CARL GINSBURG - The Intelligence of Moving Bodies PDF

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THE INTELLIGENCE OF
MOVING BODIES
Carl Ginsburg
With contributions
by Lucia Schuette-Ginsburg
THE INTELLIGENCE OF
MOVING BODIES:
ASOMATIC VIEW OF
LIFE AND ITS
CONSEQUENCES
AWAREing Press
Santa Fe, New Mexico
Copyright @ 2OlO by Carl Ginsburg and Lucia Schuette-Ginsburg.
All rights reserved.
ISBN 978-0-982423,5-0-9 pbk, 978-0-9824235-4-7 hdc
Library ofCongress Control Number: 2010918173
Feldenkrais@, Functional Integration@, Awareness Through Movement@,

and the Feldenkrais Method@ are registered service marks
of the FELDENKRAIS GUILD@ of NorthAmerica
Published by AWAREing Press

www.awareinginc.net
In Memory of Moshe Feldenkrais who discovered
a practice o.nd new bt"ological understanding to bring
us to self-directed correction and growth. And to
the many students and colleagues who can spread
fhese tdeas to those who can benefit.
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE BOOK
The Importance of Movement as a Biological Dimension
So Does the Bioiogical System as a Whole 39

The Order Problem 40
Non-linearity 45
47
50
John Lilly's Experiment ....................... ............... 52
Out on the Grass with my Dog ............... ......52
Eigen Forms ............. 55
Explorations in Perceiving ................. ............. 59
SPACE .7O
Being in the World .......................72
The Effect of Changing the Spatial Environment
of Perception and Function .............................77
The Spaee of Yourself and the Sense of Self .................. 78
TIME .......................... 84
Event Perception ........................... 85
The Specious Present ............... 88
Time and Movement .................. 90
6 THE CONTRAST OF TWO BASIC ATTITUDES .93

The Confict of Conceptualizations 96
Plasticity 100
vii
PART TWO
Affect Learning and Development 107
r.o9
r.09
A NEW LOOK AT INFANCY:
HUMAN AFFECT AND EMOTION .... LIz
Affect and the Emotions:
The Relation to Movement and Embodiment ....................................... 119
A NEW LOOK AT INFANCY: SELF-LEARNING L29

The Conditions of Self-Learning, Part I ...............................:.................... 129
The Conditions of Self-Learning, Part II:
Applying the Feldenkrais Insights .................... ................ 139
10 FROM PERCEPTION TO CONCEPTION .. .. L43
Preverbal Conceptualization:
Thinking begins before language ..... L45
Making the Label: A Dialog ........................... 148
AFFECT: A HIDDEN DIMENSION AND

A MAJOR PART OF DAILY LIFE .. ... . ...................... L52
The examples of music, painting and dance t52

Glenn Gould Plays Beethoven's Sonata Number r3 153
Affect: Movement in Painting .................... L62
Affect and Dance: Bodies in Movement .................... ..... 165
PART THREE
What Can We Do with what
We have Learned? 171.
L2 INTRODUCTION TO PART III ......... ................ L73

Somatic Thinking and Feldenkrais Functional Integration-
Paradigms of a New Practical Thinking ......................... 173
The Discovery of a Learning Pathway ............................. 176

Learning the Art of Functional Integration .......................................... L82
What is Function? What is Integration? ................ ....... L84
13 THE MINDSET OF SELF-LEARNING ......... .... 186

Case Study: Working with a Young Child .................... 188
Lucia Schuetfe-G insburg
Case Study: A Forty-Eight-Year-Old Man with a Stroke ............ 201
Carl Ginsburg
viii CONTENT
Perception, Movement, Space:

The Importance of Phenomenology ...... 2O7
The Missing Image ., ... 2OB
L4 THE CONDITIONS OF SELF-LEARNING III: ........ ............ .. 2L2
Shifting Patterns of Mobilization and the Question of Pain .... 2L2
Movement, Pattern, Pain: Unlocking the Mystery ........................... 213
Referred Pain and Body Pattern ................... .......................22I
MOVING YOURSETF AS AN ENTRY INTO
AWARENESS AND SELF-OBSERVATION .......223
Important and Necessary Conditions for Learning ....................... 223
Exploring Synergies ...............226
Completing the Image Improves
the Self-Perception and the Synergy 230
Exploring Refexive Balancing 23L
Finding Two Ways of Attending 235
16 THE NECESSITY OF DYNAM 239
Complexity in Nature 239
Coordination Dynamics ................... .............. 243
Feldenkrais' Cybernetic Loop Model of Movement,
Learning and Environment ..........................247
17 THE INTERSECTION OF SCIENCE AND EXPERIENCE.. 249

The View from Monte Grande 252
What is a Brain for Anyway? ...................... 253
Some Clashes Between Science and Common Belief and
the Usefulness of Experience 255
The Example of Mirror Neurons 262
Inter-subjective Connections: The Art of DancingTogether... 266
Learning Re-visited 267
An After Word .......... 270
ix
APPENDICES / REFERENCES 277
APPENDIX I
NOTES ON LANGUAGE AND COMPARISONS ..........:.. . ..........278
APPENDIX II
NEUROLOGICAL ASPECTS OF
THE FELDENKRAIS METHOD 288
r. A List of some Interventions used in the Feldenkrais Method
and the Effects on CNS Patterns of Mobilization ....................... ... 288
z. The Body in Gravity ................ 29O
3. Inter-subjectivity as Mediated Through Body Contact ............... 291
4. Future Investigations ................ ............-..........292
REFERENCES ..293
SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING ... ....... 299
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS. . . .............301
ABOUT THE AUTHORS . .. ...... . ......... 303
CARL GTNSBURG ............... . 304
xl
A PERSCNAL PREFACE
As I sit at my desktop computer, I am aware of my fingers
moving the keys, mybreathing, the screen in front of me and the key-
board as I move myhead to see it. The words come into myconscious-
ness as I convert my intent into sentences, what I want to describe,
and what I am aware of in my personal environment and in the space
of my outside environment. I notice the movement of my breathing,
which is smooth and shallow, without effort, the feeling of life in my
legs, my trunk, my arms, my feet, my head, as well the pressure of my
weight on the chair seat. And at the periphery I am aware of the na-
ture outside the window, the growing chestnut tree and its blossoms,
the breeze through the other bushes and trees, a bit ofblue sky and a
line of cloudiness. It is all very ordinary and yet special. I am about to
write that it was not always like so in my life, and I notice that I wiggle
my left knee from side to side. The thought reflects in a slight uneasi-
ness that couples with my peripherally conscious moving of my leg. In
the complexity of each present moment there are layers of awareness.
It was not always so. I think back on the beginnings of my
present life, back to my professorship in inorganic chemistry at a small
college connected to a larger university in the I96Os. Then my present
moments were not so full. I am sure that the feeling and sensation of
life in myself was far back in my awareness; habitual movements were
not noticed; my environment was not experienced as present, but as
a place of discomfort. I remember often a perception of not belong-
ing to where I was, that I was a foreigner on Earth. The time teaching
was tedious; that is, I experienced tiredness, a heaviness, and waited
anxiously for the bell so that I could stop and go back to my desk. And
I suffered from ailments, including repeated episodes of severe back
pain and a chronic bowel irritation.'Moving itself was experienced at
times as a chore. I was best offwith my nose in a book.
In those days I read avidly about psychology, alienation,
politics, existentialism and related topics. I had read Freud, Norman
O. Brown, PauI Goodman, Norman Mailer, Camus, Sartre, Martin
Buber and Wilhelm Reich. I subscribedto Commentary and Encoun-
fer. These interests were extracurricular. I also read in the field of the
philosophy of science and considered myself thoroughly rational. I
believed in an objective truth that could be revealed best by exper-
imental methods. I was sure that I was normal. And yet what was
understood then in scientific psychology seemed to have only a weak
xll
relationship to the experience of being alive. Limited as I was, I sus-

pected there was much that I had not experienced and not under-
stood. My readings did not make my life smarter or better. The path of
life seemed to continue without choice.
Until pain became prominent, most of my conscious expe-
rience was involved in verbal thinking, or escaping into doodling. My
life with friends was full of talk. With mywife at that time, there were
many moments of struggle and anger. I rationalized that she imag-
ined the slights and faults that brought us to conflict. It took a week-
end with an encounter group to reveal my self to myself. It was a shock
to realize that I was hiding myself from myself, and those around me.
How did I do this? What was gained and what was lost? How did it dis-
tort my concepts, and perceptions?
My intent in bringing up these personal details is to reveal a
condition that while personal to my own life at that time is actually an
induced condition that affects many people in modern culture. While
I projected a mask of calm (even to myself), I was very disconnected
from feelings and emotions that were present in the fringe of my ex-
perience, but inhibited from expression. I did not fully experience
the life in myself. I remember in the first experience of an encounter
group feeling a kind of superiority in my calm as I watched others in
the group becoming emotional at various points. During the second
weekend I exploded in unsuspected rage. After the initial shock, I
had a sense of relief and openness in breathing, a feeling of letting go.
Wilhelm Reich started to make sense. He had postulated that what is
hidden and resisted is embodied in the state of the musculature and
body. Reich as a member of Freud's inner circle was eventually ejected
from the group of psychoanalysis. Later he was considered a paranoid
and unbalanced. Yet many of his insights and intuitions are no longer
considered radical.
By the mid l97os, I had abandoned my career as a professor
and was in a training group in San Francisco with Moshe Feldenkrais,
D.Sc. The doctorate in science was obtained for work done in the
laboratory of Frederick Joliot-Curie in Paris in the l930s and award-
ed just after WWII. Yet what Moshe Feldenkrais was presenting to
us seemed far afield from physics and engineering. The theme was
movement, but not from the external perspective. It was not dance,
not performance, not aesthetics, not an external analysis of how we
A PERSONAL PREFACL xlu
moved, but an exploration of our own kinesthetic experience devel-

oping all the richness possible from that.
The year before I had the opportunity to experience his
movement lessons with a teacher who had studied with Feldenkrais
briefly in workshops. At this point I was acutely aware that the way
in which I inhibited feeling was by controlling those movements of
myself necessary to the expression of those feelings. This was not
necessarily conscious on my part. However, having awareness of what
I did and how I did it as revealed in the Feldenkrais lessons was an
important step in resolving a number of Iife difficulties. The experi-
ence of a sense of freedom in moving, dancing, acting, opened further
the possibility of an embodied life. The perception of not belonging,
not connecting, lifted. I could now go to the floor and with the move-
ment sequence processes I learned to relieve the pain producing ten-
sions in the musculature. It took many years to better connect with
life, nature, and other people. The journey I took in the late sixties,
and throughout the seventies put me on a path unimaginable before I
began. While I was guided by a number of other persons such as body
psychotherapist Ron Kurtz, and gestalt therapist Jack Canfield, the
work from 1975 to 1978 with Moshe Feldenkrais was instrumental to
revising entirely my worldview and my process of thinking. What was
personally practical now became what I would share with others the
rest of my life. I became a practitioner and then trainer of the Felden-
krais Method. I abandoned completely my academic career, and work
as a chemist.
There was another side to spending four summers with
Feldenkrais; While my explorations into feeling and moving had
resulted in a turning away from intellect, Feldenkrais was a thinker
of the first order. He invited Stanford neuroscientist Karl Pribram
to participate in three dialogs for our training group. Later we had
visits from cybernetician Heinz von Foerster, and anthropologist
Margaret Mead. We were encouraged to read widely in all areas rel-
evant to the work we were doing experientially. And from the first
session onward Feldenkrais spaced the experiential lessons with
lectures and stories to convey the strong intellectual underpinning
to his movement work. He opened up consideration of movement,
not as some subsidiary system of a person or organism, but as the
most essential aspect of being alive. What we were doing in explor-
xtv
ing movement would affect everything else in ourselves. Nothing in

the process of living was conceivable without movement. While at
first skeptical of the idea that changing patterns of moving would
also change patterns of conceptualization and cognition, for example,
it was clear after four years in training that this was a consequence
for myself. What Feldenkrais presented intellectually cohered with
everything we did on the experiential level. He encouraged us to learn
as he did and not take anything for granted. We were immersed in a
method of inquiry and self-generated discovery. TWo aspects of his
views on what we were doing were particularly attractive to me. First
that thinking involved sensing, feeling and acting. Intellectual, verbal,
thinking without grounding in the senses and experiential realm was
sterile. Second each person had the ability to find out for him/herself
and needed to, do so. Error often resulted in applying a predigested
external idea of what was correct.
As human beings we tend to be hungry for the correct view,
and the right answers. Feldenkrais'program was, despite my attraction
to a search for autonomy and self-directed improvement, a challenge.
I often wanted the correct answer to the puzzles that he presented.
I knew on the other hand that human problems were often obscure;
that is, direct cause-and-effect thinking did not lead to solutions or
that such thinking was only partially valid and limited. We had to
think outside the box of our learned cognitive structures. I began to
separate from the idea that movement was an add-on, that as a per-
son I had a motor apparatus that was responsible for my sensory mo-
tor skills. As I became adept with the method, my enhanced abilities
brought me to a thinking that was powerful in its application, and at
the same time convinced me that there was a strong middle path be-
tween working from educated pre-existing beliefs and the anarchism
of anything goes. Living systems are highly complex and ultimately
unpredictable in a strict sense. At the same time they are reasonably
lawful in how they act and interact. Learning takes place in an envi-
ronment in which action and interaction are the means whereby the
nervous system and body develop in relation to the needs for suste-
nance, reproduction and protection. Life survives out of the activities
that sustain it. Life is ongoing even if individual organisms are born,
develop and die. Yet each organism'knows' how to survive as long as
is possible. Movement and intelligence are keythreads of this ongoing
A PERSONAL PREFACE xv
process. Somehow in our western culture we have tended to lose a liv-

ing connection to these threads. Thinkers and scientists are only re-
cently rediscovering movement and embodiment. Intelligence is only
recently being rediscovered as a feature of all living things, including
the most simple.* Feldenkrais was in the forefront of this thinking
and without the exposure to his methodology this book would not be
possible. The methodology itself seemed a mystery to me, even after
years of practice. The ideas he transmitted nevertheless percolated
along with the experiencing and the scientific reading, which I con-
tinued. Thus I slowly grasped how this method lead to pattern change,
and a different sense of life. With this insight it becomes clear how
a somatic viewpoint involving mind-body- environment -world can
Iead to a praxis of awareness and engagement. The book that follows
is an exploration of this radical biological view and the consequences
that follow.
* See Frederick Prete, (ed,.), Complex Worlds

from Simpler Nervous Sysfems, MIT Press
(2OO4) for many examples. "The authors ... explain how animals with small, often
minuscule, nervous systems - jumping spiders, bees, praying mantids, toads, and
others - are not the simple'reflex machines'theywere once thought to be. Because
these animals live in the same world as do much larger species, they must meet
the same environmental challenges. They do so by construting complex perceptual
worlds within which they can weigh options, make decisions, integrate unique
experiences, apply complex algorithms, and execute plans ...".
AN INTTRODUCTION
TO TFIE BCOK
The Importance of Movement
as a Biological Dimension
As Human observers, many things in the universe are seen
by us to move. But only living things are seen to move themselves.
Moshe Feldenkrais said, "Movement is the key to life." What could
he have meant by this statement? A life form that sustains itself, and
moves itself, must be sensitive to its surroundings, therefore the intel-
ligence of (self) moving bodies. Everything alive is in movement and
has at least some movement autonomy in relation to a wider environ-
ment. Science writer and anthropologist Jeremy Narby (2005) in his
recent book , Intelligence in Nature, documents the scientific evidence
and experiential evidenie that intelligence exists at every level oflife
from the bacterium to the highest levels of evolution. By intelligence
he means, as he hones this concept, adaptability and variability in re-
sponse to the conditions of an environment inwhich Iife canbe main-
tained. To achieve this, self-movement is essential.
Hard science as a modality of learning, thinking and explor-
ing is constrained by established habits and norms of investigation.
We more often think of this methodology as leading to the freedom
of thought that established our modern world and do not notice its
limitations. More politely you could say the activity we call science
has developed certain rigorous procedures in order to establish what
is so in our world. We want to know that our conceptions have validity.
While the successes of physics, chemistry and the application of these
conceptual realms to the engineering of our environment can be
much admired, the application of its methodologies to living beings
creates unexpected problems. The methodologies of hard science fix-
ate the attention on isolating mechanisms, finding causes and effects,
narrowing attention to limited areas, and constraining thinking to an
artificial realm we call objectivity. This is not to say that the reduc-
tionist and objectivist program cannot yield knowledge of the living
world. Many important discoveries about our selves and other living
beings have followed. We now know many details about the biologi-
cal mechanisms of genetics, cellular activity, nerve transmission, and
how learning takes place in terms of structural changes in nerve cells.
And we have established that manv of these details are common to
2
organisms at vastly different levels of complexity. The complexity it-

self on the other hand has not yielded easily to reductive models. The
point is that the integrative, and relational, aspects of living systems
require more than simply adding the pieces together. We need a biol-
ogy of coherence to improve our understanding. Yet we imagine that
staying on the current popular pathway of trying to engineer our life's
problems will lead to a far better life. We think we know much more
about ourselves than bur ancestors. On the other hand we continually
produce new disasters and cover up for our lack ofunderstanding. I
remind myself of the statements of Albert Einstein,
"Insanity is doing the same old thing the same old way while
expecting different results."
and Moshe Feldenkrais:
"You see, so it's difficult for the first time too to have a thought,
which is contrary to what everybody believes."
To do the work of the Feldenkrais Method required that I

put aside many habits of thinking and doing ingrained by my long ap-
prenticeship in school. I evolved a very different perspective about
life as a result and discovered the necessity of thinking simply: sens-
ing, feeling and acting without the mediation of language. You might
describe this as thinking directly in movement. Strict adherence to
the objective stance simply interfered with successful exploration of
the human situations I was faced with, both with myself and those
who sought myhelp. Often solutions appeared indirectlyandwithout
figuring out what to do. This shift in thinking and the return to ex-
perience has practical consequences. In afterthought I could return
to language, which is necessary for conceptual communicating. The
essence of Feldenkrais' work was to take abstract concepts into con-
creteness. Everything in his work could be shown through demon-
stration.
Feldenkrais'work, while unique in its particular way of us-
ing movement exploration to expanding awareness and self-growth,
was also part of a growing trend in modern thinking. Not all scien-
tific approaches stayed within the realm of strict objectivism. What is
of value should be observable to others and therefore discoverable.
Feldenkrais had contact with a number of seminal thinkers and scien-
tists who were pioneering new ways of thinking in biology, psychology
AN TNTRODUCTTON TO THE BOOK 3
and neuroscience. Among them were Aaharon Katchalsky (Katsir),

who helped begin the development of dynamic systems theory; Karl
Pribram, who at the time developed a hologram model of brain func-
tions; and some of the founders and elaborators of the cybernetics
movement, Gregory Bateson, Margaret Mead, Heinz von Foerster and
Francisco Varela. They all appreciated something in Feldenkrais'
work that echoed their own new approaches. What we all found in
watching him work was that people with many varied difficulties
could find a way with his contact with them to improve in functioning
even when all previous interventions had failed. It looked miraculous.
Nevertheless he was simply using his extraordinary sensitivity and
understanding of human complexity to guide people to self-correc-
tion. In doing so he trusted that a living person had this capacity as a
consequence of the fundamental ability to learn. Many thinkers to-
day now call this self-organizatf.on.
Human movement and the embodied life already had a
practical tradition behind it in the oriental healing practices and mar-
tial arts, and in a growing development of somatic awareness practic-
es based on the work of Elsa Gindler, Heinrich Jacoby, Ida Rolf and
F. M. Alexander. Somatic awareness practices involve self-observation
and self-awareness processes in moving and acting. Feldenkrais had
interacted with the work of each of these teachers. In 1975, however,
in most fields of thinking and study of the human being, movement
was either ignored or relegated to a separate field of study such as
motor learning and behavior. In the past century what now is labeled
embodimenf was taken seriously primarily by phenomenology, espe-
cially in the work of Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-Ponty,
and in the psychoanalytically related work of Wilhelm Reich and Paul
Schilder. One notable exception in science was the pioneering work
of Russian physiologist and psychologist Nicholai Bernstein. We will
meet him in laterparts of the book.
Today the situation is changing radically. Neuroscientists
are now speculating that without dynamic connections to a living
body and environment, the nervous system cannot function. Profes-
sor of Neuroscience at Rutgers University Georgy Buszaki writes in
his recent book Rhythms of the Brain (2006, p.221), "However, \Mith-
out the output interacting with body and environment, no amount
of sensory stimulation can produce a useful brain." And Professor of
4
Neurophysiology Giacomo Ftizzolati at the University of Parma and

Associate Professor of Philosophy of Science Corrado Sinigaglia at
the Universityof Milanwrite inMirrorsinthe Brain (2008, p. xi),'The
rigid divide between perceptive, motor, and cognitive processes is to
a great extent artificial; not only does perception appear to be imbed-
ded in the dynamics of action, becoming more composite than used to
be thought in the past, but the acti.ng brarn is also and above all abrain
that understends."
The above comments are prompted by many new discover-
ies about the nervous system. But the whole question of body-mind
has been reassessed in recent years from scientists and philosophers.
The seminal book, which helped promote the idea of an embodied
cognitive science, The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Mind and Human
Experience (f99f) by biologist and neuroscientist Francisco Varela,
philosopher Evan Thompson, and psychologist Eleanor Rosch, moved
the discussion forward in a very positive way. They describe their book
as an "exploration of deep circularity" (p.I2). Philosophers such as
Shaun Gallagher with his book f/ow the Body Shapes the Mind (2005),
Alva Noe with Action in Perception (2OO4), and Evan Thompson with
Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology and the Sciences of Mind (2OO7)
have continued the discussion within the philosophy of mind. There
is nevertheless deep resistance among many scientists and thinkers
who wish to preserve a scientific quest for objective knowledge, as
we have understood it. There is a belief that science depends on objec-
tivism and must precede with a series of slow steps. Many scientists
operate in their fields of inquiry as if each aspect of their study is a
separate and independent entity with the idea that the accumulation
of bits will create a storehouse of knowledge. Nonetheless there were
many predecessors who suspected this approach was not enough,
that we had to consider that we are embodied beings where the fact
of embodiment challenges objectivism. I mention only a few of the
other scientists and thinkers who had considered that embodiment
arid or movement are important for a more complete understanding
of life in all its aspects and we ourselves are essential. There is no view
from nowhere. I include psychologist J.J. Gibson and his associates,
E.J. Gibson, Edward Reed and Michael Turvey; biologist Humberto
Maturana; cognitive scientists George Lakoff and Mark Johnson;
movement scientists Marc Jeannerod and J.A. Scott Kelso; develop-
AN INTRODUCTTON TO THE BOOK 5
mental psychologist Esther Thelen; philosopher and psychotherapist

Eugene Gendlin; psychiatrist Daniel Stern; and neuroscientist and
musician Manfred Clynes. Finally I would include in this list from the
more distant past, Charles Darwin, Henri Poincare, William James
andJohn Dewey.
TWo recent books with movement as a central or major
theme bring awareness to the very essential place of movement itself:
The Brain's Sense of Movemenl (2OOO) by neuro-physiologist Alain
Berthoz, and, The Primacy of Movement (1999) by philosopher, biolo-
gist and dancer Maxine Sheets-Johnstone. They are important sourc-
es for further study of the issues brought forth in this book and for
much more detail of the scientific basis and intellectual discourse in
relation to the themes of this book. If movement is so essential, we
have to consider it as integral to living beings and not just a separate
aspect of life that can be studied independently.
Thus the theme of this book is movement in relation to
everything else. There are many questions: How did we get to adult-
hood where we live with other human beings, interact with them, talk,
make love, fight, and carry on with many activities? It is impossible
to think that we can live without the matrix of other humans and
the other life forms around us. How do we develop our capacities in
relation to this matrix? We learn in intimate contact with caretakers
whether they are our parents or not. We learn also in an environment,
which includes the resources necessary for life. And the environment
includes gravity, which makes a very special demand on growth and
development. Development is a serious business in life for animate,
interacting beings. Thus we will ultimately have to account for many
levels of interaction from the molecular to the social and then to the
ecological.
As I am no longer an active scientist, what I have to contrib-
ute comes much more out of my twenty-seven years of active practice
and experience with the Feldenkrais Method. The contributions by
my wife Lucia Schuette-Ginsburg equally come from the domain of
active practice, especiallywith children. Much of Feldenkrais work is
unique as will become apparent as the book proceeds. Thus this book
will emphasize, as much as possible in book format, personal experi-
ence. It is to my mind a very good route to wisdom if used carefully
and with training. Wisdom is not the same as technical and scientific
6
knowledge, which require the practice of specific methods of investi-

gation differing from what I am proposing. But personal experience
also requires a disciplined mode of investigation in order to arrive at
a usefuI perspective. With this we can begin to sweep out the cobwebs
of conceptualization that confuse our sensing, feeling, acting and thus
our thinking. It is not a question of opposing knowledge developed
in other ways. In fact it is essential not to do this. But a disciplined
personal exploration can help clarify the conceptual confusions that
arise from an attachment to third person accounts of ourselves, as
well as how we understand our first person experience. Ultimately
the two domains should interrelate. I hope thereby to engage you,
the reader on a journey, to move away from an over-educated know-
ing and into the realm of finding out for yourself to whatever degree
is possible. Our question is finding how. We can then ask how we
perceive and how it is different from sensing, how conceiving takes
perceiving to the level of thinking, how movement leads to perceiving
and conceiving, and how perceiving ourselves accurately can lead to a
better life and abetter thinkingfor ourselves. Movement also takes us
to another realm of living related to perceiving and thinking. And that
is the realm of affect. Affect is more than what we can label emotion.
Without affect, intelligence has no way to operate. The contexb of the
investigation will be the matrix of interaction where we live and in
whichwe developed.
The book is divided in three parts. In Partl we will explore
the ground of a new thinking about life and its origins. We begin with
the insight that in biological life the first living thing enclosed itself
in a membrane and that within that boundary there was a structure
and function that ensured self-propulsion. Nothing lives or survives
without the separation and some form of sentience. We expand from
this point to investigating intention, action, perception, and how this
leads to concepts such as space and time.
In PartII the question of learning and development is
brought to the foreground, as well as the vast topic of affect and emo-
tion. We will followwith an emphasis of finding how movement is nec-
essary for affect and how affect is necessary for thinking learning and
developing. We will touch on the question of language and the relation
of affect to music and other art forms. We will explore how movement
and embodiment are essential to the development of thinking, which
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE BOOK 7
begins without words but becomes languaging in relation to living in

an environment of speaking persons.
PartIII will bring us to the practical aspects of this new
thinking about life. We will through examples show it is possible to re-
solve particular problems within ourselves and discover that through
thinking in movement we can find a way to free ourselves from ha-
bitual impasses. Specific movement explorations will be given so that
the reader can experience directly the learning process. Hopefully
then each person can find a path for acting more constructively in life
and with greater pleasure and connectedness. And lastlywe will sum
up how the developing understanding of this new view of life leads
to reconsidering many questions about learning, being and acting in
modern life.
A Note for Readers: The book is organized with a developmental sequence of

themes. However some readers may find Part I obscure on first reading.
The authors suggest that the reader can skip ahead to Part II or even part III.
If a section is difficult to understand, leave it and come back at a later time.
9
PART
ONE
From Ori.gin to Percepti.on
11
1 TNTRODUCTTON
TC PART I
I Life's Contingencies Bring Questions
A man who was blind from early childhood had his vision
restored in adulthood. He could see but he couldn't'see.'Was he look-
ing at the cat or the dog? He had no intuition. Only a careful noticing
of how the hair was or how the ears were directed, and a matching to
his verbal memory of which features constituted the dog, and which
the cat. Only this slow cognitive process allowed him to distinguish
the creature he was looking at. On the other hand simply touching and
stroking revealed immediatelywhich animal was present. It is hard to
imagine his difficulty. We take our own visual perceiving so much for
granted we tend to think all we need are eyes to see.
Walking down stairs was a misery because upon seeing his
foot he didn't know where to place it. When he was blind he had no
difficulty. He placed his foot exactly where he had stability and con-
tinued down the stairs without concern. Tragically, he never did learn
to move his eyes together and perceive as most people do. His prob-
lem was resolved when he eventually became blind again. Having
never learned to perceive meant that he couldn't 'see' even with nor-
mal eyes and having a normal image on the retina. He also could not
coordinate his seeing and his moving. These learnings are normally
accomplished in childhood without difficulty. When this does not take
place learning can happen onlywith great difficulty and effort.
Another man suffered a terrible misfortune in loosing his
proprioception, that is, his perception of his body-space, muscular ac-
tivity, orientation of his limbs, etc. No one could help him and he was
unable to move himself. He lost his ability to be an agent for his own
movement except for moving his head and neck. None of the profes-
sional people he consulted could help him. In fact most of us reading
this have a hard time understanding his experience. We have our pro-
prioception more or less intact and do not tend to notice it. How is it
he cannot move himself? He was desperate to recover his agency of
himself.
Out of this predicament he discovered that he could use his
visual perception of his limbs and trunk to guide (with considerable
effort and difficulty) his moving himself. He became extraordinarily
skillful in leading a semblance of a normal life, which was a goal he set
L2
for himself. He wanted to be Iike the person he was before his illness
and retain his sense of his personhood. His success baffied his doctors.
Nevertheless once he had established a path for himself in learning,
he did find professional helpers who could guide him.
These are exemplary stories to reveal how complex our
skills are in Iiving our daily life. The difficulties of these two persons
reveal that there is much we take for granted about ourselves. We
often fail to appreciate how our so-called mental abilities relate to
what is so essential to being alive. That is, we are moving beings and
autonomous, or self-moving beings. We take for granted also how we
learned our skills, how we Iearned to stand up, to walk up and down
stairs, how we learned to pick up obj ects, how we learned to recognize
and identify cats and dogs, and howwe learned to speak about all this.
We live each of us in the midst of our own accomplishments and in the
context of our embedded-ness in a complex social world. The ques-
tion is, can we gain awareness of what we do and how we do it, and
how we can learn and learn to learn? That will be one aspect of this
book.
In the first story a learning process was not discovered by
Vernon, the manwho lost and regained the use of his eyes. Indeed Oli-
ver Sacks, ("To See and Not See" in An Anthropoligist on Mars,1995,)
who tells the story speculates that Vernon's later loss of vision after
regaining it was a fortuitous event because it ended the sensory con-
fusion that resulted from the new ability to have visual sensation. In
the second story Ian Waterman, the man who lost his proprioception,
engaged himself in his own unique learning process. Medical sci-
ence was unable to be of any help to him, as was any therapy that he
tried. In his intention to recover some sort of agency and control of
his movement and personhood for himself, he could rely only on his
own personal discoveries. It is a life attitude much to be admired. We
would not know about it were it not for the curiosity of neurologist
Jonathon CoIe, who investigated Ian's situation in great depth and
wrote the account that we have of it (Cole, Pride and a Daily Marathon,
r9e5).
The questions raised by these two stories are indeed pro-
found. The question of mind andbody is still a quandaryfor those who
wish to pursue understanding, as is that of the origin of consciousness
itself and its relation to its material substrata, the brain and physi-
Part I, Chapter r 13
INTRODUCTION TO PART I
Life's Contingencies Bring Questions
cal body. Oliver Sacks speculates that Vernon, the man who regained
his vision, was missing the experience of moving his eyes in order to
fix his attention, track movement in his environment and correlate
the two eyes to a common point of focus. Could working with move-
ment have resulted in his gaining perceptual ability? How is moving
the eyes and body related to the act ofvisual perceiving or perceiving
with any other sensory modality? We can only speculate about Ver-
non's predicament. But we can explore the more general questions. In
the story of Ian Waterman as told by Jonathan Cole, what is clear is
that for Ian a kind of effort of will allowed him to make a sensory sub-
stitution. He used his vision to replace proprioception. In a way this is
the opposite situation of Vernon, whose newly acquired vision inter-
fered with his acute proprioception and tactile perception. How was
all this possible? And for Ian Waterman what did his sense of himself
have to do with his intentionality in seeking the learning that he ac-
complished?
In the last forty or fifty years whole new fields of studies
have opened up that are beginning to look at something beyond just
the behavior of human beings and animals. It includes a field now
known as cognitive science in which the cognitive thinking abilities
of humans have been studied at many different levels. More recently
consciousness has become a valid topic for scholarly and scientific in-
vestigation. It is even the case that such topics as embodiment, move-
ment and phenomenal experience have become respectable. I tell two
more stories to bring some of the difficulties to light.
Aphilosopherwrites abook in which he wishes to correlate
many findings from neuro-scientific research and philosophically-
based positions about consciousness into a coherent model of how
consciousness and phenomenal experience can emerge out of the in-
teraction of living systems with the natural world. It is a very good
book and provides a detailed analysis of his models. He begins his
book with the following statements:
"The main thesis is that no such things as selves exist in the
world. Nobody ever was or had a self. All that ever existed were con-
scious self-models that could not be recognized as models."
The philosopher gets up each morning, washes himself,
brushes his teeth, decides what shirt and pants he wants to wear, dress-
es himself, eats a quick breakfast before driving to his university to
L4
present himself in front of the gathered students. He wants to under-

stand how he does that. He continues the idea he began as follows:
"The phenomenal self is not a thing, but a process - and the
subjective experience of being someone emerges if a conscious infor-
mation processing system operates under a transparent self-model."
The philosopher obviously has his priorities as to what he
wishes to label as existing and what not. But how is this "conscious
information processing system" imbued with any more existence or
reality than what he calls self? Both words involve a concept about
something. In a way it is similar to how we make the concept that we
label self. How do we make concepts and how do they imply or not
imply existence? Both concepts involve process and not fixity. Self
is a biologically related processing, and information processing is a
mechanical process related to humanly created machines. Do they re-
ally relate to each other? The answer is not clear because we don't yet
fully understand biological entities.
A Nobel Prize-winning scientist writes in a book about
consciousness and the brain, reporting on important research in neu-
roscience, the following statement, which he calls the astonishing
hypothesis: "'You,' your joys and sorrows, your memories and your
ambitions, your sense of personal identity and free will, are in fact no
more than the behavior of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their as-
sociated molecules." In paraphrase the author puts it, "You're nothing
but a pack of neurons."r Are we to be astonished by his wisdom or his
confusion? Or perhaps both, because what we say, we say in a domain
of communication that does not give us a privileged position to know
God-like what is absolute. What does it mean to say that you and I are
(have being as) only a pack of neurons? In one sense it means that the
author wants us to take this as a metaphor for the metaphysical stance
he wants us to accept, i.e., there exists only a material reality. In an-
other sense the author is asking us to shed what he takes to be our
collective illusions. He makes an identity: feelings = pack of neurons.
There is no other identity possible since he uses the words "nothing
but." Of course he knows that we make all kinds of other identities.
He chooses this one to shock his audience. But he makes a biologi-
cal confusion. What are a pack of neurons outside of a living, moving
body and a world, which supports such life forms? We need somehow
to know what it means when we say to be, or to exist, and what exists
I Sir Francis Crick, The Astonishing Hypothesis, Touchstone Press (1994), p. 3.

Part I, Chapter r 15
if we only are a pack of neurons. Later in the book the scientist takes
back his all or nothing stance when he states a view beyond the hy-
pothesis and the religious view of a soul. He writes, "There is always a
third possibility: that the facts support a new, alternative way of look-
ing at the mind-brain problem that is significantly different from the
rather crude views many neuroscientists hold today, and also from
the religious point of view."2
Perhaps the dictionary can help solve our problem. Taking
a clue from Heinz von Foerster, I went to a Oxford Dictionary and
found the word'exist'means "to be; have being; be real." I then knew
where to look for elucidation of the word, exist. So I went to a few
other words in the dictionary and found that the word'be'means to
"exist; occur; live." I then found that'being' is defined as "existence,"
and that 'real' is defined as "existing in fact." I now had to find out
about'fact', which is defined as "known to be true," and'true', which
is defined as "in agreement with fact." For the word 'live' I found the
definition, "having existence," and at this point realized I had entered
a closed loop with no way out. The dictionary had put me through a
circle of word relationships without ever elucidating anything about
what the words mean. Yet I - we - use these words constantly and
know exactly how to use them for the purposes of expression.
Language when you investigate in this way is a closed circle.
It is self-referencing and self-enclosed, especially in the words estab-
lishing a ground for connection and relationship. Philosophers have
spent thousands of years trying to sort it out. Perhaps if we look for
the roots of words, the metaphorical origins, we can find a way out.
What we call'meaning'is first grounded in concrete action and expe-
rience; it is then brought to abstraction. Normally we forget the path-
way. With most concepts we can trace back through previous incarna-
tions of the word.
'Exist', for example, means in Latin to stand forward or to
stand forth. Similarly in German you can say'existense', but also
'bestehen', which also literally means to stand forth or stand out. Stand
forth how? In German the word for perceiving is wahrnehmen. Lit-
erally'take for truth'. Let us speculate. When we see an object or a
person, for example, the perception stands out in our conscious space
from a background. Something thus stands forth in the space of con-
sciousness, as it is perceived as something, an object, another being,
2
Ibid, pp. 262-26s.
16
an idea, my own being, etc. Thus the root of the word'exist' comes out
of the experience of perceiving. It originally did not have a metaphys-
ical weight of implying'Reality'. The capital R implies a metaphysical
stance, i.e., there is a Reality that can be determined as an absolute. In
daily waking life, nevertheless, we use our percepts to negotiate the
world we live in and in effect take our perceptions for reality. Some-
times we inflate this sense of reality to the metaphysical level.
In this sense a 'self' as a percept stands forth in phenom-
enal space and thus exists. It is as much a useable percept as any other.
Again there is no metaphysical existence for a self outside of the act
of perceiving, and acting. If we investigate further into this idea of
standing forth or standing out, we can see that we agree between each
other that something exists if that perception stands forth for both of
us. I exist for myself, but when you are with me I exist as a percept for
you just as you exist as a percept for me. As another example, when
you say, "Look at that cat sitting in the widow sill," and I carry out the
act of looking and say, "oh yes there he is," we are orienting with each
other. We learn to do that and agree through speech and attaching
Iabels to the perceptions. The mother says to the child, "Look there,
see the kitty in the widow." And the child looks and smiles back at the
mother. These are multiple acts of orientation and labeling. Language
is being learned here through the child following the mother and
communicating back (non-verbally) that seeing and perceiving has
happened. You see movement and coordinated action are essential to
cognitive learning in this way. As Wittgenstein wrote, "Language is a
form of life."
It is only when you get to the further reaches of abstraction
that you begin to lose the connection of what you say to what stands
forth for you. Unless you work in a laboratory or in medicine, neu-
rons exist as a cognitive idea, but do not stand forth directly in your
experience. You onlyknowthem as representational pictures. You do
not experience them. Nor do you feel them working in yourself. That
is why the philosopher Thomas Metzinger calls what he thinks of as
the operations behind the scenes of your experience, transparent.
Information processing systems are at a still further extension of ab-
straction, How do we know what that is except as a metaphor derived
from a machine that purportedly carries out such an operation? How
would anyone know that such a system exists at a biological level in
Part I, Chapter r L7
living systems? Scientists still argue about such conceptual proposi-

tions. Howthen can neurons or information-processing systems have
any metaphysical priority outside of the systems of observation and
the human observers (perceivers) who create such concepts? What
difference would it make in your life, if you knew that you were only a
pack of neurons or not? Is there an objective world out there existent
without an observer? These could be un-decidable questions. There
are many such un-decidable questions when trying to make meta-
physical statements as some thinkers today try to show us. In any
event what we say is real is surely observer-dependent.
What I propose in Part I is this: that the reader and I become
observers. I have structured the process based on my own insights
and experiences. Nevertheless, we will explore questions not with the
idea that we will arrive at an ultimate truth, but that in the act of ex-
ploring we can begin to untie the confusions and knots in our think-
ing, perceiving and conceptualizing about ourselves. The underlying
theme will be movement and moving, as avehicle for exploration and
as a ground for understanding its importance to everything else. In
this way we will trace a third path that leads to a different point of
view to the astonishing hypothesis.
Such a path is nowbecoming acceptable in science and phi-
Iosophy. There are so many books today on the varioud ideas about
consciousness, cognition, the relations of these aspects of life to the
nervous system, etc., that I wiII not burden the reader with another
review of all the ideas and theories available. But I will at times point
out where taking the point of view of the moving being may lead to
a fresh way of understanding. Above all I hope to provide a concrete
experiential way to carry out the explorations and convince through
example. Scientifically based research often can lead to important
discoveries. These may or may not correlate what we can find out in
our exploration process. What is important is to keep a dialog open
between differing forms of investigation. Ultimately we should be
able to correlate between these realms. I will, of course, cite a num-
ber of thinkers and scientists whose insights I find intriguing. Thus
we will explore from a very particular but dynamic stance without the
usual critical exposition of opposing views.
18
CRIGINS
Movement is fhe key to life.
MOSHE FELDENKRAIS
To begin with beginnings and origins is not easy. As adults

we already think we know and we have already structured our living
and thinking.We are born into aworld and a society of people around
us. We spend a lot of childhood orienting ourselves with the other
people and the world in order to continue with life. We call this process
of orienting, Iearning and socializing. There is another more funda-
mental sort of learning that involves development. We come to life
prepared through our biological inheritance to learn in this fashion
that depends on movement and interaction. We will explore this de-
velopment further in Part II of the book. For now it is sufficient to say
that much learning happens before we are capable of speaking.
Speaking expands our possibilities and at the same time
constricts experiencing. As we grow into speaking we want to corre-
late what we know already through experiencing to the new domain
of speaking. Thus children around the age of four or a little earlier
spend much time asking why this and why that. This is a difficulty for
adults who find the questions baffiing. The adults around, particularly
parents, finally get their children to stop and stay with the established
program. We learn not to ask silly questions. Then we are sent for ed-
ucation. We learn to be proud of our knowledge and to be ashamed
when we don't know The knowing, however, is often only what has
the approval and agreement of others in our social realm.
The French philosopher Rene Descartes tried to find a rock
bottombeginning. He used amethod of findingdoubt abouteachthing
he knew until he arrived at the one thing he could not doubt. We now
have a name for this place. We call it'the cogito'after its Latin form,
Cogito ergo sum.I am thinking; therefore I exist. Descartes was oper-
ating nevertheless out of a tradition in which reason was more impor-
tant than the senses. The dice were loaded. From another perspective
you could also say, I am moving myself, therefore I exist. Descartes
used his engine of doubt to eliminate this possibility. Yet he began his
experiment in doubt by moving himself on a very cold day into a small
room with a stove where he could bathe in the warmth. Perhaps if he
had stayed in the cold we would never have the cogito. On the other
hand cold and warmth are assessed through consciousing (the active
Part I, Chapter z 19
ORIGINS
point of view) or consciousness, which Descartes associated with mind

as distinct from body, which was machine-like. The two realms are re-
lated in his idea as mind directs body. This gives us a sense of moving
ourselves or having agency.
Even to say, "I am moving myself, therefore I exist," requires
that we have developed this sense of agency. In other words we have
developed a perception of embodied moving and a perception of self-
acting. There is good reason to think that the development of this
sense of agencyprecedes the development of language ability. Within
the realm of mind, we also become capable of observing. Observing
also begins before language. It is within language, however, that we
can communicate cognitively and easily about what we observe. Lan-
guage is a social domain and its existence we assume precedes our
individual existence. Mind then is transmitted through the domain
and requires action for the transmission. In this way the separation
of mind and physical body recedes and we approach mind - body as a
unity.s
We will not get to rock bottom. In effect there is no such
place. We can therefore doubt Descartes' solution that has held sway
in its various forms in the modern world. But there is something pe-
culiar about being alive and alive in a live world of other sentient crea-
tures. We can recognize an aspect of ourselves and other self-moving
creatures as having a quality we can label, autonomy.4It is not a qual-
ity we would attribute to rocks or clouds or stars or bodies of water.
We could make a machine that could have something like autonomy,
but we would have to, as autonomous beings, build such a capacity
into the design. It would not arise spontaneously in such machines.
There is something that makes living systems different from anything
non-living. This has to be said despite the arguments against vital-
ism that want to eliminate any such distinction. Vitalism puts living
things somewhere beyond physics and chemistry. And we know today
everything living depends on what we can describe through these two
3
The first appendix of this book reviews some of this terminology and relates some
of the varying points of view.
a
Francisco Varela brought the notion of autonomy (self-law) in natural systems into
theoretical biology in his book, Principles of Biological Autonomy (1979).
20
basic sciences. Vitalism in its original sense is not valid. Living things
nevertheless can still be seen as fundamentally different.s
The funny thing is that infants have been shown to know
the distinction between a mechanical being and a living being. As
Daniel Stern reports, very young babies show an interest in other be-
ings around them, but not toward mechanical devices that mimic a
livingbeing.6
Our autonomy, which allows for self-direction, self-move-
ment and the capacity to be observers, i.e., to be consciousing and
awareing, does not come from a designer and has arisen spontane-
ously in nature. I have dropped for the moment again the noun forms,
consciousness and awareness, to emphasize that these words do
not refer to things. We actively do consciousing when we are awake,
and awareing when we are actively directing ourselves to know and
find out.
Some of what follows will be difficult at first. The difficulty
is in the simplicity. The first explorations are in self-observing and in
Iooking at what it is to be an observer. I touch on the work of G. Spen-
cer-Brown, who discovered a way to build from the ground and whose
very simplicity challenges us to understand with great consternation
at first. In the next section I will touch on a novel way to answer the
question, what is a living thing that makes it different from anything
non-Iiving? I will also introduce a notion developed by Humberto
Maturana and Francisco Varela that simplifies the answer. Lastly I
will explore the question of order and the origin of life, which still has
no answer. As I touch only on the matters discussed and explored, I
recommend going to the sources cited. Otherwise stay as open as pos-
sible and contemplate when confused. Trying to figure things out does
not necessarily dispel confusion. Openness can Iead to insight.
5
Gregory BatesoninMind andNature (f978) and in Bateson and Bateson (1987)
borrowed the term creatura, to designate the living from non-living through
a comparison of differences. Maxine Sheets-Johnstone (1999) in her book
The Primacy of Movementmakes the distinction with anr'mateform for self-moving
living creatures.
6 Daniel Stern, The Interpersonal World of the Infant, Basic Books (1985).
Part I, Chapter z 2L
ORIGINS
Origin I
Objectivity is o subject's delusion,
that observing can be done without him.
I{EINZ VON FOERSTER
We begin with the act of observing, which we will inves-

tigate in our first exploration. One can only observe from the place
one is when one starts. In the two explorations that follow, observe
as spontaneously as you can with the idea that by continuing the pro-
cess something new will emerge. If you feel that you get stuck with
the process, let it go for awhile and come back to it. Although you
come to the observing process with your ideas, beliefs and feelings, as
you continue, see if you can let these go. Everything in the way of ex-
pectations, already formulated ideas and responses, will hamper the
exploration in some way. Practice will improve your ability to do this.
You need only be open to what emerges and what you experience.
Before we begin Exploration 1., we need some practice in
observing. In the following practice the best way to follow the instruc-
tions is to read the process on to a tape or digital recorder and play it
while you lie on the floor. You may also wish to try this procedure with
some of the other explorations where appropriate. This first practice
is adapted from processes developed by Moshe Feldenkrais.
Preliminary Practice
Sensation, Touch ind Movement
Please lie on your back on the floor. You can put a blanket
or rug on the floor to lie on. Lie quietly and notice what
you feel at the moment. Are you comfortable? If not, where
do you oqperience the discomfort? Perhaps rearrange how
you lie on the floor to see if you can be more comfortable.
Let the discomfort be as it is after doing this. Comfort is
important in sensing in that uncomfortable sensations
capturg your attention. Also be aware that if discomfort
remains, you mayfindyourself more comfortable later.
Notice how you lie on the floor by noticing how you make
contact with the surface of the floor. You will find in doing
22
this that some parts of yourself make contact and others

do not. For example most everyone can sense the contact
of the back of the head and most should feel contact at
the heels. In between these major points you may sense
' contact more or less. For manypeople there is little contact
at the small of the back, behind the knees, and at the tips
of the shoulders. For almost everyone the back of the neck
does not make contact.
Now notice if there is a different sensation of contact be-

tween the right side of yourself andthe left side. One side
may feel heavier or closer to the floor. Simply notice the
differences.
As you continue to lie like this notice your breathing and

sense the movement of yourbreathing. Where is the
movement gteatest and where is it the least? Bring your
two hands to lie on your upper chest and sense what
happens to the movement. Leave the hands there for at
least a minute. Then take the hands away and sense
the after-effect. Now bring the hands to the lower part of
the ribs just above the belly. Repeat the orocess.
Rest a moment. Sense any changes in your breathing.

Now bring your hands to the lower ribs at the side. Let the
palms of your hands touch the ribs lightly. Notice the
movement here. You may not have attended to this move-
mentbefore. The sensations maybe new. After at least
a minute take the hands to the lower ribs at the back and
slide them underyourselfso that the backs ofyour
hands contact these lower ribs. Notice what happens now.
How do you sense the movement? Stop and bring the
hands to the side. Notice anv differences.
ORIGINS
Origin I
Place your right hand on your lower belly and your left
hand at the bottom ofyourbreastbone and upperbelly.
Notice the movement of your lower belly and upper belly
and diaphragm as you continue breathing. Slowly make
your out-breath longer. Feel how the belly goes down, and
the diaphragm goes downward on your out-breath. Reduce
any effort. Find out if you can simply stop the out-breath
when it is comfortably complete, and you may notice that
the in-breath comes in without needing to attend to it.
Practice this for awhile until it becomes easy to breathe
out. Notice any reactions, feelings, sensations that arise.
Lie on your back with arms at your side again. Notice any
further changes. These maybe changes in the movement
ofyour breathing that you can detect or in the sensing of
the contact with the floor.
If you find gentle change with this practice, use it again to

establish a quiet state ofyourselfbefore you do the next exploration.
It may take time to get used to sensing yourself in this way and in-
creasing your ability to sense. Practice again with it if you need to
before going on. Later we will introduce other explorations that also
help in improvingyour sensory abilities.
Conscious Space
The following exploration was adapted from Stephen
Wolinsky's introduction to meditation practic e, Hearts on Fire (1996).
In traditional meditation practice one usually begins with sitting
and quieting the mind by trying to stop the flow of thoughts. Other
ways of approaching meditation involve attending to the breath, or
the sensation of air entering the nostrils, or repeating a phrase (man-
tra) over and over. In Stephen Wolinsky's approach you just let the
flow of thoughts, sensations, feelings, etc. be as they are and you simply
observe.
24
l .
txploratron 1.
Find a place to sit for a moment quietly. Sit on the floor

if this is comfortable for you. If not, sit on a chair. Do not
do anything but observe. Many things float by in your
immediate awareness. Notiee how you are within yourselfi
comfortable or not comfortable, quiet or excited, attentive
or uninterested. Stay for a few minutes to find out what
happens. While you do that just notice your breathing.
When you have become quiet enough to observe, notice

that thoughts, feelings, sensations, images, etc. appear to
flowby. Notice that in each moment that some attention
is present, it is bracketed by a moment of space. Normally
you do not notice the space, but when it occurs one
thought or sensation etc. disappears and another arises.
If you are not active, this shift continues as if by itself.
At each moment something arises askyourself the follow-
ing question: From where does that thought arise?
Keep asking until there are no more answers.
Now shift your question. This time ask yourself, to where

does that thought descend? Continue asking the question
until there are no more answers.
In the above process it is not important to find answers;

just let them come. You can observe a number of things. The thoughts
seem to contain the contents ofthe conscious space. Each period of
attention to something can be described as a present moment. Such
moments are not a point in time but are experienced as extended in
time and somehow linked to the moment before and what comes af-
ter. The sequences nevertheless may jump from one modality to an-
other or from one thought to a very different one. Each moment is
organized in some way. If it is a sensation such as an itch, it is located
somewhere onthe surface ofyourbody. If it is afeeling, the feelingcan
have a recognizable form that can be labeled. If it is a thought, or an
image, it also has a form. If something in the surroundings stands out
in your attention, it also has a form. Sometimes you experience the
movement as a continuum. But you can become aware of the shifts.
ORIGINS
Conscious Space
Whatever stands out in the attention, stands out against a

background. Each item is a form of distinction. If you think for a mo-
ment of the field of consciousness as a space as we have started to do,
then you can think of the space as open in the moment one thing de-
scends and the next item arises. The space is then cleaved or separat-
ed into the item of focus separate from the background each time an
item arises. The in-between is a momentary state of emptiness. With
practice this state can be extended in time. With first attempts you
may not detect this space. If you continue practicing the exploration,
you maybecome aware of the space if you do not make it important or
try to get there. Awareness requires quietness in yourself. Then you
will find the process easier and easier.
The place from where an item arises or to where it descends
is not discernable. By this I mean that even if you keep trying with
your question, you cannot perceive or detect in your sensation such
a place. The place is empty, and the best you can do is to make a la-
bel that has no referent. So you may say, it arises from myself. On the
other hand you keep making acts of distinction.
We now need to investigate the question of distinctions.
Without them there are no differences in the conscious space and
therefore no perceptions, thoughts, feelings, sensations or anything
else. In this state if anything exists, there would be no way of knowing
it. Thus a person is necessary an observer with a consciousing mind-
edness, for something to be declared as existing. In the abstract we
can begin to formulate a way of getting to an origin in how everything
that spills out later, such as sensations, thoughts, etc., begins with the
simplest act of making or drawing a distinction. This applies as well to
the realm of symbols and mathematical forms. Thus the mathemati-
cian G. Spencer-Brown proclaimed that the first act is the drawing of
a distinction. He writes in a beginning Note on the Mathematical Ap-
proach, which introduces his seminal work, The Laws of Form (1969):
"The theme of this book is that a universe comes into being when a
space is severed or taken apart. The skin of a living organism cuts off
an inside from an outside. So does the circumference of a circle in a
plane. By tracing the way we represent such a severance, we can begin
to reconstruct, with an accuracy and coverage that seems almost un-
canny, the basic forms underlying linguistic, mathematical, physical,
and biological science, and can begin to see how the familiar laws of
26
our own experience follow inexorably from the original act of sever-
ance. The act itself is already remembered, even if unconsciously, as
our lirst attempt to distinguish different things in a world where, in
the flrst place, the boundaries can be drawn anyplace we please. At
this stage the universe cannot be distinguished from howwe act upon
it, and the world tnay seem like shifting sand under our feet."
Normally in cognitive science we speak about the contents
of consciousness. This stance is appropriate if you want to discover
something from the outside about how a content got into a thing
called consciousness. If on the other hand you take the act of con-
sciousing as fundamental, then you cannot separate a content from
its source. What Spencer-Brown does is to show that the act of sepa-
ration is an act of consciousing. In other words consciousness is the
manifold in which we make all our distinctions, including distinguish-
ing a consciousness in itself. The circularity here is signifrcant and
unavoidable. As we shall see it is fundamental to living beings. Making
a distinction is essential to everything that is then possible. Making a
self-distinction reveals that you are part of the loop.7
Inside and Outside
t,
txploratron 2.
When you sit quietly and follow your thoughts as I suggest-
ed in the first exploration, you find in contemplation,
when you are not active, that the thoughts, ideas, images,
feelings, sensations, occur in a conscious space that has no
origin that you can detect. Askyourself in this situation,
what is inside yourself and what is.outside? Repeat sitting
quietly and afterwards make a list of what you find inside
and what you find outside. Repeat again until you exhaust
the possibilities.
7
See Douglas Hofstadter, fA m a Strange Loop, Basic Books (2007).
ORIGINS
Inside and Outside
Now stand up and walk around the room. Notice if the flow
of what is in your conscious space changes. Ask yourself
inthis situation,what is inside andwhat is outside? Make
a list and repeat until you exhaust the possibilities.
In the last part of this exploration, take a moment, when

you are in conversation with someone else, to notice the
same questions. Does the flow of content in your conscious
space change? Inthis situationwhat is inside and outside?
How do you distinguish your thought from the other
person's thought? Is there a felt sense of the difference?
These explorations may reveal that the sense of inside and

outside may change with the circumstance. When we investigate in
contemplation, every thought, feeling, sensation, etc. appears inside
the conscious space. Yet we may still make a boundary between a
sound, which we put outside our self, and a feeling, which we place
inside the self-boundary. But where does this boundary come from?
The psychoanalysts have long postulated that a child is born without a
sense of a self-boundary and especially does not distinguish between
its self and the mother. The world and self are one at first. We know
from the reports of meditators and mystics that the usual boundary of
self and the world dissolves in certain states that can be attained with
practice. In quietness the boundary is less clear. We now know from
research with infants and mothers that infants establish a boundary
at a very early point in life and the mother is recognized in distinction.
(For the accumulated evidence see Daniel Stern, 1985, and especial-
ly his discussion of the emergent self. For further consideration see
Part II.) So we can say there is something biological about a boundary.
On the other hand we can experience its dissolution.
In moving, however, we have a body space we perceive and
feel that distinguishes itself from an outside, which can remain not
moving. We know we can misperceive what is moving, as for example,
in sitting in a train and having a feeling of moving when in fact it is a
train next to us that is moving. (We check this out by observing more
carefully.) The boundary is distinguished nevertheless through mov-
ing and the feeling of generating the movement. Notice though that in
the misperception the visual impression of moving produces some-
28
thing of a feeling of moving, which stops immediately on correcting

the impression.
In talking to another person we make a clear boundary as
to which thoughts are inside our boundary and which come from the
other person. But what are we doing when we talk to ourselves? And
where is the language? Is it inside our head or outside? We say often, I
have an idea in my mind. Where is that mind, and what do we mean by
that? We seem to own a thing called mind and assume it has an inside
content. This way of speaking has created two of the major unsolved
philosophical puzzles. To the materialists who assume what exists is
outside, the puzzle is how does an immaterial mind exist in a mate-
rial body? To those who notice that everything appears inside the con-
scious space and call themselves idealists, the puzzle is what exists if
there is no mind?
Spencer-Brown has brought attention to an aspect of ex-
pression that previously seemed out of awareness. He noticed that to
cleave a space into a fftls and a that is the first act, and that that act
creates the possibility of a logic. This is this and that is that. This is
here and that is there and logically one excludes the other. There is
a marked state and an unmarked state. TWo separated spaces do not
have the same identity. This is the two-valued logic that we all know
and learned in school. It creates the possibilities of identity and dif-
ference and what are called truth functions. But what happens when
the boundary of cleavage is self-made and makes its own identity as
a separate this or that? We are now in trouble with two-valued logic.
Logical circles and paradoxes loom. There is still a bias against this
possibility. We want to have order and predictability. Paradox seems
to lead to chaos. Nevertheless we can discover that paradox is more
than significant. When Bertrand Russell and Alfred North Whitehead
created the Principia Mathematicg a work that attempted to show
how mathematics is derived from logic, they forbid the crossing of
levels that could lead to paradox.
Pert I, Chapter e 29
ORIGINS
Inside and Outside
Figure la: Boundary, Distinction, Crosslng leveis and Loop
Creating aDlsttnetlon and a Boundory

I Creating a distinction is carried out by dividing a space in two parts.
II Dividing a space creates a boundary. If one side is the marked state,

then crossing the boundary creates a movement from the marked
state to the unmarked state and reversing creates a move back to the
marked state. The symbol I can indicate the marked state; that
is, the state distinguished by the distinction. It can also indicate an
instruction to cross the boundary.
l.Lt L l-|_n,,r
\JeL
III A marked circle can indicate a closed boundary and makes a distinc-
tionbetween inside and outside.
out
Figure tb: Boundory o.nd Crosslng
Lrd=out outl= in
Adabted from Spencer-Brown, 1969.
3o
Figure tc:The Basic Rules of Combinlng Sreps

(!,n^ Qnonno.-fi,fown, LAWS O{ FOfm)
\. ,",,0 v.lJL,09U,
-l_l =_l
The above symbolization indicates to call and call again. To do so is
the equivalent of making the distinction and repeating the call to
distinction. The repeat of the instruction doesn't change the direction.
One markinside the otherindicates to cross and cross again. This

cancels the instruction. You return to where you began.
Fiortre trl.Rp-entrv ond .9elf Refercnce
This markl indicates to cross and cross again. This cancels the
instruction. You return to where you began.
Self Reference can easily lead to paradox in two-value yes no,

-
true - false schematic logic. However, a three-value logic can solve
the problem by allowing continuous change from yes to no or in
to out (see fig. 2for aphysical example: the electric bell). Another
example shown below is the continuous Moebius band that turns
in to out and vice versa as you move along the band. The band has
onlyone side.
Faces out
ORIGINS
Inside and Outside
Spencer-Brown noted such a paradox exists hidden within

the heart of mathematics. It is the equation, the square of x plus one
is equal to zero.We all know the solution of this equation is the imagi-
nary number i also known as the square root of -1. Without this de-
vice we cannot solve the equation. But this mathematical invention
hides what is really a startling paradox within the logic of mathemat-
ics. When Spencer-Brown rearranges the equation as x = -I/x, we can
see by substituting what will happen. The number x has to be a form
of unity.
If we substitute one of the two forms of unity (+l or -1)
into the equation, we obtain a paradoxical result:
We substitute +l for x: Then substitute -l for x:

x2=-I -1=-l/-1=+1
x.x=-l
x= -l/x
+l=-]/+]=-|
We obtain for each substitution +1 = -l or -l = +I.
Either way we have an impossibility in normal logic where

a negative is shown as equal to a positive. It cannot be, you might think.
Spencer-Brown thought otherwise. It was already known that this
relationship is extremely useful. The paradox was therefore hidden
from view with the substitution of the symbol i in order to maintain
the decorum ofproper logic.
What can this possibly mean? It is better to ask, what is its
use? You see each time you substitute either a +1 or -l into the equa-
tion the value flips. It is the same paradox that is called the paradox
of self-reference. Its use has to do with representing machines and
systems that have this property, for example a vibrating string, or
even a simple electrical btrzzer that operates by turning off the cur-
rent as soon as the current is on andvice versa, turning on the current
as soon as the current is off. It is a logic of yes and no and a third value
yes/no that alternates between yes and no. Spencer-Brown remarks
that Gddel's incompleteness theorem that suggests that no closed
system of logic can be found to be completely consistent is not the
32
destructive discovery that it seems to be.8 The paradoxical equation

has usefulness and meaning. A better form of logic has to include the
third value. And it turns out this has meaning in biological systems
where each organism creates its own boundary a skin or membrane,
separating itself from everything else. Something else arises out of al-
ternating between one form and another. It is the appearance of time.
A function that expresses change between + and - is periodic; time is
created in the movement of one form into the other.
Inside and outside are not fixed positions. As Spencer-
Brown suggests in the passage quoted at the beginning of this chap-
ter, "the boundaries can be drawn anywhere we please." Normally the
boundaribs are well-set habitually. We experience the skin as a bound-
ary. Sensations are distinguished as inside: a stomach ache, a head
ache, an internalvoice, etc., and outside: the sound of abird, the touch
of an object on the skin. However there are paradoxes. The sensory
surfaces are in fact integrated into the nervous system. As Georg von
Bekesy (1967, p.22O) pointed out many years ago about vision, "sen-
sations exist only within our body, yet we localize the image outside
the eye, even when we use a single eye and look at an object far away."
Again with hearing he notes that "the cochlear is deeply embedded in
bone, but we do not localize auditory sensations there but usually re-
fer them to a source in the environment." In the case of the eye, "This
externalization is achieved without the slightest recognition of the
optic image itself or the stimulations on the retina."
In further experiments von Bekesy showed that even skin
sensation normally located at the skin boundary and thus considered
internal could be projected into the external space. In one study he
placed a vibrator on each of two adjacent fingertips. The sensation
is produced by a series of'clicks. If the click is delayed for one finger
relative to the other by three or four milliseconds the person feels
the stimulation on each finger separately. Reducing the time differ-
ence to one-millisecond results in the sensations fusing and being
perceived on the finger that received the sensation first. If the time
delay is decreased more, then the sensation will move into the space
between the two fingers outside the bodyboundary.
sAustrian mathematician Kurt Gridel shocked the world

of mathematics in 1931 with
his proof of the contention that in basic parts of arithmetic and mathematics there
are propositions that cannot be proved.
ORIGINS
Inside and Outside
Figure 2: Electric Bell * Periodic Function
Eiectrical power connected, by confccfs

a""'> Bell
CoiI magnet has current and t- 'J"
pulls clapper to bell and at the
same time opens contacts.
Y
Contacts closed
,,/
Power not eonnected
CoiI Magnet stops with contact

open. The spring pulls back;
clapper closes contacts.
Spring pulls back
Contacts open
Coil Magnet
When the Doorbell Button is Pushed
The logical rule of the doorbell: If A (on) then non-A (off). If non-A
(off) thenA (on). The clapper that hits the bell then oscillates.
Time ->
34
Exploration 3.
Please sit and find a quiet space within yourself. Again
notice the flow of images, feelings, sensations, thoughts,
etc. As somethingbecomes foregtound notice thatbehind
the foreground there is background. Notice that the
background also involves feelings, sensations, images, etc.
that are not in the center ofattention. Focus your attention
on the foreground. Now switch and make the background
foreground and foreground background. Wait a moment
and repeat the process
Now continue to notice what arises and falls in your

conscious space. Notice what you identify as inside. Can
you project it outside yourboundary? Then reverse
the procedure. Find out if you can take something from
the outside and experience it as inside yourboundary.
When you get flexible with these procedures lie on the

floor in a comfortable way and bywatching the flow of
images, feelings, sensations, thoughts, etc., allow yourself
to become very quiet. Can you begin to merge with your
surroundings? Imagine the bodyboundary is dissolving.
Stay in this quiet place as long as you wish.
When you choose to get up from the floor notice what

happens. How do you recover the boundary? You need it
to act to get up.
The boundaries we form are important to our functioning

in life in many ways. Yet we have the flexibility to vary how we make
them or even dissolve them as long as we experience that we make
the choice to explore. The loss of this choice can be disturbing and oc-
curs in certain psychotic states. Then a person may experience spon-
taneously a loss of boundary, or.may experience that a voice normally
found inside appears from the outside as if someone else is speaking.
Alternatively the person might experience being cut off, isolated, as
if behind a glass, without contact to an outside world. We need a con-
sistent sense of boundary for feeling safe in the world. So when we
suspend the boundary as we did in the above exploration we need to
know how and why we did that.
ORIGINS
Inside and Outside
We learn to distinguish inside and outside. Thus we nor-

mally put body sensations, emotions, feelings, self-movement (agen-
cy), recognitions, memory, proprioception and kinesthetic sensation,
self-generated ideas, conceptions, and words, and meanings, etc. as
inside. Outside we place objects, other people, other sentient beings,
the world, rules, laws, language, mathematics, ideas and conceptions
of others, stories, movement of machines and animate beings, etc.
Spencer-Brown's.Laws of Form provides an abstract descrip-
tion of great universality. Yet it also describes the physicality of living
forms exactly in terms first of cleaving or dividing of physical space
in such a way as to define an inside and outside for living entities and
secondly as giving the essential character of difference which allows
relationship between all the entities that arise thus. While his work
is not widely appreciated, it provides the ground for the insights of a
new biology that transcends the mechanistic biology that has evolved
so far. Difference and distinction are essential for sentience without
which no living entity can move itself and therefore survive. Equally
no living entity can develop and learn. In the next section we will ex-
plore what living is in these terms.
Origin II
What is Life?
Let us ask an origin kind of question. What is it that distin-
guishes a living thing from any other kind of object, or machine, or
designed thing that moves?
Chilean biologist Humberto Maturana asked this kind of
question as a child (Maturana, 1980). He was interested in animals
and plants and his question to himself was simply put, "...what made
them living?" As a medical student he wrote a poem, which he quotes
in his introduction to Autopoiesl's and Cognition: The Realization of
the Ltving, where he describes his process of coming to his way of
answering his question. In the poem he has the following lines:
"And in his mind he does not acceptlThat beyond death nothing
should arise,/And that beyond death/There should be only death."
At the end of the poem he wrote,
"Because death is death/And life without death is only emptiness."
36
Later he changed the original question to the following:

