG. 486/6/6-
SAt0039E
[e- FOR MORE DETALS OF THIS AREA
- ÇONTINA.t-D
N
10 N
B
112
N
12 N
13
15 N A 8.96 MODIFIED O.L.P.

N
C 16
N 3.96 ISSUED FOR APPROVAL O.L.P.
N .4 No DATE
N AMENDMENT INITIALS
TP - 470mm
N
17 TYPE 'A' AMENDENT & ISSUE REGISTER C
TEST POINT
TYPE 'A' MANAGER
is TEST POINT TP - 47Onm DIRECTOR OF
TP - 47Umm No. 282
TECHNOLOGY SERVICES
1s TYPE 'A'
DATE,
TEST POINT 5216-tiem DATE:
ST DIRECTOR CF
OkENVILE DIRECTOR OF DIRECTOR OF
20
PLANNING b DESIGN WATER SUPPLY CONSTRUCTION
21 AT RECTIFIER
TP -600mm
7-50mm
22
TP-600am DATE! DATE= DATE:
D
FLIER TO DWG. DESIGN ENGINEER
23 21.3.96
486%6/6- SAIC0040E IN CHARGE
FOR' MORE DETAILS CRANK SUPERVISING
O.L.P. 21.3.96 D
24 ENGINEER
REFER TO DWG.
486/6/6- SAIC004E TRACED
25 FOR MOFE COALS
26
CHECKED
A2 REDUCE
TP -mm REFERENCES
COPYRIGHT © .1996
{27 0m No repoduotion is psreitted
CALO FIE N3. 66T0010A in whole or in pert without
the express consent os
"
i2s This DRAWING WAS PRODUCED BRISBANE CITY COUNCIL
USING OIKDRAW BRISBANE WATER
7:31
BRISBANE
3C
CITY COUNCIL
E
3;
BRISBANE WATER
TECHNOLOGY SERVICES BRANCH
atil1i9n1® TECHNICAL BERNICS
PROJECT
133
CATHODIC PROTECTION
3a 470 DIA. TRUNK WATER MAIN
t;35
TITLE
CATHODIC PROTECTION SYSTEM

ILLAWEENA STREET
F
to,
44,
SCALE: j No. 1 OF 1 SHEETS
DRAWING No.
2 I
3 4
6
/ 486/6/6- SA1T0010E
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D 1 R 125.9.531 ISSUED FOR
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REVISION ID ZCI1 APP R
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S DRA41:tiG No. ACALR12 FITE ,
`«/ìRIPdG DI4.7áAni 486 /5725-AA1C0021=- A625C21 A

SOCKETS FOR LIFTING EYEBOLTS
SEE NOTE 9
TO SUNSHIELD SLOPING DOWN
-.as- FRONT TO REAR. SEE NOTE e

A
i DOUBLE HINGED METER. PANEL
6mm THICK OPENING TO RIGHT
NOTES
/ PAINT MATT BLACK
INSIDE 8. OUTSIDE
/ 1_
1 CABINET TO BE MANUFACTURED FROM -1
2.0mm 316 -2B STAINLESS STEEL
MOUNTING PLATE ,
2 UNLESS SPECIFIED SUPPLY CABINET
600x740
WITH PLINTH. (MOUNT PLINTH TO
CABINET USING STAINLESS STEEL SCREWS) SEGEB METERING TELEMETRY
3 MOUNTING PANELS,ESCUTCHEON PLATES & DB
SEGIEB TELEMETRY
HAT SECTION TO BE ZINC PLATED MILO STEEL
POWDER COATED ORANGE. METERING
SEE NOTE 6
4 PROVIDE STAINLESS STEEL EARTH STUDS KEY 24N -177
TO DOOR AND SWITCHBOARD CABINET.
SEE NOTE 6
5 DEGREE OF WEATHER PROTECTION - IP55
KEY 24N -71
6 DOORS TO BE STIFFENED AND FITTED WITH
3 POINT LOCKING, LOCKWOOD BARRELS, EMKA TELEMETRY 8 FLOWMETER CUBICLES:- INSULATION FIXED
SWING HANDLES (MOUNTED VERTICALLYI TO FRONT, BACK, BOTTOM AND SIDES. SEE NOTE 7 190 210
CHROME TYPE (PADLOCKABLEI 600x600
7 INSULATION TO BE 25mm THICK FIBREGLASS

THERMAL INSULATION IN ALUMINIUM SANDWICH
INSULATION TO BE SECURELY FASTENED TO
INSIDE OF CUBICLE BY MEANS OTHER THAN MOUNTING PLATE
LOG BOOK HOLDER
ADHESIVE. 600x800 600x740
200Hx150Wx300
8 TOP SUNSHIELD TO BE MADE OF 316 CATHODIC PROTECTION PERFORATED PARTITION
STAINLESS STEEL SHEETING 2.0mm THICK WITH
A POLISHED 28 FINISH. TOP SUNSHIELD SHALL CATHODIC
BE SUPPORTED BY 316 S.S. "Z" SECTIONS
PROTECTION
WHICH SHALL BE WELDED TO THE TOP SKIN
OF THE SWITCHBOARD. THE SUNSHIELD SHALL
LOG BOOK HOLDER 7 MOUNTING PLATE
600x540
200Hx150Wx3013 I
BE BOLTED TO THESE SUPPORTS.