"What kind of systems are living systems that they may die, and how
come theycognize?"
And still later, as a beginning teacher of biology at the Med-
ical School of the University of Chile in Santiago, he reformulated his
question again. This was because his students would ask in still an-
other form, "What is proper to living systems that had its origin when
they originated, and has remained invariant since then in the succes-
sion of their generations?" He wanted to answer his students, but
he realized he had to think everything anew. Whatever he was after
had to be a feature of living systems from the first formal living thing
through all of evolutionary changes. He was searching for an invari-
ant that remains for all living things. The question was more difficult
than he thought. Before we answer we ask the reader to ponder the
question here and nowbefore continuing.
There are, of course, many answers in the biology text-

books as there were when Maturana asked the question. One could
list all sorts of features of living systems, such as heredity, growth, ir-
ritability, etc. Maturana wondered, "How long a list was necessary?"
and "When was the list completed?" He was unsatisfied that he had
the answers because he realized that in order to end the list he had to
know what a living system was, which was the question he was asking
in the first place. Secondly each feature listed was a feature that could
also be descriptive of something not living. Features were not selec-
tive enough. The third problem was that he realized that "any attempt
to characterize Iiving systems with notions of purpose or function
was doomed to fail because these notions are referential and cannot
be operationally used to characterize any system as an autonomous
entity." Autonomous systems, he understood, are self-referential sys-
tems. They operate as unities defined by their boundaries and are
self-maintained by the very processes that are so contained within
the boundary. Somehowthis circularity seemed essential.
Maturana says that he had some inkling of what was cor-
rect because he could reject the ones that didn't work. His genius at
this point was to recognize that there was a paradox at the heart of
the problem, one that was not generally recognized and that he had
to recognize. To put it still another way, he had to account for the fact
ORIGINS
Origin II
that Iiving systems were recognized as open autonomous systems

that distinguished themselves in an environment. Spencer-Brown's
discovery indeed was very broad.
Movement and Life

Every life form involves some sort of movement in its living
phase, and every life form is bounded.e The boundary makes a separa-
tion of the form from the rest of what is. Movement allows for the flow
of nutrients and separation allows for the life organization to be con-
tained. The separation, however, is permeable, allowing exchange of
energy and matter. The organization is the organization of processes
within the boundary. As long as the life form is alive this aspect is con-
served. Everything else can be exchanged with the environment. The
structure of the life form is also changeable and reflects the living his-
tory of the life form with its interaction with what is on the other side
of the boundary, that which we call the environment. It is not possible
to imagine a living organism, a life form, without these characteris-
tics. It is what distinguishes an animate life form from anything else.
On the other hand such a designation is not generally acknowledged
by most biologists or other thinkers about the subject.ro
Maturana eventually with his student and colleague Fran-
cisco Varela used the term "autopoiesis" as a description of such sys-
tems. He now maintains that the term describes the organization of
the living cell and its organization of processes. These are the circular
molecular interactions that continue the self-production of the cell
itself and therefore allow for the continuing of life. If the organiza-
e
Prior to Maturana's (1980) questions, the biologist and philosopher Helmuth
Plessner described the importance of a border or limit in living systems (Stufen des
Organische4I92S) as described on the Web site of the Helmuth Pessner Society
(http://www.uni-potsdam.de/phi). The description is as follows: "In his biophilo-
sophy, he explains how the cell through its membrane becomes animate within an
inanimate environment. Only first when a living system takes up a relation to its
border, does it become open (in its own characteristic way ) to what lies inside and
to what outside".
ro
Lynn Margulis was one of the first biologists to acknowledge the description of life
in terms of ongoing self-maintenance (autopoiesis). See Lynn Margulis and
Dorion Sagan, Slanted Truths, Copernicus/Springer (1997). Stuart Kauffman
presents a detailed analysis and similar model of what he calls molecular auton-
onmous agents, which he believes first distinguishes the living from non-living,
in a number ofbooks. See especially Reinventing the Sacred, Basic Books (2OO8).
38
lict r r re ?' A ri fonoi ests

Determine
Energy, Chemicals
Bounded System
Generates
Produces 1
Metabolic
Reaction Network
Reprinted by permission of the publisher from Evan Thompson, Mrn d in Life:

Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of the Mind, p. lo2, Cambridge, Mass.:
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Copyright @ 2OO7 the President
and Fellows of Harvard College.
tional processes stop, the living form dies. Maturana (2O02) says, "My
assertion that Iiving systems are molecular autopoetic systems is nei-
ther a definition nor an explanatory proposition, it is an abstraction
of the operational coherences apparent in the actual living of living
systems as molecular systems."
For many life forms self-movement becomes essential.
Imagine yourself for a moment. With your knowledge that
you are composed of material and that you eat and eliminate waste
continuously throughout your life, how much of your materiality is
the same as ten years ago, or at the start of your life? Perhaps not one
atom is still present. Yet you maintain that what is inside your skin
is still the same identical being that you identify as yourself. What is
constant is not the material of yourself, and certainly not the struc-
ture. You constantly change these things throughout life. Let us leave
the question open for now.
ORIGINS
Origin III
The Nervous System Makes Order: So Does
the Biological System as a Whole
We know that the processes of a living cell have order. We
also know that the structures that make up the cell also have order. If
this were not so, life would not be possible. In Maturana's conception
of the living cell, autopoiesis means that the basic cycle of processes
that produce the cell continues throughout its life and is maintained
until death. The cell keeps producing itselfthrough these processes by
ingesting food, absorbing energy and eliminating waste. From where
does this order arise? The question has only partially been answered
if at all.
The nervous system makes order also (in order) for the or-
ganism to move and survive, not necessarily to do philosophy, or sci-
ence, or religion. Philosophy is a human byproduct of the organism's
need for order. So too is the human activitywe call scientific investiga-
tion. But these human activities take us a long way from their origins
in biological life. Nevertheless they are not possible without the bio-
logical order that leads to perception, cognition, language, communi-
cation and the loop of social organization. Order is a survival factor,
and survival ability is an essential feature of all living systems. Does
this statement need to be said? I think yes. Because although it is ob-
vious and redundant, the stories we tell ourselves about the origins of
life do not usually make this clear. And the stories about selective ad-
vantage that see each change that is preserved in evolution as related
to survival do not account truly for all the myriad functions.
The survival and evolution of living forms over a long his-
tory is well established. As observers we can observe how living things
grow, move, learn, survive, reproduce and die, passing on to a next
generation the same abilities. It means that the functions that pro-
mote survival have to be present to organisms even in their most
basic single cell form. Survivability, especially for animal creatures,
requires movement. Every creature must be able to move toward
food and away from what is noxious and dangerous. Every creature
has to move in some way to reproduce. It means there has to be sen-
tience, responsiveness, movement ability and some form of category-
forming ability (separating what is nourishing from what is noxious).
These abilities must be there from the very origin of life forms (even if
we do not knowwhat this origin is).
40
While we can establish these statements with a certain

surety, there are still a lot of questions. Let me list a few:
- What is the origin of order?
- What is the origin of moveability?
- What is the origin of sentience?
- How did creatures learn to differentiate (make distinctions in)
aspects of their environment and in aspects of themselves?
The Order Problem

The strange thing about the theory of evolution is
that everyone thinks he understands it. But we do not.
A biosphere, or an econosphere, self-consistently
constructs itself according to principles we do not
yet fathom.
STUART KAUFFMAN
Charles Darwin described in exquisite detail the huge

evidence he accumulated to support the idea that all living systems
evolved from a simpler form into the varied complexity of life on
earth, He explained about variation and fitness, and created the no-
tion of selection as a driving force to cull the fit from the unfit. There
is a hidden problem in all of this. In order to have an evolutionary pro-
cess there has to be orddr to begin with. Selection in itself cannot cre-
ate the original order except in the redundant sense of what survives
has to be selected in the first place.
Darwin's theory was attacked exactly on this basis. The
Darwinians argued that life began as an accident and, once started,
the process was moved through the accident of mutation combined
with selection. It was selection that drove evolution by selecting ever
more complex forms that survived. The other side argued that life in
its complexity and beauty required a designer. Order came from the
mind or perhaps the hand of God. Neither side of the argument can
succeed, which has never stopped the arguers of the two positions
from continuing to assert the 'truth'of their respective positions. But
Darwin's accumulation of evidence for evolution of life forms is very
compelling and his postulation of selection as driving the engine of
evolution was a brilliant solution in his time.
Part I, Chapter 2 4L
ORIGINS
The Order Problem
Let us quickly look for a moment at the two sides. A designer

has to have order to begin with in order to design. Human beings, as au-
tonomous beings with a high degree of order and ordered interaction,
can and do design myriad aspects of their environment as well as cre-
ate art, music, dance, stories, word forms, buildings, cities, economies,
etc. People who argue for the grand designer say also that humans are
made in the image of the grand designer. But the only designer beings
humans trulyknowof are modeled on themselves. Thus the postulate
of a grand ur-designer, in whatever form, begs the question and leaves
the problem hidden. How did order arise for the ur-designer? The
propagandists for the idea of Intelligent Design cannot answer this
question. But the scientists who propagandize for evolution as driven
by accident cannot give an account for the order that appears in life
and in the non-living aspects of the perceived universe.
This other side of the debate did eliminate the designer.
As biologists gained more knowledge about the living cell and discov-
ered how genes are passed from cell to new cell in reproduction, the
role for both mutation and order was designated to the gene and its
DNA code. Design was placed in the mechanism of the gene and its
transfer of information to the cell by the algorithmic process avail-
able to it. There are two problems at least. Genes are integral to the
cell and its processes and are not autonomous agents in themselves,
and change in gene structure by mutation alone should in most in-
stances lead to either a weakening of the life form or disaster, given
that random processes in the cell are postulated as consequent to
such a change. Perhaps there is something wrong in this way of view-
ing life forms. In the past few years a deep revision in understanding
has taken place and is continuing as a result of new discoveries about
the cell, its workings and development and the relation of genetics
to the forms of life. But gradually a third position is developing that
suggests that order in living beings is a characteristic of life and its
dynamics. The new view is complex and takes into account the inter-
actions of genes with proteins coupled with development in an envi-
ronment, which allows for form and function.
The popular view of genetics runs something like this. The
discovery of DNA as the basis of genetic information means we now
knowthe plan of life. Genes determine howlife unfolds and how a par-
ticular life form will grow and develop. Genes are passed from gen-
42
eration to generation and accidents cause a change to happen, which

shifts something within the life form. The new form is then tested in
life to determine viability. An unfortunate genetic shiftwill die out. In
other words selection culls out errant forms. Genes in this view are
the determiners of life's order. The sophisticated version of this story
is called the modern synthesis, or neo-Darwinism. Richard Dawkins
is the best-known popular expositor of the modern synthesis. In his
view without a designer life forms seem to be cobbled together by a
"blind watchmaker." He has even gone so far as to metaphorically at-
tribute autonomy to the gene itself in his image of "the selfish gene."
Dawkins further argues strongly for selection as the force driving
life forms up "mount improbable." He does show that with computer
simulated genetics simple forms can become more complex with suc-
ceeding generations. He postulates that the argument has only two
sides and that the selection side is proven far beyond his own satisfac-
tion. We cannot argue against selection as a factor. Whatever organ-
isms form in nature do survive, if we can find them and describe them,
so they must have been selected to fit the conditions of the environ-
ment. If you do not have a designer, this is a tautology. The concern is
that the order problem has not been solved with Dawkins'computer
models. There are deep problems with the modern synthesis. Yet the
computer model gives a possible clue.rr
Here are some striking facts to consider: While the evolu-
tion of life appears to involve a vastly increasing complexity of life
forms and the evolution of very novel creatures, investigation of the
genetic history of life reveals striking continuity throughout this his-
tory. Kirschner and Gerhardt (2005, p.45) note that after "millions
of millennia of evolution, many metabolic en4/rnes in the bacterium
rr There is a more basic argument among biologists about selection and evolution. If
we take the stance of autopoiesis, it would seem that natural selection is insufficient
as a drivng force toward order. The Darwinists John Maynard Smith, Richard
Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, and of course many others reject the notion of autopoi-
esis and self-organization and argue for genetic mechanisms. For an overview
of the discussion see David Depew and Bruce Weber, "What Does Natural Selection
have to be Like," Cybernetics qnd Human Knowing, Vol.5, No. I (1998). The authors
take an intermediate view suggesting, "Natural selection, we assert, will not emerge
in systems other than the self-organized auto-catalytioc dissipative structures
in which chemical selection operates." For a more detailed discussion with many
contributors see Evolutionary Systems: Biological and Epistemological Perspecttves
on Selection and Self-Organization (Van de Vijver, Salthes, and Delpos, eds.), Kluwer
Academic Publishers (1998).
ORIGINS
The Order Problem
still more than 50 percent identical in their amino acid se-

E. coli are
quence to the corresponding human enzymes." '... Of 548 metabolic
enzymes sampled... half are present in all living life forms, whereas
only 13 percent are specific to bacteria alone." Now that biologists
have been able to map out the genetic codes of some life forms, it is
clear that the differences in the genetic maps of different related spe-
cies is very small. Apes and humans have differences accounting for
about two percent of the code. But even a mouse and human share
many genes in common. Humans have 22,5O0 genes. There is not
enough information here to account for the complexity of an organ
such as a human brain. The brain and nervous system involves a hun-
dred billion nerve cells and a million billion synapses all arranged
into a vast and complex network in space involving myriad functions.
Therefore the structure and complex interconnections of a human
nervous system cannot be programmed directly by genetic informa-
tion. But this is also true for other aspects of the body plan, such as
the distribution of the muscles, and the blood carrying capillaries. In
other words there are other sources of order in the development of
human beings or any other living creature. We can also point out that
while there are three hundred variant cell types in the human body,
each type contains the same genetic information. Therefore the ex-
pression of the genetic code is variable according to a complex inter-
action and there is not a direct transfer of genetic information to cell
type design. Genes are not machines.
Lastly we might point out that genetic mutation which is
supposed to be the source of variation has not produced as much vari-
ation in life forms as you would suppose if there were only random
changes in the genetic information. One of the surprises of evolution
is the degree of conservation of basic features of cells and organisms.
Each fundamental innovation in evolution has remained over millen-
niums. Some examples: The first basic innovation that we can trace
involved synergistic inclusions of single prokaryotic cells. A prokary-
otic cell lives without complex structures such as a cell nucleus and
organelles such as mitochondria. It divides simply when it reproduc-
es. Some considerably long time in pre-history after the formation of
these simple cells, some cells developed the ability to live in synergy
with other cell forms. Eventually some cells fused together so that
one partner lived inside the other. The interior partners became in-
44
clusions that served special functions in the larger cell. Thus we have
mitochondria, which have their own DN.& a cell nucleus; and other
organelles. In other words a new cell type, now called the eukaryotic
cell, evolved as a major innovation involving internal compartments
and a cytoskeleton built from microtubules. A next step was multi-
cellularity, where simply cells connected into much more complex or-
ganisms. These innovations have remained unchanged after approxi-
mately more than two billion years.r2
The three hundred or so cell types in multi-celled organ-
isms of today are all eukaryotic cells. These cell types arose of course
in the context of the innovations leading to multi-cellular creatures.
Multi-cellularity now allowed for the innovation of basic body plans.
These innovations also have been stabilized in evolution. Bilateral-
ly symmetry of which the annelid body plan (worm), the arthropod
(outside skeleton), and chordate (nerve cord), and vertebrate (inside
skeleton) body plans have been preserved. But then each of these
other body plans are still represented in today's living creatures. In
other words phenotype variation is not random but depends on modi-
fications of whathas alreadybeen developed. All major core processes
are conserved.
One other conservative factor is remarkable. Certain core
processes, especially in relation to development and gene expression,
have remained stable over Iong expanses of time. Kirschner and Ger-
hardt (op. cit.) write about what they call an invisible anatomy, which
guides the development of an animal from the egg to adult. It involves
a compartment map in the embryo that forms to allow for individual
gene expression in different areas of the growing organism. This basic
map is involved in the formation of the fruit fly as well as the human.
The complexity of the process is extraordinary and the variations
from one creature to another involve how the genes are controlled
and expressed in each compartment. It took fifty years of research to
tease out the process for the fruit fly. Kirschner and Gerhardt do not
abandon the basic genetic theory in relation to evolution. What they
do is fill in the gaps, to see where the conservation of core processes
actually allows for innovation and facilitates variation. They develop
a theory of 'facilitated variation', which shows how adaptability is a
longstanding feature in all aspects of biological systems, and how plas-
12
See Lynn Margulis, Symbrosis in CelI Evolution, Freeman (1981) and Lynn Margulis
and Dorion Sagan,Origins of Sex, Yale Univ. Press (1986).
ORIGINS
The Order Problem
ticity is available to this end. What they touch on, without explicitly
stating the thesis, is the importance of the implicit order in biologi-
cal systems, which is conserved throughout the entire history of the
development of Iiving beings. Their theory is detailed and complex,
involving the mechanisms in which genes are turned on to interact
within the organism and on the other hand turned offin response to
the contingencies of the environment and within the organism itself.
All this happens as certain genes signal to other genes during develop-
ment. While their theory has moved the thinking in biology they have
not solved completely the order problem. We still have no idea how
life began.
Stuart Kauffman more than anyone has done the technical
investigation to find out howlife can form out of a chemical soup. One
key he investigates is how auto-catalyfic sets can form in a chaotic
mix. Here a loop of chemical processes is possible where one chemi-
cal species catalyses the formation of another species which catalyses
the first. The processes are interlocked and can continue as long as
there is a flow of energy and sustenance into and out of the system. To
become somethirig like a living system, the system at minimum has
to create its own boundary. Kauffman as Maturana did previously
connects the order problem to a loop of physical processes. The ap-
pearance of a loop seems to have a certain magic as it appears again
and again at every level ofliving processes.
Non-lineariry
Take, for instance, a colony of about a hundred million
flatworms of the genus, planaria. Each of these
creatures hos about one hundred nerye cells. Thus, all
together they have about ten billton nerye cells. The
human brain has ten btllton netye cells. Why don't these
hundred million planariae represent the i.ntelligence
of ahumanbrain?
HEINZ VON FOERSTER
Human beings in their verbal thinking modality like linear-

ity because it fits the longstanding use of a two-value Iogic. Statements
can be assessed as true or false; causes can be linked in a chain and to
46
effects; complex problems can be trivialized to give the appearance of

the predictability of consequences. It doesn't matter how many times
we are caught short, we tend to stick to the cognitive framework that
we have created. It is comfortable. It fits with our own internalized
need for order.
Neuroscientists have often searched for linear chains, Iink-
ing, for example, sensory input with motor output, stimulus with
response, etc. They keep discovering loops. Many have noted that the
number of nerve cells that are directly connected to a sensory surface
are a very small proportion of the total. Even the sensory surfaces
are bound in a network in which there is output and input from the
central part of the nervous system. It is clear a linear arrangement of
nerve cells would not be a brain. It is also becoming clear that within
a nervous system itself there is no central director or intelligence to
control what happens within.
Even inside a single cell there is no actual controller, no lin-
ear cause and effect processes. The simplest prokaryote cell may con-
tain over two thousand separate proteins plus DNA" and RNA in a com-
plex of looped interrelationships of processes that keep the cell living
inside its membrane. Biologists are beginning to say all of this is self-
organized. Order seems to arise when processes connect in a loop in a
situation, in which as biologist Stuart Kauffman describes, the system
is at the edge of chaos. The technical argument is made exhaustively in
his book, The Origins of Order (1993). In Investigations (2OOO) Kauff-
man shows the possibility of what he calls an autocatalytic set that we
have described above. Here, before we get to a form that we can prop-
erly call life, chemical processes can be looped where one product can
catalyze the formation of a second product and that in turn can cata-
lyze the formation of the first. Kauffman develops his approach from
the point of view of a molecular biologist. He thus arrives at a similar
insight to that of Maturana and Varela as I have suggested. Something
about a loop of processes within a bounded structure is creative. In the
early history of life this creativity took hold. While we are beginning
to understand how the components can form in the early atmosphere
and soup of the oceans, we still have not unlocked the question of how
the cyclic processes Iinked together while forming the boundary with-
in which the first life forms began. Biologists are increasingly citing
what they call self-org4nization as a way of recognizing the creative
element. A number of books have appeared recently which expand on
ORIGINS
Non-linearity
this idea.rs Kauffman in his most recent book for the public, Reinvent-
ing the Sacred (2008), now suggests that creative order emerges from
a universe that already contains the possibility.
Movement and Sentience

Behavior is not the invention of the nervous sysfem.
HUMBERTO MATURANA AND FRANCISCO VARELA
Consi.der a bacterium swimming upstredm in a glucose

gradient, its flagellar motor rotating. If we natvely ask,
'What is it doing?'we unhesitatingly answer something
like,'It's going to get dinner.'
STUART KAUFFMAN
Plant life generally does not have the capacity to move from
one place to another. Plants maintain themselves with energy, water
and nutrients from their local environment. Plants do respond to
changes in their environment. What we may see is a change in form
with a change in the amount of water available, or a slow movement,
such as the opening flowers or leaves in the presence of light. In this
limited way plants have some degree of sentience, i.e., they detect
changes in environmental conditions and respond. It would be hard
to call this activity'behavior' as we understand it. Yet Narby (2OOO)
makes the case for plant intelligence.
Animal life by contrast is animate. Even one-cell creatures
can move over distances and propel themselves to achieve sustenance
or safety. How this is accomplished has to do with what we have
described as autopoiesis. The important thing is that the cell mem-
brane is sensitive to substances in its immediate environment. This is
a very primitive form of sentience. It is nevertheless a kind of sensing.
Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela (1989) have described how
the cell membrane of an amoeba interacts with such substances as
might occur in the presence of a protozoan, which is a food for the
amoeba. The presence ofthe detected substances changes the proto-
plasm inside the cell wall so that pseudopods form and extend in space.
rB
Scott Camazine et al., Self Organization in Biological Sysfems, Princeton (2OOl),
Ricard Sole and Brian Goodwin, Szgns of Life: How Complexity Pervades Biology,
Basic Books (200O).
48
nt traw.-f.z. tALtrn nahn I ncroqfi

tFiLYUI n rt
Source: The Tree of Knowledge,adapted from Humberto R. Maturana and

Francisco J. Valera. 1987
These pseudopods eventually engulf the protozoan thus ingesting it.

The movement or changes resulting in the expansions through the
flow of protoplasm into the pseudopods moves the animal as a whole'
Maturana and Varela write:
"... the sequence of movements of the amoeba is therefore produced
through the maintenance of an internal correlation between the degree
of change in the membrane and those protoplasmic changes we see
as pseudopods. That is a recurrent or invariable correlation is estab-
lished between a perturbed or sensory surface of the organism and
an area capable of producing movement (motor surface), which main-
tains unchanged a set of internal relations in the amoeba." (p.A7)
This is most remarkable. The basis of the functioning of the
nervous system is already present in the organism at a very early stage
of evolutionary development, before the formation in evolution of a
proper nervous system. And the functioning is consequent to the very
circular nature of the living cell with its self-produced boundary and
circular internal processes. You could call it stimulus-response, but
you could also caII it basic life intelligence. The organism can sustain
itself, protect itself in responding to its environment and survive and
reproduce. In its own way it makes choices to move towards suste-
nance and away from irritants and poisons.
We now know that even the simplest bacterium, a prokary-
ote cell without a nucleus, can behave in another remarkable way.
Normally in good times, when food is plentiful, the bacterium swims
in its own individual way. But when food becomes scarce bacteria will
ORIGINS
Movement and Sentience
coalesce into a large colony to ensure ultimate survival. There are hints
that these colonies are (and were) interconnected by communication
links.ra We are beginning to see that life forms can form an intercon-
nected web. They can couple together as well as become food for each
other. In fact what we are describing involves life forms coupling with
other life forms and coupling with the environment in various ways.
Life forms learn and change the environment.
Another very well-studied example is that of the cellular
slime mold, Dfctyostelium discoideum, which has two life forms: as
single cells which can move about freely, similar to the amoeba and
a multi-cellular organism with a very distinct series of forms (dis-
cussed in detail in Sole and Goodwin, 2OOO, pp.2I-22). The trigger
for the change from one form to the other is hunger. The lack offood
induces a chemical distress signal, which is also common to some
bacteria. In the slime mold the chemical is released in pulses, which
become a signal for the cells to gather toward each other and form a
structure which promotes survival. "Between IO,OOO and IOOOOO cells
collectively self-organize to generate a fruiting body that consists of a
structural stalk (about one third of the cells) on top of which sits a cap
of spores (the remainingtwo-thirds of the cells)." (p.22)
When we observe such elegant complexity in the very sim-
plest life forms we are in awe of the beauty of the nature around us.
Nowwe need to investigate more of our own human nature.
ra See Howard Bloom (2OOO, pp.

16 - 17) for an overview and references.
5o
PERCEPTICN
When my son was a year and a few months old, he was not
yet speaking. He had already learned to stand and walk, and he could
fetch things for himself. One winter day, after it had snowed, the sun
was out. The air was crystalline. I said to him, "Go to the hall and get
your coat and boots so we can go out." This he did, immediately bring-
ing back the clothes so I could help him put them on. Afterwards I
thought it remarkable that he had understood the sentence and acted
upon my request. Years later I thought of this incident in relation to
Chomsky's idea that language is dependent on fundamental innate
cognitive structures and that Iearning consists of filling in detail
within the biologically-determined structure. What Chomsky's idea
implies is that abstract cognitive structures such as a syntax and uni-
versal grammar must be organized first before language can begin to
develop. My son had been enveloped in language throughout his life
to that point. Every action was accompanied bywords and sentences.
He was living in what Maturana calls the linguistic domain, which
means people are speaking to each other and to him in a web of re-
lating and orienting to each other and to him. The structure of my
sentence when I thought about it was parallel to the structure of the
action I was asking him to carry out. That capability he had already
organized so that "go" meant "walk yourself," i.e., he knew how to be-
come the agent of his own standing and balancing in gravity and pro-
pelling himself forward to the place I had named. He had autonomy
and an orientation in space. The degree of complexityhe had learned
(most of this was organized. at birth) was greater than learning the
complexity of a sentence and responding in a context. I thus noticed
the structure of the sentence: subject (agent in this case "you" and
unstated but implied in the imperative of the sentence), verb (action
and direction - go and get), object (implied reflexive - move your-
self) and more objects (the clothes to be picked up): all of this was
the same sequence and structure of the actions in time that he would
make. Understanding then was not based on a cognitive abstraction
but on connecting the parallel structures in the context of our rela-
tionship, what Gregory Bateson called the patterns that connect. The
structure ofthe sentence is biological all right, but not separate, not
an abstract, and I believe not innate in the sense of a built structure in
the nervous system. But I noticed too that it depended on many other
Part I, Chapter 3 51
PERCEPTION
capabilities especially that my son already had learned to perceive the

words or at Ieast the sense of what I said. The story is not as simple as
it sounds. There are capacities that an infant has from birth that allow
the growing infant to connect with other humans, to perceive and dif-
ferentiate what is perceived, to form a sense of agency and self, and to
form perceptions that cross sensory modalities. We will investigate
the research that has uncovered these capacities later. They are not
built-in cognitive structures as such.rs
We take perceiving for granted. In everyday life we perceive
effortlessly most of the time. In new situations we can begin to ap-
preciate the difficulties. Let us start with hearing and listening since
it is so common in psychology and cognitive science to take visual
perception as a paradigm. Remember a situation in which you were
overhearing a conversation between two people speaking a language
that you never heard before. Unless you are unusually skillful at per-
ceiving could you identify an individual word from what is said in the
conversation? Could you identify a sentence? Have you visited a for-
eign country even where a language is spoken which you studied at
school and found that you could not make out a word when someone
spoke to you in that language? Verbal perception is not a matter of
detecting phonemes, the abstract units of word sounds, and putting
them together.
As an adult in learning a new language you find that you be-
gin to perceive individual words when you begin to say and use them
yourself. The movements of the tongue, pallet,lips, breath, etc., to form
a word, allow you to begin to perceive that word. The best learning
happens in interaction with. another speaker. Even then small differ-
ences in words, which are easily perceived by native speakers, may
elude your ability to detect them, for example, in French, the words
dessous (under) and dessus (on top). For native English speakers this
is particularly difficult since the formation of the difference with the
mouth and in fact the vowel sounds themselves are never made in
English. Without the ability to make the distinction in speaking, the
hearing also is not possible.
rs
See Stern (1985, 2oo4).
52
John Lilly's Experiment

This experiment can be repeated if you have access to a reel-
to-reel tape recorder or digital device that allows continuous play-
back. John Lilly some years ago created a tape loop with two reels and
a loop of tape between them, which when played will repeat the sound
recorded as long as you wish. Lilly recorded the word "cogitate" and
ran the loop for periods from one quarter of an hour to six hours, ex-
posing three hundred persons to the repeated word. What happened
for most of the subjects in the experiment is that they at first heard
the word cogitate. As the sound repeated, however, other words be-
gan to be perceived. Some people reported hearing as many as thirty
difterent words as the sound continued. Subjects were asked to write
down what they heard. Lilly states that around 2,300 words or non-
sense word sounds were created this way. He then had subjects view
different cards, one at a time, with written words on the cards while
listening to the tape. As the subject changed the card he was viewing,
he would hear the word printed on the card. Therefore the visual per-
ception of the word influenced the sound perception (Lilly, 1972, pp.
64-65).A small minority of subjects stopped hearing any sounds and
experienced an altered state. In my own experiment I corroborated
Lilly's results and heard seven different words.
Obviously the nervous system can extract or create differ-
ent percepts from the same sensory signals or information. We can
think of these percepts as invariants that transcend the sensations.
Lilly had a computer analysis made of the word "cogitate," which ana-
lyzed the word into separate phoneme slots in which different per-
ceived sounds could be selected as if these sounds originated on the
outside. The analysis showed how different words could arise. A per-
cept is also a distinction in Spencer-Brown's sense, and as he suggests
we are free to draw a distinction "in any way we please."
Out on the Grass with my Dog

To get a sense ofwhat perceptions do and how they are re-
lated to action and interaction, I create here a common scenario that
we are all familiar with. I am suggesting here that perception is an
inter-species phenomenon in which the available perceptions are re-
lated to the intentions of action. This isn't to say that a dog has the
same experience as a human. We cannot know that. Yet we sense the
PERCEPTION
dog as a fellow autonomous being and interact with him on that level.
So too the dog senses his human companions as autonomous beings
and he communicates and interacts in the way that is possible for him.
Here is the scenario:
I am out on the grass with my dog. The dog sees a stick on
the ground, picks it up in his mouth, and runs towards me. He stops
when he gets near and looks up with his eyes until he sees that we
make eye contact. He tips his head and looks up towards me again.I
do not respond. He then drops the stick at my feet, runs away from me
at the same time watching, and comes back until I pick up the stick
and throw it. Now he runs in the direction in which I throw the stick.
He stops a moment, perks his ears; the stick falls, and the dog runs in
the direction of the sound. He picks up the stick, runs back towards
me and drops the stick at my feet. I throw it again. We continue until
one of us feels enough is enough and the game is over.
Are we not all familiar with this scenario? As a human be-
ing I have the advantage, or perhaps disadvantage, ofbeing able to
describe the event. I can say or write the words'stick','play', 'game', etc.
The dog does not share this possibility with me. Even without lan-
guage the dog can communicate his desire to interact with me and
play the game.
Let us then take language and human cognition out of con-
sideration to look at the event in more detail, except that we need lan-
guage to communicate about the event itself. Thus we can examine
the raw sensory and perceptual experience.
One thing that an observer and I can notice in the event is
that the behaviors of the dog and myself are coupled together. The dog
Iooks at me; I look at the dog; our eyes track each other. You could say
that our actions are coordinated with each other. We are also coordi-
nated around the outside event of the moving stick. We both watch
the stick and listen for and anticipate the sound of the stick hitting
the ground. I can sense my own attending and also notice the dog's
eyes and ears and the behavioral signs that he is attending. It must
be that both the dog and I perceive the stick as an object in the exter-
nal space. Otherwise our actions with the stick do not make sense. On
some level both the dog and I have an awareness of the stick as a vehi-
cle for the "game," which is an activity that we both have experienced
before and therefore remembered as pleasurable. It should also be
54
clear from our behavior that I perceive the dog, and the dog perceives
me. The dog and I may not share language or some other higher cogni-
tive processes, but we must have some common processes, cognitive
events, brain and body processes, to produce the common awareness.
Perhaps we have even some common feeling of enjoyment.
I am going out on a limb here to postulate what the dog is
consciously experiencing. Nevertheless, the evidence of the dog's be-
havior, his energetic excitement, the attentiveness of his eyes and ears,
the way he runs for the stick, and so forth is similar enough to human
behavior to make an educated guess.
If we look further at the dog's behavior, there is consider-
ably more to notice. As the dog sees the stick on the ground, he lowers
his head, brings his mouth to the stick, opens his jaw and grasps the
stick. He then lifts his head and begins his run back towards me. How
does he accomplish such a complex series of actions and tasks? Some-
how he must put his head at the right distance to take the stick with
his teeth. He must grasp the stick with a complex synergy of muscular
actions of his jaw muscles and know when the stick is securely held.
Other synergies are involved so that he can lift his head, focus his eyes
on me to see where he is to run toward and begin runningback to my
position. To do this he must perceive his own action, and anticipate
the consequences so that he can match the perceptions of his own
body with the stick, the external space of his environment, and where
I am in the space. When I pick up the stick to throw it, I do the same
thing. I also anticipate the feel and perception of my action before I
act and with almost automatic movements and without forced or nar-
rowly focused attention, match the results of my action against the
anticipated perception. I am conscious, but most of what happens is
subliminal, and the actual activities of my nervous system itself, non-
conscious. My conscious perceptions when I attend to them include
my self-movement, the orientation of mybody parts to each other in
my internal space, my orientation especially of my head to the gravity
field, the external space around myself and what is present there (in-
cluding the dog, the ground and the stick), the stability of the visual
space, the timing of the various actions that I carry out, and so forth.
It is a long list. The coordination of all of this is so accomplished that
it is easy for me to act without reflecting on how I do it. Nor do I need
to attend to, or even think about there being any importance to the
processes involved. And yet the complexity involved is huge.
PERCEPTION
What are the percepts here. Notice that they transcend the
so-called stimuli involved. The dog and I see a stick, hear it when it
falls, feel its size and shape and feel its texture. The stick, which only
I can label with a word, is a multi-sensory invariant in a perceived
stable invariant space. For the dog to be able to act, the same must be
true for him even though he cannot make labels and concepts about
what he perceives. Both the dog and I perceive the stick as an inten-
tional object. We perceive it as an affordance for our game. We.also per-
ceive ourselves as an affordance both for the game and manipulating
the stick and moving in the space. The dog has his mouth and teeth as
an affordance for picking up the stick and I have my arm, hand and
the rest of myself for the same purpose. The notion of affordance was
created by American psychologist J.J. Gibson, and we will see its use-
fulness as we proceed.
The synergies of action that we both use are also like the
sensory percepts. They are invariants that are used in the anticipa-
tions that inform the action and its success. They too are forms of
perception but they are perceptions in time. We are back to the ques-
tion oforder. The creation or extraction ofthese invariants that I am
labeling'perceptions' helps to make a very complex process manage-
able for myself and the same is true for the dog. We do not appreciate
the complexity exactly for this reason. We find our perceived world
easyto manage.
Eigen Forms
A linear machine cannot spit out invariants unless pro-
grammed to do so by a non-Iinear being. Biological systems create
invariants without programming and without instruction. What is
the trick?
Heinz von Foerster, in a seminal paper, "Objects: Tokens
for (eigen-) behaviors," noted that in a feedback loop, if the results of
an action by a system are fed back into the system repeatedly, the act-
ing system moves to a fixed, self-reproducing value no matter what
the value of the input. The feedback requires a looped organization
of the process. Heinz made a very simple mathematical form to illus-
trate the process:
56
"Take any number and apply the following action to it; divide it by 2
and add I to the result. Then repeat this process on this result, that is,
use the output (result) of this operation as its next input." (As quoted
in Glanville, 2OA3, p. 97.)
Try it out with any number to start with. You will find that
the eigen form will recursively compute a number that approaches a
value of2.
What is an invariant? Imagine for a moment that you per-
ceive an object lying on a table across the room. Imagine that you see
a round dish. Imagine, from your knowledge of how the eye works,
that on the retina of eye the light image of the dish appears. What is
the shape of that image knowing the angle with which the light enters
the eye? It is certainly an oval. Now move yourself towards the dish.
Imagine howthe image changes. The image increases in size, the oval
becomes more round. Stand over the dish. The image is now round
and considerably larger. Pick up the dish in your hands and feel its
size and shape and the nature of its surface. No matter what perspec-
tive you took and no matter how the image changed, you perceived a
round dish and knew its size. The percept is an invariant. It is what
stays the same when the perspective changes. If someone picked up
the dish and threw it in the air, you would still perceive a round dish.
If the dish fell and hit the floor you would understand that the sound
belonged to the perceivable dish hitting the perceivable floor. What
we label a round dish, we take to be an object in the environment. But
the perception, which reveals the round dish as a round dish, tran-
scends the sensory perturbations ofthe retina etc. The percept is an
invariant because in moving the relationships between object, and
perspective in relation to the position of yourself as observer, follows
an invariant set of relationships. Thus the percept is a higher-level ex-
traction or construction.
Since the percept seemingly exists in the outside world, the
question is this: Does the sensory perceiving system extract the in-
variance or create it? Some cognitive scientists believe that the brain
computes the image from the sensorydata and use the idea of informa-
tion processing. It is understandable in our computer-dominated era
that such a model would be an attractive metaphor for understanding
the mechanism of a process from input to output. There is still a sig-
nificant question, howwould a biological system cobble together such
PERCEPTION
Eigen Forms
a computing device? It seems an improbability. It would make more

sense to see that the extraction and or creation of invariances would
be a general biological process stemming from the needs of an organ-
ism for survival. The computation, if we can use the metaphor, cannot
be similar to a linear algorithm.
The psychologist J.J.Gibson (1966,1979), who spent his
professional life untangling the mystery of perception, saw that the
invariant was revealed through movement. For example, in visually
perceiving an object you may see the object move against a back-
ground when someone moved it, or you moved yourself in relation to
the object and its position moved relative to the background. There-
fore the energy pattern on the retina gave information of these trans-
formations in movement through the optic array sampled by the eyes.
The invariant in this view is in the environment, yes, but also the
changing angles of the corners of the optic array on the retina, when
moving around an object such as a table, vary in relation to each other
in a relational pattern. This co-variance happens in accordance with
an invariant cross-ratio. Thus the same information is available to
anyone walking around the table and everyone can detect the same
invariant. It isn't that we all have the same sensations. We can have
nevertheless the same perception. According to Gibson the informa-
tion is external, and it specifies through movement both the self, and
the environment. How did the self get in there? In perceiving you are
or I am a self-moving orientated being.
Heinz von Foerster's insight of the eigen behavior also fits
to a biological system. As a child you played with your dish, moved in
various ways in relation to it, looked at it from various perspectives.
In other words you made repeated interactions with objects such as
dishes, and fed back through the loop ofyour sensory system and ac-
tion system what you saw in relation to your other senses. All of this
coupled with the intentionality you had towards the dish. I.e., you
wanted to throw it, eat from it, hear it fall to the floor, lick it, with
many iterations of the process. You assembled the results of these in-
teractions. These results include anticipations of how it would look,
how it sounded, how you could use it, how heavy it is, etc. The invari-
ant dish emerged out of the process. It is not as far as it seems from
Gibson to von Foerster, although Gibson puts the invariance in the
environment and von Foerster sees it generated internally out of the
process on interacting in an environment.
58
The process itself is not a separate invention of a perceiving

system in the brain. Of course in higher animals the nervous system
is essential. The process itself is general and requires precisely the
descriptions of Maturana, von Foerster, Spencer-Brown, Varela, and
later Kauffman, which specify a living system as having a particular
state ofself-organization. In a non-biological system you can achieve
a similar result by designing a parallel sort of system with iterations
(recursions) and repeated feedback. The idea is to create robots that
can learn like a biological creature without the human creators de-
veloping a world model ahead of time for the robot. The researchers,
Yuuya Sugita and Jun Tani (2OO2), designed a neural net architecture
for their robots and an environment in which the robots had to deal
with objects placed in the space in which theywould roam. The robot
had then to "generate the interface between itself and the environ-
ment." The system as it interacts in the environment spontaneously
generates attractors within the internal dynamics of the neural net, in
other words invariances in which a "symbolic structure of an environ-
ment is self-organized in the internal dynamic structure." The robots
generate both behaviors in the environment and a kind of language to
communicate about the environment. A system doesn't have to cobble
together either a computational program or its intelligence. Order aris-
es out of the organization of the processes. But with these machines it
takes a lot of iterations, four hundred thousand iterative steps, before
convergence happens. Even simple organisms are smarter.
Which brings us to an interesting study of earthworms by
Charles Darwin. These organisms are more complex than single cell
organisms. Not by much though as they have only the sensory organ
of the skin and a small ganglion of nerve cells, and no proper brain as
such. Nevertheless, as Darwin observed, earthworms could show con-
siderable flexibility in their behavior in their chosen environment.
Earthworms dig burrows by moving themselves through the earth,
eating earth as they go along, digesting nutrients and excreting what
is left. Darwin showed with his experiments how the earthworms or-
ganized their surrounding to keep the skin moist and free from irri-
tating surfaces. When he placed sharp cinders on the soil, the worms
pushed them away and made the walls of the burrows thicker where
there were coal cinders. With sharp pine needles placed on the soil
the worms pressed the sharp ends into the earth. They also plugged
PERCEPTION
Eigen Forms
their burrows with leaves and chose how to draw the leaf into the bur-
row in different ways depending on the shape. In Darwin's observa-
tion the worms did not behave mechanically in a stimulus-response
fashion, but regulated their behavior in relation to changes in the en-
vironment.16
Explorations in Perceiving
l
.Lxplorallon 4.
TactiLe Perceiving
In this exploration a partner is required and a number

ofdifferent objects need to be set out for use in the explo-
ration. The objects chosen should be small enough to fit
in the hand and different surfaces, textures, shapes, etc.
should be chosen. The person who is the experimental
subject is blindfolded and holds out a handwith the palm
upwards. The partner then places the chosen object in
the palm of the hand passively so the object simply sits in
the hand. The subject then tries to guess the identity of
the object. In the next step the subject moves the object
with the hand and again tries to guess the identity of
the object. The subject now removes the blindfold enough
to see the object. The experiment is repeatedwith each
object and finally the partners change roles.
In this first perceiving experiment note that in the passive

tactile experience, when the object just sits in your hand, there is
little ability to perceive and identify the object. With movement the
perception arises and most subjects will be able to correctly identify
the object. Here it is obvious that movement is essential for percep-
tion using the tactile sense. The same is true for perceiving textures.
Without moving a finger over the surface, we cannot identify the tex-
ture. Note also that the percept when identified is corroborated with
16
For a short overview of Darwin's experiments, see Reed (1996, pp. 20 -24).
Darwin's book The Formation of Vegetable Mould Through the Action of Earth Worms,
(1881) can be retrieved from www.darwin-online.org.uk.
6o
the visual sense. The percept remains the same invariant. That we also
have the cognitive ability to label the percept helps then to further
fixate the identity and thus the perceptual invariant.
.. 'l
|,xploratlon 5.
Vi.suaL Perceiving
In this exploration we are going to use familiar drawings

of ambiguous figures. These have alreadybeen explored
over a long history and the effects upon viewing them have
been analyzed repeatedly by philosophers, psychologists
and cognitive scientists and appear in many books. For
the moment please put aside anything you know of the vari-
ous interpretations so that you simply attend to what
happens in your perception. In the first figure look at the
figure and find what is foreground. Then reverse and make
the ground, foreground. For most people lhis is easy to do.
Can you also see foreground and background as equal?
L-i :
Now repeat the process of switching from one percept

to the other. How do you do this? If you attend carefully to
what you do with your eyes, you will begin to notice that
you move your eyes a particular way to see one percept or
the other and to see both equallywhile more difficult also
requires using the eye muscles.
Part I, Chapter 3 6r
PERCEPTION
In these second two figures the convexity and concavity

are reversible. Look at the center of the drawing and
observe what happens. Notice that the perspective of the
spatial projection of the drawn object switches. Find out
if you can see just the lines on the page without a perceived
projection, what you might call the stimulus itself. Again
attend to howyou use the eyes.
This next figure depicts an impossible object called the

devil's pitchfork. When you look at it you see either one
end of the drawingwith three forks looking like cylinders,
or the other end where two forks are perceived as rect-
angles. Try to perceive the whole object. Can you do
anything to make it possible?
This last figure is called the Kanizsa triangle. It has many

variations, but the effect is to perceive an object that is
not aetually dependent on any change in color or texture.
Nevertheless a triangle stands out in the middle of the
drawing, which appears lighter than the rest of the page.
Observe this area of the triangle closely to note that it is
not different in color than the rest of the page.
6z
These are very simple examples of the complexity of

perception. I direct the reader to the following books for
many other examples for the purpose of further explora-
tion: The Science of Illuslons by Jacques Ninio, Cornell
University Press (2OOl), andVisual Intelligence by Donald
D. Hoffman, W.W. Norton (f998).
Switching from foreground (vase) to background (two faces

facing each other in profile) is relatively easy. Notice that you do not
easily perceive both images at the same time. It is possible and you
then perceive a differentform from that of the two immediate percepts.
The reversing of concave and convex with the line drawings is more
difficult. It becomes easier when you look at (move your eyes toward)
the center of the drawing. Note again that you cannot easily maintain
the two images in the same time frame. Notice also that it is difficult
to see the stimulus image itself, which is made of drawn lines in a pat-
tern without creating one or the other perceptS or images, i.e., you see
it as something. Notice that the stimulus image remains the same. It
is only the percept that changes. With the devil's pitchfork the two
images are fused into a single stimulus image that is almost impossi-
ble to see as a whole. You are drawn in to one end or the other where
the image resolves into a percept that has coherence. In all these cas-
es the figure contains ambiguous information. Whatever produces
the perception produces a coherent image. We can think of it as an
interpretation, but who does the interpreting? The phenomenon of
perceiving is repeatable from person to person. The images perceived
are not idiosyncratic. The sensory information on the other hand
does differ from person to person, because each person may be look-
ing from a different point of view, i.e., the light patterns are moving on
Part I, Chapter 3 6g
PERCEPTION
the retina of each eye. (The eyes are never still. There is no fixed ret-
inal image.)
In the case of the Kanizsa triangle the perception of the so-
called illusory triangle cannot be dispelled by the knowledge that it is
not really there on the page. This is an important observation because
it demonstrates that the objective processes and rational cognitive
knowledge have no power over the process ofperception. Perceptual
illusions remain contrary to other evidence that what we are perceiv-
ing is not how things actually are. The other evidence involves more
careful evaluations including the act of making measurements. In
some sense the way of perceiving is a habit. In another way the in-
ter-subjective consistency of perception seems to reveal something
about the way in which the mind works. Whatever we mean by'mind',
however, must relate to the interaction of a living organism and the
world in which it lives.
If we go back to the story of Vernon told in the first chap-
ter, we can begin to appreciate Vernon's predicament. He was able to
pick up sensory information. He had not learned to perceive visually
in his long period of blindness from early childhood onward, although
he was quite capable of perceiving tactilely, kinetically, aurally, etc. At
middle age at the time his ability to sense visually was restored, he no
longer could easily learn the trick of visual perception given that he
had always relied on his other senses and the accompanying perceiv-
ing that he used for his daily functioning. Thus his inability to make
the immediate visual intuition of 'cat' or'dog', which comes so easily
to the rest of us that we think the visual perception is the cat or dog
in reality. To his sense of touch this intuition of cat or dog was also
immediate. Perception acts relatively quickly and automatically once
the ability is learned. Without perception we are forced to use very
slow substitute processes involving testing and trial and error.
This brings us back to the story of Ian Waterman. His sen-
soryloss,which involved a loss of signals from his peripheral nerves to
his arms, trunk and legs, meant for Ian a Ioss of proprioception. Just
as we perceive outside the skin boundary, we perceive our own move-
ment and action inside the skin. It allows us to perceive with immedi-
ate intuition where we are bodily in space and howwe are oriented to
the world and within our own self. We 'know' thereby where our hand
is in relation to our head, and when we move it what direction it will
6+
go. These perceptions involve a number of sensory systems from tac-

tile sensations to sensations of muscular tensions to vestibular sensa-
tions from the effect of movement and orientation in gravity in the
inner ear.
I once showed a videotape from the BBC to a class I was
teaching about Ian Waterman and his work with Jonathon Cole. I was
surprised to find out from the students that they did not understand
Ian's predicament. Even though they had already been exploring their
own kinesthetic sensations and the accompanying proprioception in
the Feldenkrais class lessons using movement, they were conceptu-
ally unclear what it might mean to lose proprioception. This revealed
how something that is present for every normal person can be ob-
scured by a lack of labeling it and pointing to it. It leads people who
should know better to say that proprioception is unconscious. For Ian
it became very conscious when he lost this ability to perceive himself.
He couldn't control any of his movements below the level of his neck,
but although he had skin and pain sensation, he couldn't feel where
his limbs and trunk were in space. Movement was possible, but not
the perceiving of it. The perceiving of his agency was.lost. Even today
when he has learned to substitute his visual sense for moving himself,
he falls in a heap on the floor when the lights go out and he cannot see
himself. His use of vision shows that functioning is possible as long
as there is some form of sensory feedback to himself for the purpose.
But the use of vision is clumsy compared to the immediate intuitions
of moving that allow us to move ourselves where we want without
having to make cognitive efforts or use ourwill power.
We get into complications here. Because of the ease of pro-
prioception and the lack of conscious attending that accompanies
moving ourselves, scientists have postulated two kinds of perceiv-
ing and even postulated separate brain pathways for each tytrle. One
kind of perceiving leads to the conscious perception of objects and
the world around us; the other, which is non-conscious, is used in the
nervous system to direct the motor system. The brain pathways have
undoubtedly been parsed. When the brain is investigated more thor-
oughly, it is seen that the neurons connect in a vast network of such
complication that separate pathways cannot be linear tracts from one
place to another. Nor is the relation of what is conscious to what is
non-conscious a simple matter either. The separation of two kinds
Part I, Chapter 3 6S
PERCEPTION
of perception is a postulate of a habitual way of thinking that splits

something called'mind'from something else called'body'. We need
to investigate further.
l 'al
r,xplorarlon o.
Proprioception and Vision
Sit comfortably. Close your eyes. Hold your hand in front

of your face about twelve inches or thirty centimeters
. away from your face and notice: Can you see some image
of your hand in your mind's eye? It needn't be an eidetic
image in which you can picture every detail, only that the
visual perception of the position of your hand is available.
Now keeping the eyes closed move your hand to the right
slowly. Notice that you know where your hand is in feeling
where it is in the space around yourself and that you can
see its position in your mind's eye. Let your head and eyes
move and follow the hand so that the act of seeing your
hand is part of the process of seeing the hand in your mind's
eye. Open the eyes verybriefly to notice if seeing the hand
in the mind's eye matches what you actually see.
Nowwith the eyes closed again move the hand wherever

you wish, right - left, up - down, forward - back, and even
behind yourself. Turn your hand also. Bvery now and then
open the eyes to check. Notice how accurately the different
senses couple together to reveal the position ofthe hand.
The integrations that lead to the coupling of vision and pro-

prioception must have developed at an early time in life. Imagine Iy-
ing in the crib and being fascinated watching yourself move your hand.
Eventually the coupling of sensations was mapped out in a way that
we knowwhere our hand is in the perceptual space around us and the
internal space generated through the information from muscle spin-
dles. But as we will find out in the next chapter these integrations may
not form completely in all individuals.
66
One aspect ofperception still needs to be explored, and that

is the circumstance that we have not yet learned to perceive a given
form of stimulus. I am reminded of stories told by westerners who
made contact with people from other cultures. T.E. Lawrence, for ex-
ample, reported that his Bedouin comrades with whom he had joined
forces in the Arab revolt during World War I were unable to perceive
faces as represented in drawings or photographs. The anthropologist
Colin Turnbull in his book, The Forest People, reported that when
he took one of his African pygmy friends out of the forest and he
observed cattle offat a distance in an open range, his friend said to him,
"that cannot be, these must be ants that we are looking at." Drawings
and other representations can faitio be perceived ifat first a percept
cannot be resolved. As soon as a perception forms, then you cannot
but help to'see'it each time the image is presented.
l .
txploratron 7.
Forming Perceptions
I present below a drawing in black and white forms that

for most people does not immediately resolve into a
perceivable image. Yetthe image is possible. Take some
time looking at the drawing and find out if you can
perceive the form of a common animal.
When you can perceive the image notice that now you
cannot lose the perception
@efore you turn the page, spend some time to allow the
image to form. You may find other images that are not quite
satisfying. The image forms clearlywhen it is resolved.
When you desire to checkforyourself, turn the page and
see the resolution on p. 69.) It becomes something of a
habit.
Part I, Chapter 3 6Z
PERCEPTION
Adapted from the Dallenbach figure, TIrc Eye Beguile* Optical lllusions,
Bruno Ernst, Benedikt Taschen, 1992.
Since perceiving is vital to life in many ways, we tend to

conserve the perceptions that we learn to use. But we often are so
habituated to certain perceptions that we cannot easily change them
even when it may be very useful to do so. Breaking habits of perceiv-
ing can be a useful procedure. In the next exploration you are asked
to, through an act of will, give up a perception. Notice that to do this
you must first give up the word label or identity of the object you are
perceiving.
Exploration
1
B.
Dropptng Perception
You can do this exploration indoors or out. It might be

an idea to take a walk outside. In the first step you merely
shiftyour judgments aboutwhatyou choose to observe.
In your walk choose an object to observe and look at. Look
at it with three different attitudes:
68
The object is ugly-

The object is somethingbeautiful.
You are neutral about the object.
Please repeat the process with things or scenes that you

normally find either beautiful or ugly or neutral so that
you can investigate the possible shifts that can happen
when you change your attitude. Can you see a garbage pile
as beautifuI or a flower as ugly? Notice the possibilities
widen when you allow alternative judgments
In the second part of this exploration take a walk again

and choose something to obserwe or look at. Imagine that
you have just arrived on Earth from a distant planet and
you have never seen Earth objects. Look at your chosen
scene or object as ifyou have never seen it before and
do not know its name or identity. What is your experience
of whatyou see now?
For most people it is difficult to drop what you know and

'see' without your knowledge and memory. One of the aspects of art
in the last two centuries has been for the artist to 'see' anew and pres-
ent an art form to allow the observer of the art form or object to ex-
perience different rather than habitual perceptions. In music there
has been an increasing shift from harmonic sounds, in which educat-
ed listeners are comfortable, to a-harmonic sounds that initially are
not acceptable. The composer John Cage, for example, by putting a
'frame' around common sounds brought sounds of everyday life into
the context of music.
The artist James Turrell creates environments in which
common perceptions and expectations are no longer possible. He dis-
covered, for example, that to lie in the middle of a cone-like structure
and look up at the sky created a different perception of a domed sky
above. In fact there is no reason to perceive a flat sky as we usually do
except that it is our habit given that we look at the sky normally with
a scatter of objects around or in an open space. We will investigate
more about art and perception in a later chapter.
PERCEPTION
Explorations in Pereeiving
Resolution of Forming Perceptions
I have hinted about higher cognitive functions in relation to

perception. In Exploration 8. you were asked to drop your knowledge
of a word label that you know for an object. The word label reminds
you ofthe percept and orients the percept in your conceptual world. I
would like to make the case that perceiving comes before conceiving
and that perception precedes representation, conception and think-
ing in representations. Normally these aspects of our cognition are so
intertwined that it is difficult to separate them.
To sum up, we have explored in a small way the questions
of perception. It is a huge topic in the history of human thought, one
which has not been properly resolved. Even the question of illusion,
which is an aspect of perception, has produced contradictory expla-
nations by different thinkers. The questions go to the heart of the
philosophical puzzles, which may still remain un-decidable, as Heinz
von Foerster and others have suggested, despite years of quarreling
and investigating. Hopefully through our exploratiorrs the questions
become more clear.
7o
SPACE
It follows that sight and touch could not have
given us the idea of space without the help of
the "muscular sense."
HENRI POINCARE
I have on a number of occasions had the opportunity in

my practice as a Feldenkrais Practitioner to work with people who
had disturbances in their perceiving of a space around themselves
and also in their internal sense of space. Most people do not think of
space as a perception. I hope I have already with Exploration 6. giv-
en you an experience to reveal that space is something perceived. Is
there a something out there that corresponds to what we call space?
Of course but space is not simply perceived with the eyes. One has to
move. Henri Poincare pointed that out many years ago in his book,
Science and Hypothesrs (1905, 1952).I quote further from his chapter
on space and geometry "Not only could this concept (of space) not be
derived from a single sensation, or even from a series of sensations;
but a motionless being could never have acquired it, because not being
able to correct by his movements the effect of the change of position
of external.objects, he would never have reason to distinguish them
from changes of state." (1952, p. 59)
Some thinkers put sensation as primary and think that it is
sensation that is what is fundamentally conscious. But even the sensa-
tions they speak about are never isolated in themselves, but projected
or located in a spatial awareness. You have a pain or a tickle located
somewhere in or on the surface of the body space. You have so called
visual sensations of color of something in the world, red for example.
The sensations involve the eye, but you see a red object projected in
the outside space. In our conscious awareness the outside world is
stable. We move ourselves in the space and see objects or beings mov-
ing in this space. The significance of this is unrealized until someone
is lacking this feature of perception.
One young man, Alan, who had a disturbance of his spatial
perception, came to see me some many years ago for another reason.
He had had an accident and hurt his neck. In the process of our work
together, I asked him to move his eyes to the right while he slowly
moved his head to the left. He jumped up from where he was sitting
and ran to the wastebasket. "I am afraid I have to vomit." he said.
Part I, Chapter 4 7L
SPACE
"I can't move my eyes like that, I get dizzy immediately and sick to
mystomach."
He didn't vomit, but in our continuing discussion he said
that he was very prone to motion sickness and that he had trouble in
childhood with reading. He was punished for his lack of ability to learn
reading, even sent to isolation in the basement of his house. Later he
was diagnosed with dyslexia. I then asked him this question: "What
happens to the world when you turn your head?"
"What do you mean?" he asked. "I don't understand the question."
I said then, "Does the world stay still or does it move, when you move
your eyes or your head?"
After a moment of thought he said, "It moves. Is that unusual?"
I said, "Yes, it is most unusual. For most people the world stays still
when you move the eyes or move the head."
He looked puzzled. For him the world always moved. Since
no one in his life ever discussed the question, he always thought the
way his world space was perceived was the same as with everyone else.
This newknowledge was a shock to him.
On the other hand he now realized that his trouble read-
ing was exactly related to this quality of his perception. He said, "You
know my trouble reading always had to do that the words on the line
didn't stay in the same place. I learned after a while to put my finger
on the page and trace along the line as I read so that I wouldn't lose
my place. It takes me a long time to read that way. At least I can read.
Otherwise I never would have made it through school."
l .
.Lxplorallon 9.
Worfd Stabilization
Sit quietly. Turn you head slowly and notice that despite
the movementyou perceive the environmental space as
standing still. Turn your eyes slowly and notice the same
thing. Now turn your head quickly and notice there is
more movement of the environment. Tilt your head to the
side and notice more movement of the outside space.
72
Close your left eye. Take your right index finger and place
it at the right corner ofyour right eyejust on the corner of
the upper lid so that you can lightly push the right eyeball
to the left. Now move the right eyeball with your finger.
Notice nowthe world space jumps with each movement of
the eye.
When the eye moves, the image on the retina moves. In fact
when you scan even slowly and turn your eyes, the eye movement
is not smooth. The eye does a series of saccades and the image jumps
from one point to another on the retina. This jumping is revealed
when you move the eyeball from the outside with the finger. Some-
how when you move the eye by your own volition with your head
oriented to the horizon, the world perception becomes stabilized.
When you move your head right and left, the head is also stabilized
in gravity. While the processes behind this stabilization are not con-
scious and often described in terms of reflexes, they are probably
learned as perceptions very early in life as soon as the head is capa-
ble of being held upright. They are complex integrations involving a
number of different sensory channels. For one thing there has to be
integration between the sensations of the head movement and posi-
tion in gravity produced by the vestibular apparatus, and the proprio-
ceptive signals of the eye muscles or neck muscles. There must be a
sense of agency that you are moving the eyes or moving the head. This
then must be integrated with the visual sensing to produce the world
perception. My client obviously had a disturbance in this integration
from early childhood. I am intentionally not calling this a mechanism.
We will return to the question of the relation of vestibular sensation
to space perception.
Being in the World