FLOWMET ERS
9 SOCKETS PROVIDED TO ALLOW 10mm EYEBOLTS SEE NOTE 6
20
TO BE SCREWED IN FROM TOP OF SWITCHBOARD KEY 24N -71 FLOWMETERS
AND REMOVED AFTER INSTALLATION. SOCKETS
I
SHALL NOT ALLOW INGRESS OF WATER, DUST I I SEE NOTE 6
8 VERMIN TO SWITCHBOARD. u KEY 24N -71
CHROME LIFT -OFF

BAKELITE GLAND PLATE
HINGES
250x150 (TWO PER CUBICLE)
40 REMOVABLE FROM BAKELITE GLAND PLATE
INSIDE OF SWITCHBOARD 250x150 (TWO PER CUBICLE)
REMOVABLE FROM
100x75 HOT DIPPED INSIDE OF SWITCHBOARD 100
600x800 600x600
GALVANISED CHANNEL
PLINTH 30 i
I 100
1280 400
LUGS DRILLED SECTION ON B -B
WITH 10mm DIA HOLES
4 OFF LUGS WELDED
FRONT ELEVATION TO PLINTH TO ENABLE

SECTION ON A -A
BOLTING TO CONCRETE
FLOOR

DESIGN J.SAY 30.8.94 :
R. DESIGN BRISBANE CITY COUNCIL
ILLAWEENA STREET xilP
DRAWN R.LISTON 30.8.94 DEPARTMENT OF WATER SUPPLY
TRUNK MAIN AND SEWERAGE
DATE: DATE:
DIRECTOR OF
CHECKED zlf.io.9cf TITLE Brisbane City
MECHANICAL & ELECTRICAL SERVICES
DIRECTOR OF DIRECTOR OF SEW.
CONSTRUCTION M & E SERVICES OPERATIONS/ W .5. ENGINEER
SWITCHBOARD SCALE: NTS No. 1 OF 1 SHEETS
DISTRIBUTION
IN CHARGE GENERAL ARRANGEMENT DRAWING No. AMEND.
o 21.10.94 ISSUED FOR CONSTRUCTION P.L.
SUPERVISING
No DATE AMENDMENT BY DATE DATE DATE: ENGINEER
CADD FILE Na. 66CO21- 486/6/6-SA1C0021E 0

32 DIA UNDERGROUND
CONDUIT
VENT PIPE TO
ENTER PIT
IN GROUND
PIT
z
E
ì
GROUND LEVEL
CABLE MARKER TAPE

IV. 'NV
/ >J'2>\Y/ /J>2\
TEST POINT UPSTAND POLY /POLY CABLE TO

ON PROPERTY ALIGNEMENT PIT OR TEST POINT
20 DIA VENT CONDUIT
FOR EACH ANODE
VENT PIPE WITH HOLES
FASTENED TO TEST POINT
POST ABOVE GROUND LEVEL
w
n
Q
GROUND LEVEL
CABLE MARKER TAPE /
3000 MIN
BASE PLATE
32 DIA. UNDERGROUND CONDUIT
MANAGER DIRECTOR OF PLANNING