The philosopher Daniel Dennett in his book Consciousness
Explained (I99I) points out that at anygiven moment the degree of in-
formation available to vision is very limited. For example, as humans
we cannot detect color in the peripheral field of vision. If you look at a
wall with wallpaper and see a hundred repeat depictions of a sailboat
or a hundred Andy Warhol photos of Marilyn Monroe you have the
SPACE
Being in the World
impression that you see everything in detail. Of course at any given

moment you do not, because you see detail only in your foveal vision;
that is, what is sensed in the center of the retina. Dennett wants to
make the case that what we think is our experience is not really so.
Let us explore the question ofcolor experience at the periphery ofour
vision. Dennett's first exploration of the matter involves the use of a
pack of cards. Dennett's claim is that that one does not have the ex-
perience of color at all. My question is why do we think that we see
color?
Exploration 10.
Peripheral Vision and Space
Hold a colored disk or playing card in natural light at the

periphery of your vision to the right just at the point where
you can detect something is there. Move the disktoward
the center and stop where you first can detect the color.
Then turn and notice the position on the wall, which corre-
sponds to the position of the disk or card. Measure the
angle of the position with respect to the horizontal line
to the outside ofyour eye. Ifyou use a large protractor
with 90 degrees at your nose you might measure 25 or 3O
degrees within the accuracy of what you can measure.
If you move the disk or card up and down rapidlyyou

can detect the presence of the disk more easily. But you can
also detect the color at a smaller angle, perhaps about
15 degrees.If you also trywith aplayingcard as Dennett
suggests you will find indeed the card can be identified
only in the central position around 90 degrees.
This second exploration provides a closer investigation of

the experience of howwe perceive. I will describe my own
exploration. The reader is invited to repeat this in his own
neighborhood by taking a walk for twenty or more minutes.
74
I leave the house and take a walk down the block. As I

walk I observe the optical flow of images around myself
and notice that I am aware of the color of things as I
turn my head to look at them. I do not particularly notice
the periphery. When I see a bush with flowers I notice
the colors and as I pass the bush I am aware that the bush
is green and the flowers yellow. But do I actually see
them in the periphery as I pass? It is not easy to say. Since
I alreadyfocused myeyes on the buih,I knowthe colors
to expect. The bush disappears as I pass, but there is no
hard line between seeing and not seeing. The periphery
rather than separating what is in my vision from what is
not (like a frame), has no sharp edge to it. The periphery is
not separate from what is in my focal vision and therefore
is not different in its basic continuity to what is in my focal
vision. It is the same world, which I take to be continuing'
in the void behind me. All I need to do is to turn and there
it is in my focal vision. My perception as a totality includes
the focal vision, the periphery and what is in the void be-
hind myself, because although the void is not experienced
as blach and is not experienced directly at all, I can always
turn and see that what is there is perceptually present.
The perception of what is behind me is not there in the
moment, but the perception that "I am in the world" is
present. The experience is thus in a context.
Now I change the experiment. This time as I pass a wall

and a garden I keep my head from turning. I keep my eyes
forward and attend to what I see in the periphery. There
is something there that looks as if it were flowers. The
color is light, but I cannot identify or name it. When I turn
andbringthe flowers into myfocalvision I see large flower
petals and see that the color is a tannish yellow. My color
sensing at the periphery is so weak that I cannot detect
actual colors or identiff them. At the periphery what is
there is between seeing and the void.
SPACE
Being in the World
Itis interesting. Insofar as the question is the detection of

color (the only question in Dennett's argument) the results
are clear cut for a non-moving object, but more ambiguous
for a moving object. If the question is the phenomenal
experience (the question that Dennettwants to eliminate),
what researchers claim, that "their peripheral field lacks
color altogether," is partiallytrue if referring to detection.
It is untrue with regard to the phenomenal experience,
which is not limited to a singular moment of time. There is
an important distinction here. The experiential field is not
sharp-bounded, it is continuous throughout, and the total
of the perceptions, including the perception of self, places
a self in the world. Thus the perception of the external
space and its contents is perceived as colored even ifthe
color detection is limited or non-existent. Dennett wants
to claimthat there are no consequences from makingthe
statement about the phenomenal experience of color as
long as there are no consequences as regards detection of
color. My claim will be as follows at this point: The ques-
tion of detection is the result of differences in sensitivity
ofthe sensory surface (retina) ofthe eye and not about
the wayvisual perception arises out of the engagement of
myself oryourself in the world.
What is revealed then about the structure of the experi-

ence? Is it important in some way that the visual field has no bound-
ary at the periphery or that the peripheral field is not distinguished in
any sharp way from the focal vision? One way of addressing the issue
is to ask, what would it be like if it were otherwise? How would you
function in the world? In answering this question you begin to real-
ize that the phenomenal experience has consequences. Indeed from
a biological point of view the structure of this experience is essential
once you understand its relation as to how an animate creature needs
to be able to perceive stability in its environment in order to move
and navigate.
Although perception is often confused with sensing, or
identified with only the content (objects) in the visual field, it is a far
broader phenomenon. Walking down a sidewalk as a conscious expe-
76
rience is rnulti-layered as to perceptions. For one thing we perceive

our body space and autonomy as a unified self-presence in the midst
of a world space that is outside the skin. The world space is stable as
we have seenformost of us. There maybe otherobjects orbeings mov-
ingwithin it, but it is experienced as stable and not moving. The body
space also has a kind of stability in that it is perceived as self, an origin
of intention, movement and agency. There are thus background per-
ceptions that are not usually mentioned, but the removal of any one
of them would produce a profound disturbance of the conscious state.
More to the point, removal of a background perception would result
in disturbances of functions. Continuity and coherence therefore are
essential to acting and functioning.
Let us investigate now the vestibular sense. It is part of the
process of stabilization of the visual world. If you spin around and
stop, the world seemingly turns around you. You have a hard time
walking, feel nauseous and lose the ability to balance. There is no vi-
sual sensory reason alone for the stability of the visual world. If you
move your eyes, the images move rapidly across the retina. If you
do this with a video camera with a frame, you get images that jump
across the screen and the background jumps also. With turning the
eyes or turning the head there is a smooth passage through a stable
world until you disturb the vestibular system by spinning yourself.
Thus normally you experience a shift of attention and focus within
a background. Once this is clear as experience, you can begin to won-
der how a nervous system produces the effect. In fact consideration of
this question has Ied to a technology to help stabilize the image on the
video camera screen.
It is more difficult to imagine what it would be like without
this stability in your normal life. Although this is not a first person ex-
ploration that can be done in your ordinary surrounding, the report
of the exploration to follow is exemplary of how, in a changed envi-
ronment, phenomenal experience can be dramatically shifted. It was
a surprise as much for the artist as it was for those who had the expe-
rience of visiting the exhibit.
SPACE
The Effect of Changing the Spatial

Environment of Perception and Function
This exploration is cited in an essay by Daniel Birnbaum
(2OOI). The description is bythe American artist James Turrell of his
installation show in Amsterdam that he titled Czfy of Arhirit. The in-
stallation involved four rooms illuminated with Ganzfelds (total illu-
mination), involving different colors in each room. The light appeared
to hover inside the wedge-shaped rooms, which entered through baf-
fled windows that reflected from different colored surfaces outside.
Turrell wrote:
"In the Stedelijk installation, people got down on their hands and knees
and crawled through it because they experienced intense dis-equilib-
rium. You went through one space and then it seemed to dim because
you can't hold color without fbld. So as you left the first room that
was pale green your eyes developed a pink afterimage. The next room
you entered was red, and you came to it with this pink, and it was just
startling. So I used a progression of space to mix the afterimage color
with the color you were about to see, also knowing that the color, after
you were in it awhile, would begin to dim. People felt someone was
turning the lights up and down on them the whole time, when actu-
ally it was just them walking through a succession of four spaces that
were lit in this manner. We finally had to cut a path in the floor, but
even then people had trouble standing." (p.226, Birnbaum, 2OOI)
Birnbaum (p.226, op. cit.) comments, "So whatt so interest-
ing about this description? Primarily the relation between blinded
eye and falling body. When the eye can't focus and loses track, the
bodily experience and self-experience becomes chaotic. This is what
phenomenologists, from Husserl to Merleau-Ponty, have studied un-
der the title,'kinesthetic experience."'
In this exploration the subjects are thrown into their own
untutored introspection. They are not expecting what happens or
asked to examine the experience. Nevertheless the experience itself
forces the examination. As with many important works of art, the
viewer or participant is challenged in a way that opens the possibility
of shifting perception and a breaking of perceptual habit.
In another installation again using Ganzfeld illumination
(in the Museum of Modern Art in Frankfurt, Germany) Turrell proj-
ects the Ganzfeld toward a solid white wall. On entering the room,
which is dark except for the illumination, the participant is convinced
78
that there is a large recess into the wall, which is illuminated by the
purple light. Essentially a space is perceived which isn't there.
We know now that some people can perceive three-dimen-
sional objects while observing patterns printed on a flat page. Books
with trick images were popular a few years ago. As you looked at the
picture, which on first examination often looked chaotic, and moved
your eyes relative to each other, eventually a new phenomenon ap-
peared and a three-dimensional image popped out.
The Space of Yourself and the Sense of Self

Inner space and outer space are seemingly two different
territories. On the conceptual level this is certainly so. Nevertheless
you perceive space and in so doing the two realms may not be so un-
related. Evidence is easy to come by. One exploration that I tried in-
volved putting on prism glasses in the office of a man who practiced
behavioral optometry. The first pair of prism glasses I tried made
the perceived distance from up and down shorter so that my feet on
Iooking down appeared much closer than normal. People putting on
new glasses often experience such a distortion. The perception ofthe
outside space was changed. The optometrist asked me to walk across
the room wearing the glasses. I was barely able to walk, as my actu-
al legs did not match what I perceived with the glasses to be my legs.
The fault was not the visual perception alone. In my internal perceived
space, I had shrunk and my legs felt as short as they looked. Only after
a few minutes, was it possible to adjust my perceptions so that I could
walk.I still could stumble easily.
I tried in succession glasses that lengthened the distance to
the floor and glasses that tilted the space so that one side of myself felt
longer than the other. If the glasses were worn for a considerable time
the mismatch between the perceiving and doing would be equalized.
In the circumstance of mismatch like this, perceiving is flexible and
the system adjusts over a period of time to allow for movement to be
carried out. We are reminded of the glasses that turned the world up-
side down. In the famous experiment with having a person wear such
glasses over a period of time the perceived world eventually righted
itself after about two weeks. If perceiving were just a matter of one
SPACE
sensory system this would not happen. Here is clear evidence of the
multi-modality of perceiving.
A second evidence for the relation of inner and outer space
comes from one of my graduated students from a Feldenkrais training,
Adam Cole. Adam came for one of his assigned private lessons with
an unusual request. He complained that he felt himself only in two
dimensions. He had width and length, but no depth, especially in his
chest. I wondered how this lack of perception of his internal space af-
fected his functional movements. The movements that seemed most
restricted involved rotation around the central axis (spine). I brought
his awareness to his ribs and the possibilityof rotating. There was still
something missing for Adam. I wondered then about how he used his
eyes. Adam grew up with a twist in the organization of his trunk that
reflected in the bones of his face and skull. He had a very asymmetric
appearance with one side of his face appearing longer than the other.
One eye then seemed positioned slightly higher in the skull than the
other. His two eyes did not track completely together. He was aware
that he lacked stereo-optic vision andsaw the world without depth.
One eye did all the seeing. I guided Adam in a process to reduce the
tonus of the musculature in his overworking eye. This allowed the
weaker eye to strengthen enough to work together with the other eye
and he quickly experienced depth in the outside visual space. We also
discovered that in one eye he had an incomplete image of his mov-
ing hand. (See Exploration 6., Proprioception and Vision.) Adam has
reported his own experiences in his quest for three dimensions in
an article he wrote for the Feldenkrais Journal. For him the changes
opened up a new world for experiencing, and also for his own progress
as a musician. I let him speak in his own words (Cole, 2OO2,pp.6-T):
"During the second year of my training, I received a lesson from Carl
Ginsburg that was a turning point for me. I don't recall the lesson in
its entirety, but I do recall a couple of its elements. Carl taught me
how to soften my chest by bringing movement back into my ribs.
Then he focused on my vision. He showed me that when I closed my
eyes and moved my finger frorn left to right, the image of my finger
vanished and reappeared in rny imagination, depending on where the
finger went. He then worked with me to fill in the missing image of my
finger as I moved it past my closed eyes, until I could 'see' it no matter
where it was.
8o
The first thing I remember about that lesson was that I could breathe
again. Actually, it wasn't a choice of breathing. The air was pouring
into my lungs. I grew cold and dizzy from the huge inrush of air, and
I had to sit quite a while to get my balance back. I also had a different
view of the world. It was as if someone had put a pair of 3-D glasses on
me. Objects appeared very solid, and the difference between things
that were close and those that were only a little farther away seemed
much more vivid. It was very odd for me to discover that what I had
been calling depth perception was in fact my intellectual approxima-
tion of depth, and that three-dimensional vision really existed!
"It was pleasant breathing and seeing so clearly, but a frightening ex-
perience awaited. Now I had to bring my physical sensations with me
into the world of people. Ten students had observed my lesson, and
when I sat up and had to look at them, I came face to face with the
sense of exposure I experienced when I was able to connect with some-
one with my eyes. I recognized that I had to really LOOK at someone
in order to have a true connection with them, and with myself. Both
the pleasant feelings of being able to breathe so freely and see such
clear images, and the unpleasant fears of the worst kinds of criticisms
being leveled against me, came into sharp reliei and I found myself
with a powerful choice that I wasn't sure I wanted: whether to con-
nect with my eyes and feel real, or to distance myself from the world
and remain safe. Dizzy from the inrush of oxygen, sitting more com-
fortably than I ever had, I looked from person to person. They were
so available to me in a visual way; I could tell just how far away they
were. I could move my head freely in any direction to look straight at
any of them if I wished. They watched me intently, some with fasci-
nation, others perhaps with embarrassment. I was torn between my
new freedom and the oppressive sense of fear that bore down upon
me. When I tried to express to Carl and to the group what I was going
through, I became overwhelmed with the intensity of the experience,
and I cried.
"Walking around outside after the lesson was like walking on the moon.
I bounced like a rubber puppet, and I thought that I must look as if I
was having spasms with every step. Meanwhile, my vision was fantas-
tically clear. I could make out every leaf on every tree, even those a
Part I, Chapter 4 8r
SPACE
quarter of a mile away. Looking at the impossibly sharp contours of

the branches with their startling autumn colors, I was dazed by clarity,
and I felt so free that I had to shout out into the crystalline air."
I have introduced here a Feldenkrais process called Func-
tional Integration We will describe it further in Part III. In the lesson
process the person receiving the lesson and I establish a back and
forth contact. I, as the practitioner leading the lesson, must rely on
this contact and coupling in order to be appropriate to Adam's learn-
ing needs. It is an uncannyprocess because I do not proceed with an
analysis of a problem, but rely on my trained ability to think directly
from my sensing and perceiving the person I am with. While the re-
sults as Adam describes them are intense and seemingly miraculous,
he must bring his awareness to what happened and bring the new
possibilities to his life. Adam goes on to describe how he took his new
patterns into his work at a conceptual level.
"Sadly, my euphoria and freedom only lasted a couple of days. My hab-
its were very strong and I soon began to lose the insights I had gained.
So, in the months that followed, I had to begin to integrate that lesson
into my life. Now, when playing in jazz ensembles, I had to get up the
courage to look at the other musicians on the bandstand, and I found
that my ability to play well fluctuated according to the extent that I
could connect to them with my eyes. The mysteries of my strengths
and weaknesses began to fall away as I discovered more important
facets to my visual acuity. I found that my abitity to understand math-
ematical concepts requiring me to concentrate for a long period of
time depended on how smoothly and easily I could read the page in the
textbook without my eyes skipping around. This discovery suggested
that not only was there a connection between my eyes and my physi-
cal state, but my thinking process as well. My ability to concentrate
on a single idea for a length of time, essential for the comprehension
of mathematics, as well as complex music, related to the ease with
which I could scan a page continuously left and right, up and down."
To give the reader a taste of what the sense of inner space
can be, our next step is to explore further. Let yourself stay open to
the experience. Record the process and play it back to be able to easily
follow the instructions, as they are complex. When you record the ex-
ploration make sure you allow enough time to carry out the observing,
imagining and sensing that is asked for.
8z
l
.Lxploration 11.
InneT Body Spoce
In this exploration we return to exploring breathing.

As with the preliminary practice that begins Chapter 2,we
will use breathing as ourvehicle for exploration.
Please lie on your back on a rug or mat or blanket and

make yourself as comfortable as possible. Aroller or pillow
under your knees may help. You may also place a support
under your head if you find your head tilting back on the
floor. While you lie quietlybegin to sense howyou experi-
ence the space of yourself. Notice first the trunk and the
space of your breathing, then the head and nech arms,
pelvis, legs. In the trunk the movement of your breathing
will reveal a sense of space. Notice anydifferences between
the right side and the left. In other areas of yourself you
may sense space through the flow of sensations through
these areas that result from blood flow, etc.
Now begin to attend to the right side. Feel the flow of air
through the right nostril as you breathe in. Notice the
passage of air as it moves through the back of the nose and
into the right bronchial tube. Can you feel the air fill the
right lung?
Now take short very light in-breaths. With each in-breath

notice how the lung can press the rib cage from inside as it
fills with air. Stay with sensing only the right side. Notice
the details of the pressing of the lung. Feel just the top
part of the right lung as it presses outward to the front of
your chest. Then notice the pressure to the side under the
armpit andhowthe shouldermoves outward. Notice the
movement to the backpart of the ribs. Then feel the move-
mentupward to the right side of the neck.
Repeat the process with the middle pdrt of the lung, notic-
ing the pressure to the front, side, bach and ifyou can, to
the inside.
SPACE
Repeat now the process with the lowest part of the lirng.
Can you detect or imagine the lung pressing downward
toward your right hip?
Again breathe lightly with short breaths and notice the

whole right lung as it fiIls with air. Notice also any place
where the lung feels as if it does not move. This is a place
where the rib cage may also not move.
Let it all go and continue to lie on your back. Notice now

differences between your sensations on the right and left
side. Is there a change in the sensory contact with the
floor? Payattention nowto the movement of yourbreath-
ing. Do you sense the movement differently on one side
from the other? Finally explore the sense of your inner
space and notice how the feeling of space may be expanded
on one side. Get up and walk around. If you wish, repeat
the experience on the left side.
In this exploration, which is taken from an Awareness

Through Movement lesson by Moshe Feldenkrais, differences in sen-
sation and self-perception are created through attending to only one
side of yourself. Although the breathing movements are the same on
both sides, your awareness was always directed to the right side. In
doing this the movement quality of the breathing can be changed so
that you become aware of a difference and a change in what would
normally be movement below the threshold of your awareness. The
underlying sense ofyour internal space can then be revealed. Since
you are the agent of the process, you begin to also become more aware
of the how the perception of self and its intentions is integrated with
the actions of the process. Moving yourself and moving your atten-
tion are the vehicles of this awareness. We must now attend to the
perception of time
8+
T]ME
If we did not move and did not detect movement wouldwe
know anything such as time? People who explore meditation serious-
Iy report that in states of what they call pure consciousness they ex-
perience a oneness with everything and that in this state they are out
of time. The essence of deep meditation is stillness. In stillness time
disappears as does distinction. If you remember, G. Spencer-Brown
said that the first act (or movement) is to draw a distinction. People
who have never experienced these states have a difficultyunderstand-
ing this. Nevertheless my question above remains.
In moving we perceive time. We also perceive movement
itself and have a part of our visual cortex, which detects movement in
the visual space. When this part of the cortex is damaged the person
perceives a succession of singular images as if watching each image
on a film run too slowly to perceive the movement. Oliver Sacks in a
recent review of a number ofbooks on consciousness notes a strange
time phenomenon experienced by some of his patients, who suffered
migraine attacksrT. These patients reported that during an attack
they would also lose motion continuity, "and see instead a flicker-
ing series of 'stills."' In this same article he also recalls how his post-
encephalitic patients that he reported on many years before in his
book,Awakenings, wouldbecome frozen, and fixated in space. He ques-
tioned them about their experience after they had come out of their
symptoms through the use of the drug L-DOPA. He reports, "some
described extraordinary'standstills' sometimes hours long, in which
not only visual flow was arrested, but the stream of movement, of ac-
tion, of thought itself."
He describes an experience with one patient, HesterY., who
had flooded the bathroom in the hospital, and on investigating dis-
covered her standing in the water completely immoveable. When he
touched her shejumped and asked what had happened.
"She said that she had started to run a bath for herself, and
there was an inch of water in the tub... and then I touched her, and
she suddenly realized that the tub had run over and caused a flood.
But she had been stuck, transfi.xed, at that perceptual moment when
there was just an inch of water in the bath."
Sacks comments, "Such standstills showed that conscious-
ness could be brought to a halt, stopped dead, for substantial periods,
17
"In the River of Consciousness," -A/ew York Review of Books (Jan. 15, 2OO4).
Part I, Chapter 5 8S
TIME
while automatic, non-conscious functions - maintenance of posture

or breathing for example - continued as before." For the outside
observer, Sacks, some movement remained, i.e., breathing and pos-
tural adjustments. Hestert eyes, however, were open and fixed. For
HesterY. time stopped.
There are two aspects of perceiving either in time or move-
ment that are difficult to understand, because we do not perceive
momentary images. We perceive an action, a sentence, a dance,. a mel-
ody. On the one hand we perceive in time and on the other hand the
percept is somehow out of time. Our verbal cognitive and conceptual
structures do not give a good account of what happens in time at all.
Notice, for example, how easy it is to describe a fixed image, a picture,
a landscape, even an emotion (as if it were a thing), and how difficult
to describe a melody, a dance, a pattern of action, how a person walks,
etc. Even to fixate what it is to experience a moment in time is nearly
a futile enterprise. As Oliver Sacks notes (op. cit.), 'We live in time, we
organize time, we are time creatures through and through." Yet we
are only comfortable when we can study what we take out of time.
Thus the behavioral psychologists studied the relation between stim-
ulus and response. The stimulus and the response are a fixed behavior
that could be described out of time. The cognitive scientists concern
themselves with mental content and representations, programs and
algorithms. Time again is missing.
Event Perception
If you remember we have already brought up the problem
of invariants in visual perception. The image that appears on the
retina is not constant, yet we consistently recognize objects, people,
animals, in fact a whole visual world. Time is involved in perceiving.
The storyhere is more complex than I have indicated. Howdo people
drive an automobile given the rapid visual flow in a moving machine?
Surely a stimulus - response model breaks down in such a situation.
So does the idea of motor program. Time arises with moving. These
considerations led J.J. Gibson to an entire rethinking of the psychol-
ogy of perception. We will come back to his discoveries in a moment.
The prior question is the perception of moving beings.
86
Some years ago the neuroscientist Karl Pribram showed a

film made by Gunner Johansson, a professor at the Univerity of Upp-
sala in Sweden, to a group of Feldenkrais Practitioners. In the film we
watched points of light move around on the screen. Very quicklywe in
the audience perceived a person walking and moving around in space.
Later we perceived two people dancing with each other. In fact that
was how the film was made. The points of light were markers on a per-
son's arms, shoulders, hips, legs, head. The bodywas covered in black
so that the viewer couldn't detect that a person was there when there
was no movement, as the background was not lighted and was also
black. The unmoving points of light revealed nothing in themselves.
But very quickly, as the person on the screen moved, we perceived
without difficulty that it was a person moving. Professor Pribram
did not tell us what we were watching. Even more uncanny, we saw
two people dancing when two people were exactly in this relation-
ship while being filmed. At the time I was amazed to realize howwell
I perceived moving people with only the clues of the moving points
of light. Later I found a copy of an article by Johansson that I had cut
out years before from Scienf ific American (Johansson,L975). On page
77 of this article thirty-six still frames from the motion picture we
saw of the two figures dancing were reproduced. Every sixth frame
from a short sequence in the film was chosen. Each dancer is marked
by twelve lights. On looking at the still images it is difficult to imag-
ine the two dancers even when cognitively knowing that the lights in
the still images belong to the shoulders, arms, legs and pelvis of the
figures. As Johansson notes in the caption of this illustration, "Naive
subjects shown the film can tell in a fraction of a second that they are
seeing the movements of two people." These facts lead Johansson to
conclude that the eye is clearly not a camera and that biologically con-
sidered the eye has to function expressly as a motion detection device.
"Whetherwe are standing still or moving through space the eye effort-
Iessly sorts moving objects from stationary ones and transforms the
optical flow into a perfectly structured world of objects, all without
the benefit of a shutter." And he concludes, "Thus the eye is basical-
ly an instrument for analyzing changes in light flux over time rather
than an instrument for recording static patterns. Roughly speak-
ing without a change in light striking the receptor there would be no
change in ion flow and no neural response." (p.76)
Part I, Chapter 5 8Z
TIME
Event Perception
How significant this ability is was revealed a few years

ago when I visited first the movement laboratory of Professor Klaus
Schneider in Munich and later Professor Esther Thelen at the Uni-
versity of Indiana. In the movement laboratory markers are placed
similarly to Johansson's subjects, on the person in the movement ex-
periment. Three or more special video cameras then record the re-
flection from the moving markers as the person moves. The cameras
record from different angles. A computer is then used to process the
data from the cameras to reveal relevant movement patterns. There
is a hitch, however. Where as a human being can rapidly perceive a
moving person, the computer cannot. For the computer to process the
data the points have to be kept distinct. When a person's arm swings
from front to back the computer cannot distinguish that the point
that made this transformation is still the same point. The data gets
scrambled. A human being, in this case a graduate student at the com-
puter, needs to unscramble the data and identify the points, a process
that can take up to a hundred hours depending on how much data is
involved. Usually only ten to thirty seconds of data are recorded. The
effort involved is enormous. I on the other hand as a person intuit
immediately that the arm made a swing from front to back.
This phenomenon is called, event perception. We can put
the perception into another form and label it as an 'event'. The pro-
cess of memory is involved and time is removed as we make this
step. Yet what happens if we reintroduce time? It is neither the time
of clocks or of our conceptions. We perceive time itself in the flow of
movement. We speak of time itself as a flow. The movement is there
even if the flow is broken up into a succession of frames. We still have
time experience.
James J. Gibson began investigating vision in the early
I93Os. Trained inbehavioral psychology, he chose to experimentwith
human subjects. His investigations led him in uhexpected directions.
By 1938 he was exploring a "field theory" of driving an automobile. Now
he was concerned with moving in space and how to perceive a field
of safe travel through a cluttered environment including such vari-
ables as breaking distance, road surface and so forth. With movement
visual flowbecame important. When the war came he worked for the
U.S.Army Air Force with the task of studying visual perception in
88
relation to flying an airplane 18. In the 1950s Gibson began a dialog

with Johansson to develop further the way event perception could be
understood in the invariances of transformations of angles and vec-
tors. Both Gibson and Johansson were committed to the idea that the
information was in the environment and in the movement.
Johansson (L975) points out that previous theories of vi-
sual perception were based on Euclidian geometry. This led people to
examine the image on the retina with the idea that this image itself
could be measured and analyzed. There are many difficulties with this
approach especially in trying to explain how the images, which are of
differing sizes and forms, can evoke a perception of a given object.
Johansson found that by using a different form of geometry projec-
tive geometry, that deals with relations that stay invariant under
shifts in pet'spective, perception could be understood in a new way.
The invariances do not show up in an Euclidian perspective.
The Specious Present

We also speak of a moment in time. It cannot be captured
and this makes for a difficulty of describing the moment as it is there
in our phenomenal experience. William James, the American phi-
losopher and psychologist, noted that the moment of time was not "a
knife edge" in experience. He used the term "the specious present" to
describe how #e experience the moment. The German philosopher
Edmund Husserl noted in his research that time in experience has a
complex texture. Francisco Varela describes this texture as follows:
"There is always a center, the now moment with a focused intentional
content (say this roorn, with my computer in front of me on which
the letters I am typing are highlighted). This center is bounded by a
horizon or fringe that is already past (I still hold the beginning of
the sentence I just wrote), and it projects toward an intended next
moment (this writing session is still unfinished). These horizons are
mobile; this very moment which was present (and hence was not
merely described, but lived as such) slips immediately past present.
Then it plunges further out ofview." (Varela, L999,p.268)
For an account ofthese researches, see James J. Gibson and the Psychology of
Perception, Reed (1988).
TIME
The Specious Present
Varela's essay from which I took this quote gives a much

more detailed analysis. Varela goes on to show the importance of
attending in this way to the phenomenal experience since it leads
ultimately to a study of the neurodynamics of temporal appearance.
The cognitive present in these scientific studies is not indeed a mo-
ment, but requires a measured time of about five hundred millisec-
onds. Varela finds that the best way from an observer's view to cap-
ture the event of a moment of time is in the mathematical language
of dynamics. For us, as observers of our own phenomenal experience,
we can make a descriptive statement, but after the event of the mo-
ment. We do so out of a series of further five hundred millisecond
time events. Within the five hundred milliseconds there are many
elementary events going on in the nervous system (again from the
outside observer's view) contributing to the experienced moment.
But these events cannot be detected or captured in a conscious space.
We cannot be internal observers of what is going on in our own sys-
tem. In fact within each moment of phenomenal time consciousness
there is no experience of time, no future or past for each event within
the structure of the event. What neuroscientists are finding out now
is that what forms in the nervous system in this span of five hundred
milliseconds are a set of dynamic cell assemblies that are active and
then subside for a moment until another cycle of the process begins.
It is a kind of holding time or'relaxation' time, which is then followed
in the language of dynamics by a phase transition. The moments then
are a series of integrations with short spaces in between in which
the phase transition is made. The cell assemblies arise according to
Varela because "neural activity forms transient aggregates of phase-
locked signals coming from multiple regions" (op. cit. p.II8). We will
review later a little more of the scientific studies that have investi-
gated these phenomena in the nervous system. For the purpose here,
the important thing is that observing our experiencing can connect to
observing as outside observers.
9o
Time and Movement
l .
txploratron lza.
Phase Lockino
Sit at a table. Begin to tap with both hands on the table

in synchrony with each other. Now speed up the tapping
eventually going as fast as you can. What happens?
At some point as you speed up you find that your hands

are moving separately. There is a phase transition that occurs with-
out your awareness that it will happen..I took this exploration from
Scott Kelso who points to other examples in his book, Dynamic Pat-
terns (t995), such as the gait transitions of a horse from walk to trot
to gallop. Here is another exploration that brings to the foreground
another puzzle.
l . 'l
hxploratron lzb.
Sit again in a chair. Begin to lift and lower the index finger
ofyour right hand and the toes ofyour right foot and
synchronize the two movements so that they Iift at the
same time. Can you do it? Go slowly. Is it easier once you
look at the finger and toes asyou move?
This exploration exposes a timing problem for the nervous

system. As Alain Berthoz explains in his book, The Brain's Sense of
Movement (2OOO, p. 9O), "signals from the muscle receptors of the foot
arrive at the cerebellum with a delay over those of the fingers that can
be considerable ..." In fact it is a factor of twice with the finger. With
the tongue it can be a factor of ten times. Notice that.you can move
the tongue also in synchrony with the toes. Berthoz notes that sen-
soryinputs from different sources do not arrive at the central nervous
system at the same time, for example the vestibular impulses are very
quick and faster than visual sensations. This brings us to a new term,
coherence, which is essential for perception and the coordination of
the senses and moving. Berthoz is skeptical that it is just a problem
TIME
Time and Movement
of dynamics and thinks we need a central mechanism for anticipat-

ing and catching up to produce the necessary coherence. Perhaps, but
coherence is a general feature of living systems.
Berthoz (2OOO) discusses many other aspects of moving in
time. In an experiment producing a proprioceptive illusion Berthoz
applied a small fifty to one hundred Hz vibration to a muscle of a sub-
ject's arm. TWo phenomenawere observed. If the arm is free to move,
there will be a reflex contraction or activation of the vibrated muscle.
If the arm is placed immobilized on a table as the vibration is applied,
the subject in the experiment will experience an illusion that the arm
is moving without being controlled along with two different percep-
tions. These are a feeling of change of position of the arm in space
and a perception of the velocity of the illusory movement. Now the
opposing (antagonist) muscle is activated rather then the muscle to
which the vibration is applied. Berthoz describes this as, "The brain
activates the muscle, perceived to be in motion, as if it were the per-
ception (and not the sensation triggered by the receptors) that leads
to the contraction" (p.27). Note also that it is the perception that is
consciously experienced and not the sensory signals.
Now we find that the myotactic or stretch reflex, that had
been discovered by Sherrington at the beginning of the twentieth cen-
tury, also turns out to be much more complex than was first under-
stood. The reflex, which is triggered by the spindle receptors in the
muscle, allows the arm, for example, to resist a force exerted on the
arm, say the sudden weight of an object placed in the hand' The spin-
dles when stretched emit nerve signals proportional to the elongation
of the muscle and the velocity of the stretch.
Muscle tissue actually contracts slowly. If the reflex were
just a simple reaction to the stretch, the reflex would not be able to
match the force. There would be no coordination of holding the object.
The spindles as it turns out are also responding to velocity, that is
the first derivative of the position, or distance per unit of time. This
allows for a dynamic anticipation such that the timing of the muscle
contraction matches the timing of the stretching. Anticipation here is
preconscious. Yet it is built into the nature of the sensory receptors in
the muscles. What I didn't knowbefore reading Berthoz is that nearly
all sensory receptors detect the derivatives of the variables that ac-
tivate them. Berthoz notes, "Evolution obviously selected receptors
92
capable of predicting the future" (p. 28). We have moved a long way
from stimulus response models of how sensory systems work.
The vibration in the experiment simulates stretching, but
what about the illusion? Illusion must involve activity at higher revels
of the nervous system and has its place in resolving sensory ambigui-
ties. Different illusions are created, depending on whether the subject
of the experiment is seated or standing or leaning on the arm. From
the activation ofthe receptors and the context ofthe global state of
the body, the cerebral cortex works out a perception of displacement
and activates the muscles that correspond to the perception. Berthoz
says, "The brain assigns a status to sensory information based on its
assessment of the general state of the body. We are very far from a
simple potentiometer" (p. 28).
I was particularly interested in what Berthoz writes about
the functioning of the vestibular system and its relation to visual and
spatial perception in relation to the detection of body movements. It
is now known that the sensory receptors of the vestibular apparatus
are capable of detecting the second derivative of angular displace-
ment and some receptors are even sensitive to the third derivative of
movement orjerk. Evolution has enabled the nervous system through
the receptors to simplify the creation of perception by reducing or
eliminating the need of calculating or computing in the sense that we
commonly understand it. Again coherence is the consequence, for ex-
ample, that in our visual perception of the world the world stays still
rather than moves, as would be the case as images move on the retina.
Feldenkrais (r980) in his talk on invariances cites this example as one
of the ways the nervous system produces an invariance to allow for
easy functioning. All of this relates to the movement of the eyes, the
balance in gravity, and the body-self image as we have explored be-
fore. The loss of this coherence or its lack of development can be seri-
ouslydisabling.
The timing of our moving is essential for coherent and
coordinated acting. Think for a moment of how you speak a sentence.
You speak in time as the sentence is a linear sequence. But the action
of forming each sound requires not only forming the mouth, lips, pal-
ate, voice box, breath, etc. (manipulation), and having the spatial con-
nections (orientation), it also requires a very precise sequence ofco-
ordinated events. Time then is organized, and movement is organized
TIME
Time and Movement
time-wise. The human nervous system then organizes manipulation,

orientation in space and timing for action to be possible. Moshe
Feldenkrais often spoke of these three parameters of movement as
basics for learning. We are not ready at this point to investigate these
matters and there is much to explore further with time. And as you
can see time is both familiar and unknown to our conceptual picture
of the world.
. TFIE CONTRAST CF
N TWC BASIC ATTITUDES
There never can be a state of facts to which new
meaning may not be truthfully added, provided the
mind ascend to a more enveloping point of view.
WILLIAM JAMES
Theories ca.n contra.dict each other, but findings ca'nnot.

EUGENE T. GENDLIN
We have been developing a view that has not been the

mainstream view of most scientists and philosophers in especially
the Western world tradition. We have been creating this view through
our explorations and through the insights of select thinkers who have
explored alternatives to what can be described as the objective third
person stance from which we imagine ourselves as independent ob-
servers. Thus Heinz von Foerster, Humberto Maturana, G. Spencer-
Brown and others challenge this notion of the objective observer and
maintain nevertheless that we can be observers as long as we know
our place so to speak, and know that when we act as observers we do
so in a community of observers who we can speak to as fellow observ-
ers. They, of course, need to be open to listen. Such a stance allows
for less hubris and more openness to different ways of understand-
ing what we are observing. Listening does not mean you need to agree,
only to take into consideration another way of seeing. This is diffi-
cult in our competitive and judgmental environment of experts. As
94
Spencer-Brown (1969, p.lf O) states in one of his most provocative

statements:
"Unfortunately we lind systems of education today, which have depart-
ed so far from plain truth, that they now teach us to be proud of what
we know and ashamed of ignorance This is doubly corrupt. It is cor-
rupt because pride is in itself a mortal sin, but also to teach pride in
knowledge is to put up an effective barrier against any advernce upon
what is already known, since it makes one ashamed to look beyond
the bonds imposed by one's ignorance."
Spencer-Brown's advice to us to begin to overcome this deficit of our
education is so:
"To arrive at the simplest truth, as Newton knew and practiced, re-
quires years of contemplation. Not activity. Not reasoning. Not calcu-
lating. Not busy behavior of any kind. Not reading. Not talking. Not
making an effort. Not thinking. Simply bearing in mind what one
needs to know."
Of course in the normal relations of the academic and busi-
ness world, we are discouraged from taking such a path. Yet scientists
tell me that when they make a new discovery they do just that, they
contemplate the data until a pattern emerges. They don't start with
a hypothesis to prove. (This is the classic model for research.) They
don't try to fit the data into their preconceptions; they arrive at a new
place noticing the detail that doesn't fit.
This is the stance that I took when I was with Adam Cole
in the session we had together exploring the question of space (in
Chapter 4, pp. 79-81).I am well aware that for someone well-edu-
cated in our modern world, it is more than difficult to accept such a
way of thinking and acting. Many of the students who choose to learn
howto engage with others in the modality of the Feldenkrais Method
find this aspect of staying open in the moment, keeping one's pres-
ence with the other person, using sensing instead of trying to think
in words what to do, grates against thgir expectations and anticipa-
tions. At the beginning they want a formula and a way to easily find
the right answer to whatever question is there. We are trained like
that, as Spencer-Brown points out. It becomes a thinking habit. We
like the third person stance. We have a security in being able to diag-
nose, make a hypothesis, find a cognitive solution before we act. And
it works very well in doing certain activities such as engineering, sur-
THE CONTRAST OF TWO BASIC ATTITUDES
gery exercise, schooling, physical science, taking tests, solvingbasic

math problems, etc. On the other hand these activities and the conse-
quences of this modality of thinking may produce entirely unwanted
results.
In the interaction with Adam Cole, what cognitive proce-
dure would have been effective? How would we know ahead of time
that his spatial sense of his body itself was connected to his eyes and an
aspect of his coordination of his vision and proprioception that only
became apparent in having him explore watching his hand with his
eyes closed? How could we predict, with the knowledge that we think
we have about the human senses, how brains work, how perception
is created, that such plasticity was possible, that the specific learn-
ing that occurred would occur? I leave this question of prior knowing
open at the moment. Obviously I did not act in this situation without
training in the discipline I was practicing, or without many experi-
ences in the practice of the craft. In attending to the circumstances,
I nevertheless stayed open. I did not actively conceptualize and talk
to myself about what I was going to do. This way of being reflective
allowed me also to take seriously Adam's experience and support his
engagement in the exploration.
It is this engagement in his self-exploration that indeed
was critical. Given the variations of moving and perceiving that he
engaged in, he could self-organize a new possibility; he could learn,
in other words. However, the self-organizing ability, the learning it-
self, is not part of his conscious directives, or his will power. These
are capacities of all living organisms. Nevertheless, nothing would
have happened had he not actively engaged in acting with himself. On
a classic scientific level we do not understand such plasticity in our
possibilities. Somehorv our way of conceptualizing our living state
has followed an unwarranted linearity and pattern of 'causal' chain-
ing that limits our knowledge. There is indeed a logical order, but as
Gendlin (1997) puts it there is also a responsive order. The responsive
order is there as we participate.
96
The Confict of Conceptualizations

This is a pervasive structure,leading in the whole life
to a function of thought tending to divide things into
separate entities, such entities being conceived of as
essentially fixed and static in their nature. When this
view is cqrried to i.ts limit, one arrives at the prevai.ling
scientific world view, in whtch everything is regarded
as ukimately constituted out of a set of basic particles
of a fixed nature.
DAVID BOHM
In philosophy one is zn consfo nt danger of producing

a myth of symbolism, or a myth of menfolprocesses,
instead of simply saying what anyone knows and must
admit.
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN
Im Anfang war die Tat.

(In the beginning wo,s the act.)
JOHANN WOLFGANG VON GOETHE
We have not yet explored the processes of conceptualiza-

tion, though we all haye our familiarity with them. In our human
domain we can explore phenomenal experience, and we can do sci-
entific research. Ultimately we should bring the results of each into
some sort of agreement. It is not an easy task given the biases on each
side of the divide.
Although the human sciences such as cognitive science
and the analytical philosophy of mind have been extremely influen-
tial in shaping human thinking about the subjects we are investigat-
ing, we can make distinctions about the thought processes involved
and show that despite the intention toward neutrality, openness and
objectivity, there are basic biases in the classic scientific and philo-
sophical platform. Often the distinctions are made under ideologi-
cal labels. Let me give sohe examples: holism versus reductionism,
non-linear dynamics versus mechanistic theorizing, idealism versus
materialism, functionalism versus mysterianism, phenomenology
versus third person objectivity, behaviorism versus cognitivism come
to mind. Even with regard to neuroscience there are splits between
those who believe the nervous system is made up of modules that

carry out specific functions and those that believe the organization
of activities are considerably more global, between those who think
the nervous system operates with specific coded information where
information is in the form of representations and thobe who think in
terrns of attractor states in the huge network of neurons that are not
specific representations. One very influential thinker is now writing
about consciousness as a global representation of a world (outside
and inside). J.J.Gibson and his followers thought that there was no
need to represent anything in the nervous system, and Maturana and
Varela strongly suggested there was no information transferred from
outside to inside and therefore no model of a world inside the ner-
vous system.
I would like to make the distinctions differently so that the
scientific evidence can be distinguished from the interpretive con-
fusions. If we take David Bohm's statement at the beginning of this
section, the structure he speaks of is the subject-object-verb struc-
ture of the sentences in our language. Action is directed by one entity
and "this action crosses over the space between them to another en-
tity, the object"(Bohm, 1980, p.29). Out of this comes the doctrine of
local causation. It means that we must identify causal (subject-object)
chains to ultimately arrive at explanations of any phenomena we ob-
serve. Let me cite a prime example from a science writer who has an
exquisite sense for the variety and beauty of life forms and their com-
plexity, Richard Dawkins. He describes a skyscraper dwelling built by
Australian compass termites that is built with the thin edges oriented
along a north-south axis. The advantage to the termites is that the flat
surfaces are warmed by the rising and setting sun, but at noon when
the sun is high and hot, the sharp edge is facing the sun in the north.
The design provides more equal temperatures inside the nest. He
calls these structures designoid ("design-oid") to distinguish them
from true design and completely random processes. He attributes this
notion of design to his favorite causative force in evolution, the natu-
ral selection process. In other words there is a cause-effect process
that presumably results from genetic modifications that leads to the
termites building such a structure. The termites behave entirely as a
result of a genetic program that leads them to build such structures.
It is entirely mechanism at work. It is an interesting difference from
98
Dawkins'hero, Darwin, who describes the earthworms, responding to

their environment in a way to see that they shape their own environ-
ment according to their sensitivities to what is there about their bur-
rows (see Chapter 3, pp. 58 - 59). Darwin in the nineteenth century is
changing the environment to explore how the earthworms are relat-
ing to the environment to observe their autonomy. What are the ter-
mites doing in relation to each other and in relation to their environ-
ment that allow for the cooperative endeavor to build the skyscraper
nest? If you only allow for local causation, do you really know what is
going on?
The alternative is to take the path we have already begun,
to begin to take notice of interaction, co-evolution, coordination,
self-organization, agency, autonomy, coherence and synergy. The in-
teresting thing is, scientists are discovering evidence to corroborate
the insights of von Foerster, Maturana, Gibson, Reed, Varela, Sheets-
Johnstone, Bateson and other pioneer thinkers. Richard Sole and
Brian Goodwin (2000) create a very different scenario, which in-
volves taking into considerations the dynamic interactions that can
be observed for colonies of insects, which can generalizeto any collec-
tion of units that can interact. They write (pp. f 48 - 49) , "In both ant
colonies and brains, individual units (ants or neurons) do not gather,
store, and process information by themselves. Instead they interact
with each other in such a way that information is manipulated by the
collective. The whole colony is the organism, the basic entitywe must
understand." Out of the interaction complex structures can emerge
which are not predicated on plans or something like genetic causa-
tion. Genes are involved of course, but not as information generators
of outside activity. This leads to a revised scenario for the forma-
tion of skyscraper termite dwellings, which now can be described as
emergence in relation to the environments. "For example," Sole hnd
Goodwin (op.cit., p.f51) write, "pillars built by termites can emerge
only if there is a critical density of termites. The system undergoes a
bifurcation at this critical number: no pillar emerges below it, but pil-
lars can emerge above it." The authors continue the description of the
building process in relation to the formation of the structure through
the termites' activities where the structure feedbacks to the activity
itself. The termites coordinate themselves with the existing environ-
ment (gravity, sun heat, etc.) and with each other through chemical
attractors and then with the structure that emerges. At the level of
the colony we can speak of self-organization and even consider intel-
ligence since the structures that evolve are coherentwith the needs of
the colony and its members.
Coordination implies dynamics. We will look into this top-
ic in more detail in Chapter 15. But in terms of the human dimension
as well as in all natural systems, dynamics, I believe, will become an
essential study for the future. As Scott Kelso (2OO2) has proposed in
his very succinct paper, "The Complementary Nature of Coordina-
tion Dynamics Self-organization and Agency," "...spontaneous self-
organizing coordination tendencies give rise to agency; that the most
fundamental kind of consciousness, the awareness of self, springs
from the ground of spontaneous self-organized activity." Scott Kelso
is a scientist interested in human movement, but trained in this new
field of dynamics, which provides him with the opportunity to look
anew at life through a different prism. His objective stance is informed
through accounting at the same time for insights gained through phe-
nomenological reflection. In a book Kelso has co-authored with David
Engstrom, The Complementary Nature (2006), the authors explore
coordination dynamics as a way of resolving the fury of contrary posi-
tions. We are addicted to polarities. Yet further investigations reveal
inevitably that polarities arise in nature and language and are linked
to each other through the 'complementary nature' of our descriptions.
Let us look at objectivity again briefly.
The stance of objectivity developed historically and cultur-
ally in opposition to social and religious mythmaking. Thus it was part
of a human revolution that has led to vast changes in howwe humans
organize our life and interactions in the sphere of governance and
economy. Useful as it is, the stance of objectivity is accompanied with
its own myths and beliefs. It can become a religious-like system of
practice eliminating other ways of knowing and observing.As Gend-
lin(1997, p.16) has pointed out, "Science does not include its context.
One result of this is that when it has a satisfactory analysis, it finds no
reason to pursue the existence of anything it has not found." Another
is that assumptions are often held as a matter of convention. Some of
the beliefs developed in what we might call 'scientism' have as much
to back them up as the religious beliefs that once dominated human
thought. I mention two: There is a belief that by staying with the pro-
100
gram we will eventually be able to understand anything we wish. This

is combined with the idea that with the knowledge we develop we can
engineer our environment and life with impunity.
There is one other myth that is so central to the objective
stance that it needs to be pointed out again. It is that each member
can act as an independent observer trained to observe withoutbias. In
reflection we can see that the enterprise, despite its obvious successes
in the fields of physics and chemistry, is undermined by many hidden
assumptions and a priori metaphysical and ontological beliefs. There
is a difficulty with language itself. As Wittgenstein tried so hard to
point out again and again in his teaching, we are normally "bewitched"
by the language we use to conceptualize. Or as Korzybsky formulated
it, "the map is not the territory." And then there is'the problem of sub-
jectivity. To quote again von Foerster, "Objectivity is a subject's illu-
sion that observing can be done without him." We need the objective
stance, but without the baggage, and using it in a complementaryway
with observation through phenomenal experience. In the words of
Varela (1996, p. 347) in relation to developing a new research program
in the cognitive sciences, such a program "seeks articulations by mutu-
al constrainls between the field of phenomena revealed by experience
and the correlative field of phenomena established by the cognitive
sciences." As Kelso and Engstrom proclaim, "contraries are comple-
mentary." What we call'obj ectivity' and its contrary'subjectivity' are
essentially linked to each other. The exclusivity of one stance or the
otherwill lead to distortion of our understanding of life. In one aspect
of modern medicine, rehabilitation, a major evolution or revolution
has revealed that what was assumed to be fixed is not. The brain is in
fact changeable throughout life. We now call this ability brain plastic-
ity. I use this discovery as a paradigm of how what seem like objective
beliefs can be thoroughly faulty.
Plasticity
One consequence of shifting the thinking is that we can
discover openness where we assumed determinism. Plasticity in na-
ture is ubiquitous and observable. Yet it often remains unnoticed. A
wounded animal heals itself; a person in a foreign country learns to
speak a new language; in a foreign city we learn to navigate; a com-
Plasticity
munity of rats learns to avoid a poison; a spinal injured cat learns to

walk again, a feat even some humans have accomplished. Ian Water-
man, the man who Iost his ability to use his proprioception that was
mentioned in Chapter l, learned to move using his visual feedback
and whatever other resources he could put together for himself. He
found some support, but not from his doctors, who knew that recov-
ery from his sort of illness was not possible.
The evidence of plasticity comes from at first just noticing.
With regard to the nervous system, hard evidence was received very
skeptically. Paul Bach-y-Rita began the search for evidence of brain
plasticity after his brother George helped his father recover func-
tion after a stroke. After his father died Paul ordered an autopsy that
revealed the huge damage from the stroke. How was it possible that
such recovery was possible? At that time (the f950s) the strong belief
in official medicine was that after a few months after a stroke no fur-
ther improvement in function was possible. With this 'wisdom' most
medical doctors discouraged attempts at improvement that in their
view would fail. George had no training in rehabilitation and no edu-
cated pessimism about the possibilities. Therefore some months af-
ter his stroke, he got his father to begin doing something with himself
by encouraging him to crawl. The father began from a state of near to-
tal incapacity and heavy spastic paralysis. Over a year they went from
crawling to catching marbles, to pot washing, to moving on his knees,
and eventually to standing and walking. The father went back to teach-
ing after the year of ardent exercising with basic life movements on a
daily basis. Paul upon seeing the results and the extensive damage to
the brain revealed at the autopsywas moved to change his career. PauI
went into rehabilitation medicine to begin to explore how plasticity
in the nervous system was possible. His first successes came through
extensive research into the possibility of sensory plasticity or what he
called at the time, sensory substitution. He, for example, taught blind
people to 'see' through a device including a small television camera
hooked to an array or matrix of electrodes that could stimulate the
skin with images from the camera.re Blind subjects were then able to
use this apparatus to 'see' after weeks of training and to use the imag-
es to pick up and manipulate objects. With two such cameras mount-
ed on a pair of glasses the subjects were able to perceive objects in a
re Paul Bach-y-Rita, B rain Mechanisms in Sensory Substitution, Academic Press (1972).

LO2
three dimensional space synthesized from the two slightly different

images in the same way your two eyes create a visual space of three
dimensions. Bach-y-Rita continued in his life to produce many such
devices including a device that could give vestibular-like signals to a
subject with severe vertigo through electrical signals to the tongue.2o
Moshe Feldenkrais was aware of Bach-y-Rita's work in the I970s and
Eileen Bach-y-Rita who was married to Paul at that time joined the
Feldenkrais training in San Francisco. The speculation at that time
was that plasticity occurred when the nervous system was stimulat-
ed through activity. Activity somehow induced nerve cells to begin
to form new dendrites, which created new connections and activity,
bypassing damaged areas. Later, research in this field has revealed an
even more exciting discovery.
It was long held in neuroscience that in humans and pri-
mates the number of nerve cells was fixed after birth. Whatever
plasticity seemed to be available was the consequence of pruning
and sculpting, not the addition of new nerve cell growth.2r When
the evidence against this view became overwhelming the New York
Times published an article about the new discoveries entitled, 'A
Decade of Discovery Yields a Shock about the Brain" (Blakeslee,
2000). Blakeslee reported that many scientists felt that "if scientists
expect others to change long standing thinking about brain develop-
ment, the standard of proof must be set very high." She quoted anoth-
er neuroscientist as saying, "neuroscientists had responded to several
of the new findings with'resounding silence."'While the evidence of
'nervous tissue growth cited in this article is strong, it is important
to connect the evidence of plasticity to actual learning and sensory
relations. It is here that we can see how plasticity results from the
action of the organism in an environment.
I refer again to Kirschner and Gerhart (op. cit.) for a gen-
eral overview of plasticity in all aspects of biological creatures. For
example, in a section on "How Cells Get Their Shape" they note that
"there is no genetic information for large-scale cellular organiza-
tion," and, "Cell shape responds to developmental and environmental
cues independently of genetic control" (p. ta8). One mechanism they
20
See Norman Doidge, M.D., The Brain that Changes Itself, Viking (2oo7) for details
of many of Bach-y-Rita's studies and many other examples of plasticity.
2r
See Carl Cotman (ed..), Neuronal Plasticity (1978) for a number of early scientific
papers on the subject.
THE CONTRAST OF TWO BAS]C ATTITUDES
Plasticity
describe, microtubule exploration, involves an activity within the

eukaryotic cell in which microtubules grow outward and then shrink
inward. When microtubules encounter a signal, the ends move toward
the periphery. Stabilizing agents then fix the ends of the microtubules,
and the microtubules no longer shrink. The cell is now shaped by the
stability. Thus a dynamic process involving movement and growth and
a kind of coupling of cell and environment results in structure based
on the history of this coupling. The process allows for adaptability of
the organism, even at this basic level. Similar'exploratory processes'
are involved in complex multi-cellular organisms, which regulate how
muscles grow toward bone, capillaries grow toward where oxygen is
needed in muscle tissue, nerve cells grow toward muscle tissue and
are pruned so each muscle cell is contacted by one nerye cell. All of
this involves feedback loops that regulate the dynamic activity.
I cite Kirschner and Gerhart again to describe an important
aspect of plasticity in how brain and sensory neurons at the sensory
surfaces must be coordinated. They do not develop together in the
embryo as you might expect. The connecting requires movement and
exploratory behavior to provide stimulation of the sensory surfaces.
This stimulates a complex pathway in the nervous system, which then
results in forming connections to specific regions of the cortex. A par-
ticular case studied in detail involves the relation of face whiskers
of the mouse to a topographic representation of the whiskers in the
mouse cortex. The whiskers are important to mice so that they can
navigate in dark spaces. As these authors describe based on the re-
search literature, at the cortex certain structures called'barrels'form
in correspondence to individual whiskers within five days after birth
of the mouse. Normally this development remains stable. In some of
the experiments, it was found that (p. f63), "Trimming some whiskers
causes elimination of their barrel domains in the cortex and enlarge-
ment of other barrels to take up the space." The actual brain structure
changes in relation to the activity produced by the sensory surface.
It was frequently held in the past that genius was related to
inborn capacities. The first evidence that this is not so was revealed
in a study of London cab drivers. Brain imaging studies revealed
that cab drivers in London, who are required to memorize their way
around this particularly complex city and know how to reach any
given address, had an enlarged part of their brain, which was involved
LO4
in spatial memory (the hippocampus). It could be argued and was

that people who were attracted to this profession already had such an
enlarged part of their brain. Nevertheless, "The size of the hippocampi
was directly proportional to the years on the job." (Goldberg, 2005,
p. 250) Goldberg is a good popular source for information about brain
plasticity in general and the most recent discoveries about the human
possibilities. Other evidence he cites involves language learning and
learning music. One study found that people who are bilingual have a
larger left angular gyrus (a part of the cortex) and also a higher white
matter density on the left. Similarly a study of musicians versus non-
musicians revealed that a part of the cortex for sound processing, the
Heschl's gyrus, is twice the size in musicians. Lastly I mention a study
published in Nature in2OO4, cited by Goldberg (see his book The Wis-
dom Parado.x for original sources of all these studies) in which before-
and-after brain scans were done on a group of healthy subjects who
trained themselves to juggle three balls in a three-month period. The
MRI scans revealed that after learning on both sides the temporal
lobes increased in gray matter and also the left parietal area showed
a similar change. When the practice was stopped the effect decreased
and the brain regions were reduced in size again. This kind of evi-
dence ofplasticity is hard to ignore.
In Part II of this book we will explore how human beings
Iearn and develop in interaction with a world and other humans. We
need the objective stance to observe what is going on since we have
no memory of what we experienced in this phase of life. It is a miss-
ing link to exploring how we got to where we are as adults and how we
got to thinking first and thinking in language second. To make sense
of what we observe objectively we must also consider phenomenal
experience as we have done so far. Here we have to make a leap of
inference. What is it like to be an infant? Out of our observations we
can discover the pathways to development and the ability to carry out
self-learning.
Moshe Feldenlcrais (f904-I984) teaching a workshop in Freiburg, Germany

Photograph, Copyright OIrene Sieben, Berlin
Plasticity
LO7
PART
TWO
Affect, Learning and Development
109
a ro
TNTRODUCTTCN
/ PARr rr
A Review of our Progress
In Part I we establishedthe notionthat animate livingthings
are organized in a special way that allows for survival. We asked: What
is it that distinguishes a living thing from any other kind of object, or
machine, or designed thing that moves? We noted that every life form
is bounded and the boundary allows the living organization to be con-
tained and separate from everything else in the universe. Thus each
living cell is bounded by a cell membrane or cell wall that protects the
inside ongoing processes and allows a flow of nutrients into the cell
and eliminates toxins and wastes. In other words the membrane is es-
sential for life and every organism is enclosed and separated as an in-
dividual entity distinct from the rest of the universe. In order to mesh
with the web of life, the cell cannot just exist. Certain basic properties
are needed.
These are:
I. Selfreproduction
2. Self maintenance
3. Selfprotection
When it grows, the cell wall forms a narrow constriction between
two bulging areas. In continuation of the process it splits into two
identical cells. The contents ofeach part are also reproduced so each
cell has the same DNA., RNA, protoplasm, etc. This division contin-
ues into the future as long as some cells survive. Living things thus
reproduce themselves and repeatedly reproduce the membrane and
the processes so contained. Movement is an essential. A living thing
also requires self-maintenance to keep the integrity of the cell mem-
brane and the ongoing processes. Beyond this self-preservation it is
necessary to allow for protection within the environment surround-
ing the organism. Cells can only continue to live in a compatible uni-
verse or area where survival is possible. Even plant life needs a place
to grow and thrive despite not having the ability of moving from its
place where it originated. Animate living things czrn move and find
the niche in the environment where living can be maintained. All of
these features continued as life became more complex. Cells merged
with other cells and through a mutual s1mergy, more complex cells
evolved where some incorporated cells formed new distinct parts we
110
now label as organelles. Cells also evolved structures that permitted

swimming and moving from one place to another. Multi-cellular life
forms became possible as cells became functionally specialized and
developed cooperative interactions.
There is a tremendous variety of life form. How is this pos-
sible? We can observe that living things are mutable in relation to
these forms and structures while conserving the organization of basic
processes. Once more complex Iife forms evolved, the variety of life
forms expanded during evolution. These forms despite the processes
resulting in this variety nevertheless conserved essential features of
life during reproduction. The cell wall, for example, is continuous in
all living forms as are the basic circular chemical processes of the cell,
and the processes of ingesting nutrients, absorbing energy, and elimi-
nating by-products. Cell structures (organelles) continue to exist in
all complex (eukaryotic) cells. CelI division, cellular form, and most of
the genetic makeup are conserved throughout evolution from simple
creatures to complex multi-cellular living systems. There are threads
of similarity in all life forms despite huge differences in structure,
shape, and functional capabilities.
As we suggested in Part I, intentionality in a biological sense
appears very early in the history of animate beings. Even bacteria
move towards nutrients and away from irritants and toxins indicat-
ing the organism relates to its surroundings. This is essential for the
functions of self-maintenance and self-preservation. From this per-
spective survival refers to survival of the organism. In fact one can-
not conceive of living things without considering coupling processes
in which the organism interacts with the surrounding environment
and with other organisms. Bacteria clump together for self-protec-
tion and shelter for the community of cells when nutrients are scarce.
These are activities that are the genesis of what at the human level
are conceived of as choosing and learning. With single celled crea-
tures one can interpret this intentionality mechanistically. In higher,
more complex, organisms the same functional activities in relation to
the environment are carried out by much more elaborate biological
structures, and with greater autonomy.
With having this much established so far, there are indeed
many more questions. How do organisms make choices? How is sen-
tience and movement involved? How is learning organized and guid-
Part II, Chapter 7 111
iNTRODUCTION TO PART II
A Review of our Progress
ed by value as expressed by affect, feeling and emotion? And how does

organismic development work in relation to the environment where
organisms live?
The sense of choice and agency accompany the activities
of living beings. In simple single celled organisms chemical sensitiv-
ity and mechanisms of self moving carry out the processes involved
in intentionality, agency and choice. Multi-cellular organisms have
evolved a nervous system, which is specialized to take over the func-
tions, which create value for the organism and produce the movement
to fulfill the organism's intentionality in the environment. We tend to
think of these capacities as 'mental' in higher creatures and especial-
ly in our human selves. As higher animals, we test and make choices
through feeling states. We take joy in learning. We are thus guided
by affect and feeling. Through observation and inference we can at-
tribute affect to animals as well. In other words, affect, feeling and
secondarily emotion are essential aspects of action, choice, and the
directive-ness of action. Affect also drives learning in two ways. It en-
ergizes the organism to interact with the surroundings and surround-
ing creatures. It provides the value essential to the learning resulting
from interaction. Developmental learning is particularly driven in
this way. A system regulating and communicating affect is involved in
relating to other organisms and con-specifics. Affect not only involves
special parts of a nervous system, but also chemical agents transfer-
ring signals to the organs and tissues and neuromuscular activity to
communicate and express the affect. This is a huge jump in complex-
ity. It is also simplicity for the organism. Choice is directed through
feeling states, which are organized at a higher level.
In the recent past all of this was modeled through the behav-
ioristt conceit, based on a mechanistic and passive account of what
happens. Development was considered driven by a genetic program,
learning by variations of stimulus and response chains, in which or-
ganismic change was a consequence of environmental impingement.
It has taken many years to begin to revise the understanding in the
terms we have outlined. Behaviorism is no longer an active model
even though traces of this paradigm still remain in some disciplines.
Other assumptions still dominate thinking, especially in relation to
our humanness. In the next chapter we will look at some of these as-
sumptions about human development. Ultimatelywe wish to restore
LLz
the importance of learning and affect in relation to movement, in

order to turn our thinking around. We are finally discovering that we
are more related to other life forms than we had imagined. We are also
beginning to realize that although we are separated by a boundary, we
are not only in an environment, we are thoroughly coupled within
that environment. All of this will be explored in Part II.
A NEW LOOKAT INFANCY:

FIUMAN AFFECT AND
EMCT]CN
It is curious how assumptions can dominate thinking, es-
pecially in relation to our humanness as biological beings. The over-
riding assumption has been in our modern Western thought that hu-
mans, as the superior higher beings, are distinct in having reason and
control over biological functions, which can be relegated to the me-
chanical. The body can only be important in the realm of the animal
instincts and forces.It is mind that makes us human. The mind con-
trols the body, but is a separate domain. The problem with assump-
tions is that they become disguised as received truths. With a closer
Iook we find that many assumptions are not corroborated by evidence.
Taken as received truth they are taught through normal education
as if self-evident. One common Western assumption that began to
crumble at the turn of the twentieth century was the notion that what
separated Man from animal was that Man had reason.
Sigmund Freud became the dominant thinker in reshaping
the idea that human life was dominated by reason. His notion of the
unconscious, even while not necessarily accepted by those involved
in experimental psychology, was taken up broadly into the dominant
cultural thinking of most of the twentieth century. Freud's theme as
culturally understood was that the unconscious controlled human
life much more than reason, and we as humans are unaware of its
force in our lives. Freudian psychoanalysis released the unconscious
to consciousness through a process of free association allowing rea-
son again to take hold. There is at least a partial validity to Freud's
A NEW LOOK AT INFANCY
therapeutic process and his postulation of the unconscious. In his

overall model he proposed that the underside of life involved the in-
stinctual needs and drives that were biologically inherited and had to
be controlled and organized to make living possible in a social world.
Thus the rd, as it was labeled, dominated the embodied life of human
beings. The id was seen as animalistic and unstructured. The general
view, which was shared by many thinkers in sociology as well as with-
in psychology, was that order was imposed on the id from outside of
the human organism. This order is developed therefore in life during
the socialization process of the infant and is organized into a men-
tal structure labeled the ego. The unconscious stays hidden lurking
in the background. Mind and body in this sense stay separate. (See
Gendlin,1987)
The strangest part of this model of the human is its view of
infancy. The infant is cut offfrom interaction and lives within the id.
Infants were thought of as fundamentally autistic. The infant learns
passively through social and environmental impingement in becom-
ing a self. One can only move ahead through the agency of thought.
Regression can only take a person back to this early space, back to
what is primitive and unorganized in bodily experience. The body it-
self is not social and cut off from the world. The problem of this view
is that it remains an assumption j ust as the earlier view dividing mind
and body with the body serving only mechanical functions. But what
if infants are not autistic? What if organizing life is much more com-
plex than we tend to believe? What if learning is something other than
imposition or conditioning?
The reason for investigating origins in part I, and especial-
ly the origin of order, will now become apparent. An infant is not a
passive creature and not cut off from the world. Unless impaired by
some accident at birth, all infants are actively engaged with the world
around them and the humans who act as caretakers. Mothers have usu-
ally observed this about their infants, despite experts and specialists
who 'knew'better. The problem comes down to this. The assumptions
made about infants were not based on careful observation. The domi-
nant model I have sketched out above became the determinant of ed-
ucated belief and the observation of those directly involved with the
care of infants (primarily mothers) was discounted as sentiment or
bias. There is also the bias of the objective stance. How can we know
LL4
infants are conscious or aware of anything? We cannot peer into their

'minds', nor can they report verbally about their experience. Lastly
most humans have verylittle memoryof infancythat is accessible.
However, the underlying disagreement is about the origin
of order. The evidence we need first of all is from better observation of
infant life and infant- mother relating. Without memorywe have no
experiential evidence as to how development proceeded with us. But
with the new evidence that has been accumulating in the last quarter
of a century, we can make inferences, given that we also watch care-
fully with openness. With a second look we will see that human be-
ings do not truly begin with a blank slate. Perception itself is not so
simple. Learning does not begin from scratch. Perception cannot be
so easily peeled away from the conceptual. We do not grow and de-
velop in isolation from other beings or from our biological source. We
need particularly biological abilities to bring ourselves into a world.
We also need a world inwhich to engage in, to develop and learn. And
that world includes all the interactions with other humans. It is an-
other loop or set of loops, which involve'structural coupling'.
Daniel Stern (1985) in The Interpersonal World of the Infant
provides an excellent account of this new way of thinking about the
Iife of infants and the importance of relating adults to the process of
development. Stern is particularly cogent in recognizing that estab-
lishing the notion of a sense of self begins very early in infant life and
it involves simple (non-self-reflective) awareness. We are speaking of
the preverbal level of direct experience, which is not yet conceptual.
In his view sense of self arises as an invariant pattern of awareness as
a consequence of an infant's action in the world and the correspond-
ing mental processes. Such a pattern can only evolve through some
form of self-organization of sensory experience. We could think of
it as a bodily perception. Later such perceptions will be verbally ref-
erenced to as a labeled self and attached to an indicator "I". Stern
says, "This organizing subjective experience is the preverbal, existen-
tial counterpart of the objectifiable, self-reflective, verbalizable self"
(1985, p. 7).
What experiences add to a basic sense of core self? Stern
suggests from his observation of infants that these experiences arise
by two or three months in the life of an infant. Stern lists the follow-
ing four experiences as essential to the evolving sense ofself:
L. Self-agency in the sense of authorship of one's own actions.