& DESIGN
DESIGN PROJECT
STANDARD BRISBANE CITY .COUNCIL

DRAWN R.LISTON
DATE. 2.12.93 DEPARTMENT OF WATER SUPPLY
DATE: CATHODIC PROTECTION
AND SEWERAGE
DIRECTOR OF DIRECTOR OF CHECKED TITLE Brisbane City
DIRECTOR OF SEW.
CONSTRUCTION M & E SERVICES
MECHANICAL & ELECTRICAL SERVICE=
OPERATIONS /W.S.
DISTRIBUTION ENGINEER VERTICAL SCALE: NTS
D 2.12.93 ISSUED FOR CONSTRUCTION No. i OF 1 S;'_F-_
IN CHARGE
R.L .
GROUNOBED DETAILS DRAWING No.
N DATE AMENDMENT BY DATE: SUPERVISING
DATE: DATE: CADD FILE No.
Q-Pulse Id TMS1264
ENGINEER
Active 21/07/2015
A625CO24E 486/6/25-AA1C0024E Page 46 of 55
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REFERENCE DRAWINGS
Ñ G
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W Ñ
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SWITCHBOARD GENERAL ARF:ANGEMENTREF DRG No.486 /6 /6- SAICOOZIE
=ir .r
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¢<z
g¢
v
Rill ó PRESS. TRANSM. SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM REF ORG
RI - SHUNT RESISTOR (SIZED TO PRODUCE A IV DROP AT FULL
LOADI.
Na.486/6/6-SAIC0032E h V `
RZ.R3 - VOLTAGE DIVIDER (SIZED TO PRODUCE A
SWITC1BOARD TERMINATION DIAGRAMS REF DRGS No.486/6/6- SA1C0033E TO SA1C0036E
VI Q Ñ C Ñ lr
VOLTAGE OF 1V ACROSS R2 AT MAX. OUTPUT VOLTAGE)
114,R5 - BLEED RESISTORS (IF REOUIREDI COUPON TYPE REFERENCE! COUPON TYPE REFERENCE
.VE AND -VE DC RISES TO BE SIZED APPROX. SNIPS ABOVE NORMAL OUTPUT CURRENT FOR 600 DIA. TRUNK MAIN FOR 755 DIA. TRUNK MAIN

DESIGN J.S. ` 3.8.93 PROJECT
& DESIGN
BRISBANE CITY COUNCIL
ILLAWEENA ST. TRUNK MAIN
DRAWN R.L. 3.8.93 DEPARTMENT OF WATER SUPPLY
DATE: DATE:
CATHODIC PROTECTION
ANO SEWERAGE
DIRECTOR OF CHECKED t- -TS ITL E RECTIFIER UNIT Brisbane City

DIRECTOR OF DIRECTOR OF SEW. MECHANICAL & ELECTRICAL SERVICES
CONSTRUCTION M & E SERVICES OPERATIONS/ W.S. WITH DATA LOGGING FACILITIES` SCALE: DITS
ENGINEER No. 1 OF SHEETS
DISTRIBUTION 1
o 23.1.95 ISSUED FOR CONSTRUCTION R.L.

IN CHARGE WIRING DIAGRAM DRAWING No. AMEND.
No DATE AMENDMENT BY SUPERVISING
DATE: DATE: CATE: ENGINEER
CADE/ FILE No. 66C031- 486/6/6- SA1C0031E o
1 4 6 7 8
NOTES
1 PH. 660W 3A
INCOMING CIRCUIT BREAKERS SHALL HAVE LINE
CN 1 i SIDE SHROUDING.
SUMP PUMP
21 CIRCUIT BREAKER RATINGS TO SUIT LOAD.
240V AC ROM DISTR. BD. GRUNDFOS KP350
31 ELCB'S TO BE RESIDUAL CURRENT DEVICES WITH
FLOAT ACTUATED
30mA SENSITIVITY.
MTR2
CN
I I MULTITRODE SUMP HIGH LEVEL ALARM
SEOEB DIRECT 240V AC MOM DISTR. BD.
12.4.95 SUMP PUMP /MULTITRODE ADDED
o
CONNECTED SINGLE A R.L.
PHASE METERING
(TARIFF 21) PROBE (SINGLE POINT)
23.1.95 ISSUED FOR CONSTRUCTION R.L.
DATE AMENDMENT INITIALS
AMENDMENT & ISSUE REGISTER

MAIN MANAGER DIRECTOR OF PLANNING
SWITCH & DESIGN
SURGE
PROTECTOR
6A
DATE: DATE:
RTU POWER SUPPLY
SITE POWER
CONSTRUCTION M & E SERVICES OPERATIONS /W.S.
AVAILABLE DISTRIBUTION
RELAY
2A
GPO (IN TEiEMETRY UNITI
DATE: DATE: DATE:
10A
iQ GPO (IN CP CUBICLE)
ENGINEER
2A DESIGN J.S. 25.1.95
io F &P FLOWNETER REFER DRG No.486/6/6- SA1C0033E (755 DIA. TRUNK MAIN)
IN CHARGE
SUPERVISING
DRAWN R.LISTON 23.1.95 M.JUKES
6A
-N ENGINEER
24 V
xo
24P1 24P1 SENIOR
---i°
TO DIFF. PRESS. TRANSMITTER (FLOW) REFER ORG No.486/6/6- SA1C0036E (410 DIA. TRUNK MAINI TRACED
ENGINEER
24P2 24P2
240/24VDC TO DIFF. PRESS. TRANSMITTER (FLOW) REFER ORG No.486/6/6- SA1C0036E (600 DIA. TRUNK MAIN!
POWER SUPPLY 24P3 CHECKED J.S. 25.1.95 ENGINEER
x,Q 24n
TO RTU CARO (REF DRG No.486/6/6- SAíC0034E)
` 24P4 '241=4 AUTOCAD FILE No. REFERENCES
TO ANALOG HIGH IMPEDANCE BUFFER (REF ORG No.486/6/6- SA1C0035E)
66C032A
10A
T TO CATHODIC. PROTECTION UNIT (REF DRG No.486/6/6- SA1C0035E)
} TO SUMP PUMP GPO (TO BE POSITIONED HIGH ON PIT WALL)

BRISBANE
CITY COUNCIL
} MULTITRODE SUMP HIGH LEVEL ALARM DEPARTMENT OF WATER
SUPPLY & SEWERAGE
MECHANICAL & ELECTRICAL SERVICES
Brisbane City
PROJECT
ILLAWEENA STREET TRUNK MAIN

REFERENCE DRAWINGS
CATHODIC PROTECTION
SWITCHBOARD GENERAL ARRANGEMENT REF DRG No. 486/6/6- SAIC0021E
LEGEND TITLE
RTU AND
G.P.O.
PRESSURE TRANSMITTER
C] SWITCHBOARD TERMINAL
SWITCHBOARD SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM
SCALE: NTS I No. 1 OF 5 SHEETS I A3
DRAWING No. AMEND.
486/6/6-SA1C0032E A

SWITCHBOARD 24VDC INTERFACE REMOTE TELEMETRY UNIT NOTES
TERMINAL STRIP MIXED I/O MODULE No.1

1 FUSES ARE 100mA RATED
(NOTE 1)
TYPE FRN1490A MIXED I/O MODULE CONFIGURATION INDICATIVE ONLY
(NOTE 21
FISCHER & PORTER

MAG. FLOWMETER
240V AC
+o I 800
1 -c"@_
801 FLOW 755
AI -1
-agi
I I
802 803
o 2
T
3 T°@-7
804 SPARE
4
AI -2
5 ß@= REFERENCE DRAWINGS
6 COMMON EARTH SWITCHBOARD GENERAL ARRANGEMENT REFER
SPA
10 DRG No. 486/6/6- SA1C0021E
814
SITE POWER AVAILABLE SWITCHBOARD SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM REFER
805
DRG No. 486/6/6- SA1C0032E
8 ßi,LT 806 POWER AVAIL.
C
73
C.P. ALARM RESET
74 807 CP ALARM RESET

10 -(:).4_
75
(.1' DI-2
C.P. DOOR ALARM 11 ""chz

76
12
808 CP DOOR ALARM
DI-3
77
C.P. POWER AVAILABLE 13
78 809 (POWER AVAIL.

14
DI -4
15 -().4
810 SPARE
MTR2 881
16 10
I DI -5
MULTITRODE SUMP 17 LEGEND

HIGH LEVEL ALARM
882 811 SUMP HI LEVEL ALARM
18 11 A TERMINAL IN CATHODIC PROTECTION UNIT
DI-6
-- INSTRUMENT EARTH
CONTINUED ON DRG No.486/6/6- SA1C0034E
MANAGER DIRECTOR OF PLANNING DESIGN PROJECT

J.S. 25.1.95
DRAWN R.LISTON 23.1.95 DEPARTMENT OF WATER SUPPLY
CATHODIC PROTECTION AND SEWERAGE
DATE: DATE:
CHECKED J.S. 25.1.95 TITLE Brisbane City MECHANICAL & ELECTRICAL SERVICES
CONSTRUCTION M & E SERVICES OPERATIONS/ W.S. SWITCHBOARD SCALE: NTS No. 2 OF S SHEETS
MTR2 ADDED ENGINEER
A 12.4.95 R.L. DISTRIBUTION
IN CHARGE TERMINATION DIAGRAM DRAWING No. AMEND.
0 23.1.95 ISSUED FOR CONSTRUCTION R.L.
SUPERVISING
DATE AMENDMENT BY DATE: DATE: DATE: ENGINEER M. JUKE S CADD FILE No. 66C033A 486/6/6 -S A1C0033E A

CONTINUED FROM DRG No.486/6/b- SA1C0033E
24VDC INTERFACE REMOTE TELEMETRY UNIT 24VDC INTERFACE SWITCHBOARD

TERMINAL STRIP MIXED I/O MODULE No.1 TERMINAL STRIP
(NOTE 1) TYPE FRN1490A (NOTE 1)
(NOTE 2)
19
812 SPARE
20 12
DI-7
21
24P3
813 SPARE 24VDC+
22 13 24N3
DI -8
24VDC-
814
23
ß
14 DIG. IN COMMON
N/C 15 24
K2
EMOTE DE -ENER 815 80
16 25 REMOTE DE- ENERGISE
DO -1
NOTES
24P3 81
17 26
2 MIXED I/O MODULE CONFIGURATION
N/C 18 27
INDICATIVE ONLY. K3
REF. RELAY 816 82
19 28 REFERENCE RELAY
DO-2
REFERENCE DRAWINGS
i20
24P3
29
83
\
K4
SWITCHBOARD GENERAL ARRANGEMENT DISCON. COUPON 817 84
21 30
REF DRG No. 486/6/6- SA1C0021E 00 -3 DISCONNECT COUPON
SWITCHBOARD SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM 24P3