2. Self-coherence inrelation to sensing a bounded physical whole
for integrated actions.
3. Self-affecfzvrfy involving inner related qualities of feeling.
4. Self-history based on regularities in a flow of experience.
Self-agency arises in the experience of moving. As an in-

fant moves an arm using volition and then feels the movement when
someone outside moves his arm, he experiences contrast. Volition
creates a difference in kinaesthetic sensation, different from what it
feels like to be passively moved. An infant also anticipates the con-
sequences of a volitional act. When you shut your eyes, for example,
it gets dark. The volitional act and proprioception of movement are
two invariants. When a mother takes the baby's wrists and plays clap
clap, the baby will experience proprioception but not volition. When
the baby claps hands, volition is involved. When the mother brings a
pacifier into a baby's mouth, neither volition nor proprioception is
experienced. In the creation of differences the infant learns to distin-
guish between these possibilities and learns to identifii those invari-
ants that bring about a core sense of self, and ofthe sense ofthe other.
As variations are added the possibilities expand.
A second experience for forming an organized core sense of
self is self-coherence. Coherence involves "having a sense of being a
nonfragmented, physical whole with boundaries and a locus of inte-
grated action both while moving and when still" (Stern, 1985, p.7L).
In organizing perception, the infant needs to distinguish the coher-
ence of movements of itself versus another. A baby sees the mother
coming and perceives a coherent object moving in front of a consis-
tent background. A baby also experiences the coherence of a temporal
structure. If you show a baby two different films of a face of a person
talking at the same time, one with a slight asynchrony, she will watch
the face with the not matching mouth and voice movements and go
back to the matching one after a short while and keep her attention
with the synchronous order. TWo events with the same time struc-
ture belong together. Coherence is also involved in intensity struc-
ture - for example in an angry outburst the loudness of vocalisation
matches the speed of forcefulness of an accompanying movement. All
the stimuli, auditory, visual, tactile, proprioceptive, are all simulta-
116
neously increased. The last coherence structure is the coherence of

form. Three-month-old babies recognize the face of their mother on
a photo. The configurations of the face may change with the expres-
sions offeeling, but the form stays coherent.
The third experience is self-affectivity. Patterns of differ-
ent feeling states (affects) accompany other experiences of self. These
can involve joy, interest, worry, rage, surprise and other unnameable
energetic feeling states. These invariant self-experiences, which are
accompanied by proprioceptive feedback from the muscles of the
face, breathing, voice apparatus, and other body areas have an inner
pattern of sensation of excitement, or an emotion of specific feeling
quality. The constellation of invariant events including feelings from
autonomic activity, muscular feedback, coupled with specific exter-
nal interactions build together an invariance of a higher order, which
creates an affect category. There are also non-categorical experienced
states that Stern designates as vitality affects, which are ubiquitous in
daily life. The important thing is that the infant experiences specific
familiar constellations in relation to a variety of life situations. A sub-
jective quality of feeling becomes then an invariant self-affect that is
re-experienced as familiar and expected.
Lastly we have the sense of sef history, a sense of continuity
"with one's own past so that one'goes on being'and can even change
while remaining the same. The infant notes regularities in the flow of
events." (p. 7l) How are self-agency, self-coherence and self-affectiv-
ity integrated into one organising subjective perspective? The episode
memory is the memory of real experiences. It is the fundament of
memory in general. A lot of similar memories for example, for exam-
ple to be hungry to be breast fed, to open the mouth, start to suck, to
get milk are bound together as the breast-milk-episode. This memory
is an expectation of how things will develop from second to second. It
is not a specific memory anyrnore but some kind of prototype of expe-
rience. These experiences together form the foundation of a core self.
It is not a concept, nor knowledge, nor a construct of the mind. "One
of the central tendencies of mind that infants readily display is the
tendency to order the world by seeking invariants. A format in which
each successive variation is both familiar (the part that is repeated)
and novel (the part that is new) is ideally suited to teach infants to
identify interpersonal invariants." (p. 71)
Part II, Chapter 8 LL7
The experience of affect becomes a guide for choices in a liv-

ingbeing, even if it is only to choose this direction or that one. Aplant
'chooses' to direct its leaves toward the sun, or to send the roots to-
ward moisture. It requires a rudimentary sentience and only enough
slow movement for survival. As we noted in Part I, a bacterium swims
toward nutrients and away from irritants. We could say there is no
learning since these capacities seem built-in. However, even if the
learning happened on an evolutionary scale, learning was involved in
organizing the capacity. On the other hand, sentience, that is, sensi-
tivity to the environment, is another essential. The living system re-
sponds now to the contingencies. How does it 'know'? We do not know
what it means for a bacterium to be sentient - we can onlv notice
the way it moves, and notice the intentionality.
Let us return to our human situation. Here we can notice
from careful observation from our own living experience that we do
not choose arbitrarily, and do not learn haphazardly. While there are
many traps that lead into difficulties, we can think and act.
We have the biological ability to detect value. As humans,
we do this with feelings, what we could also call affective states. Oddly
just as movement became a hidden dimension of our humanness so
did affect. There was for a long historical period the idea that thinking
was a human characteristic based on the ability for rationality alone.
Now we are beginning to know that without affective states, thinking
goes dead (Damasio, 1994). We have a capacity for thinking, but no
movement, no energy, no motivation to actuallythink. Gendlin (1962,
198I, I99l) demonstrates that the experience of thinking, what he la-
beled as the 'felt meaning' and later the 'felt sense' always occurs in
human cognition in the fringe of attention.
118
FIow Do You Know?

Gendlin cites the common experience of forgetting a name.
You can certainly remember such an experience. You are
motivated to search mentally. After spending some time
without success, you let the effort go. The name suddenly
appears.
How do you know in the period of searching that you have

not found the name, and how do you know that you are
correct after the name is recovered?
Until you explore the fringe of your experience you cannot

explain your uncertainty and then certainty. The fringe of
experience here is a body sense of discomfort. The body
senses changes when the name is recovered.
Recall such an experience and also attend to such an

experience when it occurs again. Ask yourself the follow-
ing questions:
What was the feeling of discomfort and where within

yourself (body) did you feel it? When you recovered the
name where within yourself did you feel a change? What
change of movement occurred?
One common experience occurs in breathing. Breathing

often stays in the fringe of our experiencing. Such experiences sim-
ply do not come into the focus of attention. Nevertheless bringing
awareness to the sensations of breathing can reveal changes other-
wise unnoticed. In this little experiment you may have found in the
searching process that your breathing is more shallow, or you may
have experienced places in the chest or throat that feel more tense.
When the name comes to you, correctness is established when you
feel the breathing deepen or other changes in muscular tension. What
Gendlin calls the felt meaning or felt sense is thus experienced and
embodied when explored. Stern uses the terms, affect, self-affectivity,
vitality-affect for the same phenomenon. It is not as strong as emo-
tion but present when you allow yourself to be aware of it. You often
do not easily put words to it even when it is detected. Gendlin, 1981
A NEW LOOK AT ]NFANCY
has developed the use of the felt sense as an entryway into changing
patterns through a process he called Focusing. Here finding language
to fit experience becomes a useful tool. When the hidden is exposed to
yourself, there is an embodied sense of relief.
I began this book with my own personal experience and dis-
covery of emotion and feeling as a hidden dimension in my own life.
There is in this masking and hiding what Feldenkrais described as an
alienation from feelings. Our state of being embodied, the autonomy
of ourselves as moving beings, become hidden aspects of life not just
on a personal level, but within language, and thus on a social level. Our
ability to think about afftlct in general is distorted and then hidden as
if rational thought demands that we can only investigate scientifically
about third person observable aspects of life such as behavior.
We have to become human observers again, knowing that
we cannot find absolutes, and that we have to explore within the hu-
man bubble. There is no objective view, i.e., no view from nowhere,
from which we can access the affective and emotional space. Yet such
towering figures as Charles Darwin, William James, and Sigmund
Freud did not ignore emotion and its expression. It took the behav-
iorist movement in the early twentieth century to relegate affect to
a mysterious force called 'reinforcement' as if reinforcement could
operate without the biological domain of affect and its operative ex-
perience in life.
Affect and the Emotions:

The Relation to Movement and Embodiment
Infants live primarily in this space of affect. Affective states
and emotional states are essential for contact, communicating needs,
learning, and just about everything else important in infant life. As
Stern writes, "We simply do not know if infants are actually feeling
what their faces, voices, and bodies so powerfully express to us, but it
is very hard to witness such expressions and not make that inference."
(Stern, 1985, p. 66) On the other hand as adults we do have our own
personal access to our inner states and can put language to our experi-
ence. Nevertheless, during a very long period in the twentieth century
as Damasio (L999, p. 38) puts it, "...both neuroscience and cognitive
science gave emotion avery cold shoulder." Yet among others Charles
L20
Darwin, and William James, were keen observers of the body expres-
sion and movement expression of feelings and emotions. Darwin in
his groundbreaking book, The Expression of Emotion in Man and Ani-
mal, particularly saw emotion as a biological given in the higher ver-
tebrates. As part of his project to present his theory of evolution in
full he collected a vast amount of information'about emotion and its
expression in different cultures and with different animals to demon-
strate the unity of humans with animal life in general. His work is still
controversial although many aspects of what he did have now been
strongly corroborated in recent studies. William James (1890, 1950,
p. 449, vol. II) followed with an important theory of the emotions
in which he postulated that, "the bodily changes follow directly the
perception of the exciting fact (stimulus), and that our feeling of the
same changes as they occur is the emotion."
Anecdotal Evidence
About the Relation of''/ Bodv
to Feeling
D.R. suffered an episode of Bell's palsyinwhich the mus-
cles on one side of her face became paralyzed. She report-
ed to me the following: "When I went to laugh (had the
impulse tolaugh), all I could do was grimace. It took the
feeling away; the feeling itself was gone. There was no joy
in laughing. I felt my face was not me. I couldn't find my
'social'self and I could not even express this to anyone.
Anotherperson, M.S., who suffered such an episode, said

that she could feel a smile coming upward from her chest
and as it came to her face the feeling disappeared.
Part II, Chapter 8 LzL
Affect and the Emotions
We now have a great deal of new research into the psychol-

ogy and neurophysiology of the emotions. For our purposes here what
is most significant is the relation between emotion and affect and
movement itself. Ttvo very different researchers have developed the
rediscovery of the insights from Darwin and James. The ethologist
Irenaeus Eible-Eibesfeldt (I97O), and the psychologist Paul Ekman
(2OO3), pioneered the effort to relate emotional states to the expres-
sions displayed especially through the muscles of the face. Both these
observers presented cross-cultural evidence of the universality of
facial expression in human relating and while there is still disagree-
ment from colleagues, the evidence presented in photographs and
films made in different cultures is compelling. Smiling for example
was documented by Eible-Eibesfeldt (op.cit.) in places such as Bali,
Tanzania, Peru, and the Pacific islands using a Bolex camera with a
mirror lens that prevented the subjects from knowing they were being
photographed. Ekman inspired by Darwin did his first study in Papua
New Guinea identifying facial expression with the feeling of emotion
revealed by the subjects. He tried a number of techniques such as
story telling to confirm the related emotion. The facial expressions of
the New Guinea people were easily identified. The vast majority of his
subjects had at best only minimal exposure to outside culture or peo-
ple of foreign origin and only knew their native language. Darwin's
biological view of the basic emotions seems confirmed in this work.
Ekman (2003) continued his explorations of expression to
reveal hidden details of the use of facial muscles in expression. Expres-
sion can be manipulated for social purposes as well as connect with
inner feeling. Superficially the two expressions can seem the same
when in fact the inner feeling is completely different. Ekman cites
the work of the nineteenth century French neurologist Duchenne de
Boulogne, who examined in muscular detail the difference between a
smile of enjoyment and the deception that fakes the emotion through
intentional control of the face in social interaction. Duchene found
the difference in the combined contraction of the orbital muscle of
the eye combined with the zygomaticus muscle, which draws the
angle of the mouth upward and backward. Duchenene noted that in
the false smile only the zygomaticus contracted and that the orbital
muscle could not be voluntarily contracted. Ekman, after a century
in which other researchers of facial expression ignored Duchenne's
L22
work, corroborated these observations and found that only 1O7o of the
people he had studied had voluntary control of orbital (orbicularis
oculi) muscle. He also found, however, that it was the outer part of the
muscle that could not be voluntarily contracted. In Duchenne's pho-
tographs of smiles and Ekman's photographs of himself with a syn-
thetic smile and a natural joyous smile, you can see the differencer.
Daniel Goleman (2OO3, p.I2a) reports, "Early on Paul (Ek-
man) had realized that expressions on the face offered a direct win-
dow on a person's emotions - but there was no scientific system for
reading emotion from the movements of key muscles on the face. So
Paul set out to build that system." To do so he and a fellow researcher
taught themselves to move each facial muscle independently "...so
that they could study how each played into the configuration for a
given emotion." Out of this investigation they developed the Facial
Action Coding System and processes to teach people who need the
skill howto read subtle cues of underlying emotions. Emotions in this
sense are not private but public. Indeed one of the major functions
of emotional expression is communication. Going back to Darwin
Ekman says (p.I35 in Goleman, 2OO3), 'Another of Darwin's ideas is
probably the most critical: that our emotions evolved over the course
of our history to deal with the most important issues of life -with
child rearing, friendship, mating, antagonisms - and the function of
emotion is to get us moving quickly without having to think." All of
this occurs through the internal signaling related to the physiological
and other changes. At the level of experience we are driven by what
we call the feeling of the emotion.
Ekman says (p.tSO in Goleman), "Our findings show that
the emotional system is unified, not fragmented in most people. It is
not, as some earlier scientists had claimed, that you can have a big ex-
pression and a small physiological response. The different parts of the
emotional package go together. If expressions are big or fast, so are
the changes in the body systems directed by the autonomic nervous
system." Despite skepticism by some emotion researchers there is
mounting neurological evidence for the origin of feeling and emotion
from the body physiological level. In extensive journal articles, Craig
r
In Ekman, 2OO4, Emotions Revealed (p.20+ & 205). See Emo tions Revealed
for detailed discussions and many other photographs revealing facial expression
in detail and also Ekman, "The Universality of Emotion," in Goleman and the
Dalai Lama. 2OO3. Destructive Emotions.
Part II, Chapter 8 L23
(2003) reviews a massive amount of research, which led toward a

conclusion that there is an afferent neural system, which monitors
and represents "all aspects of the physiological condition of the hu-
man body." Craig goes on to say, "This system constitutes a represen-
tation of the 'material me', and might provide a foundation for sub-
jective feelings, emotion and self awareness." Craig goes on to suggest
that interoceptive (interior) sensory body feelings, as non-specific
as they often are, are involved in homeostatic regulation of the body
and the sympathetic afferent system. Brain scanning studies have
begun to help piece together how body feelings are perceived and
distributed into brain areas where subjective feelings and emotions
arise through a cortical image of the interoceptive conditions of the
body as a whole. Emotional feelings are then evoked through the body
response as suggested in the James - Lange theory of the emotions.
Emotion is both feeling and motivation in this view. Damasio (f993)
has also argued for the idea that feelings are grounded in body experi-
ence and body state and has proposed the 'somatic marker' hypoth-
esis, which postulates that such a representation of the body state be-
comes a basis for distinguishing self and non-self. It is also a basis of
conscious experiencing. If we return a moment to Stern's evolution
of a sense of self in the infant much of the work of Craig and Damasio
corroborates Stern's idea that self-affectivity is an important compo-
nent of the sense of self. Stern's analysis is, however, more complete
and involves dynamically interrelated aspects beyond interoception.
Nevertheless interoception is an important link in piecing together
parts of the mind - body puzzle.
L24
Movement and the

Crossing of Emotions
We have all experienced at one time or anotherthe shifting
of one emotion to another. A common experience is to
laugh so hard that crying begins. The reverse is also
common that after crying in feeling hurt there is a shift to
laughing after an insight or newthought about one's self.
The link here is the movement involved in the emotional
expression. In both laughing and crying the body action
involves an involuntary repeated contraction and heaving
of the diaphragm muscle.
When expression of emotion is stopped it must be accom-

plished through muscular contraction. If certain emotion-
al expression is forbidden, as is sometimes the case in
families, the breathing is held and the muscles of the chest
remain contracted. On release of the muscular tension
spontaneous laughing or crying easily results.
Manfred Clynes (1976), while lesser known than Ekman,

did a related kind of study exploring emotion in terms of the pattern
of movement in time of specifically labeled emotions. These patterns
normally involve movements of the whole of yourself, which can be
detected through self-observation of your moving while expressing
yourself when in a particular emotional state. Clynes developed a
device that could record the shape of these movements in time using
simple finger pressure on a button-like surface. The finger transmits
the feeling through its relation in movement to the whole. In his ex-
periments the button-like structure is in fact a transducer that con-
verts the changes in finger pressure, both the vertical and horizontal
components, into two electrical currents that drive two pens on a re-
cording drum. In these experiments he asked subjects to remember a
moment of anger or hate or love. As long as the word designating the
emotion was understood, subjects from different cultures produced
very similar pressure patterns for each separate emotion. Thus the
generality of each specific emotion was expressed similarly indepen-
dent ofthe cultural background ofthe person. Clynes also developed
a process for self-exploration ofcycles ofexpression he called sentic
cycles. In our next exploration we will borrow this process to do our

own self- guided experiment.
t,
txplorallon 13.
AffeCt Explorations - Part A
Please find a place to sit comfortably. We begin by simulat-
ing the transducer. Place your right hand on a flat hard sur-
face where you can press your right index finger on the
surface. Ifyou can find a hard button-shaped place on a
hard surface, you can place your finger on the button. As
you experience different emotions you will press the index
finger in relation to the feelingyou have in that particular
state.
First allowyourself to become quiet. Followthe movement

of your breathing until you find it easy. Let your thoughts
pass by without becoming attached to feelings. Then stay
in a neutral affect and press the right index finger a num-
ber of times on the surface. By staying in a neutral affect
you will establish a baseline feeling of pressure that lasts
approximately one or two seconds. Just note the feeling of
the pressure and the corresponding state.
After establishing the baseline imagine or remember a

moment when you became angry. Notice the rise in pres-
sure and the difference in attack of the movement and
degree ofpressure. How does the pressure develop in
time? Notice the relation to the feeling of this emotion.
Return to the neutral pressure and the feeling ofthe
neutral affect. Now imagine a moment when you experi-
enced hate for someone. As you press with your finger
notice the different form you create with your pressure
from the first exploration. Notice that anger and hate have
a different form. You may find a difference in the time with
which you hold the pressure and how it evolves in the
duration ofpressing.
L26
Now repeat the process for the feeling of love that you may
have for someone. Again notice the rise in pressure and
the difference in the attack of the movement and the
degree of pressure. Notice the movement in time and how
it differs from the first explorations. Continue with rever-
ence, and joy, always returning to the neutral state and
remaining quiet for a while before going on. Notice that for
each emotion there is a change in the form of the pressure
in time. You can also continue with other emotions or
feelings if you wish.
In Manfred Clyne's (I}TT) studies, the transducer device

displayed both the up and down and side-to-side pressure move-
ments of the finger. On the recording drum these two motions were
recorded showing both movement components on the graph. The re-
cordings could thus be compared to one another. Thus the tracings
of anger, love, sexuality, grief, hate, joy and reverence, for example,
could be compared. He called the tracings for each state essenf icforms.
Some typical forms are shown in the figure below:
Figure 1: Sentic Traces
Love Joy No Emotion
Hate Sex .. " Anger

.|: ',t..t j
.,t t:
Grief
, 2oo gm
Source: Manfred Clynes, 1977, reprinted bythe permission of the author

Manfred Clynes is a multidisciplinary scholar and research-

er with degreesin neuroscience, engineering and music. He is also a
pianist. His interest in art Ied him to investigate the relation of art to
the communication of emotional states through the form in time or
essentic form expressed in works of art. Thus music involves form
in time that evokes states of feeling and movement. Equally form in
painting, which evokes movement in time, can also relate to essen-
tic forms. We will take up this theme in more detail in Chapter 11. We
first need to return to affect and the infant.
Affect in general as we have pointed out has been much less
studied than emotion. Emotional states come and go, whereas affect
states have a longer duration and are ubiquitous in daily life. Emo-
tions are easier to grapple with simplybecause we give labels to specif-
ic emotional states. As put by Stern, "The surest way to keep a channel
deniable is to prevent it from becoming a part of the formal language
system." (1985, p.I8O) Thus affects tend to be less recognized. In the
world of the infant 'vitality affects' are more ubiquitous and involve
more of infant life than the emotional states. They are intimately in-
volved according to Daniel Stern in the developmental process, par-
ticularly in establishing the sense of self as we have described it.
Stern (f985) thinks that infants begin to differentiate them-
selves from birth. Let us review the emergent sense of self from very
early in life. This period of emergence lasts for the first two or three
months of life. He writes about this emergent sense of self that, "It is
a sense of organization in the process of formation and it is a sense of
self that will remain active for the rest of life." And, "The first such or-
ganization concerns the body: its coherence, its actions, its inner feel-
ing states, and the memory of all these."(Stern, 1985, p. 46) Among the
processes involved are cross-modal information transfer (between
different senses such as hearing and seeing or touching and seeing),
amodal perception (where an object is perceived as the same in differ-
ent sensory modalities), and the perception of qualities as categorical
affects. Categorical affects are important to the identification of what
Stern calls vitality affects where "shape, intensity level, motion, num-
ber, and rhythm, are experienced directly as global, amodal percep-
tual qualities."(p. 5f) Vitality affects are a particularly potent way to
identifii aspects of life that often go unrecognized and accounted for.
They are more prevalent and pervasive than the usual affects that we
L28
can label as emotions or feelings. And they dominate the interactive

relations of the infant with others, especially the mother. By matching
vitality affects the infant is brought into feeling states that are a back-
ground of everyday action in later life. These feeling states become
most obvious to our awareness in art and music, in dance and other
expressive forms. Thus Stern also sees the relation of movement to
expression ofaffect.
Lastly,let us comment on the affect relationships between
members of other species and between man and animal. Again past
assumptions kept acknowledgement of these relationships out of con-
sideration. The charge of anthropomorphizing immediately put any
consideration of animal intelligence, affective social relating, thinking,
animal emotion etc. in the realm of unscientific and sentiment based
speculation. Yet Darwin saw continuity between man and animal in
the emotional and affective realms. Clynes suggests that movement
expression is communicative between man and animal exactly on
the basis of this continuity. Primatologist Frans de Waal (f998) and
(2005) through two decades of research has shown that there are ma-
jor parallels in the social intelligence of chimps, bonobos, capuchins
and macaques, and human beings. Affect and emotion provide a clear
link. Neuroscientist Jaak Panksepp (1998) has reviewed the huge
amount of brain research showing how recent research into the bi-
ology and psychology of emotion in man and other mammal species
establishes common brain-operating systems that organize the emo-
tional aspects of mammalian life. Later we can show that thinking is
equally prevalent even in what we might consider the most primitive
of animals. There are of course human capacities that distinguish hu-
man beings and cultures. We consider some of these next.
L29
N ANEWLCOKAT INFANCY:
V SELF-LEARNING
Affect and emotion are a major part of the learning process.
Truthfully we have little remembrance of how we learned as infants
and have even less of an idea about such learning. We almost think
that it all happened automatically. Let us take an example with a mo-
ment of observation of a baby about seven to eight months old ob-
served in free playing with his own movement. Here we observe a mo-
ment of learning leading to new action. The learning in this instance
is spontaneous and carried out independently. There is no instruc-
tion and no feedback from others. We can see nevertheless something
of the conditions necessary for self-learning. We can also observe the
importance of affect.
The Conditions for Self-learning, Part I

I am watching an infant Iying on a rug on the floor. He is
playrng, happily rolling from side to side. He tilts his head one way
and the other, moving his arms and legs. Literally he is exploring his
own movement through just the enjoyment of being active. He rolls
to the side; he rolls to the stomach. On his stomach he can lift his
head and look around. These are patterns of moving that are already
learned. He 'knows' that he can move so and so. He takes his lifted
legs back and down rolling partly to the side while further lifting his
head. Quite suddenly, through balancing his upper body over one hip
with the legs counterbalancing he does a small movement so that his
head lifts fully and legs go to the side. In the space of a moment he is
sitting with his head erect, balanced over his trunk and pelvis. This is
new or so I guess from his expression.
The look of surprise and joy as expressed in his face tells an
important story. He is having an ah-ha moment. He has discovered a
dynamic he has not known before and has accomplished an act that
while nbt intended particularly, fllls him with the feeling he has done
something significant. He can look around himself in a new way. He
has a newperspective on the world. His hands are free. He recognizes
a whole new configuration of himself that was not previously avail-
able. If his mother were there he would look at her as if to say, see
what I have done. But the act itself fiIls him with a good feeling. I stay
130
with fascination because I

a discrete, out of the way observer. I watch
am excited to see the surprise he expresses. I am led to presume that
this was indeed a first moment for him based on my experience of
watching babies with my Feldenkrais expertise.
One such learning moment, I believe, can be enough to start
a continuing of the learning. The dynamics of the process include the
spatial configurations, the sense of being in balance, the coordination
of head, trunk, legs, and arms, the timing of the sequences of succeed-
ing movements. All this leads to the coherence of the organization that
resulted in success. Success then provided the surprise andjoy. After
the child goes back to the floor he will desire a second go at it. He may
not succeed again right away. However, as he succeeds a second and
third time the coherent dynamic configurations will be clearer in his
kinesthetic perception of the act and it will then be repeated at will.
What evolves is an envelope of possibilities in a way similar to the way
sensory perceptions arise. As with perception many experiences are
iterated, that is repeated with slightly differing configurations. The
child thus learns to sit up from lying on the floor. He will try from oth-
er positions. This dynamic synergy including the sensing of balance,
the perception of how his head, trunk, etc. are oriented to each other,
and how this orientation changes in time, and how the movements
are initiated, becomes set and repeatable. In the viewpoint of system
dynamics the envelope of possibilities is an attractor state.
To sum up, the child now can anticipate the entire integrat-
ed feeling of himself as he acts and has a sense of satisfaction when it
all comes together. The act induces value through the evocation of af-
fect. And it is a value. Sitting he is more free. He can see about himself.
There is a delight in being in a new place and a desire to repeat the
experience. Researcher Jaak Panksepp (2OO5,'p.167) notes: "Indeed,
if it were to turn out that 'reinforcemerit' processes were actually
dependent on the affective system of animal brains (vide infra), we
may not fully understand the mechanisms of learning without prob-
ing the nature of neuro-affective processes." And, 'If animals had no
affective experiences, there would be no obvious reason for them to
exhibit learned behavioral preferences." My own comment is that the
same observation should be true for human infants.
My Feldenkrais colleagues Roger Russell and Ulla Schlaefl<e
carried out a research project in infant development some years ago.
The Conditions for Self-Learning, Part I
They recruited five sets of parents with newborn infants to videotape

their infants in free play over a period of months to document the
development of such dynamic skills. The protocol involved letting
the child alone on a blanket while awake and to videotape the infant
in free play over a period of approximately fifteen minutes. This was
repeated on a weekly basis over the timeframe of the experiment.
Comparison of the tapes of the different individual infants demon-
strated that while each infant achieved the same major landmarks
of development, the way the learning proceeded involved much indi-
viduality on the part of the infants. Esther Thelen and Linda Smith
(Lgg4) in their groundbreakingbook on the dynamics of development
make a very cogent presentation of the evidence for a dynamic view
of developmental learning through action and interaction and at the
same time argue forcefully against nativist and genetic explanations
of the developmental process. Russell and Schlaefl<e's project bears
this out. To make the point more experientially clear, try the two fol-
lowing explorations:
l .
txnloratron 14.
Rolli-ng like a Baby
In this exploration we will simulate what it was like to be

an infant. Please begin by lying comfortably on the back.
Notice again as in the introductory exploration in Part I
howyou senseyourself and howyou contact the floor.
l. Imagine thenyou are an infant. Howwouldyou arrange

your legs and arms? How would your head lie?
If you can remember watching a young infant, you would

have noticed that the legs are not straight. The knees and
hips are flexed and the knees are spread to the side. The
arms also are flexed. An infant at the stage we are simulat-
ing cannot use the legs and arms to turn or push. The trunk
is moveable and can twist and turn. First explore turning
to the side and back. Can you experience what you do with
the trunk to make these movements?
L32
You will with the legs bent you roll to the side and
see
cannot further. What do you have to change to roll on
go
the belly without using the Iegs and arms? Play with this a
while. Infants do that before they discover a new pattern.
2.Here is a clue. Infants do not necessarily intend rolling.

It maybe some other intention induces rolling. One
possibility is that the infant wants to look around to see
what is there behind. On the back the infant must take the
head back and turn to lookbehind. The trunk has to turn
with lifting the rr'ead. Try that out and find out what hap-
pens.
You may observe that taking the head back also results in
arching the spine. This allows the knees to go back and the
shoulders also. Try again and see if this is so. Once the legs
and arms are out of the way turning on the stomach is easy
bytwistingthe trunk.
Some adults cannot arch the back sufficiently to roll. Leave

it alone if this is the case, but enjoy
the process. Other
processes can improve the back and we will introduce one
in Part III.
If you succeed in rolling you find something else. You will

be able to lift your head and look around. Infants do this so
well the head sits exactlybalanced on the neck. The neck
vertebrae curye to give support.
Part II, Chapter g 133
Figure 3: Baby Flolding Head up on Sromach
fnolo oy fuar Jcnuette
Early movements are dynamically organized so that me-

chanical balance is created. Effort is not possible. Simply an infant
at the beginning of learning does not have enough muscular develop-
ment for effort. Thus the movement organization or slmergy that a
child can discover involves an easy dynamic pathway. The forces of
gravity on the upper body.are balanced against the lower body in such
a way that the action occurs with minimal effort. Implicit physics is
part of this kind of learning in infancy and it is not just learning to use
muscles to move. Thinking in movement is actively involved. Let us
explore now a movement to roll up to sit as described for the baby I
observed.
T-r I
txploratlon 15.
RoLLinq ro Slr
jfr"
Lie on U""f. Repeat lying as an infant with the
"Sain.
legs and arms bent and flexed. Remember how you rolled
to the side. Repeat this process and notice howyour
head and pelvis move to come to the side and come back to
the back. You may obserye that the same movement that
brought you to the stomach is already evoked. That is, the
head goes back and the back arches. To come back to lie
on the back you reverse the movement and bring the head
and pelvis toward each other a little.
L34
r. ^ n 7 ^ 11.
ttgure 2: baby KoLnng
Reprintedwith permission, @ Roger Russel, Susan Mertner

136
Now create a new pattern. This time as you begin to

roll (you can choose to go to either side) bring the head
forward a little and roll so the knees bend and come closer
to the head. At first you will get stuck on the side. You may
notice that you roll over your elbow. Stay with the side that
is easiest.
Thinkof howyou maymove the legs to balance your head.

Then you can begin to Iift your head as you roll. The hip
joint becomes a pivot. Continue thinking of bringing your
head closer to the knees. Feel that the elbow can help.
The discovery may happen suddenly and you will roll to sit.
Let one leg move away from the other. The pattern will
develop accordingto the configuration of bodydynamics
that allows your balance to work. Making an effort to get
up will also make it impossible to succeed. Exploringwith
ease will allow for the possibility.
This kind of learning is part of the developmental process.

There are clear steps in the process and at the same time the baby is
grappling with himself and the environment. Each step depends on
what was developed previously. Rolling to the side precedes rolling
to sit. Rolling to sit allows the infant to hold the head in gravity. The
synergies evolved evoke muscular activity previously not used by the
infant. The learning pathway is particular to each person. On the oth-
er hand the dynamic organization of each learning step is fundamen-
tally similar from person to person. So we can saythat developmental
learning is not bounded by instruction or insistence from the outside.
I am jumping here from the particular observation to what I (and
others) have observed of the learning - developmental process. It is
fair to say that most humans learn this way amazingly well as infants.
They need a minimal development of muscular strength. They need
an open free space to explore. They need the support of adults who
encourage and value the accomplishments. Instruction on the other
hand can lead to mis-learning, i.€., forming less integrated percep-
tions and synergies. Such learning, as I am describing, is the learning
thatleads to growth. For Moshe Feldenkrais this was the truly signifi-
cant biological learning. It is a Iearning that is not preprogrammed.
Part II, Chapter B L37
It unfolds in a sequence that involves the physical necessity of devel-

oping one step before the other. At one time experts imagined a ge-
netically programmed unfolding of developmental events. Keen ob-
servers of the process have noticed that while the landmark events
(Thelen and Smith, 1994), such as rolling to sit, are common events
for all able children, each child makes the discovery in his or her own
pathway. I emphasize this again because the appearance of landmarks
can lead to believing that it all happens automatically, that is as a ge-
netic program or a process built into the developing nervous system.
What actually guide the process are the necessities of the mechanics
of balance. The upper body balances against the lower with the hip
joint as a fulcrum for moving. Muscular effort is minimized.
However, learning here involves the creation of order. It
cannot happen through imitation in itself. Most of our learning the-
ories do not recognize this. There is something else not recognized.
And that is the vital importance of coherence and integration. An
infant or person recognizes the coherence of an act in the total per-
ception of the act and the necessary synergies. It also has value. It
feels right. We can call the process of creation here self-organization.
Movement itself is essential to it. Interaction in an environment with
gravity is also essential. Other humans are also essential. The patterns
that evolve can be designated with many labels. Feldenkrais used the
terms invariance or invariant. Others speak of attractors. One could
also say percepts, or motor pattern. There is very likely a general bio-
logical function here, related to a process that we have described as it-
eration in which the results of what happens is fed back into the next
process. Maturana and Varela (1987) postulated the notion of struc-
tural coupling, which involve the living being interacting and relating
in movement with the environment and with other beings. Infants
must learn in relationship. Such speculations begin to make sense in
observing again and again. We can note especially that developmental
learning is not a chain of reflexes or built of small pieces that eventu-
ally coalesce into order. Many models of the learning process are still
floating around the professional world, which are inaccurate to the
process.
Developmental learning does not involve instruction, and
while imitation is commonly involved in the child learning to be hu-
man in a human environment, developmental learning must precede
imitation with most complex acts. There are, when it is considered,
138
very different levels of learning possible. Moshe Feldenkrais (1977)

pointed out distinctive sorts of learning that have very different out-
comes and qualities. I quote at length from the introduction to his
book, The Case of Nora (1977):
"There is the learning of a skill; there is the kind of learning in which
we enlarge our knowledge or understanding of what we already
know. And there is the most important kind of learning, which goes
with physical growth. By this last I mean learning in which quantity
grows and changes to a new quality, and not the mere accumulation
of knowledge, useful as this may be. Often we do not see this kind of
Iearning at all; it can go on for more or less lengthy periods of time,
apparently aimlessly, and then a new form of action appears as if from
nowhere."
Here is an example that perhaps makes the description
more clear: When we learned to stand, we pulled ourselves up first
with our arms holding something that was steady. Slowly we explored
letting go. We came back to the floor sometimes falling. But some-
times we found a pathway where we could go down slowly and not
fall. We found a pathway up where we kept balance long enough to
be upright. It was simple enough. But we had to perceive where we
were in space and gravity. We had to know the orientation of the head
in gravity and the orientation of head, shoulders, pelvis and leg, and
which organization of all these parts succeeded in keeping the bal-
ance, which prevented falling. We had to make mistakes and explore
again. Success had to be of value and we found that value in the af-
fect that accompanied success. On the level of the nervous system we
were putting together a complex integration of all the factors and us-
ing the signals of the vestibular system, the proprioception, the visual
sense, the tactile sensing, etc. We were discovering the physical dy-
namics of our body configurations in gravity and space. In doing so
we created order parameters that brought an organization of self and
environment through synergies that made for the easiest pathway for
action possibilities. It involves an ingenious biological intelligence. I
continue with Feldenkrais' introduction:
"Most truly important things are learned in this way. There was no
method, no system in our learning to walk, speak, or count, no ex-
aminations, no prescribed term in which to complete the learning. no
preset, clearly expressed aim to be attained. This apparently aimless
Part II, Chapter g 139
method produces practically no failures of learning in the normally

constituted human, and under its conditions we become mature per-
sons, whether well educated or completely illiterate. Formal teach-
ings from childhood to adulthood seem to overlook the fact that there
are ways of learning that lead to growth and maturity with practically
no failures. Formal teaching is more concerned with what 'what' is
taught than with 'how'; its failures are very frequent."
It is odd that in most discussions of cognition the question
of learning is ignored. Somehow it is assumed that we have already de-
veloped to the point that we needn't consider how we got to our abili-
ties. We take ourselves for granted. Everyone who is intact in life can
stand up from a chair, and walk to the refrigerator to get something,
or hold a conversation with another person. It is no wonder that such
abilities were considered developed either by genetic programs (by
one school of thought) or learned by chains of conditioned responses
(as reflected in the behaviorist school of thought). Despite the fact
that over sixty years of experimentation were devoted to understand-
ing learning, the major question of developmental learning was often
not asked. Learning by conditioning only has to do with specific cou-
plings of stimuli and responses. It fixes patterns. The organization of
the act is already present. How is the organization and integration
achieved? Simple acts have a considerable underlying complexity.
They are not cobbled together out of pieces even if we fancy that this
is the case. And a child in learning is actively engaged with attention
and awareness as each newlearning step becomes possible. Again it is
often assumed that this is not the case.
The Conditions of Self-Learning, Part II:

Applying the Feldenkrais Insights
I wish at this point to begin the process of moving our in-
sights to a practical level where one can see that these insights about
learning can result in important changes in how we go about the
learning process. Here is an example taken directly from my Felden-
krais practice:
I am giving a Feldenkrais Functional Integrafion lesson to
a thirty-year-old man, Eric, who was brain damaged in an automo-
bile accident seven months before. He is slow but attentive and de-
L40
siring to improve his life situation so that he can continue his career
and reestablish himself. He shows signs of difficulty in his balancing'
While sitting, I lift his right leg and instead of immediately adjusting
and balancing himself he falls baclnvard a bit. When he walks he is
unsteady and his gait rigid. He holds the neck and chest and widens
his stance. While he has other difficulties, a painful left arm (the low-
er arm was broken) and a painful left toe (it was dislocated), for this
lesson the nervous system difficulties are paramount. He has already
had Funcff onal Integration lessons with Lucia Schuette-Ginsburg,
and recognized improvements in his movement and feeling of him-
self. I had also worked once previously with him in a partial session
in which after, he experienced an improvement in his balance. Now
I make a discovery. I ask him to get up from lying on one of our low
Feldenkrais tables. He rolls to the right side and gets himself to sitting
through balancing on his hip. Implicitly he uses the balance to lift his
trunk as he lowers the legs. I ask him to try it to the other side. He im-
mediately finds it impossible and he struggles with every attempt.
White not quite the same movement, as I had observed
with the infant, the dynamics and basic configurations of the needed
movement are similar. I want to find out. What is different in how he
mobilizes himself to the left and to the right? I ask him to go back to
lying on the back and to turn to the side where he succeeds and begin
to move toward sitting. I askhowhe does it as I guide him gentlywith
my hands. By touching his pelvis at the same time he moves he may
have a clearer sensation of his action.
Now we switch back to the difficult turning to the left side.
I watch carefully and notice that while lying on the easy right side he
uses a synergy that works. I notice how he moves the Ieft side of the
pelvis away from the ribs at the same time bringing his head forward
toward his legs. In this configuration balance is not only possible, the
movement becomes completely easy since there is a balance point
on the right hip and the pelvis movement Iifts his head without any
special effort, the dynamic we have already suggested. On the difficult
side there is no s5rnergy. He pulls the right side of the pelvis the op-
posite way, toward himself. The balance point is lost; he can only try
tremendous effort, w.hich in the end is useless.
I can try to instruct him. I actually say, "Move the pelvis
away from yourself." It is obviously of no use to him. He has no idea or
feeling of where his pelvis is in this situation and no knowledge of his
Part II, Chapter g L4L
The Conditions for Self-Learning, Part II
own movement. On the easy side he doesn't think of what he does, but
knows subliminally (without focused attention) what to do. So I have
him switch back and observe himself in more detail on the easy side. I
ask him to imagine the same movement to the other side. He replies
that he cannot do this. How is he to learn? I cannot teach him.
My idea at this point is to create the conditions in which
learning can take place. This learning must involve something like
the self-organization of a new possibility. Obviously the brain injury
has resulted in the loss of a large space in himself or perhaps we can
say 'self image'. It is a very approximate way of stating what is missing.
He only knows that he gets stuck and cannot move and cannot feel
what he does. There is nothing to rely on except the ability of the un-
injured parts of his nervous system to deal with novel sensations and
organize a different synergy and'image'. I am trying to be very careful
here to be accurate to the biological possibilities and avoid a language
of input and output, or of crediting myself with teaching him.
I ask him to lean toward his left side and support himself
with his left arm. (This he could now do after previous lessons, al-
though too much weight on the arm did cause pain.) I now supported
his head as it was tilted to the left with my right arm leaving my left
hand free to contact his pelvis. In this way I could support him over
the balance point. I move him now further down toward lying and
then further toward sitting monitoring that the movements stay easy
and that he doesn't begin to contract his right side. I take him all the
way down to the table and start to come back. He quickly contracts his
right side and so I stop. I guide him again and stop each time he makes
the interfering movement pattern. We go slower and slower. At last
we can move together a bit further toward sitting. After some time we
at last come to sitting as I guide his pelvis movement so that it moves
away from the ribs. I then ask him to notice the different movement
of the pelvis. He isn't sure. On the other hand I ask him to lie back
himself and get up. Now he succeeds and moves the pelvis away. It is
tentative. It is a start.
He gets up now and walks around. Quite dramatically he
now walks with an ease that is new for him since his injury. His balance
is more secure. The one thing that interferes is the painful left toe.
In later lessons with Lucia Schuette-Ginsburg, he had to re-
peat the learning at first but found it was quicker to learn again. Still
later she had him roll up to sit from lying on the belly as the infant had.
L42
At first he could not figure out how to get away from the floor. Then it
was possible. He made variations until a particular pattern was suc-
cessful. Suddenly there was no need for effort. With this experience
there was a satisfaction and a sense of achievement. He is learning
how to learn and learning to listen to himself in acting.
Overall he continues to improve in everything in his life.
He says things like, "I am alive again. I feel a weight is lifted from me.
I don't feel exhausted and depressed by working this way." He con-
trasts what we do with the exercises he is given elsewhere to practice,
activities where he experiences his weakness and difficulties. They
are chosen specifically because they address the weaknesses direct-
ly. Then he feels heavy and inadequate to the task. Here the learning
happens incidentally, but in connection with us. We are with him in
our process. I could call this empathy. I think it is more than that. In
any case his affect 'rbinforces' the learning he has made. He is happy
with his progress.
As Eric continued to receive further lessons with Lucia
Schuette-Ginsburg the overall effect of his learning went far beyond
movement learning. Soon after the (above related) work, he began
bringing himself to the lessons. His attention span expanded. Later
his sense of time improved and he found that he could return to his
companywhere he was an executive.
Let us go back to the story of the infant. Infant learning can
be a key to learning in many different situations. There is a relation to
the observation of the infant and the way I approached Eric's lesson
beyond the question of the similarity of the synergiy involved in Eric's
learning to roll up. The infant I watched learned under the following
conditions: He was freely exploring. He was supported and not in fear
of falling to the floor. He was not intent on succeeding or trying. He
was in a state of positive affect. He was not concerned with anyone
pressing him to accomplish something and was too young to pressure
himself. He was attending with his awareness. (We will come back to
this point later.)
Adults learn new patterns in developing in the same way as infants.

Thus I have to then do the following in general in providing
Iessons for my clients:
- I must find a way to support my client physically to
provide safety in gravity.
Part II, Chapter g L43
The Conditions for Self-Learning, Part II
- I have to create an atmosphere of easiness and without

attention to goals, intents, or outcomes.
- I have to provide my client with sensory contact that will
evoke awareness.
- I have to move slowly so that the client can process while
beingmoved.
- I have to create a s5mchronywith the client's possibilities.
1N FRCM PERCEPTICN TO
II
IV / CCNCEPTION
While perception and perceiving are very basic to life, and
fundamental to the functioning of living creatures, in higher animals
perceiving goes to a higher level that we can label as conceiving or
forming conceptions. For human beings who have the ability to rep-
resent, symbolize, and communicate in domains such as spoken and
written language, the line between perception and conception is of-
ten blurred. Human beings are above all conceptual thinkers, or at
least most humans think it is so. Before we begin to grapple with con-
cepts we need to distinguish conceiving from perceiving. To do this I
draw on a story related by Moshe Feldenkrais in his book, The lllusive
Obvious (r98r).
The story is about a visit he made to the innovative musi-
cian and awareness explorer Heinrich Jacoby. Feldenkrais had pub-
Iished his book, Body and Mature Behavior inl949, and a medical doc-
tor in Britain where he was living at the time called him and asked
him whether he had studied with Jacoby. Feldenkrais said he had not
heard of this man. The doctor pointed out that there were great simi-
larities in what he had learned from Jacoby and what Feldenkrais had
written. To rhake the story short, Feldenkrais arranged to spend three
weeks with Jacoby in Zurich during his holidays.
In the first visit Jacoby handed Feldenkrais some drawing
paper, a piece of charcoal and some bread to serve as an eraser. He
then asked Feldenkrais to draw the lamp on the piano in front of him.
Feldenkrais protested saying that he didn't know how to draw, and had
only done technical drawing for his engineering degree that he had re-
L44
ceived before reading physics at the Sorbonne. Jacoby encouraged him

more and Feldenkrais began to draw a vertical cylinder with a trun-
cated cone at the upper part and an ellipse at the bottom for the stand.
Jacoby looked at the drawing and said that this was the
thought of the lamp, but it was not the lamp. Feldenkrais writes (1981,
p.11), "I realized then that I had drawn the abstract notion of the
'word'lamp." Feldenkrais then protested again that only a painter or
trained artist could do what Jacoby expected of him and that he was
neither of these.
Jacoby insisted that he continue. "'TeIl me what do you see?'
A lamp, I said.' 'Do you see any of the outlines you have drawn?' I had
to admit that I could not identify in my drawing a single line of the
real lamp, except that the proportions were more or less those of the
lamp in front of me. 'Do you see lines?' I had to admit that none of the
Iines in my drawing were actually to be seen' 'If you do not see lines,
then what do you see when looking at this lamp? What do your eyes
see in general? They see light; then why do you not draw the lighter
and darker patches ofwhat you see?"'
Feldenkrais did as was suggested. Upon looking at his
own drawing he saw it not as one that he would do, "but one which I
thought only a painter could do." Jacoby used this technique in help-
ing his students improve their sensory and perceptual awareness. A
number of drawings by his naiVe students are reproduced in Jacoby
(f99I), and they indeed appear as if made by a trained person. Here
again I would invite the reader to try the experiment in attending to
what one actually sees instead of the idea of the object chosen for the
drawing.
The French philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty suggests
in his book, The Structure of Behavror (p.185, 1963), "verbalized per-
ception should be distinguished from lived perception." The story
shows that there are functional consequences to this distinction. It
is a distinction that many thinkers muddle because the act of verbal-
izing takes one out of the experiencing unless one is trained to notice
this phenomenon.
Merleau-Ponty (op. cit., p.185) goes on to say, "If we return
to objects as they appear to us when we live in them without speech
and without reflection and if we try to describe their mode of exis-
tence faithfully, they do not evoke any realistic metaphor. If I adhere
Part II, Chapter ro L45
FROM PERCEPTION TO CONCEPTION
to what immediate consciousness tells me, the desk when I see it in

front of me and on which I am writing, the room in which I am and
whose walls enclose me beyond the sensible field, the garden, the
street, the city, and finally the whole of my spatial horizon do not
appear to me to be causes of the perceptions which I have of them,
causes which would impress on their mark on me and produce an im-
age of themselves by a transitive action. It seems to me rather that
my perception is like a beam of light which reveals the objects there
where they are and manifests their presence, latent until then."
What we can do as human beings is to point and label. And
that changes something of the nature of conscious perceiving. It also
brings perceiving into the realm of sharing through orienting with
each other and orienting through language. But perceiving itself is
already a complex abstraction from sensory sources. While we con-
sider here visual perception, the perception of objects does not only
involve one sense channel. Each percept evolves from all relevant
modal sources and the identity of a percept arises from multi-modal
interaction.
Preverbal Conceptualization:
Thinking begins before language
A while ago I watched a television science program dem-
onstrating the thinking abilities of cephalopods. These sea creatures
(the octopus) have been studied in detail recently because they are
the most unusual invertebrates in terms of their learning abilities,
flexibility, and complexity of movement. In the particular film shown,
one octopus is in a tank with a jar with a screw top lid. The experi-
menter had placed a shrimp in the jar, an item of particular delicacy
for the octopus. In a second tank in visible range a second octopus is
able to see the first as it tries to open the jar. The first octopus makes
many tries. Eventually he surrounds the lid with its eight appendages
and discovers that he can twist open the lid and retrieve the shrimp.
Now the experimenter places a jar with a shrimp in the second tank.
Without hesitation the second octopus grasps the lid and removes it
in one go thus retrieving the shrimp
A more recent nature program demonstrated the ability of
a raven to retrieve an item of food from an open tube. Grasping the
L46
stick in the beak allowed the raven to push the food out the other end.
The experimenters then used a tube closed at the other end. Now the
raven had to pull. This was difficult. The raven knew pushing but not
pulling. At the end the raven pushed too far and in retrieving the stick
managed to also pull out the food. Further researches into the intel-
Iigence of ravens and the limitations are reported in Heinrich and
Bugnyar (April, 2OO7) in Scientific American. The authors are careful
in their conclusions. Nevertheless their many experiments demon-
strate that ravens have remarkable abilities, which do not necessarily
involve learning, but suggest that ravens are natural problem solvers
and anticipators of the action of other animals. They think in action
in relation to intention. Thinkingwithout language seems more ubiq-
uitous in nature than we ever expected.
Daniel Stern (1985) has speculated widely about the devel-
opment of cognition in infants suggesting that early cognition involved
the integration of self-invariants. He asks, "How do agency, coherence,
affectivity, and continuity all become integrated into one organizing
perspective?" (p.94) Citing research into episodic memory he specu-
lates on the importance of remembered episodes as a way for the in-
fant to anticipate how to act and react in the next similar episode. He
goes on to suggest "there are no lived experiences that do not clump
together to form episodes, because there are rarely, ifever, perceptions
or sensations without accompanying affects and cognitions and/or ac-
tions. There are never emotions without a perceptual context. There
are never cognitions without a perceptual context." (p. 95)
The infant is of necessity a learner. There is so much to
learn in active relation to the world and the people who are engaged
with the infant. On reflection the things learned in the first year with-
out language are staggering to consider. The baby learns to communi-
cate its needs, to use affect in coordinationwith others, to intersect in
social relating, to organize many actions such as reaching and grasp-
ing, to create dynamic balancing in gravity in the many differing situa-
tions in which the baby is placed or places itself, to coordinate sounds,
to understand the intentions of others, to identify people and objects.
The list is quite long. The learning is not possible without thinking. It
is also I believe not possible without awareness.
In a film of infants and very young children produced by
Resources for Infant Education, "Seeing Infants with New Eyes," with
Part Il, Chapter 1o L47
Preverbal Conceptualization
Magda Gerber, an associate of Emmi Pikler, M.D., we observe a young

child learning to climb steps. He is on three steps that end in a plat-
form in the play room. He is already able to walk the steps upward and
now challenges his balance by negotiating the steps downward. As you
watch you notice first his attentiveness. He brings his foot to the first
step below and waits. He is searching for security. He won't put his full
weight until he experiences an internal feeling of safety. When this
is accomplished he takes the other leg down and stands on the lower
step. Now he tries the next step. This time he discovers his necessary
orientation for safety more quickly. As one watches the intensity of his
expression indicates he is using his awareness to determine the orien-
tation. Later he will not need the awareness as the act of stepping up
and down becomes organized so that awareness and attention are no
longer necessary. In learning he is thinking in movement.
As adults we frequently think in movement.2 Because we do
not use language as an intermediate, we don't identifywhat we do as
thinking. Watch a dancer or skilled athlete and you will observe very
rapid thinking in action and in relation to the immediate situation.
All of us, howbver, need thinking in movement in every novel situa-
tion where we need something beyond habit. Even the learning of lan-
guage requires the development of non-verbal thinking.
We have not as yet begun to explore the domain of language.
It is this singularlyhuman capacitythat allows humans to excel in and
dominate the world environment. As we have already noted in the sto-
ry ofFeldenkrais and Jacoby, verbal cognition has the disadvantage of
separating ourselves from experiencing. Stern (1985) describes this
split dramatically in a scene in which a child perceives a patch of sun-
light on a wall. It is a global experience for the child "resonant with
a mix of all the amodal properties..." (p.L76). An adult comes in and
says, "Oh, Iook attheyellow sunlight." Stern notes, "Words in this case
separate out precisely those properties that anchor the experience
from the amodal flux that anchor the experience to a single modal-
ity of sensation." Language reduces experience. Gendlin (1997) is one
of the few thinkers to both see the problem and not take sides in the
debate between those that insist that experience cannot be captured
in language and those who believe nothing of importance is outside of
language. We will come back to him.
2
See chapter 12, "Thinking in Movement" in Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, The Primacy
of Movement.
L48
Making the Label: A Dialog

We teaeh a chtld "that is your hand", not "that is
perhaps [or'probably'] your hand". That is how a
childlearns innumerable language games that
are concerned wi.th his hand. An investigation or
question, "whether this is really a hand" never occurs
to him. Nor, on the other hand, does he learn that
he "knows" that this is ahand.
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN
Language exists in the social domain and it is learned in

interaction in this domain primarily at first in the family. It shifts
perceptions as objects and acts become reified in language. We have
to assume that infants perceive as do many animals and that percep-
tion is multi-modal, that is it is a higher integration of what is sensed
in different modalities from touch to vision to hearing etc. Language
tends to fixate what is perceived into objects and situations. We can
have a sense of self, but I, me, mine creates a verbal self that begins to
take precedence.
The entry into language world is not benign. There are
strictures and restrictions. A child is instructed through language
to knowwhat is permissible and what is dirty and forbidden, what is
good behavior and what is naughty, what should be done for mama
and what makes mama angry. Along with the learning of words and
relations to actions affect is attached and associated. In his world the
infant changes from open investigation and ease into a more restrict-
ed world. At the same time language has power. It is an affordance for
asking for what you desire, or to demand attention. You begin to give
your experience a cognitive structure beyond perceiving and pre-
verbal structures. Concepts are adopted from the language ofothers.
Concepts are an affordance for many actions and interactions. There
is no adult human life as such without them. You can also think of
them as a tool for expanding communicating about thinking. To do
this you enter the world of metaphor. Metaphor makes concepts pos-
sible and therefore is also an affordance.
L49
Affordance
The question psychologist J.J. Gibson posed is this: "'What
is the environment that we can know and act on it?" (as
quoted in Reed, 1988, pp. 230-31). Secondly and thirdly:
"What are and what are not the affordances of given things
for a given species?" and "What information is available by
means of which an observer of a given species can perceive
some affordance?" Thus an animal mayuse a stickto
extract insects as food, or a human may use a calculator to
compute needed numbers. Affordances can be created
culturally or otherwise to serve needs and wants. What is
perceived has meaning in relation to affordance and any
perceived object can have many affordances and lack others.
,
In this sense languages are affordances. The child grows
within language as environment and gradually makes
sense of it, and begins to make use of it. The child will go to
school and learn counting and then mathematics. These
are also affordances. Note that they are learned in action
and interaction andwhile language and mathematics are
part of the human environment in learning theybecome
internalized and brought into a high state of organization
allowing for rapid functioning in these domains in think-
ing, reading, speaking and writing. One major function of
language is labeling which allows us affordance in direct-
ing attention with each other, identifying common things
we perceive, naming ourselves and others, etc. Another is
the creation of tokens that canbe manipulated to enhance
thinking. Here we create a world of rules and relations that
can be explored ad infinitum.
The mother holds the child and points, "Look the kitty is
lapping the milk." The child perceives the cat and the situation and
labels kitty, lapping and milk. A whole complexity is contained in a
sentence. In the meantime the child's tongpe, palate, throat and
breathinghave developed alongwith babblingto allowthe child to say
the words. The child becomes interactive in the domain of languag-
ing. The mother might say, "The kitty is drinking the milk." The child
recognizes that she also drinks the milk. A concept is born so that the
150
child relates an action 'drinking' into a larger context. She may con-
nect it with 'thirsty', which the child knows in experience. Labels are
useful. They are also connected to the world of affect both in terms of
how words access affect and how the labeling of emotional affect con-
nects with the specificity of emotional experience.
l,'-//1
txploratlon 1b.
Lanjuage Labellng and Emotion:
Defusing Emotional Tension
Please sit or lie on the back quietly. Establish a neutral

space in yourself where your breathing is comfortable and
Iet the face and eyes become easy and without strain.
Now choose an emotion you would like to explore. It could

be anger or joy or sadness, etc. Remember a time when you
experienced this emotion. Allowyourself to recreate the
scene. As you do sq re-experience the emotion. Where do
you feel this experience in your body and in the movement
of your breathing? Stay with this experience. Name the
emotion.
After examining the experience take the emotional label

away. Let the label dissipate. Whatever you experience
nowwithout the word, imagine it as enerry. Notice again
what you feel in your body and the movement of your
breathing.
Turn your mental attention around and see whom if

anyone is doing all that.
If you clearly experience a change, choose a few other emo-

tions and repeat the process.
At the same time the experiences that remain unlabeled re-

main in the fringe. Bringing these to the foreground allows for bring-
ing language to the experience. Gendlin (f981) has demonstrated that
Part II, Chapter ro 151
Making the Label: A Dialog
the notion of the felt sense can become a powerful tool for uncovering
how this fringe sense relates to the affect behind many difficult life
situations. The step-wise process that he has called Focusing allows
people to uncover the felt sense and eventually put words to their
experience. It has a powerful effect in clarifying and modifying the
underlying feelings. The important aspect of Gendlin's process is in
developing wording (labels) for felt experience that feels right to the
person.
Concepts and reactions are not fixed. Often this seems to
be the case. Yet the discarding of concepts can shift the physiological
state of yourself. Labels and the associated metaphors are frequently
involved in strong affective associations and reactions. It is this that
allows for much manipulation of yourself by others with an interest
in doing so. Once language is absorbed and learned, concepts can be
created almost at will. In this we can create fantasies, and make con-
ceptual constructions and assumptions that no longer connect with
our biological life. It is a topic that goes far beyond what we can ex-
plore in one book.3
Affect is linked to other human expression in the arts. In
the next chapter we will explore this connection. The key again is
movement.
3
Language has been extensively written about from the cognitive point of view.
The best of this work has been Wittgenstein's powerful attempt to show that
meanings of words are not fixed but always relevant in a context of what he called
'language games'. His attempt to defuse language of its power to entrance has not
taken hold even with his followers. Gendlin in his philosophical writings has shown
that the first meanings arise from the felt sense which in his view is a total body
sense and that language meaning is always linked to a felt sense. Wittgenstein's
Philosophical Investigations, 1953 is a good entryway into his way of analysis.
Gendlin's Exp e r ie nc i ng and the C re ati o n of M e aning, 19 62, 19 97 inquires into
experienced meaning to create a link to language and explore how experienced
meaning functions in cognitions. Gendlin has many other papers available for
download at wwwfocusing.org/gendlin.
L52
AFFECT: A HIDDEN
11 DIMENS]CN AND
A MAJCR PART OF
DAILY LIFE
The examples of music, painting, and danee
The world of affect develops longbefore we have learned to
speak. Like perception it is basic to all the following steps in life. It is
physiological, sensory, and stronglyconnected to movement. It is also
chemical both physiologically and in its transmission from one being
to another. It is more than what we Iabel as emotions and feelings. We
can say it is a major characteristic of our biological inheritance, and a
major aspect of our phenomenal experience. How can we also call it a
hidden dimension?
As with movement, affect is part of embodied life and even
though its presence in experience is essential, its influence is more
background than foreground. It is noticed most when it increases and
decreases. When it decreases life becomes flat, uninteresting; one is
unmotivated to move or initiate anything. When it increases dramati-
cally one becomes manic, hyperactive; one is filled with what is called
psychic energy.
We have already noted that while emotion is more often
foreground, there are other aspects of affect often simply not noticed.
With the emphasis on cognition, there is an attempt on the part of
thinkers to look for meaning and cognitive origins for what is funda-
mentally not cognitive. It is most likely the other way around. Without
affect cognitive activity is not possible. Lastly affect is a major element
in inter-subjectivity. It is the medium of howwe connect together and
how we are originally bonded to other beings like ourselves.
Because affect is so much in the realm of what is non-verbal,
Iet us consider music as a beginning for our investigation. It is remi-
niscent of affect as we first experienced it in our very early life. Daniel
Stern (1985) makes the connection where he discusses "the sense of
an emergent self" based on his observations of infants and their inter-
action with mothers and caretakers. Vitality affects is his designation
for "... the many qualities of feeling that occur," and "... do not fit into
our existing lexicon of taxonomy of affects" (p. 54). Vitality affects are
an ongoing aspect of an infant's life experience and are distinguished
Part II, Chapter rr 153
AFFECT: A HIDDEN DIMENSION AND A MAJOR PART
OF DAILY LIFE
The examples of music, painting, and dance,
from emotions that are more immediate and short lived, and which
we can categorize. He writes (p. 54), "These elusive qualities are
better captured by dynamic, kinetic terms, such as 'surging,' 'fading
away,' 'fleeting,' 'explosive,' 'crescendo,' 'bursting,' 'drawn out,' and so
forth." Infants experience such qualities internally as well as feeling
them in being with other persons, that is the vitality affects show up
in our way of moving and being with another. We call that expressive-
ness. While some expressiveness can be described as signaled (and
this is so for specific emotions that are designated by specific facial
and bodily expressions), the expressiveness here can perhaps best be
described as 'tuning in to one another.'Stern goes on to state (p. 56),
'Abstract dance and music are examples par excellence of the expres-
siveness of vitalitv affects."
Glenn Gould Plays Beethoven:

Piano Sonata Number rg
I am watching the film "Thirty-T\ryo Short Films about Glenn
Gould." I reach the fifth film, entitledHamburg, which is set in a hotel
room in that city. The actor playing Mr. Gould is on the phone relay-
ing a telegram back to Canada about his bronchitis. A maid is cleaning
the room. A knock on the door and a package is delivered. He opens
the package as he finishes his phone conversation. Inside is a record-
ing. The maid is still cleaning the room, but he sits her down, places
the recording on the phonograph, and puts the phonograph arm at
the start of the second, allegro, movement of Beethoven's Piano Sona-
ta number 13. From the first notes I am transfixed. I have no thoughts;
I am carried by the music to a certain, hard to define, ecstasy. I feel it
as movement. I feel it as flow, as dance, as sensation of lightness, joy,
yes ecstasy. There is something else, for I am experiencing this per-
formance in a way that I have never before experienced Beethoven.
There is a precision in timing, in the dynamics of the attack on the
piano keys, in the expression of this performance that exhilarates in
auniqueway.
This experience is without content or meaning. Above all
it is embodied, and enjoyed not abstractly, but concretely as move-
ment in time. The maid at flrst sits not knowing what to expect or
what is expected of her. As she listens, she also becomes transfixed by
+s4
the sounds, and begins to move her head in relation to the music. Her
smile reveals her enjoyment. She arises to look at the album cover.
The camera shifts to a view out the window overlooking the Binnenal-
ster, the smaller lake in the center of Hamburg, and a train on the op-
posing embankment. The music carries the tone and feeling.
One could saythat there is something mysterious, ineffable,
happening here. And yet the experience is common. A communica-
tion is happening, nervous system-to-nervous system, or better yet
person to person. Beethoven's written music (basically an instruction
as to the performance of his composition) is transformed through
Glenn Gould, is transformed again in the nervous system of the lis-
tener. It is a peculiarly human kind of communication. Neither my
cat, nor my dog shows any sign with their movement or other behav-
ior to indicate that something happens to them. It is not like listen-
ing to ordinary speech. At the same time the experience is something
wide. It is not just hearing, for one experiences being compelled to
move in some relation to the movement of the sounds. There are defi-
nite bodily feelings involved, kinesthetic, emotional, subtle, which
undoubtedly relate to changes in many parts of the nervous system
including the autonomic nervous system. The experience does not re-
duce to these changes. It stands on its own. In some sense it is also a
communion. Unlike communications that happen through symbolic
representations as in ordinary speech, this communication is direct
and analogical. It takes on a transcendent quality.
And what can we say of Beethoven and Glenn Gould? We
call them geniuses. They had refined their nervous systems to a very
high level. What I mean here is that through the development of their
action and perception, they became capable of very fine discrimina-
tions and sensing of organized sound. Otherwise what they created
could not have the observed effect. For Glenn Gould this refining was a
refining of his ability to move his fingers and himself in relation to his
instrument. He did this in a particularly idiosyncratic way that looks
impossible when you see films of him at the piano. Sitting on a stool
that appears to be far too low he reached upward a little for the key-
board. His head was forward and erect, yet there are many times he
threw his head back in a gesture indicating complete involvement, or
dropped it forward in a gesture of intense listening. We know from his
mastery that this strange positioning worked for him in the sense that
OF DAILY LIFE
Glenn Gould Plays Beethoven
through this way of acting, he could make the music that he intended.
It was not ideal from the point of view of comfort. In later life he de-
veloped pain in his wrists. Nevertheless, in his playing he learned to
inhibit actions of himself that did not serve his purpose. It means that
he spent many years reflning his ability in this way by listening to the
production of his sound in relation to how he wanted to hear what he
produced, in relation to how he felt himself at the keyboard. The two
acts for him went together, that of listening and that of playing.
One would think, considering the speed of his finger mo-
tion, that he could not play consciously. Yet he could not play uncon-
sciously. He must nevertheless have gone directly from feeling the
instrument to taking the musical thought into the action of his move-
ment. I am emphasizing that the organization of movement is the es-
sential factor in both developing the skill and developing the listening,
i.e., the musical perception. You could say that he knew what he was
doingwith the piano. Affect, however, is essential. It determines what
we call the quality.
As a listener, myself for example, I must have experiences
in listening and in learning to listen in order to perceive the music. I
do not mean a technical or cognitive learning about the structure of
music. I mean the kind of learning that comes about in listening en-
joying, and beginning to make more and more discernments and dif-
ferentiations. One becomes sensitized. One gains dexterity in learn-
ing in a parallel way to how Gould gained dexterity in playing. I am
curious about my process, but even more so about how Gould gained
his mastery. We know that it cannot be through mere exposure and
repetition. Gould is gone. Luckily we have some recorded testimony
on his part about how he developed his skill.
One story (reported in Payzant, 1992,p.93) concerns some
piano trouble that Gould was having before giving a concert in Israel.
The piano available for the concert had a good tone but a difficult ac-
tion, one that Gould felt played him rather than he played it. Gould
went out into the desert to be alone and rehearse in his head the con-
certo he was to play. Now he did something that fits beautifully with
what I would call a Feldenkrais approach. He rehearsed, "not upon
the mental image he had of the Tel Aviv piano, but upon the his men-
tal image of the familiar old Chickering back home at the cottage in
Uptergrove Ontario. Every note was rehearsed mentally as if upon the
Chickering with its characteristic feel, sound and surroundings."
156
Payzant goes on to describe how Gould desperately held on

to the image at the beginning of the concert even finding at first that
it was hard to move the keys, but then discovering that he was enjoy-
ing the sensation of "distance" from the Tel Aviv piano. Gould left the
stage in a state of "exaltation and wonder." Later many in the audi-
ence commented on the quality of performance that he had produced.
Gould took these reactions as evidence of the possibility of communi-
cation "of total spirit" between performer and audience.
In a more bizarre instance Gould reported (as quoted in
Payzant,l992,p.9f) that in preparing a concert in which he began by
learning the score without the piano, and only a week ahead began
to practice it, he became blocked about the thing as a consequence
of trying to work out a fingering system for the variation in the piece.
Gould began a process to get out of his bind by trying his "Last Resort."
He placed some radios near the piano, and turned them up loudly
(all on a different station) so that when he practiced, "... while I could
feel what I was doing, I was primarily hearing what was coming off
the radio speaker ..." He discovered that he had to do more but com-
mented, "The fact that you couldn't hear yourself, that there wasn't
audible evidence of your failure, was already a step in the right direc-
tion." There is a strong anticipation here of an unrecognized aspect
of learning, that we often cannot learn when there is anxiety about
the outcome. Another form of affect dominates the process.
In the next step Gould focused on the left hand and played
the notes "as unmusically as possible. In fact the more unmusical the
better, because it took more concentration to produce unmusical
sounds, and I must say I was extremely successful in that endeavor.
In any event, during this time my concentration was exclusively on
the left hand - I'd virtual forgotten about the right - and I did this at
varying tempi and kept the radios going..." He reported then that the
blockwas gone.
Payzant comments, "This is a kind of squinting to bring the
peripheral vision into action, or an averting of the gaze while dealing
with a distasteful situation, or a stepping back in order to the better
to leap. But the centipedal interpretation covers it best. The pianist
while actually playrng the piano no more thinks in terms of fingers
following other fingers than does the centipede of his feet while
walking."
Part II, Chapter rr L57
OF DAILY LIFE
This leaves us with a number of seeming mysteries. They

are the same mysteries of practicing any skill or developing dexterity
in any endeavor. What was Gould's process to begin with? How do we
develop skill in listening as opposed to hearing? How do we become
cognitively proficient? To give the obvious answer, we must practice
in some sort of way. By itself this statement is meaningless. The im-
plication, however, is that action and interaction in the world is es-
sential, which also implies that the organization of action and move-
ment is at the heart of everything else. Later we will approach what it
means to practice and emphasize again that mere repetition accom-
plishes nothing. Repetition as merely mechanically acting deadens
affect. Affect provides the value.
I would like to return to the question of ecstasy. It turns out
to be a central theme of Gould's, although I did not know this when I
experienced ecstasy in hearing Gouldt playing of Beethoven. "Gould
says that ecstasy is the only proper quest of the artist." (I am quot-
ing Payzant again.) Gould distinguished between what is simulated
and what is genuine ecstasy, and it strikes me that what I experienced
would clearly come under the category of the genuine. The question
is, how do we get there? Experientially my ecstasy was not a sponta-
neous event. I believe it was communicated directly through Gould's
playing. Listening to other performances I find that I am not moved
in the same way by romantic interpretations of this same music of
Beethoven. It means that Gould must know on some level what he is
doing and must experience the state somewhere in order to be capa-
ble of communicating it to others. What he controls is the precision of
his timing and the attack on the keys, based on his tactile and kines-
thetic movement experience. To do this he must have a highly evolved
sense of kinesthetic and musical awareness. A particular affect we call
ecstasy infects the listener.
It is one of my points that the two awarenesses are inter-
linked. Ecstasy, for example, can be evoked through dance and cer-
emony. The experience is not simply a mental state, whatever that
might be, but involves the entire self. One has to appreciate that even
from a biological systems viewpoint the nervous system does not
create such a state without the active participation of the muscula-
ture, the chemical communications systems, the neurotransmitters,
the flow of vital fluids, etc., and that all of this feeds back through the
158
nervous system. In fact a person cannot know affect except through

the provocation of the internal senses. In this sensing there is no dis-
embodied mind experiencing ecstasy. One actually is moved and also
compelled to move oneself. Experience itself is not localized in one
sensory system, in one image, in one moment. Nor is it in the strict
sense private. Otherwise how could the experience of ecstasy be com-
municated and how could we know that it was? The experience is in-
ter-subjective for anyone open to it or prepared for it.
There must be a medium, that is, some modality through
which the communication happens, an interlinking between persons.
One might conjecture an information transfer. And in one sense there
is something of this sort. Beethoven composed a sonata, and trans-
mitted the basics of this sonata through a s5rmbolic form, written mu-
sic in which the outline of notes and timing are transmitted. Some
writers refer to this as an algorithm. However, the information of the
written score is insufficient for transmitting the music. Glenn Gould,
by the way, could easily read the score and hear the music in his head.
In fact he reported that he practiced a piece this way before he ever
sat down to actually play it. What Gould did was to create an analog
of the composition mentally from the information. To do this he had
already organized for himself his own sense of Beethoven. That is, he
could add the dynamics of performance that matched his inner sense
of Beethoven not included in the information of the score. Although
one could digitalize these dynamics, in the human realm one actually
hears and feels the Beethoven dynamic directly without there being
some informational, i.e., symbolic, intermediate. One could say that
Gould invests his complete being in his performance.
Video is wonderful for watching what happens in this realm
of performance. I am watching a videotape of Sergiu Celibidache first
rehearse and then perform the Symphony Number One of Prokofiev
with the Miinchner Phiharmoniker. The process of the rehearsal is
so clear. Celibidache is the guide, listening to his musicians with that
quality of attention one can only call masterful. He feeds back the
sound that he wants. The winds are too loud here, too forceful at an-
other point. The strings need to adjust theirbowing. The timing is too
slow at one point, the transition of theme from one group of instru-
ments to another does not flow properly. And at one passage he en-
courages the musicians to play with spite. The point is that he listens
OF DAILY LIFE
and discriminates between what he hears and what he intends aes-

thetically. He then gets his musicians to produce the sound he desires.
As they play over the problematic passages the musicians
begin to truly work together. It is as we do in all proper learning. We
don't just repeat something. We shift the performance to more close-
ly match what we intend. Again the notes on the page do not transmit
the music. Information in this sense is deficient. Celibidache com-
ments at one point to the musicians, "In classical music parts pass
from one instrument to the other. That provides the continuity. Here
everything is up in the air. So it is up to us ... You must create a unity
which is not in the score."
The performance is a marvel. What is most intriguing is
to watch Celibidache. Like Gould's playing of the piano, his conduct-
ing is a total involvement. At times he literally dances with the musi-
cians. At other moments he sings. Every facial expression, every body
gesture communicates the music. There is no performer's showing
off, onlywhat is necessary to produce the music as he hears it to him-
self. One sees a strong gesture with the hands at exactly the moment
a strong gesture is made in the music. His thinking is direct into his
action.
Again we can emphasize the importance of movement.
Celibidache moved in conductingwith his entire being. It is his move-
ment that conveys to the musicians the requisite performance, and
if he moved only his arm and baton something very different would
result. In speaking to one of his conducting students, I was made very
aware of just how conscious Celibidache was of all this. The conduc-
tor's baton was only the final point of a whole body experience.
160
l
,E,xplorallon l'l.
Affect and Music
Begin to explore the experience of music inyour dailylife.

Music is frequent in our environment and has specific
affects that change your feeling in the moment. Rather
than listening to music of your choice, begin to notice
music in the environment, on the street, in the grocery
store, or other place of commerce. Notice the music that
accompanies television. Take particular notice of what
happens to your physiological state. Do you feel energized
or exhilarated? Or perhaps do you feel dull and listless or
bored? Notice the relation to affective states.
In going to the cinema music is a major part of the manipu-

lation of affect to enhance the movie experience. Notice
what happens as the music changes in its affective quali-
ties. Notice the change in feeling in yourself. Notice that
many times an emotion is elicited, but often enough it is a
feeling that you cannot label, yet it colors the events
depicted on the screen.
We have already explored the question of quality of expres-

sion as expressed by Glenn Gould and Celibidache. It can be described
as a question of taste. There are, nevertheless, fine distinctions that
can be made. You find that one experience suits your discernment
better than another and you know this through the affect you experi-
ence. One way of exploring this aspect is to listen to two different per-
formances of the same composition. Here is a personal example:
I have invited a friend to listen to two recordings of the vio-
lin sonata of Cesar Franck. I play first a very good recording by two
French musicians. My friend and I agree. This music is very beauti-
ful; we are both affected on an aesthetic feeling level. After some min-
utes of the first movement, I replace the recording with a second one.
It isn't a long time, perhaps less than a minute and my friend reacts.
She says, "Wow! It is something so different. This playing tears at my
heart." She continues to be absorbed in the experience, and then asks,
"'Who is it then?"
After a while I say, "David Oistrakh and Sviatoslav Richter.
Isn't that something else?" For I also experience a feeling in myself
that carries me beyond my normal way of experiencing.
OF DAILY LIFE
How is it so different an experience? The notes are the same.

The melody structure is the same. We say that it is in the expressive-
ness of the playing and at the same time have a hard time putting into
words what it is. Yet in making a comparison the difference is com-
pletely clear in the experiencing of it. We can only say in a metaphoric
way "it tears at my heart".
f can also guess that for Oistrakh and Richter, it would-be
equally difficult for them to say exactly what they do to produce such
an effect in words. Yet for them they must know what they do in the
doing (playing) and can indeed teach others something of the organi-
zation of action necessary to produce a similar quality. That is, they
can show or demonstrate the quality and listen to the student until a
quality is produced. This ability to direct the student is attested, for
example, by listening to Oistrakh's students, who include his son Igor
Oistrakh, and also master violinist, Gidon Kremer.
Now just as a musician needs learning over a long period to
be able to organize the action, and reach mastery so too listeners need
to listen with love and attention to music over a long time to discern
and respond to differences in performance such as my friend and I ex-
perienced. Thus the experience isn't necessarily there for everyone.
Some will not hear any difference. But the experience is not private.
My friend and I feel it similarly and can compare our impressions. Are
our experiences subjective or objective, or perhaps neither?
I can investigate on another level. On very careful listening
I become aware that the differences in the two recordings is in the dy-
namics of the musicians' playrng. That is to say it is in the skill and
dexterity of how the violin is bowed - how the piano keys are attacked
in producing the notes. It must be so then that the musicians must
listen to their own performance and change their dynamics of play-
ing until they are capable of producing the effect they want. These dif-
ferences when measured external to the human system include very
small differences in the timingof the note production and the dynam-
ics of how the sound rises and falls with the production of each note.
There is a correlation in other words between what I hear and what is
there in the environment as produced by the musicians.
The difference in the feeling experience of listening to the
two performances is huge. These feeling differences are not localized
to the sound itself. but are embodied both in the sense of movement in
L62
myself and its quality, and in other feelings resulting from physiologi-
cal changes in heart rate, blood flow and what I will call body excite-
ment. It is these feelings that my friend and I described metaphori-
cally as 'tearing the heart.'A different vitality affect is communicated.
1 ,.
Exploration 18.
Comparisons
Find two recordings of the same composition. Without

trying to achieve anything allow yourself just to experi-
ence the music for a period. Then change to the other
recording. Observe your experience: what you felt, what
physiological changes if anywere present, what emotions
and or feelings occurred. Try this again with a few other
compositions. If you prefer jazz or other forms of music
choose from this preference. Notice with doing this a few
times you become more capable with your discernment.
Affect: Movement in Painting

I do not believe that there wcls ever a question of being
abstract or representational. It is really a matter of
ending tAis silence and solitude, of breathing and
stretching one's drms again.
MARK ROTHKO
When I am in my painting, I'm not dware of what I am

doing.It is only after a sort of get acquainted period
that I see whqt I have been about. I have no fears about
making changes, destroying the images, etc., because
the painting has a life of its own. I try to let it come
through. It is only when I lose contact wtth the painting
that the resuk is o mess. Otherwise there is pure har-
mony, o.n edsy give and take, and the painting comes out
weII.
JACKSON POLLOCK
OF DA]LY LiFE
Affect: Movement in Paintinq.
As with music, we can consider the importance of move-

ment and affect in other arts. I twice visited the great Monet retro-
spective of 1995. The second time in Vienna there were far smaller
crowds then in Chicago where nine-hundred-thousand visitors saw
the exhibition. In Vienna, I had enough time to become absorbed
into the paintings so that I became aware of the movement of Monet's
brush strokes as revealed in the texture ofthe paint. I had not thought
of painting as a movement experience except perhaps in looking at
Jackson Pollock's drip paintings where Pollock's movement is directly
connected to how his paint hit the canvass. One wonders how such a
direct and concrete art became known as abstract. In Pollock's work
movement is the very essence of what is expressed. It is not abstract
at all, but concretely literal. One again feels the painting as it commu-
nicates directly. It is abstract only in thinking that a painting should
have visual images to be concrete.
In Monet one could attend to the content of the picture and
not be directly aware of how the movement of the brush is so much a
part of the expression of the painting. And yet one is so moved. It is
a different movement expression than one might find in experienc-
ing Renoir or any other artist's work of that period. Monet was a con-
scious experimenter, and was undoubtedly aware of how his brush
movement affected the result he intended in the expression of his
painting. In other words he was doing something with the brush and
calibrating the effect on his own responses.
Monet worked as a scientist, exploring a subject at different
times of the day to paint the effects of different lighting conditions.
Often he worked with multiple canvases in a given day, switching to
another as the light changed. One series, of the houses of Parliament
and the Thames, shows not only the change in light, but also differ-
ing reflections of sunlight from the water. One actually experiences
the light as if coming from the painting. Monet knew how to layer the
colors he brushed on to directly create this illusion of light reflecting
from water. In actuality there is only the canvas. And when one ob-
seryes up close, there is no light, only the layers of paint. Therefore
it can only be so that one's nervous system synthesizes this effect. As
Monet painted he had to be too close to see the effect of what he was
doing. Yet he had to know how the layering of whites with other col-
ors would result in producing the effect of reflection. As in the case of
L64
Glenn Gould, he was perfecting his art through constant adjustment

and calibration.
Glenn Gould's perf'ormances, Celibadache's conducting, Mo-
net's painting are all examples of what the great Russian psychologist
and developer of movement science, Nicholai Aleksandrovich Bern-
stein (1996), called dexterity. Dexterity is not the same as skill. All of
the above examples involve skill. But the term, skill, is too limiting a
term to indicate the depth of comrnunication involved in what these
artists have created.
Bernstein distinguished dexterity by the following char-
acteristics: that a dexterous performance of a motor act is flexible in
the face of the changing external situation, accurate to the situation,
quick with respect to decision making and producing a good or cor-
rect result, rational, meaning expedient and efficient, and finally re-
sourceful. Dexterity in this view requires an underlying development
of a repertoire of motor skills, which are organized below the level of
conscious participation, but that movements must first be corrected
through environmental and body sensation, and then become subject
to the goals and meanings of the acting person. What Bernstein most
emphasized was that dexterity and indeed motor skill did not result
from repetition or mere repetition. What is essential is that adapt-
ability be developed. And this means that one explores continuous
background corrections in the context of responding to environmen-
tal shifts. One repeatedly solves new problems until an entire reper-
toire of responses is possible. Motor solutions have multilevel com-
plexity and are organized as whole structures.
Bernstein is a gUide to the external aspect of what we need
to considerin appreciatingthe importance ofmovement to everything
in human life. Affect is not specifically recognized. But it is implicit in
Bernstein's entire approach to dexterity. Dexterity has quality and we
often say about a dexterous performance, 'my god that was beautiful.'
Affect guides this kind of Iearning in the action of doing and creating.
165
I
Exploration t9.
AffeCt in Painting and Sculpture
Paintings and sculpture express affect and emotion

through color, form, and movement even though each
work is complete and still. Movement is particularly
expressed in the line that carries the eye. Rodin found the
movement in the stone and exposed it in removing the
stone that was unnecessary; Kandinslqy in the diagonal
splayed across the canvas; Raphael in the underlying spiral
of the placement of his figures. Go to agood museum
nearby or delve into an art book and let yourselfbe taken
in to the movement expressed in a particular painting or
sculpture. Look at it from all angles and let the feeling of
the movement come forward. Let the image recede into
the background. The movement maybe in the form or in
the expressiveness of movement in the act of the artist's
making of the work of art. Spend some time this way with
each object. Let color evoke feeling. Just notice without
judgmentwhat happens within yourself. What movement
of yourself could be evoked?
In art that'moves'us, the movement aspect and affective

aspect, while not in the forefront of our awareness, can easily be ap-
preciated when it is pointed out. In carrying out the explorations one
has to let go of one's cognitive predispositions. Different styles, ep-
ochs of art, have different feelings. We can experience that in itself.
Affect and Dance: Bodies in Movement

We must at least make a note of dance as the most connect-
ed art form in relation to moving bodies. We watch dance as perfor-
mance and we dance together. Sometimes we dance alone simply as
expression. We can abstract movement in performance to form and
design. Nevertheless dance and rhythm can connect us.
166
The San Felipe Corn Dance

Most of the villagers not involved in the ritual dance stood
around the wide central plaza of the village. There was a
sprinkling of 'anglos' (non-native visitors) standing in the
corners of the plaza which was enclosed by low adobe
houses. We waited for what seemed a long time as the dance
ritual while announced for IO:3O began when the drum-
mers and dancers felt the moment was proper. Nowwe
could hear the beginnings of the drums and chanting as
the dancers emerged from the kiva of their clan. Soon the
plaza was filled with decorated and ceremoniously clothed
humans - each one dancing * each one movingtogether
but in their own individual way - so that the spectators
were soon caught up in the dance.
As a spectator I was outside the group - yet I too was

caught into the dance. I began to resonate'ivith the move-
ment of the dancers. I became entranced in a way that was
different than watching a performance - a formal dance
put on for an audience - a spectacle. The effect ofthe
dance was visual - one has to say yes. I was watching
seeing movement, rhythm, an aesthetic - the high steps
taken - the turning bodies - the lowered heads - the
color - the corn decoration ofeach dancer - yes.
There was also something much more visceral. The

dance got into my own embodied sense of myself without
literallymoving myself. I was pulsatingwith movement.
I began to lose my separation as spectator. I was entranced
- caught into the intent of the dance - which was exactly
to bring the villagers into a synchrony to celebrate the
corn.
Part II, Chapter rr L67
OF DAILY LIFE
As a lone observer - in my brain so to speak I only see a

-
spectacle. In the feeling of the dance what I experience as move-
-
ment, affect, perception all tied together so that I loosen myself as
separate observer - I am brought to couple with the dancers who
are enacting the ceremony. I am thus embodied in a moving, feeling,
emotive state, which is shared with the dancers and villagers. I am
resonating into this collective. Has this to do with the origin of the art
form we call dance?
I am watching a performance of Bdllet Frankfurt in Ger-
many performing a piece created by choreographer William Forsythe,
which is skillfully enacted by the company of dancers involving very
complex and unusual moves. The dancers slide, tumble, run across
the stage and tangle with each other creating momentary tableaus and
breaking again. While I can observe coolly and detached, I do at.first
enjoy aesthetically the unexpected shifts, breaks, and edges created
by the dancers. I am eventually stirred by the energly and forceful-
ness of the movements and the effect of the tableau. The perceptions
of shifting space and relationships, the sudden appearance of unex-
pected movements excites in a different way than the Corn Dance. Is
there a link?
Recent developments in neuroscience have opened up the
possibilities for the scientific community to take the phenomena I
have been describing seriously. Until recently intentionality, affect,
embodiment, inter-subjectivity, and conscious experience have been
off the screen as topics for investigation. One particular discovery,
that of 'mirror' neurons, has brought these phenomena into a new
respectability. The tendency still has been to use this discovery to
suddenly provide explanations for all sorts of human capacities in
neuro-mechanistic terms. Thus'mirror' neurons have been evoked
to explain how dance is understood by the brain. 'Mirror' neurons
will be discussed further in a chapter at the end of Part III. For now
I only point out that the experiential aspect suggests that human be-
ings understand or are affected by dance and other arts and notjust
brains. The essence of this is that without the body, brain, affect sys-
tem, neuromuscular system, social systems, etc. we have no proper
explanations. What is required is some way of connecting by means
of interaction and structural coupling. Only through that can all these
168
aspects eoordinate. For this we require a dynamic description rather

than a mechanistie orte, '
In the next part of this book we will investigate how all we
have developed eanbe used in apractical way. Wewill endwith achap-
ter on coordination dynamics and a grand overview of our progress.
Feldenkrais teaching his training group in Amherst, Mass. (f98o)

With perrnission o{ the f,eldenkrais Verband, Garmany
Part II, Chapter u 169
AFFECT: A H]DDEN DIMENSION AND A MAJOR PART
OF DAILY LIFE
L7L
PART
TFIREE
What Can We Do Wtth
What We Have Learned?
L73
1a TNTRCDUCTTON
TC PART III
LL Somatic Thinking and Feldenkrais
Functional Inte g ration Paradigms of
a New Practical Thinking
-
To think in movement opens a space that can be verypotent,
potent in the sense that we can resolve many of our life's difficulties
through self-knowing.We have already presented two examples (in
Part I, Adam Cole's description of his discovery of his body space , p. Zg,
and in PartII our description of the young man with a brain injury
who recovered lost abilities, pp.139 -I42). These were examples of
the use of our Feldenkrais Method, but they are also more generally
examples of using somatic thinking to discover. ourselves in relation
to the world around us. We can expand awareness not only of what
we think of as inner sensing but also contact with what is outside our
boundary. Many other methods such as Alexander Technique, Senso-
ry Integration, Body-Mind Centering, Neuro Developmental Therapy,
and the work of Elsa Gindler and Heinrich Jacoby, which were foun-
dational to a number of somatic awareness practices, are based on the
exploration of movement and sensing. Each method chooses a dif-
ferent approach through the body to improve functioning. We want
to ask: What can we do with what we learn in this way? How does it
change how we act? Do we need change in the first place? How can we
extend ourselves in improving sensory and perceptual awareness?
Let us approach these questions through the experience
the authors gained in the practice as Feldenkrais Practitioners. Our
students and clients also gained through their experience and often
reported that to us. Adam Cole at first found a new sense of his own
spatiality and began to sense himself more completely. After the first
dazzling experiences of his lesson, what he sensed became more or-
dinary. Other functioning such as standing and balancing on his right
side also improved. It made a difference in his musicianship and his
feeling in his daily life. Attending to his feeling helped to integrate
the new patterns.
The young man with the brain injury found in a lesson that
a complex action, rolling up from the table to one side to sit, which at
the start was not possible, became possible at the end of the session.
Afterwards other functioning that was impaired, standing and balanc-
L74
ing on his injured side, also became easier. Recovering one complex
action indirectlybrought about the recovery of another ability.
How were such changes possible for Adam and the young
man? The learning in each instance did not involve verbal thinking
directly although each person was guided partly in talking to them.
Most of the time we made contact through touching and moving the
person with sensitivity and lightness. As a consequence our clients
discovered changes in themselves. We can describe these as shifts in
self-organization or self-perception, which can involve new ways of
acting in the world. I have described this as self-organized learning.
From our perspective we think of this ability to shift patterns and
perceptions through sensory awareness a fundamental biological ca-
pacity. Self-organization is perhaps not the best metaphorto describe
what happens for the person. We have not arrived at a better term. In
the descriptions of the work, however, the inner relations of the pro-
cess while non-linear will be seen as essential to the outcome. Above
all howwe make the contact to the person is a key to success.
Moshe Feldenkrais developed his method over many years
through his self-exploration and teaching others based on what he
found empirically.
About Moshe Feldenkrais,

D. Sc.
Moshe Feldenkrais arrived at his insights and practice
out of a most improbable set of circumstances. Born in
Slavuta in what is now Ukraine in l9O4 and growing up in
Kremenets and Baranovich (Belorus), he was steeped in
Jewish and Hasidic tradition.rAt the end of WorldWar I,
he left his home and traveled with a group of young pio-
neers to whatwas then Palestine, breakingwith his family's
orthodox practices. In Tel Aviv he worked as a laborer
helping to build the city until he returned to high school.
While in school he tutored younger students. After grad-
uation he worked for a British office in surveying and
developing a map of British-controlled Palestine. This led
to his obtaining a scholarship to study engineering in
Part III, Chapter re L75
INTRODUCTION TO PART III
Somatic Thinking
Paris and eventually joining the Laboratory of Joliot-Curie

where he was involved in early atomic research. The
work led to his doctorate from the Sorbonne, but only after
World War II ended. During the war he had to flee to
England. There he joined the war effort working for the
British Admiralty in Scotland.
Two circumstances moved him toward his later life's work:

In Palestine he became involved in Jewish self-defense
groups where he learned jujitsu and began studying self-
defense on his own. After writing a manual ofjujitsu,
he had a chance to meet Jigaro Kano, the developer of
modern Judo in Paris. At the invitation of Kanq he became
an expert judoka and then a Judo teacher studyingwith
teachers sent by Kano. The other set of events began with
an injury that occurred in a football match where he
twisted the knee in fallingto the side. As he was a strong
and athletic man, he was sornewhat reckless. He recovered
but suffbred bouts of repeated pain and swelling peri-
odically. A second injury to the other knee occurred in
Scotland. It left him with a second swollen and painful
knee. Doctors advised surgery. He rejected this advice. The
doctors could not assure him of success. Now he felt the
need to put himself together. He drew on what he learned
from Judo and from his investigations of anatomy, me-
chanics, and learning to find a solution to rehabilitate his
ability to move and walk. He began to explore how he dis-
tributed weight when he moved to one leg and the other.
He discovered that he could not change through his con-
scious will. On the other hand he could change how he
moved exploring the image of howhe moved himself. His
discoveries became the ground of teaching others a process.
tlnMaking Connections, River Center Publishing (2OO7),David Kaetz

traces the the unexplored roots ofMoshe Feldenkrais'thinking in the
Hasidic and Talmudic traditions inwhich he grewup.
L76
Feldenkrais developed his movement work during the last

fortyyears of his life. It led eventuallyto the two ways of
learning. He labeled the directed movement process that
could be taught t9 groups.Awareness Through Movement.
The second approach he called Fu nctional Integration.
Here the practitioner conveys to a client through touch
and skeletal-to-skeletal contact functional patterns that
evoke experiential shifts in sensing and moving. These two
learningprocesses became the primaryways he was able
to direct people to discover their own human capacity for
self-organization.2 Both processes involved in the bio-
logical sense, Functional Integration, in which a person
begins to experience the whole of one's self in acting.
The Discovery of a Learning Pathway

Feldenkrais began his explorations of his knee problems
while still in Scotland where he was a scientific officer involved in
anti-submarine research. Feldenkrais' intent at first was to find out
how he could rearrange his pattern of stepping and distributing his
weight on his trunk, pelvis, legs, and feet so that he could walk de-
spite the severe knee injuries in both legs. He began by consciously
attempting to place his weight so that mechanically the bones would
carry his body weight without producing shearing forces. These
shearing forces when present disturbed the knee joint exacerbating
the injuries. As long as he could keep his intent in his focus of atten-
tion he could move minimizing the pain and protecting the injured
joints. When he would suddenly move fast, for example running for a
bus, he would again exacerbate the injuries and find his knees swell-
ing. His exploration had to shift. He had to find a process with himself
at a different level in his nervous system, where he could find a new
pattern of moving without having to attend constantly to the details.
The process had to be subliminal and at the same time it needed
2
Originally Feldenkrais could not describe these Iearning processes with the term
self-organization. The term was not used until the I97Os. He began his work in
the 1940s. Nevertheless what he discovered depended on this biological capacity for
reorganization, change and growth. And it involved the capacityofthe nervous
system for plasticity, a capacity that was unknown and not labeled at the time of his
original discoveries.
Part III, Chapter rz L77
to expand his sensory awareness of what he was doing with himself.

What was the Iearning pathway? He started to discover that he had
to try many movements and variations, which were performed mov-
ing both slowly and with sensitivity to sensory differences. The vari-
ous steps also had to interrelate to each other in terms of the overall
movement. Whatbeganwith his rollingaround on the floor eventually
became, after teaching others, the process labeled many years later as
Awareness Through Movement. As he proceeded first with himself, he
discovered how to guide others not only through his voiced instruc-
tions, but also with hands on guidance. These hands on Functional
Integration lessons provided profound shifts for people that went far
beyond the question of posture and movement.
Fortunately we have a documented library of this work. In
the summers of I98O and'8I he arranged to have his lessons with pri-
vate pupils videotaped to create a visual record of his work. It was an
important part of creating his legacy to humanity. About 160 Func-
tional Integration sessions were filmed. This project was made in
conjunction with a large training group that was ongoing each sum-
mer. We are very fortunate to have this documentation along with
the comments he made about the lessons. The material provides us
with an insight into the thinking that produced the 'miracles'that are
seen with the many different pupils. A number of these lessons were
with children with varying degrees of disability resulting from such
conditions as cerebral palsy. I use the word'miracles'not because the
changes in the pupils are inexplicable, but because in each instance
the person involved had been given treatments from many modali-
ties that did not bring about significant improvement. In some cases
developmental steps were made in the Functional Integration lessons
that had not seemed possible despite years of therapy. In nearly all
cases improvement was visible and appreciated by the person in-
volved. This documentation is of course just that. There was no at-
tempt to make double blind studies. In fact such an approach makes
no sense in that the process involved required an intimate relation-
ship between Dr. Feldenkrais and each of his pupils. We must empha-
size that this factor of relationship is so essential that even repeat-
ing what seems like the techniques of intervention would not in itself
bring about the observed changes in the organization of the person's
action. Here is a description of one of the most dramatic interven-
tions (videotape, July 9,lg8l,Amherst, MA, Kimberly E.):
L78
Kimberley E. is an eleven-year old child, who looks into

the world with intelligent eyes, seems to understand what people
around are saying, but is not able to speak herself, or to use her arms
for any action. Nor can she use her legs to support herself for crawl-
ing, let alone walking. She cannot get out of her carriage by herself.
Her mother has to lift her to the table. In addition to the fact that she
cannot stand on her feet, the adductor muscles of her legs are pulling
her knees together in a spastic fashion. She cannot support her head
with safety and security. Her shoulders and head tend to fall forward.
When she does lift her head she moves herself erratically and without
being able to find a supported position for her head. Her mouth and
hands make frequent unintended and bizarre movements. While her
movement is impaired, she still has developed as a person.
Feldenkrais starts the lesson with whispering her name
into her ear. He then turns around to the other people in the room,
pointing out that they are excluded. He puts his ear to her mouth and
she tries to say her name. Now it is clear that they make a connec-
tion to one another. He recognizes her and she reciprocates. She is
a person in his relating to her and she in relating to him. This is an
essential first step.
In the commentary he made to his students in the train-
ing class in Amherst on July 14, 1981 (recorded on videotape), he said,
"Who had ever told (previously) a secret to that child and asked for
a reply?" In the end of the Iesson he comes back to it, saying: "Are
you Kimberley?" and she clearly said yes. Somehow one of the con-
sequences of Feldenkrais' intervention allowed her to speak, that is,
use her mouth and tongue and breath to say, 'yes'when previously
the coordination of these elements of speakingwere not possible. The
increased stability possible at the end allowed her to let go of the
contractions preventing control of her mouth and tongue.
Often Feldenkrais thought in terms of recreating the devel-
opmental pathway for a child. In this case, he pointed out that there
is no use to go with this girl through all stages of development. Such
a process would take years. What she needed was to help her to use
what she had developed up to the present. In his commentary he said
"For that, you have to attach the person, attach her to life, first of all.
Make it so life is some sort of pleasant thing." This sounds oversim-
plified. It is profound. Everything she does is not comfortable for her,
Part III, Chapter rz L79
INTRODUCTION TO PART II]
not pleasurable and not pleasant. Feldenkrais had developed in him-

self the possibility of imagining the experience of the child within the
limitations of her development. What is it like to be unable to carry
out a sensible coherent action? What is it like not to be able to speak
and yet understand what others are saying? What is it like not to
be able to sit and look around the world with ease without jerks and
unintended movement?
In the beginning he cannot open her knees. She cannot
straddle his left knee, because the adductors are so tight. He needs to
get her to a height with his knee that he can have her sit, supporting her
chest and spine with his hands while evoking the antigravity respons-
es through moving his knee to slightly disturb her balance. Through
this she could begin to feel the movements evoked in her pelvis and
chest. The moment a tiny bit of proper organisation is achieved, she
can let go of some of the parasitic contraction in her adductors and
around her hip joints. Eventually her knees are so far apart that she
can straddle his left knee. He holds her to keep her from falling off. It
is an ingenious position because he can slide his foot forward, so that
he can lower her enough, that her toes can start to touch the floor with
the heels in the air. Now he can move his knee right and left. He helps
her to come to a safe place and then challenges the safety again in soft-
ening the ribcage in all sorts of different ways. When she balances at
one point, the ribcage and head have to be in a certain space. He shifts
her a small amount so she can find a space for herself where different
parts of the ribcage have adapted. Here together with her neck and
head, she finds for a moment a balance point. He approximates that
over and over again, till he is clear it comes through to her. While he
works, he attends to her reactions noticing when she fatigues, when
the movements slow down and the distortions occur again. Then he
stops and lets her rest.
The most amazing thing is how the support overcomes the
spasticity, and over-excitation of her whole system. His supporting
opens up the space where she starts to create the function of stand-
ing on the leg. Every time when she touches the floor with her foot,
the pelvis and head have to move in conjunction with that. He points
that out to her showing his admiration, so that she knows that that is
a function that makes sense. She never had formed a functional abil-
ity for standing on a foot or two feet. Such a pattern was never formed.
180
He shows her that her arms are free to move at that moment and with
that she has another way of controlling herself, instead of making her-
self rigid and spastic. He suggests that with a soft hand she can hold
on to him; she can even caress his face; she can use her hands to do
something wonderful. At that point when she is sitting on a chair with
a roller against her back for support, he takes her head in his hands
and helps her to find the antigravity response again. When her pelvis
rolls forward straightening her spine, he ask her to look down. Her
arms are getting free again.
It is a wonderful thing to watch, how she stands at the end
with two feet on the floorwhen she is again on his knee. He even takes
his hands away briefly. The joy both have with that shows in how
warmly and appreciatively they hug each other. Her arms are free to
move around when she is organized in a sensible way and even her
tongue can be used to form words. Her whole system calmed down
and the useless flexing and extending pattern is inhibited. Her self-
experience is transformed and herface expresses her surprise andjoy
of the moment.
The seeming'miracle'here is that Feldenkrais supports a
process whereby a function is evoked that was never formed previ-
ously. Normally a child needs a year to be able to stand on her feet.
To do so safely, she has to try in numerable kinds of ways. With many
iterations and variations the function is developed firmly. As a child
tries it out again and again, he or she does not need to think about it
anymore. The child just'uses it as the intent arises. This is a biological
capacity of the human organism that involves what we already have
called self-organization. It appears without specifically teaching any-
thing as if out of the blue. Yet it involves intent, action and interaction
within the world and gravity.
The 'miracle' involves the same biological developmen-
tal learning that we introduced in PartII. The child's difficulty then
has to be seen in a different way. What interferes with her action
and movement? On one level it seems to be the spastically contract-
ing muscles coupled with a lack of motor control of the muscles that
would normally provide stability. Normal therapy focuses in on these
considerations and attempts to get the child to learn control of her
neuro-muscular system. But how can she learn in this situation. The
very attempt to lift her head produces muscular chaos. The easiest
Part III, Chapter rz 181
]NTRODUCTION TO PART III
explanation is to attribute the muscular contractions to the 'brain

damage' associated with her conditions. What if the spastic contrac-
tions have another source?
Feldenkrais' thinking takes off on this point. Watching the
lesson on the videotape, you observe exactly that the muscles are not
the central issue of the 'brain damage'. The spasticity dissolves right in
front of your eyes each time she gains her own stability. From Felden-
krais'stance the issue is that the normal developmental process and
the learning involved did not take place in the eleven years that the
child was alive. It is true that the spastic uncontrolled muscular activ-
ity interfered. But much of it is generated from the fear evoked when
stability is not found. On the other hand her learning capacity while
greatly slowed down was still available for integrating functions. One
could see that she had learned a lot in her life despite all the interfer-
ence. The key was to provide the stability that she could not provide
for herself until the missing functions that provide stability appeared
so that she could bring them into use. Feldenkrais intervened in the
loop of instability with his support. The lesson is of course a first step.
It establishes the possibility of organizing coherently for acting. In
198I there was little possibility for further intervention with a skilled
practitioner. Unfortunately we don't know more about her life. At the
time she received only a few lessons.
Despite the complexity involved, biological beings create
simplicity through integration and self-organization. Interaction of
the organism with the environment through coupling works to evoke
the integration of functions. Thus Feldenkrais' Functional Integra-
fion process involves a set of possibilities for contact, and techniques
for evoking the self-organization. It even can work between species
and people have used it to help horses, dogs and other animals reor-
ganize after injury. Before continuing with more examples we would
like to take a look at the learning process we went through to become
skilful in helping others.
L82
Learning the Art of, Funetional Integration

Broadly speaking the key abilities for the practice of Func-
tional Integration involve an expanded sensory and perceptual aware-
ness. Neither of the authors of Part III possessed the necessary skills
at first. Basic training for each of us involved years of immersion in
the practice of seeking awareness in self-directed movement process-
es and corresponding investigation of movement through touching
and following movement with another person. We became sensitized
to ourselves and to others in a way not seemingly possible at first. As
our abilities evolved through practice, improvement was measured
through the change in the effectiveness of our contact with ourselves
and other people we worked with. While not often acknowledged, the
movement from beginner to competency and then mastery in all ac-
tion evolves this way, even when specific techniques are learned.
The abilities of the Functional Integration practitioner are
not dependent on description as such, but are functional capacities.
We list a few of them here to indicate that normal education does not
develop these sorts of skills. Here is a sample:
- The ability to detect small differences in the quality of moving
within yourself and in touching others.
- The abilityto move yourself with connectedness and improved
self-use, particularly involving a greater sense of the whole of your-
self in action.
- The ability to still the inner voices and to act directly from feeling
and sensing.
- The ability to connect and synchronize with another person,
to attune with another.
- The ability to think globally as well as in detail, to open one's
attention space. And be able to move yourself from open attention to
narrow attention and back at will.
These skills and abilities among others were not available

to myself (CG) as a modern highly educated human being with a Ph. D.
In 1975 when I began to train with Moshe Feldenkrais I had begun
a long apprenticeship in discovering a different way of being in the
world. I was a beginner. I could not yet act out of a different space. Nev-
ertheless after the first three months of movement lessons, I found
myself moving myself with an unknown ease. Thinking I would not
succeed, I found success in contacting through touch. Lucia Schuette-
Part III, Chapter 12 183
Learning the Art of Functional Integration
Ginsburg (LS- G) trained with Feldenkrais' first assistant, Mia Segal.

She experienced many dramatic changes during her learning process,
growing in her security and sensitivity.
In the trainings we were not'taught'these abilities, and did
not learn how to do what our teachers could by imitation. We had to
immerse ourselves in a process of attending, listening to kinesthetic
experiencing, discovering anew how to move, and opening a space in
being conscious, which Feldenkrais labeled, owareness. Awareness in
this sense is primarily sensory and involves detecting and attending
to small differences. However. note that awareness in this sense is not
equivalent to being conscious. It takes the act of consciousing anoth-
er step in which sensory attending brings kinesthetic knowing. It is
a key to the abilities and skills listed. It is also difficult to convey to
someone who has not had the experience. It cannot be taught directly.
In fact the learning process is exactly what has already been explored
and described in relation to development in Part II. The very process
of immersing one's self in sensory detection of differences provides
the process of developing further sensory awareness. The training
process involves experiencing numerous Awareness Through Move-
menf lessons and many Functional Integration lessons.
Both of us have been increasingly involved in passing on
these abilities to people wishing to become Feldenkrais teachers. The
experiential learning and guiding through structured immersion pro-
cesses is immediately practical. By the end of the training process
students are working with people from the outside and finding a way
to use their new abilities to the benefit of others. They can touch,
make contact, and affect a shift in pattern and perception for the per-
son they work with. For many students, the thinking process itself
is still often foreign. That is, the development of sensory awareness
precedes cognitive understanding. Yet a rudimentary non-verbal
thinking is already operating. If the students continue, this thinking
process will develop and become available to cognitive understand-
ing. The new skillfulness in touching and contacting another person
is both available and practically useful.
L84
What is Function? What is Integration?

In her Iesson with Feldenkrais described above, Kimberly
discovers a function. She learns to stand on her foot and leg at least
for moments in an integrative and coherent way. Standing in gravity
is above all highly skillful. It is also a complex and coherent act. We
are so well integrated in this kind of act that we do not notice it as Iong
as the function remains possible. Nor do we remember how we got to
standing. Nevertheless it involved many attempts along with listen-
ing to yourself through the various feedbacks of your system. These
include the movements you make and how the balance varies and the
feelings of security evolve. You are indeed attending as Kimberly does
as she experiences the ability to stand on her leg. You begin to inte-
grate all the actions involved with the reflexive reactions to gravity.
Moshe Feldenkrais used the old fashioned word 'function' in relation
to the actions in life that have the attributes of coherence, usefulness,
intentionality, organization, etc., and that are involved in the mun-
dane everyday things we do as well as what we need for special skills
such as painting, acrobatics, or making music. Function in this sense
establishes the connections from intention to action. Functions also
have the attribute of needing development although some functions
such as sucking and breathing are with us from birth. The develop-
mental learning process involves creating an integration of elements
of movement and perception into a coherent pattern without which
we could not successfully act.
Kimberly discovers a function as we all do by experiencing
the coherence of connecting foot, leg, pelvis, back, shoulders, head
and neck into the act of creating standing in a way that works, feels
safe, and where the organization of the elements cohere into a bal-
ance. Without the coherence standing is not possible. Without detect-
ing the safety and balance through the proprioception, kinesthetic
sensations, sensations of balance through the vestibular system, the
eyes, the experience of world stability, and so forth there can be no
act. Integration is essential and therefore perception is essential. One
cannot divide the act between perception and motor activity, thought
and consequence. Once organized, we can organize again without
concern, without directing attention. In her lesson Kimberly only
gets a taste of this possibility. Nevertheless it is a major step.
When we learn fully, we are able to act in the immediacy of
life, leaving most of the action to the subliminal. We do not usually
What is Function? What is Integration?
directly attend to kinesthetic, vestibular, tactile, visual, aural, and

other sensations that guide our movements between anticipations
and feedback as to what we actually do. Once organized, we have the
ability to direct our actions (what we call agency), without full aware-
ness and conscious attention. Yet prior gains in awareness are opera-
tive. Our system provides us with autonomy. Many thinkers get con-
fused at this point and think lack of acute consciousing of the parts
of action means we are not conscious of kinesthetic sensation and
proprioception, and that we delude ourselves into thinking we have
will and direct ourselves unconsciously while thinking we are con-
scious. Some even imagine we can be zombies, an acting machine
without a conscious mind. This is at best a quarter truth. One thing
is sure: We cannot learn without awareness, investigation, thinking
at some level, even as infants.s
Learning itself is not conscious. The integration process it-
self is not conscious. Nevertheless the process depends on conscious
processes in feeling and detecting changes. The consequence is felt
as difference. Many integrations leading to invariants at all levels are
involved in a complete Functional Integratron. Integration cannot, I
believe, be understood without a science of what we can now call co-
ordination dynamics. Such a science is still at a beginning stage. What
we developed in Part I and Part II of this book now comes to fruition.
Moshe Feldenkrais' Functional Integratton needs this background as
a base for linking to our biological inheritance. Long after his empiri-
cal discoveries scientific investigation has caught up with the devel-
opment of coordination dynamics, and the recognition of nervous
system plasticity.
3
See Chapter t5 for further elucidation of the issues.
186
1 THE MINDSET CF
I '1
IU
SELF-LEARNING
I do not teach, but my pupils learn.
MOSI{E FELDENKRAIS
To begin we look into the developmental learning process

more clearly.We have already in Part II established some of the condi-
tions that help the learning happen. In describing Feldenkrais' lesson
with Kimberly in chapter 12, three major features stand out. These
are support and safety, variation in kinetic experience, and finally
recognition of the new patterns.
First and foremost a person has to have support for stabili-
ty and safety. And if touch is involved, trust is essential. In Kimberly's
lesson trust was created in how Feldenkrais first contacted Kimberly,
acknowledging her as a person. In placing Kimberly on his knee he
both held her trunk with his hands so that she would feel safe, and he
spoke to her briefly in a soft voice saying that he will keep her from
falling. "Look, see, she can't keep the hands still a minute; neither the
head nor upper part of the body. She is not used to having the spine
supported properly. Look, I must hold her, otherwise she would fall
forward." (Feldenkrais describing the lesson to his class on July 14,
1981while they watch the videotape of the lesson. From the transcript
of the Professional Training program held in Amherst, MA, Felden-
krais, 2OO4,pp. f9 - 27, July 14.)
Support allows her nervous system to begin to quiet down.
It is only in this condition that developmental learning becomes pos-
sible. Other sorts of learning such as conditioning do not require
support, but then the learning results in a fixed response, and not a
flexible organization. (Actually conditioning as a form of learning is
possible in any situation, but to be useful it occurs after developmen-
tal learning.) For each of us, anxiety, agitation, and fixation on trying
to get it right are states that strongly interfere with the possibility
of improving. In mutual feedback contact during the process, Felden-
krais can feel if Kimberly becomes quieter within herself, and less
so when his moving her creates more uncertainty. At the same time
she notices her own state. In this way he controls the degree of chal-
lenge so that it remains within the limits for the child's possibility and
feeling safe enough to continue.
Part III, Chapter 13 L87
THE MIND SET OF SELF.LEARNING
Safety once established then allows for a second parameter

for developmental learning: Challenging the safety within the limits
of easy possibility, creating small variations, which require an adjust-
ment to the change. "Now (I) move the knee right and left, but terri-
bly slowly so that she feels suddenly and actuallyyou with your hands
move (her) weight on the right foot (right side). But only a tiny little
bit; then you feel what happens... Look what happens. The foot can
stay like that... The entire system is constructed that when you have
pressure on the foot the brain will tell you, 'look 9o up."'
"Now this is the sort of thing which is built in ... in our system and in
such a way - like in a kitten - you have to do it fifty times and it be-
gins to work for the rest of your life. Therefore, movinglwith my knees,
open legs, a tenth of an inch to the right and tenth of an inch to the left,
holding (her) head so that she feels that that has to do with'stand-
ing on my left leg, standing on my right leg'. Only then can (sl-re) have
open legs and not like that (spastically held)." (Transcript, 1981, ibid.)
Finally, the third feature is the importance of affect and
recognition of what happens. Then Kimberly recognizes the new pos-
sibility with Feldenkrais. He points it out to her verbally, but they are
already in affective exchange with each other.
Here is an example of an extended process with a child car-
ried out by LS-G.
188
Case Studv: Workinq

with a Young Child, Clara
Luc ia S chuette-G insbura
Clarawas six years old when she came for lessons with me.
She was a thin, pretty and a rather timid-looking child, and for a six
year old she moved awkwardly with her feet turned slightly inward.
Her parents were worried because her second toes had grown over
her big toes, a condition which runs in the family. Her grandmother
had severe difficulties in walking a trouble as a result of the same
problem, and the parents wanted to help their child if possible. Later,
I found out that she was a restless child until she learned to read. In
reading she found a way to please herself, because she did not Iike
to move.
(In the first part of the process an informal evaluation is
carried out to assess the childt patterns ofaction, how she organizes
herself in life.)
When we entered my working space, which has a lot of mats
on the floor and a table, Clara walked to the table and put herself sit-
ting there. She was clear that that was supposed t6 be her place. Her
feet were dangling down. I placed supporting pads under her feet so
that she could sit with her feet on a surface. I noticed that her feet
turned inward, and that she was collapsed in her lower back, holding
herself upright by straightening her upper chest. This allowed her to
look forward. I asked her if she knew why she came to me and she said
because of her toes. She was wearing socks so I asked her what was
wrong with them. She pulled off her socks and showed me her feet,
which were very big with long toes, the second one grown over the big
toe and very sweaty and wet. I asked her if she has trouble with them,
such as pain in walking and running, and she said no, only that getting
nice fashionable shoes was not so easy sometimes.
(The assessment continues bringing in the choices and
desires of the child and the things she has accomplished. Curiosity
is essential on the part of the practitioner. Note that the assessment
does not involve a 'diagnosis' but a revealing of important aspects of
the child in her life situation and in the family.)
This was kind of a problem for me because here I had wor-
ried parents and there I had a child who did not seem to have a prob-
lem with what her parents were worried about.
Part III, Chapter r3 189
THE MIND SET OF SELF-LEARNING
Case Study by Lucia Schuette-Ginsburg
I said: 'What do you like to do?" She said that she loves
to read more then anything else. I was surprised. Could she read
with prescription glasses of +6? "Yes," she said proudly, but she
did not like to wear her glasses. I found out that she was farsighted
+5.5, but I could not believe that she could read without glasses. I
fetched a children's book and sure enough, she could read. What
was that? (I myself am farsighted at +3 and I cannot read a sen-
tence without glasses.) Her mother said that they had consulted
several eye doctors about the problem. They all prescribed eye-
glasses but did not wonder about how she could read. I decided to
leave this issue alone for the moment and asked her what she wanted
to do better. She said that she has sports now as a first grader and
she cannot do a somersault; besides that she is bad at sports. I said
that maybe we can do something about that. She agreed in a friendly
way. I found her very easy to work with through all the lessons I gave
her. She was curious and happy to have my full attention while mov-
ing. With growing trust and self-esteem, she asked for things or told
me when she did not want to try something. In the beginning she was
always patient.
(Starting the lesson the assessment continues while I be-
gin to engage the child. The pattern of her difficulties becomes more
apparent.)
I askedherto lie on the backwith the feet standing andhold
her right knee with her right hand. She definitely knew her right from
the left, but it was not quite easyfor her to reach for the knee. Reach-
ing for the left one was even more difficult. When she had her two
knees in her hands I asked her to roll a little bit from side to side, but
she could not easily open her knees and balance. We changed to the
side-lying position. She chose the left side. In this position she could
grasp her right knee much more easily, and we engaged in a little
game bringing head towards knee, then forehead, looking to the right
and left of the knee. She enjoyed herself very much. Her upper chest
softened; her neck got easier. Returning to lying on the bacl! I asked
her to hold her knees again and it was much easier for her. I asked her
to open the knees a little and she could do that. She rolled a little bit
from side to side. Herupper chest got even softer, herface brightened
up and she was much livelier. We invented all kinds of variations to
reach for the knees and to roll, crossing arms over, etc. When she came
190
back to sitting her pelvis was under her and her head was carried dif-
ferently. But most importantly, she was much more lively and wanted
to come back the next day.
I told the mother I would call her because I did not want
to talk about Clara in her presence. There was so much I was curious
about. For example, was she born with the second toes over her big
toes? I called the mother and was told that she was not born like that.
She remembered to alert the paediatrician about the family problem
when Clara was five or six months old, before there might be a prob-
lem with her feet. He told her not to worrybut to make sure she should
wear broad shoes when she would begin to walk. I asked the mother
if Clara had rolled over to lie on her stomach when she was at that
age. She responded that she was surprised to remember that around
eight months Clara had about ten sessions of neuro-developmental
therapy (Bobath) because she did not like to lie on her stomach. The
therapistfound out that she had a'distorted'pelvis. Clara did not like
to go to her because she still did not want to lie on her stomach. The
therapist insisted on that if she were to continue working with Clara.
Clara was not willing to cooperate and they stopped seeing her after
awhile.
I tried to match this information with what I found with
her. On her right foot the second toe was not as far grown over the big
one as on her left foot, and she could not roll over her left hip joint as
easy as over her right. Had she never rolled over to lie on her stomach
by herself? What did that mean for her development? If this impor-
tant step of her development is missing, could that be the key to work
with her?
I recalled what I knew about development, seeing in front
of my eyes all the different things a baby does lying on the back, then
rolling to the side, rolling back to the back, moving in a cirele on the
back already using the feet a bit on the ground. (Rolling to the side in-
volves flexing on one side more than the other and returning involves
reversing this and lengthening on the side that was flexed. Each side
requires separation from the other so the two sides can move in co-
ordination but separately in terms of direction. We term this differ-
ence differentiation, since each side moves differently.) In continu-
ing to turn, a moment arises and the baby finds itself on the stomach
holding their head up, which was not possible to do before. (Now both
Part lII, Chapter r3 191
Case Study by Lueia Schuette-Ginsburg
sides extend with the head going back. See fig. 2 in PartII, p.r32)
The world has a different perspective when this is accomplished. The
extensors (long muscles of the back and neck) now work strongly. To
get back on to the belly she would have to use her sides quite different-
ly, pushing the ground or reaching out with her arms and legs elongat-
ing one side while folding the other. There are a lot of possible ways
to go about such a function when I think about Feldenkrais' different
lessons, and my observations with different children. But one fact re-
mains, the world has a different perspective when one is lying on the
stomach and looking into the surroundings. Suddenly the baby's head
needs no support anymore from the mother. The extensors have to
work and the flexors have to let go. Arms and legs can be used differ-
ently to use the ground to start to reach for what is desired. The eyes
have to work differently to look up. Is the back supporting the move-
ment of the eyes, or the eyes supporting the movement of the baek?
(See fig. 3, PartII, p. I35) Intentions change the use ofourselves and
development.
I tried to make a working plan. I remembered Moshe say-
ing to Karl Pribram in the discussion on the tapes from San Fran-
cisco (Feldenkrais, Pribram, L975) that he tries to find the step of de-
velopment, which is missing in a child to help her evolve. How is it
that her feet developed like that? She learned walking although she
never crawled or crept. For a person's foot to step off properly, the
step offpoint is between the second and big toe functionally. You can
feel that this point supports the upper structure and there is a con-
nection through the skeleton. No other point gives that sensation
with the heel raised above the floor. Children do a lot of pushingwith
their feet while lying on the stomach creeping or crawling, getting up.
Would it help to learn movements she never did to restore functions?
And would that change something with her walking and her feet, get-
ting her toes to separate? I believed that even so she would not use
the movements anymore so extensively as she would have when she
was five month old. But she wouldbenefit. So myplanwas to rollwith
her from back to belly and the other way around in different ways if
possible and see what came out of it. But more important than any-
thing else, she could develop a joy in moving again. That would be the
groundwork for everything else, that is, to enjoy doingwhat she does,
to become curious and to be satisfiedwith herself.
L92
(Notice that the interventions are in the form of investiga-

tions and are not just a question of movement. The child's affective
experience is an essential element.)
She came to the second lessonwith a smile and itwas clear
she desired to work with me again. I felt now that we had made a good
start. I decided to work with her on the floor, so that we could roll
aroundwith alot of space and startwith somethingshe certainlymust
have done as a baby. She showed me how nice she could roll a bit from
side to side still remembering her last lesson although her upper chest
was stiff again. With her knees in her hands, her head was lying on the
floor and moved with the rolling. I put a roller under her pelvis to sup-
port her upper back on the floor so that I could work with shoulders,
head and upper chest. She realized her arms got longer and she
grabbed her feet. What a wonderful moment when she was surprised
that she could grab her feet. She took her socks offand looked into the
soles of her feet. Then we gave names to all of the toes. She has big
feet. I had thought of course of interlacing hands and toes but I did
not want to challenge her too much. Instead I had her interlace her
fingers and explore the unusual wayof interlacing. Maybe I could get
her curious about interlacing hands and toes later.
I think a lot about how much I need to challenge to evoke
learning and when not to, going slowly and without giving way to fail-
ure. With her somethingtold me to go slowly.
Next time she came she was very tired from school, so I
decided.to work with her lying on the back bringing her feet to stand-
ing. Her left foot was still turned more inward; it was not only the
foot, but the whole leg from the hip joint. Her right leg was now ly-
ing turned outward. I worked from both her feet starting with the
right, differentiatinga toes, which she enjoyed, going slowly towards
outward rotation of the foot and the leg till she was able to let the
whole legturn outward includingthe foot. We playedfrog lyingon the
back. She remarked that a frog cannot stand his feet on the ground. I
said, a frog cannot lie on his back, nor can he walk but you can. We
laughed heartily. Both of her legs were lying with the feet outward
and when she came the next time the right one was still outward more
but the left was turned inside again. So this approach did not work as
y:llT lll_:-shi_ I
4
Differentiation is an essential part of learning in which one learns to distinguish
and move different parts independently from each other.
Part III, Chapter g 193
Case Study by Lucia Sehuette-Ginsburg
I asked her to lie on her back. Her left foot was standing in-
ward with the toes crossed over; the right one was standing straight.
I asked her to lengthen the left foot and to push the floor lightlywith
the right one. I made her aware of her pelvis lifting and rolling to the
left and her ribs moving and slowly I asked her to push from different
parts of her foot, then to lift the heel and push more from the front
of her foot. After a while she put the opposite arm above her head and
I asked her to look towards her hand while simply pushing with her
foot. "Can you see your little finger, all the others one after the other?"
I followed her movements with myhands, exploringwhat she was do-
ing with herself while moving, taking over and exaggerating, or go-
ing into a new direction slightly. After a while I asked her to turn her
hand still following with the eyes and to our astonishment she could
roll onto her left side. I asked her what would happen if she kept on
turning her hand and arm and following it \ rith her eyes. She did so
and was lying on her belly. We both started to laugh with joy. We went
back and forth quickly and slowly. We did not have time to explore the
more difficult side, but her left leg was lying more turned outside.
I called her mother to ask her what she observed with Clara.
She reported that she always had a difficult relationship with her, be-
cause she was restless and nervous, and did not like to move at the
same time. Now she was much more open and accessible. "It has been
much easier with her," she said. She could not believe that what we
did had to do with the change in her daughtert attitude. Neverthe-
less she said that everything else was what it was before so it could
only have to do with what we were doing. We both were astonished
and happy. I asked her if we could still go on with our lessons on a four
day time schedule. I had to leave soon to work somewhere else. I also
knew that the family had another daughter and was not well offfinan-
cially. I thus offered that she could pay me monthly a certain amount.
That made it possible to go on.
When Clara came back she saw a big blue inflated plastic
'egg' lying on the floor and she threw herself on it. I watched her and
saw that she did not dare to put her hands on the floor on the other
side while lifting her feet from the floor. Here she was lying on her
belly. Here was an opportunity. What if she made herself soft over the
ball still with her feet on the floor? The moment she let her head and
neck soften, her legs got soft. I rolled her a little bit back and forth
L94
pushing a tinybit with her feet. After a while we found out she could
make herself like a stick rolling over a bit, or like pudding, cuddling
around the ball. One moment she moved too fast and she had to use
her hands on the floor on the other side to keep herself from falling
but she did so only with her right hand. She nearly fell and was scared.
The firmfloorwas more secure forthe moment. We wentbackto roll-
ing over, I started pulling her arms, crossing them slightly to get her
pelvis engaged to roll over. Then I asked her to push with her left foot.
Her pelvis did not roll over or lift. We used the other side to see where
she presses with the pelvis when she pushed with her foot and slowly
something happened. I helped her with the movement of her left arm
and then she could roll onto her right side. Her little two-year-old
sister at that point, entering the room, immediately imitated what
she was doing. Her mother reported proudly that Sonya loved to move
from the beginning. Clara's face darkened while her mother said that
on the playground Sonya climbs all sorts of climbing facilities but
Clara does not dare to do it. I said Clara is cautious and does not want
to do something she does not feel secure about. She liked that state-
ment obviously.
When she came back the next time she walked strangely.
Her left foot was strongly turned inside, her right one was moving for-
ward. What was going on? Her pelvis was twisted. She said her back
was hurting a little. Lying on her back her whole back was far from the
floor. I started to pull her left leg in the directions it was going easily
till her pelvis let go and her lower back and the middle of her back was
more on the floor. Then I asked her to lie on her side and she chose
the right one. "How would you roll onto your back?" I asked her and
she started to do it by pushing her left foot to the ground. I thought
of folding and unfolding, differentiatingboth sides and helping her to
find a way to move from her center. We started with folding the left
side and unfolding as she followed the left hand with the eyes while
lengthening the leg. When she came back to folding the left side she
continued following the hand with the eyes. We rolled from side to
side in the middle, elbows and knees pointing to each other. Then she
continued rolling to one side in unfolding and folding again. As in all
the other lessons, I followed her movements with my hands, finding
out where she interfered with herself and helping her to find another
way. After a while she could do this baby rolling smoothly and com-
THE MiND SET OF SELF-LEARNING
fortably with enjoyment. She walked much better but still with her
left foot turned inside a bit. She was out of pain.
Was it time to bring her on to her stomach? How would the
use of her eyes in this position help her to organize herself differently?
In sitting she still stiffened her upper chest in order to look forward.
Could this pattern change when she learned to use the extensors of
her back in a different way?
In the next lesson I asked her to lie on her belly. She did not
knowwhat to do with her head. Her elbows and lower ar'ms were glued
to the floor next to her head; she was looking to the left. I expected
that if I would lift her feet, her pelvis would lift also. I pushed through
her feet lying on the floor to get the pelvis to move. Then I asked her
to push her elbows to the floor using the ground forces to lift her
shoulders and head. To my utter astonishment her hands and lower
arms lifted and she rounded her back with the right side of
her forehead on the floor. The right side of her upper back bulged out
a little anyhow when she was lying on her belly. I decided to use this
but to differentiate this function of looking downward. I worked with
the left shoulder blade, arms and ribs to differentiate the shoulder
from the ribcage, then with the right shoulder and chest. I asked her
to push again with her left elbow and lower arm onto the floor. Gradu-
ally she experienced that with this push, different parts of her chest
lifted from the floor. I told her, "Look the floor is your friend, when
you press the force comes back to lift something else." She laughed,
and found that very funny. I asked her to look to her belly after she
had her forehead on her hands, with her hands on top of each other,
and she found out that she had to Iift the middle of her back. The same
moment somebody knocked at the door and she lifted her head beau-
tifully to see what was happening. It was so great that the environ-
ment helped that learning situation. I was not sure if she was ready to
lift her head in this new way with all the extensors supporting this
action with the pelvis on the floor, but she did the moment she was
curious to see something around herself. There is an inbuilt
pattern that is ready to work if it is not inhibited. I can trust this to
work. This action showed that clearly, but I am always astonished
when it happens. All humans learn to sit, stand and walk; it is some-
thing we inherited from our ancestors; we are standing on the shoul-
ders ofgenerations.
196
When I saw her again after a month her mother said it was
time that I was back. Clarawas her old self again, but nowmuch more
demanding and she obviously needed to see me. I was glad that her
mother thought so, because often when children start to change their
behaviour, parents have a hard time coping. They want the physical
part to changebut not always the other levels of the child. When Clara
came in, she showed me what she had done in school. She had earned
the best ratings and she was proud of it.
I still had in mind her wish to learn the somersault but
I thought she had to learn to use her arms to support her chest and
head while standing on all fours. "What about lying on your belly?" I
asked and she agreed without hesitation. I helped her to discover how
to find a place to stand her hand on the floor on both sides. With her
elbows on the floor I asked her to look up and imagine that she was
following a little animal crawling along the floor and then moving
up on the wall. Bending her knees so the feet were towards the ceil-
ing she lifted one knee then the other with my help so that her pelvis
could extent instead of being lifted. I had her close one eye and look
up and lifting one knee with it, and I found out that she used the oppo-
site leg to the eye, which she left open. We triedwith the eye open on
the same side and it was more difficult. On her back again I saw that
both of her legs were still turned with the feet outside.
In the following four to five sessions we played with creep-
ing in different ways. She became much more playful; asked for things,
uttered dislikes, and we involved her little sister whom she could
teach how to move like a crocodile. She loved to play with the creep-
ing and to involve her sister, because she understood something that
her sister, although a "better" mover, could not do. It was great that
this sisterly competition helped. This worked from now on very of-
ten, because the father or the mother had to bring her and the sister
accompanied them. She used to play around sometimes outside but
most of the time in the room. They liked each other a lot and played
often together at home. When I came back after a two month period
she told me that she learned to ride a bicycle and her mother told me
that she was much more adventurous in the playground. But they
did not report the most interesting thing which was that her right
second toe was now only a little bit over her big toe. It just touched
the nail on the side. The left foot improved also, but not as well.
Part III, Chapter rg L97
I thought she was ready to go on all fours. But in this con-

figuration her problems showed up again. So we did a lot of lifting one
arm, the other, one knee, the other, shifting weight, learning to bal-
ance. When I asked her to put the top of her head on the floor, she said
it was too painful. I tried it with a big cushion under her head, which
worked better. Then I decided to work with her feet on a roller on the
back. If she could lift her pelvis with her knees going forward and had
the experience of her pelvis and back extending it would help her.
I first worked with her right foot on a firm roller rolling her foot on
it, extending and flexing her toes, working from the heel, extending
and flexing her ankle. Moving her foot over the roller her toes slightly
separated. Then I used a roller lengthwise to differentiate the move-
ments of the.foot and the ankle, knee and hip joint. In the end she had
both of her feet on two rollers and lifted her pelvis high in the air. To
do that, she hadto push down so thatherpelvis extended and herback
and the knees would come over her feet forward in a bridge.
She loved that, because she felt like an acrobat on the roll-
ers. She was standing quite differently afterwards. Both of her feet
were pointing forward, her head was in a different place; she did not
know how to walk at first. It must have felt very strange to her.
Back on all fours again, we started in the next session to
bring one arm under and put one side of the face to the floor. This
turned out to be difficult to the left side. She could not orient herself
in this configuration and turning her pelvis to the right with her right
shoulder on the floor was at first impossible. The lower ribs on the
left and right did not know how to move. So we went back to all fours
to a movement, which became easy for her, and had been difficult in
the beginning. This was to come to sitting from all fours to one,side,
and then the other bringing one leg in front ofthe other crossing over.
I rolled her head for a while to get her to feel connected all through
the spine. Then we went back to the difficult position. The easy side
was easier now and the difficult was at least possible. Sonya jumped in
every now and then and tried also.
In the next session the girls brought a box with all kinds
of seashells with the wish for my admiration. We took one shell out
after the other and looked at them. I was a little nervous about time,
but then I decided to go with the flow and use our play with the shells
for more learning. I asked them to take off their socks and put back
198
the shells with their toes. I noticed that Sonya did not have the prob-
lem with her toes. We laughed a lot and both girls had fun. I told them
the. story about a student who I met in Heidelberg who did not have
arms and did everything with her toes. So the theme of people who
used their feet like hands brought us to exploring interlacing hands
and toes. This was not easy for Clara, but possible on both sides. This
theme accompanied us through many of the next lessons because
they liked it so much and showed me what they could do. Meanwhile
I came up with all kinds of different interlacings.
Next time we went back to the 'judo roll', a variation of the
summersault in which one rolled with the head to the side. I did not
teII Clara that was what it was. She still could bring her shoulders to
the floor and the sides of herhead. The liftingofherkneeswas difficult
again because she moved backwaids with her legs instead of rounding
her back and turning her pelvis. So we spent some time in this posi-
tion bringing the toes for running and back again and I helped her to
feel what the pelvis was doing when she did that. Now pushing from
different parts of her feet was important again. We investigated this
with both feet with each shoulder on the floor. Then she started to lift
the easy knee first and I told her that she could look from under her
standing arm at the same time. This time the force from her foot was
transmitted forward. With her easy side I asked her if she could think
of lifting this foot completely from the floor and she did. She was so
proud of herself and I was too.
I thought to myself, if we had not this experience of success,
why would we go on learning? It is such a reassuring feeling that we
are capable of doing somethingwe could not do before. Scientists are
thinking if human beings have an inbuilt capacity to want to improve
themselves, I think Clara is a wonderful example how this boosts your
self-esteem. In having somebody who helped her to go on when she
was stuck without knowing, she eventually changed her way of being
in the world with herself and with others. She now learned to roll in
the judo roll fashion in the followingweeks.
I was again out of the country for a couple of months, but
the parents came back to me when I came home. Clara is now eight
years old. I saw her last year seven times. Her right foot has all toes
next to each other and the left foot has the second toe touching the
nail at the side. These changes happened without ever correcting'
Part III, Chapter rg 199
THE MIND SET OF SEI.F-LEARNING
her. She continues to come. I have no idea how she manages with her
eyes without the eyeglasses. She wears them in school but not regu-
larly. This secret did not unfold. We are currently working standing
on a roller and here her pattern shows again, she cannot roll the roller
with her left foot, she has no balance. I brought her to the floor Iying
on the back pushing with her left foot to roll the pelvis and she was
stuck again. She could not push with the outside of her foot; she could
not lift her heel and push without cramping her toes. A little remind-
ing helped her to let the triangle with her arms go the side in all varia-
tions and Iater she could do the pushing. Back to the roller she could
roll the roller with her foot and stand on it with her fingertips on the
wall andbalance.
For myself, working with Clara was a major learning path.
Thinking of it reminds me that we all have capabilities which will un-
fold if we let it happen, that we can trust our system more than we
often think, and when someone helps us to develop awareness about
what we are doing we can change in directions we did not think of
before. I do not know what happened with her feet, when she was
around five months old. The question still stands. Was there an in-
herited weakness? Or did it arise functionally because she did not do
certain movements? Or were both processes involved? What I know
is, in walking with her through the path of filling in gaps of her de-
velopment, she started to use new functions, and her body configura-
tions started to change while growing. Even so the old patterns show
up in different ways in challenging situations. She has learned that
she can do something about it, which she did not know before. I think
that experience will accompany her through her life. Meanwhile her
little sister now comes for lessons, because she started walking with
her feet inwards. Is it a "family thing" and how is it connected? We
still have further mysteries.
200
In this extended series of lessons we have included many

movement activities in which Clara's active participation was essen-
tial. In this sense a developmental learning was created in the process,
which was facilitated to match her stages of learning. Feldenkrais
developed such facilitated processes out of his discoveries that we
now call Awareness Through Movement- We will return later to pro-
vide some sample explorations.
Physical movement is a key to learning in this way. In deal-
ing with extreme difficulties, movement may not be enough in itself.
The emotional experience of losing one's capacities may interfere
with the possibility of learning. This lesson series to follow (with CG
and LS-G) describes working with an adult with a serious neurologi-
cal problem as a result of a stroke. Here we had to consider another
level, the difficult relationships with one's self and others when life
circumstances change so radically. Learning now can seem very dif-
ficult.
20L
Case Studv: A ForW-Eiqht=Year-