22
REF DRG No.486/6/6- SA1C0032E 31
85
32
ALARM 818 86
23 33 ALARM
DO-4
LEGEND
r
24
24P3
34
A TERMINAL 87
IN CATHODIC PROTECTION UNIT
-35
J.- INSTRUMENT EARTH
s1
CONTINUED ON DRG No. 486/6/6- SA1C0035E
MANAGER DIRECTOR OF PLANNING DESIGN

1,1 zs /- 9s PROJECT
DRAWN R.LISTON 23.1.95
CATHODIC PROTECTION mi. DEPARTMENT OF WATER SUPPLY
AND SEWERAGE
DATE: DATE:
CHECKED TITLE Brisbane City
DIRECTOR OF DIRECTOR OF DIRECTOR OF SEW. MECHANICAL & ELECTRICAL SERVICES
CONSTRUCTION M & E SERVIES OPERATIONS /W.S.
ENGINEER
SWITCHBOARD SCALE: NTS No. 3 OF 5 SHEETS
DISTRIBUTION
0
SUPERVISING
ENGINEER
I CAM FILE No. 66C034- 486/6 /6- SA1C0034E 0

MA 51"-R
Page 50 of 55
CONTINUED Cathodic
FROM DRGProtection System
No.486/6/6- - Illaweena
SA1C0034E Street - Trunk Water Main - OM Manual
24VDC INTERFACE REMOTE TELEMETRY UNIT

SWITCHBOARD
TERMINAL STRIP ANALOG INPUT MODULE No.2
FUSES ARE 100mA RATED
TRANSIENT SAFETY BARRIER TYPE FRN1973A ± 1V
a
TYPE CRITIC LSJK -3R -30
51 819 820 RECT. VOLTS
n L1 E1 36
RECTIFIER VOLTAGE
AI-1
240V AC
L2 E2 822 821
37
823 824 + I RECT. AMPS

L1 El 38
AI-2 RECTIFIER CURRENT
52 826
L2 E2 825
39
/ SPARE
HIGH IMPEDANCE
BUFFERS P. GROUND
53 827 o o
`
- -
828 829 ZINC REF 755
A L1 Z 40
E1 - I-- AI-3 ZINC REFERENCE 755 DIA.
56 II 832 E
z= 831 830
I I
L2 E2 0 41
.,. o N o
-
833 834 835 ZINC'REF(COUPONI 755
L1 E1 Z I- 42
AI-4 ZINC REFERENCE (COUPON)
58 II 838 M
z 837 755 DIA.
836
A ,=-- L2 E2 0U 43 -off 10
60 839 840 841 COUPON REF 755

L1 E1 Z 44 11
AI-5 COUPON REFERENCE 755 DIA.
II
58
A }- L2 E2
844 M
0v 843
45
842
12
63 845 o m 846
- -
...- 847 ZINC REF 600
L1 E1 Z 46 13
I-- AI-6 ZINC REFERENCE 600 DIA.
66 II
850 Z z= 849 848
u L2 E2 0V 47 14
24P4 15 SPARE
24N4
16 P. GRI OUND
TERMINAL IN C.P.U.
851 O O
A. 852 853 ZINC IREF(COUPONI 600
¡
--I-
L1 E1 z
- ,-
48 17
AI-7 ZINC REFERENCE (COUPON)
-- z (
68
L2 E2
856 M = 855 854 600 DIA.
0
v 49 18
70 857 N 858 859
68
A L1
L2
E1
862
Z
- 861
50
860
19
/ COUPON REF 600
AI-8 COUPON REF 600 DIA
E2 0 -off
/ V 51 20
MAIN CUBICLE EARTH CONTINUED ON ORG No.486/6/6- SA1C0036E

DESIGN J.S. 25.1.95 :
DRAWN DEPARTMENT OF WATER SUPPLY
R.LISTON 23.1.95 niiwlllllou
CATHODIC PROTECTION AND SEWERAGE
DATE: DATE_
CHECKED J.S. TITLE Brisbane City MECHANICAL & ELECTRICAL SERVICES
25.1.95
CONSTRUCTION M & E SERVICES OPERATIONS /W.S. SWITCHBOARD SCALE: NTS No. 4 OF 5 SHEETS
ENGINEER
A 12.4.95 BUFFER TERMINALS ADDED R.L. DISTRIBUTION
0 23.1.95 ISSUED FOR CONSTRUCTION R.L.
DATE AMENDMENT BY DATE: DATE: DATE:
SUPERVISING
ENGINEER M.JUKES CADD FILE No. 66C035A 486/6/6-SA1C0035E A

CONTINUED FROM DRG No.486/6/6- SA1C0035E 24VDC INTERFACE
TERMINAL STRIP REMOTE TELEMETRY UNIT
(NOTE 1)
ANALOG INPUT MODULE No.3
24P1 24P1
52 24VDC+ TYPE FRN1421A
KENT DIFF. PRESS. TRANSMITTER
I!
(FLOW) 410 DIA TRUNK MAIN 863 864 + I FLOW 410
53
AI-1
24N1 865
24VDC- 54
24P2 24P2 FLOW 600

55 24VDC+
KENT DIFF. PRESS. TRANSMITTER AI-2
(FLOW) 600 DIA TRUNK MAIN I I 866
56 -ß 867
24N2 868
24VDC- 57 SPARE
58 -c).4.7 P. GROUND
869 SPARE
59 -c)Ei 7
AI-3
870
60 -°1EZZ3_
871 SPARE
61 -°B=
872
AI-4; _\
62 -c"Ei3.7 10
+ SPARE
11
AI-5
12
SPARE
13
AI-6
NOTES
14.

15 SPARE
16 P. GROUND
REFERENCE DRAWINGS
SPARE
CATHODIC PROTECTION UNIT REFER DRG No. 486/6/6- SA1C0031E 17
SWITCHBOARD GENERAL ARRANGEMENT REFER DRG No. 486/6/6- SA1C00Z1E.
AI-7
SWITCHBOARD SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM REFER DRG No. 486/6/6- SA1C0032E 18
+
SPARE
19
AI-8
20
, îi
& DESIGN
DESIGN ff i-95 PROJECT
BRISBANE CITY COUNCIL
DEPARTMENT OF WATER SUPPLY
DRAWN R.LISTON 23.1.95
CATHODIC PROTECTION ,
nm,,,
ANO SEWERAGE
DATE: DATE:
2.5"- 175"
CONSTRUCTION M & E SERVICES OPERATIONS /W.S. ENGINEER
SWITCHBOARD SCALE: NTS I No. 5 OF S SHEETS
DISTRIBUTION TERMINATION DIAGRAM
SUPERVISING
N DATE AMENDMENT BY DATE: DATE: DATE: ENGINEER
CADD FILE No. 66C036- 486/6/6-SA1C0036E 0
MA Page 52 of 55
CONDUIT FROM VALVE PIT

TO TEST POINT No.1
600 DIA. SLUICE VALVE

i IN PIT
R.P.A.
EXISTING 755 DIA. TRUNK MAIN I v EARTH BED 150 DIA. GAS MAIN
1/
d 755 DIA. TRUNK MAIN
REFERENCE POINT
EXISTING 600 DIA. TRUNK MAIN
TEST POINT No.1 ILLAWEENA ST.

(EXISTING)
EXISTING 410 DIA. TRUNK MAIN

a
A
CP9901
R.P.A.
EXISTING TEST POINT
MANAGER DIRECTOR OF PLANNING DESIGN PROJECT

J.SAY
& DESIGN
11.4.95 . BRISBANE CITY COUNCIL
DRAWN
ILLAWEENA ST. TRUNK MAIN ,î* DEPARTMENT OF WATER SUPPLY
R.LISTON 11.4.95 CATHODIC PROTECTION' AND SEWERAGE
DATE: DATE:
CONSTRUCTION M & E SERVICES OPERATIONS /W.S. ILLAWEENA STREET SCALE: N.T.S. No. 1 OF 3 SHEETS
ENGINEER
O 11.4.95 ISSUED FOR CONSTRUCTION R.L.
SUPERVISING
ENGINEER
CADD FILE No. 66C0039- 486/6/6- SA1C0039E 0

1x100 DIA. CONDUIT FOR CP.
-
1x40 DIA CONDUIT FOR SEGEB
SEQEB
1x40 DIA CONDUIT FOR INSTRUMENTATION
R.P.A. POLE No.2254
150 DIA GAS MAIN
C
C
L
755 DIA. TRUNK MAIN C
2x40 DIA. CONDUIT FOR CP.
EXISTING 600 DIA TRUNK MAIN
R.P.A. C.P. SWITCHBOARD