Old Man #itn a Stioke,"Bernard
Carl Ginsburg
Here is his story. One night about one a.m. Bernard awoke
and tried to turn in bed. He suddenly discovered that he couldn't
move himself. He tried to get out of bed and couldn't stand. He felt
strange and dizzy. He was very shocked to suddenly be helpless and
didn't know what had happened. His wife was equally shocked. The
ambulance was called and Bernard was hospitalized and stabilized.
After an examination, he was told that he had a stroke. In an instant
a calm and peaceful life was turned upside down.
Afewweeks later, he called me from a nearbyrehabilitation
hospital where he had been sent and where he mostly lay in his bed
helplessly. Daily therapy seemed not to result in much improvement
of his condition. He was taught how to cope. Desperate for recovery,
he was willing to seek alternatives. He had heard that Feldenkrais
work could speed recovery and wanted me to see him. At that time
he could not stand or use his left leg and could not use his left hand
and arm. His speech was slowed. He also found the normal rehabilita-
tion procedures exhausting. We worked only a little on his hospital
bed. Nevertheless I quickly established for myself that he had been a
healthy man and while his stroke had disabled him, at the same time
many important aspects of his movement and bodily organization
were intact. Bven in this first session, I found that his spine was con-
nected and well organized for standing. I could even put pressure at
the bottom of his left foot on his paralyzed side as he lay on his back,
and connect through the spine to his head. There were no strong mus-
cular interferences although some muscles were over-contracted and
others weakened. I said to him then that it was likely that he would be
able to stand and walk although I couldn't promise a miracle. He need-
ed to hear that there were possibilities and that his previous healthy
state would support his recovery. We arranged to work together after
he was discharged from the rehabilitation clinic.
It turned out that he chose to return to his home country
where he continued at a second rehabilitation hospital. Here he was
able to workwith a therapist who was also a Feldenkrais practitioner.
On his return three months later he was standing with the aid of a
brace on his left ankle. He used a cane for walking using his right hand
202
to support himself. He could not move his left arm and in standing it
hung stifry with the elbow partially bent and the fingers contracted.
He often had pain in his left shoulder, particularly if he tried to move
the arm. Nevertheless he reported that he was very pleased with the
Feldenkrais Iessons and believed that the lessons had helped his re-
covery more than the exercises given to him in rehabilitation. He
wanted to continue in order that he could return to his work.
In the first lessons he found that it was possible to stand
and take a few steps without the brace on his ankle. He also could be-
gin to move his left shoulder and lower the arm, but not lift it. I noted
two major impediments to further improving. The first was that in
moving in his daily life the effort necessary immediately resulted in
stiffening his left arm, hand and shoulder. The second difficulty was
his impatience in trying to move. He always tried immediately to use
force to overcome his inability. Where his arm had been before he
now only knew emptiness. I encouraged him to try very small move-
ments even if that only involved a thought. It seemed to him impos-
sible. Not knowing where the arm was, he contracted all the muscles
that he could feel at maximum strength. The small movement did not
exist. He thus could not modulate his effort but only produce an all or
nothing attempt to move himself.
On the other hand he continued to find more stability in
standing. I.saw that he felt more secure with the brace and I sug-
gested that he use it until he felt he no longer needed it. At the end of
a month he was arriving for lessons without the brace. He had also
returned to his work. In these first lessons, I simulated functions such
as standing through connecting through his skeletal structure. I also
moved him from the center first engaging ribs and spine before work-
ing more with the pelvis and then legs and shoulders then arms.
We had three important sessions together over six days in
which LS-G participated. In the first of these sessions I explored the
action of bringing Bernard's hand to his face. As I brought the hand
closer, his hand stiffened, particularly if I attempted to turn the hand
so he could touch his cheek with the palm turned toward his face. At
one point I moved too far which elicited pain in his shoulder. LS-G
had an idea at this point. Bernard was lying on his right side with his
legs bent. Lucia took his left hand and gently brought it to his left
thigh. She moved the hand over his thigh in a gentle stroking move-
THE MIND SET OF SELF.LEARN]NG
Case Study by Carl Ginsburg
ment, making sure the hand stayed open by not moving too far or too
fast. She asked Bernard if he felt the hand on the thigh and felt the
touching with his hand and fingers. He did. She continued until she
could take the arm to the knee and a little below. She suggested that
he stroke himself in this way at home using his right hand to move the
left. At the end ofthe process Bernard had tears in his eyes.
We also worked in sitting together. Bernard fell toward the
left side when he sat and let his head drop forward. I moved his pel-
vis forward and back gently with my hands and made sure that his
Iumbar spine moved. I then made the same movements touching the
lower ribs. As the movements became more freely available, I asked
him to move himself. I then held his head and guided him through
the same movements but also took him right and left making sure
that his ribs responded to the changes in position. He now sat taller
and with his head more in the center.
At the next session three days later, Bernard's hand had a
different shape, as did his shoulder. Movements that he could gener-
ate himself were easier. He sat with his head and shoulders more to
the middle spontaneously. Even as he improved Bernard was reach-
ing a crisis. He was very emotional and cried when he made a further
step toward improvement. In the following session two days later he
explained his situation to me.
' "I am to olazy.I don't practice enough," he said. I then asked
as to the difficulty. "I am exhausted after the day. I have no energy to
practice." Then he said, "My wife says that if I don't work at practicing,
f won't improve. She fears I will stay as I am. I went to an ergo thera-
pist and she showed me to take my left hand and while I am stand-
ing Iift it with my right hand and move it in circles and Iower it. She
also said I have to practice moving every day." His head drooped. He
looked at the floor. He experienced his inability intensely as a feeling
of helplessness and heaviness. The harder he tried to improve the less
he seemed to gain.
We had to bring to awareness the common beliefs that he
held about recovery. These are often reinforced through the anxiety
of relatives and the beliefs of therapists. They are ingrained with our
education and the person takes on the beliefs without question while
grappling with the inability and helplessness. Bernard was not excep-
tional in this.
204
Let us enumerate some of these beliefs and assumptions

here. First and foremost is the belief that by exercising frequently in
the face of a difficulty, improvement will follow. There is an assump-
tion that the mere activity will evoke the improvement and hard work
and pain are concomitant necessities. A second assumption is the
more some movement is repeated, the better the learning and recov-
ery. And a third assumption is that tryrng hard is the road to success.
These assumptions are at best only partially valid. The third assump-
tion is invalid especially in situations in which the difficulty stems to
injury to the central nervous system, as is the case in stroke. Trnng
hard evokes the pattern of the reflexive contracting, which interferes
with any possible learning. In addition the inability is exaggerated,
which becomes discouraging to the person who feels more helpless.
To make a contrast we can note that Lucia's process was
different. She asked Bernard to attend to the stroking movements by
feeling the tactile sensations of the hand and the thigh. She also indi-
cated that he only move in the range where his hand does not reflex-
ively contract and stiffen. This attending to qualities of moving shifts
the pattern of responsiveness in the nervous systern, and allows a free
flow of whatever feedback is possible.
The assumptions normally made here, both by professional
people and therapists, makes a kind of logical sense. The problem is
that it doesn't make biological sense. It doesn't account for the condi-
tions that allow biological systems to shift to new patterns and cre-
ate new order through the self-organizing process. Therefore, move-
ment in itself without consideration of the how of the process can
be less than useless; it can prevent the self-organizing learning from
happening.
The next assumption that is made is that we have done what
is possible, and the person has reached the limit of improvement to
the point where no further recovery appears or is possible. In neuro-
logical medicine arbitrary time limits are projected to the patient as
to when improvement is at an end. It is often suggested that further
attempts at recoverywill lead to disappointment and depression. We
do have another choice. But we have to help support a workable learn-
ingprocess.
I felt an important step at this point was for Bernard to
experience how he had learned and succeeded so far, but in more
Case Study by Carl Ginsburg
detail. He needed to know how to learn how to learn. I had to engage

him in the process in awaythatwas pleasurable, and safe. I hoped he
would understand well enough to bring his wife to understand what
was needed. And I knew I could not simply lecture him as to what to
do. I had to concretely demonstrate everything I would explain to
him. Only through directly experiencing that he could learn by going
slowly and gently, and then attending, could he experience change in
the moment.
We entered into a dialog. I took his left hand, gently opened
the fingers and grasped his hand. I asked him to move my hand down-
ward, which was a direction possible for him. His fingers contracted
more and he pushed downward with force using his shoulder. Did he
feel the fingers contract and the elbow stiffen? We tried other direc-
tions of movingmyarm. He couldmove itforwardtowardme andback
toward himself. Turning was possible, but very limited. Upward was
not possible. I asked him whether he could reduce the effort, and not
worry whether he moved my arm at all. If he could move it at all, he
had to make it minimal. This he began to do. When he moved my arm
downward now the elbow opened, the shoulder was easy, the hand
grasped more softly. Slowly the other movements became possible. I
asked him to turn my hand again. I asked him to notice that he could
turn further when he could remain easy with his fingers. As I saw that
he was aw'are of the difference, I made my argument. "If you try to
move, you become tight without realizing it." I asked, "If you just ex-
ercise like that, just to practice movements, what do you gain? Here in
contrast you are softer, less contracted and can move more freely."
Now he agreed that nothing changed with trying hard and
that moving minimally made new movements possible. So I said, "you
see, you do not have to exhaust yourself at all. You can enjoy learn-
ing. And you don't have to accept the pressure people put on you." We
then discussed the anxiety that the people around us have with the
disability, and he spoke of his wife's deep concerns that he will not im-
prove and recover. She particularly worried that he would not be able
to return to his work. His own fears, he said, made him depressed. So
I said that continued improvement could be slow. "On the other hand
you clearly can continue to improve and do it the way it feels right for
yourself." His anxiety lifted. We then went to the table and I asked
him to lie on his back.
20,6
When I took his Ieft wrist with my hand and drew his arm
across his chest, it was lighter than previously. The ribs on the left side
cooperated in the sliding of his arm. We could work together slowly to
get his hand to his mouth. I tried to turn his hand to touch his cheek.
Just the beginning of the movement started a contraction in his fin-
gers. We took five minutes just to bring the hand softly to the side of
his face. I rolled his upper body while keeping his hand touching his
face as long as the fingers did not contract.
I brought the arm back to lie on his chest. The hand was sof!.
I asked him to slide the hand over his chest touching himself. We tried
different directions, up and down, across the chest and back. The dif-
ficult upward direction became possible. The lesson continued with
other possibilities in simulating how he could stand and so forth. In
sitting up, he now sat spontaneously with his body and head centered,
his head erect. When he stood up he walked around the room without
his shoes and without his cane. I showed him how to bring his head
over to each side as he changed which leg he was using. He now tilted
less to the left. His arm and hand hung with less tension.
When his wife returned to the room, he began a discussion
with her about what he needed for his learning. Within himself he was
also discovering his grief and how his new circumstance had changed
the way he and his wife related to each other. In the next weeks they
would engage each other in talking out their difficulties. The depres-
sion lifted and the learning continued,
Now some months Iater Bernard walks without a brace;
he can move his arm; he can play moving his fingers a bit; he sits bal-
anced; I can bring his hand to the top of his head although he cannot
do this byhimself. He is fullyback atworkand stillwishes to improve
further.
Perception, Movement, Space:

The Importance of Phenomenology
In the case of neuromuscular difficulties the body percep-
tion is distorted. In the specific instance of neurological difficulties,
such as stroke or head injury, the perception of space is also distorted.
In both instances the changes affect functioning and moving. These
changes in a person's experience are normally not attended to by
people on the outside. Or if so, they are considered artifacts of the in-
jury or difficulty. It makes a difference when these changes are rec-
ognized as changes in phenomenal experience. If you go back to my
description of Bernard's lessons again notice how often attending to
his phenomenal experience is an important aspect of the interactions
with him. When, for example, we had Bernard move his hand to stroke
himself, we were not just exercising a movement. On the contrary
what was important was the sensory.experience of touching in rela-
tion to expanding his phenomenal space.
Externally, the person on the outside sees the combination
of muscular contractions and weaknesses as functionally interfer-
ing with movement. The thought is to work with the muscles either
through exercise or massage. What if the phenomenal spatial dis-
tortion itself is the source of difficulty? Normally from the objective
stance the phenomenal experience is out of bounds. Consider for a
moment what happens when I tryto bring Bernard's hand to his face.
Within a small range I can move his hand and arm freely toward his
face as long as I leave the arm to follow close to the body. The muscles
allow the free movement; the hand stays soft. At some point where I
reach a limit, the fingers begin to contract and I can no longer turn
the lower arm or open or bend the elbow. In other words the interfer-
ing muscular contractions are not a feature of permanence, but are
specific to where the arm is in space and in relation to the body space.
In detail I cannot turn the hand to take it to touch the right side of
the face. It is such a familiar pattern in normal life to touch the op-
posite cheek with the palm of your hand that you never think about it.
For Bernard what seems to be missing is the spatial position. The at-
tempt to reach it results in powerful contractions that prevent move-
ment. Entire areas of space seem to be forbidden, as if a wall is erected
against movement when we reach the boundary of the permissible.
When we had achieved some improvement in expanding
the allowable space, I brought up the issue with Bernard. At this point
208
in our work together Bernard could lift the arm part way, turn the
wrist, and move right and left, forward and back. If I moved him very
carefully, I could bring his hand to the top of his head. I asked him to
bring his right hand to the top of his head and asked him to notice the
space. I then asked him to move the left hand where he could and no-
tice the space. He reported that space was very restricted with the left.
I then carefully took the left hand to the top of his head. He reported
that the space was still missing in relation to how it was on the right.
And indeed there was no easy flow of movement.
We have to address the thinking process in relation to phe-
nomenal experience.
In other words we cannot just work with a person from the
outside. We have to ask the questions about howwe experience space
in terms of embodiment and in terms of moving ourselves. How is the
perception of space developed and learned? What kind of sensory ex-
perience, kinesthetic and visual, is involved? How can we know what
to provide for the person in terms of contact, touch and movement? If
it is only through sensory experience that awareness can improve and
perception develops, how can we provide the necessary experience?
We have partly answered these questions in the description
of the work with Bernard. Sometimes the pathway is discovered as
a surprise in the working process. These events alert both of us and
become keystones for new abilities as we both recognize the changes.
Bernard thus accumulates these improvements, which become a kind
of second nature, and no longer require attention. In our own learn-
ingwe acceptwhatwe have organized andlearned as simplyavailable
and natural.
The Missing Image

It is common in our culture, as we have expanded our sci-
entific cultural thinking, to look at animate beings through the meta-
phor of mechanisms. We then tryto tinkerwith ourselves through this
ideation. It is possible of course. But it is also an oversimplification
and has many unintended consequences.In the spirit of what seems
to make sense we overlook or don't observe the consequences, or bet-
ter yet hide from ourselves what in other circumstances we could eas-
ily observe. One can think of many examples in education, medicine,
The Missing Image
therapy, politics, economics, etc. Direct manipulation while success-

ful to some degree has become the mainstay approach to almost every
situation where we want to intervene. Furthermore the approach has
become encased in the stone of licensing, institutionalization, gov-
ernment regulation, and social control. We like the cause and effect
formulation even when the links are actually very tenuous. In the
Feldenkrais processes we are creating a pathway around the edges.
At this point I (CG) bring my own experience of recovery to
bear on the issue. I had the good fortune to have my Feldenkrais ex-
perience as a guide, and the help of Lucia. The injury involved a com-
plete separation of myleft clavicle from the part of the shoulderblade,
which connects to the clavicle. Chased by a very large hornet, I lost
balance and fell from steps where I was standing on to a stone street.
In shock and pain Lucia brought me to a regional hospital. While I
was told that I could heal without reconnecting the clavicle, I would
have a weak arm. Thus surgery seemed essential to recover my func-
tioning completely even though the arm and shoulder were passively
moveable. I was not ready for the junk heap. I wanted to continue my
practice. I returned to Frankfurt and I agreed to surgery with a top
orthopedic professor, doctor. After the surgery in the recovery period
I literally lost my arm for movement. Before the surgery I could move
a little. But now, in fact, although touch sensation was unimpaired, I
no longer experienced my arm as such. It had literally disappeared
as a felt appendage. It was a weird experience. The hospital staffwas
quite happy to move me. A nice young physical therapist massaged
the arm and shoulder and applied hot towels. She lifted and lowered
the arm gently. But then she placed the arm in metal support and
turned on a motor, which began to mechanically lift and lower the
arm. The idea was the constant movement would keep the shoulder
joint free and produce sensations of movement that would lead to re-
covery of movement. I protested immediately. The machine could not
detect how much movement brought me past the comfortable limit.
I said that I could move the joint much more safely by leaving the
arm on the support and moving my trunk to move the joint. This they
allowed, mumbling about how this bad patient would develop a frozen
shoulder joint.
A month-and-a-half after surgery I began to wonder how I
would recover this arm, which I could swing a little. I could not imag-
zLO
ine how I could move it with my own volition. At some point I lay on
my back on the floor with both arms at my side. I wanted to find out
if I could move my injured arm through imagining the arm using the
feeling of the other arm in movement. I tried to lift the Ieft arm and
nothing happened. I was beginning to appreciate what the phenom-
enal experience of paralysis was like. It was as if the attempt at move-
ment onlyproduced emptiness. No impulse formed.
Thinking of familiar movement processes, I reminded my-
self that my right arm could be a model as to how to lift the left arm. I
explored lifting the right arm attending to the kinesthetic sensations
that I assumed were connected to the act of lifting it. I would try a
common Feldenkrais process inwhich afterattendingto the right arm
I could imagine the same kinesthetic sensations with the left arm. But
I seemed unable to imagine anything despite the clarity I seemed to
have of the right arm. Trying to imagine in my mind's eye, I kept slid-
ing away and sidestepping any imagination. I seemed helpless. Now
I knew even better what it was like to be paralyzed. The worst of it
was it wasn't like anything. There was no self-image to produce move-
ment. The arm was emptiness and a veryheavy emptiness at that.
In his book, A Leg to Stand On (1984), Oliver Sacks vivid-
ly describes his own recovery from a severe injury to his leg and the
initial discovery that the leg was lost to him. It is probably one of the
most beautiful descriptions of the phenomenological experience of
injury and recovery available in the medical literature. Most interest-
ingly, he describes how the therapists and doctors were incapable of
understanding his experience. Their intent was to get him to contract
a muscle, to move the leg, to get him to stand and walk. His leg was
lost to a scotoma, a hole in the space of himself. How could he stand
on this alien appendage that was like "a huge, clumsy prosthesis", "a
leg shaped cylinder of chalk" and with a complete inability to think
how it can be moved? He expected his doctor would understand and
"reassure me, help, give me a foothold in the darkness." The doctor
said nothing. His physical therapists, Sacks surmised, "... had not the
faintest idea ofthe sort ofexperience I was going through, or contend-
ing with ..." Again it was only the command when they wanted him to
begin to walk, "Come on Dr. Sacks"... "You've got to begin." The fear,
the immediate lack of security, the inability to find the support of his
leg made it neariy impossible to begin. The therapists insisted and
Part III, Chapter 13 zLL
The Missing Image
he made his first steps with the therapists at first moving his leg. In
the end he did get on his legs and slowly began the process of learning.
Once he experienced a modicum of support within himself, move-
ment and activity did result in recovery of the missing image. Did the
forcing and correcting perhaps make the recovery longer, and more
stressful? (pp. IOI - ffg)
In my own situation I was most fortunate to have the abil-
ity to find my own solution. I stayed with the emptiness and decided I
didn't know enough about what I did to lift the right arm. Of course I
lifted it, but how? It was not productive to just think of the arm. There
was much more that I did that I didn't realize or bring into awareness.
So I went back to exploring. Now I attended to my back on the floor.
I lifted the right arm many times and became aware of pressing the
floor with the back of the ribs on my right side, just to the inside of the
right shoulder blade. Now I had something new to experience on the
left. I discovered the ribs first. The ribs also were not present until I
brought some attention to them. I had very little awareness of ribs on
the left and didn't appreciate how little I allowed them to move. In
fact the ribs also were injured in the fall and I reacted reflexively in
protection by making the left side of the rib cage immoveable. I decid-
ed to press the left part of the rib cage corresponding to what I felt on
the right. As I pressed, I formed the intent to lift it. I felt the arm move
a few centimeters upward. I felt the pelvis also. Ah ha, lifting the arm
was not as simple as I imagined. I needed the rest of myself as well as
the arm. Fromhere on recoverywas mostlyuphill andwiththe help of
a physical therapist I discovered which muscles needed special help.
These I worked on with deflated balloons to give gentle resistance to
increase the muscle activity.
The neuro-physiologist Karl Pribram (LgTt) postulated
many years ago, basing his ideas on the work of the Russian physiolo-
gist Nicholai Bernstein (1967), that movement requires something
more than just impulses to the muscles. Bernstein in considering the
complexity of making any movement in a body with so many muscles,
joints, levers, proposed that movements were not constructed by
chaining reflexes, or combining atomistic elements. There had to be
what he called s5mergies, in which a movement pattern was produced
at a higher level in the nervous system in which the muscles, bones
and joints were coordinated and integrated into a coherent action.
2L2
Bernstein speculated that since specifics of muscles and intensity

were not controlled at the top level of the motor cortex, the synergy
involved the spatial shape of the movement (topology). Pribram went
on to speculate that a synergy also involved, as well as the form of the
action, an intention or goal. It was the whole that was 'represented'
in the nervous system. He used the term'image of achievement'as a
label for the integrated synergy, and its impulse to a completed action.
The image of achievement was analogous to the way a visual image
forms, but includes the element of time. What is involved in recovery
is the missing image including the body in space, the tensions, ori-
entations, timing, and manipulations that are involved in complet-
ing the action. Thus Oliver Sacks recovered his leg through the act
of walking, and I recovered my arm through the act of lifting it with
a more complete body.
1 /, THE CCNDITIONS FOR

III 1 SELF-LEARNING III:
Shifting Patterns of Mobilization and
the Question of Pain
What is essential for recovery and learning? In the case
that a person suffers with difficult impairments of functioning, one
needs to evoke the self-organizing abilities of the person (or of one's
self). This is spoken of today as plasticity. Self-organization is a bit
more descriptive. It isn't obvious how to go about such a process. In
fact most of our cultural thinking leads us astray because we tend to
see a problem as first finding a fault, and then correcting directly the
thing we see as wrong. In medicine and similar therapies, for example,
one generally approaches problem-solving by searching for a pathol-
ogy or fault and then treating the pathology or directly treating the
fault. While such procedures can be successful when appropriate and
partially useful in other instances, in many situations improvement
is very limited. While our previous examples involve development
directly, these are less common instances. One normallydoesn'tthink
of pain as yielding to the same sort of process.
Part III, Chapter r4 2L3
THE CONDITIONS FOR SELF-LEARNING IiI
Shifting Patterns of Mobilization and the Question of Pain
Here is a simple example of such a different approach from

mypractice (CG):
Movement, Pattern, Pain:

Unlocking the Mystery
Tim is a young man of thirty with past experience with
Functional Integration On this occasion he had played a basketball
game a few days before. Importantly he had not played for months.
The morning after the game he awoke with pain in his upper left ribs,
which he felt when he moved, and in breathing. The next day the pain
seemed to travel down his left side toward the pelvis. He also started
to feel pain around his left hip. As we usually do, he sought relief by
trying to move his back where he felt pain. The pain increased. He
became more uncomfortable and frustrated as he tried different ap-
proaches including taking painkillers. He then thought of seeking a
Feldenkrais practitioner to give him a lesson. He remembered that
this process had been helpful in the past when other modalities had
not been helpful.
I will describe the process by which I approached his situ-
ation to expose as best I can the underlying thinking and how I take a
wide view to find a pathway to evoking my client's self ability to shift
his patterns. The details are important, but seemingly obscure to an
outside observer. As I have described, we tend as a cultural bias to
want to seek a direct cause for a problem and a link from that to a so-
Iution. While such a process has its place, in this situation we often
come to a dead end. Where is the pathology? What has the hip to do
with the ribs? The questions in themselves focus our attention on the
places where Tim hurts. Treatment of the painful places will rarely
make a difference and may increase the symptoms. Do we really want
to find out the cause of the painfulness and take it away or do these
metaphors keep us from discovering a way out? Here is a description
of the interaction of Tim and myself that produced a solution.
When Tim walked toward me, I quickly noted that he put
his weight more strongly on his left side and twisted himself in an odd
way in walking. He was in my interpretation trying to avoid his dis-
comfort. Nevertheless, I thought the pattern of his moving had signif-
icance in'creating' the painfulness. So I briefly had him stand to feel
2L4
his back muscles just touching and moving my hands lightly along his
back to detect differences from one side to the other. I felt the muscles
on the right side were more contracted, and I also observed a twist
in the spine that brought his trunk over the left leg. I asked him to
sit on the low table I use for the lessons. Continuing to touch I found
through my own sensation a place along the spine that felt different.
"Is it here?" I asked. "Yes," he said, "It's the most painful place. I feel it
all the way around the front on the left." My hands, however, detected
much muscle tension on the right especiallyto the right of the offend-
ing place on the spine.
These signs were meaningful in assessingwhere I would go
to touch, how I would proceed with an intervention. But as you will
observe with me, they were insufficient to really 'know' what to do.
The place alongthe spine,whichwas painful to touch, about the fourth
dorsal vertebra, indicated a point of injury probably to the juncture
of the rib on the left with the vertebra. It could also have been just a
distortion of the rib preventing movement that was connected to the
strong pattern of muscular contraction. This contraction I detected
on the right could also be the result of a protective reaction to a feel-
ing of instability created in the stress. One might think to try to manip-
ulate the rib and vertebra to get the head of the rib 'back in place'. A
skilled osteopathic doctor might try to make this correction. But was
this point the whole story of Tim's injury and pain? My own questions
were about movement. I did not need to know cause and effect here.
The answers would come only through touching and moving with Tim
and doing so in a way that Tim would feel in himself a sense of safe-
ty and comfort. Any movement too far would elicit more protective
contraction and more pain. I had to 'know' how far was too far from
my own acute sensing of Tim's reactions to our dance together. I did
appreciate two things. I could best move him in the easy direction (I
listened with my hands for his resistance and stopped appropriately).
I also could move his skeleton in the directionwhere the muscles were
contracting involuntarily. I could, for example, take the ribs on the
right where the muscles were pulling and move them together along
the line of the contraction. This brought immediate relief, which was
indicated by an increase in Tim's movement of breathing. While I am
guiding Tim into movement I am also attending to how he breathes
and to subtle changes in the muscles and associated movement. I was
Part III, Chapter 14 2L5
THE CONDITIONS FOR SELF-LEARNING III
Movement, Pattern, Pain: Unlocking the Mystery
intentionally moving him further into the pattern in which the over-
contracted muscles were pulling him. This procedure is clearly coun-
terintuitive to our common understanding in that this movement
increased the 'fault'. By cooperating with the muscles that are exces-
sively pulling, however, the person feels relieved in that the pattern of
distortion is supported. Technically, in a feedback situation, moving
in the direction the system chooses produces the opposite action of
letting go. Yet many people think strongly that this will make things
worse. On the contrary, a new pattern emerges that brings the person
more into balance.
Tim initially lay on the table on his left side. This gave me
an opportunity to explore many movements such as turning head,
arm, and shoulder together to observe how the vertebrae turned. (I
could touch the back with my free left hand and support him with my
right hand while I felt the movement of different vertebrae.) I found
the easy direction was to take Tim's head toward the table, and he
remarked that this gave him a relief from his pain and discomfort.
Turning the other way then became easier. I could also explore how
the pelvis moved in relation to the shoulders. I could first roll his
whole body forward and back over the left side and then separate
shoulder and pelvis. There is too much detail in all the movements we
explored together to describe each step. The important fact was that
places where I initially detected tension or resistance became easier.
I asked him to lie on the right side and found all the move-
ments were now freer. I chose to explore very carefully the vertebra
and rib that was painful on the left. I tried to find the movement that
followed in the same direction as the contraction, i.e., toward the
spine. It was very delicate and Tim said touching there was unpleas-
ant. I backed away from the irritated area and I asked Tim then to lie
on his back. This is more important than it seems on the surface. Tim
needs to feel that what I do is thoroughly safe, that he needn't react
against anything I do. Trust is established this way without speaking
about it, and reinforced by the feeling of support and safety estab-
lished kinesthetically. We have already noted this in Feldenkrais' les-
son with Kimberly. What I feel is that Tim doesn't resist but follows
alongwith me.
In this position I found that the right hip joint was restricted
in turning and that the connecting movement through the hip joint,
2L6
which translated foot, leg, and knee to the spine and head, was inter-
fered with and not clear. When this movement became clear in Tim's
image, i.e., I could feel the connection while pressing the foot from
under the arch as if the legwere standing, Tim started to feel again the
pain in the ribs. When I observed how he was lying, the twist in his rib
cage was again apparent. There was an intimate connection between
what was happening in the ribs with what was happening in the right
hip. Now I could speculate that Tim twisted his hip and rib cage in one
awkward movement during the basketball game. Improving either
areawould not result in relief until all the changes integrated into his
ability to move himself. There was still a missing element. Where was
it? At this point I did not know. I had to continue to explore.
I went to the top of the table so that I could lift Tim's head
and explore the movements of his neck and upper back. Now I went
a little too fast not listening carefully to what I felt with my hands. I
was flexing Tim's head forward, which normally is easy for people and
lifting the seventh cervical vertebra a little from the table at the same
time. Tim quickly said, "That hurts in my upper back." In fact the pain
was exactly in the same place as before. I now moved the other way
with Tim's head taking the head back and exaggerating the arching of
the neck. Tim sighed with relief. I explored moving his head and neck
this way while still lifting the seventh cervical vertebra a little from
the table. I did many variations of the angle of his chin pointing it up-
ward to the right and then to the left. The movement also lifted the
top of his breastbone. I noticed again that these movements allowed
his breathing to become easier. I stopped and lifted his head straight
upward. This was easy so I explored the flexing forward again. There
was no pain. The shift was clearly noticed by the both of us. Tim was
now comfortable. When he sat up he said, "That really feels different.
I'm taller. It's a relief."
We did a little more together (Tim was sitting) and I guided
his head in space so he could experience moving his head in coordina-
tion with chest and hips, movements essential to comfortably shifting
from one side to the other in gravity and standing and walking. Tim
then stood up and walked around to experience the difference. Many
of the distortions observed at the beginningwere resolved. "I'm afraid
I will lose it again and start hurting," he said. "It's okay," I said. "You
need to take it easy today and tomorrow. No basketball. You will see.
Part III, Chapter r4 2t7
THE CONDITIONS FOR SELF.LEARNING III
Move slowly and be just a little careful and the new place for your-
self will become second nature." TWo days later he called me from his
work to thank me again and say that all is well and he feels great.
While this is a description of an actual Functional Integra-
fion session or 'lesson', it can serve as a paradigm of situations where
people are experiencing neuromuscular pain. As this is a very com-
mon situation that people get into, there are some important obser-
vations to make. You will see that the most logical view of pain is sim-
ply incorrect in many instances. Here is a definition from a respected
philosopher, Michael Tle (2005, p.lol), who has developed a repre-
sentational theory of pain, "Pain experiences normally track tissue
damage. So tissue damage is the obvious naturalistic candidate for
the relevant quality." Yes, we know clearly that if we cut a finger with
a knife, pain will ensue as a consequence. Here we allow the tissue to
heal and the pain recedes. Humans and indeed higher animals most
likely often have pain without such a clear relationship of causality.
Many instances of pain, particularly neuromuscular pain, are much
more occult in origin as in the case of Tim.
In this instance Tim experiences pain in a number of places.
Where was the tissue damage? In his rib, hip, left side of his trunk?
None of these locations were relevant for my process. In fact to focus
onthe painful areas on his part or my part was a counterproductive
act. Clearly he somehow injured himself in the basketball game, but
where? Even the location of the injury was occluded. The only ob-
servational facts involved the neuromuscular pattern of disturbance
related to the stress he put himself under in playing without warm-
ing up. (Medical examination is notoriouslyunable to uncover causes
when some sort of pathology is not detected. In fact anatomical stud-
ies of cadavers find no clear correlation of a relation of pain in life with
the pathologies detected after death.) For Tim muscular disturbanc-
es were more on the right side and not on the painful left side. Later
toward the end of the process, we found out that certain movements
of his head, neck and upper back elicited the pain. When all of the var-
ious parts of the interconnected pattern of Tim's response to his inju-
rywere resolved, and proper functioning for standing, sitting, moving
were clear, the pain was gone. The pain therefore could not have been
'tracking tissue damage'. Was there tissue damage, or was the neuro-
muscular system out of order in response to stress? Was the pain a
2L8
representation of anything? Perhaps the disorder itself and the pain

were in an intimate relationship. If the pain were directly connected
to tissue damage, the resolution of the pain through the procedure we
used could not'have brought about this result. And if the neuromus-
cular pattern was evoked through tissue insult, it should remain after
the shift in pattern. This clearlywas not the case.s
Let us propose then that the pain and the neuromuscular
distortion was a biological response to the stress related to some in-
jury or near injury. We can also note that in the pain modality (and
this is my observation of many cases including my own self-obser-
vation), the body perception is distorted and does not match an out-
side observer's view. That is, the person may say that his right hip is
back of the left and the observer may see it more forward, the person
may feel tighter on the left side and the observer may feel the mus-
cles more contracted on the right. The pains that result are often
not in the places where the musculature is over-contracted but in
the reciprocal muscles that have weakened as a result. But then this
isn't a rule and sometimes a person experiences pain in the more
contracted tissue. The complexities involved throw all easily come,
analytical conclusions to the wind. No direct cause and effect rela-
tion is discernable.
We nowhave to examine the intervention I made. I sum up:
First and foremost, I did not correct Tim or show him how his pat-
tern was distorted. I did not correct his self-perception. I did not tell
him what to do or give him exercises. My guidance and inputs were
designed to evoke a different response in his system, so to speak. It
involved his subliminal participation in sensing the movements and
how they could be different from the pain-protection pattern. And it
involved then the self-learning and self-organizing of new patterns
and perceptions that would later become available to him in his daily
" An interesting observation about the relation of movement to pain was discovered
by Feldenkrais. Normally when we move at a joint we move the outside lighter
part while the heavier body remains stationary. If this movement becomes painful,
as for example, when a person has a frozen shoulder joint syndrome, movement
may become impossible either actively or passively. Nevertheless, if the same joint
is moved from the heavy body, while the lighter part is held stationary no pain
may be felt even if the person with the injury found passive movement excruciating.
I have corroborated this phenomenon rvith clients with this condition and we use
this understanding in designing steps in our lessons. I think this is good evidence to
say the representational theory ofpain is incorrect.
Part III, Chapter r4 2L9
functioning. This could not happen unless Tim experienced my inter-

ventions as safe. This means that I would not move him in directions
that evoked pain. If so, I would immediately back away. I could track
his system with a great deal of accuracy and precision and even detect
subtle reactions that indicated pain sensitivitybefore he could detect
it. Having successfully completed many such processes with numer-
ous students and clients, we can begin to generalize the practicality of
such an approach. It coalesces with other alternative modalities.
A General Principle: Any intervention that results in the person who
reports pain shifting or distorting neuromuscular patterns of moving,
sitting, or standing toward less distortion will likely experience pain
reduction or the elimination of pain.
If the shift does not take place or increases, there will be
no improvement. I can frequently predict now from the feel of the
changes in the person's neuromuscular system within a relatively
short period of time (within at most a few hours or a day) that the
pain experience will dramatically lessen or disappear. If there is a
remaining heavy irritation as in sciatica or other more serious pathol-
ogy, the improvement, if possible, will take more time, as healing of
the irritated tissue is needed. More rarelythere maybe adifferent sort
of pathology such as a tumor or large disk prolapse with loose pieces
of disk material that are irritating nerve roots. In these situations all-
opathic medicine and surgery are called for. There are certainly many
other issues to consider. The distortion of a person's neuromuscular
patterns is always coupled with distortions of self-perception and a
person's embodied space. It seems to be a common concomitant of
injury. However, the degree to which perceptual distortion and the
corresponding protective neuromuscular reaction are seemingly one
and the same process is not often appreciated. I wish now to use my
own personal experience of an injury to elaborate on the point.
I have already introduced my account of the injury in-
volved in a fall from a stone stoop onto a stone street in which my
left clavicle was dislocated from the bony acromium process, which
connects shoulder blade and clavicle. Technically a Tossy III injury
(the most severe dislocation), the clavicle was pushing outward above
the shoulder. In surgery the clavicle was reconnected by sewing the
torn ligaments together. A metal clamp was placed to hold the bones
together so that the ligaments would not be re-injured. The clamp
220
was removed some months later. Needless to say there was consider-
able pain surely the result of tissue damage. The curious fact I wish to
report is that the pain itself could be reduced dramatically by shifting
the 'protective' neuromuscular pattern that accompanied the injury
and its aftermath. For that I needed the assistance of another person
(LS-G), who was able to give me Functionol Integration lessons in the
hospital and after.
Here is a description of the situation. I could passively
move my left arm but not higher than the shoulder because it could
dislocate the metal clamp. When I stood up, while I did not detect the
pattern myself, my left shoulder was dropped compared to the right
and I was twisted so that my body weight was on the left foot with
my right side rotated back. The arm seemed to drag on the shoulder,
which increased the pain. After the first lesson the pattern shift al-
lowed me to stand on both legs, the twist was reduced and the shoul-
der was higher. With this pattern the pain in the shoulder was almost
eliminated
I
was still recovering from the trauma and surgery (my
ribs were also bruised and stiff). Therefore within a day my protec-
tive pattern returned. We repeated lessons every few days. In each
instance the pain was reduced through the ability I gained to shift
again back to standing on the right. Further healing, of course, made
Iife easier and easier. One can speculate that the'protective'pattern
increased the stress on the damaged places. Nevertheless the pain
had the functionality of reducing my desire to move the arm and
shoulder thus 'protecting'the injured area. This is a primitive reflex-
ive action of my system. Yet it keeps me from damaging movement.
The more balanced pattern reduced the pain even though the injured
area was not addressed directly. To maintain the higher awareness in-
volved was not easy, however, as the injury itself seemed to evoke the
primitive protection. It may well be that the more balanced self-use
on the other hand seems to promote the healing process. The aware-
ness overcomes the reflexivity of the primitive pattern. The painful-
ness of the injury in the case of Tim and his painful left side was in
terms of recovery no longer needed at all. His pain did not return. We
emphasize again that pain is a far more complex phenomenon than
meets the eye. Chronic pain is an even more difficult issue involving
much belief about the meaning of pain and its social importance to
Part III, Chapter r4 22L
THE CONDITIONS FOR SELF-LEARNING III
the individual. But there is no such thing as psychological pain in its

self, distinct from neuromuscular embodied patterns of movement
and action. What medicine calls psychosomatic pain, I believe, is an
embodied phenomenon in which the experienced pain relates to the
distorted neuromuscular activity consequent to the underlying emo-
tions and feelings.
Referred Pain and Body Pattern

Pain is sometimes related to physical irritation, as I men-
tioned, produced by pressure directly on nerve tracts. Examples in-
clude sciatica related to disc injury in the spine with pain referred to
the foot or lower leg, or nerye pain in the arm from a collapsed disc in
the neck. Calcium buildup in the channel of the spinal cord in the low-
er back can also produce referred pain in the legs. LS-G relates here
an unusual example of the usefulness of shifting patterns in relation
to this sort of pain:
Some time ago a farmer from a village nearby called me and told me his
son gave him my address and insisted that he should see me. He said,
the doctor recommended a sutgery of the spine because of a stenosis
in the spine. (The diagnosis involved detecting calcium deposits in the
channel inside the spine, which carries the spinal cord. The thinking
was that the calciurn deposits pressed against the spinal cord due to
the narrowing, thus irritating the nerves and producing the pain. We
call such pain a referred pain since it is not felt in the place of pressure,
but in the areas of the bodies, in this case the legs, where the nerve end-
ings are activated. That is, the legs are not actually in pain but the ner-
vous systern interprets the signals according to the parts of sensory
cortex that normally connect to the legs. The recommended surgery
involves chiselling out the calcium to widen the channel.)
The farmer could not walk properly and was in a lot of pain. He was
seventy-two years old. I told him that I was willing to see him for
three following lessons and after we would evaluate his options. I was
not sure that Feldenkrais work was a suitable approach to his prob-
lem, and I did not want to promise him any specific outcome. He
agreed to come on this basis. When he arrived for the first lesson, I
noticed that he could not straighten his back and keep his shoulders
222
upright. He also appeared to be in great deal of pain, judging by his

movements alone. He explained to me that his condition came up
suddenly after he had painted the ceiling in his kitchen. He was still
working as a farmer.
I did myiesson and I was surprised how he responded. I did not expect
a farmer to have this sensitivity and responsiveness. When he left, he
was stiil in pain, but walked better. I did three lessons, and each time
he walked better, and could hold himself more upright. However, he
reported that his pain remained nearly unchanged. After the three
lessons I told him that I could not do anything further for him at the
moment, as I would be away for three weeks. I suggested that although
he could stand better and walk better, he might really need to go back
to his doctor and consider the possibility of surgery. On return three
weeks later, a message from him was on my answering machine, ask-
ing me to call him, because he had not paid me. I had forgotten, think-
ingthat myworkwith him had not helped him. When I called him, he
told rne that three or four days after the treatment his condition got so
much better, that he decided not to have the surgery. He said he was
out of pain since then. This was as much a surprise for me as for him.
In this case the medical diagnosis was definitive, and un-
doubtedly an x-ray examination of the spine did show excessive cal-
cification in the channel of the spinal cord. In other words a physical
cause was identified. How then did the reorganization of this man's
standing and moving result in a change in pressure on the nerves in
the spinal channel? We can only speculate that the pressure by the
stenosis (calcium buildup) on the spinal cord was not the only issue.
The stress of painting the kitchen must have caused spasm and ten-
sion in the back, which distorted the position of the vertebrae when
he erected himself again. After the lessons, the pattern change al-
lowed the farmer to be capable of standing erect again, which reduced
the compression involved in the stenosis. That is, he could nowextend
the spine, which had remained flexed, thus reducing the compression.
The pain did not disappear immediately as the irritated nerves were
swollen from the compression. In the days after the swelling lessened
and thus the pain was resolved. Here we have a mechanical change,
which was in a direct causal relationship to the pain, and yet neuro-
muscular pattern change resolved a difficult medical issue.
Referred Pain and Body Pattern
The point of all these examples is not meant to deny the

usefulness of established medical and therapeutic processes. We con-
tend only that there are many instances in which a different thinking
and action can resolve seemingly intractable and difficult problems
that are not addressed by ordinary cause and effect thinking. One of
the major issues is that alternative approaches are often much more
specific to the individual involved. Modern medicine is often prac-
ticed as a statistical medicine that proves its effectiveness in terms of
percentages. What is hidden in this scheme is what is happening to
the individual in their very specific patterns of organization. Learn-
ing then involves finding out what needs to be learned.
1- MCVING YCURSELF AS
I1
).\) AN ENTRY INTC
AWARENESS AND SELF-
CBSERVATICN
Important and Necessary Conditions
for Learning
The empirical evidence for learning new patterns or shift-
ing self-perceptions through movement explorations has been well
established in teaching groups of people in Awareness Through Move-
ment. The key is kinesthetic and kinetic sensation related to moving.
TWo conditions for carrying out the movement steps are these:
- Each movement is done slowly. Moving quickly evokes the normal
automatic pattern that you already know and have practiced many
times. The underlying physiology is not clear, but it seems new learn-
ing requires the cortical part of the brain where there are many neu-
rons in columns. It operates slowly since the movement of impulses
has to move through many nerve cells in the column. Thus this takes
considerably more time than is needed in fast action. It has been
speculated that organized action (what some neuro-physiologists call
body schema) is translated to the cerebellum after they are learned,
where when initiated, direct the action quickly as needed. There are
224
still feedback loops to the cortex and to other parts of the movement
centers.
- Each movement is done with minimal effort. Any step in the process
should feel easy andwithout discomfort or pain. The physiologyhere
is clear. Discomfort and painfulness capture the attention and there-
by reduce or eliminate sensory awareness. As we are trying to evoke
the learning through attending to sensation not normally noticed,
the Weber-Fechner law of detecting a sensory difference is operative.
This means the minimal detectable difference depends on the under-
lying intensity of sensation; the higher the background sensation the
less sensitivity exists in trying to detect differences. Thus while you
are in a quiet room you can hear a pin drop, but not ifyou are playing
a symphony on a sound system. Similarly when you move with exces-
sive muscular contraction the high contraction decreases the ability
to detect differences in the movement through the muscle spindles.
These organs within the muscle tissue detect length through the load
on the muscle in which the spindle is embedded. While not clearly
sensed as such, they are signaling to the spinal cord and higher ner-
vous system what is happening within the muscle. If a muscle is over
contracting or chronically contracting, the effect is the creation of a
high noise level in the neuromuscular system. It is similar to the sym-
phony that drowns out a small noise. Sensitivity is reduced. Thus re-
ducing effort brings about the possibility of receiving the drowned out
signals. You can, if necessary, reduce the movement almost to noth-
ing and only imagine the kinesthetic feeling of what you are asked to
do. In the second process we will explore using kinesthetic imagining
by experiencing a movement on one side clearly and imagining the
movement on the other side.
Attending is also an important aspect of learning. Watching
children in their developmental learning, you can notice with what
awareness and attention they discover how to do complex actions.
They attend to many different levels of sensation to discern whether
what they are doing is safe and what configurations of themselves lead
to success. Imitation as I have pointed out before is not a major part
of the learning process that leads to development of new patterns
despite opinion otherwise. Children will imitate surely after basic
actions are organized. Adults also can learn through imitation. Nev-
ertheless, while watching another person may allow us to simulate a
MOVING YOURSELF AS AN ENTRY INTO
AWARENESS AND SELF-OBSERVATION
Important and Necessary Conditions for Learning
movement, habitual patterns of mobilization and self-use will remain

un-touched. In other words visual pattern can be imitated without
the kinesthetic finesse necessary to discover new possibilities. I will
return to this theme in the last chapter on the discussion of mirror
neurons.
In the processes that follow, the intent is to experience the
process just to explore the possibilities of allowing yourself to experi-
ence change. Without trying, you may begin to discover an increased
capacity for sensory awareness. The Awareness Through Movement
lessons from which these processes have been abstracted can be used
in manyways for self-development and improvement.6
Awareness grows with continuing to use it. Awareness is
best understood here as consciousness plus (kinesthetic) knowledge.
In this sense awareness is an expansion of the consciousing activity.
It is not synonymous with consciousness and not something prior to
consciousness. Feldenkrais made special use of these words to clarify
the phenomenal activity involved and to distinguish the terms from
common usage. You should also note that in the processes you are
asked to notice or sense yourself as you continue to carry out move-
ment and when you rest. The idea is to be observant in the moment.
This is a different activity than introspection. Lastly I point out that
the learning conditions require openness to new experience, and a
willingness to explore. The same conditions have already been in-
voked in the sections where Functional Integration lessons are de-
scribed. The sensory and time conditions are also necessary for prac-
titioners in contacting and guiding their clients.
6
Resources fot Awareness Through Movement lessons can be found in the Sugges-
tions for Further Reading at the end ofthe book.
226
Exploring Synergies
Movement Exploration
' 1:
Experiencing One Side
Observe yourself standing. How do the arms and shoulders

feel? You can possibly detect weight, tension, easiness,
and other qualities. If you have a mirror look at yourself in
the mirror and notice whether the shoulders are.s5rmmet-
rical. One shoulder maybe higher or more forward than the
other. This is due to differences in the muscle tonus on
each side.
Lie on your back with the legs long and the arms at your
side. Notice how each side contacts the floor. Which side
has more contact? Which side feels closer to the floor?
Does one side feel longer?
Please sit on a flat chair without arms, or a stool. Make sure

the height is comfortable. As you sit roll, yourself very
lightly forward and back until you can settle in the middle.
The rolling movement should involve as much as is pos-
sible your lumbar spine. Your head should lift as you roll
the top of the pelvis forward. Check yourself and find
out. Are you more comfortable sitting? (If you find sitting
still uncomfortable you can do a similar process lying on
the back. Make the rolling movement very light and let the
small of your back lift a little and lower. Go back to sitting)
Now notice the shoulders, the head, and trunk. Notice

the heaviness or lightness of the arms. Find the tip of the
right shoulder. Let the hand rest on the right thigh. (If you
choose lying lie on the left side with the right arm along
the side.) Begin to lift the tip of the shoulder toward the
right ear and let it go back. (On the side move the tip of
the shoulder upward relative to your trunk.) Notice how
the shoulder slides upward. Can it move smoothly or is the
movement occurringwith interruptions or jerks? Do many
Exploring Synergies
movements exploringthe quality and sensation of your

movement. Can you sense that it is the shoulder blade
that slides upward alongwith the collarbone? Stop and
rest a moment.
Next move the tip of the shoulder downward awayfrom

the head. As this becomes possible move the tip of the
shoulder through the whole range from near the ear and
away from the head. The movement is soft and easy. Stay
in the easy range. Notice the quality. Again stop and rest.
Try the following. Slowly lift the tip of the shoulder to the
ear and stay there. You can let the arm hang now. Now
leave the tip of the shoulder at the same distance from the
ear. Lower everything together arm, shoulder, head,
bending at the side. Leave the arm still where it is and lift
the head and shoulders back to where thevwere at the
start. Rest.
Find out whether anything changed. Move the tip of the

shoulder blade up and down as before. Is the quality of the
movement changed? Is the range of easy movement
different?
Put your right arm across the top ofyour head and let the
fingers ofyour right hand touch your left ear. Tilt your
head, arm and shoulder to the right, bending the trunk, and
then Iift everything and tilt left. Repeat a number of times
slowly and gently noticing the sensations of the movement
in the rib cage on each side. Notice the feeling of the spine
in moving. Rest.
Go back to sliding the shoulder blade up to the ear and

down. Is there a difference in quality?
Still sitting, find again the neutral middle point. If you

were lying on the side, bring yourself back to a chair.
Notice the heaviness or lightness of the arms. Is there a
228
change from the beginning? Now lift the left arm above
your head toward the ceiling (the one we didn't explore).
Lift the right arm the same way. Is there a difference in
quality?What moves that did not move before?What do
you sense?
Lie on the floor and compare to the experience at the

beginning.
We can explore a different movement of the shoulder blade

bymovingthe tip of the shoulderforward andbackwhile
sitting or lying on the floor. Notice how the shoulder blade
slides alongthe ribs toward the spine and awayfrom it.
Again the quality of moving, whether jerky or smooth, can
be noticeable. There is no need to correct anything. Only
staywith what happens in the moment. Let the process of
the steps work for you.
In the next step again put the right arm across the top of
the head with the fingers touching the left ear. If you are
Iying lift the head and arm together a little so it is separate
from the floor. In sitting leave the head as it is. Now rotate
your trunk along the axis ofthe head and spine as far as
it goes comfortably from one side to the other. Repeat a
few times. Go back to the movement of the tip of the shoul-
der forward and back and notice differences in quality and
range of motion. Lie on the back and check the contact
with the floor.
Come to standing. Is there difference between the left and

a
right side? What do you notice infeeling and sensing on
each side? Go back to a mirror. Are there differences in how
you appear compared to the beginning of the process?
Part III, Chapter rs 229
Exploring Synergies
While you may be trying this process for the first time, you
may have varying changes or in some instances you may not be able
to detect differences. Some practice may be needed or you may have
to slow down further and reduce the effort more. For a fewpeople de-
tecting differences will take time. Attending a class or accessing books
and tapes will give you a chance to try again. (Resources are avail-
able through the Internet, and through national Feldenkrais organi-
zations. There are suggestions at the end of the book in the section,
Sug g estions for Further Reading.)
nr l .
lvlovement txploratron 2 :
The Other Szde in the Imaoination
Return now to sitting or if Vo.jp."frr lying as you did in the

previous exploration. Take afewmoments to reviewthe
movements and the difference you feel in the movement of
the arm and shoulder blade. Now switch to explore the
left shoulder. Those lying on the floor lie on the other side.
First do one or two movements with the left shoulder blade.