\ 18500
n
EXISTING FLOWMETER
EXISTING C.P. SWITCHBOARDS EXISTING 410 DIA TRUNK MAIN

ILLAWEENA STREET
EXISTING CONDUIT EXISTING SEQEB SUPPLY
\\ 3x40 DIA CONDUITS

80 DIA CONDUIT
FLOWMETER IN PIT
COUPON TYPE REFERENCE

\
LOT 5
NV
EXISTING
FLOWMETER PIT
LOT 4
I1
/ ® ANODE BED
EARTH RESISTIVITY 0.6 OHMS /M AT 5m DEEP.
LEGEND
Q REFERENCE
O COUPON TYPE REFERENCE

DESIGN J.SAY 11.4.95 BRISBANE CITY COUNCIL
& DESIGN
ILLAWEENA ST., TRUNK MAIN
DEPARTMENT OF WATER SUPPL Y
DRAWN R.LISTON 11.4.95 CATHODIC PROTECTION AND SEWERAGE
DATE: DATE:
TITLE Brisbane city
CHECKED IZ.4.9s MECHANICAL & ELECTRICAL SERVICES
CONSTRUCTION M & E SERVICES OPERATIONS /W.S. ILLAWEENA STREET SCALE: N.T.S. No. 2 OF 3 SHEETS
ENGINEER
o 11.4.95 ISSUED FOR CONSTRUCTION R.L.
No DA TE AMENDMENT BY DATE: DATE DATE:
SUPER VISING
ENGINEER
CADD FILE No. 66C0040- 486/6/6- SA1C0040E 0

WELDED LIFTING EYES

WELD TO TOP OF EACH FLANGE
Te M flied Se SU Flom. Adm/M
except 300 1 723
Alternatively mod loop he MMMNd I fitted

with 12 mewed Ere Oats.
xxicero CD
NOTES: Bells and Muts to be Gafaated Mild Steel.
length In a0 eases to M Dio. 2 leninim m)

Threed
For Belts Studs far Jahn t Itatersley Valves
tee Drawing K. 7/13.20S.
SECTIONAL DETAIL OF FLANGE ADAPTER
BOLTS FOR 1370 81530 FA.

FOR STEEL FLANGES
TABLE OF DIMENSIONS
Tt LI L t NUMBER LQ OF $CROSS
To
E F G. H J K L M OF RUBBER p SECTION
DIA: R DIA: A DIA: B DIA: C D DIA:
BOLTS. RING. OF RING
1S4:1
225 273 3 38 1 16 37 34 8 20 23 32/ 368 279 80 48 18 12 152 8 260 6 1112
300 337 =i 25 37 34 6 20 23 406 457 343 71 57 18 12 152 .12 '324 10 25
365 415 =1 25 37 34 6 24 27 495 552 421 80 60 18 U 164 12 402 10 25
/10 445 1 25 43 /0 8 24 27 521 578 451 80 60 18 14 166 12 432 10 25
/70 510 1 25 /3 10 . 8 24 27 584 641 516 85 60 18 14 171 12 495 10 25
510 546 H 25 43 40 8 24 27 641 705 552 85 60 18 14 171 16 530 & 10 25
MO 575 1 28 43 40 8 24 27 673 736 581 90 65 18 14 181 16 560 19,10 25
600 635 3 32 43 40 10 24 27 756 825 6/1 102 70 18 14 200 16 620 & 16 32
765 800 1 41 63 50 10 30 33 927 997 806 120 83 18 231 20 785 16 32
910 960 ti 48 53 50 10 30 33 1092 1175 966 140 90 18 258 24 945 16 32
1060 11251 51 53 50 10 30 33 1251 1334 1131 150 93 18 271 28 1111 &15 32
1220 12903 51 53 50 10 30 33 1410 1492 1296 155 95 18 278 32 1270 ® 16 32

TAIL PIPE
1370 14401 54 53 50 10 30 33 1575 1651 1/46 165 96 18 289 36 1422 ®16 32
TO BE SUPPLIED WITH FLANGE ADAPTER
1530 16001 57 64 60 12 35 39 1710 1629 1606 175 105 21 313 40 1588. /Íl116 32
1870 17503 64 6/ ' 60 12 36 39 1892 199/ 1756 165 112 21 310 40 1740 & 16 32 NO. Ciredmftt7 et thathMN CM M Y
I 13 ter tM
sarMained edthln
1992 ®16 Niee
18/0 19151 70 64 60 12 36 39 2083 218/ 1921 175 122 21 330 44 32
The Umth J' awl the timed length art Mud M the Memo a
ent 1rm Flamgma MMy et fellows
E10 E0
1000 - I7
1T20 - 70
1270 13
THIS DRAWING IS AN AMENDED .
1330 b1 AND METRIC VERSION OF DRAWING Na 2/13ß90

PIS IwOae
YO Al OMy.
ttMrm ILS. Flueg. sre sudr 1M Dhnawlee rJ' tMald M detMaeN ALL DIMENSIONS MI MITM
q tlre ONWtna In lMthnps metvxlen tM M
t7Fme a. Flaneee.
trx1x+19 MOO. Nw. IniCI4IS e NCd AM3NOMSMS BRISBANE CITY COUNCIL

Owed LA
n Dell DOPT. OP WATER SUMlY SEWERAGE
lL-!i7+rÑ!!
Cnlr I
!!'}}
_
.medeSleK/lda IrOelet
0101.4
..9yy
A.+.O
3E70 trw
xlSTler+o
Mi
A 73
2
ED milubber RIr WS AtMt+d
dimension. ntMrod . 0 12
iGG6
MA.
STANDARD FLANGE ADAPTERS TO
i
.sS9 ?äïet= moo

/
S.C.
toa
ebu
dubber Nrrg
s 7-Md
substftvtW.
e. B.C.C. STANDARD DRILLINGS
naOl.e IsIP PII MO/To te6 .0.A1jf rt:a
tDOt
Page 55 of 55
A.K DATUM osanlD I b a atn3 m. b 2J13.323

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Cathodic Protection System - Illaweena Street - Trunk Water Main - OM Manual

Electrical Mechanical Water Meters

Brisbane Water 9 FEBRUARY 1996

OPERATING MANUAL FOR:

ILLAWEENA STREET TRUNK MAINS

CATHODIC PROTECTION SYSTEM

DEPARTMENT OF WATER SUPPLY AND SEWERAGE

Q-Pulse Id TMS1264 Active 21/07/2015 Page 1 of 55

486/6/25 -AA1 C0021E Standard Rectifier Wiring Diagram

(No Number) Monthly Maintenance Program

Q-Pulse Id TMS1264 Active 21/07/2015 Page 2 of 55

As a result of this, the coating defects must be rectified by periodic maintenance or an

(2.0) CORROSION AND CATHODIC PROTECTION

Corrosion is an electrochemical process in that it is accompanied by a flow of electrical current.

Q-Pulse Id TMS1264 Active 21/07/2015 Page 3 of 55

Coating: Medium Density Fusion Bonded Polyethylene

Length: Appox 4 Km ( New 755 Dia-1.72 Km )

486/6/6-SA1C0039E Illaweena Street C.P. System

2/13.323 Standard Flange Adapters to BCC Standard Drillings

486/4/6-W 10040LO Logan Water Supply Scheme,

Q-Pulse Id TMS1264 Active 21/07/2015 Page 4 of 55

(4.1) Type of Cathodic Protection: Impressed Current.

(4.6) Associated Drawings:

(4.7) Associated Standards:

(4.8) Government Regulations:

Q-Pulse Id TMS1264 Active 21/07/2015 Page 5 of 55

(1) Natural Potential Survey.

(2) Testing of Insulated Flanges, Joints.

(3) Soil Resistance Testing.

(4) Current Drain Survey.

(5) Pipe Coating Anomaly Survey.

(6) Rectifier Loop Resistance.

(7) Foreign Structure Interference Survey and Mitigation.

(8) Final Potential Survey and Commissioning.

The cathodic protection system is maintained on a monthly basis after

Q-Pulse Id TMS1264 Active 21/07/2015 Page 6 of 55

CPS Monthly Maintenance Details.

1/ Notify plant operator and/or sign entry logs where necessary.

One tradesperson, one vehicle. 20 minutes per site.

Q-Pulse Id TMS1264 Active 21/07/2015 Page 7 of 55

CPS 6 Monthly Maintenance Details.

1/ Notify plant operator and/or sign entry logs where necessary.

One tradesperson electrical, one laborer, one vehicle.

Q-Pulse Id TMS1264 Active 21/07/2015 Page 8 of 55

CPS 60 Monthly Maintenance Details.

1/ Notify plant operator and/or sign entry logs where necessary.

One tradesperson electrical, one laborer, one vehicle.

Q-Pulse Id TMS1264 Active 21/07/2015 Page 9 of 55

Brisbane Water Engineering Services

Date: 12th February 1996

System: Illaweena Street Trunk Mains

Test Point Distances Potentials to CuSO4 Resistivities

Graph of potentials and resistivity vs pipelength

0 579 947 1027 1720

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Cathodic Protection System Loop Resistance

Date 12th February 1996

Test Voltage: Test Current:

Graph of System voltage vs current.

03/22/96 LOOPI LLA. WK4

Q-Pulse Id TMS1264 Active 21/07/2015 Page 11 of 55

Electrical Engineering Unit

Cathodic Protection Bleed Point Details Form

Project .117(Àk)¿EEJÜi t Date L-4- t? '9 `