Lift the tip of the shoulder toward the left ear and back and
then forward and back. Notice how these movements differ
from the movements you made with the right shoulder
after Movement Exploration l. Let the movement go. At
this point you will not make any movement discernable
from the outside. You can, however, create in your imagi-
nationthe movements of the tip of the shoulder. Use the
memory of the kinesthetic sensations from your experi-
ence with the right shoulder as it was at the end of the first
process. If necessaryvisualize the movement, but then
step into the picture to recreate the sensations of moving.
Make one or two movements in each trajectory (up - down,
forward - back) and observe whether the ima$nary move-
ments already changed the pattern.
In this next step bring the left arm overhead and bring
the fingers overthe left ear as you did on the other side.
230
Imagine the movement again kinesthetically feeling the

ribs and spine as you bend to one side and the other. Can
you feel in your imagination howthe ribs come together
on one side and open on the other as you tilt? Continue now
turning head, neck, shoulder, and arm together in your
imagination. Imagine the turning in the chest and spine.
Ifyou need to review how it feels, go back to the right side
and explore the movements again and then go back to
imagining.
To complete the process, actually move the tip of the

shoulder blade in the two trajectories and compare to
before. Lie on the back and notice what changes further.
Stand up and notice as much as is possible what feels
different. Lift one arm toward the ceiling and then the
other and compare.
Completing the Image Improves

the Self-Perception and the Synergy
If you had some success with these two processes, you will
have discovered that you can Iift each arm with greater ease. You may
also have become aware that your self-(body) image has expanded.
You may have had an image of the arm only from the shoulder joint to
the hand. You may have been unaware that to lift the arm a complex
synergy ensues, which involves the shoulder blade moving and turn-
ing. The ribs and spine are also moving. Most people learn synergies
without remembering what they did and continue to live their life
without awareness. Sometimes the lack of awareness leads to trouble
and a person so forgets the ribs and spine that in trying to reach for
something on a high shelf they injure muscles in the arm. They tell
themselves they are just stiff.
The synerry for arm lifting is a complex one that begins
with moving the shoulder joint and increasingly turning the shoulder
blade upwards. In the total synergy, the ribs and spine cooperate with
this movement and the antigravity balancing system adjusts for the
shifts in the center of weight as the weight shifts to the opposite side.
Part III, Chapter 15 23L
Completing the Image ...
Knowing all this intellectually does not mean that you actually move
yourself in the full pattern as described. You may be more skillful
on one side or the other without again being aware of the difference.
Even if you tried to imitate someone who moves very elegantly you
would not actually see the subtle differences. The way to improve in-
volves bringing awareness and filling out the 'image of achievement'.
That this is a conscious process is clear frorn the fact that we used the
kinesthetic imagination in this lesson to expand the image involved.
Imagined movement does have consequences as measured by EMG
recordings from the muscles involved.T
We will come back to this in the last chapter to discuss
two aspects. First that the notion that proprioceptive and kinesthetic
sensations are unconscious and not necessary considering that we
normally act habitually. If this is so, our problem is, how would we
correct the pattern? Somehow we must bring the subliminal sensa-
tions into awareness with our attention. Second the notion that there
are two systems; the one that controls movement is usually referred
to as body schema. Most movement scientists considered that the
'schema' is below the threshold of consciousness. The other system
according to this view involves bodily sensation and appearance and
is labeled body image. While perhaps separate in neurological terms,
these are separate neither in the phenomenological space nor in the
functional aspects of moving one's self. Obviously from our experi-
ence of expanding the kinetic sensory experience and finding a func-
tional change, this suggests that in the larger frame there is no practi-
cal distinction.
Exploring Refexive Balancing

Moshe Feldenkrais was once designated the poppa of grav-
ity, Ida Rolf, the momma. Their two different approaches to reform
the human condition intersected with the concern of each with grav-
ity. Gravity is ubiquitous in the world where we live. It cannot be left
to chance. Thus if we slip on something, a very fast antigravity system
begins a process to recover the balance. Posture and the antigravity
response were long considered reflexes. In nature many even simple
organisms orient themselves in the gravity field. It is a necessity for
7
For a discussion see Chapter II (imagined actions as a prototypical form ofaction
representation) in Marc Jeannerod, Motor Cognition (2006).
232
functional activity. While we can refer to the orienting activity and

antigravity responses as reflexive, the control of this activity cannot
be a reflex. As Berthoz (2ooo, p.2L9) notes "Posture is controlled by
perception and not by local refl exe s." And (p. 222) "The multi-sensory
control of balance is not due to a simple string of responses to stimuli.
It involves comparison of the state of the sensors with prediction."
Here is a short exploration of how movement organizes
the balance:
Movement Exploration 3:
Improving Balance
Please stand. Find the most comfortable standing for

yourself. Notice as best as you can how your head is
oriented with the shoulders and the pelvis. How are the
feet eontacting the floor? Where is the pressure? Can
you sense where you need to hold yourself?
Put the feet apart about the width of the shoulders. Begin
to sway a small distance forward and back. Do the move-
ments from the ankles with the knees soft although straight
and the legs in line with the trunk. In other words let the
body be as one piece to the ankles. How far can you go
before you lose yourbalance or find that you are lifting the
forefoot or heel away from the floor? Make the range of
moving within the limits of your ability to keep balance.
Continue by exploring moving to the right arid left. You may

find this direction easier. Begin to combine the two direc-
tions so thatyoubegin to make a circlewiththe top of your
head. Imagine a pencil at the top of the head that would
draw a circle on a paper placed above your head. As you
move make sure the feet stay on the floor. If they do not,
reduce the size ofthe circle until you can leave the entire
surface of each foot onthe floor. Change the direction of
the circle and continue. Make manymovements. Stop.
Take a walk and notice any changes.
AWARENESS AND SELF.OBSERVATION
Exploring Refexive Balancing .
Now stand again and close your eyes. What differs? Begin
to sway forward and back. Is it easier to keep balance or
more difficult? If it is more difficult, make the movement
smaller. Switch then to swaying right and left. Begin
to make circles againbycombiningthe two movements.
Continue making circles for awhile in both directions.
Then open the eyes and continue. How does it differ?
Stop and observe how you stand. Walk a few moments.
Please continue in the followingway. This time as you

stand lift your right arm above your head toward the
ceiling. Begin to make circles again. Notice that the move-
ment is no longer symmetrical. Continue in the other
direction. Let the arm down and continue the circles.
What is the shape of the movement? Repeat lifting the Ieft
arm. When you let the arm down what happens to the
shape of the movement? Manywill find it is an ellipse
and extended right left.
Repeat the process lifting both lengthened arms to shoul-

der height in front of yourself. Make circles as before and
continue in the opposite direction. Again notice what
happens and how the movement changes after you lower
the arm.
In this last part put the arms at the side with the palms
of the hands backwards. Take the arms backward as far as
is comfortable. Make circles in each direction. Stop and
notice the differences. Nowwhen you make circles as you
did at the beginning notice that circles can be wider than
before. Stand and find out ifyou can detect changes in how
you are standing.
234
It is curious that most people cannot make changes in the

standing organization that has become habitual for them. Often as
children and in adult life people are told that their posture is faulty. In
directing attention to the fault a child will try to correct themselves
through overriding the existent pattern with muscular holding and
effort. These overriding patterns will then also become part of the ha-
bitual posture. Becoming aware of what is seen as faulty, adults also
will attempt to correct themselves. Doing so may result in more harm
than good. On the surface the posture will appear corrected. Function-
aIIy you can show that the person is not fully stable. The breathing is
interfered with through the holding in of the chest and back. The spine
can be pulled into a pattern not fitting the way the vertebrae work to-
gether. Back injury can be a consequence. Many professional people
who advise people about posture are not aware of what the person ac-
tually does to correct it according to their guidance, and do not notice
that the person is left with one faulty pattern imposed on the old one.
Finding a way of learning involving indirect self-correction is on the
other hand often successful in creating a new possibility.
A number of processes have been developed to evoke a self-
correction. I mention three: Alexander Mefhod (developed by F.M. Al-
exander at the beginning of the twentieth century) uses subliminal-
ly instructed self-direction in the movement of the head, neck and
chest that brings you to a more full length and aligns the head, trunk
and pelvis in a different way. The process was self-discovered by the
founder of the method, who was an actor, in trying to cure a prob-
lem with his speakingvoice. Rolfing, developed by Ida Rolf, is a more
physically directed process evoked through a deep friction of the mus-
cular connective tissue that releases the muscular pattern of hold-
ing. The person experiences spontaneous change after. In the above
Feldenkrais process, which we just experienced, movemeirt was used
to create variation. We have already discussed this way of eliciting
change in the description of the Feldenkrais integration process with
the young girl with severe cerebral palsy. The Feldenkrai.s Method
overall is the third possibility for changing the reflexive pattern for
all action in gravity. All three methods are indirect and do not involve
conscious attention to the fault itself. Similar processes are involved
in other disciplines such as Ideo-Kinetic facilitation developed by
Mabel Todd and Lulu Sweigard, Body Mind Centering developed by
Exploring Ref exive Balancing
Bonnie Bainbridge Cohen, The Bobath Method in Physical Thera-

py involving neuro-developmental facilitation, and the movement
work of Irmgard Bartenieff based on Rudolph Laban's ideas about
human movement. All these processes involve some form of increas-
ing body awareness in moving and are therefore accessing the same
fundamental biological processes.
In our process for accessing balance the variations in mak-
ing the circles allow for larger and larger circles. Adjustments in the
ribs and spine organization follow. The main factor, however, is in
the improvement in orientation. One can speak of alignment, but
the main shift is in better sensing the support generated by the skgl-
etal organization supporting the body for moving. Muscles along
the trunk and legs that were involved in support become free for ac-
tion. The muscular pattern for support changes through the discov-
ery of a different sense of orientation. Thus the easy synergy is evoked
when the skeleton again can function as the supporting structure
without muscular holding and effort, and without consciously directed
attention.
Finding Two Ways of Attending

Attention is another dynamic that is generally not under-
stood. Commonly we think of attention as a mental process and des-
ignate only one possibility to this function. When we are directed
to pay attention, we narrow the attention to focus on a small part of
the field of conscious possibilities. Useful as it is to focus on a task
such as reading or threading a needle, a more open attention can have
manybenefits. How is this accomplished? The use of the eyes is a key.
Attention involves a considerable muscular component that is direct-
ed through the eye muscles but actually involves the rest of the body
and the breathing. Therefore changing attention patterns involves
letting go of the narrow attention by allowing the softening of the
eye muscles. The breathingwill change as well as the general tonus of
the rest ofvourself.
236
Movement Exploration 4:
Softening the Eyes
In order to do these processes you can read through each

process and then go through the steps. Alternatively
someone could read through each part of the process
slowly, givingyou time for the steps.
Lie on the backwith the knees standing. Close the eyes and
cover the eyes with the palms of your hands, the outside
edge of the palms resting against each side of your nose.
The hands keep out light. In your visual field you may see
black or you may see colored areas. As your eyes relax you
can find an area of black or alternatively dark blue. Keep
letting go of tension in the eyes, the face, the mouth, and
the jaw. Let your breathing be light and easy. Continue
allowing the dark areas to expand until you have the entire
visual field either black or dark blue. Take whatever time
is needed. Feel the eyeballs sink further into your head.
Imagine you are looking into softvelvet.
Now slowly move the right eye to the right corner and back
to the middle. (Keep the eyes closed and covered.) Move
the riglrt eye to the left corner and back to the middle. Make
a circle with the right eye going down first, then in an arc
to the right corner, up and in an arc to the left corner and
down and around. Reverse direction. Rest with the eyes
covered and find again the dark field of vision. Imagine you
are looking into soft velvet. Slowly sit up rolling to the side
andveryslowlyopenyour eyes. Notice the difference in
the right side of your face and the left. Look around your-
self slowlyand notice anydifference in seeing.
In this part of the process you can sit in a chair. Close the
eyes. Find an image that you can imagine, a face, or an
image of a full moon. Keep the image in your mind's eye
in front of yourself. You need not see avivid image. The
image is there so that you do not move the eyes relative to
the outside space while you do the following movements:
Turn your head very slowly to the right and back to the
middle with the eyes quiet and watching the image in front
of you. Then turn the head left and back to the right slowly
with the eyes always forward toward the image. Make sure
your breathing remains easy. As your head moves the eyes
are still. Relative to your head the eyes move inside. Notice
the sensation. Bring the movement to a close. Keep the
eyes closed. Begin to repeat the same process now lifting
your chin and loweringyourchin slowly.
Slowly open your eyes and as before notice how the eyes
feel. Look about, feel and sense the quality of seeing. Find
out if your field of vision is wider than before. This experi-
ence is open attention. Notice if the softness spreads to the
rest of yourself. Walk about and keep exploringwhatever
is newforyou.
As you continue to walk go backto your more normal

narrow mode of focusing. Feel the difference. Then switch
backto open attention. You should note nowthat it is
possible to choose how you attend. The difference is in the
eye muscles and movement. Narrowfocus and attention
and open attention are available in all sensory domains.
Notice that when you listen attentively and in focus,
the eyes tighten as well as the muscles in your neck. The
breathing also is affected. The same is true in the other
senses.
In this last exploration, we can realize howwe often do not

recognize that what we call our mental states are embodied literally in
the organization of the musculature as well as in the internal physiol-
ogy related to the autonomic nervous system. Here we have direct ev-
idence of mind - body unity. But furthermore the experience of soft-
ening the eyes has also the effect of softening the tension in the rest
of yourself. In an interesting experiment with a number of groups of
my students, who had experienced open attention, I arranged half the
class to lie on the back. The other students were then instructed to
touch the foot of a person lying down. These students were instructed
238
to touch with the idea of focusing with their hands on the feeling of the
bones of the foot and examining the structure with a focus on the task.
At a given point these students were then instructed to shift to open
attention. Both those lying and those touching were asked to notice
any change in experience. Reports after included both persons expe-
riencing a change in breathing. The touched person also experienced
change in the foot, which persisted when the person stood up. In stand-
ing they experienced more contact with the floor on this foot and an
increased ease of standing on that side.
These different possibilities of narrow (focused) attention
and open attention are often not recognized. In studies of attention
only narrow attention is acknowledged and the results of the studies
are limited to this one possibility. The understanding of attention is
thus incomplete. As an example cognitive scientists are fond of dem-
onstrating 'inattention bliirdness' to naive audiences who have not
previously explored their own attention processes. In these demon-
strations an audience is asked to watch a film in which they are given
a task, for example to watch a game in which a ball is thrown back
and forth and count the number of passes of the ball. While the film
proceeds, someone in a gorilla suit walks across. Later the audience
is surprised to find out about the gorilla because the majority didn't
see it. The audience is then apprized of the limited nature of their
consciousness. The demonstration, however, is only valid for nar-
row attention, which is induced by the task. In one demonstration a
woman who was not English-speaking did not follow the task instruc-
tions. She, of course, saw the gorilla. In open attention, what is in the
environment reaches awareness more easily. We can understand now
how inattention blindness is a characteristic of narrow focus and not
a characteristic ofattention in general.
Open attention has its uses. To cite one example, in open
attention, pattern stands out rather then detail. In teaching Felden-
krais practitioners to observe clearly, observing pattern perception is
essential. Normally students are often practiced only in focusing to
search for pattern. They become confused when they try to analyze
through attending in a narrow attention mode and often say they can-
not detect anythingwhen observing another person. After practice in
open attention, the students begin to appreciate their abilityto detect
pattern both in seeing and touching another person. Important de-
MOV]NG YOURSELF AS AN ENTRY INTO
tail appears spontaneously out ofthe open attention state in contrast

to the sifting of details looking for what is important. One can imag-
ine that people who are particularly skillful such as great athletes
who think and act with extraordinary speed have already mastered
the art of open attention without necessarily having been taught. One
can also imagine howthe art of Japanese swordsmanship and archery
relate to the kind of meditation practice in Zen and other forms of
Buddhism.
1 TFIE NECESSITY CF
II f'l
'\-/ DYNAMTCS
Complexity in Nature
The science of classical physics began with problems that
only required simple linear mathematics for analysis and prediction.
Humans could produce a precise science of simple systems including
such problems as flnding the pathways of two billiard balls after colli-
sion with each other, or producing equations to describe the motions
of the earth around the sun. If the moon were also included, the math
became more difficult. In the nineteenth centurywith the discoveryof
atoms and molecules, kinetic problems could be approached as a col-
lective of many bodies randomly moving as in the example of a gas in a
container. In this situation a statistical analysis can describe how the
properties of the gas as a whole interrelate with relatively easy math-
ematical formulations. It was the in-between situation of many bod-
ies that were interactive that seemed to be beyond the reach of known
mathematical techniques. By the end of the nineteenth century sys-
tems involving three bodies in movement and interaction seemed
beyond a precise mathematical description. The method of dynamics
evolved to begin to handle these more complex situations. The French
scientist, philosopher and mathematician, Henri Poincare, began to
develop a mathematical way to approximate complexity. He is now
known as the founder of chaos theory. In the l96os Edward Lorenz
developed chaos theory further in trying to develop a mathematical
description of unpredictable weather systems. He developed three
240
non-linear equations to describe such systems, which while simple

enough on first examination, behaved in ways no mathematician had
ever seen before. The solutions described an unpredictable random
behavior. The apocryphal story is that the movement of abutterfly in
one place could make a disturbance that later would produce a storm
somewhere else. Linear mathematical equations describe idealized
situations where causes and effects relate simply. Lorenz's equations
tried to describe real situations in nature, which can involve flow,
splitting, unusual patterns, etc. The first applications beyondweather
patteins included collections such as stars in a galaxy, fluid changes of
state, or sudden events such as heart arrhythmia. It began to be appar-
ent that all aspects of living systems could seemingly be approached
by related mathematics. Up to the mid-twentieth century scientists
looking for a way of describing phenomena in biology, psychology,
sociology, medicine and related sciences designed experiments to fit
normal cause and effect relations. When it didn't work, they resorted
to working with populations using statistical analysis and described
results with probabilities. Ultimately this turns out to be unsatisSr-
ing. Dynamics today in various forms is increasingly recognized as a
pathway for more accurate descriptions of natural processes. While
the activity of the smallest units such as cells and their components
have yielded some of their secrets through direct experimentation to
uncover mechanisms of activity, further exploration has revealed the
need for a dynamic understanding.
The possibility of a science of dynamic interactions and
coordination has been an underlying theme of everything discussed
so far in this book. It is particularly relevant to the explorations in the
previous chapter. The pioneers of this way of thinking about biol-
ogy and living beings did not use the term'dynamics' at first. In the
l94os the term cybernetics roughly identified a group of thinkers who
were impressed with the self-regulatory aspects of biological systems.
Gregory Bateson, Heinz von Foerster, Humberto Maturana, Warren
McCulloch, W.T. Powers, Gordon Pask, among others sawthat the na-
ture of feedback in a system changed the waywe had to think about the
processes of living beings. In Part I we explored some of this thinking.
The field of cybernetics transformed (bifurcated) into different path-
ways in the following years. The engineers moved toward the possi-
bility of creating artificial intelligence. Another group developed the
Part III, Chapter 16 24L
THE NECESSITY OF DYNAMICS
Complexity in Nature
concept of neural networks and parallel distributed processing. A

new science of complexity began to evolve. The biologist Aharon
Katchalsky in the early l97os pioneered along the lines of the following:
The possib ility of waves, oscillations, me.crosfofes

emerging out of cooperative processes, sudden transi-
tions, prepatterning, etc. seems made to order to
ossisf in the understanding of integrative processes...
particularly in advancing questions of htgher order
functions that remain unexplained in terms of contem-
porary neurophy siology.
AHARON KATCHALSKY (KATSIR) AS QUOTED IN KELSO
AND ENGSTRoM (2006)
Katchalskywas tragically killed in a terrorist raid at the Tel

Aviv airportinlg72. As Kelso (1995,p. 258) puts it, "That agenda died
when its champion and inspiration ... was slain ..." Katchalsky was a
friend of Moshe Feldenkrais and the imprint of dynamics underlies
the way Feldenkrais developed his processes. Dynamics continued
underground in the synergetics of Herman Haken and in the thinking
of a number of other biologists (see Kelso and Engstrom, 2OO6 for an
overview).
In the past few years, investigations at the very basic level
of the neuron and the synapse have uncovered a whole vast field
of dynamic processes governing the behavior of neurons (Smythes,
2OO2). Previously the brain has been described in terms of fixed nerve
nets and the nerve itself as a transmitter of nerve signals. Nerve cells
do not transmit signals directly as electrical wires do, say in a com-
puter. What happens at the end of the nerve axon where there is a gap
(or synapse, in technical terms), the nerve impulse produces a release
of a chemical transmitter that connects to the dendrites (connecting
to the center of other nerve cells). Usually this involves a very Iarge
numbers of dendrites, which allegedly relay the signal to other nerve
cells. Nerve cells were thought of as a kind of 'biological soup'within,
in which organelles floated and chemical reactions took place. This
simple view is seemingly more and more an oversimplification.
John Smythes (2OO2, p.2) suggests the following: "Recent
research, however, has shown that this classic picture is widely in-
242
accurate." He goes on to state, "The interior of neurons is not a soup,

but is highly structured, in part by a variety of scaffolding proteins,
so that interacting enzymes and their substrates are held in highly
specific micro-anatomical relation to each other." And, "The whole
system is controlled by a vastly complex 'signaling' system." At the
level of the synapse researchers are beginning to observe that syn-
apses are "bio-chemically unique" and are formed in relation to sur-
rounding cells, relations of the larger organism to the environment,
the prior history of activity and the prior development. At the cellular
level dynamic processes are also operative, which have been found
to be critical to the integration of the structure and function of the
ongoing living cell and its processes, and relation of cells to other cells.
If the linear view of the synapse, which relates how the signal from
one neuron is transmitted to another neuron or to a muscle fiber, is
not accurate as a description, then the very basis of neurology needs
revision.
Past history does not fixate synaptic structure but ongoing
interaction at the level of the organism evokes plasticity and change
in this structure. Dendritic branching also forms in relation to the
activity of an organism in an environment. Smythes (p.5) cites much
research over a number of years, which shows that animals raised in
a complex environment in which they are very active exhibit an "in-
crease in dendrites and synapses in the cerebellum and cortex." The
activity here involves much learning through experience in motor
activities, running mazes, and acrobatics. What happens therefore
at lower levels affects the higher levels. The dynamic view requires a
change in our understanding of causal connections. Integration is
occurring at many levels as a consequence of self-generative activity
of an animal in an environment. Surely we can say at this point that
the environment is not a causative agent in all of this. Nor is the indi-
vidual neuron, except perhaps in the very simplest nervous systems.
What is now much more clear is that a nervous system evolves its
abilities through a vast network of interacting elements. These ele-
ments are the individual neurons. But if the individual neurons are
not determinate, what is? The place of action is within the network.
To understand this we need coordination dvnamics.
Coordination Dynamics
From what we have developed so far we can speculate that
the phenomenon of integration is everywhere in nature and especial-
ly in living things. Anything alive must have integrity, coherence, and
relationship within itself and with the external environment. Devel-
opment and learning are essential for the basic life functions of self-
maintenance and self-preservation. And movement is essential for
each of these functions and that of reproduction. Living things begin
with the cell, which forms with a boundary, a cell wall that divides the
inside processes from the outside, and that controls the flow of nutri-
ents in and the elimination of wastes. At the different levels integrat-
ed structures exist from the most basic to the most complex. What are
these different levels? We list the following:
- Molecules
- Organelles
- Cells
- Organisms
- Societies
- Environments
-World
Integrative processes are involved in creating structures, functions,
and the autonomy of organisms. They have been identified in a num-
ber of our explorations although some of these terms overlap:
- Self-organization
- Growth
- Learning
- Movements
- Actions
- Functions
- Interaction and coupling (synergies)
One key concept involving all of these processes is learning.
Where does learning happen? We can now identify a number of dif-
ferent levels. Surelychanges at the synapse are essential but there are
also changes in the dynamics of propagation of impulses. At a higher
Ievel we can notice the changes in the coordination of excitation and
inhibition neurons. It is now understood that movement depends
not just on excitation of neurons in connection to muscle fibers, but
also is completely dependent on neurons that inhibit impulses. Thus
the organization of a movement even a very simple one requires the
244
coordination of excitation and inhibition. Higher up in the forma-

tion of a movement within the neural network attractors (patterns)
must form which involve this coordination. At still higher levels co-
ordination is formed between body parts (synergies), and movement
becomes action in the world involving intention. Dynamics is involved
at each level.
Notice that we can take any part of the process and try to
create a linear explanation of what happens. And much of the scien-
tific approach in the twentieth century did just that. AII the extensive
research on conditioned learning focused on trying to change one
variable in a highly restricted and controlled (by the researcher) envi-
ronment. The findings in this work still stand. The irregularities in
using individual animals were hidden by the use of statistical analysis
to try to establish lawful relationships. The linearity on the other hand
was forced. The attempts to find the laws of learning only involved the
specific controlled situation and thus the behavior of the animals was
force fit into the established concepts of determinism. Animals learn
in nature in a coupling with the surroundings. Thus the many levels
involved and their interaction were never acknowledged. In Part I, we
quoted Heinz von Foerstert question about the nature of complexity.
"Take, for instance, a colony of about a hundred million flatworms
ofthe genus, planaria. Each ofthese creatures has about one hundred
nerve cells. Thus, all together they have about ten billion nerve cells.
The human brain has ten billion nerve cells. Why don't these hundred
million planariae represent the intelligence of a human brain?"
It is both an amusing and profound question. Numbers don't
count, only the possibility of coordinated connections and activity.
Nowwe can appreciate that science has to growpast the limitations of
assumed conceptualization. Coordination dynamics as suggested by
Kelso and Engstrom is a very beginning approach to complexity, but
one that can potentially create a research agenda to account for the
integrative and disintegrative processes of living systems.
Here are some characteristics of dynamic systems.
- They can be linear - non-linear
- They can shift from convergence to divergence and reverse
- Attractors and repellers can be created
- Stability- meta-stability- instability are all possible
- They can be multi-functional
These characteristics allow for considerably more flexibili-

ty than our usual cause-elTect models of processes. Note that dynamic
systems can be used to describe both integrative as well as disintegra-
tive processes. Importantly biological systems can be modeled much
more accurately with both processes and a way to predict the direc-
tion. Note too that while linear predictability is less useful in a broad
sense, dynamic systems show enough regularity to allow for a science
of coordination. Thus:
Coordination Dynamics, the science of coordination, is

a set of context-dependent laws or rules that describe,
explain, and predict how patterns of coordi.nation form,
adapt, persist, and change in natural systems.
KELso & ENGsrRoM,:006
Coordination dynamics can look at many levels of interaction:

- In the cell - relations between molecular components -'autopoiesis'
- In the organism - functional coupling:
- Within part of a systern
- Between different parts of the same system
- Between different types of things
- In the social and natural environment
Which can then result in the formation of:
- Synergies
- Attractor states
- Coherence
- Functionality
- Usefulness
- Intentionality
- Agency
Again some of these categories overlap. Rather than causa-

tion from the bottom up as if the elements such as neurons controlled
what happens at the higher level or that the higher Ievel determines
all that happens belowwe can have a reciprocal causalitywith coordi-
nation dynamics. In other words, upward and downward causation is
operative.
246
Figure t: The Reciprocctl Cctusality of

Coordinotion Dynamics
Higher level eoordination

pattern
- aaa
aao
a :
Upward Causation :
Downward Causation
Elements are involved in : Parameters Higher level controls lower
"alf-nrnen izinn level elements throuqh
processes through interaction - signaling etc.
Oa u
-c- '
rl d.
Individual coordinating elements

"*if;."1'o:.i,15::91"1",.",|'"i:,ii$:i:"'o
Source: adapted from Kelso & Engstrom,2006, and Noble, 2006.
J.A. Scott Kelso and David Engstrom have shown in their

book, The Complementary Nature,thalwe are often facedwith dichot-
omies and oppositions. Some examples are: good-evil, wave-par-
ticle, mind-body, materialism-idealism, collective -individual, bot-
tom up-top down, holism-reductionism. What they demonstrate
is that each opposition relates to the other through the nature of
living beings and the way we identify with qne side or the other. As
indicated with our diagram showing upward and downward causa-
tion, coordination dynamics reveals the connection between the
two sides and gives us a concrete way to see beyond the opposition.
They also point out that we are only at the beginning of investigating
dynamics in nature. There is much to learn in the future. The Dynam-
ic approach, however, is not a panacea for the many difficulties in the
biologically related sciences. It is a way of more accurately describing
the different levels within and without living systems, and developing
a mathematical framework for such descriptions. It leads to humble-
ness in our attempts to explain complexity in life. It probably cannot

explain how the biology ofthe brain creates the experience of color,
sound, touch, taste, and all the other attributes of a conscious life. But
it can give us clues as to how we can direct our lives as demonstrated
in this book in discovering pathways to development, Iearning and
self-healing.
Feldenkrais' Cybernetic Loop Model

of Movement, Learning and Environment
Figure z: Feldenkrals' Cybernetic Loop Model
Skeleton
rd
l.t
it i Central Nervous
...i ..r.
':".:,-:)i7" system r.,..
We can sum up the usefulness of what we have suggested

with a model that Feldenkrais presented a number of times. It is best
put into a simple diagram:
In his talk to his scientific colleagues presented in 1981 at
CERN in Geneva, Feldenkrais asked a number of provocative ques-
tions. These questions bring into focus how relationships to the world
we live in are essential to life and living. In some ways they are obvi-
ous. But there remain many mysteries. Here is a selection from his
talk with some further questions that are related:
- Suppose there were no light. Could you imagine that there would
be eyes in any animal?
248
- Ca+ you imagine if there were no gravitation, whywould God or

anyone make (or evolve) a skeleton? Who would need a skeleton if
there were no gravitation?
- Without gravitation, howwould you learn to walk?
- Without gravitywho would need avestibular system to detect
orientation. and movement?
- How is it that you do not see objects as a camera does, but see
objects as you know them to be in size and shape as an invariant in
your experience? Where did you learn to do such a thing?
- Could you skate before walking, or learn Japanese given that you
were born in Geneva and never lived with a Japanese person as a
child? In other words how could you learn to speak without an envi-
ronment of speaking persons?
- How could you learn without making mistakes?
- How could you learn anythingwithout an environment?
- How do you learn time?
The most important learning in life has to do with devel-
opment, and becoming a person. Such Iearning involves a sequence
of steps. And you learn to do the things you know in many different
ways. This learning contrasts with academic learning, which is not
necessary to life. We learn through our senses. Developmental learn-
ing connects with skill and ability. If you ask how a violinist learns to
play such an instrument, you realize that you connect the brain to
what you do in practicing. ft means you have to act and feed back to
yourself the consequences. Thus you need at minimum the skeleton,
muscles, the nervous system and the environment in which you act
including the instrument. In fig. 2 we see an overview of the connec-
tions. Note that the skeleton carries out the action formed in the con-
nection of the musculature. The action is within and on the environ-
ment, which feeds back to the musculature the sense of gravity and
support. This then feeds back to the nervous system. The nervous sys-
tem also detects what the environment contains and directs the mus-
culature. Thus each side of the diagram connects to the neighboring
side in both possible directions and the whole system makes a loop of
processes. With such a system learning becomes possible as long as
the elements themselves are plastic enough to change in relation to
the feedback loop. We have here a large view of coupling.
249
1A THE INTERSECTION
|I // cFSCIENCE
AND EXPERIENCE
For my money, understanding the self-organizing ability
of the brain is the most interesting challenge to science.
GEORGY BUZSAKI
Recently a young woman who was born with a neuropathy

that left her without feeling in her lower legs and feet received a les-
son from me about standing, walking and balancing. She also was in
a Feldenkrais Training and having arrived at the training barely ca-
pable of walking, was now quite functional while still having to gird
herself to maintain balance. In my lesson I rolled the bottom of her
feet over a Styrofoam roller and later put each foot the long way on
the roller and asked her to lift her pelvis on each side. She was lying
on her back. After I worked with one side, I asked her to experience
herself standing. Her first reaction was that she had sensations in her
foot that were entirely new to her and she felt a steadiness on that side
that felt quite novel to her. She expressed her sensation as "feeling the
bones ofher foot". I began the lesson by creating a different environ-
ment through the use of the roller. Rolling the foot on the roller (an
action with the environment) and the other steps involved changed
the sensory experience. The musculature responded with a different
expression through the musculature based on how the nervous sys-
tem responded. Together we intervened in the loop and shifted the
relation to the environment. At the end of the lesson she walked with
a security she never experienced before. The experience led to tears
and a powerful relief after a lifetime of struggle.
Afterwards we had a discussion about the lesson. A person
who was trained in the medical field asked how it was possible for
this young woman to feel anything in her foot given that she suffered
the neuropathy. From the person's point of view the whole thing was
suspect and maybe the woman just imagined some sensation. From
the person's training and understanding the diagnosis of neuropathy
meant that such feeling was impossible. I had observed in touching
and moving the young woman's head in gravity while she was sitting
that from a very shaky balance before the lesson her reactions to shifts
in gravity became smooth. For me this was observed evidence that
250
a profound shift in her system occurred. I could only consider her

report as truthful to her experience at the moment.
For the young woman the lesson was a triumph because her
physicians had often told her she could never improve her condition.
As far as she could find out from experts, the diagnosis ofneuropathy
meant that her feeling sense was impaired for the rest of her life. The
diagnosis had no meaning beyond that, as no one could explain fur-
ther or suggest how to help.
The question is, where is the difficulty? Do we need to ex-
pand our understanding of what is valid? Are the standards of classi-
cal scientific investigation and the accompanying model of epistemol-
ogy adequate to the task of dealing with the high level of complexity
exhibited by living organisms? How can we incorporate experiential
material in ways that can be appreciated as valid? All these questions
are pertinent to the investigations in this book. In principle the find-
ings of science should relate to the findings from experiential pro-
cesses even though experience involves a different domain of inquiry.
We are dealing of course with different levels. What relates
to nerve impulses and neuropathy can only be investigated through
measurements relating to the functioning of nerve cells. We cannot
directly experience this or even higher levels of the functioning of
our neryous system. Yet this functioning has consequences in what
we experience. The experience itself occurs at a much higher level
of integration. In the young woman's case something happened as a
result of an evoked sensory experience. I moved her foot over the roll-
er and whatever sensory signals she felt must have evoked an expand-
ed sensoryawareness and aperception, which she described as feeling
the bones ofher foot. Standing her foot on the roller and asking her
to lift evoked further integration. It was the how of the intervention
that made the process viable for her. The integrated sensations and
new feelings became a simplicity that then allowed her to stand with
a feeling of stability. Underlying was a series of dynamic interactions
at lower levels that involved considerable complexity and processes
that we do not yet understand but have labeled as self-organization.
If dynamic interaction is operative at every level (and be-
tween levels) in living systems, there is no level that has operational
simplicity. Simplicity becomes possible with integration processes
and the resulting entities can be perceived and later labeled. On the
Part III, Chapter 17 25t
THE INTERSECTION OF SCIENCE AND EXPERIENCE
one hand we can learn to move creating qmergies that bring our in-
tent into fruition. Learning to balance is like that, as the young wom-
an did. Synergies are like that. The integrated capacities become what
we deal with in daily life. I grab the banana and eat it or I pick up the
stick to throw to the dog, who picks it up and runs to me. As such func-
tioning becomes integrated and immediately evoked, we accept it as
something unimportant and relegate it to the fringe where we call it
unconscious. On the other hand once we have labels and language we
can create explanations, and imagine mechanisms. In this kind of ac-
tivity we often approximate and cut corners to conceptualize about
ourselves and where we live. We make linear what is essentially non-
linear. The illusions we create become a consensus. Part of our diffi-
culty is that the integration processes are not directly controlled. They
are not visible as such and difficult to investigate with current experi-
mental methods. Thus the underlying assumptions and conceptual
structure and our cognitive systems in the end are not reliable guides
to what we are doing. Cognition rules nevertheless, often to the det-
riment of our potential humanness and our capacities for awareness
and natural intelligence. We think we know and don't know and don't
know how we know. We proclaim the effectiveness of logical opera-
tions and implicitly rely on simple cause - effect thinking. Complexi-
ty then looks like magic. The structural and formal paradoxes that are
characteristic of living systems at all levels from the physical identity
of the living cell to abstract logical thought are then not noticed and
not acknowledged. Scientific experimentation usually requires nar-
rowing the questions down to the fewest number of variables and
trying to control a single variable with the intent of isolating a man-
ageable set of relationships. Despite the ingenious ability of many
scientists to design sophisticated processes to try to prove specific
theories and speculations, experiments cannot ultimately settle dif-
ficult questions. Frequently the narrow view leaves out consideration
of manyunseen aspects of the question involved. Thus many theories
and speculations eventually are abandoned as either new data or new
perspectives arise. The question is, do we need a different structure
for thinking about ourworld and ourselves? The use of the cybernetic
loop provides a different model for thinking through the problem.
One recent shift in cognitive science is worth noting. Re-
searchers involved in artificial intelligence and robotics have dis-
252
covered that purely cognitive investigations have not succeeded in

furthering progress in these fields. To imitate living systems in their
flexibility, adaptability, and learning ability researchers are beginning -
to go back to observing real living animate creatures. Thus the ques-
tion of embodiment arises.s While much of the simulation work in-
volves modeling a learning process computationally using the ideas
of connectionism and neural networks, there is movement toward
coordination dynamics. This involves consideration of context, envi-
ronment and the need for internal and external coupling. However, it
is still trying to engineer what living systems can do so elegantly. The
humbleness of Francisco Varela is refreshing.
The View from Monte Grande

It(sci.ence) is one thing we happen to do as human
beings. It is a form of knowledge ...
How does this magicprocess aetually eome about?

How do spiders walk with eight legs and do not get
trampled? How do we get to shake hands and not miss
each other? This for me is utter magic.
When.l see red is there anything out there that is coming

through my eyes? There is no relationship between light
and color. I prefer not to call it a paradox. .[t is o dance
and between this clash of what we dipped into and
the way we dre internally coherent, this world comes up.
There fs one wave that is the activity of the eyes and
another wclve, whtch is the internal part of the brain,
and there is tAis elash. Out of this elashcomes the very
stable reality we call color.
The brai.n is o sysfem so consfructed os to create a stable

reality. It is not a devi.ce to pick up information...
We cannot be forced to be subjeet to constantly check
what is the real case.
8
See anumber of papers in Mareschal et al., 2OO7, Neuro-constructivism, Yol. 2,
on neuro-robotic simulations and Torrence et al., 2007, "Machine Consciousness:
Embodiment and Imagination."
The View from Monte Grande
This world is our room dnd our dance together and

whatever we do changes what the world is lifte ...
Bee and flower dre together in such a wdy that if we
take one awdy both of them disappear.
You can't get it to eome together if you think all

the pieces are independent of each other.
QUOTES BY FRANCISCO VARELA IN THE FILM, MONTE GRANDE
(FRANZ RETCHLE, 2oo5)
What is a Brain for Anynray?

Varela's depiction of the brain in the above quote should
give us pause. In the Oxford Companion to the Mind, edited by Richard
Gregory, 1982 two biologists R.M.Gaze and J.S.H.Taylor (p.295)
comment on the function of the brain and nervous system as follows:
"'When we consider neural function we flnd ourselves beset with far
greater difficulties than in the study of neural structure. This is
because, except for its most obvious roles, we do not know what the
function of the nervous system actually is." They further note that the
description of the neural function "as'information processing' mere-
ly hides our ignorance behind a term which is presently popular with-
out explaining anything." Alain Berthoz (2OOO, p.4) states boldly,
"The brain is above all a biological machine for moving quickly while
anticipating." J.J.Gibson (1966, p.27I) writes about the function of
the nervous system in perception, "The exploratory perceptual sys-
tems typically produce transformations so that invariants can be iso-
lated. And the action of the neryous system is conceived as a resonat-
ingtothe stimulus information, not astoringof images oraconnecting
up of nerve cells." These are not mainstream views. Nor do they agree
with each other. Nevertheless they suggest the need for a dynamic
view of the nervous system in living beings.
Varela's notion connecting brain and stability, however, is
jarring. Living beings require coherence and stability for survival
above all. All functions tend toward disruption when stability can-
not be achieved. Moshe Feldenkrais challenged in the following way
asking what is the major function of the nervous system and brain.
Popular views invoked by his pupils included moving the body, think-
254
ing, imagining, creating emotion, etc. To all of these he was dismis-

sive. "The primary function of the nervous system is the ordering of
chaos." But he also added, "The nervous system is there in order that
we should not knowthatwe have one."
If dynamic interaction is operative at every level, then to
think we can understand ourselves and living processes in general
without consideration of coordination, coupling, coherence, and other
properties resulting from dynamic interaction in the interlocking
systems involved is a mirage. A science of coordination and system
dynamics has only been possible since the early 197Os. Scientists
who have adopted this stance have only touched the surface. There is
much more to learn and investigate.
Francisco Varela, Humberto Maturana, and Heinz von
Foerster as consultant collaborated on developing a beginning dy-
namic view of the process of a living system in 1970. When Varela tried
to present their then radical notion that they named autopofesis to his
scientific colleagues in the United States, "the reception was cold and
distant." (Varela, I996b, p. a13) Today it is still a struggling point of
departure, yet concepts such as enaction, autonomy, embodiment, sit-
uatedness, operational closure are invoked often enough in scientific
papers to suggest a growing acceptance of this new view. Beyond this
we can take the evidence of self-exploration into account and use the
insights gained to change what we do on a practical level. Here we can
investigate the realm of experience through opening our awareness,
and discover how these sorts of findings relate to knowledge discov-
ered through established methods. Scientific approaches are not to be
discarded. The knowledge gained can be expanded. As self-observers
we can add another dimension. However we have to become trained
and accurate observers.
Some Clashes Between Science and Common

Belief and the Usefulness of Experience
Theories can contradict each other, but findings cdnnot.
E.T. GENDLIN
How do we observe ourselves as moving human beings? In

truth we have to say there is much confusion about the matter. Cul-
turally the inherited view is that we have conscious control over our
movement, actions and behavior. We also have the idea that improve-
ment requires training our will power over ourselves and the inability
to do so suggests weakness. Our legal system is based on the notion
of personal responsibility. Part of this common view was overturned
in the twentieth century as the Western religious view receded and
the ideas of Freud and the notion of social molding of the person be-
came prominent. Psychologists and neuroscientists have narrowed
this view further by investigating the notion of free will in relation to
the conscious direction of movement. Benjamin Libet (extensive dis-
cussions) carried out a series of important experiments to investigate
the question.e What he found within the confines of his investigations
was quite clear. The mind itself or consciousness itself does not and
cannot produce movement and action. Libet established this claim
with experiments in establishing the timing of an action in relation
to the timing of the appearance within consciousness of the intent to
carry out the action. He asked how these factors related to the neu-
rological onset of the preparation to move. In these experiments the
subject was instructed to choose arbitrarily to move a hand. The sub-
ject determined the time that corresponded to the conscious aware-
ness of the intention with a clock on a screen. EMG recordings from
the subject's arm muscles were used to indicate a readiness potential
to prepare the action. The readiness potential was also corroborated
through EEG recordings from the subject's skull. Libet found thereby
that the readiness potential preceded the consciousness ofthe intent
to move by about 350 milliseconds.
Libet and many others have used this as indicating a para-
dox in which the brain precedes the conscious intent to act contrary
to our subjective sense that we have initiated the action through our
thought. Jeannerod (2006, p. 64) concludes, "... we realize that con-
scious free choice and conscious will are consequences, not causes,
e
See Mind Time, Libet (2OO4) and Motor Cognitio4 Jeannerod (2006) for extensive
discussions.
256
of the brain activity that itself causes the action to appear or the
choices to be made."
There are three technical issues with regard to this conclu-
sion. The first is that the intent was already established in the experi-
ment in that the subject was asked to move the hand at some arbitrary
point in time. The second is that any act occurs in a context and with-
in the cybernetic loop we have previously described. Thus moving a
hand requires having already feedback from the environment and a
sense of the skeleton in relation to the intent to move. Libet's experi-
ments seem to assume that a so-called spontaneous act is context-free
and simply a feed-forward process in which muscular action is gen-
erated. The assumption behind the idea of a voluntary act seems to
be that it can be generated without a context just from a thought. We
seem to misunderstand what voluntary action means on both sides of
the question. The third is the question of time within the frame of the
conscious moment. As Libet and others have established neurologi-
cally the conscious moment of experience is not a point at all. It takes
3OO to 5OO milliseconds of activity in the nervous system before a
conscious experience appears. Nevertheless, within the experiential
space of the 3OO - 5OO milliseconds there is seemingly no experience
of time. While many neuroscientists suggest that the brain backdates
the onset ofthe intention to correspond the onset ofreadiness, in the
phenomenal space of experience the entire phenomenal moment is
a unified whole. We have two separate frames for time in this case. It
wouldn't make sense in clock time for the thought event to precede
the neural event as the neural event has to be there for the thought
event to be experienced. On the other hand in the phenomenal space
the two events appear together on the grounds that otherwise the
nervous system would have instant points of consciousness. There is
now evidence to show that in consciousing coherence reigns despite
the timing of events in the transmissions within the nervous system.
It makes sense. If coherence isn't created. there is no stabilitv for the
acting person. I cite two examples:
- The distance at which nerve signals travel is relatively slow Thus
signals from the foot require a much longer time to reach the higher
nervous system than signals from the eyes. Nevertheless, if you move
your toes rhythmically and watch the toes your visual sense of the
movement matches that of the feeling of the movement. Or better yet
Some Clashes Between Science and Common Belief ...
you can easily learn to move your finger to the same beat. (Berthoz,
2OOO, p.90)
- A second point is that different sensory channels have different tim-

ing for the process of entering consciousness. Libet's observations
of the timing of when an event becomes conscious can involve up-
wards of 4OO - 5OO milliseconds. Natalie Angier (2009) in her report
on recent research on hearing and vision, quotes Boston University
researcher Barbara Shinn-Cunningham, "The temporal resolution of
our vision is an order magnitude slower than what our auditory sys-
tem can cope with." Hearing a series of clicks is detected as separate
entities at twenty clicks per second. If you run a series of film frames
at this same rate we see a movie and not separate frames.
In the case of the coherence of intentionality and autonomy,
what would be the effect if Libet's measurements would be what is ex-
perienced in relation to the connection of intent and action? Surely
the person would experience confusion. Would our sense of autono-
my disintegrate? As shown many years ago by Fairbanks (see Smith
and Smith, 1966, pp. 367 -372), delaying feedback (in this case speech
delayed electronically) disturbs function even at very small time
scales. At IOO milliseconds speech is considerably interfered with and
maximum disturbance is at 2oo milliseconds. This is a disturbance of
coherence smaller than Libet's measured separation. It seems that
the interpretation and the whole question of timingwithin conscious
experience needs to be revisited. The question of coherence within
the frame of consciousness as well as the frame of action is clearly still
an unexplored topic. Here dialoging and coordinating between expe-
riential and objective findings could be fruitful. It will probably take a
long time to finally sort these questions out.
At this point I wish to draw on distinguishing what is con-
scious, unconscious, and what we can intentionally bring into aware-
ness. Jeannerod (2006), who has spent a lifetime studying movement,
is impressed as to how many things we do in life we do automatically,
without awareness. His assumption is that most of our actions are
unconscious and depend on motor commands that are complex but
basically programmed through non-conscious motor imagery. As
with many scientists his views here are based in the empirical labo-
ratory work that he has done and reported in the scientific journals.
258
And he is correct in part that for the average person much of life's nor-
mal processes go bywithout notice or attention.
Let us look in more detail. Through experience we know
that conscious focused attention interferes with action. For example
good skiers will report that when they are at peak performance they
experience themselves as not actively skiing, but as if theywere being
skied. To get to that level of skill they need a good deal of skill learn-
ing. How is that accomplished? Surely it would be a misconception
to attribute the learning to imitation. The person developing such a
skill must actually ski and attend to what corrections are necessary to
improve. Here conscious awareness of the act is essential. You could
ask yourself, what am I doing? Where is my weight centered? How
do I turn, keep my balance, etc.? Instruction can help. But as Nich-
olai Bernstein (1996, pp. 180- 181) observed many years ago practice
is not just repetition. It is a question of feedback, observing one's self
in the action and correcting each time. What grows in this process is a
sensory awareness that becomes fast and accurate, faster in fact than
what normal conscious attention can do; Each variation in the ground,
the surroundings must be reacted to without slow cortical thought.
But is this equivalent to unconscious? Only if you define conscious by
focused attention and verbal thinking. As Glenn Gould put it in rela-
tion to how fast his fingers could fly over the keyboard of the piano,
"Imagine if the centipede had to think of each leg as he moved." Yet
Gould had to know exactly what he was doing to produce the effect
he intended for his audience.ro
Voluntary action and movement then requires learning and
the integration of what is voluntary to what involves very fast feed-
back loops and anticipations at a subliminal level of awareness. The
reflexive activities of the nervous system are always present in mov-
ing and must integrate with the intention of action. While the reflex-
ive activities have been investigated thoroughly, they have also been
split off as a separate topic for science and treated purely as a mecha-
nism. Yet they are an essential part of the dynamic. We live and act
in gravity and must include this essential element in everything we
do. The reflexive activities also have to be faster than cortical thought.
Survival depends on it. In this sense all activities require reflexive ad-
justments that cannot work with attention and all voluntary actions
to
See Payzant,L992,p.89, and the story ofthe centipede and the toad, Bernstein,1996,
pp.2O2-2O3.
have a non-conscious part in the organization of the actions. What

then is needed on the part of conscious awareness?
The answer we need is not at the level of the mechanisms of
the nervous system and brain. Here coordination dynamics finds its
place. If each act involves a dynamic organization, then the action has
a description not as a fixed pattern or a program, but as an envelope
of dynamic possibilities integrating all the levels involved to create
a coherent pattern of mobilization and action. What are the control
factors? They cannot be commands in the ordinary sense of this word.
And they cannot be specific and certainly not direct conscious con-
trols of muscle action, and do not code for a developing structure. In
coordination dynamics they are called control parameters. Kelso and
Engstrom (2006, p. 1f8) state, "... control parameters refer to natural-
ly occurring environmental variations and - or specific types of func-
tional information that move a system through its patterned modes
of coordination and cause them to adapt and change."
In order to learn then the coordination parameters must be
discernable, sensory, accessible to conscious awareness, and there-
fore available to be experienced. Moshe Feldenkrais without labeling
them as such defined three major parameters for movement and action:
t. Manipulation: The trajectories and movements of trunk, head and
Iimbs to effect an action or movement. (Kinesthetic awareness and
proprioception)
2. Orientation: The relation of parts of the self to each other in grav-
ity and space that allows for action to continue with balance and ease.
(Proprioception)
3. Timing: The real-time sequence of an act to produce a coherent act
and make an action continuous. (Internal sequence and timing)
Each of these is crucial for efficient and coherent action.

These are consciously aware parameters I believe for children in-
volved in developmental learning.
Findings can be established through our acts as observers
and as experimenters. Nevertheless. As new findings appear, many
previous assumptions fall out of favor. We have to see the scientific
endeavor as an ongoing process in which opinion and thought change
slowly as context and society move towards new metaphors and pro-
cedures in conjunction with new findings. Can we use self-observa-
26o
tion combined with scientific findings to untangle misconceptions?

Two misconceptions about consciousness and our ability to move
ourselves persist. The first is the idea that we have direct conscious
control and direction of our actions contrary to the discussion above
about the centipede. The other is thatwe act most of the time without
consciousness. Let us take these two contending suppositions as can-
didates for examination. The first contention is deeply embedded in
Western culture and society from earlier times and exists in our laws
and religions where we hold human beings as responsible for what
they do. The second contention came about as neuroscientists tried
to test the validityof the first contention. The most crucial issue is the
timing of nervous system events related to intention, conscious expe-
rience. In the now famous experiments of Libet (2004) that we have
already referred to, it was established that the formation of the inten-
tion to act preceded the conscious experience of the intention by up
to 5OO milliseconds. This is the time necessary for a stimulus to enter
the space of consciousness, and the event as measured by clock time
differs from timing of the phenomenal awareness and the phenome-
nal awareness seems to be backdated, that is the awareness appears in
synchrony with the intention to act. In the most crucial experiments
the subject was asked to choose a moment to move a finger. Thus the
subject experienced making a voluntary movement and reported the
moment when the intent arose as an experience. The actual brain ac-
tivity indicating the formation of an intent was also recorded and as
stated the brain event preceded the report. It would appear then that
there was no choice as such. But this analysis is valid only if we stick
to the micro timing investigated by Libet. Actions are both planned
ahead and initiated through prior choices in previous frames of pres-
ent moments. There is no need to consciously control the automa-
tisms. There is a need to have them well organized and the awareness
attuned to the environment. One needs to be consciousing but on the
action and intent, not the details of moving. The parameters of action
when the movement and body awareness is developed give freedom
to change the action within the context of what one is doing. Having
multiple patterns creates choice. Choices and action nevertheless
depend on context, and prior conditions and learning.
One example may be instructive. The act of standing up
from a chair is a common dailv action that can be carried out without
Part III, Chapter r7 zGL
awareness and only the conscious intent to get up. It is reflexive and
mostly automatic. Often the habitual act is carried out with unneces-
sary effort and for older people it becomes difficult requiring pushing
with the arms. As long as the habit pattern involves unaware parts of
the action, a person has no choice but continuing with the habitual
organization of the act. There is no free choice.
F.M. Alexander explored this action so that he could dis-
cover an alternative to the habitual. In his investigation he discov-
ered that the same pulling the head downward that interfered with
his voice also interfered with the reflexive activity of standing up. In
fact any extra contraction of the neck muscles to pull the head back or
bring it downward and forward produced an inelegant and inefficient
movement that required excessive effort. Inhibiting parasitic move-
ments and contractions of the neck and head resulted in an alignment
that allowed a more efficient and pleasant movement. Here the ori-
entation parameter is operative in that the relation of head to trunk
and pelvis and pelvis to the feet brings the weight fully to the floor
through the skeleton and evokes the reflexive contraction ofthe front
of the thighs that brings one's self to standing. It feels effortless. As
Iong as the orientation is clear you can do the action in many ways.
When the orientation is not clear the same muscles that operate so
smoothly in standing up over-contract and increase dramatically the
effort involved. The neck contracts reflexively in response to the im-
balance and effort. The net effect of bringing awareness to the action
brings the ability to carry out the act with freedom from unnecessary
automatisms and freedom to act in different directions. Free choice is
restored and with minimum awareness the new organization is used
without the need of direct conscious control. The answer to the free
will question depends on shedding compulsive and unaware patterns
of mobilization.
The larger question of free will cannot be answered here.
But some neuroscientists have gone over the edge to declare that free
will has been proven impossible and that human beings act according
to forces that make them not responsible for their actions. This is at
best a half-truth. As just described, many human actions are compul-
sive, habitual, emotionally driven and impulsive. Yet the possibility
of choice makes freedom possible in the time frame of conscious
moments. Above all positive affect creates the ability to choose in a
262
constructive and humanly connected way. We have a biological ability

to connect to our fellow human and non-human beings.
The Example of Mirror Neurons

The discovery of a biological ability to connect and empa-
thize was made at the 'objective'level by Giacomo Rizzolatti, Vittorio
Gallese and their co-workers at the University of Parma in Italy. This
multi-faceted discovery of mirror neurons began with the discovery
of particular neurons in the pre-motor cortex of the brain that were
active when the monkeys they were investigating carried out a par-
ticular action such as eating a fruit. The whole action seemed to be
involved and not just the movement involved. A later discovery came
about by accident when a monkeywho was still connected to the data
collection device watched as another monkey, who was set up for an-
other experiment, was eating by bringing food to his mouth. The same
neurons in the pre-motor cortex that activated in the action sequence
now activated through the one monkey seeing the other. These neu-
rons were subsequently described as "mirror neurons" in that the
seeing monkey mirrored the action known by the seen monkey. I put
scare quotes around the mirror designation because I think the meta-
phor disguises something biologically important and creates a me-
chanical understanding that does not fit accurately the phenomenon.
Nevertheless the discovery is not only important, but has relevance
to a number of biological and human issues.
The first important characteristic of the mirror neuron is
that in terms of action the neuron fires only when three aspects of
movement come together. These are the intention or goal, the sense
of agency (i.e., the action is generated by the animal or person and ex-
perienced as such), and the pattern of mobilization (how the action
is carried out). This correlates with an important finding in Func-
tional Integration where functions are simulated through the contact
of practitioner and client and in guiding and evoking movement. For
example, in a recorded session in which a young woman came with
a twisted foot and leg as a result of birth injury, Feldenkrais (1975)
simulated standing by contacting the twisted foot with a flat board.
Slowly he touched first the outer toes and waited for a response, he
then continued until the foot made spontaneous normal contact, lis-
The Example of Mirior Neurons
tening with his hands as the reflexive responding to the light pressure
increased. (This responding is a reflexive response as the contact in-
creases that involves the muscles that would be involved in standing
up.) When the responding was clear and the foot related to the board
as if standing Feldenkrais began to press more to indicate a connec-
tion through the young woman's skeletal structure that would con-
nect foot to head as it would if she were actually standing on the foot.
The beauty ofthe process is that the effort and pressure is reduced to
a mere fraction of the pressure of actually standing. In this situation
the pattern can change and it did. Her head and neck responded by
shifting in relation to the leg he was pressing. He then asked her to
respond consciously back by moving her leg and pelvis to increase the
pressure while the new organization was maintained.
. The consequence was that when she stood after on the
affected foot, she spontaneously straightened the foot, leg and hip, and
brought her head over the affected side. She could now walk more
normally. Feldenkrais described function as "the connection be-
tween intention and action." But the young woman's system reorga-
nized as the function was simulated. We can speculate that the ner-
vous system recognized the intact complete function. In fact I have
found in working with people with neurological injury resulting in
paralysis that movements which have functional relations lead much
more quickly to recovery than abstract movements that are isolated.
Thus with a woman with a stroke (reported in Ginsburg,1992 and,
L999, pp.88 - 89) in asking her to take my hand with her affected hand
and move me evoked a much more coherent action than asking her
to move her free hand. This seems to corroborate Rizzolati's original
discovery that the complete action is recognized in terms of intention,
agency, and pattern of mobilization. (I am using the term pattern of
mobilization in preference to motor command, motor plan, motor
program, and motor schema in part because these concepts seem to in-
dicate the action is centrally generated instead ofbeing generated by
dynamic interaction with what is happening in environment.)
This leads to a second point about the mirror neuron dis-
covery. While very specific neurons are activated and it seems as if a
mechanism is being discovered, behind the scenes we can speculate
that a dynamic attractor group of neurons are involved. It is the pre-
dilection ofthe researchers here to investigate single neuron activity.
264
In Fogassi and Gallese (2OO2, pp.28-29) there is strong indication

that the area F5 neurons that were investigated involve what they call
action representations, which are "attributed more to the whole cir-
cuit rather than to the individual areas forming it.'And that the mir-
ror system biologically formed "... to achieve a better control of the
dynamic relation between an open system - the living organism - and
the environment." But mirror neurons are only a part of the picture.
Michael Graziano and his co-workers at Princeton Univer-
sity have made a parallel discovery about the motor cortex. For an
overview see Graziano (2006) "The Organization of Behavioral Rep-
ertoire in the Motor Cortex". The motor cortexwas thought for many
years to be an areawhere the muscles were mapped out in relation to
the body parts. In Penfield's original studies with patients undergoing
surgery he had touched a point in the cortex and stimulated it briefly.
He would then observe which body part, for example a finger, would
move. KarI Pribram in his talks with Feldenkrais in 1975 (Pribram,
Feldenkrai s 2OO7, and Pribram, l97I) suggested that the motor cortex
represented the images of achievement and that the motor cortex
could be conceived "as a sensory cortex for action" (Pribram 1971,
p.2+8). He also suggested (p.250) that the image of aclievement is
"composed of learned anticipations of the force and changes in force
required to perform a task. These fields of force become the parame-
ters of the servo mechanisms and are directly (via the thalamus) and
indirectly (via the basal ganglia and cerebellum) relayed to the motor
cortex, where they are correlated with a fast time cerebellar compu-
tation to predict the next steps in the action." This complex feedback
description is clearly describing what we would now call a dynamic of
action. For Pribram the image of achievement is then a guide for the
action. The motor cortex is not a simple keyboard for action. Much of
this is now accepted in the current neuroscience of movement.
(Berthoz, 2OOO, Jeannerod, 2oo6,Rizzolati and Sinigaglia, 2OO8)
In Graziano's (Graziano, Taylor and Moore, 2OO2) work the
original discovery was made when particular points in the motor
cortex of monkeys were electrically stimulated over a more extended
period (5OO milliseconds). The longer stimulation produced a com-
plex movement related to an action. For example at one site the mon-
key is described like so (p.842), "...the left hand closed into a grip
posture, turned to the face, moved toward the mouth, and the mouth
The Example of Mirror Neurons
opened." In his review article Graziano (2006) creates a very dynam-

ic overview of a motor cortex organized topographically around what
he calls "ethological categories." That is, functions in the world, imag-
es of achievement, intentional activities are evoked, not single move-
ments. But single neurons seem to be tuned to what he calls "end pos-
tures" that is the goal of the action. Graziano also proposes that the
"cortical map of muscles is continuously remapped by feedback." The
connectivity in the nervous system is "... not fixed but fluid, changing
constantly on the basis of feedback from the periphery." What is de-
scribed here is a very plastic, dynamic system, which allows for rel-
evancy in the environment. The intentional relationship of organism
and environment that we described in Part I is an invariant through-
out biological history. Only the complexity increases.
One feature of Gallese's work is that he demonstrated clear-
ly that it was not the movement of the action that evoked the mirror
neuron response, but the fact that a con-specific or similar animal
was carrying out the action. Thus there was very little response if the
monkeywatched a mechanical arm make the same active movement.
This fits with discoveries that even very young infants respond to
humans much more strongly than robots. But infants also respond
to the smell of the mother's milk, to the touch of the mother or other
human, to affect expression, etc. The mirror system as described in
these experiments only involves the visual sense coupling somehow
with the feeling underlying kinesthetic action. Certainly there is evi-
dence that there are chemical (through smell or taste) communications
that also involve entrainment between livingbeings (Brennan,2OO4).
It would seem then that biologically many animals and humans inter-
connect on a number of levels as a feature of their interrelationships
including social and family relating. Humans also relate to animals.
The mirror system therefore cannot be the mechanism of everything
attributed to it. On the contrary it must relate to a wider biological
capacity of many animals, which brings relationship and connected-
ness. One last note: there is good evidence that the mirror system is
not built in at birth but requires developmental learning. Research-
ers compared dancers from two different systems of training, bal-
let and capoeira. Each observed dancers performing either ballet or
capoeira. When they watched performances of their own discipline,
mirror neurons were active, but not when they watched performers
266
of the unfamiliar discipline they did not show activation of the mirror
system.rr
With particularly startling discoveries, people jump on a
bandwagon using the new results to explain what was previously ex-
plained otherwise. The reaction of many sociologists, linguists, and
other scientists is a paradigm example of this. Some of this work may
very well bear this out. Perhaps the best outcome of this interest is
that the topic of inter-subjectivity has become respectable.
Inter-subjeetive Connections:
The Art of Dancing Together
Inter-subjectivity is a condition of humcnness.
DANIEL STERN
Inter-subjectivity is a touchy subject. Again we run up

against assumptions. In this case the educated assumption is that
each person's subjective experience is isolated within the person's
consciousness. The essence of this view is that no person can truly
understand another person's experience. Mothers and babies, P€o-
ple in love, people experiencing the spread of excitement in a social
group, musician and audience in a concert, people at a political ral-
ly might very well testiff otherwise. Stern elucidates further (Stern,
2OO4, p.97): "I will suggest that it (inter-subjectivity) is also an in-
nate, primary system of motivation, essential for species survival, and
has a status like sex or attachment." He further suggests (p.98) that
"It promotes group formation, it enhances group functioning, and
assures group cohesion by giving rise to morality." Stern's particular
interest is in the psychotherapeutic process. Therapy truly works for
a client when there is some form of empathic connecting or mutual
agreement where insights are recognized. Connection depends upon
the presence of the therapist. Eugene T. Gendlin writes (1990, p. 205),
"The essence of working with another person is to be present as a
living being. And that is lucky because if we have to be smart, good,
mature, or wise, then we would be in trouble ... What matters is to
be a human being with another human being, to recognize the other
person as a being in there."
rr
Spivey, 2oo7,p.24O gives references to this research.
THE INTERSECTiON OF SCIENCE AND EXPERIENCE
Inter-subjective Connections: ...
Feldenkrais (1981, pp. 3-4) writes of the connection of two

persons in the Functional Integration process: "Through touch, two
persons, the toucher and the touched, can become a new ensemble:
two bodies when connected by two arms and hands are a new entity.
These hands sense at the same time as they direct. Both the touched
and the toucher feel what they sense through the connecting hands,
even if they do not understand and do not know what is being done."
Learning is the essential outcome.
Coordination dynamics allows us to look at the interac-
tions involved in learning and particularly in work with ourselves and
others, engaged in integrating and self-revealing processes. Coupling
is essential in all developmental learning. Coupling implies a dynam-
ic interaction between organism and environment, organism and
others leading to new patterns. Inter-subjectivity according to Stern
(2004) thus occurs in shared present moments between two or more
people12. In the work of Moshe Feldenkrais a key is dancing together.
In the work of Daniel Stern the notion of attunement is key to shifts
in perception, action and insight. Coordination of movement and
quality, affect attunement, mutual recognition of shifts, are some of
the dynamic parameters involved.
Learning Re-visited
What we have established to this point necessitates a shift
in understanding learning. Let me begin with a personal story. In the
summer of L974I attended a workshop, in which we were offered ear-
ly morning sessions where we could experience Feldenkrais Aware-
ness Through Movemenf lessons. In one session we were to explore
lying on the stomach with the right arm Iying on the floor overhead.
We were instructed to lift the arm from the floor. At that time in my
life I had had little experience of moving myself beyond what was ha-
bitual, and I often sufferedbouts of backpain. This simple movement
was obviouslybeyond myhabitual because I could not figure out, nor
could I imagine how, to get my arm away from the floor. This was not
a problem for the others in the workshop. I on the other hand had no
t2
Present Moments are elucidated in Stern, 2OO4 in some detail. His use of the term
refers to short spans ofcoherent activitywithin the flow ofconscious experience,
which take a few seconds of clock time. This is somewhat longer than the minimal
time span for a consciousness to appear as a'spacious present'.
268
pattern to rely on. I tried pushing the floor with the left hand. While
the right arm lifted a bit it required an effort that seemed far beyond
what should be necessary. I changed over the hands. The left arm was
equally lame. While I could have spent a lot of time continuing to
effort, we were encouraged to let the process go if we could not find a
wayto move easily. And so I did.
The following morning upon awakening I had the impulse
to go to the floor and try the movement we had explored the day be-
fore. I lay on the floor with one arm extended on the floor overhead. I
then lifted the arm entirely without effort. At that point I could not
understand why the movement was not possible on the previous day.
Needless to say whatever learning was needed was accomplished
while I slept and it required no further trials.
In a second remarkable experience I explored a lesson
called "The Carriage of the HeadAffects the State of the Musculature"
from Feldenkrais' book, Awareness Through Movement (L972). The
lesson involves lying on the stomach and lifting the feet with the head
lying on one side. You then tilt the pelvis first with the feet touching
and sliding one foot on the lower leg of the other as you tilt. In a later
variation you place the two feet and legs together and tilt the whole
ensemble of legs and pelvis toward the floor on one side while keep-
ing the feet and Iegs together. In the first part of the lesson you always
tilt to the right while changing later head and leg positions. The in-
structions in the book then have you explore the different movements
through mental recall. When you are clear about what you have done,
you are then asked to imagine all the movements with your pelvis
tilting to the left, which you did not do before. As I did this process
slowly imagining the same movements to the other side, I felt a dis-
tinct sensation along my spine traveling upward toward my head in
synchronywith the imagined twisting. The tight small muscles along
the spine'released segment by segment and I ended up tilting fur-
ther to the left than I had to the right. The Iearning to the left hap-
pened within the immediate time of the imagining process. Felden-
krais comments (p. 129,1982 Penguin edition of Awareness Through
Movement), "Slowly you will become aware of a strange sensation,
unclear to most people: a clearer picture of your self image. Here the
new image concerns mainly the muscles and skeletal structure. It is
much more complete and accurate than that to which you were accus-
Learning Re-visited
tomed and you wonder why you did not learn this condition sooner."
I recommend that readers find a copy of the bookrs and try the various
Iessons.
The point here is simple. If complex learning such as I have
described can be accomplished without repeated practice, Iearning
curves, trial and error, imitation, or any of other ideas we have about
learning, then we must reconsider the concepts we have created to
explain how we learn best. Surely almost all the experimentation of
over one-hundred years has only explored the more primitive learn-
ing possibilities such as conditioning, connectionism, learning by as-
sociation, etc. Irene Pepperberg (2001) a comparative psychologist
at Brandeis and Harvard Universities who has reported on her work
with Grey parrots over a number of years, has noted that, "a parrot,
like a young child, does not rely exclusively on conditioned responses
or simple associative learning, but has a repertoire of desires and pur-
poses that cause it to form and test ideas about the world and how it
can deal and function in the world..." One of Dr. Pepperberg's parrots,
Alex, could tell an experimenter when shown a paper triangle "... what
color the paper was, what shape it was and - after touching it - what
it was made of ."ra Alex was trained through observing a model/rival
similar to how parrots learn from each other in aviaries coupled with
the bird observing the purpose of the learning and the interactive na-
ture in using the words. In these conditions which are only sketch-
ily stated here the bird learned rapidly and within a day both words
and some cognitive understanding. Prior attempts to train parrots to
speak through associative conditioned learning "failed to teach any
level of communicative competence." (Pepperberg, 2OOI)
Pepperberg notes that animals have to learn quickly in the
wild and would not survive if learning involved trial and error. She
further notes that, "Children's language acquisition is so fast that
after 3O years ofstudy, researchers are still perplexed by the process."
B.F.Skinner the noted behavioral psychologist was clearly wrong
about language learning but so apparently is professor Chomskyt
counter-proposal about the innateness of syntax in the human ner-
vous system. Certainly there is evidence that there are innate aspects
rs
Available from Feldenkrais Educational Foundation. wwwfeldenkrais.com
ra
Report in the New York Times by Benedict Carey on the death of Alex Sept. Ilr,2OO7:
"BrainyParrot Dies, Emotive to the End." Details of these studies are available in
I. Pepperberg, The Alex Studreg Harvard Univ. Press, 1999.
270
relating to the organization necessary for development. On the other

hand can specific structures such as syntax appear as a new form out
of the blue in evolution? There is increasing evidence that genes do
not work that way and are specific only to the formation of proteins
and act in relation to each other for complex processes. The other
complexities seem to involve the interaction and signaling between
genes having to do with the timing of growth and the interaction with
the environment. Again understanding the dynamics seems a neces-
sary next step.
An After Word
We began the Introduction to Part I (Chapter r.) with the
two stories and the questions they bring up, that of Vernon who lost
his sight early in life and recovered seeing after surgery as an adult,
and Ian Waterman who lost his proprioception and ability to move
himself. Both stories are profound in revealing some things about
our selves that are obscured by the ease and lack of memory of our
general development. Vernon had his vision restored but could not
see, i.e., he was unable to perceive as normally sighted persons can
visually perceive. In Oliver Sacks' account, Vernon seemed to lose his
equilibrium when he couldn't perceive and only recovered after los-
ing his vision again. Seeingwas too confusing for him. His adaptation
to blindness was more comfortable for negotiating his daily life. The
story brings to awareness that having sight and being able to see is
not the same. The perceiving process makes seeing possible. And in-
deed this process was not seriously investigated through most of the
twentieth century except by a few neuroscientists and psychologists.
It is still not fully understood. On the other hand Ian Waterman, who
Iost that part of his body perception we call proprioception, did not
remain in depression and collapse. But lacking help from medicine
and therapeutics at first, he eventually discovered on his own how he
could recover a capacity to move himself. He was not willing to simply
remain in his paralyzed condition. With substituting another sense
(vision) for the missing kinesthetic sense, and other remaining senses
such as feeling of pain, possibly pressure, temperature, he was able
to create another way to recover a modicum of autonomy. He learned
again to move as normally as possible. Do we now know how this was
Part III, Chapter rz 27L
An After Word
possible? It is clear that Ian made a major discovery about human

capacity without knowing that he had done so. He also did so in con-
tradiction to the prognostications of his physicians. Yet it is striking
that his primary physician did not recognize or acknowledge his dis-
covery and achievement. Perhaps the cognitive dissonance between
what the physician held in his knowledge and what he saw when Ian
first walked into his office after his recoverv of movement was too
great for acknowledgement.
Which brings us to the following observation: The belief in
the efficacy of our cognitive and conceptual formulations about our-
selves and our capacities is limiting further discovery and the further
development of what it is to be human. It is also distorting the social
milieu and our lives within it. This is not said in opposition to research
and medicine, but to the dominance of objectivist strategies of inves-
tigation along with a refusal to look into other possibilities. Gendlin
(2OO7) says, "Science does not include its context. One result of this
is that when it has a satisfactory analysis, it finds no reason to pur-
sue the existence of anything it has not found." Gendlin promotes a
'new empiricism' involving what he calls a'responsive order'. Rather
than assuming one can isolate each factor, one assumes interaction at
many levels including the researcher. The application of such a pro-
cess is particularly relevant to the themes of this book. IanWaterman
investigates his own possibilities and discovers the crossrelation be-
tween his vision and movement. And what could have been the out-
come for Vernon, the man who had his eyes restored and still couldn't
perceive? If he had the opportunity to explore the movement of his
eyes in relation to bringing the eyes into coordination and ease in
perceiving, would he have recovered the ability to see with percep-
tion? We don't know the answer. Vernon never had the opportunity
to explore new options. He remained disturbed by his confusion in
seeing without being able to create order and a relation to the rest of
himself. In the end he became again blind.
The issue cornes to a head in considering modern scientific
medicine with its hidden model of body as a machine that can onlybe
manipulated with chemical agents, surgery etc. While the successes
in saving and extending life are well in the forefront, the underside
not only exists. It is becoming a larger problem. Human beings have
life difficulties that do not necessarily yield to the machine metaphor.
272
At the same time people are entranced by the possibility of miracle

medical cures and often equally search for alternative practices with
the wish for the miracle potion. Without appreciation of the circular-
ity and non-linearity of living s5rstems and their relation to the world,
disasters are produced.rs
What this book has attempted to show is that our biological
life has possibilities beyond what we imagine. The process we have
labeled self-organization, while not yet completely understood, is
working for many animals and humans throughout life. It provides
life forms with multiple intelligences at different levels. It is certainly
involved in all complex learning.And it is brought into action through
movement (activity) in the different environments inhabited by the
life forms and of course human beings. The best example of this ca-
pacity is its involvement in all forms of somatic and developmental
learning. Another way of putting it is that growth and improvement
are potent possibilities.
We have demonstrated some of these possibilities in our
book and supported the empirical evidence with reports of recent
discoveries and shifts in thinking in biology, and neuroscience. Fur-
ther we have supported the rationale of this work through discus-
sions of coordination dynamics, new ideas about brain plasticity, and
the notion of autopoiesis as a fundamental aspect of living systems.
Ultimately we wish to promote the pursuit of self-knowing through
somatic practices as a way of advancing human abilities and the im-
provement of human living. This was at one time the underlying pur-
pose of philosophy, beginning with Socrates'dictum to know thyself,
and more recentlywith Wittgenstein (1980), who suggested, "The way
to solve the problem you see in life is to live in a way that will make
what is problematic disappear." And to fit into "lifet mould...you
must change the way you live ..." (p. 27) Somatic practices clarify self-
knowing through kinesthetic and kinetic exploration that reveal what
and how you are doing in your life that allows you to make what is
problematic disappear or at least make life more pleasurable for your-
selfand others.
The how of such a project does require a commitment and
a practice to bring a discipline into your explorations. Elsa Gindler
devised exercises in which a simple action, such as moving from the
rs 21, and Chapter 9 "Less is more

See Groopman,2OOT,and Gigerenzer,2OOT,pp. 20 -
in health care."
An After Word
floor to a chair, is investigated through a detailed self-observing of

how you carry out the action until you understand the pathway and
act in knowledge of what you do. Heinrich Jacoby asked his pupils
to draw a picture of what you see until you realize the difference be-
tween drawing the idea of the object with an outline and drawing the
impression of light and dark that depicts how you see the object. He
also asked his pupils to play a tune from memory, getting them to re-
alize that efforting makes the task nearly impossible. He showed that
quality comes from reducing effort and verbal or imagistic thinking
and staying with the phenomenon. F.M. Alexander taught his pupils
to create within themselves a kinesthetic thinking process before act-
ing, which inhibits useless contractions and interferences in acting.
The genius of Moshe Feldenkrais was to discover the condi-
tions that enhance the learning capacity and to devise 'lessons'that
bring awareness to the act to counter useless interference and kin-
esthetic confusion. Perhaps this is the greatest challenge in that his
processes do not directly correct mistakes, but allow the person to
self-discover the errors. What are you doing and how are you doing it
and can you detect this in your own sensing and observing? The prac-
tice can take time and patience. The reward is finding how to act with
awareness of the whole of yourself.
This is the critical message I wish to leave the reader: Tech-
nology can be intriguing and helpful. It can on the other hand back-
fire against the user. Our own system has inbuilt qualities and tools
for development and problem-solving that we often have not tapped.
These aspects of our existence work in unexpected ways and show
the power of allowing rather than pushing the river. This is the gift of
our biology and intelligence. It can yield to us only with openness and
the intent to explore. The best solutions to our life problems may be
those that we self-discover. Here we require the training of our sens-
ing, observing and acting. It takes more than just letting go even if
this step is essential. It is an old empirical discovery in many cultures
that was eclipsed with the rise of modernism and Western science.
The successes of many alternative therapies and processes, without
necessarily recognizing the source, depend upon these aspects ofour
living possibilities.
Lastly we would like to suggest that the experience of so-
matic exploration creates a second discipline for investigation for
274
the biological and human sciences. Many problems in the philosophy

of mind, consciousness studies, the neuroscience of sensation, per-
ception, movement, action, etc. can benefit from a dialog between the
so-called first person experience of somatic investigation and nor-
mal third person scientific investigation in these fields. Varela (1996)
proposed exactly such a dialog in suggesting a research program that
"seeks articulations by mutual constrainfs between the field of phe-
nomena revealed by experience and the correlative field of phenom-
ena established by the cognitive sciences." Hopefully such a project
is truly beginning. There is considerable resistance in the scientific
community and yet a dialog can enrich both sides of the opposition.
Without such a project conceptual distortion will continue into the
future. There is much work to be done.
Feldenkrais teaching in Amherst, Mass. (1981)

Photograph, Copyright OLionel Delevingne
THE INTERSECTION OF SC]ENCE AND EXPERIENCE
An Aiter Word
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277
Appendices
References
278
Appendix I
Notes on Language and Comparisons
In writing this book I have used language and the details are experienced in the context of
concepts somewhat differently than is com- the whole. Thus many details can be absorbed
mon in scientific, philosophical and popular and the pattern of the whole becomes more
writing. Certain terms stem from the usage of complete. The consequences include more
Moshe Feldenkrais, who adopted common coordination through an enhanced self-image.
terms but shifted meanings to express his spe- In open attention the moment of the arising
cial insights. Other common terms used in of a new awareness can catch the attention.
the book are applied with broader meanings
than is usual. This glossary compares and
correlates many terms and concepts from the
Awareness
different disciplines and suggests the rationale Awareness even in the language ofphilosophy
for the special usage adopted. of mind is often not distinguished from con-
sciousness. On phenomenological and practi-
cal grounds Feldenkrais needed to specify
Attention awareness to distinguish the state of knowing
In psychology and cognitive science attention as sensation or perception that leads to differ-
is often thought of in terms of the selection of ences in action. In this he spoke ofawareness
sensory information. Such information to be as consciousness plus knowledge (especially
useful must not overwhelm the mind and thus kinesthetic knowledge and self knowledge).
there is an essentially automatic selecting of There is a relation here to the term awareness
part ofwhat is received through the senses. as used in meditation practice where aware-
This has culminated in the view that consciousness can be described as shining a light on
ness is either focal or non-existent. A person aspects of ongoing experience in meditating.
sees or experiences a small part of what could Feldenkrais did specify at one point, that
be available and therefore we suffer from in- "awareness is that part of thinking mechanism
attention blindness and can be fooled through that listens to the self while I am acting." r
the phenomenon of change blindness. While The parallel here to meditation is that by
this condition is common for the modern per- shining the light ofconsciousness on what you
son it is wrongly assumed in psychology and do automatically and without thinking or
related sciences to be the only possible natural knowing you begin to bring choice to how you
state. Feldenkrais and others have observed act, and what you do. Awareness in this sense
that the field offocal attention also involves a can only be invited and not directed. However
fixation ofthe musculature ofthe eyes and the movements of attention can bring out the
the rest of the body. It is thus possible through possibility of awareness.
opening the space of attention through relax-
ing the eyes, etc. to become sensitive to a much
wider field of awareness. In Feldenkrais les-
Body, Body-Mind
sons kinesthetic attention is directed to many In the living state one perceives or experiences
details in the movement experience and then one's body as distinct from the body as corpus.
to a wider expanse of one's self in moving. (See Often in common language we split body from
Awareness below.) Learners are directed to mindedness in such usage as "I have a body," or,
shift to various aspects of the foreground in "my body." Embodimenthas become a popular
moving and to parts of the body normally not term in the field of consciousness studies to em-
attended to. In returning to the background phasize the situatedness of mindedness in
r
"Moshe Feldenkrais Discusses Awareness and Consciousness with Aharon Katsir
(Katchalsky)" Feldenkrais Journal, 19, 2006, p. 6.
Appendix I 279
conscious experience; thus, body-mind. self-correcting shift in the system (from within
Feldenkrais stated, "My contention is that the the organism). On a more general biological
unity of mind and body is an objective reality, basis the notion of autopoiesis postulates a cir-
that they are not entities related to each other cular causation in which A produces B, and B
in one fashion or another, but an inseparable in turn produces A. Thus a living cell produces
whole while functioning." And, 'A brain without itself within its boundary, which is also self-
motor functions could not think..."2 This is produced. Thompson, 2OO7 quotes Immanuel
echoed by neuroscientist Georgy Buzsaki in Kant as follows:'An organized product of
reacting to the notion ofa brain which could be nature (organism) is one in which everything
conscious through evoked activity as follows: is a purpose and also reciprocally a means."5
'A brain grown rn vitro with sensors attached but This should not be taken to mean that living
without the ability to move those sensors by systems lack basic order.
the brain's output... cannot become conscious,
in the sense that the neuronal responses evoked
by the sensory inputs would not acquire or
Choice
reflect meaning."s In many scientific models of living systems and
ofthe universe at large the basic assumption
based on the classic notion of causality is that
Cause and Effect determinism reigns in nature. In biology genes
Feldenkrais thought the classic notion of Cause are considered as causal agents, in behavioral
and Effect was both inaccurate and limiting psychology the environment acts as a trigger
in thinking about life processes. With his under- and determinant of behavior, in neuroscience
standing of systems and looping feedback con- studies of the timing of neural events in an
trol he suggested that we have to abandon the action seem to show that the neural event pre-
kind of linear feed-forward mechanism that cedes the experience of choice. These notions
moves a system in a direct path from point A to seem to preclude that we can have choice
B, for example from a stimulus input to some in acting in the world and that the life of an
form ofaction output. The direct notion of organism is predetermined by its genetic
causality here is correct for linear mechanical- makeup. From his notion ofstructural deter-
ly linked artifacts such as the digital computer minism Humberto Maturana suggests a more
or machines with positive control. In living dynamic viewpoint in which everything that
systems coordination dynamics holds. This happens in the flow of existence is in "corre-
allows for bifurcations and other non-linear spondence with the structural coherences of
behavior. Some years ago cybernetician the moment."6 Here it is the internal and fluid
W.T. Powers, 1973 proposed that rather than structure of the organism, which is determi-
stimuli being the cause of behavior, our actions nate and not the external environment. Struc-
themselves function through controlling our ture changes with learning and experience.
perceptions. a This involves reciprocal feedback In this light Feldenkrais proposed that ehoice
loops between organism and environment. is possible given that the structure provides
In practice this means rather than correcting a alternative patterns of mobilization. If only
fault in a Iiving organism directly, we evoke a one possibility is available, there is no choosing.
2
M. Feldenkrais, "Mind and Body", Systematics,2 (l),1964.
3
G. Buzsaki, R hy thms of the B rain, Oxford, 2oo 6, p. 371.
aW. T. Powers, Behavior: The Control of Perception,Aldine, 1973.
5
E. Thompso n,Mind in Life, Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press, 2oo7, p.I37.
6
H. Maturana/B. Poerksen , From Being to Doing, Carl-Auer Ve rlag, 2OO4.
28o
Difference,
One is wired in by previous conditioning. The
Differentiation
antidote is the cultivation of awareness and Gregory Bateson (1972) suggested, 'A bit of
alternative patterns. (See Cause and Effect information is definable as a difference which
above.) makes a difference."s Such a difference
"or distinction or news of a difference"e seems
Concept essential to learning. The Gibsons, J.J. and
Normally concepts are considered as given E.J. (in a paper published in 1955) ro took the
by statements in the form of verbal or mathe- term differentiation to be the essential pro-
matical propositions, or as metaphors, which cess of perceptual learning as an active seeking
represent concepts through analogical similar- of information in contrast to the then estab-
ities. There is a tendency to consider concep- Iished notion of learning by association. Per-
tual thinking as fundamentally representa- ceptions were built up of repeated interactions
tional and verbal. In recent years non-verbal with the percept filling in more differentiated
thinking has been recognized in infants, ver- details (developing a percept as an invariant
tebrate animals, and some invertebrates such through iterations ofthe coupling in variations
as cephalopods. In our usage non-verbal con- of interaction). Feldenkrais noted that coordi-
cepts are at a higher, more complex level of or- nated movement required the prior differenti-
ganization than percepts and generally involve ation of body elements and movements. Com-
action in relation to perception. Concepts pare how you can move each finger of the hand
require the prior organization of a perceptual separately and in a coordinated fashion to
wcirld. Symbolic and representational concepts grasp etc., with how you move the toes of the
as in mathematics and verbal thought relate foot. For most people all the toes move toge-
to the experiential level through extended meta- ther as one unit even when you attempt to
phoric relationships. T There are often ques- move a single toe. Children who are born with-
tions about the appropriateness and validity of out arms do indeed learn to use the feet for
conceptualizations. The scientific method grasping and lifting and can often bring a cup
and its variations are attempts at providing evi- to the mouth with the foot or write with a
dence to support validity. Opinion and belief pen held with the toes.
are more fizzy and, often related to social
doctrine and habit. Language is often used to The differentiation is developed through using
establish rapport in various social domains the foot to replace the missing hands and
where evidence is weak or outright tenuous. the desire not to be helpless. Differentiation is
There are thus strong links between language an essential process in learning through the
and affect. Language is Iearned also in the Feldenkrais method.
social domain and its syntax and rules are ex-
ternal to our internal processes. Nevertheless,
symbols and symbolic thought are absorbed
and integrated so that we can create verbal and
written communications.
7
See G. Lakoffand M. Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, Univ. of Chicago Press, 2OO3,
and G. Lakof and R. Nunez , Where Mathematics Comes From, Basic Books, 2OOO.
8 G. Bateson, S tep s to an Ecology of Mind" J ason Aaronson, 197 2, p. 3I5.
e G. Bateson, Mind and Nafure, Dutton, 1979, p. 228.
ro J.J. Gibson and E.J. Gibson, "Perceptual Learning: Differentiation Or
Enrichment?" In E. J. Gibson, ed., An Odyssey in Learning and Development,
MIT.199r.
Appendix I 28L
Function
Feldenkrais used the old term function to relation to the intent of action. Therefore his
indicate the actions that we use in life. It can in- thinking also paralleled the notion of function.
clude everything from breathing to standing ln recent years the discovery of'mirror neu-
to walking to speaking and also specific actions rons'has tended to corroborate that the con-
such as bringing something to the mouth and nection of intention and action is an important
eating. Function here is a concrete biological brain functionalism for action and the ob-
process not connected to the abstract idea of served understanding of seen actions carried
function as proposed by functionalism. Since out by con-specifics. In the budding science
all actions involve complex organization and of co-ordination dynamics functions are estab-
relation to the contingencies of the moment lished through the formation of attractor states,
from gravity to connecting to a moving object which involve coordinated cell assemblies
or person, there is a basic question as to how for carrying out actions. Some movement sci-
a person or animal can connect intentions to entists (Alain Berthozrs, Marc Jeannerodra)
the pattern of action. Feldenkrais thought speak of anticipations as guiding actions. While
of function exactly in terms of this connection, nomenclature and descriptions vary there
the function then in the role of organizing is a coalescing of an underlying conceptual
the action in relation to intention. He further agreement. However, the nature of the learn-
discovered the power of simulating functions ing process, that seems to involve what we
as a means of establishing new patterns. have labeled self-organization, remains myste-
The nervous system seemed to resonate to such rious. Georgy Buzsakirs suggests that this
simulation as directed by a skilled and sensitive ability of the brain is "the most interesting
agent through touch, connection and move- challenge in science."
ment. For many years, especially in the field
of psychology, the notion of intention was con-
sidered as an unnecessary mental concept.
Integration
The action was then considered a chaining of An infant can move but only certain specific
already established reflexive connections. functions such as breathing and sucking are
The net result was to eliminate the need to ex- organized very early after birth. This is essen-
plain or investigate the Iearning of coherent tial for survival. Other movements are either
action. It was either built in or established chaotic or global without the possibility of
through conditioning. Nicholai Bernsteinrr coordination or coherence. As functions develop
was responsible for seeing the fallacy of such more and more capabilities are organized
an approach and established the notion of such as holding the head up and looking. The
synergy, which refers to self-organized pat- function becomes integrated in what we have
terns of mobilization developed through feed- labeled a synergy. In childhood before muscles
back and iteration in interaction with the have strengthened to override a weakness,
environment. Synergy is close to the notion of we often organize functions with a better inte-
function. Karl Pribram12 who was strongly gration than as adults. In adult life many func-
influenced by Bernstein coined the term 'image tions are disturbed as growing also involves
of achievement' to represent synergy in trauma and mis-learning. The points of distur-
rr See particularly N. Bernstein, The Coordination and Regulation of Movements,

Pergamon Press, 1967.
12
K. Pribram,Languages of the Brain, Prentice-Hall,I97I, chap.13.
rs A. Berthoz The Brain's Sense bf Movement, Harvard Univ. Press, 2OOO.
,
ra M. Jeannerod, Motor Cognition,2006.
rs G. Buzsaki, (op. cit.), p. 27o.
282
Kinesthetic Sensing,
bance involve loss of skeletal integrity, exces- Kinesthetic Awareness
sive and corresponding weak muscle activity, It is remarkable the degree to which the sens-
weakened breathing, etc. One can detect the ing of movement is either not detected or ac-
loss ofmore ideal integration through observing knowledged by educated people. Nicholas
simulated functional movement and noticing Humphrey, for example, who wishes to argue
deviations and breaks in a movement change that consciousness resides entirely in sensa-
either visually or through touch. Improvement tions as opposed to perceptions, says, "... it is
can also be appraised as changes accumulate like something to have sensations, but not
in a lesson process. Integration is thus observ- anything much to engage in most other bodily
able at a body level, but it also must reflect activities!" He actually means movement
a better integration at the neurological level. when he says, "But surelywhat it is like to wave
hardly compares with what it is like to feel
pain, or taste salt or sense red." re He is limit-
Intention ing what he means by sensation to the five
Moshe Feldenkrais used intention to desig- classic senses. Today we know that there are
nate the aim (goal) of an act or movement, and sensory receptors, Golgi tendon organs in
in this book we have grounded this sense of the tendons and muscle spindles embedded in
the term in a broad biological understanding of the muscular tissue, which are sensitive to
movement in relation to an organism's needs, changes in relation to movement in the joints
and purposes. Neuroscientist Walter Freeman and muscle tissues. While there is argument
suggests this sense of the term differs from by researchers whether for example spindles
motive or desire, 16 In the philosophic discipline produce actual sensations rather than infor-
of phenomenology consciousness is consid- mation needed to perceive the body moving
ered intentional as it aims toward what is in space, it is clear with attending to yourself
beyond itselfand therefore toward the world and developing awareness that you can sense
and perceived objects. 17 While the two senses effort, tension, orientation, and joint move-
relate to each other they address different ment, etc. when waving your hand. These are
realms of understanding. Thinkers who choose aspects of movement sensation also contri-
a mechanistic third person account of natural buting to proprioception and the feeling
living systems avoid both understandings of of embodiment. While for some people kines-
intention as incoherent. Philosopher Daniel thetic sensations stayentirelyin the fringe
Dennett proposes the term'intentional stance' ofconscious experiencing, they can be evoked
to avoid giving the notion of intention any through movement. In rare instances, one
weight. Recent advances in neuroscience have side of the body may be missing in the kines-
established a neurological basis of intention thetic image even though movement function-
with the discovery of 'mirror neurons', which ing remains intact. Often this phenomenon
are evoked in both the carrying out of a pur- accompanies amblyopia where one eye does
posive action as well as the observation of such not develop a clear connection to the visual
an action by another con-specifis. r8 cortex with corresponding distortions of move-
ment in the effected eye.
16
W. Freeman, How Brains Make Up Their Min4 Columbia Univ. Press, 2OOO, p. 8.
See also Chap. 2for further explication.
u See E. Thompson, Mind in Life, Belknap (Harvard Univ. Press), 2OOT, pp. 22 gS.
-
r8 G. Rizzolati and
C. Sinigaglia, Mrrrors in the Brar4 Oxford, 2OO6.
re N. Humphrey, "How to
Solve the Mind-Body Problem", Jou rnal of Consciousness
Studies 7 (4), 2OOO, p. 14.
Appendix I 283
Mental, Mind
As the concepts mind and mental developed "... mind appears to be an emergent property
historically, they referred to conscious experi- that arises among the interactions of a brain,
ence. Dualism arose as philosophers realized its body, and the surrounding environment -
that the realm of the mental seemed radically which interestingly, often includes other
different than the realm ofphysicality. Physi- brains and bodies."20
cality seemed to have spatiality, concrete prop-
erties such as mass and extension, etc. whereas
Pattern of Mobilization
the mental realm was empty and seemed to
exist in no space. The dichotomy has created Feldenkrais sometimes used the term pattern
myriad problems for philosophers. Attempts of mobilization to describe what he otherwise
to solve the mind-body problem, that is the spoke of as function. Here he was referring
problem ofhow mind can evolve out ofphysi- to the specific pattern of muscular organization
cal reality, involve a number of strategies. that would effect an action. Such patterns can
Spinosa proposed a form in which mind and be evoked even in imagining an action in which
body were of one substance. Berkeley chose an no movement is activated in that very small
idealism that suggested reality was essentially muscular activity can be detected while think-
known through mind. Eliminative materialists ing through the movement. There is a relation
have opted for physicalism as the only reality here to the term body schema. (See Self
with the brain as the responsible agent thus Image below.)
eliminating the concept of mind. Functionalists
stay primarily physicalists but propose that
functional operations that are symbolic and
Perception
representational can be run on any physical Perception is often thought of in terms of
system such as a computer or a brain. Mysteri- specific sensory modalities. Thus it has often
ans insist the problem is unsolvable. All the been studied as visual perception, tactile per-
polarized options have one problem or another ception, etc. We have taken the view adopted
and the discussions have not resolved them. from Alain Berthoz that perception is much
From the point of view of this book it is impor- better considered as multi-modal and that the
tant to note that any concept or view is given objects ofperception are realized from differ-
from the point ofview ofan observer and thus ent or multiple sensory channels.2r Thus the
there is a loop between how something is ex- percept is organized at a higher level than a
perienced and how it is perceived and concep- sensation. We have also emphasized the inter-
tualized. Every thing conceived as reality is active formation of percepts so that we can
produced from the interaction of an organism postulate that the mechanisms of perception
and the world producing an organization and are operative in any interaction and we can
order that supports life and its processes. The identify the percepts of objects, other persons,
loop cannot be eliminated. Thus we can use self, the body and parts of the body, move-
the concept of mind to refer to the processes ments and so forth. Perceptions do not require
that organize a brain and body as well as to the Iabeling and can be shared between us and
experience that is our phenomenal space in other higher animals who do not possess lan-
which we live. The dichotomy thus can poten- guage. When perception involves the recogni-
tially be resolved through studying the coordi- tion of an affordance we can assume a higher
nation dynamics of the interaction. Cognitive level of thought, as the percept is now under-
psychologist Michael Spivey proposes that stood in relation to a given intent. The term
20 M. Spivey, The Continuity of Mind, Oxford, 2oo7, p. 3ol^.

2r A. Berthoz, 2ooo (op. cit.)
284
affordance was introduced by J. J. Gibson to notion and specified through his research how
designate those aspects of things in the envi- an inborn unconditioned reflex could be
ronment, which have use to the perceiver conditioned so that the'reflex'response to
for desirable ends, or need to be avoided. 22 a stimulus could be shifted to an entirely
different stimulus. Out of this he attempted
Thus perception moves to conception. For to create an entire psychology and a theory
humans a percept also becomes a concept of learning. This project was continued with
through labeling and abstracting. Thus we can behaviorism and especially B. F. Skinner's oper-
see an object with a flat surface on which we ant conditioning, which worked through
can place and label it with its functional affor- reward and reinforcement. As Feldenkrais not-
dance as a table. It is now a concept and can ed, the expansion ofthe findings of Pavlov
stand for all objects, which serve the function; and his followers and descendents could not
or by analogy and resemblance we can identify establish such a foundation for psychology,
tablelands, water table, or be at table and have "unless physiological terms are stretched
the tables turned on us, etc. The power of beyond their accepted meaning."zs futU rn",
conceptualizing through language expands the Pavlov's findings (as well as those of Skinner)
possibilities of perception dramatically. were established in artificial laboratory con-
While most cognitive scientists consider that ditions and could not be extended to human
a percept is an internal representation of de- behavior and learning because ofthe incompat-
tected features of the environment. Christine ibility with the greater capacity and com-
Skarda suggests, "Perception is a process plexity of human behavior and thought. With
by which organisms use their embeddedness current observations we are now beginning to
in physical reality as ifthey were independent realize that many animals have learning capac-
of it." 2g This point of departure shifts percepts ities far beyond conditioning. Nothing said
from what is considered an integrative process here diminishes the validity of the findings of
of organizing sensation to splitting the fabric this research program as long as the limit of
of experience into parts. the work is acknowledged. The reflex notion
can also be useful in specifying reflexivity
as essential non-conscious activity that lie un-
Refex, Refexive derneath all action in gravity. That is, action
Sir Charles Sherrington introduced the notion often requires speed where the use of reflexive
of the reflex in 1906 to describe a limited activity is a necessity given the slowness of
activity of the motor neurons, which could be the cortex in responding to the contingencies
analyzed and investigated by purely physio- of balance and responsiveness.
logical means. Sherrington took his researches
very far and at the same time noted, "But the
simple reflex is a convenient, if not a probable,
fiction."2a Ivan Pavlov generalized the reflex
22 J. J. Gibson The
, Senses Considered. as Perceptual Sys/ems, Houghton Mifflin, 1966,
reprinted 1983, Greenwood Press, p. 285.
23 C. Skarda, "The Perceptual Form
of Life", in Reclaiming Cognition, R. Nunez
and W Freeman, eds., Imprint Academic,1999,p.79.
2a
C. Sherrin gton, The Integrated Action of the Nervous System, Yale Univ. Press,
1961,p.7.
25 M. Feldenkrais, Body
and Mature Behavior; Somatic Resources, 2OO5, p. 59.
Appendix I 285
Representation
The use ofthe word representation in cogni- appear in the nervous system they seem to
tive science depends on the popular input/ relate to the modality of sensory experience.
output model ofthe nervous system in connec- There are distinct areas for each sensory
tion with the notion of information processing. modality. However, the phenomenon of syn-
Outer reality impinges on the senses and the aesthesia in which cross modalities are experi-
input information is transferred to the higher enced, such as seeing colorwith specific sounds,
brain centers where it is processed to produce indicate the boundaries are not always fixed.
output as action or as mental content. Thus In current neuroscience how sensory experi-
experience is a representation of outside reality. ence is generated in these specific areas is
The problems with this metaphoric use of unknown. Ifwe designate sensory experience
representation are as follows: We designate and corresponding perception in which inte-
something as a representation when one thing gration produces the specific items of experi-
such as a word, a sign, a picture, etc. is by encing as presentation, then we can use re-
convention used to represent something else. presentation in a proper context. In this view
Complex thought in Ianguage or mathematics representation begins externally in social
or pictorial art is not possible without represen- interaction. Words, sentences, pictures, images,
tations. Thus one thing stands for something symbols, musical notation, maps, numbers,
else and thus is re presented. In the computer mathematical equations, etc. are products of
world representation is also essential in that in societies and specifically taught to each gener-
the interface of man and machine the electrical ation. When representations are learned and
on/offsignals are converted to numbers and internalized they become tools ofinternal cog-
words in the human interface. The meaning is nition and thinking. Thus we talk to ourselves,
only possible in this interface as sense and and think through problems with various rep-
meaning are only possible in a human world. resentations. What is originating in experience
The computer does not represent anything itself often cannot be easily represented and
to itself. It only processes signals and changes thus the conflict between representational
forms. In experiencing, what is there is pre- thought and affective experiencing. Neverthe-
sented as such to humans without our know- less affect and non-representational experi-
ing what is truly there in the world or how ence can be communicated directly through
the senses, which seem to be transmitted as form in time as in music or poetry, and in color
nerve impulses become experience in the mani- and form in the plastic arts as well, in direct
fold modalities of sensing. All the nerve im- human contact in attuning with one another.
pulses, from eyes, tongue, nose, ears, tactile
contact, balance detection, etc. Iook exactly
Self Image
alike as spikes in a train ofexcitation. There is
no distinction at this level between sound or In movement science a distinction is often
light or smell or taste. They seem to be like the made betweenbody image and,body schema.
electrical impulses in the computer. But they A rough distinction is as follows: Body image
are not. For one thing the flow is not one-way, is what you imagine of your embodied being
but the sensory surfaces are involved in a involving perceptions, attitudes and beliefs.
loop ofsignals forwarding and returning. The Maxine Sheets-Johnstone objects to the use of
percepts seem to be related not to individual image here in that the word implies the visual
impulses but synchronous rhythmic activity in sense whereas kinesthesia and proprioception
groups of nerve cells. Where these activities are primarily involved and are clearly non-
286
visual.26 Body Schema is often intended to des- intermediate thinking processes but move as if
ignate motor sensory capacities and "processes thinking from the situation directly into action.
that regulate posture and movement."27 While
the distinction can be traced in the nervous
system there is undoubtedly a dynamic inter- Sensation
Iocking. Feldenkrais used the term self image Sensation is what is evoked through stimu-
to include this interlocking and emphasize lation at the sensory surfaces and is experi-
that acting in the world involves knowing how enced as light, touch, sound, etc. It is distinct
and knowing one's self in action. His use of from perception while being essential to it.
'image'was conventional but he was clear that Feldenkrais directed his pupils to sensory
a child learns to move him/her self in kinetic differences and thus sensory awareness as a
and proprioceptive experiencing. There is key to developmental learning.
good evidence that such learning occurs through
the use of awareness. The experience of aware-
ness is forgotten after the learning happens and
Somatie
creates a misimpression in adults who may The terms somatic and soma were promoted
tend to not attend to how they act. Action then by Thomas Hanna in founding a new maga-
is seen as automatic and often is stereotyped zine-journal of the bodily arts and sciences in
in habitual patterns, which normally need no 1976 entitled Somatics.2s Hanna's point was
further exploration. Thus the idea that body that "Living functions are never random change,
schema is a non-conscious process. However, nor are living structures ever static. In fact
the reintroduction of awareness brings about the more we observe livingbodies, the less they
the possibility of expanding the range of appear to be 'bodies' at all in the substantial
patterns and leads to dexterity and enhanced sense in which we have traditionally conceived
skill in life's activities. One speculation is that of bodies." He went on to say, "Living organ-
learning with awareness requires slowing isms are somas.' that is, they are an integral and
down and attending and specifically evokes orderedprocess of embodied elements which
activity in the cortex ofthe brain. The patterns cannot be separated either from their evolved
evolved are not necessarily located where they past or their adaptive future. A soma is any
form but are flexibly moved in the nervous individual embodiment of a process which
system as dynamic attractor states and cell endures and adapts through time, and remains
assemblies. Thus they can be shifted to fast a soma as long as it lives." And, "A soma
-
acting centers such as the cerebellum. The namely any organism of any species - is an
more patterns available to the person the more embodiment of functions that is constantly
the person can react quickly to the contingen- in the process of depletion and destruction and
cies of acting quickly in the moment. It is replenishment and reconstruction." These
believed then that the cerebellum releases the terms make a clear distinction that eliminates
pattern and the action iS produced with feed- the need for the polarity mind and body. The
back to and from the motor cortex and sensory functions of the living organism that Hanna
centers. One sees this with very skillful per- had listed are timing, standing, facing, maneu-
formers and athletes who act without anv vering, wanting, and intending, which imply
26 M.
Sheets-Johnstone, "What are we naming", in H. De Preester and V. Knockaert
(eds.), Body Image and Body Schema, John Benjamins Pub. Co. (2OOS).
27
S. Gallagher, "Dynamic models of body schematic processes." In De preester
and Knockaert (op. cit.) p.234.
28 T. Hanna,
"The Field of Somatics" , Somatics | (t), tg76.
Appendix I 287
the beginnings ofthe organized functions that protected our evolutionary ancestors in falling
we have attributed to mind but which in Iiving from trees. The vulnerable belly is made
organisms are active even before the forma- smaller through folding and in falling it is the
tion of a nervous system in evolution. Timing bone protected back, which strikes the ground.
is present in organisms through acts ofcoor- There is thus an evolutionary advantage to this
dination, standing involves actively organizing pattern ofresponse. On the other hand ifthis
in gravity, facing that organisms orient them- activity persists, the continued activity inhibits
selves toward intent such as seeking sustenance, the anti-gravity system and the person is
maneuvering involves self movement, wanting dis-coordinated. Learning is blocked. Support
involves appetite, and intending is "the partic- then is essential in recovering the ability to
ular shape of action which functionally mobi- Iearn.
lizes the soma to fulfill its appetite within
the world." While somatics has been used to
designate the fields of mind-bodywork and
the concomitant learning processes involved
it has not been adopted more generally.
Support
Developmental learning and skill learningare
strongly affected by the conditions under
which the Iearning takes place. Under pressure
or tension a person often includes the tension
alongwith the skill. The pattern of mobiliza-
tion is thus also recreating the tension, which
eventually makes trouble for the person.
Even though the tension remains subliminal,
the effect in muscular action can be quite
strong. One sees this phenomenon often with
performers who feel compelled to perform
with exactitude. One of the most severe conse-
quences with especially musicians is focal
dystonia, in which the person loses muscular
control of key parts of the action. Learning
happens best in situations in which the nervous
system is quiet and the person comfortable
and safe. In the FM persons are often physical-
ly supported to reduce unnecessary muscular
tension. With young children learning may be
impossible without safety and physical support
until self- support is available. Here lack of
stability evokes contraction of the flexor mus-
culature. Feldenkrais speculated that the
flexing pattern evoked through fear or danger
288
Appendix II
Neurological Aspects of the Feldenkrais method
change these embodied patterns. Attempts to
r. A List of Some Inter-
improve posture in gravity for example by
ventions Used in the
direct correction usually involves creating as
Feldenkrais Method and
much compensating body tension as was in-
the Effects on CNS'e
volved in the disturbed posture. The nervous
Patterns of Mobilization
system simply does not work that way through
The contingencies oflife effect changes in the direct instruction. Nevertheless pathways
optimal functioning of the neuro-muscular for self-correction are available in a number of
system through disturbances in the patterns learning systems. In this appendix we list some
of mobilization for action and the reflexive specific interventions from the Feldenkrais
activity allowing for balance and movement in Method that can evoke directly changes in the
gravity. The experiential consequences of nervous system related to neuro-muscular
these disturbances can include any and all of organization. The listing is not exhaustive but
the following: Pain, restricted breathing, gives some idea of what is possible. The inter-
feelings of tightness, tiredness, loss of energy, ventions are based on cybernetic and dynamic
loss of affect, irritation and negative emotion, understandings that create the most effective
etc. The consequences for the observed func- connection to the brain itself. The descriptions
tional body involve loss of alignment of body do not specify the skills involved that would
segments, loss of support for the head and require a training process. However, the inter-
neck, clumsiness in moving, collapse of the ventions may be used in designing lessons
chest, distortion ofthe pelvis, shifts of align- for changing patterns such as in Awareness
ment to one side. Attempts to override faulty Through Movementlessons, which involve a
body patterns often produce further inter- sequence of learning steps to be carried out by
ference with breathing and the antigravity the person. The same interventions are also
function and loss of movement ability. The used in -Funclional Integrafion where the prac-
disturbances can be evoked through physical titioner uses variations of the interventions
and psychological trauma and or stress, stress- to create a movement experience with the
ful learning, negative social interaction, feel- person. Both processes are equivalent in terms
ings of guilt, loneliness, abandonment, and of the effect in the n'ervous system. The inter-
so forth. People tend to seek relief in a number ventions are described here primarily in relation
of ways often without success or with unwanted to Functional Integration.
complications through drugs, relaxation,
dissociation, dulling of feeling states, hypnosis, Non-invasive touching contact: Such contact
-
religion, aggression, and denial. More direct creates sense of safety, which allows for lower-
intervention involving either somatic and body ing tonus and increasing sensory awareness
aspects, including manipulation of muscular of part of the body touched. Often changes the
tissue (massage), acupuncture, bodywork, etc., pattern ofbreathing, resulting in a reduced
or mental aspects, which can include medi- effort ofbreathing.
tation, counseling, psychotherapy, etc. are prob- - Supporting limbs or other body parts in a
ably more effective. neutral space: Taking over the active holding
that may be present allows for lowering tonus
What is important to note is that relief gener- and unnecessary neuro-muscular activity.
ally is not facilitated by direct attempts to use - Moving a limb through an optimal pathway
one's will power and conscious direction to through finding a pathway with minimal
2e
CNS - Central Nervous Svstem
Appendix II 289
resistance: Creates a sense of safety in allowing problem with the right leg or hip in which
one person to move the other. Increases movement is inhibited reflects to the left
awareness of the preferred easy pathways and shoulder. Working with the diagonal to clarify
trajectories for limbs and trunk. relationships will improve the functioning
- Supporting a body pattern by lifting or gently of the right leg in walking.
pressing to exaggerate the direction already - Reversing the origin of a movement by hold-
indicated by the pattern: Increased breathing ing the distal part (on the outside) while mov-
can indicate shifts in body tonus. ing the central part: This is useful, for example
when a person has restriction in the shoulder
- Moving parts of the body in one connection
together in relation to observed holding of joint with pain. The shoulder joint is moved
distal and proximal parts: This paradoxically equaltywhether the arm is moved or the more
allows for an increased sense of letting go and central part, the shoulder blade, is moved.
sensory differentiation of parts. Howeverwhile movingthe arm is painful, mov-
ing the shoulder blade while holding the arm
- Bringing parts in closer proximity along the
pathway of a contracting muscle: This step can at the elbow still is not. The central nervous
allow for letting go of unnecessary muscular system understands the movement differently
holding. in such a way that what would be painful mov-
ing the distal part is not painful moving the
- Moving parts and joints in a differentiated
pattern: The greater the differentiation of proximal part. This allows a shift in the pattern
trunk (spine and ribs), major parts of the trunk of mobilization in moving the distal part. Once
(pelvis and shoulder girdle), limbs and con- the movement of the joint is recognized as
nection to the trunk (joints and shoulder blades, not painful in the one movement there is im-
for example), head and neck and relation to provement in the other (distal) movement.
the trunk, etc., the greater the whole body struc- - Simulating function through skeletal-to-
ture can adapt for the needs of movement skeletal connecting between practitioner and
in gravity and the better a natural reflexive person in movement allows for recognition
alignment.. in the CNS of the function: Here the entire
- Simulating skeletal functions through length- function can be evoked through the contact.
ening or gently compressing connections from The recognition apparently establishes a reso-
limbs to trunk and spine: For example moving nance or attunement that reorganizes the neu-
the spine from the foot connecting clearly romuscular patterns involved in the function
through the bones ofthe foot, ankle, knee, pelvis, and thus the pattern of mobilization. It is un-
sacrum, spine, neck and head can evoke a clear whether the recognition of a functional
change in a person's alignment in standing on pattern is inherent from early development,
that leg with shifts in muscular organization but the evidence of such recognition in a child
all along the pathway. who never experienced the function would
through the indicate that this is possibility.
- Finding diagonal relationships a
body structure: Walking for example involves - None of the above described facilitations
reciprocal shifts between one leg and the other. are effective in establishing new functional
The trunk shifts to accommodate to gravity patterns unless certain other steps are involved.
through movement of the spine and shoulders A new pattern of mobilization in specific areas
in relation to the pelvis in a flowing pattern. of the self or moving body needs to be integrat-
The swing of the arm and movement of the ed into the total functional movement patterns.
shoulder relates to the opposite leg. Thus a For example, a person may experience a new
29o
mobility in the use of a hip joint. In standing unless something untoward occurs which
and walking on that leg using the new mobility, brings conscious attention that the anticipation
the person may still not be able to shift the does not match what actually happens.
head and neck over the newly free leg. Ifthe Then you are conscious of stumbling or having
total pattern isn't experienced, the nervous to catch your balance.
system will eventually move back to the faulty
pattern and the person feels a loss ofthe newly The question ofbalance is critical in standing
found mobility. Integration can be facilitated and walking in that unbalance can result in
through connecting through skeletal contact falling or stumbling. The reaction of an antigrav-
and evoking integrated functional patterns. ity mechanism to catch yourself is very fast,
Sometimes integration may involve integrating and in fact faster than thinking and primarily
movements with the eyes, or finding a better reflexive. You know something happened many
functioning of a foot to support one side or the milliseconds after the event. You are then
other. Most significant integration involves either on the ground or stabilizing yourselfafter
attending to the feeling quality of new patterns the disturbance. In the learning process of
while walking or carrying out normal activities. balance, falling happens often. While the securi-
ty and sense of safety is compromised in the
learning process, a child persists in learning
z. The Body in Gravity
until safety in gravity is achieved. Thus falling
One of the essential features of our world in and subsequent pain is tolerated while learn-
relation to development and functioning ing continues. The payoffis in thejoy and
for a living body is gravity. For humans this is satisfaction of accomplishment. The affect sys-
especially critical because we balance our- tem in this way supports the developmental
selves on a very small base. While the basic process.
anti-gravity reflexive activity is not fully
in awareness in daily life, we always act to We can note again that instruction is not a valid
achieve balance at every moment. The antici- pathway to learning complex dynamic actions
pation ofeach act then includes how the act such as balancing. Direct correction will create
unfolds in gravity. If you stand and move your new errors in the developmental process.
right arm to the right, you shift the center For adults improvement in functions in gravity
of gravity toward the right. Without adjusting is possible through awareness development
your action to reflect this change, you would and attending to the parameters oforientation,
lose balance quickly. But already in intending manipulation, and the timing of movement
to move the arm you may discover that you and function. It can be a long process of further
are already moving your head and body to adjust learning.
for the shift of the center of gravity. It is nor-
mally so effortless that there is no need to
focus attention or thought on the problem. Optimal Standing
While we can conceivably attribute this skill The human skeleton allows for considerable
to a fast reflexivity, the reflexive activity extension creating uprightness in contrast to
involved is too slow to prevent becoming unbal- most other animals, which either stand on four
anced. Thus the learned anticipation of the legs or like apes remain partially flexed when
shift of balance is believed to be essential. All seeking uprightness. For humans the balance
of this is normally outside of direct awareness, on small feet results in an unequaled freedom
Appendix II 29L
in movement especially in turning the body. organization must always respond to the need
Thus there is an advantage in the high degree for balance. No injury therefore is truly local
of instability in having such a high center of and the distribution of tonus in standing and
gravity. Young children in achieving upright- walking is determined by this need. The pattern
ness do so with a precision in orienting the may long outlast the injury. After the toe no
head and shoulders in relation to the pelvis and longer hurts the protective pattern remains.
legs that is often not possible in later life. And the main effect will be in the spine and
The musculature is relatively undeveloped and ribs where the forces from each side converge.
muscular override ofthe basic balancing orien- Reorganizing the pattern between the two
tation is not possible. In growing into adult- sides cannot usually be possible through con-
hood many children lose a clear orientation. scious correction unless the person has devel-
Muscular effort is then necessary to maintain oped a high level ofawareness.
balance. In an un-compromised orientation
the spinal segments align so that the forces We must also point out that the discovery of
(weights ofthe upper parts) are passed vertebra more optimal patterns in gravity can lead to
to vertebra along the tangent ofthe spinal improving the total state ofthe person involv-
curves in such a way that there are no shearing ing feelings of self worth, well being, adequacy
forces. Muscular tonus is minimized and the and potency. At the same time these shifts
rib cage and diaphragm are free for breathing. can lead to an improved personal expressiveness,
ability to make contact with others, and to
act with increased equanimity. The overall effect
Life's Contingencies is to enhance mobility, dexterity, strength,
Can Distort the Optimal and balance. It is here that we can best observe
Standing that mind-body functions as a whole.
Balance is so critical to life that it must be
achieved no matter how. Thus every small and
g. Inter-subjectivity as
Iarge trauma can affect the tonus ofthe re-
Mediated Through Body
flexive activity and thus the functional body
Contact
organization. Injuries also provoke protective
reactions in the musculature, which then We have described briefly some of the inter-
affect functional organization. For example, ventions that evoke changes in the CNS
an injury to the big toe of the right foot will patterns of mobilization. These changes are
produce pain in the toe at first. The person will greatly enhanced in using the techniques
then shift the way of bringing weight to the of Functional Integration by developing the
right foot to take pressure away from the toe. skills of inter-subjective contact. In other
This affects the use ofthe lower leg, but because words technique alone can be helpful but
the weight moves through the hip, the hip the process of calibrating one's self to the
and pelvis are shifted. The spine is now orga- person you make contact with can increase
nized to correspond to the changed right the effectiveness ofthe interaction greatly.
side as is the left leg, which needs to take more
of the weight. The head now must shift to From the experience ofthe person touched
keep the center of gravity over each foot but in there is a feeling of easiness and letting
a new pattern to reflect the differences in the tensions subside. The person may feel "that is
two sides. In other words the functional body where I would most like to be supported and
292
touched." Or, "The way I am moved feels like

it is my way to move." There is a sense of flowing
together or being danced in the movements.
From the experience ofthe practitioner there

is a sense of attuning yourself with the person.
Where is the easiest movement? Where.are
the limits at which resistance appears as just a
slight thickness in the moving? Where can
the connections through the skeleton be detect-
ed, and can you feel specific places in the spine
etc. where there is interference and discom-
fort? Can you influence the place detected at a
distance so that you and the person experience
a shift? One listens with the hands and the
whole body. One moves slowly, attending to each
shift in feeling. One can gently support at the
base ofthe head and evoke a subtle and power-
ful gentle lengthening ofthe spine, which
shifts the entire organization of the person in
gravity. One does this through creating the
Iengthening movement with the entire self.
The hands communicate but do not separately
make the movement.
4. Future Investigations
There are a number ofdiscoveries presented
here and in this book that come from the prac-
tice of various somatic methods, especially
the Feldenkrais Method. These discoveries are
practical and significant but remain in the
domain of the somatic practices. Further in-
vestigation ofthe various phenomena and
procedures is necessary to bring them into
wider recognition and use in the larger society.
With new tools of investigation such as brain
scanning it may be possible to demonstrate
that changes in the nervous system do accom-
pany the practices outlined above. Much
documentation through video and other media
can also be helpful. Experiments need to be
devised to demonstrate specific interventions
and the effectiveness of the self-learning model.
We look toward the future.
293
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299
Suggestions for Further Reading

Books that Awake You to New Thinking
- Paul Ekman, Emotions Revealed: Recognizing
Books by Moshe Faces ond Feelings to Improve Communication
Feldenkrais and Emotional Life, An Owl Book, 2004.
Awareness Through Movement: Harper
-
San Francisco, 1991 (Feldenkrais'basic move-
ment lessons).
Dynamics and
a New Biology
- Body and Mature Behavior: A Study of Anxi-
ety, Sex, Gravitation and Learning, Somatic - Scott Camazine et aI., Self-Organization in
Resources and Frog Ltd., 1949, 2005. Biological Sysfems, Princeton University Press,
- The Case of Nora: Body Awareness as Healing 2001.
Therapy,1977,1993. - Denis Noble, The Music of Life: Biology
- The Potent Self: A Study of Spontaneity and Beyond the Genes, Oxford University Press, 2OO6.
Compulsion: Somatic Resources and Frog, Ltd., - Ricard Sole and Brian Goodwin, Signs of
2002. Life: How Complexity Pervades Biology,Basic
Books.2OOO.
- Steven Strogatz, Sync: The Emerging Science

Books on Somatic ofSpontaneous Order, Penguin Books, 2004.
Practices
- Alan Fogel, The Psychophysiology ofSelf-
Intelligence in Animals with
Aw arene ss, WW. Norton, 2OO9.
Don Hanlon Johnson, Bone, Breath &

Small Nervous Systems
-
Gesture: Practices of Embodimenf, North - Frederick Prete, ed., ComplexWorldsfrom
Atlantic Books,1995. Simpler Nervous Systems, MIT Press, 2004.
- Don Hanlon Johnson, Body, Spirit and
Democracy, North Atlantic Books, I994.
Language and Animal
- Don Hanlon Johnson, editor, Groundworks: Intelligenee
Narratives of Embodiment, North Atlantic
Books.1997. - Roger Fouts, Next of Kin: What my Conversa-
tions with Chimpanzees Have Taught Me about
Intelligence, Compassion and Being Huma4
Brain Plasticity Viking Penguin, 1997.
- Norman Doidge, M.D., The Brain That - Irene Pepperberg, Alex and Me: How a Scien-
Chang e s I ts elf, Viking, 2OO7. tist and a Parrot Uncovered a Hidden World of
- Elkhonon Goldberg, The Wisdom Paradox, Animal Intellfgence - and Formed a Deep Bond
Free Press.2OO5. in the Process, Harper Collins. 2O08.
- Gerald Huether, ?fte Compassionate Brain:
How Empathy Creates Intelligence, Tntmpeter,
2006.
Philosophy of Moving
Bodies and Body-Mind
- Eugene Gendlin, Focusrng, Bantam Books,

Development and Affect 1981.
- Daniel Stern, M.D.,.Forms of Vitality: Explor- - Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, The Corporeal

ing Dynamic Experience in Psychology, the Arts, Turn: An Interdisciplinary Reader,
P sy cho the r ap y, and D ev e lop men t, Oxford, 2O IO. Imprint-Academic, 2OO9.
300
Sources for Materiels and

Information about the
Feldenkrals M€thod and
More
wwllr,AchejvihgExaellence. aotn
wnnri.feldenkrais,eornT,shopl'
www.f eldenkrEtgr,esoqteegrs.oqr
www"fel"denkrais,com The Feldenkrais G,uild@
of North.Amedea for furither information about
training classee, and practitioners.
301
Acknowledgments
This book came into existence over a period of five years in which
I struggled to understand and articulate a way of thinking about life
and humanness based on the work I came to love. I absorbed that
work from the major teacher in my life, Moshe Feldenkrais. The
basic themes of the book came from Feldenkrais. Theywere not easy
to understand and I had to put into a practice a methodology of
exploring a kind of unfamiliar self- knowledge. How did I learn to
move? How did perceiving arise? What did moving have to do with
thinking? How do I attend to myself in action and moving?
Mywife Lucia Schuette-Ginsburgbecame mypartner in dialog.

During our morningbreakfast we frequently explored questions
related to the evolving book. Without her loving help this book would
not have come into being. And I also thank her for her contributions
to the book including case studies and a discussion of essential de-
velopment in early life. We are each other's teacher.
I wish to especially acknowledge Francisco Varela, who had en-

couraged me to write and publish in professional journals before his
untimely death, and advised me not to try to be a philosopher.
There are a number of teachers I would also like to acknowledge

who guided me forward. ParticularlyMia Segal, GabyYaron,
RuthyAlon, Ron Kurtz, Stephen Wolinsky, CarolAgneesens,
Jack Canfi eld, Myriam Pfeffer, Eilat Almagor, Russell Delman,
Marjorie Barstow, Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, Emilie Conrad Da'oud,
and the many students around the world who were essential
in getting me to articulate my thinking clearly.
Some of the colleagues who helped in discussions or provided feed-

back include Roger Russell, Dennis Leri, Edward Dwelle, Ilana Nevill,
and Livia Calice.
Lastly I would like to profusely thank those who helped to create

a reality out of my manuscript, the book designers Iris Dresler,
and Gundula Prinz, the editor forAWAREing Press, James Beach,
Erhardt Pfotenhauerwho helpedwith cover design, and Ulrike
Edschmidt who made many important suggestions about design
and publication.
303
About the Authors

Carl Ginsburg, Ph. D., after beginning a career as a professor of
inorganic/physical chemistry joined the first professional training
in the Feldenkrais Method with Moshe Feldenkrais in 1975. He was
led to this break with his original chosen career through his experi-
ences in bioenergetics, Alexander work, Rolfing, body psychotherapy
and Feldenkrais movement. Much of this interest came about when
he sought help in solving his chronic back pain difficulties and then
reflected on his experiences recognizing his problem as a mind - body
phenomenon. In private practice for manyyears, he brought the
Feldenkrais Method to the Shake-A-Leg program, a program for spinal
cord injured adults, where he explored the possibilities of recovering
function through evocation of plasticity in whatever way possible
for the participants. In 1986 he began working in training new
Feldenkrais practitioners and eventually became educational direc-
tor of a number of training groups including groups in the US,
Germany, UK, Austria, Canada, and Italy and taught as guest trainer
in many programs including those in France, Sweden, Switzerland,
Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and Argentina. He has published
widely about aspects of the Feldenkrais Method and somatics in
general in the Feldenkrais Journal, Interface Journal, Somatics, the
Journal of Humanisttc Psychology, and the Journal of Consciousness
Studies. (See select publication list.)
Lucia Schuette-Ginsburg studied pedagogy and began a career as

a teacher for primary and secondary schools in Frankfurt, Germany,
and at the same time participated in the first Free School in Frank-
furt as a supporting parent. Later she had a position as a special
education teacher in the FranKurt School System helping hospital-
ized children continue learning. She became interested in the
Feldenkrais Method to help her son. Eventually she joined a training
program directed by Feldenkrais'first assistant and trainer Mia
Segal. Subsequently she developed a private practice in FranKurt
and went on to become an Assistant Trainer. She is now recognized
as a Trainer of the Feldenkrais Method. One of her major interests
is in working with young children with developmental problems.
304
"As a teacher of movement and awareness for twenty-five years, I

have from a practical perspective been workingwith the relations
between movement, sensation, perception, and cognition to guide
mypupils and clients to improved human functioning and increased
awareness. I have observed during this time with myself and many
others that improvement in one aspect, for example movement
coordination, translates to other areas of cognitive functioning such
as perception and cognition. I work most directly with attention and
sensory awareness, particularly as to how one senses one's self in
moving. To give a very simple example, I might ask what do you sense
in your ribs and spine as you shift your weight sitting from one side
to the other and how are the sensations different on the right and the
Ieft? As an alternative I might just gently bring my hand to the area
of interest while the person is moving, which awakens then the
sensory awareness for the person of aspects of moving normally
unattended to. Something then is perceived in the action that was
not available to one's conscious state. The interesting thing is that
these changes have so profound an effect. A person who has difficulty
with balance may find this functioning easier. Another person may
find a change in eyesight, and another an easing oflow back pain.
Others mayfindthat un-sensed and unacknowledged emotions may
arise." (C. Ginsburg, "Mind and Motion", Journal of Consciousness
Studies,vol. 8, no. 17, 2OOI, p. 65.)
The Intelligence of Moving Bodies is a genuinely enltghtening
work, a revelation to dnyone who ltghtly passes over experience
of hts or her body and is thereby actually unfamiltar with
the subtleti.es of bodi.ly experience. Gi.nsburg offers detailed
guidance through two dozen exercises that are based on the
work of Dr. Moshe Feldenkrais. exercise s that lead readers
to explore thei.r bodi"liy experience and to reach personal con-
clusions. An extensive survey of recent work in psychology
on feeling, percepti.on, and motion runs in tandem with the
exerclses and provides a much needed corrective to objective
models with'how the body works'.
MAXINE SHEETS-JOHNSTONE, AUTHOR OE THE PRIMACY OF
MOVEMENT &THE CORPOREAL TURN
I espectally enjoy the vast context, the strings ltnktng

this thtnking fo so many diverse, creative Beings
and the combination of humanness and rigorous inquiry ...
A true contibution for all of us ...
RUSSEL DELMAN, FOUNDER, THE EMBODIED LIFETM SCHOOL,
FELDENKRAIS TRAINER AND MEDITATION TEACHER
Here is a book that offers deep tnsight into the human psyche
from the perspecfive of how we move. It illuminates and
expands the work of Moshe Feldenkrais by showing how his basic
insights ore consis tent with new resedrch in human develop-
ment, movement sfudies, and system.s sciences. Engagingly
written and filled with insightful exercises, Ginsburg's book is
an elixir for both mind and body.
ALAN FOGEL, PROFESSOR OF DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY'
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH, A ROSEN METHOD BODYWORK PRACTITIONER,
AND AUTHOR OF THE PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGV AF SELF.AWARENESS..
REDISCOVERING THE LOST ART OF BODY SENSE.
$30.0t)
r sBN 978-0-9824235-A-9
AWAREing Press
Santa Fe, New Mexico
www.awareinqinc.net llillruilffi illilill tfiilltltfltl
Printed in Canada

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Library ofCongress Control Number: 2010918173

Feldenkrais@, Functional Integration@, Awareness Through Movement@,

Published by AWAREing Press

So Does the Bioiogical System as a Whole 39

6 THE CONTRAST OF TWO BASIC ATTITUDES .93

A NEW LOOK AT INFANCY: SELF-LEARNING L29

AFFECT: A HIDDEN DIMENSION AND

The examples of music, painting and dance t52

Affect and Dance: Bodies in Movement .................... ..... 165

L2 INTRODUCTION TO PART III ......... ................ L73

The Discovery of a Learning Pathway ............................. 176

13 THE MINDSET OF SELF-LEARNING ......... .... 186

Perception, Movement, Space:

17 THE INTERSECTION OF SCIENCE AND EXPERIENCE.. 249

APPENDICES / REFERENCES 277

3. Inter-subjectivity as Mediated Through Body Contact ............... 291

4. Future Investigations ................ ............-..........292

relationship to the experience of being alive. Limited as I was, I sus-

moved, but an exploration of our own kinesthetic experience devel-

ing movement would affect everything else in ourselves. Nothing in

process. Somehow in our western culture we have tended to lose a liv-

* See Frederick Prete, (ed,.), Complex Worlds

organisms at vastly different levels of complexity. The complexity it-

To do the work of the Feldenkrais Method required that I

and neuroscience. Among them were Aaharon Katchalsky (Katsir),

Neurophysiology Giacomo Ftizzolati at the University of Parma and

mental psychologist Esther Thelen; philosopher and psychotherapist

knowledge, which require the practice of specific methods of investi-

begins without words but becomes languaging in relation to living in

A Note for Readers: The book is organized with a developmental sequence of

present himself in front of the gathered students. He wants to under-

I Sir Francis Crick, The Astonishing Hypothesis, Touchstone Press (1994), p. 3.

living systems? Scientists still argue about such conceptual proposi-

To begin with beginnings and origins is not easy. As adults

point of view) or consciousness, which Descartes associated with mind

We begin with the act of observing, which we will inves-

this that some parts of yourself make contact and others

Now notice if there is a different sensation of contact be-

As you continue to lie like this notice your breathing and

Rest a moment. Sense any changes in your breathing.

If you find gentle change with this practice, use it again to

Find a place to sit for a moment quietly. Sit on the floor

When you have become quiet enough to observe, notice

Now shift your question. This time ask yourself, to where

In the above process it is not important to find answers;

Whatever stands out in the attention, stands out against a

Inside and Outside

In the last part of this exploration, take a moment, when

These explorations may reveal that the sense of inside and

thing of a feeling of moving, which stops immediately on correcting

Figure la: Boundary, Distinction, Crosslng leveis and Loop

Creating aDlsttnetlon and a Boundory

II Dividing a space creates a boundary. If one side is the marked state,

Figure tb: Boundory o.nd Crosslng

Figure tc:The Basic Rules of Combinlng Sreps

One markinside the otherindicates to cross and cross again. This

Fiortre trl.Rp-entrv ond .9elf Refercnce

Self Reference can easily lead to paradox in two-value yes no,

Spencer-Brown noted such a paradox exists hidden within

We substitute +l for x: Then substitute -l for x:

We obtain for each substitution +1 = -l or -l = +I.